ANNUAL EDITIONS

Race and Ethnic Relations 07/08

Sixteenth Edition

EDITOR

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Catholic University of America

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Editors/Advisory Board

Members of the Advisory Board are instrumental in the final selection of articles for each edition of ANNUAL EDITIONS. Their review of articles for content, level, currentness, and appropriateness provides critical direction to the editor and staff. We think that you will find their careful consideration well reflected in this volume.

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Preface

In publishing ANNUAL EDITIONS we recognize the enormous role played by the magazines, newspapers, and journals of the public press in providing current, first-rate educational information in a broad spectrum of interest areas. Many of these articles are appropriate for students, researchers, and professionals seeking accurate, current material to help bridge the gap between principles and theories and the real world. These articles, however, become more useful for study when those of lasting value are carefully collected, organized, indexed, and reproduced in a low-cost format, which provides easy and permanent access when the material is needed. That is the role played by ANNUAL EDITIONS.

The explosion of journalistic accounts, the growing legitimacy of ethnicity and race as salient—if not significant—factors related to economic globalization, and the superpower status of the United States of America all engage our attention toward and understanding of race and ethnicity. Experiences of race and ethnicity are aspects of personal identity sustained by societies, governmental policies, economics, and religion, as well as the historical narratives of meaning; all of which are embedded in the *mentalities* that influence personal and group identity. The reader is invited to observe race and ethnicity in the United States; and to discern the development of regimes that have been applied to this socially and economically mobile and culturally pluralistic and immigrant-receiving country.

Nearly a hundred years after the U.S. Supreme Court declared the civil rights laws passed by Congress after the 'War Between the States' unconstitutional, the Court addressed the issues again in 1954 in *Brown v. Topeka Board of Education.* A decade later, in the mid-1960s, Congress stepped up to the plate and passed civil and voting rights laws and immigration reform by the mid-1960s. The universal proclamation of the America Dream found new vigor, but engaged new challenges of pluralism and diversity. Though related to personal/individual rights, cultural rights are clearly associated with a group's participation and its respected access to its part within the public and social affairs. Given its size—and the historical legacy of slavery, conquest, and immigration—the contemporary reality of the United States remains rooted in the legacies of many cultures and the ongoing drama of evocations of race and ethnicity oscillate between celebrative proclamations and lamentations and outrages based on experiences of oppression and unfairness. Such is the destiny of a large society comprised of many cultures and the negotiation of boundaries among groups in a political order committed to personal liberties and civil rights. Thus the issue and realities of racial and ethnic diversity are patiently real and woven into the very nature of the country. Beyond the personal claims of liberties and rights stand other questions: How well are we negotiating relations among and between groups? How well are we shaping and sharing the burdens and benefits of social change and economic affluences? How we make such social choices determines the character of our common life.

This collection was designed to assist you in understanding ethnic and racial pluralism in the United States in a global age. Unit 1, acquaints the reader with case-studies that are illustrative of the contemporary scene at the micro levels. Each fine grain case-study reveals the specificity and particularity of race and ethnic intersections. Unit 2 addresses the specific historical characteristics of diversity and delineates significant features of American-diversity related to slavery and color consciousness and immigration. The ongoing, yet changing impacts and characteristics of a new American demography are broached in Unit 3. The historical and contemporary experiences of immigration are covered in Unit 4.

The uniquely American expressions of indigenous groups in this modern society are reviewed in Unit 5. Very large and historically marginated populations are treated in the selections found in Unit 6 and Unit 7, which focus respectively on African Americans and Hispanic/Latino Americans.

Unit 8 explores various dimensions of the Asian American experience. Unit 9 extends the discussion of ethnic identity to Americans of Eastern European and Mediterranean background and offers comparative perceptions and perspectives of ethnic Americans on contemporary issues. Selections in Unit 10 illustrate how the most basic legal principles of a society, and especially the U.S. Congress and Supreme Court's interpretation of them, are significant for the delineation of race and ethnic relations. The intersection of the aspirations for inclusion and the realities of economic, gender, and racial claims reveal a pattern of cultural pluralism and contemporary challenges to the promise of American liberties. This unit presents selections of articles that address approaches to understanding the origins of racialism and strife. It focuses on the religious and ethnic origins that shape the consciousness of group affinities and give rise to political and governmental mobilizations of regimes.

In addition to the annotated table of contents, this edition of *Annual Editions: Race and Ethnic Relations* contains a list of Internet References that can be used to further explore article topics and a Topic Guide to reference articles by subject. Readers may have input into the next edition of *Annual Editions: Race and Ethnic Relations* by completing and returning the prepaid article rating form in the back of the book. Thank you.

John A. Kromkowski
Editor

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UNIT 4
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UNIT 5
Indigenous Ethnic Groups

The concepts in bold italics are developed in the article. For further expansion, please refer to the Topic Guide and the Index.

UNIT 6
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

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The concepts in bold italics are developed in the article. For further expansion, please refer to the Topic Guide and the Index.

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The concepts in bold italics are developed in the article. For further expansion, please refer to the Topic Guide and the Index.

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The concepts in bold italics are developed in the article. For further expansion, please refer to the Topic Guide and the Index.

The concepts in bold italics are developed in the article. For further expansion, please refer to the Topic Guide and the Index.

Topic Guide

This topic guide suggests how the selections in this book relate to the subjects covered in your course. You may want to use the topics listed on these pages to search the Web more easily.

On the following pages a number of Web sites have been gathered specifically for this book. They are arranged to reflect the units of this *Annual Edition*. You can link to these sites by going to the student online support site at *http://www.mhcls.com/online/*.

ALL THE ARTICLES THAT RELATE TO EACH TOPIC ARE LISTED BELOW THE BOLD-FACED TERM.

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39. Miracle: American Polonia, Karol Wojtyla and the Election of Pope John Paul II
42. Where We Stand on Issues
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Internet References

The following Internet sites have been carefully researched and selected to support the articles found in this reader. The easiest way to access these selected sites is to go to our student online support site at *http://www.mhcls.com/online/*.

AE: Race and Ethnic Relations 16/e

The following sites were available at the time of publication. Visit our Web site—we update DUSHKIN ONLINE regularly to reflect any changes.

General Sources

Library of Congress
http://www.loc.gov

Examine this extensive Web site to learn about resource tools, library services/resources, exhibitions, and databases in many different fields related to race and ethnicity.

Social Science Information Gateway
http://sosig.esrc.bris.ac.uk

Access an online catalog of thousands of Internet resources relevant to social science education and research at this site. Every resource is selected and described by a librarian or subject specialist.

Sociosite
http://www.pscw.uva.nl/sociosite/TOPICS/index.html

Open this enormous site of the University of Amsterdam's Sociology Department to gain insights into a number of social issues. A six-column alphabetical list provides links to activism, affirmative action, discrimination, poverty, race and ethnic relations, urbanization, women's issues, and much more.

UNIT 1: Local Experiences of Racial and Ethnic Identity, Communities, and Diversity in America

American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
http://www.aclu.org

This site contains links to the ACLU's archives of information about civil rights in the United States and around the world, now and historically. Consult the index to find discussions of such topics as racial equality and immigrants' rights.

Human Rights Web
http://www.hrweb.org

The history of the human-rights movement, text on seminal figures, landmark legal and political documents, and ideas on how individuals can get involved in helping to protect the rights of all peoples around the world can be found at this valuable site. Links to related sites can also be accessed here.

Supreme Court/Legal Information Institute
http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/index.html

Open this site for current and historical information about the Supreme Court. The archive contains many opinions issued since May 1990 as well as a collection of nearly 600 landmark decisions of the Court.

UNIT 2: Echoes from the Past and Pieces of Our Ambiguous Legacies

U.S. Census Bureau
http://www.census.gov

Here is a link to the U.S. Census Bureau, which provides useful demographic research and statistics.

UNIT 3: Demography and Diversity

U. S. Census Bureau
http://www.census.gov

Diversity.com
http://www.diversity.com

U. S. Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services
http://www.USCIS.gov

UNIT 4: Immigration and the American Tradition

Child Welfare League of America (CWLA)
http://www.cwla.org

The CWLA is the United States' oldest and largest organization devoted entirely to the well-being of vulnerable children and their families. This site provides links to information about issues related to the process of becoming multicultural.

National Immigration Forum
http://www.immigrationforum.org

This pro-immigrant organization offers this page to examine the effects of immigration on the U.S. economy and society.

The National Network for Immigrant and Refugee Rights (NNIRR)
http://www.nnirr.org

The NNIRR serves as a forum to share information, to educate communities, and to develop and coordinate plans of action on important immigrant and refugee issues.

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)
http://uscis.gov/graphics/index.htm

Visit the home page of the USCIS to learn U.S. policy vis-à-vis immigrants, laws and regulations, and statistics.

Center for Migration Studies
http://www.cmsny.org

This site contains various information on migration studies such as socio-demographics, historical, economic, political, and legislative studies.

Islamic Human Rights Commission
http://www.ihrc.org

This site brings light to the needs of Islamic human rights. It also provides daily updates as to recent events and movements in the Islamic world.

www.mhcls.com/online/

UNIT 5: Indigenous Ethnic Groups

American Indian Science and Engineering Society (AISES)
http://www.aises.org

This AISES "Multicultural Educational Reform Programs" site provides a framework for learning about science, mathematics, and technology. There are useful links to programs for Native American education.

UNIT 6: African Americans

National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)
http://www.naacp.org

Open this home page to explore the NAACP's stances regarding many topics in race and ethnic relations. Many links to other organizations and resources are provided.

AIDs and Black New Yorkers
http://www.villagevoice.com/issues/0024/wright.php

This article, which is one of six, gives some understanding on the still growing death toll on the black community due to AIDs.

UNIT 7: Hispanic/Latino Americans

Latino American Network Information Center (LANIC)
http://lanic.utexas.edu

The purpose of this site is to offer Latinos sources of information on everything of importance. The site links to housing, employment, ethnicity, income, and political issues. It also offers the latest news of interest to Latinos and Hispanics.

National Council of La Raza (NCLR)
http://www.nclr.org

Explore NCLR's home page for links to health and education issues in the Hispanic community. Many other economic, political, and social concerns are also covered at this site.

UNIT 8: Asian Americans

Aisan American Studies Center
http://www.aasc.ucla.edu/default.asp

Asian American for Equality
http://www.aafe.org

Asian-Nation
http://www.asian-nation.org/index.shtml

UNIT 9: Eastern European and Mediterranean Ethnics

Africa News Online
http://www.africanews.org

Open this site for *Africa News* on the Web. This source provides extensive, up-to-date information on all of Africa, with reports from Africa's newspapers and other sources.

Cultural Survival
http://www.culturalsurvival.org

This nonprofit organization works to defend and protect the human rights and cultural autonomy of indigenous peoples and oppressed ethnic minorities around the world. Learn about policies intended to avoid genocide and ethnic conflict.

The North-South Institute
http://www.nsi-ins.ca/ensi/index.html

Searching this site of the North-South Institute—which works to strengthen international development cooperation and enhance social equity—will help you find information on a variety of issues related to international race and ethnicity.

Order Sons of Italy in America
http://www.osia.org

This site encourages the study of Italian language and culture in American schools and universities.

The National Italian American Foundation
http://www.niaf.org

This is the website of The National Italian American Foundation. They are know as advocates in helping young Italian Americans with their educations and careers as well as strengthening cultural and economic ties between Italy and the U.S.

The Chicago Jewish News Online
http://www.chicagojewishnews.org

This site is an up-to-date news watch of what is happening in the Jewish community.

Polish American Congress
http://www.polamcon.org

At this site you can discover the current issues and recent events in the Polish community.

Polish American Journal
http://www.polamjournal.com

This is the site of the Polish American Journal, a monthly newspaper dedicated to the promotion and preservation of Polish American culture.

UNIT 10: Understanding Race and Ethnic Relations: Exploring Challenges

Yale University Guide to American Ethnic Studies
http://www.library.yale.edu/rsc/ethnic/internet.html

This site, provided by Yale University, contains a list of resources regarding ethnic identity research and links to organizations that deal with ethnic identity.

American Indian Ritual Object Repatriation Foundation
http://www.repatriationfoundation.org

Visit this home page of the American Indian Ritual Object Repatriation Foundation, which aims to assist in the appropriate return of sacred ceremonial material.

Center for Research in Ethnic Relations
http://www.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/CRER_RC

This eclectic site provides links to a wealth of resources on the Internet related to race and ethnic relations.

The International Center for Migration, Ethnicity, and Citizenship
http://www.newschool.edu/icmec

The Center is engaged in scholarly research and public policy analysis bearing on international migration, refugees, and the incorporation of newcomers in host countries.

We highly recommend that you review our Web site for expanded information and our other product lines. We are continually updating and adding links to our Web site in order to offer you the most usable and useful information that will support and expand the value of your Annual Editions. You can reach us at: *http://www.dushkin.com/annualeditions/.*

UNIT 1

Local Experiences of Racial and Ethnic Identity, Communities, and Diversity in America

Unit Selections

1. **Ethnic Goes Exurban,** Tyler Cowen
2. **It's Blarney Meets Chutzpah, over Red Wine and Green Beer,** Jennifer Medina
3. **A Shift in the Income Divide in Queens Puts Blacks Ahead of Whites,** Sam Roberts
4. **'New Brooklyns' Replace White Suburbs,** Rick Hampson
5. **Parishes in Transition,** Jessica Trobaugh Temple and Erin Blasko
6. **In New York, Gospel Resounds in African Tongues,** Daniel J. Wakin
7. **In Brooklyn, an Evolving Ethnicity,** Delizia Flaccavento
8. **Mélange Cities,** Blair A. Ruble
9. **Greektown's Rise No Myth,** Antero Pietila

Key Points to Consider

- Explore the racial and ethnic diversity of neighborhoods, towns, and counties that are within your experience and compare them to the accounts presented in these articles.
- Review local, metropolitan, state and national data on ancestry data collected and published by the U.S. Census.
- In what respect does location define race and ethnic relations?
- Does the rise of ethnic marketing foster the assimilation of new immigrants?
- What opinions do you have about churches comprising populations that are predominately one ethnic group?
- Does the economic climate of a particular time significantly influence group relations? What additional variables are important for intergroup relations?

Student Web Site

www.mhcls.com/online

Internet References

Further information regarding these Web sites may be found in this book's preface or online.

American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
http://www.aclu.org

Human Rights Web
http://www.hrweb.org

Supreme Court/Legal Information Institute
http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/index.html

A new generation of American leaders was increasingly comfortable with experiences of racial and ethnic diversity. They challenged the country and its institutions of cultural formation to discard the "Melting Pot" ideology and to replace it with a universalism of law, due process, and equal protection for all. This effort could be easily claimed in legislation, but the stubborn facts of social practices were embedded in patterns of regional diversity and mobility. The economic limitation related to levels of urbanization and social development as well as a political potential and competitive edge that could be achieved by either pandering the passions of fear, hatred, and prejudice created a web of contradictions that would define race and ethnic relations: the singular isolation and exclusion of persons whose ancestry was rooted in American slavery and consciousness of color; the mentalities and constraints of a unique American form of shared consciousness derived from the dichotomous mentality of Anglo-conformists and their logic, practices of social division, and divisiveness; the urban immigrant and ethnic enclave experiences that demanded a new evocation of cultural pluralism beyond the insularity, isolation, and racialist mentalities; and institutions of governance derived from the rural foundations of states in the Anglo-Scot-Irish American culture that lacked mechanisms of metropolitan governance.

Ethnic and racial identities are social constructions of culture. The articles in this section present contemporary accounts of local experiences which suggest that modern forms of identity and communities are formed by shared symbols and meanings that constitute bonds of union among persons. Such modern bonds are self expressed in various ways as types of ethnic and race relations. Such behaviors are not simply primordial givens. On the contrary, they are dynamic and changing cultural forms. They are fashioned from relationships among persons and in the constitutions of groups, and they are significantly—if not essentially—shaped by the willful orchestration of leaders intent on explanations and action within social, economic, and cultural institutions.

Dr. Thaddeus C. Radzilowski, president of the Piast Institute, argues that ethnicities are derived from and cultivated in local communities. Thus, localism is a feature of race and ethnic relations experienced in specific residential communities and the bonds of shared values—traditions—that are formative of personal consciousness and group identity. Radzilowski's view on this approach to ethnic and race relations in grounded in the argument expressed in the following three points:

- Ethnicity is one of the deepest and most enduring of human identities because it is based on language, religion, culture, family, common history, and local community. It can have political salience and as such can play both negative and positive roles. However, political or public salience is not necessary for its survival. It can be the basis of community formation and a generous pluralism on the one hand, or divisiveness and prejudice on the other.
- Ethnicity in America is a creative adaptation to life in the New World by immigrants, both free and coerced. It was an attempt by newcomers to make themselves at home in a new place, often under difficult and challenging conditions. Out of the process came cultures that were born out of preservation, adaptation, direct borrowing, and invention—often reinforced by prejudice and interest. Successful ethnicities have kept the ability to change themselves to meet new conditions as well as to modify the dominant society in which

they are embedded and to affect other ethnic cultures with whom they exist.

- Ethnic adaptation to preserve core values and to mobilize group members in times of difficulty has happened with remarkable speed given the usual more leisurely pace of historical change. To be able to anticipate and use ethnicity in ways beneficial to the evolution of our society requires a clear understanding of recent history and current prospects if it is to succeed.

Articles in this unit present a sample of case-studies. This sampling, like the many thousands of weekly profiles of ethnics, immigrants, and enclave populations that appear in your local papers and magazines provide access to distinctive locations and their particular qualities. In composite, they are the pieces of pluralism within our social fabric, our consciousness of human variety and values rooted in rural and various national traditions that are being part of the American reality. The challenges and opportunities of contemporary race and ethnic relations in America are shaped within the framework of social, political, economic, and cultural institutions. Contemporary trends, currents of opinion and attitude, are influenced by significant events and communications, as well as imaginative portrayals—at times called 'literary ethnicity'. Such social processes are woven into porous configurations of local, regional, and national relationships. Viewed from this perspective, a significant facet of what constitutes the American reality is derived from fundamentally localized demography. To adopt this perspective requires attention to the variety of populations, their settlement patterns, and the movement and succession of groups and cultures from old neighborhoods to new neighborhoods. This social and analytical approach invites the observer to examine the American reality as a dynamic process involving the shifting clustering of racial and ethnic groups and their renegotiation of relationships in new places, in new ways, and with new opportunities and challenges that are endemic to American pluralism.

These articles recount experiences of ethnic populations in specific situations and places. They portray unresolved dilemmas related to American pluralism. Ethnic clustering was driven in part by the "creative destructiveness" of economic growth and the bonds of group affinity—their choices, opportunities, and challenges experienced in both turbulent group relations and the hopeful processes of recovering viable urban communities. The pivotal significance of terrorism on immigration is particularly salient for the entire country. Yet the process of forging new relations among communities reveals the development of new strategies and the formation of shared values derived from various traditions and articulated as each group negotiates the pathway from immigrant to ethnic American. Thus "becoming American" occurs in the ongoing process of addressing challenges and opportunities. This shift in consciousness regarding race and ethnic relations as well as the technological capacity, information, and data explosion produce new models and explanations of society and culture and further increases awareness of ethnicity and race.

Settlement patterns and economic differences within societies and the arrangements of economic production are usually explained in terms of theories of progressive development or of class conflicts. Unlike such structural causes and determinants, current social practice and new modes of explanation appear to be motivated by a new horizon of cultural values and the collective aspirations of ethnic groups. Currently we discover that the forces reconstructing social realities are the products of creativity, imagination, and religion. Each of these factors appears to be influenced by and interrelated to contemporary articulations of racial and ethnic relations. Consciousness of the pluralism expressed in ethnic, racial, religious, and cultural diversity have emerged throughout the world. Various social science and humanistic disciplines are recasting models and calibrating variables to account for these powerful forces of cultural, religious, and ethnic cohesion as well as forms of conflict that erupt from time to time at the boundaries that define contentions that are salient for group interaction and mobilization.

Article 1

Ethnic Goes Exurban

Washington's Sprawl, as Told through Its Migrating Restaurants

TYLER COWEN

Little more than a decade ago, the quest for a *dosa* meant going to the District. That staple of south Indian cooking, the masala dosa (fry a moist mix of ground lentils and rice into a long, waferlike form, and stick something like potatoes inside), was a rare commodity in the Washington area.

Today, dozens of local restaurants serve dosas. The Indian restaurant Minerva, located in Fairfax, has 11 different dosas on its menu, stuffed with chutneys, spinach, onions, chicken and lamb in addition to potatoes. In much of outside-the-Beltway Virginia, where I do most of my eating these days, it's easier to find a good dosa than a decent hamburger.

If we are what we eat, this simple parable of the dosa reflects how rapidly our region has changed. Ethnic eating has gone exurban, tracking the march of immigration and the growth of small businesses from inner city to inner suburb and finally to exurbs that were virtually all-white rural outposts with cornfields just a decade ago; it has moved from Northwest D.C. to redefine dining throughout the sprawling Washington region.

I know, because since I came here 26 years ago to study at George Mason University, I've been eating my way all over Washington. I started in the Latin and Ethiopian dives of Adams Morgan in the 1980s. In the '90s, I circled the Beltway to find the Indian and Chinese restaurants that newcomers were opening in Rockville and Silver Spring. Today, I'm most likely to travel out to malls in Chantilly, Centreville and Herndon for the most authentic Middle Eastern, Chinese, Indian and Korean food. An economist by day and a diner by night, I've gradually gained knowledge of exurbia while becoming an expert on ethnic food.

One commonly held belief is that Washington area dining has been driven by refugees from political crises around the world. Back in the '80s there was some truth to this theory, when the new urban chic involved sharing a platter of lamb tibs around a basket-woven table in Adams Morgan's Ethiopian enclave. But we see no swarm of Iraqi restaurants today (there was one in Herndon—Zuhair's—but it closed after about a year in business); nor has civil war in Somalia brought platters of *muffo* patties to D.C. tables. Indeed, the cuisines with the most potent recent growth in our area—Indian and Chinese—have come from countries with their own booms over the past 15 years.

The emergence of ethnic restaurants depends not on refugees from global trouble spots, but on several shifting social and economic factors: a concentration of people from the ethnic community, space at low rents, and a cuisine with potential to appeal to mainstream America. Where those forces are present, expect a culinary explosion; where they are not, ethnic restaurants will retreat.

Those are the factors that have shaped this region. Between 1960 and 2006, the District's population dropped from close to 800,000 to just 550,000, about 20 percent of whom live below the poverty line. High taxes, bad schools and expensive housing impelled people to leave for the suburbs, taking their businesses with them. Immigrants also began following the new opportunities—settling outside the city. During the same period, Tysons Corner went from a cow patch to a bunch of auto dealerships to a first-tier shopping and business center. Small wonder that would-be restaurateurs such as Nat Kittayapifon, the manager at Pilin, chose Tysons over the District. "We were the first Thai restaurant in Fairfax County 17 years ago," he remembers. "Now I can count 10 on my fingers with no problem."

Of course, the District, with its lobbyists and international organizations, continues to be a center for expense-account dining. But the good ethnic restaurants downtown are either trendy (think Rasika and Indique, both of which reinterpret Indian for upmarket American eaters), or cater to the wealthy international crowd (such as the Spanish Taberna del Alabardero near the International Monetary Fund and World Bank). For the best buys, though, you have to get in the car and head out to the sprawl. These days, the most authentic, spiciest food comes at cheap, ugly strip malls, far from the District and miles from the Metro.

Adams Morgan once served as a classic parvenu dining spot, but its signature Ethiopian restaurants are no longer fresh. Old staples such as Meskerem now attract more Americans than Ethiopians. More vital mom-and-pop Ethiopian places—the ones that serve *kitfo*, raw beef sprinkled with chili peppers and a form of dry cottage cheese—opened first on U Street and then moved down to Ninth Street just south of U.

Georgetown and Dupont Circle priced out most of their good ethnic food more than a decade ago. Even Chinatown is at risk from the forces of gentrification. It's merging with the now-fashionable Verizon Center neighborhood, which is fast crossing over to trendy fusion and mainstream chains. Zaytinya (Middle Eastern fusion), Zengo (Latin-Asian fusion) and IndeBleu (a mix of French and Indian flavors) are among the best restaurants in the District, but all are known for their bars as much as for their menus.

Outside the District, much the same pattern has reshaped close-in urban centers such as Old Town Alexandria. In the late '80s, Old Town used to lure me with its Afghan *pilaus* and *chalows*, its Asian fusion and its chili at the Hard Times Cafe (my favorite stop on the way to Bullets games in Landover). But Afghan places have now spread farther west, edgier Asian dining has moved to Maryland, and Hard Times has become a chain and softened its chili's bite to appeal to the Old Town tourist trade.

I now travel to much grittier West Alexandria, especially near Interstate 395, which boasts a culinary range from Pakistani to Thai to Szechuan. Cheap rents, easy parking and highway proximity have made possible places there like the Thai Hut on Van Dorn Street, where I go now to find my favorite *mee krob.*

A similar shift has taken place in Maryland, where Rockville's strip malls provide better options than upscale and closer-in Bethesda. College Park and Gaithersburg—both fairly distant and shabbier—are its closest rivals for their array of Caribbean, Indian and Latino offerings. But Maryland lags behind Virginia as a host state for new ethnic restaurants. The 2005 Small Business Survival Index, which ranks states according to such measures as income tax rates and health-care regulations, shows why: Virginia stands in 13th place among the 50 states—making it a more hospitable setting for starting up a small business than Maryland, which comes in 25th.

Within Virginia, ethnic food has been on the move, heading westward toward lower rents and new population centers. As Victor Serrano of Victor's Grill, a Falls Church restaurant serving Latino meats, put it, "We have our restaurants out in the suburbs because the Bolivian and Argentine communities are spread out throughout Arlington, Falls Church, Vienna and Annandale. Our strategy is to make ourselves convenient."

And convenience for ethnic restaurant owners these days often means proximity to suburban places of work. "We wanted to be close to the offices here," says Rani Varma, the owner of Bombay Tandoor in Tysons Corner. "We get a flood of people at lunchtime."

Falls Church has held on to the reputation it established in the 1990s for Asian and especially Vietnamese food. Indeed, the Eden Center on Wilson Boulevard—the bustling economic reflection of a county where one in every four residents is now foreign-born—attracts Asian visitors from the entire East Coast. I used to go to this huge mall whenever I wanted; now I worry about whether I can find a parking space.

In the 1980s and early '90s, I could still find excellent ethnic food—particularly Vietnamese—in Arlington and Clarendon, but more recently, I've watched well-established suburban eateries march toward the exurbs. Take Madhu Ban, the excellent Indian vegetarian restaurant that used to be in Clarendon: As the area gentrified, rents rose, and the owner, Munshi Ram, moved out. He reopened his restaurant as Punjab Dhaba in Loehmann's Plaza in Falls Church, closer to the Dulles corridor and the high-tech boom that helped double the Indian population in the Washington region from fewer than 40,000 in 1990 to some 78,000 in 2000. A *dhaba* is typically a roadside cafe, and this one is right next to the Bollywood movie theater. I can tell when the Indian movies start and end by watching the flow of crowds at the restaurant.

Ethnic food continues to shift farther west. Later this September, Rangoli will open as the first Indian restaurant in South Riding in the Market Square strip mall, just off Route 50 in Loudoun County. As recently as 2000, there were fewer than 10,000 Asian residents in Loudoun; by 2005, that number had more than tripled to 28,813. Many of these new residents come from Fairfax and Arlington counties in search of cheaper housing and are eager to bring their favorite foods along.

The strip mall that will house Rangoli already has a Subway and Firkin & Hound—a chain selling "pub food"—and is about to get a place called Thai Chili, too. This mall symbolizes the new look of contemporary ethnic dining—indistinguishable from the surrounding exurban area.

These malls have become more accessible for immigrants as they have gained wealth—and cars. John Chia, the owner of Kam Po, says he chose Leesburg Pike near Baileys Crossroads for his Chinese-Peruvian eatery because it is convenient for the region's estimated 75,000 Peruvian transplants as well as other Latinos. "Old ethnic neighborhoods, all your restaurants were walking distance," he says. "Now 99 percent of my customers come in cars." (Kam Po is what in Lima would be called a *chifa*, run by Chinese immigrants to Peru who moved to the D.C. suburbs, bringing their own brand of fusion food with them.)

This new mobility is weakening the whole notion of the ethnic neighborhood. Forget the old Chinatown paradigm: Diffusion is the new model. As a result, ethnic restaurants are more like scattered outposts, drawing from a wide radius. As Serrano points out, "Our competition is not right next door. We compete with . . . restaurants five or 10 miles away."

My eating odyssey has uncovered other surprises and undermined old assumptions. Who would have guessed, for example, that good Peruvian and Bolivian restaurants outnumber Mexican ones in a region that is home to more than 32,000 Latino-owned businesses and where one in 11 residents is Latino? Or that a variety of Mexican tacquerias, soup joints and bakeries are centered in the no-man's land of Bladensburg, on and near Kenilworth Avenue? The surrounding community is largely Hispanic, and it is only a matter of time before Mexican entrepreneurs spread this food to Northern Virginia.

Of course, the march of immigration is a more complex story than that told by the restaurants I find. Filipinos, for example, are the second most numerous Asian group in the

United States (some 2 million, compared with 2.7 million Chinese). But outside of Little Manila in Los Angeles and parts of San Francisco, Filipino restaurants are unusual. The Washington area—where there are some 34,000 people of Filipino heritage—has Little Quiapo in Arlington and Manila Cafe in Springfield. But few non-Filipino Americans have a love for fish sauce, vinegar marinade and oxtail. And, as my Filipino friend John Nye has told me, many Filipinos prefer a home-cooked meal.

Korean food also remains largely the province of Korean patrons. Most Westerners don't go beyond *bul gogi* (broiled beef) or perhaps *bibim bap* (rice bowl with egg and vegetables). The cuisine tastes harsh to the uninitiated, with its abundant garlic and unusual seafood delicacies. This also explains why Korean restaurants remain so tightly clustered near Korean communities (most of the best are in Annandale) and why just about every Korean restaurant is good. Unlike Chinese restaurants, there is little danger of Koreans taking the Americanized beef-with-broccoli route.

Not that beef-with-broccoli is always a recipe for success. In fact, exurban ethnic food typically packs a punch. Bennie Cardozo of Minerva remembers the perils of trying to adapt: "For the first several months, we tried to cook to American tastes. We nearly went out of business. Then we switched to spicy and traditional to target local Indians, and all of a sudden lines were out the door."

Louis Armstrong once said "All music is folk music." Similarly, all cuisine is ethnic cuisine. My quarter-century sampling of dosas and other delicacies has become a case study in the demographics of our rapidly changing area.

Tyler Cowen, a professor of economics at George Mason University, writes an ethnic dining guide at http://tylercowensethnicdiningguide.com.

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Article 2

It's Blarney Meets Chutzpah, over Red Wine and Green Beer

JENNIFER MEDINA

The hosts hoped to bring two ethnic groups together, so the invitation included a glossary:

St. Patrick's Day—"An Irish festival involving lots of alcohol celebrating St. Patrick on his special day. (a k a: a great opportunity to drink.)"

It went on to define a lesser-known observance.

"Purim—A Jewish carnival involving lots of alcohol celebrating the defeat of Haman by Mordecai and Esther and the saving of the Jews. (a k a: a great opportunity to drink.)"

It is a quirk of two calendars. While St. Patrick's Day always falls on March 17, the date of Purim follows the Jewish lunar calendar. So tonight, for the first time in 19 years, the Irish, the Jews and anyone eager for mischievous revelry with a little drink can get together, as Purim begins at sundown.

St. Patrick's revelers at the Fitzpatrick Manhattan Hotel on Sunday probably didn't know Mordecai from Haman, and that was even before they had their first drink.

For two roommates, Alexander Robinson and Charlie Stocks, the coincidence was a cause for a celebration. On Saturday, Mr. Robinson, who is Jewish, and Mr. Stocks, who is Irish, got started early and held their first St. Patrick's Purim Party at their Chelsea apartment.

"It was a double whammy," Mr. Robinson said. "We started looking at the connections, and the strongest link for us seemed to be drinking. We thought it was divine inspiration to promote multiculturalism."

The Purim celebration includes a reading from a scroll that recounts the story of the Jews' deliverance from a planned massacre in ancient Persia. Tradition dictates that revelers become so intoxicated that they cannot tell the difference between Mordecai, a hero of the story, and Haman, who plotted against the Jews.

St. Patrick's Day commemorates the Irish saint who helped to bring Catholicism to the country and has long been an important part of New York culture. Bars and pubs typically have lines out the door, with customers traveling from all over the world.

The connection between the festivals runs deeper than beer and wine, said William B. Helmreich, a professor of sociology and Judaic studies at the City University of New York Graduate Center.

While the Irish have corned beef, Jews munch on hamentaschen, triangular cookies that resemble the hat Haman wore. And Jewish communities often parade in costume and have carnivals for children.

"Both holidays create and maintain group solidarity and religious identity," Mr. Helmreich said. "Whether you bring the Irish together in a parade in Manhattan or bring the Jews together in a synagogue in Queens, the intention is the same."

While most bars throughout the city will be catering to shamrock-wearing partygoers, B. B. King's in Times Square will hold a Purim party, with two Jewish rock bands and kosher food. Michael Fancher, a club manager, said he expected as many as 600 people, though most may not be old enough to drink.

"Most of these guys will have bottled water and soda," he said. "But it's nice. It means you won't get those once-a-year amateurs. We'll have an early night."

Perhaps they do not expect the same crowd as Mr. Robinson had at his party.

"When everybody left, they couldn't tell the difference between Haman and a leprechaun."

Article 3

A Shift in the Income Divide in Queens Puts Blacks Ahead of Whites

SAM ROBERTS

Across the country, the income gap between blacks and whites remains wide, and nowhere more so than in Manhattan. But just a river away, a very different story is unfolding.

In Queens, the median income among black households, nearing $52,000 a year, has surpassed that of whites in 2005, an analysis of new census data shows. No other county in the country with a population over 65,000 can make that claim. The gains among blacks in Queens, the city's quintessential middle-class borough, were driven largely by the growth of two-parent families and the successes of immigrants from the West Indies. Many live in tidy homes in verdant enclaves like Cambria Heights, Rosedale and Laurelton, just west of the Cross Island Parkway and the border with Nassau County.

David Veron, a 45-year-old lawyer, is one of them. He estimates that the house in St. Albans that he bought with his wife, Nitchel, three years ago for about $320,000 has nearly doubled in value since they renovated it. Two-family homes priced at $600,000 and more seem to be sprouting on every vacant lot, he says.

"Southeast Queens, especially, had a heavy influx of West Indian folks in the late 80's and early 90's," said Mr. Veron, who, like his 31-year-old wife, was born on the island of Jamaica. "Those individuals came here to pursue an opportunity, and part of that opportunity was an education," he said. "A large percentage are college graduates. We're now maturing and reaching the peak of our earning capacity."

Richard P. Nathan, co-director of the Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government in Albany, called Queens "the flip side of the underclass."

"It really is the best illustration that the stereotype of blacks living in dangerous, concentrated, poor, slum, urban neighborhoods is misleading and doesn't predominate," he said.

Andrew A. Beveridge, a Queens College demographer who analyzed results of the Census Bureau's 2005 American Community Survey, released in August, for The New York Times, said of the trend: "It started in the early 1990's, and now it's consolidated. They're married-couple families living the American dream in southeast Queens."

In 1994, an analysis for The Times found that in some categories, the median income of black households in Queens was slightly higher than that of whites—a milestone in itself. By 2000, whites had pulled slightly ahead. But blacks have since rebounded.

The only other places where black household income is higher than among whites are much smaller than Queens, like Mount Vernon in Westchester, Pembroke Pines, Fla.; Brockton, Mass.; and Rialto, Calif. Most of the others also have relatively few blacks or are poor.

But Queens is unique not only because it is home to about two million people, but also because both blacks and whites there make more than the national median income, about $46,000.

Even as blacks have surged ahead of whites in Queens, over all they have fallen behind in Manhattan. With the middle class there shrinking, those remaining are largely either the wealthy, who are predominantly white, or the poor, who are mostly black and Hispanic, the new census data shows.

Median income among blacks in Manhattan was $28,116, compared with $86,494 among whites, the widest gap of any large county in the country.

In contrast, the middle-class black neighborhoods of Queens evoke the "zones of emergence" that nurtured economically rising European immigrants a century ago, experts say. "It's how the Irish, the Italians, the Jews got out of the slums," Professor Nathan said.

Despite the economic progress among blacks in Queens, income gaps still endure within the borough's black community, where immigrants, mostly from the Caribbean, are generally doing better than American-born blacks.



Figure 1 Comparing Incomes. Median income in 2005 for Queens households.

Source: Analysis of census date by Andrew A. Beveridge, Queens College Department of Sociology

"Racism and the lack of opportunity created a big gap and kind of put us at a deeper disadvantage," said Steven Dennison, an American-born black resident of Springfield Gardens.

Mr. Dennison, a 49-year-old electrical contractor, has four children. One is getting her doctoral degree; another will graduate from college this school year. "It starts with the school system," Mr. Dennison said.

Mr. Vernon, the lawyer from Jamaica, said: "It's just that the people who left the Caribbean to come here are self-starters. It only stands to reason they would be more aggressive in pursuing their goals. And that creates a separation."

Housing patterns do, too. While blacks make more than whites—even those in the borough's wealthiest neighborhoods, including Douglaston—they account for fewer than 1 in 20 residents in some of those communities. And among blacks themselves, there are disparities, depending on where they live.

According to the latest analysis, black households in Queens reported a median income of $51,836 compared with $50,960 for non-Hispanic whites (and $52,998 for Asians and $43,927 among Hispanic people).

Among married couples in Queens, the gap was even greater: $78,070 among blacks, higher than any other racial or ethnic group, and $74,503 among whites.

Hector Ricketts, 50, lives with his wife, Opal, a legal secretary, and their three children in Rosedale. A Jamaican immigrant, he has a master's degree in health care administration, but after he was laid off more than a decade ago he realized that he wanted to be an entrepreneur. He established a commuter van service.

"When immigrants come here, they're not accustomed to social programs," he said, "and when they see opportunities they had no access to—tuition or academic or practical training—they are God-sent, and they use those programs to build themselves and move forward."

Immigrants helped propel the gains among blacks. The median income of foreign-born black households was $61,151, compared with $45,864 for American-born blacks. The disparity was even more pronounced among black married couples. The median for married black immigrants was $84,338, nearly as much as for native-born white couples. For married American-born blacks, it was $70,324.

One reason for the shifting income pattern is that some wealthier whites have moved away.

"As non-Hispanic whites have gotten richer, they have left Queens for the Long Island suburbs, leaving behind just middle-class whites," said Professor Edward N. Wolff, an economist at New York University. "Since home ownership is easier for whites than blacks in the suburbs—mortgages are easier to get for whites—the middle-class whites left in Queens have been relatively poor. Middle-class black families have had a harder time buying homes in the Long Island suburbs, so that blacks that remain in Queens are relatively affluent."

The white median also appeared to have been depressed slightly by the disproportionate number of elderly whites on fixed incomes. But even among the elderly, blacks fared better. Black households headed by a person older than 65 reported a median income of $35,977, compared with $28,232 for white households.

Lloyd Hicks, 77, who moved to Cambria Heights from Harlem in 1959, used to run a freight-forwarding business near Kennedy Airport. His wife, Elvira, 71, was a teacher. Both were born in New York City, but have roots in Trinidad. He has a bachelor's degree in business. She has a master's in education.

"Education was always something the families from the islands thought the children should have," Mr. Hicks said.

In addition to the larger share of whites who are elderly, said Andrew Hacker, a Queens College political scientist, "black Queens families usually need two earners to get to parity with working whites."

Kenneth C. Holder, 46, a former prosecutor who was elected to a Civil Court judgeship last year, was born in London of Jamaican and Guyanese parents and grew up in Laurelton. His wife, Sharon, who is Guyanese, is a secretary at a Manhattan law firm. They own a home in Rosedale, where they live with their three sons.

"Queens has a lot of good places to live; I could move, but why?" Mr. Holder said. "There are quite a number of two-parent households and a lot of ancillary services available for youth, put up by organized block associations and churches, like any middle-class area."

In smaller categories, the numbers become less precise. Still, for households headed by a man, median income was $61,151 for blacks and $54,537 for whites. Among households headed by a woman, the black and white medians were the same: $50,960.

Of the more than 800,000 households in Queens, according to the Census Bureau's 2005 American Community Survey, about 39 percent are white, 23 percent are Hispanic, 18 percent are Asian, and 17 percent are black—suggesting multiple hues rather than monotone black and white.

"It is wrong to say that America is 'fast becoming two nations' the way the Kerner Commission did," said Professor Nathan, who was the research director for the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders in 1968 and disagreed with its conclusion. "It might be, though, that it was more true then than it is now."

Article 4

‘New Brooklyns’ Replace White Suburbs

Anaheim, other cities reshaped by immigration wave

RICK HAMPSON

One day in the early 1950s, Walt Disney pulled his car onto the new freeway running south from Los Angeles and drove until he came to a village surrounded by orange groves. Here he decided to build “the happiest place in the world”—Disneyland.

Over the next three decades the community that grew up outside the park became as much a refuge from reality as anything inside it. People moved here to escape the crime, congestion or complexion of Los Angeles. Very conservative and very white, Anaheim epitomized the bland bedroom suburb where nothing ever happened and no one wanted it to.

Today, however, Anaheim has changed into something even Disney never imagined: a sprawling yet congested city with more people than Cincinnati, only a third of them Anglo. It is represented in Congress by a female Democrat named Sanchez and filled with people who weren’t born in the USA and don’t pray, curse or gossip in English.

In its diversity, it’s growth—even the chip on its shoulder—Anaheim is “the new Brooklyn,” says Robert Lang, director of the Metropolitan Institute at Virginia Tech.

It’s not the only one. A whole class of traditional, white-bread suburb has turned into a new kind of city that helps reshape the nation by effectively importing immigrants and exporting native-born residents. The latter move to communities farther out on the metropolitan periphery, contributing to sprawl.

Fewer urban poor

Strong economy in the ’90s enabled many poor Americans to leave inner-city slums

In Anaheim, for example, whites are steadily giving way to large, poor, hard-working immigrant families—much like the ones who settled in Brooklyn a century ago and helped to make it famously diverse and vibrant.

There’s no official definition of the New Brooklyns. But here are some common characteristics.

- **They are surprisingly large**—more than 100,000 residents. Santa Ana, Calif. (population 338,000 in 2000) and Anaheim (328,000), which anchor Orange County south of Los Angeles, are more populous than such traditional big cities as Cincinnati (331,000), Buffalo (293,000) and Newark (274,000).
- **They’re fast growing,** with population growth of at least 10% in each decade since being classified “urban” by the Census Bureau. Moreno Valley, Calif. (population 142,000) wasn’t even incorporated until 1990. But it already has more people than Bridgeport, the largest city in Connecticut, and its population is expected to double in 20 years. Pembroke Pines, Fla., grew 110% between 1990 and 2000 to 137,000 residents, making it the fastest growing of the New Brooklyns.
- **They are racially and ethnically diverse.** The percentage of residents who are foreign-born or speak a language other than English at home far exceeds the national rates (11% and 18% respectively). Three quarters of the residents of Hialeah, Fla., were born outside the USA, and nine in 10 don’t speak English at home. That out-Brooklyns even Brooklyn, where in the last census 38% of the residents were foreign-born and 47% didn’t speak English at home.

Ethnic diversity usually is associated with the large cities of the Northeast, not the suburbs of the Sun Belt. But the New Brooklyns turn this assumption on its head: Compare Fremont, Calif. (37% foreign-born) and Coral Springs, Fla. (21%) with cities such as Cleveland (5%) and Pittsburgh (6%).

Although the New Brooklyns were once new settlements on the suburban frontier, they’re getting old. Their housing, accordingly, is more attractive to immigrants looking for bargains and less attractive to longtime residents who can afford to trade up.

Sometimes, though, there is friction between newcomers and old-timers. In Irving, Texas, a member of the parks board created a stir last year when she claimed the rise in immigrants was “killing this city.” Some New Brooklyns have been slow to adjust to the changes. Although three quarters of the residents of Santa Ana are Latino, less than a quarter of the municipal library books are in Spanish. Pembroke Pines, which is more than a quarter Hispanic, did not appoint its first Hispanic police sergeant until last November.

Table 1 The 'New Brooklyns'

Several traditional suburbs have become rapidly growing, ethnically diverse cities that help launch immigrants toward the middle class. Like Brooklyn, the borough of New York City that played a similar role a century ago, these cities far exceed the national averages for residents who were born outside the USA and who speak a language other than English at home. Ten such communities:

City	2000 pop.	Metro area	Foreign-born pop.	English is 2nd language
Hialeah, Fla.	226,000	Miami	**72%**	93%
Santa Ana, Calif.	338,000	Los Angeles	**53%**	80%
Daly City, Calif.	104,000	San Francisco	**52%**	66%
Sunnyvale, Calif.	132,000	San Francisco	**39%**	46%
Anaheim, Calif.	328,000	Los Angeles	**38%**	55%
Chula Vista, Calif.	174,000	San Diego	**29%**	53%
Pembroke Pines, Fla.	137,000	Miami	**29%**	37%
Irving, Texas	192,000	Dallas	**27%**	38%
Bellevue, Wash.	110,000	Seattle	**25%**	27%
Aurora, Colo.	276,000	Denver	**16%**	23%
U.S. average			**11%**	**18%**

Sources: Census Bureau, USA TODAY research

- **They're not No. 1.** At least one other community in the metro area is larger and better-known. Chula Vista, Calif. (population 174,000) is the same size as Providence, or Knoxville, Tenn., but is dwarfed by neighboring San Diego. Anaheim, larger than 32 of the 50 state capitals, is just another town in the vast Los Angeles media market.
- **They get no respect.** It's another characteristic they share with the original Brooklyn, which was looked down on by haute Manhattan for its strange accent, odd foods and lowbrow enthusiasms. The New Brooklyns are often unknown, underrated or misunderstood. Lang calls them "stealth Brooklyns"—more populous, more diverse and more happening than commonly thought.

