



# The golden age of hacking

Malware analysis

Pen-test methods

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Portal:Computer\\_security](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Portal:Computer_security)

# Malware analysis template

[http://www.counterhack.net/malware\\_template.html](http://www.counterhack.net/malware_template.html)

LAB 6.5/6.6

LAB 6.7

Static  
analysis

Activity	Observed Results
Load specimen onto victim machine	
Run antivirus program	
Research antivirus results and file names	
Conduct strings analysis	
Look for scripts	
Conduct binary analysis	
Disassemble code	
Reverse-compile code	
Monitor file changes	
Monitor file integrity	
Monitor process activity	
Monitor local network activity	
Scan for open ports remotely	
Scan for vulnerabilities remotely	
Sniff network activity	
Check promiscuous mode locally	
Check promiscuous mode remotely	
Monitor registry activity	
Run code with debugger	


Dynamic  
analysis

# Forensic Analysis of an unknown file

- Before you begin check if you are allowed to examine!
- Question to answer - what are the true functions and capabilities of the file/program?
- Deep knowledge about the program may give additional benefits as
  - Anti-... methods
  - Damage control know how
  - Info about the creator
- Executable file formats
  - [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Executable\\_file\\_formats](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Executable_file_formats)
  - ELF, PE, COFF (.exe, executable rights)
  - Object code (.o)
  - Shared libraries (.dll, .so)

# Executable file formats

- Symbols
  - Defined symbols, which allow it to be called by other modules
  - Undefined symbols, which call the other modules where these symbols are defined
  - Local symbols, used internally within the object file to facilitate relocation
- Linker
  - Linking of libs and obj files resolving symbols
  - Arranging objects in programs address space
  - Relocation of code
- What is relocation?
  - Combine all the objects sections like .code (.text), .data, .bss, etc. to a single executable
  - Replacing symbolic references or names of libraries with actual usable (runnable) addresses in memory




# An applications different versions

- Source code
- Debug binary
  - Contains debug info
- Regular binary
  - Dynamic linked libraries
- Regular binary
  - Static linked libraries
- Stripped binary
  - Symbols are removed

Going from source code to a binary executable



From: <http://threatexpert.com> 2009-05-14



# Automatic malware analysis

- Scan malware with different AntiVirus agents
  - If there is an alert, research AV manufacturers websites
  - If analysis is already done – 90% of your job may be done 😊
    - AV report can be faulty, malcode may be of a new variant etc.
- Web based static and dynamic analyze
  - <http://www.virustotal.com>
  - <http://www.sunbeltsecurity.com> - ThreatTrack Security
  - <http://metascan-online.com/>
- Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
  - Mandiant IOC Editor and Finder
  - iDefense MAP (Malcode Analyst Pac)
  - FTK – Cerberus
- Many other various solutions – Search! Landscape is changing constantly
- [ethical-hacker.net](http://ethical-hacker.net) > Blog (Tools and Techniques)
  - [http://ethicalhackernet.blogspot.com/2008\\_04\\_01\\_archive.html](http://ethicalhackernet.blogspot.com/2008_04_01_archive.html)

- Open
- Launch in Content Viewer
- Open With... ▶
- Create Bookmark...

File Edit View Evidence Filter Tools Manage Help

Filter: Cerberus Score Filter Manager...

Explore Overview Email Graphics Bookmarks Live Search Index Search Volatile

Case Overview

- db (0 / 29)
- dbb (0 / 2)
- dbx (0 / 8)
- ddb (0 / 1)
- default (0 / 1)
- desklinc (0 / 4)
- dic (0 / 1)
- dll (4 / 4)
- doc (0 / 13)
- dtd (0 / 5)
- enc (0 / 1)
- evt (0 / 3)
- exe (2 / 2)
- gif (0 / 239)
- htm (0 / 145)
- html (0 / 12)
- htt (0 / 3)
- idx (0 / 4)
- ind (0 / 8)