Anaheim suffers from this kind of image problem. It has become the opposite of the homogeneous, xenophobic community its critics detested. It has a Boeing facility, two major league sports teams, and a larger convention center than Los Angeles, San Francisco or Seattle. Still, Mayor Curt Pringle complained this year that "Anaheim hasn't gotten its due."

During the World Series last fall, a newspaper columnist explained the difference between the two host cities: San Francisco has everything but parking, he wrote; Anaheim has nothing but parking. Mayor Willie Brown said he wished his Giants were facing the Yankees: "Can you imagine the embarrassment if we lose to *Anaheim*?" When the Angels beat the Giants to win their first World Series, Pringle's predecessor, Tom Daly, called it "redemption day."

There was much to be redeemed.

Founded in the mid-19th century by German wine makers, by 1924 the community had fallen under the sway of the Ku Klux Klan, which secretly gained control of the city council. People started calling the town "Klanaheim"—a tag that stuck even after the council members were ousted.

Disneyland, which opened in 1955, transformed Anaheim's economy far more than its outlook. The city became a bastion of the arch-conservative John Birch Society and a favored destination of Angelenos fleeing urban crime and congestion. Meanwhile, Disney kept drawing more tourists, which meant more workers were needed to clean the park and make the hotel beds. Most of them were not Anglos.

Anaheim became a hotbed of anti-immigrant sentiment. City voters supported state ballot initiatives to make English the official state language and deny children of illegal immigrants access to schools.

But Anaheim kept changing. Between 1990 and 2000 the Anglo population dropped by nearly 25%, and the Latino population nearly doubled. In 1996, Rep. Robert Dornan, one of the most conservative Republicans in Congress, was defeated by Democrat Loretta Sanchez, who a few years earlier couldn't even get elected to the Anaheim city council.

Today Anaheim is about half Latino, a tenth Asian and about a third white. Its people speak more than 60 languages, and one study concluded that the city has more integrated and diverse neighborhoods than Los Angeles.

"You just get used to everybody being different than you," says Meghan Shigo, a 26-year-old real estate agent who lives with her husband and baby in a 1923 Mission-style home in Anaheim's historic Colony District. "Some people don't like it, but I do."

In the older working-class neighborhoods, cars are parked bumper-to-bumper along the curb; a bicyclist is as apt to be a man riding to work as a kid at play; large extended families spill out of small, aging houses onto sagging front porches and into dusty yards.

These neighborhoods seem to get more crowded by the day. The city's average household size (3.34 people) is 29% higher than the national average, and the percentage of families with children under 18 is a third higher. People are poor but generally hard working. For example, 75% of students at Anaheim High School, one of eight that serve the city, are eligible for school lunch aid, but only 6% of the school's families are on welfare.

Jorge Solares, 34, an immigrant from Guatemala, moved here from Los Angeles for reasons the settlers of the 1960s would understand: He wanted to get away from gang violence and airport noise. He likes it here, even though he wasted thousands of dollars putting stucco on the bungalow he bought in the historic neighborhood where the town was first settled. His new neighbors informed him that stucco, a fixture in the Latino architectural vernacular, was not appropriate. He agreed to strip it off. "That's how they do things here," he says. "So I go along. It's still better than L.A."

Not everyone is so enthusiastic. Ellen Lavalle, 42, who lives less than a mile from Solares, said she will soon move to one of the newer desert communities to the east. "It's gotten too crowded here—too many people on the street, too much noise," she said.

Although Latinos still are far less likely to register or vote than Anglos, the city's demographic changes have been reflected in politics. Last November, voters for the first time elected two Latinos to the five-person city council. And this week, the Angels pass into new ownership when Latino businessman Arturo Moreno becomes the first minority with a controlling stake in a major league baseball franchise.

When Disney's Tower of Terror thrill ride opens later this year, those who ride to the top will, for a few seconds before they plunge back toward earth, look out on the great panorama of Anaheim, the new city of Angels. But they won't see any sign of the village that once charmed Walt Disney.

Contributing: **Bruce Rosenstein.**

Article 5

Parishes in Transition

Holding on While Letting Go

Parishioners face momentous mission in joining their distinctive traditions

JESSICA TROBAUGH TEMPLE AND ERIN BLASKO
Tribune Staff Writer

Riding a pink two-wheeler bike, a young Hispanic girl cruises the sidewalk in front of St. Adalbert Catholic Church.

Outside the building's heavy front doors, she pauses and cranes her head, looking for something.

Unsatisfied, she takes off again. But as she rounds the corner, she finds what she's been seeking. She hops from the bicycle seat and kicks down the stand.

Trucks and motorcycles rev and basses boom at the four-way stop on the corner of Olive and Huron streets, but the girl pays them no notice.

She kneels on the cement, folds her hands and with lifted gaze utters her prayers before a figure of Jesus, who greets her with lowered arms and bowed head.

She knows nothing of the church whose statue this is. Its heritage, its service times or whether Masses are said in Polish or Spanish. She's come simply looking for Christ.

Parishioners of St. Stephen, St. Adalbert and St. Casimir Catholic churches in South Bend may similarly find themselves resting on their commonality of Christianity.

On April 27, St. Stephen Catholic Church, South Bend's first Hungarian-founded parish that now serves a predominantly Spanish-speaking congregation, learned that it will close on May 31 and merge with the traditionally Polish St. Adalbert.

St. Adalbert will become part of a "parish community" by sharing two Congregation of Holy Cross priests, the Rev. David Porterfield and the Rev. Christopher Cox, with St. Casimir, another Polish parish.

As parishioners of churches with distinct cultural heritages and practices, they and clergy are faced with the challenge of meshing those cultures while preserving each one's special character.

During a session of the transition committee, which formed late last year and includes members of each parish and ethnic group, Porterfield created a subcommittee on ethnic traditions.

"It'll take education" for each group to understand and appreciate one another's religious traditions and practices, Porterfield said.

"Participation and education," added St. Adalbert member Tim Hudak.

But the group has the added challenge of holding tight to this task while weeding through a tangle of suggestions, concerns and logistical issues that comes with such a drastic and disorienting move.

St. Casimir parishioner Ann Marie Sommers mentioned carrying the Blessed Sacrament around the church building on Easter as one example of a cherished ritual in her parish not practiced at all Catholic churches.

But new liturgical rules might require a change in that, noted Monsignor J. William Lester, who earlier this week relinquished his duties as St. Adalbert's administrator.

Another parishioner suggested to Lester, however, that the Stations of the Cross in St. Stephen, which are statuaries, take the place of the portrait-style Stations in St. Adalbert.

While many agreed the fixtures are beautiful and would be a nice element to carry over from St. Stephen, questions of wall placement and mounting challenges arise. And what of the Stations at St. Adalbert? "We have to first find out if some family donated them," Lester said.

A statue of Our Lady of Guadalupe and some pictures will make the move, Porterfield said. But the sensitive issue of what will happen to the pews, stained-glass windows and ornate wood altar remains to be decided and will depend on whether or not the local diocese chooses to preserve the structure.

The possibility of a joint bulletin for St. Adalbert and St. Casimir came up for discussion, too. But, Porterfield pointed out, in the early stages of the transition most Hispanic activities will take place in St. Adalbert.

One committee member suggested that including the events in the St. Casimir bulletin would help Hispanics feel more welcome at the church. A second member agreed and said the inclusion would advance the effort "to be one big community."

But Porterfield offered up a sobering fact. "Given that people really don't want this, I think we should hold off on that for a while."

The issue of English Masses also arose for debate. On any given Sunday, people clog the aisles and spill out the doors during the two Spanish Masses at St. Stephen. Parishioners registered there, most of them Spanish speaking, number 6,500. Church rolls at St. Adalbert list roughly 1,300 and at St. Casimir, 550 parishioners. Both churches will add Spanish Masses.

Though Mass times haven't been officially hammered out, the group unanimously agreed on one Sunday English Mass per church. "I'm just thinking that if one church has two (English Masses), then the other will have to also," Porterfield said.

And though letters of welcome from St. Casimir and St. Adalbert appeared in the St. Stephen bulletin on Sunday, Guadalupe Salazar of St. Stephen tearfully mentioned one unpleasant encounter with a member of St. Adalbert. "She said she felt the Hispanics would push them out," Lopez said. "And it hurt: Because we're not coming to this church because we want to. We have no choice."

And because there is no other choice, Louis Ciesielski of St. Adalbert said, the transition will have to be accepted by everyone who intends on remaining with the parishes.

"My brother, who used to attend St. Stephen, said that the older Hispanic women would get on their knees and walk on them to their pews. They showed great devotion. I hope some of that devotion will rub off on us, too," Ciesielski said: "We are a Catholic church. . . . We must open our arms to everyone."

But St. Stephen member Irene Egry, whose parents married in the church, said she doubts she'll make the move to St. Adalbert.

She and her baby sister made their First Communion at St. Stephen. They graduated from the grade school and every Sunday walked to Mass with their father—their mother attended a later Mass.

She grew up hearing her father sing in the men's choir, and every year she and her sister dressed up in their traditional Hungarian garb and danced in the St. Stephen Day street festival. Today, she's still a member of the St. Theresa Society.

In her west-side home, stacks of church memorabilia sit at her fingertips: memory books, photos, sheet music to Polish hymns. From beside her chair she picks up a pocket-size volume with a creased and faded cover—her father's prayer book.

"I like old things," she says.

It will be hard letting go.

Old Order Changing on South Bend's West Side

ERIN BLASKO

A return visit to South Bend in 2002 confirmed a Polish sociologist/anthropologist's prediction about South Bend's Polish community.

When Janusz Mucha visited South Bend in 1990 he hadn't anticipated writing about the Polish community here. In fact, he didn't know it existed.

Mucha, a professor of sociology and anthropology from Krakow, Poland, served as a visiting professor at Indiana University South Bend.

After learning of the Polish community on the city's west side, Mucha began to study and take part in many of the community's activities.

His research led him to write "Everyday Life and Festivity in a Local Ethnic Community," published in 1996 by Columbia University Press. In the book he suggests that the once strong community will decline.

In August 2002, Mucha returned to South Bend as a visiting Fulbright professor at IUSB. Once here, he learned his prediction had been correct.

"Now the article is about the Polish community *and* the Latinos," he said, referring to the large number of Hispanics who have moved to South Bend's west side in the last several years.

"The area is actually an area in transition," he said. "First it was to black, and now it is to Hispanic."

In 1990, Poles made up 21 percent of the west-side population and Hispanics made up 4.3 percent, Mucha pointed out. In contrast, the 2000 census showed Poles dropping to 11 percent and Hispanics rising to 14 percent.

"It's a process of ethnic succession," Mucha said. "One population is moving out, and another one is coming in."

"Ten years ago there were many Polish businesses" on the west side, he said, "and now they are nearly gone. Many are Hispanic now."

The ethnic succession of the west side is unique because the Poles are not being forced out but are leaving on their own, Mucha said.

"In reality, it's first that the Poles move out and leave vacant stores," he said. "And then the Hispanics take over the vacant stores."

But why are all of the Polish residents leaving?

According to Mucha, it has to do with education.

"Educated professionals are moving out of the neighborhood," he said. "And the old population is dying out . . . or going to nursing homes."

Besides Polish people and businesses leaving the west side, the local Polish Catholic parishes also are going through a period of change.

Because of smaller congregations and a shortage of priests, many of the old Polish parishes are either sharing priests or merging with other parishes.

"St. Hedwig's and St. Patrick's (have) one pastor," Mucha said. "St. Casimir has the same pastor with St. Stephen's, and St. Stanislaus merged with another parish."

And he cited the merger between St. Stephen and St. Adalbert Catholic churches.

Currently, St. Stephen, originally a Hungarian parish, is predominantly Hispanic, while St. Adalbert remains predominantly Polish.

As early as 1990, west-side parishioners were offered at least two Polish Masses a week. The Masses are mostly in English now.

Now St. Hedwig and St. Adalbert have only one Polish Mass a month. "There are not many people during these Polish Masses. And most of them are elderly," Mucha said.

Despite the decline in Polish parishes, Mucha said the churches are decorated with many Polish symbols and at least one Polish carol is included in Christmas services.

"There also are some other Polish religious traditions in the Masses," he added. "But it's shrinking."

Not only is the Polish language disappearing from the church, it is also disappearing from daily life.

"The Polish language is gone" from the South Bend Polish community, Mucha said. "Only old people know Polish now."

"After World War II, the schools stopped using Polish as the language of instruction. The younger generations know some phrases and use some phrases, but nothing more."

Although the Polish neighborhood and language are in decline, many Poles still gather for important Polish events throughout the year, including Mucha.

"I attended the Polish Heritage Month Dinner at the very beginning of November," he said, "and also the Polish Oplateck" on Christmas Eve.

The Oplateck, explained Mucha, is "a very thin wafer that is shared with others with wishes of all the best."

According to Mucha, the Polish Heritage Month Dinner was attended by fewer than 200 people, and the Polish Oplateck attracted about 300.

Mucha described the crowd at both events as "mostly elderly."

Although the decline of South Bend's Polish community is evident, Mucha said it will be quite a while before it completely dies out.

Mucha pointed to the continued existence of Polish organizations such as the Achievement Forum and the Chopin Fine Arts Club as evidence of the staying power of many Polish traditions.

"They don't care much about language," Mucha said of the Polish clubs, "but they like to socialize with people who care about Polish traditions."

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Article 6

In New York, Gospel Resounds in African Tongues

DANIEL J. WAKIN

Every Sunday, in more than 100 churches across New York City, pastors preach the Gospel in languages like Ibo, Twi and Ga. Conga drums drive songs of praise. Swaths of kente cloth cover bodies swaying in the pews.

An explosion of African immigrant churches in the past 15 years has helped reshape religious worship in the city. The surge is creating oases of Christian faith for newcomers from Nigeria, Ghana, Congo, Ethiopia and other countries and fueling an evangelical movement along the province of Latinos and African-Americans.

"They're having an impact beyond the African church," said Tony Carnes, a sociologist of religion and a co-editor of "New York Glory: Religions in the City."

"The African churches are bringing new vitality and new ways of doing things to African-American and other churches," he added.

As membership increases, the churches are growing more visible in their neighborhoods. "People walk in and find community—friendly, African hospitality," Mr. Carnes said. "And second, there's this big emphasis on spiritual power in their services." As African churches attract increasing numbers of white worshipers, they can serve as a bridge between races, he added.

In some cases, churches founded by white missionaries during the colonial conquest of 19th-century Africa are sending their own missionaries here. Many of the churches have close ties to denominations back home and use the same hymnals and prayer books. They import pastors or send them home to the mother church for training.

The movement in the United States has been lightly chronicled, but it is now drawing the interest of scholars of religion. Mark Gornik, a Presbyterian minister, is writing his doctoral dissertation at the University of Edinburgh on New York's African churches.

"Africans are taking their faith to Africans," he said, adding that in the city alone, he has counted at least 110 African immigrant congregations that have sprouted since the late 1980's.

They have names like the Apostolic Church of Ghana, Deeper Life Bible Church (Nigeria), Emmanuel Worship Center International (Ethiopian) and the Lighthouse Church of Ghana.

"What's happening in African churches is largely at the beginning," Mr. Gornik said. "They're very responsive to human needs. It is a home away from home for people."

That is exactly how Daniel Berkoh, 53, a member of the Church of the Pentecost in the Williamsbridge section of the Bronx, sees it. "It's like being among my people," he said during a Palm Sunday service. "It makes me feel as if I'm back home in Ghana. If I go to any of the other churches, I won't see this."

Denominations have been multiplying. For example, the Redeemed Christian Church of God, a global Pentecostal movement based in Nigeria, came to New York in 1995 and now has 14 branches in the city, said the Rev. Nimi Wariboko, the pastor of a congregation in Brooklyn.

African churches can serve as a bridge between races.

The Presbyterian Church of Ghana, its roots planted by Swiss missionaries 175 years ago, has two outposts in the Bronx, one in Harlem and one in Brooklyn. The Celestial Church of Christ, founded in Benin but with a largely Nigerian membership, lists 12 New York City branches on its Web site.

Dozens of other independent congregations have popped up because individual African pastors received the call. African congregations also coalesce within mainline churches like the Methodist and Roman Catholic Churches.

But the most rapid expansion has come from Pentecostal and evangelical Christianity, which has surged in Africa and in other parts of the developing world. That energy has found an ignition point in a city where a tradition of religious tolerance and pluralism intersects with large-scale immigration.

Most of the African congregations are from Nigeria and Ghana, sub-Saharan Africa's largest contributors of immigrants. But there are growing numbers of other ethnic congregations.

According to census figures, New York's African population doubled from 1980 to 1990, and again before 2000, when

95,000 African-born people were counted. The number is probably higher because the count does not include more recent arrivals and many illegal immigrants.

The population is expected to grow even more this decade, said Peter Lobo, the deputy director of the population division of the Department of City Planning, who characterized the new arrivals as "overwhelmingly highly educated and professional."

On Palm Sunday, about 500 worshipers filled the main sanctuary of the Church of the Pentecost. The left-most section of chairs was filled by men; women dominated the right section, with some mixing in the middle section. In Ghana, the separation would be strict, but here, church elders make concessions.

The women, wearing traditional African dresses and head wraps, were a riot of color—green, yellow, black and purple. The congregation sang hymns with the vibratoless astringency of African choruses. A band kept them rocking with a reggae-gospel beat. Voices quickly rose in a cacophony of prayer and speaking in tongues.

As the noise diminished, one voice arose. A woman stood, while the others sat with their eyes closed and heads bowed. She began to pour out words, prophesying in Twi, a major language of Ghana. "Those living in sin should repent or else God will bring his wrath upon them!" a worshiper translated for a visitor.

More hymns in Twi followed, and Pastor David Tekper's sermon. An interpreter near the altar rendered it into English, although Mr. Tekper held an English service earlier, in one example of how his church is trying to reach out to others.

"Jesus has done his work on the cross," he preached. "He has delivered you. He has saved you." After each phrase, the congregation roared back with, "Wagye wo" (You have been saved).

Before the service, Mr. Tekper and Apostle Albert Amoah, leader of the Church of the Pentecost in the United States, talked about their efforts toward the church's growth. The church has five branches in New York and on Long Island and at least 57 in a dozen districts around the nation.

It is the largest Pentecostal denomination in Ghana, Mr. Tekper and Mr. Amoah said. The American wing was started in the Bronx in 1986 by a handful of immigrants as an informal prayer group.

Like many Pentecostal churches, it is trying to reach beyond ethnic borders.

"We also need to attract much more of the Americans," Mr. Amoah said. "The church is universal. The kingdom is transcultural, transethnic."

Mr. Tekper acknowledged that progress had been slow. Maybe the services should be shorter than the usual three or four hours, he mused, or maybe African dress should be discouraged. Mr. Amoah added, "But we need to be careful to not cut off our own people."

Small churches, too, are trying to bring in non-Africans.

"When I was called, God didn't tell me to make it an African church," said the Rev. Eddie Okyere, pastor of the Miracle Church of Christ in Prospect Heights, Brooklyn. Mr. Okyere, who was a postal worker in Ghana, came to the United States and attended a Brooklyn branch of the Full Gospel Bible Institute while working as a dietary assistant. He was ordained in 1990 and opened his church four years later.

His congregation of 120 includes Africans, white Americans, Haitians and Caribbean natives. "Jesus didn't come from one particular group," he said.

The Full Gospel Believers' Church of Harlem, whose congregation is mainly from the Ivory Coast, sends preachers to the streets to bring people into its sanctuary on First Avenue and 120th Street. It also runs a food pantry. Its pastor, Victor Nimba, began preaching in his native Abidjan. "My heart was burning for having my ministry over here in America," he said.

Many African churches are pushing roots down deeply, either by affiliating with national denominations, like the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), or joining worldwide movements, said Moses Biney, pastor of a Presbyterian Church of Ghana congregation in the Bronx and a doctoral candidate at Princeton Theological Seminary.

So-called African independent churches, which are indigenous to the countries and incorporate local practices, export themselves; missionary-fostered churches that grow to strength on their own preserve Western elements, like elders who govern the church, general assemblies and some liturgy and hymns.

"These churches don't start as a way of evangelizing or proselytizing," Mr. Biney said. "They start as a way of forming communities and dealing with new conditions. Then they begin to focus on other people."

The new churches display a striking variety of worship styles and histories, and often have strict codes of behavior: no smoking, no drinking, no eating of pork or "crawling animals," no lipstick in church. They help nurture African customs like naming ceremonies.

At the Christ Apostolic Church in Brooklyn, congregants bring jugs of water to be blessed by the pastor, Abraham Oyedige, a respected leader referred to as "Daddy," said Dale Irvin, the academic dean and professor of world Christianity at New York Theological Seminary. Members drink or wash with the water throughout the week before special occasions, for informal blessings, or for illness. "The water becomes a very powerful healing symbol," Professor Irvin said.

These churches create a cultural refuge, he said. "They are a way for Africans to pass on to their children their African values," particularly for African immigrants who see their children quickly assimilating into African-American culture.

Some churches also provide an array of social services, like help with immigration problems, jobs and health counseling.

Mr. Wariboko, the Redeemed Christian Church minister, said the "African world view," in which the spiritual world can hold sway over the physical world, tallied closely to the world view of the Bible.

In this view, it also meshes well with the exuberant worship style of Pentecostalism, marked by an emphasis on conver-

sion, the power of the Holy Spirit, close attention to the Bible and gifts like the ability to prophesy, speak in tongues and heal.

For Kwasi Ohene, 47, belonging to the Presbyterian Church of Ghana congregation in Harlem lets him strike a cultural balance. "You live in America, and also you live in Ghana," he said. His father-in-law died recently, and the congregation is helping to pay for the body's return to Ghana, where tradition says burial should take place. "Since we are from the same place, people understand that," he said.

As Mr. Ohene spoke in Mount Morris Ascension Church on West 122nd Street, where his church rents space, Gashishie Aguedze waited outside for the services to end. Spread on the sidewalk were rows of fat yams from Ghana, tins of Africa Queen-brand mackerel and red palm oil for cooking. He fully expected them to sell out.

Article 7

At a Crossroad

In Brooklyn, an Evolving Ethnicity

The Italian immigrants who came to Brooklyn, New York, in the mid-twentieth century are gradually aging and moving away. The Federation of Italian-American Organizations in Brooklyn is hoping to cultivate their cultural identity with new Italian language programs and community centers.

DELIZIA FLACCAVENTO

The streets of Bensonhurst, a Brooklyn neighborhood in New York City, are dotted with pasticcerie, paesani clubs, pizzeria, barber shops and tailors—examples of how Italian immigrants overcame homesickness by incorporating the food and habits of the old country into their new neighborhood's daily rhythms.

But, as the last wave of these immigrants from the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s ages, these last bastions of their culture are disappearing. Faced with watching their heritage fade away, some Brooklyn residents are using language, athletic, and social programs as modern methods of preserving their heritage and attracting young Italian Americans back to the neighborhoods their parents left.

"First-generation Italian Americans struggled and they succeeded in order to survive. That time is gone," says Brooklyn resident G. Jack Spatola, chairman of the Federation of Italian-American Organizations in Brooklyn, which represents 44 local associations. "A new generation has been brought up, an American generation that is proud of its Italian heritage but wants more than a few tables and decks of cards to be motivated to come together and share their common roots."

The Neighborhood

Things have changed considerably since the days when 18th Avenue between 65th and 75th Streets was an Italian "enclave" where newcomers could speak Italian to shop and socialize. Today, more recent Chinese and Russian immigrants are buying the businesses and houses that once belonged to Italians.

In the early 1980s, there were more than 600,000 Italian Americans in Brooklyn, according to research by sociologist Jerome Krase, a professor at Brooklyn College of the City University of New York. Less than 200,000 remain, according to the 2000 U.S. Census. Rising real estate costs coupled with the desire for better schools and a less urban lifestyle have led second-generation Italian Americans to relocate to Staten Island, New Jersey and Long Island, New York.

As has already happened on Mulberry Street in Manhattan, this part of New York City is losing much of its Italian cultural identity. Although Brooklyn still has a number of pasticcerie where one can smell and taste centuries of culinary tradition, the neighborhood is changing. In the streets, the sight of elderly men wearing tailored topcoats, cuffed trousers, and coppolas—traditional Sicilian floppy berets with short visors—reinforces the awareness that a way of life is fading away.

"People in a sense, they're nostalgic," said Brooklyn resident Jim Grundy, an employee of the Federation. "They see the change and they wish it could always stay the same, but it never is that way of course."

On 18th Avenue, 86th Street and in downtown Brooklyn near the port, there are many clubs of paesani—immigrants born in the same city, town, or village—such as the Society of the Citizens of Pozzallo, and the Sciacca, Vizzini, Militello and Palermo. Membership in these clubs is dwindling.

Emanuele Tumino, a retired carpenter who has lived in Brooklyn for nearly 45 years, spends his days talking of the old days, drinking coffee and playing cards at the Societá Figli di Ragusa on 18th Avenue, a social club for immigrants born in the Sicilian town of Ragusa. "In those times, there was nothing in Italy, otherwise would we ever have come to America?" he said in January, explaining both the impetus that drove him to the United States and his longing for the old country's way of life.

"The immigrants, mostly from the South and from Sicily, were poor and unskilled and had a real need for the assistance and the comfort of the paesani societies, which also helped them maintain a feeling of closeness to home," explained Bay Ridge resident Frank Susino.

But despite their once-vital role, many of these social clubs are losing membership, acknowledged Salvatore Fronterré,

director of the Patronato Ital-Uil, a Brooklyn office funded by the Italian government that helps first-generation Italian Americans with bureaucratic problems and pensions. "Many clubs are closing down and nothing can really be done to stop history from taking its course," he said.

Saint Dominic's Roman Catholic Church on 20th Avenue in Bensonhurst is one of the very few churches still offering daily masses in Italian. Although Sunday services are full, Father Ellis Tommaseo predicts that won't last much longer. "I came to the U.S. less than one year ago; people were so happy and excited to hear that a priest would be assigned here from Italy," he said in January. "I found a very warm environment, but we are already fewer than we were when I got here. In less than 15 years, there will be nobody left."

Creating a Change

Father Tommaseo strongly believes that language is the key to preserving cultural heritage and, outside the church, has joined the Federation of Italian-American Organizations of Brooklyn language program. He teaches today's Italian to adults who know only old dialects and children who want to connect with their heritage.

Similarly, Federation members are working to attract young Italian Americans now scattered across New York City back to traditionally Italian communities.

"The community is concerned because the young people are not staying," said Grundy. "They're moving out to the suburbs and things like that."

Spatola says the disappearance of Brooklyn's Italian soul can be avoided only if the Italians remaining in the area unite to invest in leisure and cultural centers. Therefore, paesani social clubs could be replaced by Italian-American community centers offering athletic and leisure facilities, language and cooking classes, libraries, art galleries and movie screening spaces.

In May, the Federation was in the final negotiations to purchase a property in Bensonhurst for the area's first such Italian-American community center. An estimated $6 million is needed to build the center, much of which could come from the New York City government, said Grundy, the Federation's project coordinator.

The Federation plans to open a two-story structure and gradually add two more stories, creating a full-fledged community center with gymnasium, swimming pool, community meeting center and classrooms, Grundy said. Eventually, the center would house all of the disparate youth outreach, language, and soccer programs now offered by the Federation all over Brooklyn.

Such programs can also provide support to the children of Italian immigrants. Born in Brooklyn to Sicilian parents, Salvina Barresi, 23, often feels trapped between the American drive to do what is best for the individual and the Italian pressure to do what is best for the family. She still cannot answer whether she is Italian, American, or both. "During my last trip to Italy, I was Sicilian in Rome, American in Sicily and Sicilian again in New York," she said.

Salvina's mother, Giovanna, said she considers herself an Italian living in America. Many immigrants feel similarly, but in at least one borough, some are carving out a place where their children can have the best of both worlds.

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Article 8

Mélange Cities

The disruption that immigrants bring is often a benefit.

BLAIR A. RUBLE

Tenstions and conflict get the headlines when peoples make contact, but historically migration is not a singular event tied always to a "crisis." Migrants of all sorts—immigrants, emigrants, refugees, displaced persons, guest workers—have become a significant presence in cities around the world. According to the UN Human Settlements Program, there are approximately 175 million official international migrants worldwide, not including those without complete documentation. Even this massive movement of people is not unprecedented. During the past 500 years, Europeans began to inhabit the rest of the world and nearly 10 million African slaves were forced to migrate to the Americas; another 48 million people left Europe for the Americas and Australia between 1800 and 1925. That is not to mention the tens of millions of people who have migrated across other national boundaries, continental divides, and oceans during the past half-century. Migration is simply part and parcel of human existence. And it has always brought fruitful encounters as well as conflict.

The transformative power of today's migration is easiest to see not in established "mélange cities" such as New York but in traditionally more insular communities such as Washington, D.C., and Montreal, which were long divided by race, language, culture, religion, ethnicity, or class. Once split along single fault lines between two core groups—whites and blacks in Washington, French-speakers and English-speakers in Montreal—these urban centers have become new mélange cities, and the evidence suggests that we should view such transformations with more hope than fear.

Montreal offers the clearest example in North America of the creative disruption wrought by new immigrants. In that city divided—and defined—for decades by conflicts between Francophones and Anglophones, a curious story appeared in the press a couple of years ago. During the depths of a typically harsh Quebec February, it was reported that Filipino and Hispanic parents were trekking with their sick children through snow-filled streets to a small apartment complex in the fringe neighborhood of St.-Laurent, where they desperately beseeched an iconlike portrait of the Virgin Mary to cure them. Abderezak Mehdi, the Muslim manager of the low-rise building, claimed to have discovered the Virgin's image in the garbage. According to Mehdi and Greek Melkite Catholic priest Michel Saydé, the Virgin shed tears of oil that could cure the ill and tormented. Michel Parent, the chancellor of the Roman Catholic archdiocese of Montreal, cautioned skepticism, noting that "while it is true that nothing is impossible for God, historically, that is not how God acts."

This small and almost comically inclusive multicultural scene of healing, which unfolded in a dreary neighborhood built at a time when Montreal was starkly divided between speakers of French and of English, captures some of the positive aspects, as well as some of the tensions, of a change that has occurred over the past three decades or so, as immigrants and their Canadian-born children have grown to number more than a quarter of the city's population.

Immigrants are not the only force for change. Montreal's growth into a sprawling metropolitan region laced by freeways that provide a new organizing structure of daily life has rendered many old cultural and geographical boundaries meaningless. The Internet is likewise no friend to the old order. But it is the newcomers, who have no stake in the city's past divisions, who have had a singular impact on its political life. The once-powerful Francophone *sovereigntiste* movement, which long pressed for the secession of the entire province of Quebec from Canada, has lost momentum in considerable measure because of opposition from immigrant groups. Those groups were an essential component of the very narrow majority that defeated the last referendum on Quebec sovereignty in 1995, 50.6 percent to 49.4 percent. Pro-sovereignty politicians have since been looking for ways to court the immigrant vote. The communally based populism that once dominated Montreal politics is giving way, slowly but surely, to a new pragmatism more suited to a world in which communities compete for investment and bond ratings.

Montreal maybe further along the road to true cultural diversity than most North American cities, but its experience is hardly unique. Metropolitan Washington, D.C., another historically divided city, was the United States' fifth largest recipient of legal migrants during the 1990s, and it is beginning to experience some of the same sort of change affecting Montreal.

Twenty-first-century Washington is already dramatically different from the "Chocolate City, Vanilla Suburbs" days of the 1970s. New arrivals from El Salvador and Ukraine, Ethiopia and Vietnam, Brazil and India, and dozens of other countries, as well as other areas of the United States, have fanned out across an expanding metropolitan region that extends from Frederick, Maryland, 50 miles to the west, to the shores of the Chesapeake Bay and beyond to the east; from north of Baltimore more than 100 miles south to Fredericksburg, Virginia. The region as a whole is an incredible polyglot blend. The neighborhoods in the inner-ring Virginia suburb of South Arlington defined by zip code 22204, as well as zip code 20009 in the city's trendy Adams Morgan–Mt. Pleasant area, are each home to residents from more than 130 different countries, according to a group of Brookings Institution analysts led by Audrey Singer. Yet not very

many Americans or even Washingtonians appear aware that their capital has become a mélange city.

New arrivals from El Salvador, Ukraine, Ethiopia, Vietnam, Brazil, India, and many other countries have made America's capital a mélange city.

After Congress gave up its direct oversight of the capital city and reinstated partial home rule in the 1970s, local affairs quickly came to be dominated by the polities of race. As children of the civil rights battles of the 1960s, many of Washington's first elected officials appeared to view local politics as a new version of the nation's great racial struggle, and symbolic polities took precedence over pragmatic city management. This civil rights regime began to flay as the city's financial and management problems grew, and by the time Mayor Marion Barry was arrested in 1990 on charges of smoking crack cocaine, the dream of the city's activist leadership to transform D.C. into a showcase for their values and policies had been shattered. Congress essentially placed the city in receivership by appointing a financial control board in 1995.

The collapse of local government prompted a new generation of neighborhood leaders to enter local politics, shifting attention to pragmatic concerns about city services and neighborhood quality of life—a focus that began to allow immigrants into the city's political mix even as their presence became a subject of debate. During his 2002 reelection campaign, for example, Mayor Anthony Williams stirred controversy by proposing that noncitizens should be allowed to vote in local elections. Arriving in large numbers just at the moment of municipal regime shift, immigrants helped mold a new, broader political environment in which race yielded its preeminence to more pragmatic concerns. When the first major issue of the new era emerged in 2004 in the form of a controversy over the financing of a new baseball stadium, most local observers were not prepared for the spectacle of a raging city council debate waged virtually without any reference to race.

In other new mélange cities, the story plays out in different ways. The Latinization of Denver's population and voter base has encouraged both political parties to reach out to minority voters. Once-sleepy Charlotte, North Carolina, has been transformed by, among other things, a 932 percent increase in its Hispanic population between 1980 and 2000. The country's second-largest city, Los Angeles, elected Antonio Villaraigosa in 2005 as its first Hispanic mayor since it was a village of 6,000 people, back in 1872.

Similar shifts are occurring throughout the world. In the Ukrainian capital of Kyiv, immigrants from Vietnam, China, Pakistan, and the Middle East are blunting the force of a nationwide population decline, and officials are beginning to speak of migration as a long-term answer to the country's economic and demographic decline.

Even as seemingly homogenous a society as Japan has felt the impact of immigration. Japan's shrinking population and economic uncertainty are helping to drive companies to relocate factories abroad. Japan's reputation for homogeneity is not unearned, and national policies do not encourage immigration, but local leaders in some cities have decided that the best way to keep their local economies healthy is to actively seek out migrants from abroad.

Few cities anywhere in the world have been as aggressive in pursing international migrants as Hamamatsu. A city of more than half a million located half way between Tokyo and Osaka, Hamamatsu boasts major Honda, Yamaha, and Suzuki factories. Realizing that the city would lose its economic base without new residents, municipal officials began to recruit workers from Japanese migrant communities in Brazil and Peru. The officials assumed—rather naively, it would seem to American eyes—that given their Japanese heritage, the immigrants would easily fit into local neighborhoods and workplaces. In fact, the migrants were descendants of Japanese who had left the home islands as much as a century before. They were Brazilian and Peruvian more than they were Japanese.

As a result, Hamamatsu—like Montreal, Washington, and many other mélange cities—is no longer the community it was. There are four Portuguese newspapers, four Brazilian schools and a Peruvian school, Portuguese and Spanish community centers, and numerous samba nightclubs. City hall now publishes local laws and regulations in several languages, and municipal leaders have learned to embrace Brazilian holidays as their own, often using them as launching pads for local political campaigns.

Other cities in Japan have been changing as well. Osaka, long the home of Japan's largest Korean community, publishes city documents in nearly a half-dozen languages. Sapporo and other communities on the island of Hokkaido post street signs in Russian. Tens of thousands of city residents of all ages and races turn out for Kobe's annual samba festival.

Migrants, though still few in number, have brought significant change to Japan. Some of that change is measurable and lamentable, such as increasing income inequality, rising crime rates, and enervated traditional institutions. Other changes that cannot be measured neatly may be creating opportunities for communities to escape dysfunctional institutions and patterns of life. One unexpected effect of the search by Hamamatsu and other Japanese cities for labor from abroad has been pressure from below on the traditionally hyper-centralized Japanese state to cede some central control over immigration policy.

How should we weigh the negative and positive impacts of immigration? Is all change for the worse? Heightened anxiety over international terrorism has cast suspicion on cities themselves as a social form and on migration as a social phenomenon. The impulse to withdraw into a cocoon of homogeneity increasingly undermines the acceptance of difference. The experiences of mélange cities such as Montreal, Washington, and Hamamatsu show us another course. Voluntarily or not, such cities have come to represent lively alternatives to a 21st-century metropolitan future in which everyone seeks protection from others unlike themselves. Despite the new mélange cities' obvious imperfections, their enormous intercultural vitality provides the basis for successful strategies for a 21st century in which people's movement around the world remains a fact of human existence.

Blair A. Ruble is the director of the Wilson Center's Kennan Institute and its Comparative Urban Studies Program. His most recent book, *Creating Diversity Capital* (2005), examines the impact of transnational migrants on Montreal, Washington, and Kyiv.

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Article 9

Greektown's Rise No Myth

Revival: Renovated rowhomes and other signs of new life have residents optimistic.

ANTERO PIETILA

When a completely redone rowhouse sold for more than the $150,000 asking price recently, it was seen as a harbinger of Greektown's comeback.

What made community activists particularly happy was that the two-bedroom Newkirk Street house was snapped up in just four days; properties in that Southeast Baltimore enclave used to languish on the market for months without as much as a nibble.

"It's an uphill battle, but we are turning the corner," said John E. Gavrilis, executive director of nonprofit Greektown Community Development Corp. "There is a lot of strength in this community, but there are also lots of weaknesses."

Walking along Eastern Avenue, near Ponca Street, within sight of Johns Hopkins Bayview Medical Center, Gavrilis passed an alarming number of empty storefronts next to thriving restaurants and coffeehouses where knots of men gathered to play cards or shoot the breeze in Greek. On side streets were boarded-up rowhouses, along with decrepit single-family homes that absentee speculators have illegally converted into multiple rental units.

Gavrilis, a retired city police colonel and former commissioner, thinks such problems can be corrected.

"People will invest in their properties if they know they can get a return," he said, listing Greektown's strengths: restaurants with a regional following; St. Nicholas Greek Orthodox Church; and homeownership that is climbing again after dipping perilously during the last decade.

The rowhouse at 402 S. Newkirk St. is the first of 20 houses the development corporation plans to rehabilitate during the next two years and sell to homeowners. A ribbon-cutting ceremony will be held there at 10:30 a.m. tomorrow. Sen. Barbara A. Mikulski, Mayor Martin O'Malley and Peter G. Angelos, the lawyer and Orioles owner, are expected to attend.

In a way, "Greektown" is a misnomer for the area. The neighborhood of 1,346 homes and 60 businesses is a melting pot—always has been.

When Greeks started moving to Baltimore in droves in the early 1900s, many settled in houses built on hills east of Highlandtown because Bethlehem Steel had jobs and the No. 26 streetcar ran to Sparrows Point, said Helen Johns, a lifelong resident. At the time, the community had a strong presence of Finns—whose national flag's colors are the same blue and white as Greece's—as well as a sprinkling of German and Irish residents.

"It was always a diverse community," said Johns.

Ask Lefteris "Lefty" Tamaris, who has lost the lease on his corner grocery. The next operator will be Indian. Several years ago, Tamaris himself displaced a Chinese-owned restaurant, when he opened a fish store.

"This used to be very crowded with Greek families," said Steve Yianakis, who came from Greece in 1947 and put in "20 years, 6 months" at the Sparrows Point plant. He now operates Athenaikon, a music and souvenir shop.

Yianakis, who serves as host of a Greek-language radio show each Sunday, said that quotas dried up immigration.

Those few who come nowadays tend to be professionals, learn the language quickly and seek their American dream in the suburbs, he said. They are like the children and grandchildren of earlier immigrants who want to live in Essex, Timonium or Bel Air, instead of Greektown.

"If I was young, I would go, too," he said wistfully. His wife, Katina, nodded in agreement.

That geographic dispersal of the Greek community can be seen at St. Nicholas' afternoon school. Seventy-six pupils come there from throughout the region twice a week.

"The main focus is Greek language, reading and writing," said Carol Demetrios, a PTA member, who is not Greek, but learned the language after she fell in love with her future husband.

Efforts to revitalize Greektown have not been without disputes. An early confrontation—which continues to linger—erupted over Eastern Avenue nightspot owners' desire to increase adult entertainment. The development corporation fought a go-go bar and other nightclubs, insisting they had contributed to the decline of the neighborhood by harboring drug traffic, prostitution and the fencing of stolen goods.

Then there is the $1.3 million cultural center of St. Nicholas Greek Orthodox Church. The new complex has been virtually completed for two years. But because of a quarrel between the church and the contractor over final tasks, it was never finished and stands empty and vandalized behind a padlocked fence.

An agreement was reached with the contractor last year. George Perdikakis, board president of St. Nicholas, said construction will restart soon and that "we'll have some use [of the building] within 180 days."

Architect Jim Shetler, who has served as a consultant to the community development corporation, thinks "Greektown is going to be fine."

He said the area is desirable because it's close to a major employer, Johns Hopkins Bayview Medical Center, and to major roads, such as the Harbor Tunnel Thruway and Interstate 95.

Shetler is also optimistic because the city is close to starting a $7 million reconstruction and beautification of Eastern Avenue and the underpass that connects Highlandtown and Greektown. Whether it's road improvements or housing, construction increases confidence, Shetler said.

"Scaffolding is great for neighborhoods," he said. "When you see scaffolding and dumpsters, positive things are happening."

UNIT 2

Echoes from the Past and Pieces of Our Ambiguous Legacies

Unit Selections

10. **The Slave History You Don't Know,** Scott McLemee
11. **Paying for Jefferson's Sins,** Algis Valiunas
12. **How the GOP Conquered the South,** Michael Nelson

Key Points to Consider

- In your opinion, are the issues related to slavery and the history of the South—particularly the impact of large-scale plantation slavery—ongoing influences and thus relevant to contemporary public issues?
- Does the grouping of people into categories and divisions such as black or white have the same meaning in all regions of this country? Are such categories relevant for self-identification? For government policy? For the law? For understanding pluralism in America?
- What stereotypes of American regions have you encountered? Explain and discuss the question of regional and universal values.
- Does the historical archaeology of your personal identity shape your view of race and ethnicity? In what respect does the past have current personal and social significance?
- Should the U.S. Census Bureau collect religious data?

Student Web Site

www.mhcls.com/online

Internet References

Further information regarding these Web sites may be found in this book's preface or online.

U.S. Census Bureau
http://www.census.gov

Race and ethnic relations, discrimination, and population diversity are essential dimensions of American history. Certain aspects of American history are broached in these articles: the legacy of slavery, segregation, and racialist conquest and immigration, as well as Anglo-American colonial developments. These features of social history call attention to the original context of the American experiment in the formation of a large republic. A complete social history would include:

- the variety and specificity of indigenous, migrant, and imported populations.
- the particular scale and regional uniqueness of demographic configurations and patterns of settlement.
- the historically embedded characteristics of dominant cultures.

The history of interaction with minority groups and recent patterns related to immigration—especially the diffusion of settlements and the formation of new enclaves—are rooted in the exclusionary practices of the past. The material in this unit establishes the base for the ongoing process of peopling America, and the experiences of new immigrants. These articles illustrate the accessibility and attractiveness of the legacy of slavery, conquest, urbanization, group mobility, and the racial and ethnic succession of enclave neighborhoods. The specific dynamics of group isolation and integration point to the complexity generated by public policy—most importantly, the designations available for legal remedies for racial and ethnic isolation and exclusion. Race and ethnic relations was marked by various actions of the U.S. Supreme Court, most recently in decisions regarding affirmative action: *Grutter v. Bollinger* and *Gratz v. Bollinger.* But this movement in public policy does not stand alone and should be read within the larger framework established by the original U.S. Constitution. The American record illustrates the way that the American founders handled ethnic pluralism. In most respects, they ignored the cultural and linguistic variety within; and between the 13 original states, instead adopted a legal system that guaranteed religious exercise free from government interference, due process of law, and freedom of speech and the press. The founders, however, conspicuously compromised their claims of unalienable rights and democratic republicanism with regard to the constitutional status of Africans in bondage and indigenous Native Americans. Even after the

Civil War and the inclusion of constitutional amendments that ended slavery exclusionary, practices continued. Decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court helped to establish a legal system in which inequality and ethnic discrimination—both political and private—were legally permissible.

The articles in this unit focus on and the larger scale of human affairs, especially regional forces that shaped cultural patterns. The South, unlike New England and much of the northern industrial states, has deeper ambiguities about the uprooting force of bourgeois and market-driven universalism. Until recently, when immigration patterns occurred, the absence of large-scale immigration and urbanization limited its historical experience with diversity and pluralism. Southern regional culture is not homogeneous but does have embedded in it a particularity that is well worth exploring in more detail for its impact on ethnic and racial group formation. Interaction, in the context of the southern experience and the process of separation and integration, is unique and yet formative to a good deal of our national discourse on race relations. The contextual character of group relations is well established in the social sciences as a powerful explanatory variable. In fact, ethnicity as a local identity may be utterly and entirely contextual.

The presence of a politically relevant past and the invocation of religious warrants for group conflict have indicated the need for new approaches to peacekeeping and educational strategies for meeting and transcending group differences. Ethnic relations have erupted into warfare in Africa, where conflicts have shattered emerging states and thus challenged the hopeful myth of postcolonial renewal as well as the racial/ethnic myth of black solidarity. But Africa's emerging countries are not alone. The Middle East, central Europe, India and China, Canada, Northern Ireland, and the Balkans are additional venues of destructive conflict. Each of these simmering cauldrons—not melting pots—illustrates the stakes and consequences of unresolved conflict and distrust concerning land, religion, culture, leadership, and economic production and distribution. Each also shows the rewards and recognitions that fuel human passions, ambitions, and the will to dominate and to govern the affairs and destinies of various peoples that cohabit contiguous regions.

Article 10

The Slave History You Don't Know

A scholar's startling study of the Southwest wins unprecedented acclaim

SCOTT MCLEMEE

Last Year, when James F. Brooks was an assistant professor of history at the University of California at Santa Barbara, he published *Captives and Cousins: Slavery, Kinship, and Community in the Southwest Borderlands* (University of North Carolina Press). Around the time the book appeared, he got tenure.

The very day he learned of that decision, Mr. Brooks made one of his own. Politely declining the promotion, he finished the semester. Then he moved with his family to Santa Fe, where he became director of the press at the School of American Research—an institution with a puzzling name, given that it has neither faculty nor students.

It is, rather, a think tank for interdisciplinary studies in the humanities. Resident scholars and visitors with fellowships discuss topics such as bioethics, material culture, and the slippery concept of community. Showing a visitor around the adobe buildings on the property, Mr. Brooks seems quite at home. Santa Fe figures prominently in his work on Southwestern history. And the school's interdisciplinary focus is very much in keeping with his scholarship—which has, over the past few months, won him sudden acclaim.

This spring, *Captives and Cousins* made an unprecedented sweep of the history profession's top prizes. Mr. Brooks received the Frederick Jackson Turner Award from the Organization of American Historians, honoring the work of a first-time author writing on an important aspect of American history. He shared the Bancroft Award, given by Columbia University each year to two authors of distinguished works in American history and diplomacy. His book also received the Francis Parkman Prize, given by the Society of American Historians "to promote literary distinction in historical writing."

Winning the Parkman automatically makes *Captives and Cousins* a selection of the History Book Club. "I guess that means my book will sell two more copies," says the author in a sardonic moment, "since it's not about the Civil War or the Nazis." Indeed, his topic has almost completely disappeared from America's historical consciousness, not to mention its coffee tables. *Captives and Cousins* reconstructs more than four centuries of the slave economy taking shape in the deserts and flatlands of what is now the Southwestern United States.

Accounts of slavery in America tend to begin in 1619, with the first shipload of Africans sold in Virginia. "People think of it as something that mostly existed in the Black Belt," says Mr. Brooks, referring to the region of the deep South where African slaves worked the land. "And people assume that it ended in 1865." But a different form of bondage emerged in the 1500s, when Spanish invaders encountered the indigenous people of North America. A "distinct slave system," as Mr. Brooks calls it—similar to chattel slavery in some ways, but distinct in others—grew out of ethnic conflicts and commercial exchanges in the region that came under Spanish influence. And it existed until well after the Civil War.

Captives and Cousins is so recent that only a few reviews—overwhelmingly favorable—have appeared in scholarly journals. But something of the enthusiasm it generates among readers may be discerned from the comments of Catherine Clinton, a scholar at the Gilder Lehrman Center at Yale University, who says her policy nowadays is to ignore every new publication she possibly can while finishing her own book on Harriet Tubman. While staying at a friend's place, Ms. Clinton noticed a copy of *Captives and Cousins* and started to glance through it.

"Because I'm under deadline," she says, "I don't read *anything* unless it is directly related to my research. But I opened up this book and could not put it down. I was just knocked out by the fact that someone could be writing about slavery in such a new and totally fresh way that expands our horizons geographically and chronologically. It's so rare that you get bowled over by a work in your own field."

Virtual Unknown

In the 44 years that the Bancroft, Parkman, and Turner awards have run concurrently, it has occasionally happened that a single book received two of the prizes—but never, until now, all three. Until winning this triple-header, Mr. Brooks was unknown beyond the circle of those interested in Southwestern history. At the annual convention of the Organization of American Historians, in April, scholars wondered just who this prodigy might be.

Bits and pieces of an answer emerge from conversation. At 48, he is not, strictly speaking, a young scholar. Yet he is still at a fairly early stage of his professional career, having taken some detours on his way through academe. Mr. Brooks grew up in Colorado, where he lived and worked on a ranch. He got his GED after dropping out of high school, then went to college. But his undergraduate studies were interrupted for about 10 years as he built an advertising and graphic-design studio in Denver.

In his early 30s, he sold the business and finished his B.A. at the University of Colorado at Boulder. He entered the history program at the University of California at Davis in 1989, where his dissertation was an early version of *Captives and Cousins.* He spent some postdoctoral time at the Institute for Advanced Study, in Princeton, N.J., among other places, and won a number of prizes for his scholarly articles. His decision to leave the professorial track at Santa Barbara to enter the world of academic publishing—motivated in part, he says, by Santa Fe's lower cost of living—seems even more anomalous given that he continues to conduct the occasional seminar at his old department. Mr. Brooks may well be the only academic ever to pass up a tenured position in order to become an adjunct at the same university.

"I always chafed against the 'gotta write the book to get tenure' rule," he says. The narrative finesse with which he handles archival material in *Captives and Cousins* seems almost like a reproach to the familiar plodding style of much historiography. So does his extensive use of material from anthropological journals. "The political economy of academic life rewards specialization," he says. "But I found that the kinds of questions historians asked seemed boring, while the ones that anthropologists asked were a lot more interesting."

A Different Kind of Slavery

It was, Mr. Brooks says, a French anthropologist's analysis of slavery in Africa that opened his eyes to how the culture and economy developed in the American Southwest. In *The Anthropology of Slavery* (1986)—which Mr. Brooks read after the University of Chicago Press published it in English translation in 1991—Claude Meillassoux provides a neo-Marxist interpretation of slavery that challenges many of the assumptions that grew out of the experience of the Atlantic slave trade.

The chattel slavery practiced in the American South defined the slave as, in principle, an object available for sale—to be purchased as a source of labor. But the notion of the slave as commodity, said Mr. Meillassoux, worked only in a society characterized by advanced market relations. It didn't apply very well to cultures in which slaves tended to be prisoners taken in combat. Besides their labor, those slaves had symbolic value as proof of a tribe's power and honor.

Or rather, the honor of its men. For, as Mr. Meillassoux's analysis suggested, the role of slavery in Africa was ultimately inseparable from the rules governing gender. Male authority was exercised over both enslaved captives and the tribe's "kin" (the women and children). An enslaved captive might even be transformed into kin, through marriage or adoption—unlike the situation on the Southern plantations, where the line between master and slave was fixed and immutable.

The interaction of violence, honor, and kinship in African slave systems struck Mr. Brooks as key to understanding the zone of contact between the Spanish and Native American groups in the Southwest. Well before the European invasion of America, the lives of indigenous peoples often included the practice of raiding, with members of one tribe enslaving the women and children of another. The importance of the captives went well beyond their ability to toil—or even their value as status symbols. Slaves provided valuable information about the language and way of life of the tribe from which they had been kidnapped. The captors might ransom slaves back to their kin—an exchange that could also serve as the occasion for other useful economic transactions, to the advantage of both groups. Or a slave might be fully assimilated into the captor tribe.

"It sounds like 'soft' slavery when an enslaved person can become kin. But it actually perpetuates the system."

"It sounds like 'soft' slavery when an enslaved person can become kin," says Mr. Brooks. "But it actually perpetuates the system. When a slave becomes kin, you lose that unit of prestige that comes with ownership. If you intend to remain a high-prestige person, that means you have to go get more slaves."

Familiar Territory

When the Spanish arrived, they were by no means shocked at the indigenous captivity system. On the contrary, it was the one thing about the New World that looked familiar. In Spain, Roman Catholics and Muslims alike had been seizing captives from one another for generations—according to analogous codes of manly honor—resulting in similar forms of economic exchange and cultural cross-pollination. Mr. Brooks recounts a story from 1541 involving an Indian slave whom the Spanish dubbed El Turco ("The Turk") because of his resemblance to Islamic captives they had known back home.

"Indian slavery was prohibited again and again by the Spanish crown, which was quite sensitive about this compared to the English," says Mr. Brooks. While Catholic theologians remained undecided on whether or not Africans had souls, they had concluded that Indians did—which made enslaving them a problem, at least in theory. "On the ground, of course, it could be accomplished in any number of ways," says Mr. Brooks. "The subterfuge to develop alternative forms of slavery, without calling it that, was very sophisticated."

What to the ungenerous eye could look like a purchase of slaves from an Indian tribe could be rationalized as an act of Christian charity—their "rescue" from captivity. "Then they would spend the rest of their lives working off the cost of their ransom."

The government in Mexico City—and later, Washington—tried to suppress the slave trade in the Southwest. But captivity was deeply rooted in indigenous folkways, and the growth of ranching fueled the demand for slaves to take care of livestock. The region's relative isolation gave it a degree of cultural and economic autonomy. Only in the late 19th century, as it became more fully integrated into the rest of the country, did the slave system finally disappear.

"We have long understood that when Indians took Spanish captives or when Spaniards seized Indians, these belligerent acts increased tension between the two societies," says David J. Weber, director of the Clements Center for Southwest Studies at Southern Methodist University. "Brooks explains how the seizure of captives also brought Spaniards and Indians closer together."

Back to the Future

The memory of captivity in the Southwest has faded, but its traces are still visible to Mr. Brooks, if not to the untrained eye. One of Santa Fe's popular tourist destinations is the Church of San Miguel, built in 1650. "It's advertised as the oldest church in the country. What they don't usually tell you is that it was built in the heart of the slave community."

Some readers are almost certainly going to be offended by Mr. Brooks's attention to the ambient violence of the history he recounts. The Indians that he portrays aren't New Age icons—peaceful, egalitarian, in touch with the deeper rhythms of the cosmos. The pre-Columbian slave system was by no means as horrific as the Middle Passage, but it was violent even so. And the rape of female slaves by male slave owners may be the one transhistorical invariant across all cultures.

"It might be safer not to look at the brutality between the two races, but he's quite willing to go into that gray area."

"That's where James is taking something of a risk," says Donald Lee Fixico, a professor of American Indian history at the University of Kansas. "It might be safer not to look at the brutality between the two races, but he's quite willing to go into that gray area." What impresses Mr. Fixico is the way Mr. Brooks treats all parties in the conflict "as equally dynamic, with one side not really subordinate to the other."

"What's innovative about his work," says Clifford Geertz, a professor emeritus of social science at the Institute for Advanced Study, "is that he focuses on a field of relationships—the intermixture of people, involved in each other's lives in various ways, so that the usual concepts applying to the various groups don't work very well. I think that's really quite extraordinary."

Mapping a field of relations, working out the terms of engagement for groups that are otherwise distinct. . . . That sounds, in fact, rather like the task of someone overseeing the work at an interdisciplinary research institute, such as the School of American Research. The analogy, Mr. Brooks suggests, goes even further: His work on the slave system is part of a larger concern that he is exploring in a new project—a book called *Nations, Tribes and Cultures: Borderland Peoples and a History for the Twenty-First Century,* now under contract with Harvard University Press.

"There is one question that really interests me," he says. "How do people of diverse backgrounds get along—or not get along—in a landscape without a strong state?" The interactions recounted in *Captives and Cousins* took shape in what he calls "nondominant frontiers, volatile cultural borderlands in which no one group could assert a monopoly of power."

In his work in progress, Mr. Brooks calls the 20th century a time of "stable national borders, homogenous national populations, monopolies of violence, cultural and political hegemonies"—all of which, he notes, "seem to be vanishing in the solvent of global capitalism." The history of the coming decades may, he says, resemble the 19th century more than the 20th.

"You may be done with the past, or think that you are," says Mr. Brooks, "but it's never really finished with you."

Article 11

Paying for Jefferson's Sins

ALGIS VALIUNAS

At a moment when national unity has assumed special importance, a novel demand by a group of black activists is raising the possibility that race relations in the U.S. are about to take an especially divisive turn. What the nascent movement wants is, in brief, financial reparations, and not for any present-day wrong but for the historic crimes of slavery and segregation. Some advocates of reparations have put the squeeze on particular businesses, like the insurance companies—many of them still in existence—that wrote policies for slaves in their masters' names. Others have called for a vast program of spending on education and physical rehabilitation in poorer black neighborhoods. Still others have staged an assault on the U.S. Treasury, demanding a substantial lump-sum payment to each black American.

At the "Millions for Reparations" rally held on the mall in Washington, D.C. this past August, the air was filled with chants of "Black power!" and "Start the revolution!" Charles Barron, a New York City councilman (and former Black Panther), told the gathered crowd, "I want to go up to the closest white person and say, 'You can't understand this, it's a black thing,' and then slap him, just for my mental health." Such better-known inciters as Louis Farrakhan, Al Sharpton, Johnnie Cochran, and Jesse Jackson have also rallied to the cause. On Capitol Hill, Representative John Conyers, the dean of the Congressional Black Caucus and the senior Democrat on the House Judiciary Committee, has pressed for the creation of a federal commission to study the issue.

As the advocates of reparations see it, American society is corrupt at its source. All white Americans have profited from this historical corruption; all black Americans have suffered from it. What remains is for white Americans to take responsibility for the nation's original sin, and in particular for the acts of the founding fathers who brought the country into being.

Among the alleged malefactors of the early republic, none is held to be more odious than Thomas Jefferson. When the sins of the fathers are recited, the failings deemed most egregious tend to be his. Jefferson's life illustrates more neatly than any other the disparity between what America promised and what it delivered, a disparity that remains, in the words of NAACP chairman Julian Bond, "our greatest state embarrassment today." And the reason Jefferson has become the most notorious slave master in American history is that, we are told, he ought to have been the last man ever to hold others in bondage.

Hosting a dinner for American Nobel laureates, President John F. Kennedy lauded the assembled eminences as "the most extraordinary collection of talents . . . that has ever been gathered together at the White House, with the possible exception of when Thomas Jefferson dined alone." The encomium, intended as a witty bow to an acknowledged superior, also reflected a certain barbed ambivalence toward real genius. Jefferson had his violin, his architecture, his library full of classical sages, his collection of mastodon bones. Kennedy had his molls and his James Bond novels, and must seldom have dined alone; he wished to be thought of, and he may have been thought of, as the most intellectually vital President we had had for a long time, but a chasm separated his mind from that of Jefferson.

Everything, absolutely everything, fascinated Thomas Jefferson. He helped to found and served as president of the American Philosophical Society, which devoted itself less to rarefied speculation than to practical concerns in the great American can-do spirit. Father of the University of Virginia, he foresaw the advance of learning into a future whose shape no one could predict but that, he was confident, would leave the past in the dust, giving men greater power over harsh inhuman nature and unruly human nature. Although his classical learning was rich and deep, his heroes were the giants of modern thought—Francis Bacon, Isaac Newton, John Locke. He professed Christianity but in his own defiant fashion, blaming churchmen down the generations for the sophisticated perversion of Jesus' simple and wholly admirable teaching.

In politics, Jefferson had the "vision thing" in abundance. If, as Plato teaches, poets are the creators of the gods, then Jefferson is our arch-poet; he breathed life into the American household deities of equality and liberty. To John Adams he declared his faith in a natural aristocracy of virtue and talent—"the most precious gift of nature for the instruction, the trust, and government of society"—and in the ability of the democratic masses to separate the genuine aristocrats from the pretenders. Picked by the Continental Congress to draft the Declaration of Independence, he formulated the new nation's creed with such eloquence that every American now swears by his best-known words: "We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty & the pursuit of happiness."

Applying these high-minded notions to practical affairs was another matter, and one at which Jefferson was notably less successful. As minister plenipotentiary to France from 1784 to 1789, he was filled with republican contempt at the antics of royalty: the king, he wrote, "hunts one half the day, is drunk the other, and signs whatever he is bid." But he utterly failed to see what the French Revolution would bring, and his predictions of bloodless constitutional reform seem ludicrously sunny in retrospect. More disturbing was his readiness to believe that, come what may, glorious republican virtue would eventually sprout from the reddened Parisian streets.

A decade later, as the nation's third President, Jefferson again struggled to accommodate his principles to the contingencies of political life. Though the strictest of strict interpreters of the Constitution—he had branded his predecessor in the White House a virtual tyrant for the egregious overreaching of the Alien and Sedition Acts—he soon faced constitutional difficulties of his own in the form of the Louisiana Purchase. As he wrote to one Senator, "The Constitution has made no provision for our holding foreign territory, still less of incorporating foreign nations into our Union." Yet, in the name of American greatness, Jefferson himself bulldozed these pesky niceties, not without qualms but trusting that the occasion justified his offenses against the law.

Sticking with principle often served Jefferson no better. Considering war to be a relic of an Old World immorality that the New World in its purity ought to avoid, he responded to English aggression on the high seas with a widening circle of merely commercial sanctions, none of which worked in the least. Worse, his naive measures, which eventually extended to the treacherous French as well, wrought severe economic and moral harm at home. As Henry Adams would later observe in his monumental history of the period:

> The peaceable coercion which Jefferson tried to substitute for war was less brutal, but hardly less mischievous, than the evil it displaced. The embargo opened the sluice-gates of social corruption. Every citizen was tempted to evade or defy the laws. Every article produced or consumed in the country became an object of speculation; every form of industry became a form of gambling.

These episodes in Jefferson's career have led historians to wonder whether his legendary brainpower found its optimal use in political life, or whether his devotion to metaphysical subtleties was allowed to interfere too often for the nation's good with the urgent demands of practice. But for all this may suggest about Jefferson's weaknesses as a public man, it is nothing as compared with the unsettling questions raised by his relationship to slavery. Here, as the strident advocates of reparations appreciate, nothing less is at stake than his moral stature.

As a leading member of Virginia's landed gentry, Jefferson came into a hefty inheritance in human flesh and blood. His father left him 52 slaves, and his father-in-law, John Wayles, left him 135 more, ranking him second among slave masters in Albemarle County. Wayles also bequeathed to Jefferson a sizable debt, which he paid off in part by selling slaves.

Jefferson was known to sell or buy a slave in order to keep a family together, a benevolent-seeming practice for which, however, it is hard to give him much credit. As he told a correspondent, in such instances the requirements of humanity and sound business happily agreed: when slaves married within "the family"—that is, with other slaves on the same plantation—they were "worth a great deal more . . . than when they have husbands and wives abroad." In a similar vein, Jefferson thought it not only decent but financially responsible to give easier chores to slave women with infants, for turning out a new child every two years contributed more to the master's prosperity than the labor of the hardest-working field hand ever could. "In this, as in all other cases," he wrote, "providence has made our interest and our duties coincide perfectly."

Jefferson's more general opinions about blacks received their fullest expression in his *Notes on the State of Virginia* (1782). They reveal a stark and unabashed repugnance. He found blacks physically ugly, and declared that they themselves agreed in this estimate, showing a marked preference for the figures and features of whites. Since blacks urinated less and sweated more than whites, they gave off "a very strong and disagreeable odor." They were brave enough, but their bravery, he speculated, stemmed from a childish incapacity to appreciate oncoming danger. Lust, rather than the tender sentiments of love, ran strong in them. Their memory was sharp, but their imagination was stunted and insipid, and their powers of reasoning were "much inferior"; Euclid stumped the best of them. Telling a simple story was about as far as they went in evidencing the signs of consecutive thought.

What explained these deficiencies? In ancient Rome, Jefferson wrote, slaves had suffered conditions far harsher than those of American blacks, and yet among them had arisen artists and thinkers of real distinction. It must be, then, that the condition of slavery itself was not responsible for the shortcomings of blacks; it must be the doing of nature. Yet Jefferson scrupulously edged away from this conclusion, proposing "as a suspicion only" that blacks were inferior to whites "in the endowments both of body and mind."

Where nature had *not* stinted the endowment of blacks, Jefferson emphasized, was in strength of heart, in the moral sense; there "she will be found to have done them justice." And, without diminishing the brutal harshness of the opinions enumerated above, it is important to register that, for Jefferson, this was no faint or condescending praise. In his view, the fundamental human desire for goodness and justice resided not in the intelligence, which notoriously served the baser passions and led men astray, but in our capacity for ethical sentiments. By Jefferson's lights, as Garry Wills observed in *Inventing America: Jefferson's Declaration of Independence* (1978), "The moral sense is not only man's *highest* faculty, but the one that is *equal* in all men."

What, then, of Jefferson's own moral sense? What we can say for a certainty is that it did not allow him to rest easy with the incontrovertible evil of slavery. Though in his original draft of the Declaration of Independence he had laid the blame for this distinctively American institution on, of all people, King George III, there was at least no mistaking the seriousness of the crime. The English king, Jefferson wrote, had "waged cruel war against human nature itself, violating its most sacred rights of life and liberty in the persons of a distant people who never offended him, captivating and carrying them into slavery in another hemisphere or to incur miserable death in their transportation thither."

Nor was Jefferson blind to the complicity—and corruption—of his own class. "The whole commerce between master and slave," he wrote in *Notes on the State of Virginia,* "is a perpetual exercise of the most boisterous passions, the most unremitting despotism on the one part, and degrading submissions on the other. Our children see this, and learn to imitate it." Later in the same passage comes a famous outcry of guilty fear that can leave no doubt as to the state of his own conscience:

> I tremble for my country when I reflect that God is just: that his justice cannot sleep for ever: that considering numbers, nature, and natural means only, a revolution of the wheel of fortune, an exchange of situation, is among possible events: that it may become probable by supernatural interference! The Almighty has no attribute which can take side with us in such a contest.

As for remedies, Jefferson pronounced himself in favor of slavery's abolition; but he also feared that whites and free blacks would never be able to live together in peace. Contempt on one side and desire for vengeance on the other made a race war all but inevitable. Thus, he insisted, emancipation would have to be paired with a suitable plan for the humane resettlement of freed slaves in Africa—a condition visionary enough to push the whole vexed question, including the status of his own slaves, safely into the future.

In short, though Jefferson deplored the institution of slavery, he could not bring himself to resist it. His sentiments were those of a man deeply aware of his and his country's wrongdoing, but his actions were those of a complacent squire, loath to give up the plantation life for which he had so pronounced a taste.

Damning as this posture appears in principle and in general, its ugliness has been magnified by what we now know—or, in any event, have reason to believe—about Jefferson's own relationship to the people who were his property, particularly the young woman named Sally Hemings.

The Hemings "affair" has become the chief particular in the indictment against Jefferson, but it is hardly news. In his 1973 historical novel, *Burr,* Gore Vidal has the title character recall a faux pas he once committed by assuming that a child he saw at Monticello was the master's grandson. The blushing Jefferson replied, "That is a child of the place. A Hemings, I think." As the character of Burr goes on to observe (in Vidal's unmistakable sneer):

> Since the child was obviously son or grandson to him, I had seriously blundered and, as in law, ignorance is not a defense. It was a curious sensation to look about Monticello and see everywhere so many replicas of Jefferson and his father-in-law. It was as if we had all of us been transformed into dogs, and as a single male dog can re-create in his own image an entire canine community, so Jefferson and his family had grafted their powerful strain upon these slave Africans, and like a king dog (or the Sultan at the Grande Porte) Jefferson could now look about him and see everywhere near-perfect consanguinity.

What *is* new is the supposedly hard evidence that now links Jefferson to Sally Hemings. I say "supposedly" because the source of this evidence, the DNA tests described in a headline-grabbing 1998 article in the scientific journal *Nature,* were hardly definitive. As Eugene Foster, one of the researchers who conducted the tests, pointed out in a letter to the *New York Times,* "the genetic findings that my collaborators and I reported . . . do not prove that Thomas Jefferson was the father of one of Sally Hemings's children. We never made that claim."

It is a question with a long and a cheap history, freely drawn upon by Vidal in his own cheap attack. In 1802, during Jefferson's first presidential term, James Callender, a noted purveyor of scurrility whom Jefferson had employed to scorch his political enemies, turned on his patron. Weaving rumors into front-page news, Callender accused Jefferson in a Richmond newspaper of having "kept, as a concubine, one of his own slaves." The opposition press squeezed the story to the last venomous drop. Poetasters composed ditties about "long Tom" and "sooty Sal." An abler poet, the Englishman Thomas Moore, who had met Jefferson, let him have it with finer skill but no greater delicacy: "The patriot, fresh from Freedom's council come,/ Now pleased retires to lash his slaves at home;/ Or woo, perhaps some black Aspasia's charms,/ And dream of freedom in his bondsmaid's arms."

Jefferson himself kept silent on the matter (with the possible exception of a private letter he wrote in 1805 that hints at a denial), but after his death his family vehemently rejected the story. His granddaughter Ellen Randolph Coolidge wrote to her brother-in-law in 1858, "The thing will not bear telling. There are such things, after all, as moral impossibilities." She named Jefferson's nephew, Peter Carr, "the most notorious good-natured Turk that ever was master of a black seraglio kept at other men's expense," as the father of Sally Hemings's children. On the other hand, Sally's son Madison Hemings told an Ohio reporter in 1873 that his mother began having sexual relations with her master when she was a fifteen-year-old body servant to Jefferson's young daughter and he was minister to France. She bore him four children, he declared, and all were freed upon reaching adulthood—the only slaves Jefferson ever emancipated—in accordance with a promise he had made to Sally while they were in France, where she could have chosen to remain as a free woman.

Until recently, scholars tended to believe the denials of the white Jeffersons and to discredit the assertions of the black

Hemingses. In this regard, the 1998 DNA study had something for everybody. Though it established that one reputed son of Jefferson was unrelated to him, it showed that another, Eston Hemings, carried the Jefferson Y-chromosome. But some 25 adult male Jeffersons with this chromosome were living in Virginia at the time in question, and several of them had definitely been to Monticello. This was the source of Dr. Foster's unwillingness to speak of clear proof. Still, as he went on to write in his letter to the *Times,* when all the relevant considerations of time and place were taken into account, the "simplest and most probable" explanation for the data was that the child was Thomas Jefferson's.

At the very least, it is clear that Jefferson was guilty of terrible moral carelessness. As the historian Paul Rahe has observed, "Despite the distaste that he expressed for the propensity of slaveholders and their relatives to abuse their power, Jefferson either engaged in such abuse himself or tolerated it on the part of one or more members of his extended family." Yet even to speak of Jefferson's abuse of authority in this case misses the point: it was within his authority to do whatever he pleased with Sally Hemings, and everyone knows what absolute power does.

Which brings us back to reparations. Jefferson is singled out for opprobrium in Randall Robinson's *The Debt: What America Owes to Blacks* (2000), the unofficial handbook of the movement. To Robinson's (mistaken) mind, it has been "conclusively proved through DNA comparisons" that Jefferson fathered at least one of Sally Hemings's children. That some would nevertheless defend Jefferson, especially on the grounds that he was no worse than many another "man of his time," moves Robinson not at all. He ransacks history for comparable instances of men whose contemporaries and compatriots thought well of them and who nevertheless committed unspeakable deeds: "the same specious excuse can be offered for Atatürk or Franco or Lenin or Mao or Hitler." As he sees it, American chattel slavery represents the worst thing men have done to each other for at least the past 500 years, and Jefferson's complicity in this "black Holocaust" marks him as one of history's grossest monsters.

It is easy enough to fault Robinson for portraying slavery not as just one of the unconscionable enormities of modern history but as the ultimate moral horror. He suffers from a case of what might be called genocide envy, a craving for the special luster that putatively clings to the victims of the worst crime known to man. One wonders what he would say if 18th-century Americans had simply set out to exterminate black Africans like vermin, rather than to work them like beasts of burden.

Robinson is right, however, in refusing to exonerate Jefferson on the grounds that he merely did what everybody else was doing. Once you head down that route, nothing is wrong provided that the cultural norms of the day declare it right. Furthermore, there were other men, even in Jefferson's Virginia, who knew slavery was wrong and who acted on that knowledge. Although this conclusion has been resisted by those who still cling to the legend of Jefferson the spotless egalitarian, his reputation, like the principles he so eloquently espoused, can withstand intellectual honesty. Whatever the ugly facts of his slave-owning, he remains one of the greatest men this country has ever produced.

What the reparations movement itself gains from such a reckoning is much less clear. Jefferson and some of the other founders may indeed need to pay a debt, in terms of historical esteem, for their participation in slavery, but how can this impose a financial burden on present-day American society as a whole, and white Americans in particular?

As David Horowitz forcefully contends in his recent book, *Uncivil Wars: The Controversy over Reparations for Slavery* (2001),* few Americans ever owned slaves, even in the South. Moreover, whites were not uniquely responsible for slavery; the Africans who wound up in America were captured and sold by Arabs and other blacks. Nor were whites the only beneficiaries of slavery. The average income of blacks in the U.S. now runs 20 to 50 times that of Africans in the countries that American slaves came from. If black America were considered a nation all its own, its per-capita GNP would rank today tenth in the world. As Horowitz concludes, nowhere else in the world are black people so prosperous and privileged, "a bounty that is a direct result of the [democratic] heritage that is under assault."

Like other critics of reparations, Horowitz stresses the obvious historical truth that the U.S. has already paid a considerable toll for slavery, in the form of 350,000 Union dead in the Civil War. Robinson and other advocates of reparations have greeted this claim with smug indifference or even derision, contending that the men of the North fought not to dismantle slavery but to defend their own economic and political interests. A useful arbiter on this question is the black intellectual W.E.B. Du Bois (1868–1963), who would become the patron saint of black nationalism. As he wrote in *The Souls of Black Folk* (1903):

> The problem of the 20th century is the problem of the color-line—the relation of the darker to the lighter races of men in Asia and Africa, in America and the islands of the sea. It was a phase of this problem that caused the Civil War; and however much those who marched South and North in 1861 may have fixed on the technical points of union and local autonomy as a shibboleth, all nevertheless knew, as we know, that the question of Negro slavery was the real cause of the conflict.

Considering the impressive economic and political strides that many black Americans have made over the past several decades, it is fair to wonder why the reparations movement has emerged at this particular moment, and with such extreme demands. Much of the answer, as Jefferson himself would have appreciated, has to do with the notoriously elusive commodity of equality: the more one has of it, the more galling become those inequalities that remain.

For black Americans, the attainment of full equality before the law, ratified and extended by the civil-rights legislation of the 1960's, naturally begot the desire for equality of fortune, of outcome. When this was not forthcoming, something had to be blamed for the intolerable result, and white racism was quickly identified as the culprit. What followed were the

various remedies—unprecedented spending on education and welfare, racial preferences in universities, corporations, and professions—that black leaders demanded, and liberals readily granted, as compensation for the supposed persistence of discrimination. Today's proposals for actual cash reparations are but the latest, and most desperate, scheme for enabling America's blacks to overcome their chronic ills by imposing atonement on America's whites for their racial sins.

By now, however, it is impossible to believe that a mere lack of financial resources is the essential problem of American blacks. As we have learned in recent years through the work of writers like Thomas Sowell, Stephan and Abigail Thernstrom, and John McWhorter, the roots of our racial divide are overwhelmingly cultural. Why does black academic achievement, even in the growing black middle class, persistently lag behind that of other Americans? Why does anti-intellectualism remain such a problem among black students? Why have so many seemingly unassimilable immigrants succeeded in the U.S. at the same time that a considerable portion of black America remains mired in poverty and dependence?

The reparations movement is not an answer to these questions. Indeed, doomed though it is to failure—even the most reflexively sympathetic liberals have declined to join so outlandish a cause—it has already become a problem in itself, diverting the black community from the reckoning it must do with its own history, a reckoning far more urgent than any to be undertaken with the towering ghost of Thomas Jefferson.

Note

(*)Reviewed by Jacob Heilbrunn in the April 2002 COMMENTARY.

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Article 12

How the GOP Conquered the South

MICHAEL NELSON

The greatest change in American national politics of the past 60 years has been the transformation of the South from the most solidly Democratic to the most solidly Republican region of the country. In the 1930s and 1940s, Democrats enjoyed a strong advantage in presidential elections because they could count on winning the 127 electoral votes cast by the 11 states of the old Confederacy. Congress was almost always Democratic because Democrats owned all 22 Southern seats in the Senate and all but a couple of the South's 105 seats in the House of Representatives. In other words, the Democrats began every election nearly halfway to the finish line.

Consider how much has changed. In 2004 John F. Kerry ran up a 252–133 electoral-vote lead over George W. Bush outside the South but lost the election because the South went 153–0 for Bush. In the current Congress, although Democrats from non-Southern states outnumber Republican non-Southerners by 41–37 in the Senate and 154–150 in the House, the GOP has converted its Southern majorities—82–49 in the House and 18–4 in the Senate—into control of both chambers. The South not only switched parties from the 1940s to 2000, but it also became, because of rapid population growth, a bigger political prize.

The 2004 election was no fluke. The GOP has won seven of the last 10 presidential elections (interestingly, the three Democratic victories belonged to Southerners, Jimmy Carter of Georgia in 1976 and Bill Clinton of Arkansas in 1992 and 1996), and it has controlled both houses of Congress since 1994, the longest period of Republican legislative dominance since the 1920s. John Roberts's confirmation as chief justice of the United States is just the latest example of how control of the presidency and the Senate has also enabled the Republicans to populate the third branch of government, the judiciary. Since 1968 Republican presidents have made 10 of 12 Supreme Court appointments, along with 65 percent of all federal appeals-court appointments and 62 percent of all district-court appointments.

The new Republican majority did not come about through a sudden and dramatic realigning election like the ones in 1860 and 1932. Instead, there has been what Karl Rove calls a "rolling" (or, to use a preferred term of political scientists, a "secular") realignment in which the GOP has gradually become home to the great majority of Southern white voters of all social and economic classes.

The tale of how the South's secular Republican realignment came about can be understood in large part through three recent books, each of them by or about a major southern GOP leader: *Strom: The Complicated Personal and Political Life of Strom Thurmond*, by Jack Bass and Marilyn W. Thompson; *Here's Where I Stand: A Memoir,* by Jesse Helms; and *Herding Cats: A Life in Politics,* by Trent Lott. The well-researched Thurmond biography is illuminating because of—and Helms's and Lott's self-serving memoirs despite—what the authors have to say.

The story of the South's Republican transformation begins in 1948, even though the national Democratic majority that Franklin D. Roosevelt built in the 1930s was then in the midst of winning its fifth consecutive presidential election, and the Republicans weren't competitive in a single Southern state. FDR's New Deal coalition was a complex assemblage, constituted differently in different parts of the country. In the North, it rested on the support of groups that Roosevelt himself had helped to attract into the Democratic fold: blue-collar workers, Roman Catholic and Jewish voters, ideological liberals, and African-Americans.

The Southern part of the New Deal coalition—essentially, every white voter in a region where, in most counties, only whites could vote—was one that Roosevelt inherited. The South was solidly Democratic because of the antipathy Southern whites had developed during Reconstruction toward the occupying Republicans and their agenda of civil rights for the newly freed slaves. Thurmond, Helms, and Lott were heirs to this tradition. Each of them was a politically active Democrat before he became a Republican.

Despite the Democrats' majority status, a fault line ran through their coalition: The interests of integrationist blacks and segregationist Southern whites were clearly not harmonious. As long as African-Americans did not press a civil-rights agenda on the federal government, this fault line remained unexposed and, therefore, politically insignificant. But in the aftermath of World War II, returning black veterans who had fought against racism and tyranny abroad increasingly

demanded federal protection for their civil rights at home. Northern liberals and labor-union leaders supported those demands.

Forced to choose between the Northern and Southern wings of his party, President Harry S. Truman reluctantly accepted a strong civil-rights plank in the 1948 Democratic platform. He won the election, but only at the price of a crack appearing in the solidly Democratic South. From 1932 to 1944, FDR had carried every Southern state in all four elections. In 1948, however, Georgia stayed with Truman, but the other four Deep South states—Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina—cast their electoral votes for Democratic Gov. Strom Thurmond of South Carolina, the nominee of the rebellious Southern Democrats who had walked out of their party's pro-civil-rights convention and formed the States' Rights Party, or Dixiecrats.

Curiously, Thurmond had risen through the ranks of South Carolina politics as a strong advocate for improving the public schools that served both races, so much so that Bass and Thompson title their chapter on his governorship "Progressive Outlook, Progressive Program, Progressive Leadership." As a public-school teacher and, at age 26, the winner of an election that made him the youngest county superintendent of education in the state, Thurmond crusaded for adult literacy, especially among African-Americans. But the educational improvements Thurmond wanted to make were to schools that he insisted remain segregated. Truman's 1948 civil-rights program not only took Thurmond by surprise—he had actually endorsed Truman for re-election the year before—but also spurred him to run against the president.

In 1954, after the Supreme Court ruled segregated public schools unconstitutional in *Brown v. Board of Education,* Thurmond ran a write-in campaign for senator. He won, the only write-in candidate in the history of Congress ever to do so, and soon established himself as the South's angriest face of opposition to civil rights. "Listen to ol' Strom," said South Carolina's other senator, the Democrat Olin Johnston, as Thurmond waged a 24 hour and 18 minute filibuster against the rather weak 1957 Civil Rights Act. "He really believes all that shit."

All of the Deep South states that Thurmond carried returned to the Democratic fold in the 1952 and 1956 presidential elections, when the party muted its commitment to civil rights for the sake of unity. But by then a new crack had appeared in the Democratic South, this one along economic lines. The Republican candidate in both elections, Dwight D. Eisenhower, did well in the six states of the Peripheral South—Arkansas, Florida, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia—where racial issues mattered somewhat less and, as metropolitan areas began to grow rapidly after World War II, the GOP's pro-business policies mattered more. Eisenhower carried all of the Peripheral South states except Arkansas and North Carolina both times he ran.

The Republican breakthroughs in the South proved to be enduring. In 1960 the GOP presidential candidate, Richard M. Nixon, lost the election but carried half of the Peripheral South. Four years later Sen. Barry Goldwater of Arizona, a prominent opponent of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, won all five Deep South states, including, with Thurmond's strong support, South Carolina. (The only other state Goldwater carried in losing overwhelmingly to President Lyndon B. Johnson was Arizona.) Thurmond not only campaigned for Goldwater but became a Republican, leading an exodus into the GOP that many of his fellow white Southerners joined. Starting with Goldwater in 1964, the Republican nominee has outpolled his Democratic opponent among Southern white voters in every presidential election.

The 1968 election took place in a changed political environment. Because of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, both championed by President Johnson, African-Americans in the South were newly enfranchised and enjoyed federal protection against many forms of racial discrimination. In reaction, a strong Southern Democratic opponent of civil rights, Alabama governor George C. Wallace, bid for the support of Southern whites in hopes of denying both major party candidates a majority of electoral votes and throwing the election into the House of Representatives. Polls showed him leading Nixon, the GOP nominee, and Democratic Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey in every Southern state. Thurmond, however, stood solidly by Nixon, touring the South to argue that "a vote for Wallace is a vote for Humphrey." "Strom killed us," Bass and Thompson quote Wallace's campaign manager, Tom Turnipseed, as saying. Although Wallace carried most of the Deep South, Nixon carried South Carolina and nearly all of the Peripheral South, enough to win the election.

During his first term as president, Nixon labored to bring Wallace's supporters into his 1972 re-election coalition. His efforts to use issues such as law and order and opposition to school busing to graft white support from all parts of the South onto the traditional Midwestern Republican base were rewarded on election day. Nixon swept the South, carrying every state in the region by majorities ranging from 65 percent to 78 percent.

The success of Republican presidential candidates in the South began to be echoed in other Southern elections. The infusion of millions of loyally Democratic African-American voters into the Southern electorate in the late 1960s made the party more liberal and drove many conservative whites into the GOP in Congressional and state as well as presidential elections. The number of Republican senators in the 22-member Southern delegation rose from 0 as recently as 1960 to 3 in 1966, 7 in 1972, 11 in 1982, 13 in 1994, and 18 in 2004. Similar gains occurred in Southern elections to the House, where the Republican ranks grew from 7 percent of Southern members in 1960 to 22 percent in 1966, 29 percent

in 1982, 51 percent in 1994, and 63 percent in 2004. In elections to state office, the number of Republican governors increased from 0 to 7 of 11 from 1960 to 2004. Republicans did not control a single Southern state legislative house as recently as the late 1960s; they now control half of them.

Two of the Southern Republicans who rode Nixon's 1972 coattails into Congress were Helms, the first Republican elected to the Senate from North Carolina since Reconstruction, and Lott, the first post-Reconstruction Republican from Mississippi to win a seat in the House. Like Thurmond, Helms and Lott were active Democrats before they migrated into the Republican Party—indeed, each had worked in Washington for one of his state's conservative Democratic legislators. "I'm tired of the Muskies and the Kennedys and the Humphreys and the whole lot," Lott said when he publicly announced his conversion.

Once in the Republican fold, each in his way helped to solidify the GOP's hold on Southern white voters. The rough-edged, goggle-eyed Helms, who quickly became the Senate's leading conservative gadfly on issues like defunding the National Endowment for the Arts, resisting the creation of the Martin Luther King holiday, and keeping the Panama Canal in U.S. hands, led the Republican campaign to win rural and blue-collar support based on these and other cultural and religious appeals. Lott, the blow-dried (he has a chapter in Herding Cats called "Hair: An Issue for Our Time") veteran of fraternity politics at Ole Miss, used his growing influence as House minority whip and Senate majority leader to promote conservative economic policies that reinforced Republican loyalties among the South's business and professional classes.

Helms based his 1972 Senate candidacy less on his erratic career as a newspaper and radio reporter in Raleigh, staff member for conservative Democratic Sen. Willis Smith, executive director of the North Carolina Bankers Association, and news director of WRAL-TV in Raleigh than on the enemies he had attacked during 12 years of nightly five-minute editorials that aired on WRAL and, through syndication, on many of the state's radio stations. The University of North Carolina was one of Helms's favorite editorial targets. As far as he was concerned, UNC was an arrogant bastion of Northern radicalism on issues like civil rights and communism. "The word from Chapel Hill," he said in one broadcast, "is: Send money and shut up. That is the measure of 'academic freedom' as it is practiced there." Another recurring theme of Helms's editorials was "the harm being done to relations among neighbors of different races by the militant intrusion of outsiders."

As a first-term senator, Helms harnessed his ambitions to former governor of California Ronald Reagan's high-risk challenge to President Gerald R. Ford for the 1976 Republican presidential nomination. The gamble paid off. Reagan's candidacy was floundering because, as Helms rightly points out in *Here's Where I Stand,* the conservative candidate was listening to "self-declared experts" advising him to "tone down his conservatism and make himself appear more 'mainstream.'" After losing the first five primaries to Ford, Reagan won North Carolina by following Helms's advice to fan the flames of populist resentment engendered by the president's proposal to deed the Panama Canal to Panama. Reagan's primary victory enabled him to carry the fight for the nomination to the convention and, although he narrowly lost, to move to the front of the Republican pack in 1980.

Race as a defining element of Southern politics won't stay under the Republican rug any more than it did when the South was solidly Democratic.

Helms also came to the rescue of Southern Republicanism after the setback of Carter's victory over Ford in the general election. Carter carried 10 Southern states, partly on the basis of regional pride and partly because, as a born-again Southern Baptist, he won the support of most evangelical Christian voters. Forced to the left as president by the liberal Democrats who dominated Congress, however, Carter alienated his home region and many of his coreligionists. Helms stepped forward to help rouse white evangelicals, who had not been especially active in politics during most of the 20th century, to organize in opposition when the Carter administration proposed to withdraw tax-exempt status from the mostly white Christian schools to which many of them sent their children.

Reagan capitalized on that development, as well as on a stagnant economy and a decline in American power abroad, when he challenged Carter's bid for re-election in 1980. His strong rhetoric opposing abortion and upholding traditional values appealed to white Southern Christians across class lines. Helms again spurred him on. In a chapter called "Hot-Button Issues," Helms lays bare the political issues that mattered most to him, then and since: the liberal media ("men and women who certainly have a smug contempt for American ideals and principles"), the NEA (financing "decadent people" with "a militant disdain for the moral and religious sensibilities of the majority of the American people"), school prayer ("in its place has been enshrined a sort of permissiveness in which the drug culture has flourished, as have pornography, crime, and fornication"), and abortion (a "holocaust, by another name").

Helms's most famous election came in 1990, when he was challenged by the African-American mayor of Charlotte, Harvey Gantt. Trailing in the polls, Helms ran a television ad

that showed a white hand crumpling a rejection letter from an employer. "You needed that job and you were the best qualified," the announcer intoned. "But they had to give it to a minority because of a racial quota. Is that really fair? Harvey Gantt says it is." *In Here's Where I Stand,* Helms denies that his campaign was "about Mr. Gantt being black; it was always and only about him being a liberal." But Helms's own words belie his claim. One of the first things he tells us about Gantt is that he "had taken advantage of a minority preference to gain an available television license" in Charlotte. As a measure of just how successful Helms's long-term political strategy was, however, he won stronger support from the state's poorest and least-educated white voters than from any other group.

Like Helms, Lott grew up in a blue-collar family and rode a strong high-school record to college and a professional career. Interestingly, Lott devotes not a single word to academics in *Herding Cats's* chapter on "The Legacy of Ole Miss." Instead, he dwells lovingly on membership in Sigma Nu and, through it, as bass-baritone in a vocal quartet he formed and as head cheerleader at Ole Miss football games. Those positions helped wire him into the campus's leadership network—no small thing at a school that, Lott notes, has traditionally produced all of Mississippi's governors and other statewide officials.

Lott stayed at Ole Miss for law school, joined Pascagoula's leading firm, and, after spending four years as Democratic Congressman William Colmer's administrative assistant, ran as a Republican when Colmer retired in 1972. He won, with Colmer's support, and concentrated his efforts in the House on "fiscal responsibility and a strong national defense." As his party's whip from 1981 to 1988, Lott continued to stress economic issues. His major achievement was to woo enough conservative Democratic support in the Democratically controlled House to pass Reagan's massive 1981 tax cuts and domestic spending reductions. One favorite tactic was to look up "the names of [their] key contributors and supporters" and rouse those mostly wealthy conservatives to put pressure on their Democratic representatives in Washington.