File Content

Hex Text Filtered Natural

Score: 30 EB9ECF568945B60E76396D504AD6094D

**+/- Cerberus Score**

NETWORK	0
PERSISTENCE	0
PROCESS	+4
CRYPTO	+2
PROTECTED STORAGE	0
REGISTRY	+2
SECURITY	0
OBFUSCATION	+20
PROCESS EXECUTION SPACE	+2
BAD SIGNED	0
EMBEDDED DATA	0
BAD	0
SIGNED	0
<b>Final Score</b>	<b>30</b>

File Content Properties Hex Interpreter

File List

Display Time Zone: W. Europe Daylight Time (From local)

Name	Item #	Path	Category	C.	Cerberus Sc...	Cerberus - Network	Cerberus - Persistence	Cerberus - Process
Dd5.exe	3668	precious.E01/Partition 1...	Exe	30	N	N	Y	
Dd1.exe	3666	precious.E01/Partition 1...	Exe	30	N	N	Y	

Loaded: 2 Filtered: 2 Total: 2 Highlighted: 1 Checked: 208 Total LSize: 1753 KB

precious.E01/Partition 1/The Precious [NTFS]/[root]/RECYCLER/S-1-5-21-1801674531-1177238915-725345543-1004/Dd5.exe

Ready Overview Tab Filter: [None]

# Cerberus Stage 1 Score

Attribute	Threat Score	Description
Network	+1	Imports networking functions.
Persistence	+4	Indicates signs of persistent behavior. For example, the ability to keep a binary running across computer restarts.
Process	+4	Imports functions to programmatically interact with processes. For example, reading or writing into a process's memory, or injecting code into another process.
Crypto	+2	Imports Microsoft Cryptographic Libraries. For example, the ability to encrypt and decrypt data.
Protected Storage	+5	Imports functions used to access protected storage. For example, Internet Explorer stores a database for form-filling in protected storage.
Registry	+2	Imports functions used to access or change values in the registry.
Security	+4	Imports functions used to modify user tokens. For example, attempting to clone a security token to impersonate another logged on user.
Obfuscation	+20	Contains a packer signature, contains sections of high entropy, or imports a low number of functions.
Process Execution Space	+2	Unusual activity in the Process Execution Space header. For example, a zero length raw section, unrealistic linker time, or the file size doesn't match the Process Execution Space header.
Bad Signed	+20	Contains a signature but the signature is bad.
Embedded Data	+5	Contains an embedded executable code.
Bad / Bit-Bad	+20	Contains an IRC or shellcode signature.
Signed / Bit Signed	-20	Contains a valid signature.




# ELF (Executable and Linking Format)

- ELF header

Tells us basic info and where everything is located in the file

Can be read directly from the first `e_ehsize` (default: 52) bytes of the file

Fields of interest: `e_entry`, `e_phoff`, `e_shoff`, and the sizes given. `e_entry` specifies the location of `_start`, `e_phoff` shows us where the array of program headers lies in relation to the start of the executable, and `e_shoff` shows us the same for the section headers



```
/* ELF File Header */
typedef struct
{
    unsigned char e_ident[EI_NIDENT]; /* Magic number and other info */
    Elf32_Half    e_type;              /* Object file type */
    Elf32_Half    e_machine;          /* Architecture */
    Elf32_Word    e_version;          /* Object file version */
    Elf32_Addr    e_entry;            /* Entry point virtual address */
    Elf32_Off     e_phoff;            /* Program header table file offset */
    Elf32_Off     e_shoff;            /* Section header table file offset */
    Elf32_Word    e_flags;            /* Processor-specific flags */
    Elf32_Half    e_ehsize;           /* ELF header size in bytes */
    Elf32_Half    e_phentsize;        /* Program header table entry size */
    Elf32_Half    e_phnum;            /* Program header table entry count */
    Elf32_Half    e_shentsize;        /* Section header table entry size */
    Elf32_Half    e_shnum;            /* Section header table entry count */
    Elf32_Half    e_shstrndx;        /* Section header string table index */
} Elf32_Ehdr;
```