Truman won the 1948 election, but only at the price of a crack appearing in the solidly Democratic South.

Elected to the Senate in 1988 against a Democrat who tried to brand him (in Lott's phrase) "as an over-dressed elitist—a country-club Republican," Lott networked his new colleagues with Sigma Nu aplomb, forging a brother-pledge style of coalition that included young GOP conservatives like Phil Gramm of Texas and John Ashcroft of Missouri with "some of the 'old bulls,' like Jesse Helms [and] Strom Thurmond." In 1994 they chose him as Senate GOP whip; two years later, when the GOP's Senate leader, Bob Dole, resigned to run for president, Lott was easily elected to take his place.

Although Lott was insider to Helms's outsider and emphasized mainstream economic conservatism rather than Helms-style cultural conservatism, both men were strong supporters of President Bush. (Helms awards Bush his ultimate accolade: "I know Ronald Reagan would be proud of this man.") The president's tax cuts and strongly pro-business tax and regulatory policies gladdened Lott's heart, as well as those of the South's white business and professional classes. To Helms's delight and that of working-class and rural white Southerners, Bush also identified himself and his party as the chief defenders of traditional social values, both by what he upheld (religious faith, flag-waving patriotism, marriage between a man and a woman, restrictions on abortion) and what he opposed (gay marriage, sexual permissiveness, gun control).

As the Democratic pollster Stanley Greenberg points out, Republicans "don't say, 'Vote for us because we're making progress.' They say, 'Vote for our worldview.' " Therein lies a source of enduring Republican strength in the South and, increasingly, in the other red states. Voters who support a party because they share its values are much less likely to abandon it than voters whose support is based on how well things are going in the economy or the world.

Republicans pride themselves on the progress they have made in the South by stressing conservative economic policies and Christian values. Appeals based on race, they like to think, are a thing of the past. After all, no one figured out more quickly than Thurmond what it meant in the late 1960s when Southern blacks became enfranchised: "It means you can't win any longer just by cussin' the niggers," Bass and Thompson quote him telling an aide. Thurmond hired the first African-American staff member of any Southern senator, became a champion in Washington of his state's traditionally black colleges, and voted for the King holiday and the Voting Rights Act of 1982. Even Helms makes much in his memoirs of his recent crusade to end AIDS in Africa, an effort in which he and U2's Bono have been famous if unlikely bedfellows.

But race as a defining element of Southern politics won't stay under the Republican rug any more than it did when the South was solidly Democratic. The first and last chapters of Lott's book deal with the incident for which he always will be most remembered, his remarks at Strom Thurmond's 100th birthday party on December 5, 2002. Harking back to the 1948 election, in which Thurmond made his national debut as the candidate of the segregationist Dixiecrats, Lott said, "Mississippians voted for him. And if the rest of the country had followed our lead, we wouldn't have had all these problems over the years either."

In *Herding Cats,* Lott explains his remark in terms of personal compassion (Thurmond "slipped easily into bouts of depression. I often rushed over to lighten his mood") and historical ignorance ("I was only 7 when Strom was barnstorming the South"). Besides, Lott writes, "he was already 87 years old when I came to the Senate in 1989, and by then he was fully committed to the minorities in his native South Carolina." Few others had any trouble remembering Thurmond's crusading segregationist past, and some pointed out that Lott had lavished nearly identical praise on Thurmond's 1948 candidacy in a speech he gave in 1980, long before Thurmond needed any special cheering up.

In the firestorm that followed Lott's thoughtless remarks, the story of Thurmond's racist past was retold in the present, Lott's friend Bush cut him loose, and by the end of the month, Lott had been replaced as Senate majority leader by Bill Frist. As far as Lott is concerned, the whole thing was personal—the president "blasted me . . . in a tone that was booming and nasty," and Frist engaged in "a personal betrayal." Lott could not very well claim to be a victim of prejudice against Southerners, of course—Bush is a Texan and Frist a Tennessean.

"In its grand outlines," wrote the political scientist V.O. Key in his classic 1949 book *Southern Politics in State and Nation,* "the politics of the South revolves around the position of the Negro." To be sure, African-Americans now can vote in the South, and many have been elected to local office, especially in the region's increasingly black cities. But one thing hasn't changed: The South's dominant political party, Democratic in Key's time, Republican now, is essentially all white.

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UNIT 3

Demography and Diversity

Unit Selections

13. **Racial Restrictions in the Law of Citizenship,** Ian F. Haney López
14. **Ancestry 2000: Census 2000 Brief,** Angela Brittingham and G. Patricia De La Cruz
15. **Forces That Shape Ethnic Opinion: What Ethnic Americans Really Think,** James J. Zogby
16. **Zooming in on Diversity,** William H. Frey
17. **Intermarriage in the Second Generation,** Gillian Stevens et al.

Key Points to Consider

- Given the newly authorized tabulation of multiple race and ethnic identifications, can you calculate the number of combinations and permutations of race and ethnic identity?
- In what senses are these combinations of self-identification reflective of American attitudes toward self-identification?
- Are ethnic interest groups really representative of their constituencies? What does representation mean?
- In light of the nature of geographic boundaries, what positive and negative impacts are associated with the concentration of ethnic groups into nearly homogenous enclaves?
- Does public attention to race and ethnicity reinforce mentalities that are deeply formative of race and ethnic identities and relationships among persons and organizations?
- Do such mentalities foster negative stereotypes and positive prototypes of race and ethnicites?
- In what respect does the attention to the history of slavery and immigration shape contemporary consciousness?

Student Web Site

www.mhcls.com/online

Internet References

Further information regarding these Web sites may be found in this book's preface or online.

U.S. Census Bureau
www.census.gov

Diversity.com
www.diversity.com

U.S. Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services
www.USCIS.gov

The history of immigration and ethnic group diversity is embedded in the history of America from its earliest times. The material in this unit reveals the ongoing process of peopling America and the experiences of new immigrants. These articles illustrate the accessibility and attractiveness of economic opportunities, the impact of new technologies, and the development of new partnerships and collaborations. The specific dynamics of group isolation and integration point to the complexity generated by public policy—most importantly the designations available for racial and ethnic identity offered for the first time in the 2000 U.S. Census. The plentitude of resources and the social imagination of community leaders, as well as specific characteristics of race and ethnic populations—their size, scale, and scope—and the range of governmental policies determine race and ethnic relations.

Because of the considerable fluidity of immigrant experiences, the complex processes of cultural identity, and the political use of cultural symbols such as race and ethnicity, the search for more analytical rigor in the field of race and ethnic relations is far from complete. A guide to discernible and measurable features of ethnic phenomena and characteristics that are attributes of ethnicity was developed in a fine collection of materials on this topic, lists the following markers of ethnic groups: common geographic origin; migratory status; language/dialect; religious faith(s); ties that transcend kinship, neighborhood, and community boundaries; shared traditions, values, symbols, and literature; folklore; music; food preferences; settlement and employment patterns; special interests in regard to politics in the homeland and in the United States; institutions that specifically serve and maintain the group; and an internal as well as external sense of distinctiveness. The contributions and concerns of various ethnic immigrant groups over many generations provided a deeply woven pattern of material and a complex social history of America. From the 1850s to the 1870s, immigrants to America came predominantly from Britain and northern Europe. To these European, and perhaps to some Asian immigrants, America represented freedom to enter the economic struggle without constraints of

state- and status-bound societies whose limits could not be overcome except through emigration. Yet this historical pathway to liberty, justice, and opportunity came to be perceived as a "tarnished door" when the deep impulses of exclusion and exclusivity came to the forefront. The victims were aliens who, ironically, achieved the American promise but were denied the reward of acceptance and incorporation into the very culture they helped to fashion. This unit's articles describe the immigrant experience and once again raise the issues that every large-scale multiethnic regime must address: How can unity and diversity be channeled into political, economic, and cultural well-being?

Article 13

Racial Restrictions in the Law of Citizenship

IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ

The racial composition of the U.S. citizenry reflects in part the accident of world migration patterns. More than this, however, it reflects the conscious design of U.S. immigration and naturalization laws.

Federal law restricted immigration to this country on the basis of race for nearly one hundred years, roughly from the Chinese exclusion laws of the 1880s until the end of the national origin quotas in 1965.[1] The history of this discrimination can briefly be traced. Nativist sentiment against Irish and German Catholics on the East Coast and against Chinese and Mexicans on the West Coast, which had been doused by the Civil War, reignited during the economic slump of the 1870s. Though most of the nativist efforts failed to gain congressional sanction, Congress in 1882 passed the Chinese Exclusion Act, which suspended the immigration of Chinese laborers for ten years.[2] The Act was expanded to exclude all Chinese in 1884, and was eventually implemented indefinitely.[3] In 1917, Congress created "an Asiatic barred zone," excluding all persons from Asia.[4] During this same period, the Senate passed a bill to exclude "all members of the African or black race." This effort was defeated in the House only after intensive lobbying by the NAACP.[5] Efforts to exclude the supposedly racially undesirable southern and eastern Europeans were more successful. In 1921, Congress established a temporary quota system designed "to confine immigration as much as possible to western and northern European stock," making this bar permanent three years later in the National Origin Act of 1924.[6] With the onset of the Depression, attention shifted to Mexican immigrants. Although no law explicitly targeted this group, federal immigration officials began a series of roundups and mass deportations of people of Mexican descent under the general rubric of a "repatriation campaign." Approximately 500,000 people were forcibly returned to Mexico during the Depression, more than half of them U.S. citizens.[7] This pattern was repeated in the 1950s, when Attorney General Herbert Brownell launched a program to expel Mexicans. This effort, dubbed "Operation Wetback," indiscriminately deported more than one million citizens and noncitizens in 1954 alone.[8]

Racial restrictions on immigration were not significantly dismantled until 1965, when Congress in a major overhaul of immigration law abolished both the national origin system and the Asiatic Barred Zone.[9] Even so, purposeful racial discrimination in immigration law by Congress remains constitutionally permissible, since the case that upheld the Chinese Exclusion Act to this day remains good law.[10] Moreover, arguably racial discrimination in immigration law continues. For example, Congress has enacted special provisions to encourage Irish immigration, while refusing to ameliorate the backlog of would-be immigrants from the Philippines, India, South Korea, China, and Hong Kong, backlogs created in part through a century of racial exclusion.[11] The history of racial discrimination in U.S. immigration law is a long and continuing one.

As discriminatory as the laws of immigration have been, the laws of citizenship betray an even more dismal record of racial exclusion. From this country's inception, the laws regulating who was or could become a citizen were tainted by racial prejudice. Birthright citizenship, the automatic acquisition of citizenship by virtue of birth, was tied to race until 1940. Naturalized citizenship, the acquisition of citizenship by any means other than through birth, was conditioned on race until 1952. Like immigration laws, the laws of birthright citizenship and naturalization shaped the racial character of the United States.

Birthright Citizenship

Most persons acquire citizenship by birth rather than through naturalization. During the 1990s, for example, naturalization will account for only 7.5 percent of the increase in the U.S. citizen population.[12] At the time of the prerequisite cases, the proportion of persons gaining citizenship through naturalization was probably somewhat higher, given the higher ratio of immigrants to total population, but still far smaller than the number of people gaining citizenship by birth. In order to situate the prerequisite laws, therefore, it is useful first to review the history of racial discrimination in the laws of birthright citizenship.

The U.S. Constitution as ratified did not define the citizenry, probably because it was assumed that the English common law rule of *jus soli* would continue.[13] Under *jus soli,* citizenship accrues to "all" born within a nation's jurisdiction. Despite the seeming breadth of this doctrine, the word "all" is qualified because for the first one hundred years and more of this country's history it did not fully encompass racial minorities. This is the import of the *Dred Scott* decision.[14] Scott, an enslaved man, sought to use the federal courts to sue for his freedom.

However, access to the courts was predicated on citizenship. Dismissing his claim, the United States Supreme Court in the person of Chief Justice Roger Taney declared in 1857 that Scott and all other Blacks, free and enslaved, were not and could never be citizens because they were "a subordinate and inferior class of beings." The decision protected the slave-holding South and infuriated much of the North, further dividing a country already fractured around the issues of slavery and the power of the national government. *Dred Scott* was invalidated after the Civil War by the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which declared that "All persons born. . . in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are declared to be citizens of the United States."[15] *Jus soli* subsequently became part of the organic law of the land in the form of the Fourteenth Amendment: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside."[16]

Despite the broad language of the Fourteenth Amendment—though in keeping with the words of the 1866 act—some racial minorities remained outside the bounds of *jus soli* even after its constitutional enactment. In particular, questions persisted about the citizenship status of children born in the United States to noncitizen parents, and about the status of Native Americans. The Supreme Court did not decide the status of the former until 1898, when it ruled in *U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark* that native-born children of aliens, even those permanently barred by race from acquiring citizenship, were birthright citizens of the United States.[17] On the citizenship of the latter, the Supreme Court answered negatively in 1884, holding in *Elk v. Wilkins* that Native Americans owed allegiance to their tribe and so did not acquire citizenship upon birth.[18] Congress responded by granting Native Americans citizenship in piecemeal fashion, often tribe by tribe. Not until 1924 did Congress pass an act conferring citizenship on all Native Americans in the United States.[19] Even then, however, questions arose regarding the citizenship of those born in the United States after the effective date of the 1924 act. These questions were finally resolved, and *jus soli* fully applied, under the Nationality Act of 1940, which specifically bestowed citizenship on all those born in the United States "to a member of an Indian, Eskimo, Aleutian, or other aboriginal tribe."[20] Thus, the basic law of citizenship, that a person born here is a citizen here, did not include all racial minorities until 1940.

Unfortunately, the impulse to restrict birthright citizenship by race is far from dead in this country. Apparently, California Governor Pete Wilson and many others seek a return to the times when citizenship depended on racial proxies such as immigrant status. Wilson has called for a federal constitutional amendment that would prevent the American-born children of undocumented persons from receiving birthright citizenship.[21] His call has not been ignored: thirteen members of Congress recently sponsored a constitutional amendment that would repeal the existing Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and replace it with a provision that "All persons born in the United States. . . of mothers who are citizens or legal residents of the United States. . . are citizens of the United States."[22] Apparently, such a change is supported by 49 percent of Americans.[23] In addition to explicitly discriminating against fathers by eliminating their right to confer citizenship through parentage, this proposal implicitly discriminates along racial lines. The effort to deny citizenship to children born here to undocumented immigrants seems to be motivated not by an abstract concern over the political status of the parents, but by racial animosity against Asians and Latinos, those commonly seen as comprising the vast bulk of undocumented migrants. Bill Ong Hing writes, "The discussion of who is and who is not American, who can and cannot become American, goes beyond the technicalities of citizenship and residency requirements; it strikes at the very heart of our nation's long and troubled legacy of race relations.[24] As this troubled legacy reveals, the triumph over racial discrimination in the laws of citizenship and alienage came slowly and only recently. In the campaign for the "control of our borders," we are once again debating the citizenship of the native-born and the merits of *Dred Scott.*[25]

Naturalization

Although the Constitution did not originally define the citizenry, it explicitly gave Congress the authority to establish the criteria for granting citizenship after birth. Article I grants Congress the power "To establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization."[26] From the start, Congress exercised this power in a manner that burdened naturalization laws with racial restrictions that tracked those in the law of birthright citizenship. In 1790, only a few months after ratification of the Constitution, Congress limited naturalization to "any alien, being a free white person who shall have resided within the limits and under the jurisdiction of the United States for a term of two years."[27] This clause mirrored not only the de facto laws of birthright citizenship, but also the racially restrictive naturalization laws of several states. At least three states had previously limited citizenship to "white persons": Virginia in 1779, South Carolina in 1784, and Georgia in 1785.[28] Though there would be many subsequent changes in the requirements for federal naturalization, racial identity endured as a bedrock requirement for the next 162 years. In every naturalization act from 1790 until 1952, Congress included the "white person" prerequisite.[29]

The history of racial prerequisites to naturalization can be divided into two periods of approximately eighty years each. The first period extended from 1790 to 1870, when only Whites were able to naturalize. In the wake of the Civil War, the "white person" restriction on naturalization came under serious attack as part of the effort to expunge *Dred Scott.* Some congressmen, Charles Sumner chief among them, argued that racial barriers to naturalization should be struck altogether. However, racial prejudice against Native Americans and Asians forestalled the complete elimination of the racial prerequisites. During congressional debates, one senator argued against conferring "the rank, privileges, and immunities of citizenship upon the cruel savages who destroyed [Minnesota's] peaceful settlements and massacred the people with circumstances of atrocity too horrible to relate."[30] Another senator wondered "whether this door [of citizenship] shall now be thrown open to the Asiatic

population," warning that to do so would spell for the Pacific coast "an end to republican government there, because it is very well ascertained that those people have no appreciation of that form of government; it seems to be obnoxious to their very nature; they seem to be incapable either of understanding or carrying it out."[31] Sentiments such as these ensured that even after the Civil War, bars against Native American and Asian naturalization would continue.[32] Congress opted to maintain the "white person" prerequisite, but to extend the right to naturalize to "persons of African nativity, or African descent."[33] After 1870, Blacks as well as Whites could naturalize, but not others.

During the second period, from 1870 until the last of the prerequisite laws were abolished in 1952, the White-Black dichotomy in American race relations dominated naturalization law. During this period, Whites and Blacks were eligible for citizenship, but others, particularly those from Asia, were not. Indeed, increasing antipathy toward Asians on the West Coast resulted in an explicit disqualification of Chinese persons from naturalization in 1882.[34] The prohibition of Chinese naturalization, the only U.S. law ever to exclude by name a particular nationality from citizenship, was coupled with the ban on Chinese immigration discussed previously. The Supreme Court readily upheld the bar, writing that "Chinese persons not born in this country have never been recognized as citizens of the United States, nor authorized to become such under the naturalization laws."[35] While Blacks were permitted to naturalize beginning in 1870, the Chinese and most "other non-Whites" would have to wait until the 1940s for the right to naturalize.[36]

World War II forced a domestic reconsideration of the racism integral to U.S. naturalization law. In 1935, Hitler's Germany limited citizenship to members of the Aryan race, making Germany the only country other than the United States with a racial restriction on naturalization.[37] The fact of this bad company was not lost on those administering our naturalization laws. "When Earl G. Harrison in 1944 resigned as United States Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization, he said that the only country in the world, outside the United States, that observes racial discrimination in matters relating to naturalization was Nazi Germany, 'and we all agree that this is not very desirable company.'"[38] Furthermore, the United States was open to charges of hypocrisy for banning from naturalization the nationals of many of its Asian allies. During the war, the United States seemed through some of its laws and social practices to embrace the same racism it was fighting. Both fronts of the war exposed profound inconsistencies between U.S. naturalization law and broader social ideals. These considerations, among others, led Congress to begin a process of piecemeal reform in the laws governing citizenship.

In 1940, Congress opened naturalization to "descendants of races indigenous to the Western Hemisphere."[39] Apparently, this "additional limitation was designed 'to more fully cement' the ties of Pan-Americanism" at a time of impending crisis.[40] In 1943, Congress replaced the prohibition on the naturalization of Chinese persons with a provision explicitly granting them this boon.[41] In 1946, it opened up naturalization to persons from the Philippines and India as well.[42] Thus, at the end of the war, our naturalization law looked like this:

> The right to become a naturalized citizen under the provisions of this Act shall extend only to—
>
> (1) white persons, persons of African nativity or descent, and persons of races indigenous to the continents of North or South America or adjacent islands and Filipino persons or persons of Filipino descent;
>
> (2) persons who possess, either singly or in combination, a preponderance of blood of one or more of the classes specified in clause (1);
>
> (3) Chinese persons or persons of Chinese descent; and persons of races indigenous to India; and
>
> (4) persons who possess, either singly or in combination, a preponderance of blood of one or more of the classes specified in clause (3) or, either singly or in combination, as much as one-half blood of those classes and some additional blood of one of the classes specified in clause (1).[43]

This incremental retreat from a "Whites only" conception of citizenship made the arbitrariness of U.S. naturalization law increasingly obvious. For example, under the above statute, the right to acquire citizenship depended for some on blood-quantum distinctions based on descent from peoples indigenous to islands adjacent to the Americas. In 1952, Congress moved towards wholesale reform, overhauling the naturalization statute to read simply that "[t]he right of a person to become a naturalized citizen of the United States shall not be denied or abridged because of race or sex or because such person is married."[44] Thus, in 1952, racial bars on naturalization came to an official end.[45]

Notice the mention of gender in the statutory language ending racial restrictions in naturalization. The issue of women and citizenship can only be touched on here, but deserves significant study in its own right.[46] As the language of the 1952 Act implies, eligibility for naturalization once depended on a woman's marital status. Congress in 1855 declared that a foreign woman automatically acquired citizenship upon marriage to a U.S. citizen, or upon the naturalization of her alien husband.[47] This provision built upon the supposition that a woman's social and political status flowed from her husband. As an 1895 treatise on naturalization put it, "A woman partakes of her husband's nationality; her nationality is merged in that of her husband; her political status follows that of her husband."[48] A wife's acquisition of citizenship, however, remained subject to her individual qualification for naturalization—that is, on whether she was a "white person."[49] Thus, the Supreme Court held in 1868 that only "white women" could gain citizenship by marrying a citizen.[50] Racial restrictions further complicated matters for noncitizen women in that naturalization was denied to those married to a man racially ineligible for citizenship, irrespective of the woman's own qualifications, racial or otherwise.[51] The automatic naturalization of a woman upon her marriage to a citizen or upon the naturalization of her husband ended in 1922.[52]

The citizenship of American-born women was also affected by the interplay of gender and racial restrictions. Even though under English common law a woman's nationality was unaffected by marriage, many courts in this country stripped women who

married noncitizens of their U.S. citizenship.[53] Congress recognized and mandated this practice in 1907, legislating that an American woman's marriage to an alien terminated her citizenship.[54] Under considerable pressure, Congress partially repealed this act in 1922.[55] However, the 1922 act continued to require the expatriation of any woman who married a foreigner racially barred from citizenship, flatly declaring that "any woman citizen who marries an alien ineligible to citizenship shall cease to be a citizen."[56] Until Congress repealed this provision in 1931,[57] marriage to a non-White alien by an American woman was akin to treason against this country: either of these acts justified the stripping of citizenship from someone American by birth. Indeed, a woman's marriage to a non-White foreigner was perhaps a worse crime, for while a traitor lost his citizenship only after trial, the woman lost hers automatically.[58] The laws governing the racial composition of this country's citizenry came inseverably bound up with and exacerbated by sexism. It is in this context of combined racial and gender prejudice that we should understand the absence of any women among the petitioners named in the prerequisite cases: it is not that women were unaffected by the racial bars, but that they were doubly bound by them, restricted both as individuals, and as less than individuals (that is, as wives).

Notes

1. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE TARNISHED GOLDEN DOOR: CIVIL RIGHTS ISSUES IN IMMIGRATION 1–12 (1990).
2. Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882). *See generally* Harold Hongju Koh, *Bitter Fruit of the Asian Immigration Cases,* 6 CONSTITUTION 69 (1994). For a sobering account of the many lynchings of Chinese in the western United States during this period, *see* John R. Wunder, *Anti-Chinese Violence in the American West, 1850–1910,* LAW FOR THE ELEPHANT, LAW FOR THE BEAVER: ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL HISTORY OF THE NORTH AMERICAN WEST 212 (John McLaren, Hamar Foster, and Chet Orloff eds., 1992). Charles McClain, Jr., discusses the historical origins of anti-Chinese prejudice and the legal responses undertaken by that community on the West Coast. Charles McClain, Jr., *The Chinese Struggle for Civil Rights in Nineteenth Century America: The First Phase, 1850–1870,* 72 CAL. L. REV. 529 (1984). For a discussion of contemporary racial violence against Asian Americans, *see* Note, *Racial Violence against Asian Americans,* 106 HARV. L. REV. 1926 (1993); Robert Chang, *Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space,* 81 CAL. L. REV. 1241, 1251–58 (1993).
3. Act of July 9, 1884, ch. 220, 23 Stat. 115; Act of May 5, 1892, ch. 60, 27 Stat. 25; Act of April 29, 1902, ch. 641, 32 Stat. 176; Act of April 27, 1904, ch. 1630, 33 Stat. 428.
4. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874.
5. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, *supra,* at 9.
6. *Id. See* Act of May 19, 1921, ch. 8, 42 Stat. 5; Act of May 26, 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153.
7. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, *supra,* at 10.
8. *Id.* at 11. *See generally* JUAN RAMON GARCIA, OPERATION WETBACK: THE MASS DEPORTATION OF MEXICAN UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS IN 1954 (1980).
9. Act of Oct. 2, 1965, 79 Stat. 911.
10. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). The Court reasoned in part that if "the government of the United States, through its legislative department, considers the presence of foreigners of a different race in this country, who will not assimilate with us, to be dangerous to its peace and security, their exclusion is not to be stayed." For a critique of this deplorable result, *see* Louis Henkin, *The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny,* 100 HARV. L. REV. 853 (1987).
11. For efforts to encourage Irish immigration, *see, e.g., Immigration Act of 1990, § 131, 104 Stat. 4978 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (c) [1994]). Bill Ong Hing argues that Congress continues to discriminate against Asians. "Through an examination of past exclusion laws, previous legislation, and the specific provisions of the Immigration Act of 1990, the conclusion can be drawn that Congress never intended to make up for nearly 80 years of Asian exclusion, and that a conscious hostility towards persons of Asian descent continues to pervade Congressional circles." Bill Ong Hing,* Asian Americans and Present U.S. Immigration Policies: A Legacy of Asian Exclusion, *ASIAN AMERICANS AND THE SUPREME COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1106, 1107 (Hyung-Chan Kim ed., 1992).*
12. Louis DeSipio and Harry Pachon, Making Americans: Administrative Discretion and Americanization, *12 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 52, 53 (1992).*
13. CHARLES GORDON AND STANLEY MAILMAN, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 92.03[1][b] (rev. ed. 1992).
14. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). For an insightful discussion of the role of *Dred Scott* in the development of American citizenship, see *JAMES KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608–1870, at 300–333 (1978);* see also *KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION 43–61 (1989).*
15. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
16. U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
17. 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
18. 112 U.S. 94 (1884).
19. Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253.
20. Nationality Act of 1940, § 201(b), 54 Stat. 1138. See generally *GORDON AND MAILMAN,* supra, *at § 92.03[3][e].*
21. Pete Wilson, Crack Down on Illegals, *USA TODAY, Aug. 20, 1993, at 12A.*
22. H. R. J. Res. 129, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). An earlier, scholarly call to revamp the Fourteenth Amendment can be found in PETER SCHUCK and ROGER SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT: ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY (1985).
23. Koh, supra, *at 69–70.*
24. Bill Ong Hing, Beyond the Rhetoric of Assimilation and Cultural Pluralism: Addressing the Tension of Separatism and Conflict in an Immigration-Driven Multiracial Society, *81 CAL. L. REV. 863, 866 (1993).*
25. Gerald Neuman warns against amending the Citizenship Clause. Gerald Neuman, Back to *Dred Scott? 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 485, 500 (1987).* See also *Note,* The Birthright Citizenship Amendment: A Threat to Equality, *107 HARV. L. REV. 1026 (1994).*

26. U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 4.
27. Act of March 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103.
28. KETTNER, supra, *at 215–16.*
29. One exception exists. In revisions undertaken in 1870, the "white person" limitation was omitted. However, this omission is regarded as accidental, and the prerequisite was reinserted in 1875 by "an act to correct errors and to supply omissions in the Rev-ised Statutes of the United States." Act of Feb. 18, 1875, ch. 80, 18 Stat. 318. See *In re Ah Yup, 1 F.Cas. 223 (C.C.D.Cal. 1878) ("Upon revision of the statutes, the revisors, probably inadvertently, as Congress did not contemplate a change of the laws in force, omitted the words 'white persons.' ").*
30. Statement of Senator Hendricks, 59 CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 2939 (1866). See also *John Guendelsberger,* Access to Citizenship for Children Born Within the State to Foreign Parents, *40 AM. J. COMP. L. 379, 407–9 (1992).*
31. Statement of Senator Cowan, 57 CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 499 (1866). For a discussion of the role of anti-Asian prejudice in the laws governing naturalization, see generally *Elizabeth Hull,* Naturalization and Denaturalization, *ASIAN AMERICANS AND THE SUPREME COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 403 (Hyung-Chan Kim ed., 1992).*
32. The Senate rejected an amendment that would have allowed Chinese persons to naturalize. The proposed amendment read: "That the naturalization laws are hereby extended to aliens of African nativity, and to persons of African descent, and to persons born in the Chinese empire." BILL ONG HING, MAKING AND REMAKING ASIAN AMERICA THROUGH IMMIGRATION POLICY, 1850–1990, at 239 n.34 (1993).
33. Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 255, § 7, 16 Stat. 254.
34. Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, § 14, 22 Stat. 58 (1882).
35. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 716 (1893).
36. Neil Gotanda contends that separate racial ideologies function with respect to "other non-Whites," meaning non-Black racial minorities such as Asians, Native Americans, and Latinos. Neil Gotanda, "Other Non-Whites" in American Legal History: A Review of *Justice at War, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1186 (1985). Gotanda explicitly identifies the operation of this separate ideology in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence regarding Asians and citizenship. Neil Gotanda,* Asian American Rights and the "Miss Saigon Syndrome," *ASIAN AMERICANS AND THE SUPREME COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1087, 1096–97 (Hyung-Chan Kim ed., 1992).*
37. Charles Gordon, The Racial Barrier to American Citizenship, *93 U. PA. L. REV. 237, 252 (1945).*
38. MILTON KONVITZ, THE ALIEN AND THE ASIATIC IN AMERICAN LAW 80–81 (1946) (citation omitted).
39. Act of Oct. 14, 1940, ch. 876, § 303, 54 Stat. 1140.
40. Note, The Nationality Act of 1940, *54 HARV. L. REV. 860, 865 n.40 (1941).*
41. Act of Dec. 17, 1943, ch. 344, 3, 57 Stat. 600.
42. Act of July 2, 1946, ch. 534, 60 Stat. 416.
43. Id.
44. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 2, § 311, 66 Stat. 239 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. 1422 [1988]).
45. Arguably, the continued substantial exclusion of Asians from immigration not remedied until 1965, rendered their eligibility for naturalization relatively meaningless. "[T]he national quota system for admitting immigrants which was built into the 1952 Act gave the grant of eligibility a hollow ring." Chin Kim and Bok Lim Kim, Asian Immigrants in American Law: A Look at the Past and the Challenge Which Remains, *26 AM. U. L. REV. 373, 390 (1977).*
46. See generally *Ursula Vogel,* Is Citizenship Gender-Specific? *THE FRONTIERS OF CITIZENSHIP 58 (Ursula Vogel and Michael Moran eds., 1991).*
47. Act of Feb. 10, 1855, ch. 71, § 2, 10 Stat. 604. Because gender-based laws in the area of citizenship were motivated by the idea that a woman's citizenship should follow that of her husband, no naturalization law has explicitly targeted unmarried women. GORDON AND MAILMAN, supra, *at § 95.03[6] ("An unmarried woman has never been statutorily* barred from naturalization.").
48. PRENTISS WEBSTER, LAW OF NATURALIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND OTHER COUNTRIES 80 (1895).
49. Act of Feb. 10, 1855, ch. 71, § 2, 10 Stat. 604.
50. Kelly v. Owen, 74 U.S. 496, 498 (1868).
51. GORDON AND MAILMAN, *supra* at § 95.03[6].
52. Act of Sept. 22, 1922, ch. 411, § 2, 42 Stat. 1021.
53. GORDON AND MAILMAN, *supra* at § 100.03[4][m].
54. Act of March 2, 1907, ch. 2534, § 3, 34 Stat. 1228. This act was upheld in MacKenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915) (expatriating a U.S.-born woman upon her marriage to a British citizen).
55. Act of Sept. 22, 1922, ch. 411, § 3, 42 Stat. 1021.
56. *Id.* The Act also stated that "[n]o woman whose husband is not eligible to citizenship shall be naturalized during the continuance of the marriage."
57. Act of March 3, 1931, ch. 442, § 4(a), 46 Stat. 1511.
58. The loss of birthright citizenship was particularly harsh for those women whose race made them unable to regain citizenship through naturalization, especially after 1924, when the immigration laws of this country barred entry to any alien ineligible to citizenship. Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, § 13(c), 43 Stat. 162. *See, e.g.,* Ex parte (Ng) Fung Sing, 6 F.2d 670 (W. D. Wash. 1925). In that case, a U.S. birthright citizen of Chinese descent was expatriated because of her marriage to a Chinese citizen, and was subsequently refused admittance to the United States as an alien ineligible to citizenship.

Ancestry: 2000

Census 2000 Brief

ANGELA BRITTINGHAM AND G. PATRICIA DE LA CRUZ

Ancestry is a broad concept that can mean different things to different people; it can be described alternately as where their ancestors are from, where they or their parents originated, or simply how they see themselves ethnically. Some people may have one distinct ancestry, while others are descendants of several ancestry groups, and still others may know only that their ancestors were from a particular region of the world or may not know their ethnic origins at all. The Census Bureau defines ancestry as a person's ethnic origin, heritage, descent, or "roots," which may reflect their place of birth, place of birth of parents or ancestors, and ethnic identities that have evolved within the United States.

This report is part of a series that presents population and housing data collected by Census 2000, where 80 percent of respondents to the long form specified at least one ancestry. (About one-sixth of households received the long form.) It presents data on the most frequently reported ancestries and describes population distributions for the United States, including regions, states, counties, and selected cities.[1] The listed ancestries were reported by at least 100,000 people, and the numbers cited in this report represent the number of people who reported each ancestry either as their first or second response.

The question on ancestry first appeared on the census questionnaire in 1980, replacing a question on where a person's parents were born. The question on parental birthplace provided foreign-origin data only for people with one or both parents born outside the United States. The current ancestry question allows everyone to give one or two attributions of their "ancestry or ethnic origin" (Figure 1), and in doing so, enables people to identify an ethnic background, such as German, Lebanese, Nigerian, or Portuguese, which was not otherwise identified in the race or Hispanic-origin questions.

The ancestries in this report also include the groups covered in the questions on race and Hispanic origin, such as African American, Mexican, American Indian, and Chinese. For these groups, the results from the ancestry question and the race and Hispanic-origin questions differ, but the latter are the official sources of data for race and Hispanic groups. In some cases, the totals reported on the ancestry question are lower than the numbers from the race or Hispanic-origin question. For instance, nearly 12 million fewer people specified "African American" as their ancestry than gave that response to the race question. One reason for this large difference is that some people who reported Black or African American on the race question reported their ancestry more specifically, such as Jamaican, Haitian, or Nigerian, and thus were not counted in the African American ancestry category. Similarly, more than 2 million fewer people reported Mexican ancestry than gave that answer to the Hispanic-origin question.[2] In other cases, the ancestry question produced higher numbers, such as for Dominicans, whose estimated totals from the ancestry question were over 100,000 higher than from the Hispanic-origin question, where many Dominicans may have reported a general term (like Hispanic) or checked "other" without writing in a detailed response.[3]



Figure 1 Reproduction of the Question on Ancestry from Census 2000
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 questionnaire.

More than four out of five people specified at least one ancestry.

In 2000, 58 percent of the population specified only one ancestry, 22 percent provided two ancestries, and 1 percent reported an unclassifiable ancestry such as "mixture" or "adopted." Another 19 percent did not report any ancestry at all, a substantial increase from 1990, when 10 percent of the population left the ancestry question blank (Table 1).

Table 1 Ancestry Reporting: 1990 and 2000

(Data based on sample. For information on confidentiality protection, sampling error, nonsampling error, and definitions, see *www.census.gov/prod/cen2000/doc/sf3.pdf*)

Ancestry	1990[1]		2000		Change, 1990 to 2000	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Numerical	Percent
Total population	**248,709,873**	**100.0**	**281,421,906**	**100.0**	**32,712,033**	**13.2**
Ancestry specified	222,608,257	89.5	225,310,411	80.1	2,702,154	1.2
Single ancestry	148,836,950	59.8	163,315,936	58.0	14,478,986	9.7
Multiple ancestry	73,771,307	29.7	61,994,475	22.0	−11,776,832	−16.0
Ancestry not specified	26,101,616	10.5	56,111,495	19.9	30,009,879	115.0
Unclassified	2,180,245	0.9	2,437,929	0.9	257,684	11.8
Not reported	23,921,371	9.6	53,673,566	19.1	29,752,195	124.4

[1]1990 estimates in this table differ slightly from 1990 Summary Tape File 3 in order to make them fully consistent with data from Census 2000.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Summary File 3 and 1990 special tabulation.

Nearly one of six people reported their ancestry as German.

In 2000, 42.8 million people (15 percent of the population) considered themselves to be of German (or part-German) ancestry, the most frequent response to the census question (Figure 2).[4] Other ancestries with over 15 million people in 2000 included Irish (30.5 million, or 11 percent), African American (24.9 million, or 9 percent), English (24.5 million, or 9 percent), American (20.2 million, or 7 percent), Mexican (18.4 million, or 7 percent), and Italian (15.6 million, or 6 percent).

Other ancestries with 4 million or more people included Polish, French, American Indian, Scottish, Dutch, Norwegian, Scotch-Irish, and Swedish.

In total, 7 ancestries were reported by more than 15 million people in 2000, 37 ancestries were reported by more than 1 million people, and 92 ancestries were reported by more than 100,000 people (Table 2).

The largest European ancestries have decreased in population, while African American, Hispanic, and Asian ancestries have increased.

The highest growth rates between 1990 and 2000 occurred in groups identified by a general heritage rather than a particular country of ancestry. For example, the number of people who



Figure 2 Fifteen Largest Ancestries: 2000. (In millions. Percent of total population in parentheses. Data based on sample. For information on confidentiality protection, sampling error, nonsampling error, and definitions, see www.census.gov/prod/cen2000/doc/sf3.pdf)
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 special tabulation.

Table 2 Ancestries with 100,000 or More People in 2000: 1990 and 2000

(Data based on sample. For information on confidentiality protection, sampling error, nonsampling error, and definitions, see *www.census.gov/prod/cen2000/doc/sf3.pdf*)

	1990		2000		Change, 1990 to 2000	
Ancestry	Number	Percent of total population	Number	Percent of total population	Numerical	Percent
Total population	**248,709,873**	**100.0**	**281,421,906**	**100.0**	**32,712,033**	**13.2**
African*	245,845	0.1	1,183,316	0.4	937,471	381.3
African American*[1,2]	23,750,256	9.5	24,903,412	8.8	1,153,156	4.9
Albanian	47,710	–	113,661	–	65,951	138.2
American*	12,395,999	5.0	20,188,305	7.2	7,792,306	62.9
American Indian*	8,689,344	3.5	7,876,568	2.8	−812,776	−9.4
Arab*	127,364	0.1	205,822	0.1	78,458	61.6
Armenian	308,096	0.1	385,488	0.1	77,392	25.1
Asian*	107,172	–	238,960	0.1	131,788	123.0
Asian Indian	569,338	0.2	1,546,703	0.5	977,365	171.7
Austrian	864,783	0.3	730,336	0.3	−134,447	−15.5
Belgian	380,403	0.2	348,531	0.1	−31,872	28.4
Brazilian	65,875	–	181,076	0.1	115,201	174.9
British	1,119,140	0.4	1,085,718	0.4	−33,422	−3.0
Cambodian[2]	134,955	0.1	197,093	0.1	62,138	46.0
Canadian	549,990	0.2	638,548	0.2	88,558	16.1
Chinese	1,505,229	0.6	2,271,562	0.8	766,333	50.9
Colombian	351,717	0.1	583,986	0.2	232,269	66.0
Croatian[1]	544,270	0.2	374,241	0.1	−170,029	−31.2
Cuban	859,739	0.3	1,097,594	0.4	237,855	27.7
Czech	1,296,369	0.5	1,258,452	0.4	−37,917	22.9
Czechoslovakian	315,285	0.1	441,403	0.2	126,118	40.0
Danish	1,634,648	0.7	1,430,897	0.5	−203,751	−12.5
Dominican[1,2]	505,690	0.2	908,531	0.3	402,841	79.7
Dutch	6,226,339	2.5	4,541,770	1.6	−1,684,569	−27.1
Ecuadorian[1]	197,374	0.1	322,965	0.1	125,591	63.6
Egyptian	78,574	–	142,832	0.1	64,258	81.8
English	32,651,788	13.1	24,509,692	8.7	−8,142,096	−24.9
European*	466,718	0.2	1,968,696	0.7	1,501,978	321.8
Filipino	1,450,512	0.6	2,116,478	0.8	665,966	45.9
Finnish	658,854	0.3	623,559	0.2	−35,295	−5.4
French	10,320,656	4.1	8,309,666	3.0	−2,010,990	−19.5
French Canadian[1,2]	2,167,127	0.9	2,349,684	0.8	182,557	8.4
German[1]	57,947,171	23.3	42,841,569	15.2	−15,105,602	−26.1
Greek	1,110,292	0.4	1,153,295	0.4	43,003	3.9
Guatemalan	241,559	0.1	463,502	0.2	221,943	91.9
Guyanese	81,665	–	162,425	0.1	80,760	98.9
Haitian[1,2]	289,521	0.1	548,199	0.2	258,678	89.3
Hawaiian	256,081	0.1	334,858	0.1	78,777	30.8
Hispanic*	1,113,259	0.4	2,451,109	0.9	1,337,850	120.2
Hmong	84,823	–	140,528	–	55,705	65.7
Honduran	116,635	–	266,848	0.1	150,213	128.8
Hungarian	1,582,302	0.6	1,398,702	0.5	−183,600	−11.6
Iranian	235,521	0.1	338,266	0.1	102,745	43.6
Irish[1]	38,735,539	15.6	30,524,799	10.8	−8,210,740	−21.2
Israeli	81,677	–	106,839	–	25,162	30.8
Italian[1,2]	14,664,189	5.9	15,638,348	5.6	974,159	6.6
Jamaican[1,2]	435,024	0.2	736,513	0.3	301,489	69.3
Japanese	1,004,622	0.4	1,103,325	0.4	98,703	9.8
Korean[1,2]	836,987	0.3	1,190,353	0.4	353,366	42.2
Laotian	146,947	0.1	179,866	0.1	32,919	22.4

(continued)

(See footnotes on next page)

Table 2 Ancestries with 100,000 or More People in 2000: 1990 and 2000—Continued

(Data based on sample. For information on confidentiality protection, sampling error, nonsampling error, and definitions, see *www.census.gov/prod/cen2000/doc/sf3.pdf*)

Ancestry	1990		2000		Change, 1990 to 2000	
	Number	Percent of total population	Number	Percent of total population	Numerical	Percent
Latin American*	43,521	–	250,052	0.1	206,531	474.6
Lebanese[1,2]	394,180	0.2	440,279	0.2	46,099	11.7
Lithuanian	811,865	0.3	659,992	0.2	−151,873	−18.7
Mexican[1,2]	11,580,038	4.7	18,382,291	6.5	6,802,253	58.7
Nicaraguan	177,077	0.1	230,358	0.1	53,281	30.1
Nigerian[1,2]	91,499	–	164,691	0.1	73,192	80.0
Northern European*	65,993	–	163,657	0.1	97,664	148.0
Norwegian[2]	3,869,395	1.6	4,477,725	1.6	608,330	15.7
Pakistani	99,974	–	253,193	0.1	153,219	153.3
Panamanian	88,649	–	119,497	–	30,848	34.8
Pennsylvania German	305,841	0.1	255,807	0.1	−50,034	−16.4
Peruvian	161,866	0.1	292,991	0.1	131,125	81.0
Polish[1,2]	9,366,051	3.8	8,977,235	3.2	−388,816	−4.2
Portuguese	1,148,857	0.5	1,173,691	0.4	24,834	2.2
Puerto Rican	1,955,323	0.8	2,652,598	0.9	697,275	35.7
Romanian	365,531	0.1	367,278	0.1	1,747	(NS)
Russian	2,951,373	1.2	2,652,214	0.9	−299,159	−10.1
Salvadoran	499,153	0.2	802,743	0.3	303,590	60.8
Scandinavian	678,880	0.3	425,099	0.2	−253,781	−37.4
Scotch-Irish	5,617,773	2.3	4,319,232	1.5	−1,298,541	−23.1
Scottish	5,393,581	2.2	4,890,581	1.7	−503,000	−9.3
Serbian	116,795	–	140,337	–	23,5422	0.2
Slavic	76,923	–	127,136	–	50,213	65.3
Slovak[1]	1,882,897	0.8	797,764	0.3	−1,085,133	−57.6
Slovene	124,437	0.1	176,691	0.1	52,254	42.0
Spaniard	360,858	0.1	299,948	0.1	−60,910	−16.9
Spanish	2,024,004	0.8	2,187,144	0.8	163,140	8.1
Swedish	4,680,863	1.9	3,998,310	1.4	−682,553	−14.6
Swiss	1,045,492	0.4	911,502	0.3	−133,990	−12.8
Syrian	129,606	0.1	142,897	0.1	13,291	10.3
Taiwanese[1,2]	192,973	0.1	293,568	0.1	100,595	52.1
Thai[1]	112,11	–	146,577	0.1	34,460	30.7
Trinidadian and Tobagonian	76,270	–	164,738	0.1	88,468	116.0
Turkish	83,850	–	117,575	–	33,725	40.2
Ukrainian[1,2]	740,723	0.3	892,922	0.3	152,199	20.5
United States*	643,561	0.3	404,328	0.1	−239,233	−37.2
Vietnamese	535,825	0.2	1,029,420	0.4	493,595	92.1
Welsh	2,033,893	0.8	1,753,794	0.6	−280,099	−13.8
West Indian*	159,167	0.1	147,222	0.1	−11,945	−7.5
Western European*	42,409	–	125,300	–	82,891	195.5
White*	1,799,711	0.7	3,834,122	1.4	2,034,411	113.0
Yugoslavian	257,986	0.1	328,547	0.1	70,561	27.4
Other ancestries	3,989,728	1.6	4,380,380	1.6	390,652	9.8

– Rounds to 0.0.

* General response which may encompass several ancestries not listed separately (i.e., African American includes Black and Negro). NS Not statistically different from zero at the 90-percent confidence level.

[1]Included in the list of examples on the census questionnaire in 1990.

[2]Included in the list of examples on the census questionnaire in 2000.

Notes: Because of sampling error, the estimates in this table may not be significantly different from one another or from other ancestries not listed in this table. People who reported two ancestries were included once in each category. The estimates in this table differ slightly in some cases from the estimates in other data products due to the collapsing schemes used. For example, here German does not include Bavarian. Some groups correspond to groups identified separately in the race and Hispanic-origin questions. The race item provides the primary source of data for White, Black, American Indian, Alaska Native, Asian groups, Native Hawaiian, and Pacific Islander groups. The Hispanic-origin question is the primary identifier for Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, and other Hispanic groups.

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 1990 Census and Census 2000 special tabulations.

reported Latin American, African, or European all more than quadrupled (Latin American increased from 44,000 in 1990 to 250,000 in 2000, African grew from 246,000 to 1.2 million, and European rose from 467,000 to 2.0 million). Other general heritage groups that at least doubled in size included Western European, Northern European, Asian, Hispanic, and White.

The three largest ancestries in 1990 were German, Irish, and English. In 2000, these groups were still the largest European ancestries, but each had decreased in size by at least 8 million and by more than 20 percent (Table 2). As a proportion of the population, German decreased from 23 percent in 1990 to 15 percent in 2000, while Irish and English decreased from 16 percent to 11 percent, and from 13 percent to 9 percent, respectively. Several other large European ancestries also decreased over the decade, including Polish, French, Scottish, Dutch, and Swedish.

The number of people who reported African American ancestry increased by nearly 1.2 million, or 4.9 percent, between 1990 and 2000, making this group the third largest ancestry. However, the proportion of African Americans decreased slightly over the decade, from 9.5 percent to 8.8 percent.

The population of many ancestries, such as Mexican, Chinese, Filipino, and Asian Indian, increased during the decade, reflecting sizable immigration, especially from Latin America and Asia. Several small ancestry populations, including Brazilian, Pakistani, Albanian, Honduran, and Trinidadian and Tobagonian, at least doubled.

Seven percent of the U.S. population reported their ancestry as American.

The number who reported American and no other ancestry increased from 12.4 million in 1990 to 20.2 million in 2000, the largest numerical growth of any group during the 1990s.[5] This figure represents an increase of 63 percent, as the proportion rose from 5.0 percent to 7.2 percent of the population.

The Geographic Distribution of Ancestries

In each of the four regions, a different ancestry was reported as the largest.

Among the four regions, the largest ancestries in 2000 were Irish in the Northeast (16 percent), African American in the South (14 percent), German in the Midwest (27 percent), and Mexican in the West (16 percent, see Table 3).[6]

At the state level, 8 different ancestries were each the largest reported in 1 or more states. German led in 23 states, including every state in the Midwest, the majority of states in the West, and 1 state in the South. In 3 of those states, German was reported by more than 40 percent of the population: North Dakota (44 percent), Wisconsin (43 percent), and South Dakota (41 percent).

The other leading ancestries at the state level were African American in 7 contiguous states from Louisiana to Maryland and in the District of Columbia (also notably high at 43 percent); American in Arkansas, Tennessee, Kentucky, and West Virginia; Italian in Connecticut, New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island; Mexican in 4 states from California to Texas; English in Maine, Utah and Vermont; Irish in Delaware, Massachusetts and New Hampshire; and Japanese in Hawaii.

Many other ancestries were not the largest ancestry in any state but represented more than 10 percent of a state's population, including American Indian in Oklahoma (12 percent) and Alaska (11 percent); Filipino (18 percent) and Hawaiian (16 percent) in Hawaii; French in Maine (14 percent), Vermont (15 percent), and Rhode Island (11 percent); French Canadian in New Hampshire (10 percent); and Norwegian in North Dakota (30 percent), Minnesota (17 percent), South Dakota (15 percent), and Montana (11 percent, see Table 3).

Other ancestries not noted above were among the 5 largest in a state but represented less than 10 percent of the state's population. Examples include Chinese in Hawaii (8.3 percent), Czech in Nebraska (4.9 percent), Danish in Utah (6.5 percent), Eskimo in Alaska (6.1 percent), Polish in Michigan (8.6 percent), Portuguese in Rhode Island (8.7 percent), Spanish in New Mexico (9.3 percent), and Swedish in Minnesota (9.9 percent).

Twenty-four different ancestries were the largest in at least one county in the United States.

German was the leading ancestry reported in many counties across the northern half of the United States, from Pennsylvania to Washington, as well as some counties in the southern half. Mexican was the leading ancestry along the southwestern border of the United States, and American and African American were the most commonly reported ancestries in many southern counties, from Virginia to eastern Texas.

Several ancestries that did not predominate in any state were the most common within one or more counties. Examples include Aleut and Eskimo in some counties of Alaska; American Indian in counties in Alaska, Arizona, California, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Washington, and Wisconsin; Finnish in several counties in the Upper Peninsula of Michigan; French in counties in Connecticut, New York, Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, and Louisiana; French Canadian in counties in Maine; Dutch in several counties in Michigan and Iowa; Norwegian in counties in Iowa, Minnesota, Montana, North Dakota, and Wisconsin; Polish in one county in Pennsylvania; and Portuguese in one county each in Massachusetts and Rhode Island.

Table 3 Largest Ancestries for the United States, Regions, States, and for Puerto Rico: 2000

(Data based on sample. For information on confidentiality protection, sampling error, nonsampling error, and definitions, see *www.census.gov/prod/cen2000/doc/sf3.pdf*)

Ancestry	Total population	Ancestry	Percent	Ancestry	Percent	Ancestry	Percent	Ancestry	Percent	Ancestry	Percent
United States	**281,421,906**	**German**	**15.2**	**Irish**	**10.8**	**African Am.**	**8.8**	**English**	**8.7**	**American**	**7.2**
Region											
Northeast	53,594,378	Irish	15.8	Italian	14.1	German	13.6	English	8.3	African Am.	6.5
Midwest	64,392,776	German	26.6	Irish	11.8	English	8.4	African Am.	7.8	American	6.5
South	100,236,820	African Am.	14.0	American	11.2	German	10.0	Irish	8.8	English	8.4
West	63,197,932	Mexican	16.0	German	13.3	English	9.9	Irish	9.0	American	4.1
State											
Alabama	4,447,100	African Am.	19.9	American	16.8	English	7.8	Irish	7.7	German	5.7
Alaska	626,932	German	16.6	Irish	10.8	Am. Indian	10.5	English	9.6	Eskimo	6.1
Arizona	5,130,632	Mexican	18.0	German	15.6	English	10.4	Irish	10.2	Am. Indian	6.1
Arkansas	2,673,400	American	15.7	African Am.	11.9	Irish	9.5	German	9.3	English	7.9
California	33,871,648	Mexican	22.2	German	9.8	Irish	7.7	English	7.4	African Am.	5.1
Colorado	4,301,261	German	22.0	Irish	12.2	English	12.0	Mexican	9.0	American	5.0
Connecticut	3,405,565	Italian	18.6	Irish	16.6	English	10.3	German	9.8	Polish	8.3
Delaware	783,600	Irish	16.6	German	14.3	African Am.	14.0	English	12.1	Italian	9.3
District of Columbia	572,059	African Am.	43.4	Irish	4.9	German	4.8	English	4.4	Salvadoran	2.3
Florida	15,982,378	German	11.8	Irish	10.3	English	9.2	African Am.	8.6	American	7.8
Georgia	8,186,453	African Am.	21.6	American	13.3	English	8.1	Irish	7.8	German	7.0
Hawaii	1,211,537	Japanese	20.7	Filipino	17.7	Hawaiian	16.3	Chinese	8.3	German	5.8
Idaho	1,293,953	German	18.8	English	18.1	Irish	10.0	American	8.1	Mexican	5.5
Illinois	12,419,293	German	19.6	Irish	12.2	African Am.	11.5	Mexican	8.2	Polish	7.5
Indiana	6,080,485	German	22.6	American	11.8	Irish	10.8	English	8.9	African Am.	6.5
Iowa	2,926,324	German	35.7	Irish	13.5	English	9.5	American	6.6	Norwegian	5.7
Kansas	2,688,418	German	25.8	Irish	11.5	English	10.8	American	8.7	Mexican	4.7
Kentucky	4,041,769	American	20.7	German	12.7	Irish	10.5	English	9.7	African Am.	5.7
Louisiana	4,468,976	African Am.	25.5	French	12.2	American	10.0	German	7.0	Irish	7.0
Maine	1,274,923	English	21.5	Irish	15.1	French	14.2	American	9.3	Fr. Canadian	8.6
Maryland	5,296,486	African Am.	20.5	German	15.7	Irish	11.7	English	9.0	American	5.6
Massachusetts	6,349,097	Irish	22.5	Italian	13.5	English	11.4	French	8.0	German	5.9
Michigan	9,938,444	German	20.4	African Am.	11.0	Irish	10.7	English	9.9	Polish	8.6
Minnesota	4,919,479	German	36.7	Norwegian	17.3	Irish	11.2	Swedish	9.9	English	6.3
Mississippi	2,844,658	African Am.	28.3	American	14.0	Irish	6.9	English	6.1	German	4.5
Missouri	5,595,211	German	23.5	Irish	12.7	American	10.4	English	9.5	African Am.	8.8
Montana	902,195	German	27.0	Irish	14.8	English	12.6	Norwegian	10.6	Am. Indian	7.4
Nebraska	1,711,263	German	38.6	Irish	13.4	English	9.6	Swedish	4.9	Czech	4.9
Nevada	1,998,257	German	14.1	Mexican	12.7	Irish	11.0	English	10.1	Italian	6.6
New Hampshire	1,235,786	Irish	19.4	English	18.0	French	14.6	Fr. Canadian	10.3	German	8.6
New Jersey	8,414,350	Italian	17.8	Irish	15.9	German	12.6	African Am.	8.8	Polish	6.9
New Mexico	1,819,046	Mexican	16.3	Am. Indian	10.3	German	9.8	Hispanic	9.4	Spanish	9.3
New York	18,976,457	Italian	14.4	Irish	12.9	German	11.2	African Am.	7.7	English	6.0
North Carolina	8,049,313	African Am.	16.6	American	13.7	English	9.5	German	9.5	Irish	7.4
North Dakota	642,200	German	43.9	Norwegian	30.1	Irish	7.7	Am. Indian	5.1	Swedish	5.0
Ohio	11,353,140	German	25.2	Irish	12.7	English	9.2	African Am.	9.1	American	8.5
Oklahoma	3,450,654	German	12.6	Am. Indian	12.1	American	11.2	Irish	10.3	English	8.4
Oregon	3,421,399	German	20.5	English	13.2	Irish	11.9	American	6.2	Mexican	5.5
Pennsylvania	12,281,054	German	25.4	Irish	16.1	Italian	11.5	English	7.9	African Am.	7.4
Rhode Island	1,048,319	Italian	19.0	Irish	18.4	English	12.0	French	10.9	Portuguese	8.7
South Carolina	4,012,012	African Am.	22.8	American	13.7	German	8.4	English	8.2	Irish	7.9
South Dakota	754,844	German	40.7	Norwegian	15.3	Irish	10.4	Am. Indian	8.2	English	7.1
Tennessee	5,689,283	American	17.3	African Am.	13.0	Irish	9.3	English	9.1	German	8.3
Texas	20,851,820	Mexican	22.6	German	9.9	African Am.	8.7	Irish	7.2	American	7.2
Utah	2,233,169	English	29.0	German	11.5	American	6.6	Danish	6.5	Irish	5.9
Vermont	608,827	English	18.4	Irish	16.4	French	14.5	German	9.1	Fr. Canadian	8.8
Virginia	7,078,515	African Am.	14.9	German	11.7	American	11.2	English	11.1	Irish	9.8
Washington	5,894,121	German	18.7	English	12.0	Irish	11.4	Norwegian	6.2	American	5.2
West Virginia	1,808,344	American	18.7	German	14.0	Irish	11.0	English	9.7	Am. Indian	4.4
Wisconsin	5,363,675	German	42.6	Irish	10.9	Polish	9.3	Norwegian	8.5	English	6.5
Wyoming	493,782	German	25.9	English	15.9	Irish	13.3	American	6.4	Am. Indian	4.7
Puerto Rico	**3,808,610**	**Puerto Rican**	**69.0**	**American**	**2.5**	**Spaniard**	**2.1**	**Dominican**	**1.7**	**Hispanic**	**0.8**

Notes: Because of sampling error, the estimates in this table may not be significantly different from one another or from other ancestries not listed in this table.

People who reported two ancestries were included once in each category. Some groups correspond to groups identified separately in the race and Hispanic-origin questions. The race item provides the primary source of data for White, Black, American Indian, Alaska Native, Asian groups, Native Hawaiian, and Pacific Islander groups. The Hispanic-origin question is the primary identifier for Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, and other Hispanic groups.

African American and Mexican were the most commonly reported ancestries in the ten largest cities in the United States.

In 2000, African American was the most frequently reported ancestry in New York City, Chicago, Philadelphia, and Detroit (Table 4).[7] Mexican was the leading ancestry in Los Angeles, Houston, Phoenix, San Diego, Dallas, and San Antonio.

Additional Findings

What Combinations were the Most Common Among Respondents Who Reported Two Ancestries?

The most common ancestry combinations in 2000 were German and Irish (2.7 percent of the population), German and English (1.7 percent), and Irish and English (1.4 percent).

What Other Ancestries were Reported?

Overall, about 500 different ancestries were reported during Census 2000. The category "Other ancestries" in Table 2 consists of all ancestries with fewer than 100,000 people (such as Venezuelan, Samoan, or Latvian) as well as all religious identifications (which are not tabulated).[8]

About Census 2000

Why Census 2000 Asked about Ancestry

Information about ancestry is required to enforce provisions under the Civil Rights Act that prohibit discrimination based upon race, sex, religion, and national origin. More generally, these data are needed to measure the social and economic characteristics of ethnic groups and to tailor services to accommodate cultural differences.

Data about ancestry assist states and local agencies on aging to develop health care and other services tailored to address the language and cultural diversity of various groups.

Under the Public Health Service Act, ancestry is one of the factors used to identify segments of the population who may not be receiving medical services.

Accuracy of the Estimates

The data contained in this report are based on the sample of households who responded to the Census 2000 long form. Nationally, approximately 1 out of every 6 housing units was included in this sample. As a result, the sample estimates may differ somewhat from the 100-percent figures that would have been obtained if all housing units, people within those housing units, and people living in group quarters had been enumerated using the same questionnaires, instructions, enumerators, and so forth. The sample estimates also differ from the values that would have been obtained from different samples of housing units, people within those housing units, and people living in

Table 4 Largest Ancestry for the Ten Cities with the Highest Population: 2000

(Data based on sample. For information on confidentiality protection, sampling error, nonsampling error, and definitions, see *www.census.gov/prod/cen2000/doc/sf3.pdf*)

City	Total population	Largest ancestry			
		Ancestry	Number of people	Percent of population	90-percent confidence interval
New York, NY	8,008,278	African American	922,116	11.5	11.4–11.6
Los Angeles, CA	3,694,834	Mexican	983,157	26.6	26.5–26.8
Chicago, IL	2,895,964	African American	804,053	27.8	27.6–27.9
Houston, TX	1,954,848	Mexican	467,213	23.9	23.7–24.1
Philadelphia, PA	1,517,550	African American	493,177	32.5	32.3–32.8
Phoenix, AZ	1,320,994	Mexican	320,092	24.2	24.0–24.5
San Diego, CA	1,223,341	Mexican	237,867	19.9	19.2–19.7
Dallas, TX	1,188,204	Mexican	306,072	25.8	25.5–26.0
San Antonio, TX	1,144,554	Mexican	472,324	41.3	41.0–41.6
Detroit, MI	951,270	African American	599,667	63.0	62.7–63.4

Notes: Because of sampling error, the estimates in this table may not be significantly different from one another or from other ancestries not listed in this table. People who reported two ancestries were included once in each category. Some groups correspond to groups identified separately in the race and Hispanic-origin questions. The race item provides the primary source of data for White, Black, American Indian, Alaska Native, Asian groups, Native Hawaiian, and Pacific Islander groups. The Hispanic-origin question is the primary identifier for Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, and other Hispanic groups.

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 special tabulation.

group quarters. The deviation of a sample estimate from the average of all possible samples is called the sampling error.

In addition to the variability that arises from the sampling procedures, both sample data and 100-percent data are subject to nonsampling error. Nonsampling error may be introduced during any of the various complex operations used to collect and process data. Such errors may include: not enumerating every household or every person in the population, failing to obtain all required information from the respondents, obtaining incorrect or inconsistent information, and recording information incorrectly.

In addition, errors can occur during the field review of the enumerators' work, during clerical handling of the census questionnaires, or during the electronic processing of the questionnaires.

Nonsampling error may affect the data in two ways: (1) errors that are introduced randomly will increase the variability of the data and, therefore, should be reflected in the standard errors; and (2) errors that tend to be consistent in one direction will bias both sample and 100-percent data in that direction. For example, if respondents consistently tend to underreport their incomes, then the resulting estimates of households or families by income category will tend to be understated for the higher income categories and overstated for the lower income categories. Such biases are not reflected in the standard errors.

While it is impossible to completely eliminate error from an operation as large and complex as the decennial census, the Census Bureau attempts to control the sources of such error during the data collection and processing operations. The primary sources of error and the programs instituted to control error in Census 2000 are described in detail in *Summary File 3 Technical Documentation* under Chapter 8, "Accuracy of the Data," located at *www.census.gov/prod /cen2000/doc/sf3.pdf.*

All statements in this Census 2000 Brief have undergone statistical testing and all comparisons are significant at the 90-percent confidence level, unless otherwise noted. The estimates in tables, maps, and other figures may vary from actual values due to sampling and nonsampling errors. As a result, estimates in one category may not be significantly different from estimates assigned to a different category. Further information on the accuracy of the data is located at *www.census.gov/prod/cen2000/doc/sf3.pdf.* For further information on the computation and use of standard errors, contact the Decennial Statistical Studies Division at 301-763-4242.

For More Information

The Census 2000 Summary File 3 data are available from the American Factfinder on the Internet (*factfinder.census.gov).* They were released on a state-by-state basis during 2002. For information on confidentiality protection, nonsampling error, sampling error, and definitions, also see *www.census.gov /prod/cen2000/doc/sf3.pdf* or contact the Customer Services Center at 301-763-INFO (4636).

Information on population and housing topics is presented in the Census 2000 Brief series, located on the Census Bureau's Web site at *www.census.gov/population/www/cen2000/briefs.html*. This series presents information on race, Hispanic origin, age, sex, household type, housing tenure, and social, economic, and housing characteristics, such as ancestry, income, and housing costs.

For additional information on ancestry, including reports and survey data, visit the Census Bureau's Web site on at *www.census.gov /population/www/ancestry.html*. To find information about the availability of data products, including reports, CD-ROMs, and DVDs, call the Customer Services Center at 301-763-INFO (4636), or e-mail *webmaster@census.gov.*

Notes

1. The text of this report discusses data for the United States, including the 50 states and the District of Columbia. Data for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico are shown in Table 3.
2. The estimates in this report are based on responses from a sample of the population. As with all surveys, estimates may vary from the actual values because of sampling variation or other factors. All statements made in this report have undergone statistical testing and are significant at the 90-percent confidence level unless otherwise noted.
3. For more information about race and Hispanic groups, see Census 2000 Briefs on Hispanic, American Indian and Alaska Native, Asian, Black, Native Hawaiian and Pacific Islander, White, and Two or More Races populations, available on the Census Bureau Web site at *www.census.gov/prod/cen2000 /index.html.*
4. The estimates in Figure 2 and Table 2 in some cases differ slightly from the estimates in other data products due to the collapsing schemes used. For example, here German does not include Bavarian.
5. American was considered a valid ancestry response when it was the only ancestry provided by a respondent.
6. The Northeast region includes the states of Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont. The Midwest region includes the states of Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, and Wisconsin. The South region includes the states of Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia, a state equivalent. The West region includes the states of Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.
7. Census 2000 showed 245 places in the United States with 100,000 or more population. They included 238 incorporated places (including 4 city-county consolidations) and 7 census designated places that were not legally incorporated. For a list of places by state, see *www.census.gov/population/www/cen2000/phc-t6.html*.
8. Smaller groups are listed at *www.census.gov/population/www/ancestry.html.*

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Forces That Shape Ethnic Opinion

What Ethnic Americans Really Think

JAMES J. ZOGBY

Different patterns of self-definition and political thinking do appear to exist among the several ethnic groups in our survey. In the last chapter, we saw how each of the six communities was impacted by several demographic variables.

To obtain an even closer look at the impact of each of these factors, we reorganized the data from Chapter Four in order to compare how the ethnic identification and political ideology of each community is shaped by place of birth, education, religious observance, income, gender and age.

A. Ethnic Pride

1. Compared by Place of Birth

Table 1 Pride in Ethnic Heritage

	Italian	African	Hispanic	Jewish	Asian	Arab
U.S.-Born	78.5	91.5	81.5	86.5	83.0	88.5
Immigrants	85.5	90.0	86.5	79.5	78.5	92.5

Table 2 Importance of Ethnic Heritage

	Italian	African	Hispanic	Jewish	Asian	Arab
U.S.-Born	29.5	62.0	53.5	46.0	41.5	41.0
Immigrants	47.0	69.0	76.5	66.5	58.5	73.0

Table 3 Friendships Outside Ethnic Groups

	Italian	African	Hispanic	Jewish	Asian	Arab
U.S.-Born	97.5	79.0	91.5	90.5	98.0	96.0
Immigrants	91.5	84.5	70.0	87.5	81.0	83.0

While Arab American immigrants are more conservative than native-born Arab Americans, they are also more inclined than native-born Arab Americans to identify with the Democratic party. As in the case of other groups, high school graduate Arab Americans lean more toward the Democratic party than college-educated, and Arab American women, more than Arab American males, are identified as Democrat, while younger Arab Americans are much less inclined toward the Republican party than older Arab Americans.

The degree of pride in ethnicity and the importance of ethnic heritage are clearly impacted by place of birth, but the impact varies from group to group. Quite logically, ethnic heritage appears to be more important for immigrants in all of our ethnic groups than it is for their native-born counterparts. But the similarity ends there.

In addition to ethnicity being more important to their self-definition, immigrant Italian and Arab Americans also feel more pride in their ethnic heritage than native-born Italian and Arab Americans. Jewish and Asian American immigrants, on the other hand, feel substantially less pride in their heritage than their native-born counterparts.

Generally speaking, most groups report that their immigrants form friendships outside of their ethnicity to a lesser degree than their native-born counterparts. The only exception to this pattern is African American immigrants. The legacy of racial separation and its impact on native-born African Americans appears to be the reason here.

2. Compared by Education Level

Table 4 Pride in Ethnic Heritage

	Italian	African	Hispanic	Jewish	Asian	Arab
High School	89.0	90.0	85.5	92.0	78.5	92.5
College	75.5	95.5	86.5	83.0	80.5	88.5

Table 5 Importance of Ethnic Heritage

	Italian	African	Hispanic	Jewish	Asian	Arab
High School	38.0	69.5	74.0	54.5	67.0	73.0
College	27.5	57.5	57.0	44.5	53.0	38.5

Table 6 Friendships Outside Ethnic Groups

	Italian	African	Hispanic	Jewish	Asian	Arab
High School	96.0	74.5	71.0	72.5	71.0	90.0
College	99.0	86.5	93.0	94.0	88.5	96.5

There is a clear pattern here. The higher the level of education, the lower the emphasis on ethnic heritage—both pride in heritage and its importance to self-definition. The only exception is in the case of African Americans, for whom pride in heritage increases as they become more educated.

All groups, to varying degrees, reveal that the college-educated among them have a higher percentage of friendships outside their ethnicity than those with high school degrees.

3. Compared by Frequency of Religious Observance

Table 7 Pride in Ethnic Heritage

	Italian	African	Hispanic	Jewish	Asian	Arab
Weekly	82.0	92.0	87.0	83.0	80.5	90.0
Never	61.5	85.5	75.0	64.0	72.0	87.0

Table 8 Importance of Ethnic Heritage

	Italian	African	Hispanic	Jewish	Asian	Arab
Weekly	36.0	67.0	70.0	76.5	57.5	54.5
Never	23.0	52.0	39.5	25.5	52.0	34.0

Table 9 Friendships Outside Ethnic Groups

	Italian	African	Hispanic	Jewish	Asian	Arab
Weekly	97.5	75.5	74.5	81.0	87.5	91.0
Never	97.0	82.0	91.0	97.0	90.5	96.5

Without exception, there is a direct correlation between pride in heritage and the importance of ethnic heritage and attendance at religious services. Those who say they attend services weekly are more likely to indicate, to a greater degree, pride in their heritage and the importance of heritage in self-definition. The degree is most significant among Jewish Americans.

4. Compared by Income Level

Table 10 Pride in Ethnic Heritage

	Italian	African	Hispanic	Jewish	Asian	Arab
$25–50,000	81.5	93.5	82.0	89.0	82.0	89.5
$75,000	74.0	93.0	86.0	88.5	80.0	90.0

Table 11 Importance of Ethnic Heritage

	Italian	African	Hispanic	Jewish	Asian	Arab
$25–50,000	28.5	60.4	66.5	48.0	54.0	54.0
$75,000	24.0	55.5	51.0	42.0	43.0	48.5

Table 12 Friendships Outside Ethnic Groups

	Italian	African	Hispanic	Jewish	Asian	Arab
$25–50,000	98.0	80.5	84.5	87.0	80.0	96.5
$75,000	98.0	88.0	93.0	95.5	88.0	99.0

Income is less of a determinant in ethnic pride than the other factors explored in this survey—but it does have an impact on some groups.

The general pattern that emerges is that ethnicity becomes slightly less important in self-definition as ethnics earn more income. And most ethnic groups in the higher income bracket report a slight increase in friendships outside their groups.

5. Compared by Gender

Table 13 Pride in Ethnic Heritage

	Italian	African	Hispanic	Jewish	Asian	Arab
Male	77.5	91.5	87.0	83.0	80.0	89.0
Female	80.5	91.5	86.0	89.0	79.5	90.5

Table 14 Importance of Ethnic Heritage

	Italian	African	Hispanic	Jewish	Asian	Arab
Male	22.0	62.0	60.0	35.5	49.0	42.5
Female	38.5	63.0	69.0	60.0	60.0	61.0

Table 15 Friendships Outside Ethnic Groups

	Italian	African	Hispanic	Jewish	Asian	Arab
Male	97.5	82.5	83.5	93.0	80.0	94.5
Female	97.5	76.5	75.5	88.0	90.0	89.0

Ethnic heritage is vastly more important to Italian, Jewish and Arab American women that it is to men in those three ethnic communities. To a somewhat lesser degree, gender plays a similar role for Asian and Hispanics. There are no gender differences among African Americans with regard to the importance of ethnicity in self-definition.

Slightly more African, Hispanic, Jewish, Asian and Arab American males report having friendships outside their ethnic groups than their female counterparts. The notable exception here is Asian American females, who report ten percent more external friendships than Asian American males.

6. Compared by Age

Table 16 Pride in Ethnic Heritage

	Italian	African	Hispanic	Jewish	Asian	Arab
18–34	70.5	89.5	86.5	86.0	76.0	91.0
55–69	85.0	94.5	84.5	87.5	83.5	91.0

Table 17 Importance of Ethnic Heritage

	Italian	African	Hispanic	Jewish	Asian	Arab
18–34	26.0	55.5	65.0	43.5	50.0	52.0
55–69	36.0	70.5	70.5	48.5	49.0	59.0

Table 18 Friendships Outside Ethnic Groups

	Italian	African	Hispanic	Jewish	Asian	Arab
18–34	98.5	85.0	79.5	83.0	87.5	92.0
55–69	97.0	75.0	71.0	93.5	82.5	91.0

The age of some of our respondents does impact their attitudes toward their ethnic community. Older Italian Americans, and to a lesser extent older Asian and African Americans, feel greater degree of ethnic pride than their younger ethnic counterparts.

But the importance of ethnic heritage in forming the self-definition of our respondents increases among older ethnic Americans in almost all our groups. The most significant increases are among African Americans and Italian Americans.

A lower percentage of older African Americans, and Hispanic and Asian Americans, than their younger counterparts, report friendships outside their ethnic communities. Only among older Jewish Americans do these external friendships increase.

B. Political Identification

1. Compared by Place of Birth

Table 19 Ideology—Liberal/Conservative

	Italian	African	Hispanic	Jewish	Asian	Arab
U.S.-Born	28.5/33.0	41.5/25.0	40.5/26.0	50.0/19.5	29.5/32.5	26.5/36.5
Immigrant	22.0/38.0	43.0/23.5	32.5/33.5	37.0/28.0	35.5/26.0	16.5/40.5

Table 20 Party—Democrat/Republican

	Italian	African	Hispanic	Jewish	Asian	Arab
U.S.-Born	38.0/32.0	78.0/6.0	56.5/17.0	67.5/15.0	33.5/31.0	35.7/38.5
Immigrant	26.5/59.0	76.5/15.0	57.5/27.0	53.0/20.5	36.0/23.5	39.0/30.0

Italian, Hispanic, Jewish and Arab American immigrants tend to be less liberal and more conservative than their native-born counterparts. Asian Americans, on the other hand, move in the opposite direction, with Asian American immigrants appearing to be somewhat more liberal and less conservative than native-born Asian Americans.

Native-born Italian and Jewish Americans tend to identify more with the Democratic party and less with the Republican party than their immigrant counterparts. The opposite is true for Asian and Arab American immigrants whose identification with the Republican party is lower than it is for native-born Asian and Arab Americans. African and Hispanic American immigrants also tend to identify slightly more with the Republican party, but overall identification with the Democratic party remains quite high among both groups.

2. Compared by Education Level

Table 21 Ideology—Liberal/Conservative

	Italian	African	Hispanic	Jewish	Asian	Arab
High School	28.5/30.5	31.5/32.5	38.5/33.0	36.5/32.0	26.5/29.0	24.5/41.5
College	29.0/33.5	49.5/12.5	38.0/25.0	51.5/75.5	24.5/28.5	22.5/37.0

Table 22 Party—Democrat/Republican

	Italian	African	Hispanic	Jewish	Asian	Arab
High School	49.5/26.0	79.5/7.0	57.0/20.5	60.0/22.0	30.0/32.5	49.0/30.5
College	33.5/37.0	74.9/9.5	53.5/23.5	69.0/14.0	32.0/26.5	35.5/38.5

Their level of education appears to have a significant impact on the political outlook of African and Jewish Americans, with college-educated members of both groups appearing to be notably more liberal and substantially less conservative than their high school-educated counterparts.

Education had a similar but less substantial impact on the political philosophy of Hispanic and Asian Americans. It appears to have no impact on Italian and Arab Americans. Education levels appear to have only a slight impact on the party identification of African, Hispanic and Asian Americans. As Italian and Arab Americans become college educated, they tend to identify more than their high school counterparts with the Republican Party. The opposite holds true for Jewish Americans.

3. Compared by Frequency of Religious Observance

Table 23 Ideology—Liberal/Conservative

	Italian	African	Hispanic	Jewish	Asian	Arab
Weekly	24.5/34.0	39.5/26.0	33.5/36.5	34.0/32.0	25.5/38.5	17.5/47.5
Never	37.5/26.0	44.5/14.5	41.0/26.5	58.0/15.0	38.5/24.5	32.0/22.5

Table 24 Party—Democrat/Republican

	Italian	African	Hispanic	Jewish	Asian	Arab
Weekly	36.5/42.0	78.0/6.0	57.0/23.5	59.0/21.0	24.5/28.0	36.0/40.5
Never	44.5/25.5	50.0/9.5	60.5/16.0	73.5/11.0	40.5/27.0	29.5/29.0

The impact of religious observance on the political philosophy of our surveyed ethnic Americans is substantial and consistent across the board. In all groups, those who are religiously observant tend to be more conservative and less liberal than those who are non-observant.

The same holds true, but to a slightly less degree, with party identification. The only exception here is with non-observant Arab Americans, who tend to be both Democratic and less Republican than Arab Americans who attend weekly religious services.

4. Compared by Income Level

Table 25 Ideology—Liberal/Conservative

	Italian	African	Hispanic	Jewish	Asian	Arab
$25–50,000	26.0/39.0	48.0/20.5	40.0/31.0	49.5/24.0	26.5/32.0	20.0/42.5
$75,000	27.0/26.5	50.0/23.0	28.5/34.5	50.0/17.0	39.0/30.0	32.0/22.5

Table 26 Party—Democrat/Republican

	Italian	African	Hispanic	Jewish	Asian	Arab
$25–50,000	36.0/26.0	80.0/65.0	62.0/24.0	64.0/19.0	43.5/19.5	35.5/44.5
$75,000	35.0/37.0	69.0/9.5	41.0/37.5	66.0/15.5	22.5/34.0	33.5/39.0

Income plays a role in determining the political philosophy of our ethnic groups, but not in the way one might expect. As Italian, Jewish, Asian and Arab Americans earn more income, they identify less with a conservative political outlook. Among African and Hispanic Americans, the impact of income appears to be slight.

The impact of income on party identification, on the other hand, presents a more complex picture. Italian, African, Hispanic and Asian Americans become more Republican and less Democratic as they report larger incomes. Both Jewish and Arab Americans who earn more than $75,000 a year show a slight drop in identification with the Republican Party.

5. Compared by Gender

Table 27 Ideology—Liberal/Conservative

	Italian	African	Hispanic	Jewish	Asian	Arab
Male	24.0/36.5	44.0/24.5	36.0/33.0	49.0/19.0	38.5/26.5	23.0/40.0
Female	32.0/30.0	39.0/25.0	35.5/29.0	48.5/20.0	29.5/28.5	24.0/34.5

Table 28 Party—Democrat/Republican

	Italian	African	Hispanic	Jewish	Asian	Arab
Male	35.0/39.5	73.5/7.0	55.0/24.0	62.5/15.0	36.0/24.5	36.5/38.0
Female	39.5/27.5	82.0/6.0	59.0/18.5	69.5/16.5	34.5/27.0	39.5/33.0

Only among Italian Americans does gender appear to play a significant role in influencing political philosophy and party identification. Italian American women are more liberal, less conservative, more Democrat and less Republican than Italian American men.

In the other ethnic communities in our study, the results are less clear. Asian American men, for example, are more liberal and only slightly more Democratic than Asian American women. The reverse is true for Arab Americans. Jewish women are more Democratic than Jewish men, but they are both equally Liberal.

6. Compared by Age

Table 29 Party—Democrat/Republican

	Italian	African	Hispanic	Jewish	Asian	Arab
18–34	26.5/29.5	73.0/5.5	49.0/17.0	61.5/18.0	47.0/20.5	40.0/24.5
55–69	44.0/34.0	83.0/7.5	55.5/26.5	67.5/16.5	23.5/30.5	39.0/35.5

Older Italian, African, Hispanic and Jewish Americans have a greater affinity toward the Democratic party. Older Asian and Arab Americans are more Republican. Of the other groups, only younger Asian Americans are more Democratic than their older counterparts.

Final Observations

Even after five chapters and ninety-four tables of data, it is safe to say that we have only just scratched the surface of this study. When printed in full, a complete set of cross-tabulations from Zogby International's "culture polls" contains over 2,000 pages of tables. What we have presented here is a synopsis of that data—its essence—in an effort to determine how ethnic Americans define themselves and how they think about issues.

What we have found is that ethnicity is a factor in shaping many people's self-definition and outlook. Clearly, most ethnic Americans, event those who are first, second and third generation native-born Americans, remain proud of their heritage. And this heritage, and the shared sense of history, culture and concerns that it represents, does, in fact, have a measurable impact on attitudes.

When four in five or more say that they are proud of their heritage, and when one-third to two-thirds of all of our respondents say that this heritage is *very* important to their self-definition—then we must pay attention to this factor.

How the impact of this factor makes itself felt may vary from group to group, and may increase in intensity from issue to issue. It is, for example, well-known that each ethnic community has some specific issue of concern, oftentimes foreign policy matters, that defines a key part of their political agenda.

While we measured the importance of many of these issues in polling our six individual ethnic communities, in this book we focused on the attitudes of ethnic Americans toward a more general set of issues that all have in common.

We found some areas where responses were quite similar. We also found some areas where striking differences exist between our groups and even their component subgroups. We found, for example, that of all of our groups, ethnic pride and the importance of ethnicity are strongest among African Americans, and to a different extent, immigrant Jewish and Arab Americans—groups that have experienced a degree of discrimination.

Though ethnic pride and identification are strongest among immigrants and only somewhat less strong among college-educated and wealthier native-born Americans, the pull of this force remains quite strong. More than 50% of all of our respondents retain a "strong emotional tie to the land of their "heritage," and almost 20% of those surveyed send money to family in the countries of their background.

We also found evidence in our study of the effects of discrimination. Although we seek to become "one America," almost half of our respondents reported experiencing discrimination because of their ethnic heritage, and more than 15% of our respondents noted that they do not have close personal friendships with individuals of other ethnic communities.

We also noted a connection between ethnic pride, religiosity and political philosophy. We found, for example, that the pull of ethnicity is most deeply felt among those who are the most religiously-observant in their respective communities. More than 50% of all of our respondents attend religious services at least weekly. And this group, by and large, appears to be more conservative in political outlook.

On the whole, however, we found that it is difficult to apply traditional labels to the positions that these ethnic Americans take on important current issues. In fact, if the combined set of positions supplied by all six ethnic

communities were bundled together as a package, they contradict a central tenet of contemporary conventional political wisdom. While many self-styled "moderates" in both political parties have come to define the "new" political center as fiscally conservative and socially liberal, what we have found in our study, is that on many key issues, our groups are both fiscally liberal and socially conservative.

All of this should give pause to policymakers and provide material for further research for analysts. Our "culture polls" represent only a beginning of this study—a benchmark against which we intend to measure the results of future surveys. Much more can and should be done. We invite those who are interested to investigate our complete cross tabulations to make their own comparative studies.

Article 16

ZOOMing in on Diversity

Decades-old patterns distinguish immigrant arrivals from domestic movers, but closer analysis reveals how dispersal melts the pot quicker in some places than others.

WILLIAM H. FREY

America's changing racial and ethnic makeup will profoundly transform the nation's regional landscape for at least the next four decades. Consumer markets, politics and day-to-day personal transactions simply will not go on as they have up to now as this change sweeps the nation. By 2050, only half the population will be non-Hispanic white, the Census Bureau projects. The Hispanic and Asian populations will both triple, the black population will almost double and the white population will barely hold its own.

Yet, what looks to the naked eye like a diversified melting pot at the national level takes on a dramatically different look if you zoom in on specific regions and metropolitan areas. Why? Mostly because people moving to the United States from other countries pick certain places to settle, whereas people who already live within national borders choose others. The lion's share of immigrating Hispanics and Asians tends to cluster in gateway locales, while domestic migration networks of whites and blacks often follow different paths. And there are reasons for this.

Diverging migration patterns have unevenly distributed racial and ethnic diversity into America's regions. Three states—New Mexico, Hawaii and California—already stand out as the nation's first nonwhite majority states. At the same time, there are the 15 states, where minorities account for less than 15 percent of the population. Each minority group, including Hispanics, Asians and blacks, has tended to cluster in geographic patterns that begin to suggest staying power.

Exactly what is the role of race and ethnicity in ingrained and emerging patterns of migration? How rapidly are Hispanics and Asians dispersing away from the traditional gateway regions? And to what extent is their migration converging with the mainstream? New answers to these questions can be drawn from census migration statistics for 2000–2003, and freshly compiled Census 2000 race migration statistics for 1995–2000. After analysis, we might assert that while America may not become a true national melting pot anytime soon, there is a measure of "simmering" going on.

Immigrant Magnets, Domestic Migrant Magnets

Arriving immigrant minorities tend to cluster geographically because destination communities provide them with a comfort zone of familiarity, while others require greater acclimatization for new residents to survive and thrive. Ethnic enclaves in gateway metropolises like Los Angeles and New York contain already established institutions—churches, community centers, stores, neighbors—that make new arrivals feel at home, and give them social and economic support. Immigration laws also foster clustering. Since family reunification is regarded as a priority in legal immigration, family-related migrant "chains" direct many new arrivals to the nation's gateway cities.

If immigrants choose a U.S. destination based on familiarity and cultural support to get started, domestic migrants tend to move for more pragmatic, hardheaded reasons. Most times, it's economic opportunity in the labor market. What's more, whites and blacks are better represented among domestic migrants. The places in which they choose to resettle are less constrained than those of immigrants, for whom a familiar language and the presence of family mean more than the local unemployment rate in selecting a destination.

A distinction between immigration and domestic migration—not a new phenomenon—still holds (see Table 1). Among the nine leading "magnet metro areas" for immigrants, only one—Dallas—is on the list of the largest metro destinations of domestic migrants. Traditional gateways, New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago, Miami and Washington, D.C. attract the greatest number of immigrants. These six areas have led all others since the mid-1960s, when current immigration laws came into effect. They've become permanent beacons for newcomers, despite the fact that geographic labor markets have shifted through the years.

But even as the welcome mat cities stay the same, domestic migrant magnets come and go and change as the pushes and

Table 1 Metropolitan(*) Magnets for Immigrants and Domestic Migrants [1995–2003]

Immigrant Magnet Metros			Domestic Migration Magnets		
	Immigrants from Abroad	Net Domestic Migration		Immigrants from Abroad	Net Domestic Migration
1 New York	1,605,530	−1,511,765	**1** Phoenix	224,305	387,482
2 Los Angeles	1,196,359	−676,213	**2** Las Vegas	98,813	368,434
3 San Francisco	613,037	−556,777	**3** Atlanta	258,889	338,015
4 Chicago	527,651	−525,974	**4** Dallas-Fort Worth	386,647	212,758
5 Miami	493,056	−162,715	**5** Tampa-St. Petersburg	99,097	206,223
6 Washington, D.C.	451,546	−22,018	**6** Orlando	112,061	188,480
7 Dallas-Fort Worth	386,647	212,758	**7** Sacramento	89,368	155,167
8 Houston	353,738	22,794	**8** Austin	83,113	146,412
9 Boston	301,915	−141,665	**9** Charlotte	66,159	143,406

*Metro Areas are defined as CMSAs, MSAs and NECMAs. Names are abbreviated.
Source: William H. Frey analysis of Census 2000 and U.S. Census Bureau Population Estimates, 2000–2003

pulls of metro economies shift opportunity from place to place over time. Clearly the past decade has brought population and jobs to western areas such as Phoenix and Las Vegas, in addition to longstanding southern juggernauts, Atlanta and Dallas. Increased appeal among metros in Florida (Tampa, Orlando, West Palm Beach) and North Carolina (Charlotte and Raleigh) is also evident.

A striking fact to take note of: if a place appeals to immigrants, it tends to have the opposite effect on people who choose to move domestically. Seven of nine leading immigrant magnets lose domestic migrants to the rest of the country. New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco and Chicago lose the most domestic migrants among all metros in the U.S. Domestic migrants are leaving immigrant magnets, not as a response to immigrants per se, but because of the increasing congestion and high costs of living in highly urbanized metro areas. The numbers show that recent immigrants, and by extension, immigrant minorities will continue to dominate these areas' population gains.

While migration patterns among immigrants and domestic movers tend to mirror those reported in the 1990s (see "Immigrant and Native Migrant Magnets" *American Demographics,* November 1996), the gravitational pull among areas that attract immigrants does appear to be losing some power. The nine immigrant magnet areas represent 51 percent of all U.S. destinations among recent arrivals, compared with 57 percent in the late 1980s.

The new data also reveals that immigrants play a significantly larger role in the gains of domestic migrant magnets. Domestic in-migrants create jobs in construction and other services that attract immigrants as well. The greater the dispersal among domestic migrants, the speedier the dispersal of immigrant minorities across the country.

The parallel immigration and domestic migration patterns that characterize metropolitan areas also play out at the state level. Again, six immigrant magnet states, California, Texas, New York, Florida, Illinois and New Jersey attract nearly 3 in 5 migrants from abroad, a slight drop from 3 in 4 in the 1980s. Still, high immigration states house more racially and ethnically diverse populations than the entire rest of the country (see Figure 1). However, especially in the West, a significant dispersal of Hispanics and Asians has begun to develop in states such as Nevada, Arizona and Colorado.

Whites and Blacks

It is whites and blacks who largely define and delineate domestic migration patterns in the U.S. And as you might imagine, there are marked differences in the destinations each gravitates toward. White migration tends to run consistent with overall domestic migration patterns observed earlier. Most whites exit



Figure 1 High Immigration States Are Melting Pots, Others Are Simmering.
Source: William H. Frey analysis of U.S. Census Bureau Estimates, 2002

Table 2 Largest Domestic Migration Gainers & Decliners Whites and Blacks, [1995–2000]

Greatest Gainers				Greatest Decliners			
Whites		Blacks		Whites		Blacks	
Metro*	Size	Metro*	Size	Metro*	Size	Metro*	Size
1 Phoenix	169,220	Atlanta	114,478	**1** New York	−470,685	New York	−193,344
2 Las Vegas	121,908	Dallas	39,360	**2** Chicago	−219,449	Chicago	−59,282
3 Tampa	74,657	Charlotte	23,313	**3** Los Angeles	−199,048	Los Angeles	−38,833
4 Austin	70,032	Orlando	20,222	**4** San Francisco	−121,180	San Francisco	−30,613
5 Atlanta	66,911	Las Vegas	18,912	**5** Detroit	−111,211	Detroit	−15,955

*Metro Areas are defined as CMSAs, MSAs and NECMAs. Names are abbreviated.
Source: William H. Frey analysis of Census 2000

congested urbanized metropolises such as New York, Chicago, Los Angeles and San Francisco, and several Rust Belt metros. Their destinations tend to be Phoenix and Las Vegas and other Sun Belt "hot spots" (see Table 2).