# ELF (Executable and Linking Format)

- ELF Program segment headers
  - Describe the **segments** of the program used at run-time
  - In a typical ELF executable usually end-to-end, forming an array of structs
  - The interesting fields in this structure are p\_offset, p\_filesz, and p\_memsz
- ELF Section headers
  - Describe various named **sections** of the binary as a file
  - Each section has an entry in the section headers array
- HT Editor (<http://hte.sourceforge.net/>)
  - Examine and modify everything in an ELF file (PE files also), disassemble etc.

```
/* Program segment header */
typedef struct
{
    Elf32_Word  p_type;          /* Segment type */
    Elf32_Off   p_offset;       /* Segment file offset */
    Elf32_Addr  p_vaddr;        /* Segment virtual address */
    Elf32_Addr  p_paddr;        /* Segment physical address */
    Elf32_Word  p_filesz;       /* Segment size in file */
    Elf32_Word  p_memsz;        /* Segment size in memory */
    Elf32_Word  p_flags;        /* Segment flags */
    Elf32_Word  p_align;        /* Segment alignment */
} Elf32_Phdr;
```

```
/* Section header */
typedef struct
{
    Elf32_Word  sh_name;        /* Section name (string tbl index) */
    Elf32_Word  sh_type;        /* Section type */
    Elf32_Word  sh_flags;       /* Section flags */
    Elf32_Addr  sh_addr;        /* Section virtual addr at execution */
    Elf32_Off   sh_offset;      /* Section file offset */
    Elf32_Word  sh_size;        /* Section size in bytes */
    Elf32_Word  sh_link;        /* Link to another section */
    Elf32_Word  sh_info;        /* Additional section information */
    Elf32_Word  sh_addralign;    /* Section alignment */
    Elf32_Word  sh_entsize;     /* Entry size if section holds table */
} Elf32_Shdr;
```

# ELF Object File Format

Sections in object code is linked into the executable

One or more sections maps to a segment in the executable

## Some of the sections (from elf.pdf)

**.bss** This section holds uninitialized data that contribute to the program's memory image. By definition, the system initializes the data with zeros when the program begins to run.

**.comment** This section holds version control information.

**.data and .data1** These sections hold initialized data that contribute to the program's memory image.

**.debug** This section holds information for symbolic debugging. The contents are unspecified. All section names with the prefix `.debug` are reserved for future use.

**.dynamic** This section holds dynamic linking information

**.hash** This section holds a symbol hash table.

**.line** This section holds line number information for symbolic debugging, which describes the correspondence between the source program and the machine code. The contents are unspecified.


**.rodata** These sections hold read-only data that typically contribute to a `.rodata1` non-writable segment in the process image.

**.shstrtab** This section holds section names.

**.strtab** This section holds strings, most commonly the strings that represent the names associated with symbol table entries.

**.symtab** This section holds a symbol table, as "Symbol Table"

**.text** This section holds the "text," or executable instructions, of a program.



# Sweetscape 010 editor - ELF template

The screenshot shows the 010 Editor interface with the following components:

- Workspace:** Shows the file path `C:\data\HDA\Digitalbrott_och_eSäkerhet\forensics_2\labs_mm\challenge`.
- Hex Editor:** Displays memory addresses from `0000h` to `00B0h`. The hex data is `7F 45 4C 46 01 01 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 2D 00` at `0000h`. The ASCII view shows `.ELF.....` at `0000h`.
- Inspector:** Shows the structure of the selected ELF header:

Type	Value
Signed Byte	127
Unsigned Byte	127
Signed Short	17791
Unsigned Short	17791
Signed Int	1179403647
Unsigned Int	1179403647
Signed Int64	282579962709375
Unsigned Int64	282579962709375
Float	13073.37
Double	1.39613051777803e-309
String	!ELFrrr
Unicode	難読ä r
DOSDATE	11/31/2014
DOSTIME	08:43:62
FILETIME	11/24/1601 01:26:36
OLETIME	
time_t	05/17/2007 12:07:27
- Template Results:** A table showing the structure of the ELF header and program header table:

Name	Value	Start	Size	Color
struct FILE file		0h	F4h	Fg: Bg:
struct ELF_HEADER_elf_header		0h	34h	Fg: Bg:
struct e_ident_t_e_ident		0h	10h	Fg: Bg:
enum e_type32_e_e_type	ET_EXEC...	10h	2h	Fg: Bg:
enum e_machine32_e_e_machine	EM_386 (3)	12h	2h	Fg: Bg:
enum e_version32_e_e_version	EV_CUR...	14h	4h	Fg: Bg:
Elf32_Addr_e_entry_START_ADDRESS	134513600	18h	4h	Fg: Bg:
Elf32_Off_e_phoff_PROGRAM_HEADER_OFFSET_IN_FILE	52	1Ch	4h	Fg: Bg:
Elf32_Off_e_shoff_SECTION_HEADER_OFFSET_IN_FILE	8728	20h	4h	Fg: Bg:
Elf32_Word_e_flags	0	24h	4h	Fg: Bg:
Elf32_Half_e_ehsize_ELF_HEADER_SIZE	52	28h	2h	Fg: Bg:
Elf32_Half_e_phentsize_PROGRAM_HEADER_ENTRY_SIZE_IN_FILE	32	2Ah	2h	Fg: Bg:
Elf32_Half_e_phnum_NUMBER_OF_PROGRAM_HEADER_ENTRIES	6	2Ch	2h	Fg: Bg:
Elf32_Half_e_shentsize_SECTION_HEADER_ENTRY_SIZE	40	2Eh	2h	Fg: Bg:
Elf32_Half_e_shnum_NUMBER_OF_SECTION_HEADER_ENTRIES	34	30h	2h	Fg: Bg:
Elf32_Half_e_shtrndx_STRING_TABLE_INDEX	31	32h	2h	Fg: Bg:
struct PROGRAM_HEADER_TABLE program_header_table		34h	C0h	Fg: Bg:
struct program_table_entry32_t_program_table_element[6]		34h	C0h	Fg: Bg:
struct program_table_entry32_t_program_table_element[0]		34h	20h	Fg: Bg:
struct program_table_entry32_t_program_table_element[1]		54h	20h	Fg: Bg:
struct program_table_entry32_t_program_table_element[2]		74h	20h	Fg: Bg:
struct program_table_entry32_t_program_table_element[3]		94h	20h	Fg: Bg:
struct program_table_entry32_t_program_table_element[4]		B4h	20h	Fg: Bg:
struct program_table_entry32_t_program_table_element[5]		D4h	20h	Fg: Bg:

# Static analysis methods (Linux)

- Hash the file
- File
  - Properties and type of file etc.
- Strings
- Hexdump
- Nm
  - List symbol info
- Ldd
  - View shared objects which is linked in at runtime
  - Listed in the .interp section
- Readelf, elfdump, objdump

```
hjo@lnx:~/ $ file winkill
winkill: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel
80386, version 1 (SYSV), for GNU/Linux
2.0.0, dynamically linked (uses shared libs),
for GNU/Linux 2.0.0, not stripped
```

```
hjo@lnx:~/ $ nm winkill
...
08048784 T parse_args
08049c78 D port
          U printf@@GLIBC_2.0
08048760 T usage
          U usleep@@GLIBC_2.0
...
D The symbol is in the initialized .data section
T The symbol is in the .text (code) section
U The symbol is unknown
...
```

```
hjo@lnx:~/ $ ldd winkill
linux-gate.so.1 => (0xffffe000)
libc.so.6 => /lib/tls/i686/cmov/libc.so.6
(0xb7e36000)
/lib/ld-linux.so.2 (0xb7f70000)
```