Blacks have a preference for southern destinations. In fact, the 1990s was the decade in which a surge in a black "return to the South" began, representing a wholesale reversal of the South-to-North migration of earlier decades. For the first time, the South gained blacks in its migration exchanges with each of the other regions of the country. The culture and heritage in the South appear to have a strong appeal among blacks, along with a strong economy. African American Gen Xers and Gen Ys tend to be less concerned by the region's history of racial discrimination, than with available jobs and the chance to network with other middle-class blacks. Young black college graduates lead the way among this group of movers. However, the South is gaining blacks from almost every demographic group, including seniors.

So, while white domestic migrants head to the Sun Belt destinations in both the West and the South, southern destinations are more dominant among black migrants. The top ranking black destination is Atlanta, followed by Orlando, Charlotte and Dallas. At the state level, blacks' preferences are apparent, compared with whites. Georgia, North Carolina, Florida, Maryland and Texas received the largest black gains; while whites show a greater preference for Arizona and Nevada. Still, both racial groups are departing from the same places. Four of the top immigration states, New York, California, Illinois and New Jersey, show the greatest out-migration of both African Americans and Anglos, mirroring the overall domestic migration flight from these areas.

Both the black and white movement patterns help to reinforce the distinct racial and ethnic structures of their destination regions. The out-migration of whites, in particular, serves to increase the minority profiles of the big immigration states. At the same time, the white movement to the "non-California" West tends to give their states and metros a more suburban feel. And the black migration back to the South tends to reinforce the regions longstanding largely white-black demographic profile.

Hispanics and Asians

There are two ways that Hispanic and Asian movements affect metro areas and states. As we've said, destinations among recent immigrants tend to focus on traditional gateways. However, there is an increasing tendency for both groups to participate in the domestic migration. This seems to be the primary vehicle for their dispersion beyond the gateways.

The greatest destinations for Hispanic immigrants include the traditional gateways, led by Los Angeles, New York and Miami. Only two non-immigrant magnet metros—Phoenix and Atlanta—rank in the top 10 recent Hispanic immigrant destinations. Domestic migration among Hispanics contrasts with the destinations of recent immigrants (see Table 3). To a large degree, these Hispanic domestic migration patterns mirror those for whites. Las Vegas and Phoenix represent the top destinations. Similarly, many domestic migrant Hispanics are leaving the traditional immigrant magnet areas of Los Angeles, New York, San Francisco and Chicago. To be sure, the latter metros are gaining many more Hispanics from immigration than are lost through domestic out-migration; but a pattern of dispersal is apparent.

The same pattern is shown at the state level where California, Texas, Florida, New York, Illinois and New Jersey lead all others in gaining Hispanic immigrants.

Yet, four of them are losing Hispanic domestic migrants to a broader swath of states across the country. This dispersion of Hispanic domestic migrants reflects smaller numbers than those of the more concentrated immigrant flows, but the numbers are trending to increase over time.

The Asian patterns are similar to those of Hispanics, wherein immigrant destinations are losing Asians through domestic migration dispersal. However, compared with Hispanics, the dispersion of Asians away from the gateways is much lighter, reflecting their recency of arrival. The exception to this pattern is San Francisco, which draws Asians from both immigration and domestic migration (see Table 4).

Table 3 Hispanic Immigrant Destinations & Domestic Migrant Magnets, [1995–2000]

Greatest Immigrant Destinations		Greatest Domestic Net IN-Migration		Greatest Domestic Net OUT-Migration	
Metro*	**Size**	**Metro***	**Size**	**Metro***	**Size**
1 Los Angeles	378,858	**1** Las Vegas	57,926	Los Angeles	−272,712
2 New York	338,878	**2** Phoenix	51,838	New York	−162,246
3 Miami	198,350	**3** Dallas	42,853	San Francisco	−60,994
4 Dallas	145,132	**4** Orlando	38,173	Chicago	−32,278
5 Chicago	140,069	**5** Atlanta	32,831	El Paso	−26,165

* Metro Areas are defined as CMSAs, MSAs and NECMAs. Names are abbreviated.
Source: Census 2000

Table 4 Asian Immigrant Destinations & Domestic Migrant Magnets, [1995–2000]

Greatest Immigrant Destinations		Greatest Domestic Net IN-Migration		Greatest Domestic Net OUT-Migration	
Metro*	**Size**	**Metro***	**Size**	**Metro***	**Size**
1 New York	221,132	**1** San Francisco	17,881	New York	−36,351
2 Los Angeles	171,806	**2** Las Vegas	17,562	Los Angeles	−28,323
3 San Francisco	151,151	**3** Dallas	13,605	Honolulu	−12,486
4 Washington, D.C.	64,687	**4** Atlanta	13,522	Fresno, CA	−9,266
5 Chicago	58,117	**5** Seattle	11,727	Merced, CA	-2,952

* Metro Areas are defined as CMSAs, MSAs and NECMAs. Names are abbreviated.
Source: Census 2000

Multicultural Flight

Ten years ago, I wrote an article called "The New White Flight:" (*American Demographics,* April 1994) to highlight the fact that most of the domestic migrants leaving immigrant gateways were non-Hispanic whites. That movement did, and still does, reflect a kind of suburbanization across metropolitan areas and state boundaries toward places that offer affordable housing and improving employment prospects. The difference now is that this domestic out-migration from Los Angeles, New York and other high immigration metros is much more multicultural. There are more Hispanics than whites leaving Los Angeles as a result of domestic migration. In New York, while whites still dominate the exodus, Hispanics and blacks account for a larger share of out-migrants in the late 1990s than 10 years prior. It appears now that blacks and immigrant minorities are responding to the same middle-class crunch as whites, in leaving high immigration metropolitan areas.

The other side of the coin is what is happening in domestic migration magnets. Phoenix and Atlanta provide good examples. In both of these metros, domestic migrating whites and blacks tend to lead the overall gains. But noteworthy in both metros is a phenomenon in the increasing domestic in-migration of Hispanics and, to a lesser degree, Asians. While the overall demographic profiles of these areas do not have nearly the melting pot character of immigrant magnets like Los Angeles or New York, their strong domestic migration flows are creating employment opportunities for new immigrants.

Conclusion

Recent race-ethnic migration patterns show that America still has a long way to go before it becomes a coast-to-coast melting pot, where racial and ethnic groups spread evenly across the land. High immigration gateway states and metros continue to stand out as the most racially and ethnically diverse in the nation. They are not, by and large, magnets for white and black domestic migrants who tend to flow to ever-changing constellations of domestic migration magnets. Yet, this analysis also confirms, with migration data from the census, that there exists a true dispersion of Hispanics and Asians as part of a new multicultural flight away from several immigrant gateways. Gradually, these migration patterns will accelerate as they lead to further simmering among our diverse peoples toward a more integrated society.

Article 17

Intermarriage in the Second Generation

Choosing between Newcomers and Natives

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Social scientists have long considered high levels of racial and ethnic intermarriage—along with language acquisition, socioeconomic attainment, and residential patterns—a bellwether of social integration into the larger American society. Intermarriage requires individuals in different groups to form intimate attachments, which suggests that group boundaries are fading in importance and that preferences for marriage within the group are weak.

Moreover, the children of interracially married couples have complex racial backgrounds and often identify with two or more races, which further blurs the boundaries between groups and leads to more intermarriage in the next generation.

In the mid-20th century, Milton Gordon, a noted sociologist, presented the "straight-line" theory of racial and ethnic assimilation. He argued that levels of racial and ethnic intermarriage would increase steadily over generations as the social barriers between racial and ethnic groups diminished and preferences for in-group marriage faded.

Over the course of the 20th century, levels of intermarriage increased steadily among European immigrant descent groups. Levels of ethnic intermarriage were very low among European immigrants near the beginning of the 20th century, higher among their native-born children (the second generation) in the middle of the century, and very high among their grandchildren and great-grandchildren (the third and later generations) by the end of the 20th century.

The increases in levels of intermarriage across generations thus tracked and helped accelerate the integration of European groups, which originally were considered to be racially distinct, into American society.

During the last 40 years, however, most immigrants have come from Asia and Latin America. Are their children—the new second generation—showing higher levels of intermarriage than their immigrant parents?

Causes of Intermarriage

The "straight-line" theory of racial and ethnic assimilation suggests that levels of intermarriage increase across generations as social boundaries between groups diminish and elements of cultural distinctiveness, such as fluency in a non-English language, fade between the first and second, and between the second and third generations.

Levels of intermarriage between groups are, however, also affected by demographic factors in addition to preferences. For example, all else being equal, members of larger groups are less likely to intermarry than members of smaller groups because there have more potential partners.

Members of racial and ethnic groups that are more geographically clustered or segregated are more likely to marry within their own group due to the higher likelihood of interacting with one another within the shared space.

In addition, third parties can intervene. For example, some parents, especially immigrant parents, pressure their children to consider only prospective spouses of similar ethnic or racial descent.

The relative balancing of these forces varies according to generation. In some ways, the first generation is the most distinctive since many (although not all) marry before they arrive in the United States. Their marriages are thus not subject to the same demographic considerations as those of second and later generations.

Second-generation adults, who currently compose a relatively small number of people sandwiched between larger numbers of first- and third-generation adults, encounter relatively small numbers of prospective spouses who are also second generation.

Estimates from the March 2005 Current Population Survey (CPS) suggest that the first generation consists of about 35.3 million foreign-born Americans. The second generation, here defined as Americans with at least one foreign-born parent, consists of only about 21.1 million people, and the third generation, defined as Americans with native-born parents, contains over 221 million people.

If generation is a proxy for cultural distinctiveness, then many second-generation adults are pressured by demographic constraints to choose between first-generation immigrants who identify more strongly with their ethnic and racial origins and third-generation Americans for whom race and ethnicity are less important.

Methodology

Because high rates of intermarriage between two or more groups are viewed by scholars as evidence that the social boundaries between the groups are fading, social science research on intermarriage typically relies on survey or census data. These data provide an overview of levels and patterns of intermarriage.

Unlike the US census and most other major surveys, the US Census Bureau's CPS contains information on the birthplaces of respondents and of respondents' parents. Consequently, it is possible to determine whether respondents are members of the first, second, or third (and later) generations.

To increase the sample size, data from the 2003, 2004, and 2005 Annual Social and Economic Supplements of CPS were merged. Because CPS does not explicitly ask for information on respondents' spouses, the analyses presented here only refer to married men and women who were living in the same household and whose information could be linked, not to all married couples.

Respondents were defined as foreign born or first generation if they were born abroad and did not have American-born parents. They were considered to be second generation if they were native born (i.e., born in the United States, Puerto Rico, and outlying areas, or born abroad to American parents) and reported having either one or two foreign-born parents.

Respondents were considered to be third (or later) generation if they were native born and both of their parents were also native born. Some "third-generation" respondents could therefore trace their ancestry on American soil back four or more generations.

The 2003–2005 CPS files contain information on respondents' race and Hispanic origin. Race is measured using the major categories of white, black, Asian, American Indian and Alaskan Native, and other, plus some complex categories such as black-Asian or black-white. Because the racial categories do not apply very well to Hispanic respondents, the category "Hispanic" is treated as a separate racial/ethnic category.

Very few second-generation respondents chose American Indian or any of the complex racial categories, and so the intermarriage statistics presented here focus on Asian, black, and white respondents, and Hispanic respondents of any race.

Results

In 1970, just a few years after the US Supreme Court struck down all antimiscenegation laws, less than one percent of marriages were interracial. Since then, levels of racial intermarriage have steadily increased. In 1980, about two percent of marriages were interracial; by 2000, about 5.4 percent were interracial.

The upward trend in levels of racial intermarriage has continued into the first part of the 21st century. CPS data gathered between 2003 and 2005 show that about 7.5 percent of all marriages are interracial.

Whatever the generational statuses of the husband and wife, most of the interracially married couples consist of a white spouse with an Asian, Hispanic, or black spouse; less than one percent of interracially married couples consist of two non-white spouses.

The combinations of races among the interracially married couples do differ by gender. For example, there are more Asian wives with white husbands than Asian husbands with white wives, and more black husbands with white wives than black wives with white husbands.

By Generation

Figure 1 shows the percentages of married women by generation and race/ethnicity who have husbands of a different race or ethnicity than themselves.

The patterns of intermarriage across race and generation suggest that levels of racial intermarriage are strongly affected both by the differing opportunities and preferences for intermarriage within each generation and each ethnic/racial group. Levels of intermarriage are low among the first generation for all women. Except for Asian women, well over 90 percent of foreign-born women have husbands of the same racial or ethnic origins as themselves.

The low levels of intermarriage in the first generation are followed by higher levels of intermarriage in the second generation for all non-white women. Among Asians and Hispanics, the increase in levels of intermarriage continues into the third generation. For Asian and Hispanic women, then, the pattern fits the expectations generated by the "straight-line" assimilation theory, with steady increases in intermarriage across generations.

The picture differs for white women and black women. Levels of intermarriage among white women are relatively steady across generations, hovering around five percent. The steadiness can be attributed to the large numbers of whites in the American population—all else being equal, levels of intermarriage are always lowest among members of larger groups.



Figure 1 Percentages of Women in Interracial Marriages.

White foreign-born women are unlikely to be married to a man outside their ethnic/racial group because many arrive in the United States already married. Second- and third-generation white women are likely to meet and marry a native-born white man because the white population is still, by far, the largest racial group in the United States.

It is more difficult to explain why levels of intermarriage among blacks are substantially higher among the second generation than among the third-generation. Perhaps second-generation black women who grew up in a household with at least one foreign-born parent are less affected by the accumulation of racial discrimination in the American context and thus more open to marrying someone of another race. Second-generation blacks may also be more likely or be more able to emphasize their national or regional origins, e.g., Trinidadian, in lieu of identifying themselves as American-born black or African American.

Another possible reason for the gap is that second-generation black women are more likely than third-generation black women to live in major metropolitan areas, to have higher levels of education, and to have a racially complex ancestry—all attributes that lead to racial intermarriage.

And, finally, this result could be an anomaly generated by a small sample size: the level of intermarriage among second-generation black women is based on only 70 cases.

Since the results for men parallel those for women, those statistics are not presented here. Foreign-born men are very likely to have spouses of the same racial and ethnic origins as themselves. For Asian and Hispanic men, levels of intermarriage increase between the first and second, and the second and third generations. Levels of intermarriage among white men hover at low levels in every generation while levels of intermarriage among second-generation black men are higher than among first- or third-generation black men.

By Parentage

The next way to examine the data is by separating those with one foreign-born and one native-born parent from those with two foreign-born parents. The presumption is that those who grew up with two foreign-born parents identify more strongly with their racial and ethnic origins and so have stronger preferences for in-group marriage than those with one foreign-born and one native-born parent.

Second-generation Americans with one foreign-born and one native-born parent are also more highly educated and earn more than those with two foreign-born parents. This segment of the second generation is generally more integrated into American society.

In addition, many respondents with one foreign-born parent and one native-born parent are the children of racially intermarried parents, because marriages involving one immigrant and one native-born American spouse are likely to be interracial. Individuals with racially complex backgrounds are more open to the prospect of racial intermarriage than others.

Figure 2 shows that all racial/ethnic minority women with only one foreign-born parent and one native-born American parent are, in fact, more likely to be racially intermarried than second-generation women with two foreign-born parents. The same is true for men: racial/ethnic minority men with only one foreign-born parent are more likely to be racially intermarried than second-generation men with two foreign-born parents.

About half of Asian women with one foreign-born and one native-born parent, for example, are in interracial marriages versus a quarter of Asian women with two foreign-born parents. Asian women with one foreign-born and one native-born parent may be particularly likely to be intermarried because they are likely to be the daughters of Asian "war brides" and (white) American-born men who served in the military.

The difference in levels of intermarriage for second-generation women with two foreign-born parents versus those with one foreign-born and one native-born parent introduces complexities associated with "cross-generation" marriage.

The "straight-line" theory of assimilation presumes that marriage occurs within each generational cohort: immigrants marry other immigrants, members of the second generation marry other members of the second generation, and so on. This assumption is, however, simplistic.



Figure 2 Percentages of Second-Generation Women in Interracial Marriages by Parentage.



Figure 3 Percentages of Second-Generation Wives with First-, Second-, and Third-Generation Husbands.

Figure 3 shows the percentages of second-generation women of each racial/ethnic group with first-generation, second-generation, and third-generation husbands. Overall, relatively few second-generation women have second-generation husbands: the majority marry either first-generation or third-generation men.

However, there are striking differences across racial/ethnic groups. Over 75 percent of white second-generation women marry into the third generation. Black second-generation women are also very likely to marry into the third generation although some marry foreign-born men.

Hispanic second-generation women are fairly balanced with respect to marrying foreign-born, second-generation, or third-generation American men. Asian second-generation women are more apt than other women to marry someone of the same generational status as themselves.

The second generation thus appears poised between marrying either immigrants or third-generation Americans rather than other second-generation Americans. This pattern may be attributable to demographic constraints.

The adult second generation is still relatively small and so it is easier for white and black second-generation adults to marry into the very large third generation than to find prospective spouses among the smaller numbers of first- and second-generation white adults.

For second-generation Asians and Hispanics, the continuing high levels of immigration to the United States mean that the first generation is also fairly large.

Conclusions

The marriage behavior of the second generation lies betwixt and between that of the first and the third generations in two ways. Levels of racial and ethnic intermarriage increase substantially between the first and second generations for black, Asian, and Hispanic Americans, and increase again between the second and third generations for Asian and Hispanic Americans.

Even when the focus is narrowed to differences within the second generation, levels of intermarriage increase as the distance from the immigrant experience lengthens. Second-generation Americans with one foreign-born parent and one native-born parent (who were thus in a cross-generation marriage) are more likely to marry interracially than those who grew up with two immigrant parents.

The second generation is also poised between reaching back into the first generation or reaching forward into the third generation for spouses. Currently, only a minority of second-generation Americans are married to other second-generation Americans. This pattern probably reflects, in part, the relatively small size of the second generation, which is sandwiched between a very large number of third-and-later-generation Americans, and, for Hispanics and Asians, a growing number of immigrants.

The increases in rates of racial/ethnic intermarriage across generation, and the common pattern in which members of the second generation marry third-generation Americans, suggest that Asians and Hispanics are being quickly integrated into the larger American-born population.

Intermarriage is often considered to be one of the most important signs of assimilation and integration of immigrant-descent groups for several reasons. First, high levels of intermarriage demonstrate and accelerate the fading of cultural and social boundaries between immigrant descent groups and the larger American population. Second, high levels of intermarriage are also typically accompanied by growing similarities in the educational and labor force achievements of immigrant groups and the larger American population.

Gordon composed his theory of "straight-line" assimilation after observing marriage behavior among European-descent groups in the first part of the 20th century. The data presented here show that the two largest contemporary immigrant descent groups in the United States, Asians and Hispanics, are following the same generational patterns of intermarriage today.

UNIT 4

Immigration and the American Tradition

Unit Selections

18. **New Americans Fresh Off the Presses,** Daniel Akst
19. **The Diversity Visa Lottery—A Cycle of Unintended Consequences in United States Immigration Policy,** Anna O. Law
20. **Immigration and America's Future: A New Chapter,** Doris Meissner et al.
21. **More Muslims Are Coming to U.S. after a Decline in Wake of 9/11,** Andrea Elliott
22. **A True Believer in Immigrants,** Karin Brulliard
23. **The Hotel Africa,** G. Pascal Zachary

Key Points to Consider

- In what ways have the events of 9/11 and the War in Iraq spilled over into American communities? Did you know about Arab-Americans and Muslims in America prior to these events? How are local police officers and police budgets prepared for the new demands of Homeland Security?
- Does discrimination based on national origin affect all ethnic populations? Why?
- Does the proliferation of ethnic media suggest the improvement of public information?
- Do large-scale economic, social, and political systems increase or decrease the need for small-scale social systems—such as ethnic enclaves and affinity associations rooted in ethnic/racial tradition, ritual, custom, and support groups based on ethnic identity?

Student Web Site

www.mhcls.com/online

Internet References

Further information regarding these Web sites may be found in this book's preface or online.

Child Welfare League of America (CWLA)
http://www.cwla.org

National Immigration Forum
http://www.immigrationforum.org

The National Network for Immigrant and Refugee Rights (NNIRR)
http://www.nnirr.org

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)
http://uscis.gov/graphics/index.htm

Center for Migration Studies
http://www.cmsny.org

Islamic Human Rights Commission
http://www.ihrc.org

The history of immigration law does not champion American ethnic groups. Immigration laws include the Chinese Exclusion Acts of the 1880s, the National Origins Quota System of the 1920s, the Mexican Repatriation Campaign of the 1950s, and the McCarran-Walter Act in 1952. A new era began with the inclusiveness of the mid-1960s. The findings of the 1990 U.S. Census pointed to a range of demographic, economic, and social indicators in this most recent era of immigration in the United States. Both the immediate impact of present-day newcomers and the changes in America that can be attributed to the conflicts and contributions of previous immigrants appear to be facets of nearly every contemporary social issue.

As the unit articles make clear, immigration and migration not only have an impact on the receiving country, but also affect nations that lose the talents, skills, and loyalty of disaffected migrants. Immigration and migration, moreover, contribute to an already complex process of inter-generational relationships and the socialization of persons whose experiences of profound cultural change are intensified by competition, patterns of settlement, options for mobility, and the consciousness of ethnic traditions that conflict with dominant cultural and educational institutions. As a guide for your own study, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights has noted that increased immigration raises the following issues for both recent arrivals and Americans by birth:

- *Employment:* The areas of occupation selected by or imposed upon various ethnic populations trace ethnic group mobility strategies and ethnic succession in the workplace, especially in manufacturing, hospitals, restaurants, and maintenance and custodial positions. Some ethnic populations appear to have greater numbers of highly educated persons in professional or semiprofessional positions.
- *Institutional and societal barriers:* The job preferences and discrimination against the ethnic enclaves and persons in small communities that are isolated from mainstream English-speaking society suggest the value of second-language competencies. Mutual accommodation is required to minimize the effect of inadequate language skills and training as well as difficulties in obtaining licenses, memberships, and certification.
- *Exploitation of workers:* The most common form is the payment of wages below minimum standards. Alien workers have been stereotyped as a drain on public services. Such scapegoating is insupportable.
- *Taking jobs from Americans: Fact or fiction?:* The stunning fact is that immigrants are a source of increased productivity and a significant, if not utterly necessary, addition to the workforce as well as to the consumer power that drives the American economy.

The intrinsic complexity of immigration as a social issue is one reason for the lack of comprehensive and long-range planning evidenced by U.S. immigration laws. The extreme diversity in our immigration sources clearly adds to the complexity of this issue. Immigrant success stories are mingled with fear that the foreigner will take jobs and that our infrastructure will be strained. The late 1900s is a turning point in U.S. immigration history, not only because it signals the beginning of direct federal controls, but also because it reflects new immigrant sources, whose ability to assimilate will be questioned. The first general immigration law was enacted in 1882. Generally, it established a 50-cent head tax per immigrant and gave the treasury secretary jurisdiction over immigration matters. The 1882 act also excluded convicts, paupers, and mentally defective aliens. Earlier that year, Congress had passed the Chinese Exclusion Act, which based ineligibility for admission to the United States on national origin. The act also prohibited foreign-born Chinese from becoming citizens, and placed a 10-year ban on the admission of Chinese workers. In 1890 there were 107,488 Chinese aliens on the

American mainland; because of the Exclusion Act that number had dwindled to 61,639 by 1920.

Thousands of Chinese aliens had come to the West Coast as contract laborers to build the railroads in the mid-1850s. By 1880 there were 189,000 Chinese in the United States. Their sheer numbers coupled with the fact that most were unskilled and worked for low wages generated hostility and adverse public opinion. Calls for restrictive measures grew until Congress responded with the 1882 act. However, the issue did not disappear after the act's passage.

In the next several decades, Congress would take further restrictive measures against the Chinese. In 1884 in fact, Congress amended the Chinese Exclusion Act. The section dealing with Chinese workers was extended to cover all Chinese, regardless of whether they were Chinese subjects. The immigrant head tax increased to $1.00 in 1884. Thousands of Japanese immigrants arrived in the late 1800s. Initially, Hawaiian sugar plantations were their destination, where they worked as contract labor. Canadians and Mexicans also streamed across our land borders in this period to work in factories and fields. Congress amended the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act again in 1892, as it was about to expire. The 1892 amendment extended the exclusion provisions for an additional 10 years and required all Chinese workers to obtain a residence certificate within 1 year. In 1893 Congress passed an act that reinforced prior immigration laws. It also required ship owners to collect information about incoming aliens to help identify those who were excludable. Boards of inquiry were established in 1893 to deal with immigration problems, including deportation. Calls for more regulation and restriction of immigrants continued through the turn of the century. Various members of Congress proposed a literacy test again and again as an immigration control to exclude aliens who were unable to read in any language. Legislation to accomplish this was vetoed by presidents Cleveland, Taft, and Wilson. In 1917 a literacy test for incoming aliens was enacted over President Wilson's veto. Between 1901 and 1920, 14,531,197 immigrants entered the United States.

In 1901 an immigrant anarchist assassinated President McKinley. Theodore Roosevelt, who succeeded McKinley, told Congress that U.S. policy should be to systematically exclude and deport anarchists. Two years later, Congress responded by adding anarchists to the growing list of excludable aliens in the first federal law making political ideas and beliefs grounds for deportation.

The 1903 immigration act also barred epileptics, insane persons, and professional beggars from entry. In addition, it raised the head tax to $2.00 and re-codified the contract labor law. Congress passed a subsequent statute in 1907, which raised the head tax to $4.00 and earmarked these revenues for use in defraying the costs of enforcing U.S. immigration laws. The 1907 act also created a commission to study immigration, which came to be known as the Dillingham Commission after the senator who chaired it. The commission submitted its lengthy 42-volume report in 1911. It concluded that the immigrants who started coming to the United States in the late 1800s adversely affected the American labor movement.

The engagement of the United States beyond its continental limits brought American and Asian interests into a common arena now called the Pacific Rim. The most recent and perhaps most traumatic episode of this encounter was the conflict that erupted in 1941 at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii. The cultural roots and current interaction between the United States and Asia form complex concerns that are explored in this unit's articles. Understanding the cultural matrices of Asian nations and their ethnicities and languages initiates the process of learning about the Asian emigrants who, for many reasons, decided to leave Asia to seek a fresh beginning in the United States.

By the 1980s the public language had again changed. The metaphors of Third World resistance to colonialism born out of opposition to the Vietnam War was transferred to domestic politics and Third World people were equated with a new domestic group, "people of color." The black/white metaphor resulted in the leveling of the ethnic reality into a simple bi-polar racial world. Both of these undermined the possibility of a common language to build solidarity. With the coming end of the dominations of this bi-polar thinking in American life, we can see the possibility of a re-emergence of ethnicity that will include not only the older third and later generations of the old ethnic groups—who continue to hunger for identity that has a meaning, a rich culture and a story which "white ethnicity" does not offer—but also the new immigrants from most of these groups who continue to come with the language and culture of the homeland, and who must be brought into engagement with American life and culture.

For this we need new expressions of ethnicity that can underpin a generous multi-culturalism. Its legitimacy has already been established. Now we need to give it rooting in solid values that come out of each ethnic group's experience, and to its expression in their different enculturations to be shared across groups. There are two elements that need to be developed if we are to be successful. First, the soft multi-culturalism that is based on superficial sharing of cultures has to be given some rigor. It is now largely based on the exchange of information about the folk and high culture of the homeland and contains almost nothing about the American experience of the group, the cultural adaptations it has developed to make it successful in the New World, or its interactions with others. This is where we can learn about the contributions of the group to the civic culture of the communities it lives in. The second element is that we need to train the leaders of groups to elicit from their history precisely those experiences which allowed them to be successful, and to contribute. It is at this point that we will be able to move to mobilizing ethnic groups to use their experience positively and to teach those lessons abroad.

New Americans Fresh Off the Presses

The reach—and influence—of the ethnic media in the United States continues to grow. Assimilation, acculturation, citizenship and news from home are only some of the subjects that ethnic media outlets present to millions of eager readers in dozens of different languages every day.

DANIEL AKST

The tragic death of Sandra Bonaventure, a pregnant 20-year-old whose battered corpse was discovered by a homeless man in Manhattan last June, didn't make *The New York Times*—which is perhaps why Garry Pierre-Pierre works for the *Haitian Times* instead.

He spent seven years as a reporter at *The New York Times* before founding the Brooklyn-based Haitian weekly, and since Bonaventure was the daughter of Haitian parents, hers is the kind of story his paper jumps all over.

"My goal is to get young Haitians involved in the community," Pierre-Pierre says, adding that, "Citizen-building is our whole mission."

Garry Pierre-Pierre,
founder and publisher of the *Haitian Times*

There are thousands of ethnic periodicals and broadcast outlets all across America, and the *Haitian Times* is in some ways atypical. Its editor and publisher is a Haitian-American with rare experience at the most exalted levels of mainstream media, and he publishes the *Haitian Times* in English rather than the language of the home country (in this case, a French patois known as Creole).

But in other ways the *Haitian Times* is quite typical indeed. Operating on a shoestring, it strives to serve one of America's fast-growing new immigrant groups, and its editor wears so many hats that Medusa herself would have trouble accommodating them all. The photos are fuzzy and the layout wouldn't be out of place in a high school paper, but Pierre-Pierre and his tiny team know their community intimately and strive every day to live up to the paper's motto—"Bridging the Gap"—by covering news of Haitians in America as well as Haiti itself. It is a gap that will be familiar to the editors—and readers—of any ethnic newspaper: the gap between old country and new, between traditional ways and a new life, between Haitian and American.

Thus, a recent issue covered not just the Bonaventure murder, but an attack on Haiti's National Palace, as well as the life and work of a Haitian painter who lives in Harlem. "My goal is to get young Haitians involved in the community," Pierre-Pierre says, adding that, "Citizen-building is our whole mission."

Like the immigrants they are springing up to serve, ethnic newspapers, broadcast media and even web sites are cropping up all over America. Nobody seems to know how many such outlets are operating just now, but one good answer is: "a lot." In New York, the Independent Press Association counts 274 ethnic papers and magazines just in the metropolitan area, even while acknowledging that this figure isn't comprehensive. The Association counts 27 ethnic dailies in New York City alone.

In markets such as New York and Los Angeles, Spanish-language radio and TV stations are among the most watched. The large number of Hispanic immigrants and their common language have produced a handful of Latino media juggernauts including Univision Communications Inc., which is the nation's fifth largest TV network.

"The ethnic press is very important, particularly these days," says Carnegie Corporation's Geri Mannion, who reports that her elderly mother still reads the *Irish Echo.* Mannion runs the Corporation's Strengthening U.S. Democracy program, which has the goal of promoting citizenship and voter participation and raising the level of civic literacy in an age of large-scale immigration. Civics aren't taught much in school anymore, and changes in technology, attitudes and official policy have made it easier than ever for immigrants to retain a separate language and culture. Under these circumstances, says Mannion, the ethnic media serves a vital role as "a conduit to the immigrant community."

As a sign of the influence these new ethnic papers and broadcasters are having, a recent study commissioned by New California Media, a nonprofit organization of more than 400 ethnic media outlets, found that ethnic media reach 84 percent of

California's three largest minority groups: Latinos, blacks and Asians. Together, these groups make up something like half the population. Sandy Close, as the organization's director—perhaps not the most objective person on the subject—nevertheless makes a persuasive case when she says of the new ethnic press, "This segment is the most powerful force in American journalism since the emergence of the alternative media in the 1960s."

Accordingly, the mainstream media is paying attention—from a weekly Bosnian-language column in the *Utica Observer Dispatch* (there are perhaps 5,000 Bosnian refugees in and around Utica, N.Y.) to a full-blown Vietnamese-language edition published by the *San Jose Mercury News.* Mainstream media companies have also invested in established ethnic organizations. NBC (itself a unit of General Electric Company), owns the No. 2 Spanish-language TV network, Telemundo, and in Southern California, the Times-Mirror Company, parent company of the *Los Angeles Times,* bought a 50 percent stake in *La Opinión,* America's oldest and largest Spanish-language daily, from the founding Lozano family. José Ignacio Lozano is now chief executive.

At *La Opinión,* in Los Angeles, Gerardo Lopez wrestles with challenges not unlike those facing Garry Pierre-Pierre, albeit on an altogether different scale. Lopez is editor of *La Opinión,* with a daily circulation of 130,000 and 86 editorial staffers. Immigration issues are bread-and-butter topics at his newspaper going back to the Simpson-Mazzoli immigration law of 1986, which offered amnesty to many illegal immigrants. "We had an avalanche of readers asking, Do I qualify? How do I do it?" In response, Lopez says, "We published a special supplement on that particular law, explaining in very simple terms, Who can help? What documents are needed?"

La Opinión has undertaken similar explanatory efforts for the Census and at election time. During election season, it even includes a voter registration form right in the newspaper. Periodically, it tells readers how to become a citizen and how to register to vote. And before the last mayoral election in Los Angeles, Lopez says, the paper convened groups of 20 to 30 people in various parts of town and, in an effort to better serve its community, questioned them closely about the issues most important to them. What readers wanted to know about, the editor says, "guided our coverage."

Accelerating Acculturation

To historians, the rise of the ethnic media in recent years is far from surprising, since the same thing happened in the 19th century, the last time America saw sustained immigration on this scale. Barbara Reed, a Rutgers University historian who has studied the ethnic media, notes that the first Jewish newspaper in this country sprang up in 1823, the first black paper in 1827 and the first Indian paper in 1828.

One big difference this time around is technology. Immigrants can stay in touch with their country of origin—by telephone, e-mail and cheap airfares—in ways they never could in the old days. Indeed, thanks to the Internet, immigrants can often read their home newspaper, just as the people back home can read an ethnic paper here. Even the tiny *Haitian Times* puts some of its articles on the web.

The nature of immigration has changed, too; the heavily Latino component means that some immigrant communities, particularly Mexican-Americans, remain physically closer to home and are continually refreshed with newcomers in a process that shows no signs of abating. America nowadays is much more willing to accommodate the newcomers' language and culture, both officially and unofficially. Even illegal immigrants are protected from certain forms of discrimination and have witnessed, instead of the old-fashioned roundups, periodic amnesties. Given its aging native population, appetite for eager workers and even its historic image of itself (as expressed in the words of Emma Lazarus on the Statue of Liberty), America is likely to see continued high levels of immigration for a long time to come.

If the ethnic media are an essential conduit to immigrants, then it's fair to ask: to what extent are the ethnic media helping new arrivals become Americans? Do these papers and broadcasters build citizens? Do they promote assimilation? Or do these new media act to sustain ethnic and linguistic segregation?

The vastness and diversity of America's ethnic media make generalizing extremely difficult, but those who've studied the subject tend to agree that the ethnic press is not accelerating immigrant assimilation, a concept that is itself out of favor in some circles. "The growth of the ethnic media is helping to slow the process of assimilation and thereby making this a much more complex country," says Sergio Bendixen, a Miami pollster who conducted the New California Media survey.

If anything, the new ethnic media are accelerating the process of assimilation to a different national identity altogether. "By covering the life of the home country or region, the papers often dissolve distinctions that had been active back home, creating a broader solidarity," writes Abby Scher, director of the Independent Press Association-New York, in its latest member directory. "Robert Park observed this process early in the century, when large New York dailies dealt with 'Italy' or 'Germany,' not Genoa, Naples or Saxony."

The ethnic media, many observers agree, is simultaneously *acclimatizing* newcomers to America while helping them retain their native culture.

A more recent example is *India Abroad,* a colorful New York-based weekly owned by the Indian media conglomerate rediff.com. India is a vast nation of many languages and cultures, but publications like *India Abroad* help cement émigrés into a group made cohesive by their Indianness in America, as

well as by their economic success. While some ethnic papers have as a central narrative the struggle of an oppressed people (their readers), this is peripheral in *India Abroad,* which focuses heavily on successful Indian-Americans. The paper, produced partly in India, features matrimonial advertisements rife with teachers, engineers and medical professionals, and also carries extensive business coverage. It, too, is engaged in acculturation, regularly publishing essays by successful Indians on immigration, identity and other such issues. One, by a young journalist, was headlined "Assam, where's that?"

Carlos Cortes, a retired historian at the University of California, Riverside, who has studied the ethnic press—and who recalls that his own grandparents banned Spanish at home when they arrived in this country from Mexico—agrees that assimilation is being delayed. But he insists on a distinction between assimilation and acculturation. And the ethnic media, he says "are accelerating acculturation."

That's in fact what most students of the ethnic media seem to think—that the ethnic media are simultaneously acclimatizing newcomers to America while helping them retain their native culture. What ethnic papers and broadcasters are doing, in other words, is "bridging the gap," just as Garry Pierre-Pierre tries to do with the *Haitian Times* in Brooklyn, and just as the ethnic press has always done.

In fact, the role of the ethnic media hasn't changed all that much in the last hundred years or so, even if immigration—and America—have changed plenty. Barbara Reed says the ethnic press historically has performed a variety of functions. It gave immigrants a chance to "control their own message," and thereby shape their own image of themselves. It was a forum of opinion, and also provided editorial leadership to a given community of immigrants. Another role was what Reed calls "surveillance," meaning that a ethnic paper would monitor how the rest of society was looking at "us." Are they accepting? What is the nature of the stereotypes they have for us?

And let's not forget commerce. The ethnic press gave advertisers a way to reach immigrants, who in turn got a way to obtain goods and services of special interest to them, or at least provided by someone who might speak their language or, quite literally, understand where they were coming from. Ethnic papers have also served to keep immigrants to one city apprised of their countrymen's doings in other parts of America, as well as to keep everyone up on the news of the home country. Finally, says Reed, "many of these publications acted as a teacher" of group heritage to a younger generation that might have been born in America and thus lack first-hand knowledge of the old country.

Pashree Super Pat says this is why he puts money from his other business ventures into *InterThai/Pacific Rim News,* an English-language paper he publishes in Los Angeles: "It's almost like a donation. We do this for the education of young people, to continue the Thai culture and tradition."

Another thing the ethnic media historically have taught was "what it means to be a citizen in this country," Barbara Reed says, adding that, "Usually these publications didn't tell people for whom to vote. But they did tell them to vote."

A Presence in the Community

Walking the streets of central Brooklyn with the editor of the *Haitian Times* is an eye-opening experience, especially if you grew up there, as this reporter did. It's summer, stiflingly hot, and this is a neighborhood that was once on the ropes. It's still relatively poor, but there are no vacant shops, and the streets aren't menacing in the least. Once overwhelmingly African-American, this section of Brooklyn is now largely Caribbean, with Haitians living among Jamaicans, Barbadians and other island immigrants. French signs make Haitian churches and shops obvious, and Haitian foods are available from sidewalk vendors. Pierre-Pierre points out a storefront he finds particularly interesting; it's a business that helps immigrants send money home, one that has succeeded despite the size and prominence of Western Union because, says Pierre-Pierre, they understand the Haitian market and speak the people's language. They know, for instance, that some immigrants want to send not just money but food, so they handle this as well, arranging for the purchase of items in Haiti that customers can pay for here.

There is a constant flow of money and goods from Haitian neighborhoods back to the island, which is why, in Brooklyn, you often see someone wrestling a large cardboard barrel into or out of a vehicle. These are shipping containers, but they are not to be confused with the battered metal barrels seen on the streets of the same neighborhoods. "These are jerk cans," Pierre-Pierre explains, used to prepare a popular form of Caribbean barbecue.

On this particular day, Pierre-Pierre heads for the offices of Brooklyn's annual Caribbean parade, where he wants the *Haitian Times* to have a modest presence. The parade is a big deal, but not that many Haitians participate. "We're trying to change that," he says. (*La Opinión* participates in a similar parade in East Los Angeles.) The parade office is in a storefront, and one of the women working there takes an interest in his venture. She works for an HMO and asks for his business card, which Pierre-Pierre obligingly provides.

"The *Haitian Times* plays a very important role in the community," says the Reverend Philius Nicolas, pastor of the Evangelical Crusade of Fishers of Men, a Haitian-oriented church in Brooklyn's Flatbush section. Nicolas is an uncle to Abner Louima (a Haitian immigrant who was the victim of a notorious and brutal 1997 attack by former police officer Justin Volpe inside a Brooklyn police station) and praises Pierre-Pierre for his coverage of that case as well as for his overall knowledge of Haitian life in Brooklyn. He adds that the paper is important for another reason: "There are several other newspapers, but this one is unique because it's published in English, so other people will learn what's going on in the Haitian community."

The soft-spoken 40-year-old Pierre-Pierre says he decided to publish the *Haitian Times* because he saw the need for a Haitian paper focused on Haitians in this country, one that was free of the strong factionalism he says infects the two main Haitian papers that were already publishing. His target audience, he says, is the younger, better-educated generation—his own cohort—rather than those who refuse to make the mental leap from Creole-speaking exile to English-speaking American. He wants young, upwardly mobile Haitians to stay put and, more important, get involved, which is why he publishes in English. Culturally, he says, Haitians value education highly, but "a lot of educated Haitians stay away from the community."

Pierre-Pierre's own route to the community was a circuitous one. His middle-class family brought him to America from Haiti when he was eight years old, and he grew in Elizabeth, New Jersey. Like many Haitian immigrants, he experienced some friction with American-born blacks, yet decided to attend predominantly black Florida A&M University, out of a desire, he says, to attend college with high-achieving blacks in an environment where being black was more the norm. He also did a stint in the Peace Corps, during which he met his American wife, who is white.

Although a major goal of the paper is raising its readers' political consciousness—it encourages them to become citizens and urges the citizens to vote—it doesn't endorse candidates. "Not yet," says Pierre-Pierre. "You have to develop your base, grow your community, develop an identity, develop credibility. It's a step you evolve into." Still, covering politics is a top priority; this season, for example, the *Haitian Times* carried an interview with New York State Comptroller and Democratic gubernatorial candidate H. Carl McCall (who was later defeated by incumbent governor George Pataki), and the paper covered the 42nd Assembly District race in Brooklyn. "We guide," Pierre-Pierre says of his philosophy. "We let people know the importance of registering and voting, what it means to their kids' education."

Like the many ethnic papers that have come before it, the *Haitian Times* focuses on helping readers—in this case, the 500,000 Haitians in the New York metropolitan area—find their way in their new country. "They're making the transition from exiles to an immigrant group," Pierre-Pierre says. "As they make that transition, I'd like the *Haitian Times* to be dead center guiding that."

One challenge has been making sure the *Haitian Times* is dead center rather than merely dead. Unable to raise as much financing as he'd hoped before launching the tabloid-sized paper in October 1999, Pierre-Pierre puts out his 15,000 circulation weekly on a budget so tight he can't even pay himself a salary. The *Haitian Times* claims a dozen staffers and has paid reporters in Miami and Haiti, but a number of functions, including some writing and editing, are performed by volunteers.

Pierre-Pierre spends his time juggling business and journalistic obligations, and when a potential advertiser is on the phone he takes the call personally, although he insists he doesn't let this influence the paper's coverage. "We don't accept ads that are tied up to a story," he said in a recent interview. "We don't accept money to write stories. We write stories because we believe they're worth printing."

The remarkable July 24, 2002 issue of the *Haitian Times* was full of such stories, including one about the rise of Haitian-American Republicans; a follow-up on the case of Abner Louima; a profile of an up-and-coming Haitian-American middleweight boxer; an essay about Alexandre Dumas on the occasion of his 200th birthday; a couple of articles about immigration; an account of the abduction and beating of an investigative reporter in Haiti; an Associated Press story about the collapse of a Haitian banking scheme that cost some depositors their life savings; Haitian entertainment listing for Haiti as well as America; TV and radio listings; a horoscope, a gossip column, an advice column and a recipe for Haitian cabbage rolls.

The cover story of that same issue, about the mysterious "suicide" of a young Haitian-American entrepreneur near Buffalo, New York, was written by Macollvie Jean-Francois, a wry and energetic novice Pierre-Pierre hired as a college student. She has since developed into a mainstay of the paper. That's another of the ethnic media's unsung roles: providing jobs and training for journalists covering communities unlikely to get much ink in the mainstream media.

Passions and Divisions

The idealism of editors like Pierre-Pierre notwithstanding, it's easy to idealize America's ethnic press, but by and large these are not great papers; most have small news budgets and editorial staffs, and this lack of resources makes it almost impossible for them to conduct the kind of in-depth enterprise reporting required to expose corruption or throughly cover complex issues. Even *La Opinión,* which communications professor Federico Subervi of Pace University calls "the most sophisticated and complete of the Spanish-language dailies in the country," doesn't have a regular city hall reporter and finds it impossible to closely cover labor. About five years ago, perhaps as a reflection of staffing constraints, it went off the beat system altogether.

Subervi blames the media—mainstream and Latino—for the low electorial participation of Latinos, noting that in Puerto Rico and Mexico, to cite a couple of examples, voter turnout is much higher than it is here among native-born Americans, never mind naturalized Latino voters. "The current Latino ethnic media are doing a lukewarm job in promoting the political knowledge and participation of Latinos," he says. "It could be a lot better, and it should be a lot better."

The media can make the difference, he says, citing Miami's Cuban immigrants. When they first arrived, they had low political participation, but when Dade County adopted an English-only ordinance for government purposes in 1980 (it was later rolled back), a local Spanish-language TV station was able to galvanize Cuban political energies around the slogan "Vota para que te respeten" (Vote to be respected). The Abner Louima

case had a similar effect on Brooklyn's Haitians, according to Pierre-Pierre.

One of the challenges facing every ethnic publication in acculturating immigrants is keeping up with evolving readers.

This is not to say ethnic papers stand apart from politics, although they sometimes stand apart from American politics. In general, among ethnic papers, "the content is much more advocacy-oriented towards a particular world view or perspective shaped by the conditions of the community, albeit filtered through the part of the community most represented by the paper and the owner's perspective," says John Anner, executive director of the Independent Press Association.

Ethnic papers often reflect the passions and divisions of the home country. In Brooklyn, for instance, Pierre-Pierre says, there is a Haitian paper identified with the pro-Aristede forces, and another considered anti-Aristede. Both are in French. Most of California's dozens of Vietnamese-language papers, on the other hand, are strongly anti-Communist, like their readers, yet here, too, there are sharp divisions. Five Vietnamese immigrant journalists have been murdered since 1981 while doing their jobs in this country, according to Jeff Brody, a Cal State Fullerton journalism professor who has studied these newspapers. Their deaths were part of a climate of political violence surrounding the Vietnamese media in this country as a result of tensions between conciliatory factions and the anti-Communist extremists, says Brody, who notes that while Vietnam has no tradition of a free press, Vietnamese-American journalists quickly adapted to ours. The violence has subsided in the past decade or so as Vietnamese immigrants have accepted the idea that the Communist regime is more likely to collapse of its own contradictions than as a result of violent overthrow.

Even in the absence of murder, journalistic ethics are sometimes a problem in the ethnic press. Kang & Lee, a New York-based advertising agency that specializes in the Asian-American market, warns, in its online *Asian Media Reference Guide,* "that there is a very close relationship between the advertising sales and the editorial departments of these media… In fact, many publications allocate editorial space according to the advertising volume of the client." Kang & Lee urges clients to leverage their ad spending to get more editorial coverage, but warns clients not to be surprised by a shakedown, either: such publications may use their editorial clout to pry some ad dollars out of you, "perhaps even threatening to print a negative article regarding your company or product, or heavily endorsing your competitors."

Challenges and Change

If the ethnic media has its ethical lapses, well, plenty of mainstream newspapers are beholden to their advertisers too, especially to the holy trinity of supermarkets, auto dealers and real estate agents. On the other hand, they don't provide the kind of coverage the ethnic papers do. Last year, for instance, *IndiaWest,* a 25,000-circulation weekly in San Leandro, California, made national news by reporting that McDonald's was using beef extract to flavor its French fries—anathema to the Hindus who make up the bulk of the paper's readers. Vegetarians were appalled and a class-action suit was filed against the fast-food chain. A McDonald's in India was even vandalized.

One of the challenges facing every ethnic publication in acculturating immigrants is keeping up with evolving readers. Brody says that when Vietnamese-language newspapers first sprang up to serve new immigrants in California's Orange County, they provided news of the homeland, news of the growing local Vietnamese community, and also information about negotiating the place they had come to live. That means information about English classes, becoming a citizen, American holidays and how to enroll your children in school. But Brody says that as the Vietnamese community became more established, the Vietnamese newspapers became less focused on matters of civics. Instead they expanded feature coverage of celebrities, movies and fashion.

No matter how much their readers change, one thing that doesn't change in the ethnic media is the need to explain world events to their readers. When terrorists attacked New York's World Trade Center, for example, workers and residents in the nearby Chinatown section of Manhattan turned to Sinocast, a radio station that broadcasts over 92.3 FM. Sinocast listeners must have a specially adapted radio to pick up the station, but such devices are sold by the station and local stores, and by September 11, 2001, they were common all over the neighborhood.

Across the country, you can find similar radios under the palm trees of West Hollywood, California, a center of the 600,000 Russian-speaking immigrants who have settled in Southern California. There, listeners can subscribe to all-day broadcasts form the Panorama Media Group, which also publishes Russian newspapers in Los Angeles. Eugene Levin, who owns the business, says he believes the paper serves the dual function of making its readers into Americans while keeping them up on their own culture and interests. "We try to help them as much as possible adjust to the American way of life," he says.

From his company's offices above Hollywood Boulevard, Levin has constructed a Russian-language media empire, complete with radio and television studios, an entertainment newspaper, a Russian yellow pages, and *Panorama,* probably the leading Russian paper in Southern California. His newspapers and radio service carry English lessons and the business section of *Panorama* has published articles about American laws and how to conduct yourself inside an American company.

A genial 50-year-old, Levin is politically active; he acknowledges donating money to political campaigns and attending political dinners and the like. His wife is a county commissioner of consumer affairs as well as director of West Hollywood's Russian Community Center, and Levin heads an association of Russian immigrants. Lately, he's trying harder

Keeping Strong Ties to Homelands, Immigrants Are Still Committed to Becoming U.S. Citizens

More results of the Public Agenda study on immigrants' attitudes:



The popularity and importance of an ethnic press in the United States is consistent with a recent study carried out by Public Agenda, which found that nearly half of all immigrants follow current events in their home countries. Most immigrants even telephone friends and family in their home country at least a few times a month and 14 percent regularly send money back home. "The immigrant press is probably serving a powerful need, helping people keep tabs on current events, sports and politics in their countries of origin," says Public Agenda's Steve Farkas, a senior vice president and director of research.

Public Agenda, the nonprofit and nonpartisan public policy research organization (www.publicagenda.org) that was founded in 1975 by social scientist Daniel Yankelovich and former U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance, conducted the survey with support from Carnegie Corporation's Strengthening U.S. Democracy program. The program seeks to strengthen democracy through a variety of strategies, which include supporting efforts to help immigrants to become fully engaged citizens. One statistic suggests the practical importance of this mission: immigrants, with their children, are expected to represent two-thirds of the nation's population growth by 2050.

Public Agenda's study, which explored immigrants' attitudes about the immigration experience, was based on focus groups carried out around the country and on a national survey, conducted in October and November of 2002, of a randomly selected group of 1,002 immigrants, who came from dozens of nations. Although there has been public concern in the U.S. about the latest wave of immigration, especially its size and ethnic complexity, Public Agenda finds that the values and attitudes of immigrants toward such things as work and the responsibilities of citizenship reflect those of Americans in general. "The expectations that immigrants have of America, especially its promise of freedom and economic opportunity, sound very much like echoes from our immigrant past," Farkas says. "Many are very proud to be here and see America as a dream come true, and even more see citizenship as something necessary and as a practical way to improve their life and the lives of their families."

The study found that almost half of the immigrants surveyed already think of themselves as Americans. "A surprisingly high number are already citizens and very few do not plan to pursue citizenship," Farkas said. "The longer they are here, the more likely they are to become citizens and to speak English."

The ethnic press, Farkas added, continues to provide a link between cultures, much in the way it has done historically, but today's immigrants have more options, including staying in touch by making those relatively inexpensive telephone calls home—as 28 percent do at least once a week. Nevertheless, the Public Agenda study indicates that most immigrants are making a firm commitment to their new homeland.

to get his readers and listeners more politically active as well. While *Panorama* has long encouraged readers to vote, it only recently started endorsing political candidates, and politics, especially the Middle East, are a staple on his radio service. He says politicians in southern California understand the importance of the ethnic media and seek their endorsement.

Among the Haitians of Brooklyn, radio is probably the single biggest source of news and information, eclipsing the various Haitian newspapers. Reverend Nicolas and Garry Pierre-Pierre agree that this is because of the relatively low literacy rate among Haitian immigrants. Using a license for a station in Asbury Park, New Jersey, which in recent years has gained a concentration of Haitians, Nicolas himself began broadcasting in Creole from Brooklyn using a relay device, but the Federal Communications Commission made him stop. The three remaining Haitian radio outlets in Brooklyn all use subcarrier frequencies to broadcast, meaning that, like the Sinocast broadcasts, they require a specially adapted radio.

Meanwhile, at the end of a long day at the paper's storefront office, I chat with Macollvie Jean-Francois, the *Haitian Times* 23-year-old reporter, who says many of the people she meets in her work "see themselves as Haitians living in New York" rather than as Americans. Jean-Francois is a Haitian-born graduate of John Dewey High School and Baruch College, a branch of the low-cost City University system, but when I casually ask whether she is a citizen, I'm surprised to learn she is not. "I've applied," she says. "I finally realized I've spent more time being in America than in Haiti. I'm more comfortable speaking English than French." And travel, she says, is easy on an American passport.

Citizen or not, Jean-Francois loves writing about the Haitian community—"I like to see immediately the impact of what I write"—and ticks off the issues she's covered, including health care, education and immigration. She recalls writing about a group of women arrested for marrying men to make them eligible for citizenship, and now she's working on a piece about how noisy it is in Haitian Flatbush—a neighborhood that always seemed so quiet when I grew up there. Like her boss, she believes in the mission of the *Haitian Times,* and when she talks about it, her enthusiasm is obviously genuine. As she puts it, "If you don't know yourself, how can you ever aspire to become someone else?"

Daniel Akst is a writer whose work appears in *The New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Wilson Quarterly* and other publications. His latest novel, *The Webster Chronicle*, was published by the Blue Hen imprint of Penguin Putnam.

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The Diversity Visa Lottery—A Cycle of Unintended Consequences in United States Immigration Policy

ANNA O. LAW

Each year since 1988, the federal government of the United States runs an unusual lottery—not a lottery that awards cash, but one that awards 50,000 visas to nationals of a special list of designated countries that are deemed "underrepresented" in the current legal immigration system. The lucky winners of the visa lottery are granted a visa to enter the United States, lawful permanent residence status (the coveted green card), and the recipients eventually qualify for naturalization. Many immigration analysts and others in the public may have heard by now of this small and obscure provision.[1] What is not known is the true origin of the provision including the impetus for its creation, and how far the program has strayed from its originally intended purpose. How did such a bizarre program that contradicts the philosophy of American immigration admissions become a temporary, and then later a permanent part of the Immigration and Nationality Act?

This article argues that the factors that created the push for the diversity lottery in existence today had its roots in the changed immigration patterns wrought by the Immigration Act of 1965. The diversity lottery idea actually dates much further back in time than the late 1980s when the program first met with legislative success. This article further argues that the chain of unanticipated consequences emanating from the 1965 Act led to the creation of the diversity lottery, a policy which itself, spawned further unintended consequences in the shifting group of beneficiaries. Using Congressional hearing reports, other government documents, and personal interviews with actors who took part in creating and implementing the diversity lottery, this article traces the creation and evolution of the lottery and the role of several key Congressmen who sought to create a policy to benefit their ethnic constituents in the time honored practice of pork barrel politics.

Impact of the 1965 Act

To truly understand the reason for the existence of the diversity lottery today, one must understand the impetus for the policy that dates back to the passage of the Immigration Act of 1965 because today's lottery is actually a direct response to these changes.[2] The present lottery system is also a cobbling together of different concepts and strategies devised by many different Congressmen over the years who were responding to the changed immigration patterns.

The Immigration Act of 1965 was viewed as a watershed act and one of the most liberal and expansive reforms to the American system because of its abolition of race, ethnicity and national origin from the immigration selection process.[3] The 1965 Act revamped the entire immigration selection system by replacing national origin considerations with a seven-category preference system. This preference system prioritized immigrant admissions based primarily on close family relationships to a United States citizen or a lawful permanent resident (a green-card holder), and secondarily on considerations for employment skills. The 1965 Act completely abolished race, ethnicity and national origin as criteria for immigrant admissions and replaced it with the neutral preference system and a 20,000 per country limit within the Eastern Hemisphere, which also had an overall hemisphere limit of 170,000. Originally, the 1965 act did not place per country limits on the Western Hemisphere, although the region was capped at 170,000. In 1978, Congress passed a law without controversy that brought the Western Hemisphere countries under a worldwide cap and imposed a 20,000 per country limit on all countries worldwide. With this change, the reforms begun in 1965 were finally complete.[4]

As will become clear, the call for the creation of the diversity lottery arose from a group of politically well-situated Irish and Italian-American Members of Congress who sought to benefit their ethnic constituents by rigging the immigration system in favor of these ethnic groups. To comprehend why these two particular groups led the charge, one needs to understand some of the unforeseen circumstances that resulted from the overhaul of the immigration system in 1965 and their connection to the movement to create the diversity lottery in the late 1980s.

Unanticipated Results of the 1965 Act and Early Remedies

One major unforeseen, and certainly unintended, result of the 1965 Act was that it precipitated a huge shift in the ethnic and racial composition of the immigrant flow. Architects of the 1965 Act expected Europeans to be the main beneficiaries of the new preference system since it was expected that the groups who were already in the United States in large numbers would be the ones to petition for their relatives and not the small numbers of racial minorities like the Asians and Africans, for example. In a Department of Justice form letter sent to members of the public who wrote to the Johnson Administration regarding the 1965 Act and also in an informal briefing book sent out to Congressional staff, the Administration addressed the racists' and xenophobes' charge that "the bill would let in hordes of Africans and Asiatics"

> The bill would not let in hordes from anywhere at all. Persons from Africa and Asia would continue to be in effect, quota immigrants, as they were under present law, but would be treated like everyone else . . . but immigrants will have to compete and to qualify to get in, and immigration will not be predominantly from Asia and Africa . . . The simple fact is that nations differ greatly in the number of their people who have occupational attainment, or the family ties in the United States, to obtain a preference . . . Indeed very few people from certain areas could even pay the cost of tickets to come here.[5]

The statement shows that the Administration and authors of the 1965 Act did not anticipate the shift in the national origin composition of immigrants that happened after the 1965 reforms.[6] Whereas the previous immigrant flow was largely from Northern and Western Europe, the 1965 Act led to a modest increase in Eastern and Southern immigration, but an explosion in immigration from Asia and Latin America. By 1975, immigrants from Asia and Latin America accounted for about two-thirds of the immigration to the United States.[7]

Lottery supporters have often cited the empirically observable shift as justification for their approach to distributing immigration visas, the logic being that older immigrant groups like the Italians and Irish were being shut out of the system due to the shift toward Asian and Latino admissions that was facilitated by the 1965 changes. While Asian and Latino immigration rose, immigration from Ireland went on a steep decline after 1965, and Italy developed large waiting lists in family preference categories. The *INS Statistical Yearbook* reports that while immigration from Ireland was an average of 4,836 per year in the decade 1951–1960, and 8,597 per year in 1961–1970, the numbers decreased precipitously in 1971–1980 to 1,149 per year. By 1985, on the eve of the debate over the first version of the lottery provision legal immigration from Ireland numbered 1,397.[8]

However, to focus on the observable increase in numbers of legal immigrants from Asia and Latin America, and the decline of Irish immigrants and the growing demand for Italian immigration, is to focus on the symptoms of the phenomena and not the root causes. Two particular provisions in the 1965 Act directly caused the drop in Irish and Italian immigration as well as backlogs[9] under the fifth family preference (brothers and sisters of United States citizens): the labor certification requirement and the lack of a preference system governing Western Hemisphere immigration after the 1965 changes. In finding solutions to these problems that plagued Irish and Italian immigration in the late 1960s, several enterprising Congressmen devised initial approaches to benefiting their ethnic constituents that lay the groundwork for what is the diversity lottery today.

The Irish and Labor Certification

The connection between the labor certification requirement which was created by the 1965 Act and the rise of the diversity visa movement is a little known fact.[10] Prior to the labor certification requirement created by the 1965 Act, the labor certification was a negative requirement; an alien was ineligible for immigration only if the Secretary of Labor determined that qualified United States workers were available for the job or the alien's employment would adversely affect American workers in the same line of employment. Under this system, it was rare for the Secretary of Labor to take this type of action and the labor certification "requirement" was not really any kind of screen on immigration at all. After the passage of the 1965 Act that amended section 212(a)(14) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the labor certification requirement (which was a last minute addition to the Act) became an affirmative requirement. An alien could immigrate only if he/she obtained, *prior to the issuance of their visa,* the Secretary of Labor's pre-clearance that they would not adversely affect the job market for United States workers.[11]

The pre-1965 system also had a loose version of the preference system in place before and after 1965. Under this system, there was a "non-preference" category of immigrants to which no percentage was assigned, but who would receive all the unused numbers of the preference categories. For countries with high immigration in comparison to their quota, the non-preference route was foreclosed. For instance, Italy with its pre-1965 annual quota of 5,600 always had more demand for immigration than supply of visas so there were no non-preference numbers left. The case in Ireland however was very different. It was a high quota country with a demand for immigration that was below the supply of visas. Most Irish immigrants utilized this non-preference category to get to the United States. The procedure for non-preference immigrants to get a visa was fairly simple and "pretty much any Irish man or woman who wanted to immigrate could just pick up and do so, with relative ease."[12]

In fact, for most of the Irish, the non-preference route to immigration was the only route available to them. The majority of the Irish who wanted to immigrate had only distant relatives in the United States (cousins, aunts, uncles) and none close enough to petition for them.[13] Those who had no relatives to

petition for them could theoretically obtain a visa by qualifying through one of the employment preferences, but few of the Irish possessed the skills and education to qualify via an employment preference. The last nail in the coffin was that now the new "affirmative" labor certification requirement was in place and the requirement applied fully to non-preference immigrants. The labor certification requirement devastated Irish non-preference immigration. With no close relatives to petition for them, unskilled, semi-skilled, and even some skilled workers had great difficulty qualifying under the employment preferences.[14]

The Department of Labor pre-clearance requirement prevented many Irish intending immigrants from coming to the United States, which led to a drastic decline in admission numbers from 1968 forward. From 1971 forward, Ireland ranked among the highest of the countries that did not use up their annual quotas and among the countries that had a huge gap in the number of immigrants the country was actually sending and the number of visas allotted annually to that country. In his testimony before the House Immigration Subcommittee in 1973, John P. Collins, on behalf of the American Irish National Immigration Committee,[15] testified to that effect when he noted that individuals who were seeking to escape the civil unrest in Ireland were prevented from doing so by the immigration laws:

> These individuals, not yet large in number, have aunts, uncles and cousins in the United States. Lacking sisters and brothers who are U.S. citizens, they cannot qualify for fifth preference visas. Nor can they meet the requirement of the other family related preferences. The stringent application of labor clearance makes it impossible for them to qualify for a nonpreference, third preference, or sixth preference visa. Their only hope is to seek asylum here and obtain status as a refugee.[16]

Collins' also offered anecdotes and documents from the INS in his testimony indicating that the Irish attempts at applying for political asylum were by and large being rejected. One of the letters to his client from the INS that Collins quoted noted that the Irishman was ineligible for asylum because he was not coming from a Communist country. Collins' testimony fits the pattern of United States asylum policy before the 1980 reforms in which asylum policy was an extension of United States cold war foreign policy, where almost any and all applicants for asylum from Communist countries were successful and few nationals from non-Communist countries were successful.

The labor pre-clearance policy created by the 1965 Act prevented many Irish from immigrating through the formerly heavily utilized non-preference category, effectively cutting off the most popular way of legally immigrating to the United States. In an earlier appearance before Congress, Collins also confirmed the direct effect of the labor certification requirement on Irish immigration, "there is no doubt that section 212(a)(14) of the act has caused a decrease in Irish immigration to the United States, as many Irish visa applicants are unskilled or semi-skilled workers, they are unable to qualify."[17]

As a byproduct of their inability to qualify for family, employment, or non-preference immigration, a large number of Irish entered the United States under temporary, nonimmigrant visas and overstayed their visas with the implicit consent of the United States consulate. In his 17 June 1973 testimony before the House Subcommittee on Immigration, Collins was asked what he thought about the large number of Irish "tourists" who were coming to the states. The questioning went as follows:

> Mr. Cline. We understand, Mr. Collins that there are approximately 20,000 visitor visas issued in the Republic of Ireland each year. I wonder whether there is intent to immigrate rather than a temporary visit, if they know they could apply somehow for 234(h) and stay deportation. If so, would many people from the six counties come to Southern Ireland and attempt to obtain visitor visas?
>
> Mr. Collins. That is possible. The fact that there are 20,000 visitors coming to this country from Ireland, I think is one of the problems inherent in the present law. I think, we would be kidding ourselves and this committee be kidding itself, if it believed that all these 20,000 coming here from Ireland were just coming here, in fact, just as visitors.[18]

Collins and the members of Congress were aware of the growing illegal Irish population in the United States and seemed to look the other way. Another source also confirmed that the United States consulate in Ireland was "issuing nonimmigrant visas left and right."[19] The American consulate personnel appeared complicit in creating an undocumented Irish population in the United States. The growth and presence of this illegal Irish population would eventually be another source of pressure for the creation of the diversity lottery.

The Italians and the Fifth Preference Backlog

Italian migration patterns under the changes created by the 1965 Act were quite different from the Irish. The problem plaguing Italian immigration was oversubscribed categories that led to backlogs, especially in the fifth preference (brothers and sisters of United States citizens).[20] Prior to 1965, Italy had an annual quota of 5,600, which was heavily oversubscribed.[21] When the 1965 Act was passed, the people on the waiting list simply got transferred over to the new waiting list. The new system prescribed by the 1965 Act did not actually take full effect until 1968. In the interim, there was a transitional system where the old quotas remained, but unused quota numbers were assigned to a pool that would go toward clearing backlogs. There was "an expectation" that the Italian backlog numbers would go down during the transition period. However, this did not happen and by 1 July 1968, there were still about 100,000 Italians on the fifth preference waiting list.[22]

By 1970, there was a call to "do something for the Italians," the rationale being that the system was not working as intended to reduce backlogs, and that Italian families should not be kept apart. Rev. Joseph Cogo, representing the American Committee on Italian Migration, appeared as a witness to testify about the fifth preference backlog and other immigration

issues relating to the Italians. In 1973, he appeared before the House Subcommittee on Immigration to testify in favor of the preference system (like the one already in place in the Eastern hemisphere) being imposed on the Western Hemisphere. While endorsing many of the changes created by the 1965 Act, Cogo explained why he supported a preference system for the Western Hemisphere.

> We fully support the establishment of a preference system for natives of the Western Hemisphere. The present 18-month backlogs experienced by qualified applicants from the Western Hemisphere are deplorable. Moreover, to treat all applicants subject to the numerical limitation identically without regard to closeness of family ties or job skills inflicts great hardship upon applicants.[23]

Cogo was referring to Italy's backlogs in the fifth preference that existed from 1970 to a portion of 1973 and voicing his support for a preference system that would at least prioritize the clearing of the backlog. Without a preference system, all intending immigrants were granted visa priority dates according to a first come first serve basis, not based on the closeness of ties to relatives in the United States.

Although the rhetoric emphasized the urgent need to "do something for the Italians," the fact was that many Italians eventually lost interest in immigrating to the United States by the early 1970s. The Department of State (DOS) visa office tried to show the distinction between people on the backlog waiting list and those whose turn had been reached but not yet issued a visa. From the visa office's point of view, the application was valid indefinitely, or for as long as the relationship between the United States petitioner and Italian beneficiary existed. The DOS had no idea why people were not responding when they got the call that their priorities date had been reached. Some could have moved without a forwarding address, others could have died, but whatever the case, many of the eligible immigrants who were contacted by the DOS were not responding.[24] One might suspect this drop in interest was due to the improving economic conditions in Italy (and in Europe more generally) and the fact that Italy was an original member of the European Community (later the European Union), thus making it easier for their nationals to travel to other parts of Europe rather than come to the United States.

In any event, the demand for Italian visas dropped considerably and at a 1976 hearing, Congressman Joshua Eilberg (D-PA) expressed gratification that the backlog in the fifth preference for Italy was no longer a problem. He asked Reverend Cogo to explain the reason for the clearance of the backlog. Cogo responded:

> In my opinion, the primary reason for the tremendous fallout under fifth preference is the fact that the American citizen is more anxious to give his counterpart Italian brother or sister a chance to migrate here than the Italian is actually to come. . . . Another great factor for the fallout is the present uncertain situation of the American economy and the poverty of job opportunities.[25]

Cogo too realized that the demand for immigration from Italy was decreasing. While he was a frequent witness at Congressional hearings on immigration to press the Italian cause (appearing nine times before Congress between 1970 and 1989) the reality was that by 1970 many of the Italians had lost interest in coming. Yet, the *idea* of continuing to admit Italian immigrants had taken on a life of its own. When the DOS visa office tried to explain that their letters offering American visas were not being answered, their efforts to explain "fell on deaf ears, and, in fact, simply infuriated many people, both because the explanation was complicated" and because it was a politically unpopular idea that the Italians simply had no interest in coming.[26] So the efforts to "do something for the Italians" continued.

Joining Forces and the Rhetoric of "Reform"

The Irish had the labor certification problem and the Italians, for a while, had the backlog problem. They decided to join forces to increase their political strength and because the two groups' goals were very similar—to amend the Immigration and Nationality Act specifically to benefit nationals from Italy and Ireland. The two groups also faced the same political and public relations problems of justifying the rigging of the system to benefit certain countries, which in fact constituted a return to the national origins principle that the 1965 Act had both wiped out and renounced.

At this point, several policy entrepreneurs[27] stepped in to champion the causes of the Irish and Italians. One of the first was William "Frits" Ryan (D-NY), a member of the House immigration subcommittee, who repeatedly attempted from 1968 to 1973 to introduce bills to benefit the Irish, but without success. H.R. 165 introduced in 1969 is an example of one of Ryan's bills. This bill attempted to place a floor on the level of immigration for each country in the Eastern Hemisphere of which Ireland was a part. The floor would be computed as 75 percent of the average annual number of immigrant visas made available to each country during the 10-year period preceding the 1965 Act. If a country after 1965 did not use up its annual allotment, the difference between that number and the floor would result in extra visas outside of the numerical limit of 20,000 per country and would be exempted from the labor certification requirement.[28] In so doing, Ryan was attempting to address the low usage of Irish visa numbers and deal directly with the source of the problem by eliminating the labor certification requirement that was preventing the majority of the Irish from immigrating.

While Ryan was trying to help the Irish, Peter Rodino (D-NJ) tried to pass bills to benefit the Italians and Irish, first in 1968, again in 1969 and several times after that. Examples of his attempts were H.R. 10618 and H.R. 2118, both introduced in 1968. This bill would be a three-year temporary measure, not a permanent measure like the one Ryan was suggesting. The approach Rodino took was to authorize the utilization of available but unused visa numbers for a three-year period beginning in 1968. These additional visas would also be exempt from the labor certification requirement. H.R. 10618 though intended to aid the Irish and Italians, was neutral in language, and it sought

to confer benefits on any other "disadvantaged countries" who did not use up their annual allotment of visas in 1968. These extra visas would be issued on a first come first serve basis, not by country. Rodino argued that without this legislation, the unused numbers would simply be lost.[29] The Irish interest groups however, favored Ryan's bill citing the temporary nature of Rodino's bill as insufficient to alleviate the Irish problem in the long run.

In the late 1960s and through the 1970s, Ryan, Rodino and Emmanuel Celler (D-NY)[30] wrote bills to benefit the Irish and Italians. These seasoned politicians realized that to argue for additional visas for a group of what could be generally characterized as unskilled, not well educated workers, and with no close family ties to those in the United States, but who wished to immigrate, was not a politically savvy or viable move. Instead they adopted two rhetorical strategies to champion their cause. One was to introduce the concept of "new seed immigrants," an idea that was largely Celler's invention.[31] "New seed immigrants" or "independent immigrants" were young, single immigrants who would be allowed to immigrate under a "new seed" visa category and who would be exempt from labor certification. Using the concept was a clever way to distract from the fact that these immigrants had neither close family ties to the United States nor qualifying job skills, and otherwise did not qualify for immigration. Celler and others argued that a number of seed immigrants should be admitted each year because there was something valuable in someone who simply wanted to come to the United States not because of family relations or work skills, but because of their pioneering spirit and immigrant work ethic.

A related rhetorical strategy was to wax nostalgic about the great contributions to this country by the earliest immigrant groups. For example, in one of his appearances before Congress, Collins catalogued the Irish and their historical contributions in the American Revolution, the Civil War, and of Andrew Jackson, the first American President of partial Irish extraction. Collins added:

> If the handiwork of the Irish were painted green, the average American city would be splashed in all sides with emerald hues. . . . It is safe to say that all the Irish have done for America has never been fully told . . . but despite these facts we now find that the restrictive new immigration law has drastically reduced the issuance of immigration visas to Ireland.[32]

Similarly, Edward J. Sussman, National Secretary of the Steuben Society of America[33] stated:

> We cannot conceive that Congress or the people want a law which would all but "dry up" immigration from all of northern Europe. It is inequitable and unjust to those components of the American people who contributed most generously to the founding and building of the nation.[34]

The rhetoric of "seed immigrants" fused with the "we built this country" rhetoric became the verbal strategy of the Irish and Italian pro-immigration forces.

The champions of the diversity lottery also used a third rhetorical strategy, one of a claim of discrimination against these two groups. This strategy was to present the observable decline in Irish and Italian immigration as *prima facie* evidence that the post-1965 system constituted discrimination (intentional or not) against these two groups, even if the 20,000 per country limit was designed to guard against national origin discrimination. Some of this language of discrimination rose to the level of hyperbole, comparing the present immigration laws to the Chinese Exclusion Acts. Philip O'Rourke, Chairman of the California branch of the American Irish Immigration Committee asserted, "Having corrected such past inequities as the 'Chinese Exclusion Act,' it surely was not the intent of Congress that there be an 'Irish Exclusion Act' contained in the present law."[35] What the language of "new seed," "we built this country" and "discrimination" had in common was simply that the rhetoric was a calculated way to gain support for what was purely pork barrel politics and to mask the reality of a return to a national origins based system which privileged some countries over others in the immigration system.

The rhetorical efforts and other political maneuvering by the pro-Irish and Italian immigration congressmen culminated in a House bill that was passed on 17 March 1973, not coincidentally, on St. Patrick's Day. The bill contained specific provisions to benefit the Irish and Italians. The plan was to take a historical average of the number of visas that adversely affected countries that had been issued prior to 1965, and then to restore those visa numbers to make up for the drop off in numbers in the post-1965 period.[36] However, the bill got no further than the House. Sen. James Eastland (D-MS), then chair of the Senate Judiciary committee, a staunch foe of increased immigration and a supporter of national origins quotas, was not about to let another immigration bill remain active in wake of the results of the 1965 Act. Between 1966 and 1976, Eastland did not hold a single hearing on any immigration bill and any bill that was sent to his committee got bottled up there and died.[37]

The 1980s and the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA)

The issue lay untouched for many years after Ryan's death in 1976 and was not taken up again until the mid 1980s. No bills came to the floor in the 1980s to address the Italian and Irish question because the nation's attention had by then turned to the question of illegal immigration.[38] There was no movement on the Irish/Italian immigration until the swirl of politics involving the passage of IRCA in 1986.

By the mid 1980s, the Italians had thoroughly lost interest in immigrating but the Irish had not due in large part to the sizeable illegal population in the United States seeking legal status and the worsening economic conditions in Ireland. Representative Brian J. Donnelly (D-MA) and others stepped in and took over Frits Ryan's role as champion of

Irish immigration. These new advocates of Irish and Italian immigration adopted such concepts as "new seed immigration," "adversely affected countries," and "discrimination" from the late 1960s and 1970s and worked them into their bills. Donnelly's program called NP-5, sought to amend section 314 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.[39] The Donnelly amendment provided 10,000 visas for nationals of "adversely affected countries." Edward Kennedy (D-MA) filed companion legislation in the Senate. Donnelly and Kennedy's efforts also received an important and timely boost from then Speaker of the House, Tip O'Neal. As Speaker, he had great influence over the House Rules Committee that determines which bills would be allowed to the floor for debate. When Rodino, chair of the Judiciary Committee, went to see O'Neal about scheduling IRCA for floor debate, O'Neal told Rodino that the before the bill came out of committee there had better be something in the bill for the Irish or the bill would never see floor action.[40] Rodino agreed and allowed the Donnelly/Kennedy amendment to remain, O'Neal waived the necessary points of order, and the Donnelly/Kennedy provision became part of the law when IRCA eventually passed. From a timely *quid pro quo* was born the first incarnation of the diversity visa lottery.

Donnelly's NP-5 program benefited persons from "adversely affected countries." A list of "adversely affected countries" would be generated with such a country defined as any country that did not use more than 25 percent of its 20,000 annual allotment of visas. The Department of State was charged with compiling the statistics to determine which countries were the top thirty-six "adversely affected countries." After crunching the numbers, these countries were designated as "adversely affected": Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Bermuda, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, The Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Guadeloupe, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco, the Netherlands, New Caledonia, Norway, Poland, San Marino, Sweden, Switzerland, and Tunisia.[41] Nationals of these predominantly European and African countries would be allowed to submit their names and the first 10,000 applicants who were drawn based on their applications' arrival time in the mail would obtain immigration visas.

The Department of State received a whopping 1.4 million applications for the NP-5 program during a seven-day registration period in January 1987! The NP-5 results showed that, the countries that benefited the most from the program and the respective number of lottery winners were: Ireland (3,112), Canada (2,078), and Great Britain (1,181).[42] The high success rate of the Irish was due to their well-planned and coordinated efforts that involved that country chartering planes and literally depositing the applications in post office boxes on Capitol Hill.[43]

Donnelly, like previous proponents before him argued that there was a great need for such a program because certain countries, especially Ireland, were being "shut out" under the current admission system. Donnelly gave three reasons for introducing the visa lottery. First he noted, "our Nation must reintroduce into the immigrant stream those countries that have been determined to be adversely affected by the reform act of 1965 and face the same barriers with the passage of the 1986 reform bill." Second, he added that the NP-5 program held out the possibility of legal immigration for those who would normally come illegally (or who were presently illegally residing in the United States). Third, Donnelly noted that NP-5 would allow for natives of the adversely affected thirty-six countries to compete in a more "equitable" manner with other nationalities. Donnelly agreed that the goal of the 1965 Act was admirable in ending discrimination against immigrants based on national origins and added that it was "a principle I would not wish to change." However, Donnelly asserted that "the southern and eastern Europeans who are expected to benefit from the 1965 law are now effectively excluded from the immigrant pool on an equal basis with residents of northern and western Europe."[44] In his rhetoric, Donnelly simply drew from and adopted the ideas of Ryan, Celler and Cogo that had been floating around for a while and until then, had not met with legislative success.

After the NP-5 program and during the debate leading up to the Immigration Act of 1990 (IMMACT '90) Donnelly was counseled to add the diversity concept as a political tactic to gain the support of Asian and Latino ethnic groups and employers who were all lobbying for different provisions to be included in IMMACT '90.[45] These groups were not at all fooled by the politically correct language, as evident in their testimonies before Congress.[46] Of course the politics surrounding the entire diversity lottery itself, going back to its origins in the late 1960s, cast serious doubt on the sincerity and commitment of the provisions supporters of true diversity. Perhaps by utilizing the term "diversity" Donnelly and his supporters hoped to tap into the popularity and influence of the multicultural movement that was in vogue in the 1980s. But the use of the terms "diversity," "independent immigrant" and "new seed immigrant" to describe the NP-5 and its progeny, glossed over the real return to national origin considerations represented in these programs.

The Immigration Act of 1990 (Immact '90)

After major legislation concerning illegal immigration was enacted in the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Congress turned its attention to legal immigration. Legal or permanent immigration became an issue for two reasons. First, there was concern over the imbalance between the overwhelming majorities of immigrants admitted on family reunification track as opposed to the number of "independent immigrants." The diversity lottery in the 1990s was partially a response to the claim that Asians and Latinos have a "lock" on the family-based preferences. Others have raised the accusation that the diversity lottery actually had more sinister intentions to carefully calibrate the lottery to minimize Mexican and Asian migration while maximizing the migration of European and African immigrants.[47] I found no evidence that this was the case, although the strange classification of Mexico as a country in South/Central America rather than North America was curious.

Second, there was concern over the backlogs under the family-based immigration petition preference system, specifically the second preference (spouses, and minor children of permanent residents; and also unmarried sons and daughters of lawful permanent residents); and the fifth preference (brothers and sisters of United States citizens). This time, the backlogs were hurting Asian and Latino families and intending immigrants.

Reflecting these concerns, the primary focus on IMMACT '90 was the numerical limits and preference systems that regulate the current permanent legal immigration admission system. IMMACT '90 established a three track preference system for the admission of immigrants: family-sponsored, employment-sponsored, and an independent track. Highlights of IMMACT '90 included an increase in the worldwide cap, an increase in employment-based visas from 54,000 to 140,000, and a *permanent* provision for the diversity lottery.[48]

Many different interest groups in addition to the Irish and Italians organized to affect the outcome of IMMACT '90, including Asians and Latinos. While Asian and Latino interests found the diversity lottery idea repugnant because of its clear return to national origin considerations, potentially the most damaging proposals in IMMACT '90 from these groups' point of view were proposals to cut back on numbers on the second preferences (spouses, children and unmarried sons and daughters of lawful permanent residents) and to eliminate altogether the fifth preference (brothers and sisters of United States citizens). These were and continue to be the admissions preferences most heavily used by Asians and Latinos. The rationale for cutting back on these two categories was to minimize "chain migration." In particular, some Congressmen argued that brothers and sisters and adult children were not nuclear family members and that the system should not allow an immigrant to bring "extended" family members.[49]

It is necessary to understand how important the family preference issues were to Asian and Latino interests and how much they had at stake because the battles over these provisions eventually eclipsed their efforts to defeat the diversity provision, thus allowing the lottery to eventually pass. Asian and Latino interests were victorious in preventing the constriction of the family preferences and the second and fifth preferences remained intact. However, despite their opposition (and others) to the diversity lottery, the provision became a part of IMMACT '90.

Legislative History of the "Diversity Lottery" in Immact '90

The diversity lottery that is in existence today was a relatively obscure provision buried in a huge omnibus immigration bill. The diversity lottery, being neither a family nor employment-based policy, was classified under the independent immigration track. It is precisely because the lottery was neither family nor employment based that made the provision extremely controversial. The fact that such a provision was even under consideration at all was highly unusual given the primary goals of American immigration to reunify families and secondarily to address employment needs of the country. Even during the era of national origins and Chinese exclusion, American immigration policy had always operated on the understanding that this nation purposefully and deliberately selects immigrants based on their family ties to those already in the country and based on the jobs skills they will contribute. But the lottery approach to immigration admissions dispenses with the affirmative selection of immigrants by introducing a random selection process.

In effect, there were two diversity programs. One program was a transitional program that ran in fiscal years 1991 to 1994. This transitional program provided for 40,000 visas for each fiscal year. At this point, the program was changed from a first come first serve basis to a true lottery where applications received would be assigned a number and a computer would randomly draw numbers from the total applications received. As testament to the influence of the bill's architects, during the transitional programs, *40 percent (18,000) of the 40,000 visas for each fiscal year 1992 through 1994 would be reserved for Ireland.* Beginning in fiscal year 1995, 50,000 visas would be allotted each year for the diversity lottery with the top ten countries that have contributed the most immigrants to the United States (after the 1965 reforms), excluded from eligibility. These ineligible countries are China, Taiwan, Colombia, Dominican Republic, India, Jamaica, Korea, Mexico, Philippines, Great Britain, Guyana, and Haiti. The only requirements of lottery applicants was that they have either a high school education or at least two years of work experience in an occupation which requires two years of training or experience. Applicants would be selected randomly by computer and would have to re-register each year if not selected.[50]

In the debate leading up to the passage of IMMACT '90 in 1987, Congressman Donnelly again introduced legislation that sought to make the visa lottery a permanent part of the immigration system since the NP-5 program was to expire after the 1988 fiscal year. Donnelly further justified the need for the permanent lottery system citing the tremendous response to the NP-5 program, especially from natives of "older sources of immigration" such as Canada, Ireland, Italy, and other nations in Europe. In a 1987 Congressional hearing before the subcommittee on Immigration, Donnelly stated:

> The cumulative effect of the policy for the last twenty years has been to discriminate against any of the peoples who have traditionally made up our immigrant stock . . . Today we have an opportunity to correct these imbalances in immigration and open our doors once again to legal immigration slammed shut on those nations that enjoy long historic and family ties with our country.[51]

In the question and answer period following Donnelly's testimony, Chairman Romano Mazzolli (D-NY) probed Donnelly on his motivation for introducing the lottery and asked whether there were many illegals on the Eastern seaboard. Donnelly admitted that the program was intended as a backdoor amnesty program for the Irish when he answered:

> [B]ecause we were unable to extend the amnesty program, they would still have an undocumented illegal status like any other—most especially I think you are indicating the

> young Irish undocumented workers . . . of which I have in my constituency alone over 10,000.[52]

Even if his illegal constituents could not vote, Donnelly as an elected official was in the position to help them in a direct way through creative law making.

On the Senate side, the main supporters of the lottery approach to visa allocation were Senators Edward Kennedy (D-MA) and Daniel P. Moynihan (D-NY); and Senator Alfonse D'Amato (R-NY), all with considerable seniority and influence. In addition, Senator Kennedy was a member of the Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Affairs. Senator Kennedy introduced companion legislation to the House bill to redress the "unforeseen problems" posed by the 1965 Act that inadvertently restricted immigration from "old seed sources of our heritage."[53] Meanwhile, Senator Moynihan argued, "fairness is at issue" and added "we need to help the descendants of our forefathers, to open the doors to opportunity for them also."[54] Senator D'Amato, another supporter of the lottery, charged that the current visa system dominated by Asian and Latin American countries "is an injustice which I believe we should work to correct . . . it is simply not fair to penalize so many countries, and it is not in our self-interest."[55] Again, the same mantras of discrimination, new seed immigration, and nostalgia for the past permeated their rhetoric, divorced from the reality of the pork barrel politics that was going on.

While Donnelly took the initiative in creating the NP-5 program, the move to make it a permanent part of the immigration system required the lottery provision to be passed as part of an overall immigration act. Enter Congressman Bruce Morrison (D-CT) who was then the first term chairman of the Judiciary's Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees and International Law. Morrison has been credited as the author and "prime architect" of IMMACT '90. Although he worked closely with Senators Edward Kennedy and Alan Simpson (R-WY) Morrison reportedly "galled some of his colleagues by his single-handed steering of the legislation." Morrison saw to it that when his bill was being scaled back that the lottery provision remained intact. Opponents of the measure dubbed the lottery provision the "Irish Amnesty Provision."[56]

But this time, the pro-Irish lobby met not opposition in the form of a James Eastland, but in other ethnic interests. Asians and Latinos, through their interest group representatives, vigorously protested against the lottery system arguing that it would represent a backsliding in immigration policy and a reintroduction of discriminatory national origins considerations into immigrant admissions policy. In a statement before the Senate Judiciary Committee, a representative of the Mexican American Legal Defense [and Education] Fund (MALDEF) said:

> If Congress lends its imprimatur to the legislation, it will signal a major reversal of policy in which national origins will once again play a role in determining which persons can be admitted into the United States.[57]

Many other groups joined MALDEF and individuals in their protest against the lottery provision or any point system that would award extra points for English language ability, and award extra points to nationals from "adversely affected countries." *La Raza,* the Asian American Legal Defense Fund, Organization of Chinese Americans, and Japanese American Citizens League were other ethnic lobbies that protested against both the lottery system and a point system that would favor Europeans.

The Asian and Latino interests were not the only groups that objected to the diversity lottery. Other non-Latino and non-Asian groups and individuals found the diversity lottery equally objectionable on principle, even if they did not have a personal stake in the matter. Also posing objections to the lottery were the American Immigration Lawyers Association, Doris Meissner (of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and former INS Commissioner) and Lawrence Fuchs of Brandeis University, a well-known scholar of American immigration. Fuchs asserted that the visa lottery made no sense because it was based on the idea that "nations and countries immigrated, rather than individuals." Reminding the committee of the progress made in the abolition of national origins by the 1965 act he said, "we should seek them as immigrants because they are desirable for their attributes as persons, and not because of their national origins backgrounds."[58] Fuchs underscored a fact that the lottery proponents were trying to conceal, that "the Filipino, Mexican, or Chinese who lacked employment skills or close relatives were in the same predicament as the Irish and Italian"—any bias in the system was not nation specific but specific to the individual circumstances of the intending immigrant.[59] Like many other observers, Fuchs realized that the lottery was an attempt to legalize the illegal Irish population since many of the illegal Irish had missed the eligibility cutoff date for the 1986 amnesty program, a second chance amnesty and a throwback to national origins based immigration.[60]

Despite objections from many sectors, the diversity lottery passed and remains a part of today's immigration system. Several factors contributed to the lottery's legislative success. The first, was the leadership of Morrison who was in a key position of power as the Immigration Subcommittee Chair, and the tireless efforts of Donnelly and the support of other senior members of Congress. The second, was the neutralizing of the opposition in Asian and Latino interests who had their hands full fighting the cutbacks on family preferences. Despite attempts to cut back on the second and fifth preferences, those preferences remained untouched in IMMACT '90. The Asian and Latino communities considered this development a huge victory for them since they had all along viewed the preservation of these preferences as their first priority in the IMMACT '90 debate. When these provisions of the law remained untouched or when their "piece of the pie" was given back they were willing to stomach the passage of the diversity lottery. Finally, the relatively small number of visas (44,000 for the first three years, and 50,000 thereafter) as well as the temporary nature of the pro-Irish bias made the lottery more palatable.

Post Immact '90—Variation on a Theme of Unintended Consequences

After the passage of IMMACT '90, interest in the diversity lottery issue seemed to fade from the political radar screen.[61] There were no further hearings on the subject after 1990 and there were no serious efforts to remove the provision from the immigration law. By 1996, the attention of the policy and immigrant communities had again shifted to much larger issues such as the preservation of alien welfare rights and the fate of criminal aliens as Congress debated and eventually passed the [Illegal] Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), Anti-Terrorism and Death [Effective] Penalty Act (AEDPA), and sweeping welfare reform legislation in the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA). Later, in 2001, the Bush Administration's discussion of the possibility of another amnesty or "regularization" for approximately 3 million illegal immigrants from Mexico (and potentially other groups) took center stage. The amnesty proposal was in turn eclipsed by the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001. These two events relegated the comparatively insignificant 50,000 diversity visas to the back burner for policymakers.