# Readelf

**hjo@lnx:~/\$ readelf**

**Usage: readelf <option(s)> elf-file(s)**

**Display information about the contents of ELF format files**

**Options are:**

- a --all**           Equivalent to: **-h -l -S -s -r -d -V -A -l**
- h --file-header**   Display the ELF file header
- l --program-headers** Display the program headers
  - segments**       An alias for **--program-headers**
- S --section-headers** Display the sections' header
  - sections**       An alias for **--section-headers**
- g --section-groups** Display the section groups
- t --section-details** Display the section details
- e --headers**       Equivalent to: **-h -l -S**
- s --syms**           Display the symbol table
  - symbols**       An alias for **--syms**
- n --notes**         Display the core notes (if present)
- r --relocs**        Display the relocations (if present)
- u --unwind**        Display the unwind info (if present)
- d --dynamic**       Display the dynamic section (if present)
- V --version-info**   Display the version sections (if present)
- A --arch-specific**   Display architecture specific information (if any).
- D --use-dynamic**    Use the dynamic section info when displaying symbols
- x --hex-dump=<number>** Dump the contents of section **<number>**
- w[liaprmfFsoR]** or  
**--debug-dump[=line,=info,=abbrev,=pubnames,=aranges,=macro,=frames,=str,=loc,=Ranges]**  
Display the contents of DWARF2 debug sections
- l --histogram**      Display histogram of bucket list lengths
- W --wide**           Allow output width to exceed 80 characters
- @<file>**            Read options from **<file>**
- H --help**           Display this information
- v --version**        Display the version number of readelf

**Report bugs to <URL:<http://www.sourceware.org/bugzilla/>>**

# Objdump and HT Editor

```
[*] select mode
- hex
- text
- disasm/x86
- some statictext
- elf - unix exe/link format
  - elf/header
  - elf/section headers
  - elf/program headers
  - elf/image
  - elf/symbol table .dynsym (4)
  - elf/symbol table .symtab (27)
  - elf/relocation table .rel.got>
  - elf/relocation table .rel.plt>
```

HT Editor - <http://hte.sourceforge.net/>

- Provides readelf functions and further probing of contents

## • Disassemble

-d, --disassemble     Display assembler contents of executable sections  
-D, --disassemble-all   Display assembler contents of all sections

- Convert from binary to assembly code
  - Dead listing
- `hjo@lnx:~/ $ objdump -d winkill`


```
08048874 <main>:
8048874: 55          push %ebp
8048875: 89 e5      mov  %esp,%ebp
8048877: 81 ec b8 3a 00 00  sub  $0x3ab8,%esp
804887d: c7 45 e8 98 3a 00 00  movl  $0x3a98,0xfffffe8(%ebp)
8048884: 83 7d 08 01  cmpl $0x1,0x8(%ebp)
8048888: 7f 0e      jg   8048898 <main+0x24>
804888a: 8b 45 0c   mov  0xc(%ebp),%eax
804888d: 8b 10     mov  (%eax),%edx
804888f: 52       push %edx
8048890: e8 cb fe ff ff  call 8048760 <usage>
8048895: 83 c4 04   add  $0x4,%esp
...
```

```
08048760 <usage>:
8048760: 55          push %ebp
8048761: 89 e5      mov  %esp,%ebp
8048763: 8b 45 08   mov  0x8(%ebp),%eax
8048766: 50       push %eax
8048767: 68 80 8b 04 08  push $0x8048b80
804876c: e8 97 fe ff ff  call 8048608
<printf@plt>
...
```

This is an excerpt from the output!

# Further analysis!

- RDF chapters 13, 14 and 15 are elite!
- Ch 14 deals with
  - Advanced static analysis options
  - Advanced dynamic analysis options
  - Unlink an unpacked tmp file
    - Open and execve the deleted tmp file
  - Generate core file (process dump)
    - `ulimit -c unlimited` (to enable core)
    - `kill -s SIGSEV <PID>` (from another console), other signals which action is core should do aswell, SIGSEV = Invalid memory reference
    - Check out the Linux manual: `man signal`
  - Examine core files with `gdb`
  - Packers
  - RCE etc. ...





# Further analysis...

- Different methods to recover a unpackable packed binary...

- Debugfs

- ext2/ext3 file system debugger
- Similar to ifind and icat as in SITIC course exercise but on a deleted file

- Strace hexdump – output all

- In combination with hexeditor (cut and paste) rebuild binary

- /proc pseudo file system

- `ls -al /proc/<PID>/`
- `# man proc`
- Copy the exe link

- Packers as UPX(nrv/ucl)


- First try to unpack with packer versions
- Note that programmer may have "edited" away traces of used packers with a hexeditor

- Crypt-packers as Burneye

```
hjo@lnx:~/ $ ls -al /proc/29279/
dr-xr-xr-x 5 hjo hjo 0 Feb  6 12:56 .
dr-xr-xr-x 82 root root 0 Nov  7 11:49 ..
-r----- 1 root root 0 Feb  6 12:57 auxv
--w----- 1 root root 0 Feb  6 12:57 clear_refs
-r--r--r-- 1 root root 0 Feb  6 12:56 cmdline
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 0 Feb  6 12:57 coredump_filter
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 Feb  6 12:57 cwd -> /
-r----- 1 root root 0 Feb  6 12:57 environ
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 Feb  6 12:57 exe ->
/tmp/upxRandName (deleted)
dr-x----- 2 root root 0 Feb  6 12:57 fd
dr-x----- 2 root root 0 Feb  6 12:57 fdinfo
-r----- 1 root root 0 Feb  6 12:57 limits
-r--r--r-- 1 root root 0 Feb  6 12:57 maps
-rw----- 1 root root 0 Feb  6 12:57 mem
-r--r--r-- 1 root root 0 Feb  6 12:57 mounts
-r----- 1 root root 0 Feb  6 12:57 mountstats
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 0 Feb  6 12:57 oom_adj
-r--r--r-- 1 root root 0 Feb  6 12:57 oom_score
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 Feb  6 12:57 root -> /
-r--r--r-- 1 root root 0 Feb  6 12:57 smaps
-r--r--r-- 1 root root 0 Feb  6 12:56 stat
-r--r--r-- 1 root root 0 Feb  6 12:57 statm
-r--r--r-- 1 root root 0 Feb  6 12:56 status
dr-xr-xr-x 3 hjo hjo 0 Feb  6 12:57 task
-r--r--r-- 1 root root 0 Feb  6 12:57 wchan
```

# Burneye's three layers of executable protection

- Scrambles the code in the executable thru **obfuscated** instructions
- **Encryption** of the binary program
- **System fingerprint** – will only run on certain computers



# Static and dynamic verification

- Verify difference/similarity between examined file and assumed source code/binary in "the wild"
- Compare output
  - With diff or other line by line tool
  - Functions with nm
  - Strings
  - Assembly code side by side
  - Ssdeep, nwdiff, bindiff (binary)
- strace, ltrace
- Gdb/ddd or other tools as IDA Pro, OllyDbg
  - <http://www.gnu.org/software/ddd/>
  - <http://www.hex-rays.com/idapro/>
  - <http://www.ollydbg.de/>
- Practical usage testing and monitoring
  - Isof, netstat, wireshark etc. (live response methods)



**IDA Pro**




# IDA Pro


The screenshot displays the IDA Pro interface with several windows open:

- Assembly Window:** Shows assembly code for a function. Key instructions include `ds:DeleteFileA`, `hTemplateFile`, `duFlagsAndAttributes`, `duCreationDisposition`, `lpSecurityAttributes`, `duShareMode`, `duDesiredAccess`, `lpFileName`, `CreateFileA`, and `DeleteFileA`. Comments include `; CODE XREF: sub_3737681C+B3fj` and `; CODE XREF: sub_3737681C+C5fj`.
- Names Window:** Lists symbols such as `StartAddress`, `DllMain(x,x,x)`, `memset`, `strcpy`, `strlen`, `memcpy`, `strcat`, `strcmp`, `_CRT_INIT(x,x,x)`, `start`, `_initherm`, `RegDeleteKeyA`, `RegQueryValueA`, `RegSetValueExA`, `RegEnumValueA`, `RegCloseKey`, `RegCreateKeyExA`, `RegEnumKeyExA`, and `RegOpenKeyExA`.
- Strings Window:** Lists strings from the `.data` section, including `Working Set`, `User Time`, `Privileged Time`, `Processor Time`, `Process`, `Counter 009`, and `software\microsoft\windows nt\source`.
- Graph Window (WinGraph32 - Xrefs to CloseHandle):** A control flow graph showing multiple subroutines (e.g., `sub_37376270`, `sub_37379623`, `sub_37377463`, `sub_37373983`, `sub_37374592`, `sub_373747DF`) all converging on the `CloseHandle` function.
- Callers and Callee:** Shows the caller `.text:373764F1` calling `DllMain(x,x,x)` at `.text:37376808`.
- Loaded Type Libraries:** Lists `vc6bwin` (Visual C++ v6 <windows.h>).
- List of applied library modules:** Shows `vc32ntf` (Applied, 1, Microsoft Visual C++ 6.0).
- Program Segmentation:** Shows memory segments for `.text`, `.idata`, `.rdata`, and `.data`.
- List of problems:** Shows `BADSTACK` errors at various addresses.

# Dynamic analysis



Victim Machine



These four programs could be installed on a single box, or separate, dedicated machines.

## VMware aware malware

As for example Blue and Red Pill

<http://www.invisiblethings.org>

<http://bluepillproject.org>

## Debugger aware malware

PEB (Process Environment Block) struct got a member variable:

UCHAR BeingDebugged;

Malware check itself if being debugged!

```
int swallow_redpill () {
    unsigned char m[2+4], rpill[] = "\x0f\x01\x0d\x00\x00\x00\x00\xc3";
    *((unsigned*)&rpill[3]) = (unsigned)m;
    ((void(*)())&rpill)();
    return (m[5]>0xd0) ? 1 : 0;
}
```

# Pen-test methods



Ongoing



2005/2006

Open Information  
Systems Security Group


2003

NIST Special Publication 800-42  
Guideline on Network Security Testing

# Types of security tests


## Security Test Types

"Security Testing" is an umbrella term to encompass all forms and styles of security tests from the intrusion to the hands-on audit. The application of the methodology from this manual will not deter from the chosen type of testing.



# Approach & Methodology

# ISSAF





# OSSTMM 2.2

## Sex områden ingår i Osstmm

Open source security testing methodology manual, Osstmm, är en metod för säkerhetsgranskningar. Den presenterades i början av 2001 av Pete Herzog.

Syftet var att ge säkerhetsgranskare en gemensam grund att arbeta från och samtidigt ge kunder möjlighet att veta vad de kan förvänta sig av ett test.

Följande områden behandlas i Osstmm:

**1 Informationssäkerhet** - Vilken typ av information rörande företaget som finns tillgängligt på internet.


**2 Processäkerhet** - Här testas hur personalberoende hanteras.

**3 Informationsteknik säkerhet** - Hur olika typer av nätverksutrustning, program med mera ska testas.

**4 Kommunikation** - Tester av faxar, modem och pbx:er.

**5 Trådlös säkerhet** - Trådlösa accesspunkter, handhållna datorer, infrarött, rfid och så vidare.

**6 Fysisk säkerhet** - Områdes- och byggnadsgranskning. Hur motståndskraftigt är kontoret mot fysiska angrepp.



Kostnad och tid för olika säkerhetsteststekniker enligt Osstmm.

Billigast är sårbarhetsskanning (1). Genom att verifiera så kallade "false positives" får vi en "säkerhetsskanning" (2).

Penetrationstester (3) är ett målorienterat arbete för att komma åt ett system eller nätverk. Riskanalyser (4) och säkerhetsgranskningar (5) är vanliga sätt att granska säkerheten och har inte så mycket med penetrationstester att göra. Etisk hackning (6) definieras som ett penetrationstest utan måldefinition. Säkerhetstester (7) kan beskrivas som ett fullskaligt penetrationstest.

# Support docs for ordering a pen-test (mainly for Swedish organizations)

- Så beställer du det perfekta penetrationstestet och säkerhetstestet
  - Två artiklar - 2008 och 2013 från IDG
- Säkerhetspolisen (SÄPO)
  - Säkerhetsskyddad upphandling – en vägledning - från 2009
  - För myndighet (staten, kommun eller landsting)
  - Vad är säkerhetsskydd?
  - Processen säkerhetsskyddad upphandling
- By searching the Internet there is a lot of guides and documents available which describe this process in detail
- Choosing the right vulnerability scanner for your organization (report)
  - The Magazine Information Week