Eventually, the Irish also lost interest in the visa lottery that was created for them. The economic situation in Ireland greatly improved by 1995. The *Financial Times* reported, "Ireland's crippling unemployment problem eased sharply in 1994–95 as the economy created 49,000 new jobs, the biggest annual increase since 1972." The same article also noted that the improved economy in Ireland had slowed the flow of emigration, "The recent economic recovery has also stemmed the flow of net migration, which reached a peak of 43,900 in 1989."[62] Also, because Ireland was admitted to the European Union in 1973, their nationals, like the Italians are now able to travel and work in other parts of Europe which may in turn have further cut down on Irish emigration to the U.S. After the improved economy beginning in 1995, the Irish abandonment of the diversity lottery was clear and the stark statistics tell the story. As late as 1994, the last year of the diversity lottery transition program, a total of 16,344 Irish immigrated via the diversity lottery. But by 1996, the number dropped to 963, by 1997 it was 359 and by 1998 the number was 318![63]

Perhaps one of the strangest footnotes to the diversity lottery odyssey is that the lottery unintentionally came to benefit many more nationalities than its original target beneficiaries. The neutral mathematical formula devised by the Department of State to determine which were the adversely affected countries produced a list that in addition to Italy and Ireland included many African and European countries, and a few Asian countries. Although the largest beneficiaries were the Irish in the NP-5 program and transitional programs, the most recent Immigration and Naturalization statistics from 1996 through 1998 show that the latest beneficiaries of the lottery have been largely the nationals of other European and African nations. More specifically, in fiscal year 1996 nationals from Nigeria, Ghana, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, and Poland were the most successful in the lottery. In fiscal year 1997, the top diversity visa receiving countries were Albania, Poland, Bangladesh, Ethiopia and Nigeria. And in fiscal year 1998 (the most recent and complete set of INS statistics available) the top diversity visa receiving countries were: Albania, Nigeria, Bulgaria, Bangladesh, and Romania.[64] Although the official numbers are not yet available for the 1999 and 2000 lotteries, *This Day,* a Nigerian newspaper in Lagos, reported that Nigerian nationals received approximately 6,000 visas in the fiscal year 2000 visa lottery, a number up from the approximately 4,000 figure in 1999.[65] These numbers place Nigeria as first or second among diversity visa receiving countries in 1999 and 2000. A program that was created by and intended for the Irish and Italians and then abandoned by those two groups has become a permanent part of the immigration system benefitting entirely different groups of individuals.[66]

Conclusion

The story of policy making in general, and American immigration policy in particular, is often marked by unintended consequences that flow from previously implemented policies. The diversity lottery is an example of the efforts of a group of policy entrepreneurs who had the will and the way to mitigate the unintended effects of the 1965 Act that had foreclosed using national origins as a selection criterion. The end result of their efforts led to even more unpredictable outcomes. The unanticipated consequences emanating from the Immigration Act of 1965 begot the diversity lottery which in turn, went on autopilot, and begot an unanticipated group of beneficiaries. Perhaps the biggest irony of the diversity visa lottery is that the lottery, conceived for less than principled purposes, is in fact producing a stream of immigrants from countries that are very different than the ones that currently dominate the immigration system.

Notes

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1. See for example Stephen Legomsky, *Immigration and Refugee Law and Policy,* 2nd ed. (New York, 1997), pp. 204–211, Walter Jacob, "Note: Diversity Visas: Muddled Thinking and Pork Barrel Politics," *Georgetown Immigration Law Journal* (June 1992) and numerous articles in the print media and ethnic media. Jacob attributes the origin of the diversity lottery idea to the recommendations of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy that existed in the mid-1980s.
2. I am very grateful to Cornelius "Dick" Scully for pointing out to me that the roots of the lottery go much further back than the late 1980s.
3. David Reimers, *Still the Golden Door—The Third World Comes to America.* (New York, 1985), pp. 80–81.

4. David Reimers, "An Unintended Reform: The 1965 Immigration Act and Third World Immigration to the United States," *Journal of American Ethnic History,* 3 (Fall 1983): 80, 87, 89.
5. Letter in Q & A form from Norbert A. Schlei, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel to "Fellow Citizens" in response to the public writing in about the immigration act. Also published in the *Congressional Record* of the 89th Congress, 28 April 1965. "Legislative Background Immigration Law 1965" Box 1. Folder "Road to Final Passage" Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, Texas.
6. See also Reimers, "An Unintended Reform." Reimers lays out in detail how the unintended shift in the ethnicity in immigrants came about.
7. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, *Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Services, 1994* (Washington, D.C., 1996), p. 12.
8. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, *Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1994* (Washington, D.C., 1996), pp. 27–28.
9. Due to the implementation of the 20,000 per country limit for immigrant admissions, some countries had developed large backlogs in certain family petition categories because there are more people who wish to immigrate per year than there are available visa numbers. For example, U.S. citizens petitioning for their unmarried brothers and sisters in the Philippines or China must wait 18–20 years before their brothers and sisters will have a current visa priority date that would allow them to enter the U.S. and obtain permanent residence (get a greencard). Some argued that these lengthy backlogs undermine the credibility of the system.
10. Dick Scully explained in detail what this connection was. Cornelius "Dick" Scully, telephone conversation with author, 28 June 2001.
11. Cornelius "Dick" Scully, telephone conversation with the author, 28 June 2001 and email communication to the author, 26 July 2001. Mr. Scully (now retired) was a career civil servant at the Department of State between 1968 and 1997. He was for many years, the Director of the Office of Legislation, Regulations and Advisory Assistance, which was the technical section of the visa office at State. While at his position, Mr. Scully was responsible for writing all the regulatory orders to implement all the various lotteries, including the current one. Given the many years he was at the Department of State's visa section, Mr. Scully is truly the institutional memory of the place.
12. Additionally, the process for immigrating under the non-preference quota was quick. One simply wrote a letter to the consular officer stating their desire to immigrate; the officer would send them a biographical information form to fill out. Upon receipt of the form the officer would check whether there were actual numbers available for the non-preference applicant. If there were, which was always the case in Ireland, the applicant was sent information to prepare for a visa interview. If the interview went smoothly, the visa would be issued on the spot and the applicant could travel to the US. (Scully, email communication to author 26 July 01.)
13. Under U.S. immigration law, only close relatives such as spouses, sons and daughters, and brothers/sisters have petitioning rights—not more distant relatives like cousins, aunts, uncles or grandparents.
14. David Reimers "An Unintended Reform," pp. 73–74 and Scully, telephone interview with author 28 June 2001.
15. This umbrella organization was composed of members of all the major Irish American organizations in the U.S. including the Ancient Order of Hibernians, the Knights of Equity, and the Gaelic Athletic Association.
16. Testimony of John P. Collins, House Subcommittee on Immigration, *Western Hemisphere Immigration Hearing on H.R. 981,* 93rd cong., 1st session, 1973, p. 324.
17. Testimony of John P. Collins. Subcommittee No. I of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, *The Effect of the Act of October 5, 1965, on Immigration From Ireland and Northern Europe,* 91st cong., 1st session, 1969, p. 15.
18. Testimony of John P. Collins, House Subcommittee on Immigration, *Western Hemisphere Immigration Hearings on H.R. 981,* 93rd cong., 1st sess., 1973, p. 323.
19. Arthur "Skip" Endres, phone interview with author, 11 July 2001. Mr. Endres was Chief Counsel to Congressman Peter Rodino (D-NJ) when Rodino was first Chair of the House Immigration Subcommittee and then Chair of the full Judiciary Committee. Rodino and his staff played active leadership roles in the passage of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act and the Immigration Act of 1990.
20. Backlogs result when more persons than 20,000 wish to immigrate each year to a particular country. If the 20,000 slots are already used up that year, the persons must wait on a wait list until the year a slot opens up for them.
21. Dick Scully reports that at one point, there were well over 100,000 registrants on the Italian waiting list for brothers and sisters of U.S. citizens. (Scully, email communication to author 26 July 2001.)
22. Scully, email communication to author, 26 July 2001.
23. Testimony of Rev. Joseph A. Cogo, *Western Hemisphere Immigration,* 1975, p. 313. Reimers notes the Italians were also in favor of the 20,000 per country limit even though it meant an increase in backlogs because the general feeling at the time was that no country should dominate the immigration system and a set per country limit would be the fairest way to ensure that goal. (Reimers, "An Unintended Reform," p. 74.)
24. Scully, email communication to author, 26 July 2001. Scully adds that in the late 1960s the U.S. government took the extraordinary step of instructing the Italian postal service to find the persons whom the visa approval letters had been sent to and get them into the immigration process.
25. Testimony of Rev. Joseph A. Cogo, House Immigration Subcommittee Hearing on H.R. 981, *Western Hemisphere Immigration,* 1973, p. 320.
26. Scully, email communication to author, 26 July 2001.
27. In the political science literature, policy entrepreneurs are described as "advocates who are willing to invest their resources—time, energy, reputation, and money—to promote a position in return for anticipated future gain in the form of material, purposive or solidary benefits." Kingdon further articulates three common qualities of such entrepreneurs. They have some claim to a hearing as a representative of a group or an "authoritative decision-making position; they are known for their political connections and negotiating skills, and they are persistent and tenacious." John Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies,* (New York, 1995), pp. 179–181. One will see that Kingdon's description of policy entrepreneurs quite aptly describes the Members of Congress who negotiated previous and present versions of the diversity lottery.

28. Opening statement of Michael Feighan, Hearings of the U.S. House, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee No. 1, *The Effect of the Act of October 3, 1965 on the Immigration from Ireland and Northern Europe,* 91st cong., 1st sess., 1969, pp. 2–3.
29. Opening remarks of Peter Rodino. *The Effect of the Act of October 3, 1965 on the Immigration from Ireland and Northern Europe,* 1969, pp. 4–5, 8–9.
30. Celler, and later Rodino, served first as chair of the House Immigration Subcommittee then the House Judiciary committee.
31. Endres, telephone interview with author, 11 July 2001.
32. Testimony of John P. Collins, Hearings of the U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee, *The Effect of the Act of October 3, 1965 on the Immigration from Ireland and Northern Europe,* 1969, pp. 11–12.
33. The society is a national organization of American citizens wholly or in part of Germanic origin and who have been actively interested in U.S. immigration issues.
34. Testimony of Edward J. Sussman, U.S. House, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Immigration, *The Effect of the Act of October 3, 1965 on the Immigration from Ireland and Northern Europe.* 1969, pp. 26–27.
35. Statement of Philip O'Rourke, U.S. House, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee No. 1, *The Effect of the Act of October 3, 1965 on the Immigration from Ireland and Northern Europe,* 1969, p. 30.
36. Endres, phone interview with author, 11 July 2001.
37. Scully, email communication to author, 26 July 2001. Scully speculated that Eastland bottled up all immigration legislation because he felt he would lose control of an immigration bill if it went to the floor.
38. Endres, telephone interview with author, 11 July 2001.
39. House Report 100-1038, *Immigration Amendments of 1988,* Document submitted by Peter Rodino to accompany H.R. 5115.
40. Endres, telephone interview with author, 11 July 2001. Mr. Endres, as chief counsel of the Judiciary, was present at the meeting between O'Neal and Rodino when this deal transpired.
41. 52 *Federal Register* 1,449 (1987).
42. U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, *Diversity Lottery Program, 1987: Hearings on S. 161,* 101st cong., 1st sess., 1987, p. 4.
43. Endres, telephone interview with author, 11 July 2001. It was clear that the Irish government took a very active interest in this lottery given the depressing economic situation in that country. Endres reports that during the events leading up to the passage of IRCA, he asked Donnelly whether the Irish are interested in the provision and why Rodino had not heard from the Irish consulate. Rodino received a call the following day from the Irish Prime Minister.
44. Testimony of Brian J. Donnelly, U.S. House, Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law, 100th cong., 2nd sess., 1988, p. 7.
45. Walter Jacob, "Note: Diversity Visas," p. 313. Jacob writes that Harris Miller, the chief lobbyist for the Irish Immigration Reform Movement told him that the diversity language was used to gain support from the other interest groups.
46. See the statements of objection to the diversity provision in the testimonies from representatives from the Organization of Chinese Americans, La Raza, Mexican American Legal Defense Fund, and the Japanese American Citizens League among others in U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Immigration, *Hearings on S 161—the Diversity Lottery Program,* 101st cong., 1st sess., 1987.
47. Scully pointed out that no Administration had ever treated Mexico as anything but a North American country. (Scully, telephone interview with author 28 June 2001) The gerrymandering of Mexico into South/Central America seems to lend credence to the charge that the current lottery is a reaction against Latino migration. With Mexico in another hemisphere, the only three countries left in the Northern Hemisphere are the U.S., Canada and the Bahamas. Under the present diversity lottery rules, each hemisphere has a cap and each country has a cap. Moving Mexico to another hemisphere would free up more visas for the remaining countries in North America.
48. Joyce Vialet and Larry Eig, *Immigration Act of 1990* (P.L. 101-649) Congressional Research Service report to Congress, 1990 (no. 90–601), pp. 1–2.
49. Asian and Latino interests strenuously fought the proposals that would cut back on family preferences. Both these groups criticized the proposal's definition of "nuclear family" as Eurocentric and culturally insensitive. Asian interest groups also argued that it was too soon to cut back on these preferences especially when their communities had just recently begun to enjoy the benefits of the liberalized immigration laws provided by the 1965 Act after they had been discriminated for so long under the Asia-Pacific Triangle system.
50. U.S. Department of State, *Visa Bulletin Number* 2a Volume VII, p. 3.
51. Statement of Brian Donnelly, U.S. House, Subcommittee on Immigration, *Hearings on S. 161, Diversity Lottery Program,* 101st cong., 1st sess., 1987, p. 52.
52. Statement of Brian Donnelly, U.S. House, Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the Committee on the Judiciary House of Rep., 100th cong., 2nd sess., 1988, p. 11. The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) in 1986 granted amnesty to illegal aliens who were residing in the country but most of the illegal Irish missed the cut-off date for eligibility because the economic problems in Ireland that precipitated a large number of illegals coming to the U.S. occurred *after* the amnesty cut-off date. Since IRCA was intended as a one-time only amnesty opportunity that could not be repeated, the diversity lottery was designed as a "back door amnesty" for the Irish illegals.
53. Statement of Edward Kennedy, U.S. House, Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the Committee on the Judiciary, 100th cong., 2nd sess., 1988, p. 2.
54. Statement of Patrick Moynihan, U.S. House, Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the Committee on the Judiciary, 100th cong., 2nd sess., 1988, pp. 37, 40.
55. Statement of Alfonse D'Amato, U.S. House, Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the Committee on the Judiciary. 100th cong., 2nd sess., 1988, p. 41.
56. Dick Kirschten, "Opening the Door," *National Journal* (1990): 2003.
57. Statement of MALDEF. U.S. House, Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the Committee on the Judiciary, 100th cong., 2nd sess., 1988, p. 519.
58. Testimony of Lawrence Fuchs, U.S. House, Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the Committee on the Judiciary, 100th cong., 2nd sess., 1988, p. 180.

59. I have elsewhere written about Fuchs' objection to the provision and the logic inconsistencies of the lottery defenders' arguments. Anna O. Law, "Race, Ethnicity and National Origins in Public Policy—When Should it Matter?" *Georgetown Immigration Law Journal* (1986) vol. 10: 71, 75.
60. Lawrence Fuchs, telephone interview with the author, 13 March 1998. Fuchs added that there was no illusion on the part of the sponsors of the bill that the lottery provision could be justified on principle. All the rhetoric about diversity was "just window dressing."
61. Scully's view was that by the time IMMACT '90 passed, the interest groups and the policy community were more generally worn out over the battle and gave up on attacking the lottery. He notes that even the Federation for American Immigration Reform, a restrictionist group, has stopped attacking the diversity lottery (email communication with author 19 July 2001). Between 1996 and the present, the *New York Times* ran fewer than a dozen stories on the diversity lottery. Most of these stories were about the effects of the lottery on individuals' lives or on neighborhoods and communities. However, I suspect the lottery received far more coverage in the ethnic media, especially in countries that were meeting with high rates of success with the lottery.
62. John Murray Brown, "Irish economic recovery brings biggest rise in jobs since 1972," *Financial Times* (London, 25 October 1995).
63. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, *Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1994* (Washington, D.C.,) (1994, p. 44, 1996, p. 46, 1997, p. 44, 1998, p. 32) INS Statistical Yearbooks for 1999–2000 are not yet available.
64. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, *Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1994* (Washington, D.C.,) (1996, pp. 46–47, 1997, p. 44–45 1998, 32–33) INS Statistical Yearbooks for 1999–2000 are not yet available.
65. Chidi Uzor, "US Embassy Issues 3000 Diversity Visas to Nigerians," *This Day,* (Lagos, Nigeria) 5 April 2001.
66. It is unclear whether there is a constituency supporting the diversity lottery today and who that constituency may be because there has been no serious policy discussion about the lottery since 1990. However, one might suspect that new interest groups (other than the Irish and Italian ones) would emerge to defend the lottery if the provision was under attack.

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Article 20

Immigration and America's Future

A New Chapter

Report of the Independent Task Force on Immigration and America's Future

DORIS MEISSNER ET AL.

The Benefits of Immigration

Immigration offers the United States unique benefits that will allow us to be a more productive, competitive, and successful nation in the 21st century.

Productivity

Immigration augments and complements the workforce exceptionally well because the US economy is creating more jobs than can be filled by native-born workers. In the 1990s, half of the growth in the US labor force came from new immigrants.[1] That share is projected to grow. This demand for foreign labor is evident across the skills spectrum. At a time when Japan and most European countries are less competitive and face mounting social welfare costs because of declining working-age populations, infusions of young, taxpaying immigrants are helping the United States overcome worker, skills, and entitlement program shortfalls. Without immigration, we cannot sustain the growth and prosperity to which we have become accustomed.

Competitiveness

Immigrants are helping the United States maintain a competitive edge. In the critical fields of science and engineering, immigrants play a pivotal role. To take just one example, in 2004, 50 percent of students enrolled in engineering graduate programs in the US higher education system were foreign-born.[2] At a time when China and India are increasingly competitive, the United States must continue to attract the world's best and brightest—or risk losing an important resource to other nations.

Immigration also propels entrepreneurship. Immigrants are more likely to be self-employed than native-born Americans.[3] The number of Hispanic-owned businesses has grown at three times the national average.[4] And one quarter of Silicon Valley start-ups were established at least in part by immigrants, including Intel, Sun Microsystems, and Google.[5] These and countless immigrant-owned businesses across the country are creating jobs, revitalizing neighborhoods, and helping the US economy adapt to changing global market conditions.

Dynamism

Immigration remains a driving force behind the dynamism of American society. The impact of immigration on daily life is evident in the food we eat, the entertainment we watch, the houses of worship we attend, and the sports we play. Prominent immigrants have won Nobel Prizes, built soaring skyscrapers, written or performed masterpieces, and served at the highest levels of government. Classic indicators such as employment, education, military service, intermarriage, and home ownership show that today's immigrants are successfully integrating into American society.

In an age of globalization, America's openness to immigrants is also an important foreign policy asset. Those who live, study, or emigrate to the United States learn first-hand about our values of freedom, opportunity, individual rights, and the rule of law. And in a global economy that increasingly demands global interaction, exposure to a diversity of people and experiences is a unique resource for Americans.

The Challenges of Immigration

Despite these substantial benefits, America's immigration system has been overwhelmed by myriad challenges. Many of these challenges are tied to illegal immigration and the resulting population of unauthorized immigrants in the United States.

Illegal Immigration

The most dramatic manifestation of the breakdown of America's immigration system is that a large and growing share of today's immigration is illegal. According to recent estimates, 11.5 to

12 million unauthorized immigrants are in the United States—nearly one-third of the country's foreign-born population.[6] For a nation of immigrants that is also a nation of laws, this level of illegal immigration is unacceptable. Illegal immigration generates insecurity about America's borders, carries economic and fiscal costs, and risks the creation of an isolated underclass. The prevalence of illegal immigration also generates disturbing social and cultural tensions, and causes a decline in Americans' support for immigration more generally.

Temporary Immigration

Along with illegal immigration, nonimmigrant (temporary) immigration programs constitute the primary ways immigration has adapted to new conditions and labor market demands. Temporary immigration programs have increasingly been used as a step to permanent immigration and are filling standing, ongoing labor market needs. The result is that illegal immigration is meeting the nation's low-skill demands, and temporary visa programs are meeting the demands for mostly high-skilled immigration.

An Over-Burdened System

Illegal immigration occurs within the bounds of a broader immigration system that is over-burdened and no longer serves the nation's needs. The primary engines of immigration—family unification and employment—generate far more demand than the immigration system can meet. Individuals who apply to immigrate legally—on a temporary or permanent basis—face overly complex procedures, unreasonable delays, and inflexible statutory ceilings that dictate levels of immigration to the United States.

Native-Born Workforce

Immigration—particularly illegal immigration—also presents challenges to the native-born workforce. While the net economic impact of immigration is beneficial to the US economy, today's immigration also has some troubling consequences. Illegal immigration can have negative impacts on wages at the bottom end of the pay scale. And immigrant labor, particularly of unauthorized immigrants, can lead to declining labor standards that undercut the position of native-born workers.

Integration

The sheer number of today's immigrants—and the fact that many are unauthorized—presents substantial integration challenges. Many of the costs and responsibilities associated with integration are borne by states and localities. Large numbers of immigrants are now settling in states such as Georgia, North Carolina, and Nebraska that do not have recent traditions of immigrant integration. Unauthorized immigrants by definition cannot be integrated into American society, complicating integration further. And at the local level, communities are often faced with demands for services from unauthorized immigrants, particularly for education and health care, which are costly and engender resentment.

Security

Despite more than a decade of unprecedented growth in resources for border security, the number of unauthorized immigrants residing in the United States has led to a sense that the government lacks the ability and will to secure its borders. Many border communities feel besieged, and citizens across the country are calling increasingly for strengthened border enforcement. Within the country, rules against employers hiring unauthorized immigrants are easily broken, manipulated, or simply under-enforced.

While the overwhelming majority of migrants entering the United States do not represent a threat to national security, the borders must be the front line for security. In a post-9/11 environment, Americans are particularly concerned about terrorists crossing a permeable border or fraudulently gaining admittance to the country at legal ports of entry. In addition, increases in smuggling, dangerous border crossing patterns that have led to tragic migrant deaths, and vigilantism all pose risks to migrants and border communities alike.

An Immigration Policy for the 21st Century

The Independent Task Force on Immigration and America's Future believes America has entered a new era of immigration, and thus needs a new framework for immigration policy. Our recommendations integrate economic, security, and social concerns. We make proposals that are comprehensive, and governed by rules that are simplified, fair, practical, and enforceable. Above all, we have sought to build for the future upon a firm foundation of America's values and traditions of successful immigration.

Attracting the Immigrants the United States Wants and Needs

The Task Force recommends the simplification and fundamental redesign of the nation's immigration system to accomplish timely family unification and to attract the immigrant workers required for the United States to compete in a new economy.

A Redesigned System

Immigration should take place through three new streams: temporary, provisional, and permanent. Temporary visas would be issued for short-term stays and work assignments, such as seasonal employment. Provisional visas would allow employers to recruit foreign-born workers for permanent jobs and possible future immigration after a testing period of several years. A combination of such temporary and provisional visas, based on the nature of the job, is preferable to a bracero-like guest-worker program, which ties workers to individual employers and

provides no opportunity for permanent residence. Finally, permanent immigration would be available both to those who apply directly, and those who "graduate" from provisional status.

The proposed system would initially set annual immigration levels at about 1.5 million, approximately 300,000 less than the actual annual number of immigrants—legal and illegal—being absorbed into the labor market and the country today. The system would simplify many visa categories and procedures, so that US immigration is better able to meet family unification and labor market goals. Special visa categories would be created, such as "strategic growth visas" for individuals in strategically important disciplines.

Standing Commission

An independent, federal agency called the Standing Commission on Immigration and Labor Markets should be created. The Standing Commission would make recommendations to Congress every two years for adjusting immigration levels. Its recommendations would be based on analyses of labor market needs, unemployment patterns, and changing economic and demographic trends. In adjusting immigration levels to be flexible to changing market conditions and ongoing review, the Standing Commission would provide an important tool for policymaking, much as the Federal Reserve does for monetary policy.

Executive Branch

To bolster the government's capacity to implement immigration policy, the president should: 1) name a White House coordinator for immigration policy; 2) issue an executive order establishing an interagency cabinet committee for immigration policy; and 3) strengthen the capacity of executive branch agencies to implement major new immigration mandates.

Enforcing the Rules

People cross the border illegally or overstay their visas because of the availability of jobs in the United States and the absence of legal immigration opportunities. Any strategy to reduce illegal immigration must therefore increase the numbers of workers admitted legally, and then effectively and credibly punish employers who continue to hire unauthorized workers. The new bargain must be that with increased employment-based immigration, employers be given the tools to reliably hire only authorized workers, and be held to high standards of compliance with immigration and other labor standards laws.

Employer Enforcement

Mandatory employer verification and workplace enforcement should be at the center of more effective immigration enforcement reforms. Without them, other reforms—including border enforcement—cannot succeed. Electronic verification is a major undertaking that relies on upgrading several massive federal databases. Government agencies must be given sufficient, sustained resources and support to upgrade databases and establish privacy and anti-discrimination safeguards. To assist in the process, the Department of Homeland Security should create a Workplace Enforcement Advisory Board to help build support for new employer enforcement policies, and monitor the progress of new measures.

Secure Documents

A secure Social Security card is necessary to combat fraud, enable individuals to establish their eligibility to work, and allow employers to easily verify the documents presented by legally authorized workers—US citizens and non-citizens alike. A secure, biometric Social Security card should be developed to replace existing non-secure cards. Along with "green" cards and immigration work authorization cards—which are already secure, biometric documents—the three cards should eventually be the only documents used to verify work eligibility.

Border Enforcement

Border enforcement must accomplish a number of intertwined goals: restricting the illegal entry of people and goods; regulating the flows of people and goods that the United States wishes to admit; protecting against terrorism and other national security threats; and protecting against criminality, violence, and other threats to the quality of life.

- *Smart borders.* To accomplish these goals, implementation of "smart border" measures that combine personnel, equipment, and technology should be accelerated. The administration should submit an annual report to Congress and the American people that establishes measures of effectiveness for border enforcement and reports progress in meeting them. Three particular areas that need to be closely monitored are Border Patrol staffing and support, the effectiveness of technology, and civil rights protections of migrants and border community residents. Border enforcement efforts have received substantial resources in recent years with uncertain results. In implementing border enforcement policies, Congress and the public need better information to assess the effectiveness of those investments.
- *Ports of entry.* Immigration enforcement in other areas of border security should continue to be strengthened, especially legal ports of entry and overseas visa issuance. As southwest border enforcement increases, incentives for individuals to use legal ports of entry to gain admittance to the United States will continue to grow. Legal immigration admissions procedures must not become "weak links" in border protection. Sustained attention to document security and vigilance in the issuance of overseas visas will continue to be of key importance. Meanwhile, security must be balanced with efficiency, as facilitating legitimate trade and travel are essential to economic prosperity and US engagement around the world.
- *Counter-terrorism.* Terrorist travel and transportation tactics should be aggressively targeted with the same depth and urgency as terrorist communications and finance. International terrorists depend upon mobility. Every time a terrorist crosses an international border,

he must make contact with an enforcement official. This represents a significant vulnerability for terrorists, and a vital opportunity for counter-terrorism officials. The tracking and disruption of terrorist travel demands higher priority and resources. Border officials must have ready access to information, such as real-time intelligence and law enforcement watch-lists, to enable them to promptly identify terrorism suspects.

Labor Market Protections

A re-designed immigration system must not diminish employment opportunities or wages of native-born US workers. Furthermore, increased levels of immigration must not be accompanied by declining labor standards—for US workers or for foreign-born workers.

- *Labor certification.* The existing case-by-case labor certification system should be replaced with a system that provides for pre-certified employers, designates shortage occupations for blanket certifications, and uses a streamlined individual certification process for non-shortage occupations. Pre-certifications would require employers to file sworn attestations that no qualified US workers are available to do the job, that no striking workers are being replaced, and that prevailing wages will be paid.
- *Worker flexibility.* Temporary and provisional workers should have the right to change employers after an initial period without jeopardizing their immigration status, and to exercise labor rights comparable to those of similarly employed US workers.

Immigrant Integration

US immigration policies are specified in great detail in US laws, but integration policies are skeletal, ad hoc, and underfunded. Immigrant integration is an essential dimension of successful immigration, especially in a period of large-scale immigration. Currently, there is no focal point for leadership in the federal government to promote immigrant integration. Individual, family, and state and local efforts accomplish a great deal, but they could be better leveraged to achieve important national goals.

Office of Immigrant Integration

A National Office on Immigrant Integration should be created to provide leadership, visibility, and a focal point at the federal level for integration policy. The office would establish goals for immigrant integration, and measure the degree to which these goals are met. The office would assess and coordinate federal policies and agencies related to integration, and serve as an intermediary with state and local governments. As a principal priority, the office should examine the supply of and demand for English-language instruction among limited English-proficient groups, and provide leadership and expertise for public and private sector initiatives and resources to meet that demand.

The Unauthorized Population

An earned path to permanent legal status is the most urgent immigrant integration need at this time and should be provided for unauthorized immigrants currently in the United States. The requirements for earning legal status should be the same for all eligible applicants. A legalization process should be simple, with an eligibility date that is as recent as possible. The process should include registration for work eligibility in the United States, accompanied by a background security check, English-language requirements, and payment of a substantial fine for illegally entering the United States. Earned legal status should occur within the context of broad, comprehensive immigration reform.

The Region

Illegal migration is a regional issue. Nearly 80 percent of the unauthorized population in the United States is from Latin America, primarily from Mexico and Central America. The flow of remittance earnings from migrants in the United States to families and communities in their home countries has reached record amounts. The United States must engage Mexico and Canada in longer-term initiatives that result in viable economies and higher standards of living throughout the region.

Conclusion

America's ability to effectively manage and take advantage of our current period of large-scale immigration constitutes a new chapter in the nation's immigration experiences that will play a large part in shaping our nation in the 21st century. Will we be able to compete effectively? Will we be secure? Will we maintain our tradition of openness? The Task Force strongly believes that the United States can answer each of these questions in the affirmative, but only if we adopt a simplified, comprehensive, and new approach to immigration that addresses the American people's sense of crisis about illegal immigration, as well as the opportunities that immigration provides for the United States in a new era.

Notes

1. Andrew Sum, Neeta Fog, Paul Harrington, et al., "Immigrant Workers and the Great American Job Machine: The Contributions of New Foreign Immigrants to National and Regional Labor Force Growth in the 1990s" (Boston, MA: Northeastern University Center for Labor Market Studies, August 2002), 16–17.
2. The Council of Graduate Schools found that 50 percent of students enrolled in graduate degree programs in engineering were foreign-born temporary US residents, while 41 percent of students enrolled in graduate degree programs in the physical sciences were foreign-born temporary residents. Heath A. Brown, "Graduate Enrollment and Degrees: 1986 to 2004" (Washington, DC: Council of Graduate Schools, Office of Research and Information Services, 2004).
3. About 10.4 percent of foreign-born workers are self-employed, compared to 9.4 percent of native workers. Jeanne Batalova

and David Dixon, "Foreign-Born Self-Employed in the United States," *Migration Information Source* April 1, 2005, http://www.migrationinformation.org/USFocus/display.cfm?ID=301.

4. US Census Bureau, "Growth of Hispanic-Owned Businesses Triples the National Average," Press Release (Washington, DC: US Census Bureau, March 21, 2006), http://www.census.gov/PressRelease/www/releases/archives/business_ownership/006577.html.
5. A study by the University of California, San Diego, found that one-quarter of Silicon Valley start-ups were established by Chinese and Indian immigrants during the 1990s. See AnnaLee Saxenian, "Silicon Valley's New Immigrant Entrepreneurs" (University of California, San Diego, The Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, May 2000).
6. Passel, "The Size and Characteristics of the Unauthorized" (see n. 1).

Article 21

More Muslims Are Coming to U.S. after a Decline in Wake of 9/11

ANDREA ELLIOTT

America's newest Muslims arrive in the afternoon crunch at John F. Kennedy International Airport. Their planes land from Dubai, Casablanca and Karachi. They stand in line, clasping documents. They emerge, sometimes hours later, steering their carts toward a flock of relatives, a stream of cabs, a new life.

This was the path for Nur Fatima, a Pakistani woman who moved to Brooklyn six months ago and promptly shed her hijab. Through the same doors walked Nora Elhainy, a Moroccan who sells electronics in Queens, and Ahmed Youssef, an Egyptian who settled in Jersey City, where he gives the call to prayer at a palatial mosque.

"I got freedom in this country," said Ms. Fatima, 25. "Freedom of everything. Freedom of thought."

The events of Sept. 11 transformed life for Muslims in the United States, and the flow of immigrants from countries like Egypt, Pakistan and Morocco thinned sharply.

But five years later, as the United States wrestles with questions of terrorism, civil liberties and immigration control, Muslims appear to be moving here again in surprising numbers, according to statistics collected by the Department of Homeland Security and the Census Bureau.

Immigrants from predominantly Muslim countries in the Middle East, North Africa and Asia are planting new roots in states from Virginia to Texas to California.

In 2005, more people from Muslim countries became legal permanent United States residents—nearly 96,000—than in any year in the previous two decades.

More than 40,000 of them were admitted last year, the highest annual number since the terrorist attacks, according to data on 22 countries provided by the Department of Homeland Security.

Many have made the journey unbowed by tales of immigrant hardship, and despite their own opposition to American policy in the Middle East. They come seeking the same promise that has drawn foreigners to the United States for many decades, according to a range of experts and immigrants: economic opportunity and political freedom.

Those lures, both powerful and familiar, have been enough to conquer fears that America is an inhospitable place for Muslims.

"America has always been the promised land for Muslims and non-Muslims," said Behzad Yaghmaian, an Iranian exile and author of "Embracing the Infidel: Stories of Muslim Migrants on the Journey West." "Despite Muslims' opposition to America's foreign policy, they still come here because the United States offers what they're missing at home."

For Ms. Fatima, it was the freedom to dress as she chose and work as a security guard. For Mr. Youssef, it was the chance to earn a master's degree.

He came in spite of the deep misgivings that he and many other Egyptians have about the war in Iraq and the Bush administration. In America, he said, one needs to distinguish between the government and the people.

"Who am I dealing with, Bush or the American public?" he said. "Am I dealing with my future in Egypt or my future here?"

Muslims have been settling in the United States in significant numbers since the mid-1960's, after immigration quotas that favored Eastern Europeans were lifted. Spacious mosques opened in Chicago, Los Angeles and New York as a new, highly educated Muslim population took hold.

Over the next three decades, the story of Muslim migration to the United States was marked by growth and prosperity. A larger percentage of immigrants from Muslim countries have graduate degrees than other American residents, and their average salary is about 20 percent higher, according to census data.

But Sept. 11 altered the course of Muslim life in America. Mosques were vandalized. Hate crimes rose. Deportation proceedings began against thousands of men.

Some Muslims changed their names to avoid job discrimination, making Mohammed "Moe," and Osama "Sam." Scores of families left for Canada.

Yet this period also produced something strikingly positive, in the eyes of many Muslims: they began to mobilize politically and socially. Across the country, grass-roots groups expanded to educate Muslims on civil rights, register them to vote and lobby against new federal policies such as the Patriot Act.

"There was the option of becoming introverted or extroverted," said Agha Saeed, national chairman of the American Muslim Task Force on Civil Rights and Elections, an umbrella organization in Newark, Calif. "We became extroverted."

In some ways, new Muslim immigrants may be better off in the post-9/11 America they encounter today, say Muslim leaders: Islamic centers are more organized, and resources like English instruction and free legal help are more accessible.

But outside these newly organized mosques, life remains strained for many Muslims. To avoid taunts, women are often warned not to wear head scarves in public, as was Rubab Razvi, 21, a Pakistani who arrived in Brooklyn nine months ago. (She ignored the advice, even though people stare at her on the bus, she said.) Muslims continue to endure long waits at airports, where they are often tagged for questioning.

To some longtime immigrants, the life embraced by newcomers will never compare to the peaceful era that came before.

"They haven't seen the America pre-9/11," said Khwaja Mizan Hassan, 42, who left Bangladesh 30 years ago. He rose to become the president of Jamaica Muslim Center, a mosque in Queens, and has a comfortable job with the New York City Department of Probation.

But after Sept. 11, he was stopped at Kennedy Airport because his name matched one on a watch list.

A Drop, Then a Surge

Up to six million Muslims live in the United States, by some estimates. While the Census Bureau and the Department of Homeland Security do not track religion, both provide statistics on immigrants from predominantly Muslim countries. It is presumed that many of these immigrants are Muslim, but people of other faiths, such as Iraqi Chaldeans and Egyptian Copts, have also come in appreciable numbers.

Immigration from these regions slowed considerably after Sept. 11. Fewer people were issued green cards and nonimmigrant visas. By 2003, the number of immigrants arriving from 22 Muslim countries had declined by more than a third. For students, tourists and other nonimmigrants from these countries, the drop was even more dramatic, with total visits down by nearly half.

The falloff affected immigrants from across the post-9/11 world as America tightened its borders, but it was most pronounced among those moving here from Pakistan, Morocco, Iran and other Muslim nations.

Several factors might explain the drop: more visa applications were rejected due to heightened security procedures, said officials at the State Department and Department of Homeland Security; and fewer people applied for visas.

But starting in 2004, the numbers rebounded. The tally of people coming to live in the United States from Bangladesh, Turkey, Algeria and other Muslim countries rose by 20 percent, according to an analysis of Census Bureau data.

The uptick was also notable among foreigners with nonimmigrant visas. More than 55,000 Indonesians, for instance, were issued those visas last year, compared with roughly 36,000 in 2002.

The rise does not reflect relaxed security measures, but a higher number of visa applications and greater efficiency in processing them, said Chris Bentley, a spokesman for United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, part of Homeland Security.

Like other immigrants, Muslims find their way to the United States in myriad ways: they come as refugees, or as students and tourists. Others arrive with immigrant visas secured by relatives here. A lucky few win the green-card lottery.



Figure 1 Muslims Before and After 9/11. The number of people entering the United States from many predominantly Muslims countries declined sharply immediately after Sept. 11 but has resurged since 2004.

*Includes students, tourists, foreign diplomats and business travelers, who may have been admitted more than once in a given year.

Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

Ahmed Youssef, 29, never thought he would be among the winners. But in 2003, Mr. Youssef, who taught Arabic in Egypt, was one of 50,000 people randomly chosen from 9.5 million applicants around the world.

As he prepared to leave Benha, a city north of Cairo, some friends asked him how he could move to a country that is "killing people in Iraq and Afghanistan," he recalled. But others who had been to the United States encouraged him to go.

He arrived in May 2005, and he found work loading hot dog carts from sunrise to sundown. He shared an apartment in Washington Heights with other Egyptians, but for the first month, he never saw his neighborhood in daylight.

"I joked to my roommates, 'When am I going to see America?' " said Mr. Youssef, a slight man with thinning black hair and an easy smile.

Only three months later, when he began selling hot dogs on Seventh Avenue, did Mr. Youssef discover his new country.

He missed hearing the call to prayer, and thought nothing of unrolling his prayer rug beside his cart until other vendors warned him against it. He could be mistaken for an extremist, they told him.

Eventually, Mr. Youssef found a job as the secretary of the Islamic Center of Jersey City. He plans to apply to a master's program at Columbia University, specializing in Arabic. For now, he lives in a spare room above the mosque. Near his bed, he keeps a daily log of his prayers. If he makes them on time, he writes "Correct" in Arabic. "I am much better off here than selling hot dogs," he said.

Awash in American Flags

Nur Fatima landed in Midwood, Brooklyn, at a propitious time. Had she come three years earlier, she would have seen a neighborhood in crisis.

Hundreds of Pakistani immigrants disappeared after being asked to register with the government. Thirty shops closed along a stretch of Coney Island Avenue known as Little Pakistan. The number of new Urdu-speaking pupils at the local elementary school, Public School 217, dropped by half in the 2002–3 school year.

But then Little Pakistan got organized. A local businessman, Moe Razvi, converted a former antique store into a community center offering legal advice, computer classes and English instruction. Local Muslim leaders began meeting with federal agents to soothe relations.

The annual Pakistan Independence Day parade is now awash in American flags.

It is a transformation seen in Muslim immigrant communities around the nation.

"They have to prove that they are living here as Muslim Americans rather than living as Pakistanis and Egyptians and other nationalities," said Zahid H. Bukhari, the director of the American Muslim Studies Program at Georgetown University.

Ms. Fatima arrived in Brooklyn from Pakistan in March with an immigrant visa. She began by taking English classes at Mr. Razvi's center, the Council of Peoples Organization.

She has heard stories of the neighborhood's former plight but sees a different picture.

"This is a land of opportunity," Ms. Fatima said. "There is equality for everyone."

Five days after she came to Brooklyn, Ms. Fatima removed her head scarf, which she had been wearing since she was 10. She began to change her thinking, she said: She liked living in a country where people respected the privacy of others and did not interfere with their religious or social choices.

"I came to the United States because I want to improve myself," she said. "This is a second birth for me."

Article 22

A True Believer in Immigrants

"One day, we will gather for celebration. I believe that this takes time."—The Rev. José E. Hoyos

KARIN BRULLIARD
Washington Post Staff Writer

José E. Hoyos stood on a stage in front of the U.S. Capitol this month, calling on lawmakers to do what is "morally correct and just" by welcoming illegal immigrants into society. The Catholic priest had dreamed of seeing an ocean of immigrants stretching from his feet to the Washington Monument. Instead, the crowd before him filled a fraction of one block of grass.

When illegal immigrants demanded amnesty at nationwide rallies in the spring, Washington area organizers turned to Hoyos, director of the Arlington Diocese's Spanish Apostolate, to marshal and inspire protesters. Though unfamiliar to many outside the Hispanic community, his magnetic preaching and frequent appearances in Spanish-language media have earned him near-celebrity status among local Latinos and in El Salvador, a nation to which he has dedicated much of his ministry.

But on this September afternoon, it was clear that not even Hoyos could rouse the masses.

"One day, we will gather for celebration," said the Colombia-born Hoyos, 50, taking a break in the shade after his speech, his hazel eyes surveying the paltry gathering. "I believe that this takes time."

The passion of spring seems to have fizzled, leaving leaders such as Hoyos to ponder the smoldering remnants of the spark that drove millions of illegal immigrants to the streets just a few months ago. Has the movement that seemed full of powerful promise in April sputtered out, or will it revive after this month's disappointing rally turnouts?

Hoyos—believer in miracles, admirer of fictional idealist Don Quixote—takes a long view, perhaps because a short view never yielded much.

"I'm still looking for answers," he said.

The same week that fewer than 4,000 people turned out for a Sept. 7 rally in Washington, demonstrations in Los Angeles and other cities produced even smaller crowds. Immigration proposals have stalled in Congress, and anti-illegal immigrant backlash is high.

Hoyos said protesters stayed home this month because they had seen no results from earlier demonstrations or because arrests of undocumented workers had made them fearful.

To the priest, who began demonstrating at the Capitol and asking politicians to pardon illegal immigrants in the early 1990s, this year's protests and their youthful organizers injected a shot of energy into an old quest.

Since he first met illegal immigrants while studying in Chicago 20 years ago, Hoyos has believed most are good people who need a break. He sees it like this: Someone knocks on your door in the middle of the night and needs protection. Do you help or close the door?

"I understand they are breaking the law. But what other things can they do?" asked Hoyos, who immigrated legally and became a U.S. citizen in 1995.

Hoyos said his position has elicited frequent e-mails, many from Catholics, telling him he should be ashamed and perhaps arrested. Some within the 67-parish Arlington Diocese grumbled that the flier he made for this month's rally—which called support of illegal immigrants a "moral obligation"—was overly histrionic, he said.

"Who will help the poorest of the poor?" Hoyos responded, referring to the Book of Isaiah. "The poorest of the poor are the immigrants."

The Hoyos Phenomenon

His charisma is legendary within the Hispanic community.

When a D.C. Latino Civil Rights Task Force picked board members in 1993, Hoyos received the most votes, without campaigning. When he was transferred from a

Falls Church parish to Dale City in 2001, congregants in Falls Church collected 3,000 signatures in protest.

In Dale City, legions of Latinos quickly filled the pews, and a Latino home-buying boom nearby became known among some real estate agents as the "Father Hoyos phenomenon."

"When he walks in the room, he's got it," said Paul Kyle, president of a beer and wine distributor and board member of Marcelino Pan y Vino, the nonprofit organization Hoyos founded in 1992 to help sick immigrants pay for lifesaving treatments.

Hoyos greets everyone—from reporters to distraught immigrants who stop by his office—with the warmth of an old friend. He plays pickup soccer. He cracks jokes during sermons. On the eve of the recent rally, he watched "Maid in Manhattan," a Jennifer Lopez movie he enjoyed because it features an Anglo politician who falls for a poor Latina.

Mostly, immigrants adore him because he is a believer—in their goodness, in their futures.

Hoyos's brother Francisco described the reaction he gets from patients at Providence Hospital in Northeast Washington, where he is a critical care physician: "People from Nicaragua, people from Mexico, people from Guatemala—everybody is telling me, 'Oh, you are the brother of Father Hoyos. … He is the one that is working for us. He is the one that is looking out for us.' "

If Hoyos was undeterred at this month's rally, it was partly because many in attendance sought him out.

"We came for him," said Agustin Fuentes, 43, a Woodbridge truck driver who carried a Bible in his backpack.

In Hoyos's vision of immigration reform, the United States would send a mega-Peace Corps to build toilets and encourage investment in poor nations. All illegal immigrants would get green cards. Everyone who wanted to immigrate would be allowed, with the exception of criminals.

If enough critics hear illegal immigrants' personal stories of struggle, Hoyos said, "they will understand."

When he says that, Hoyos is referring to a chapter in his own biography. In 2002, guerrillas with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia kidnapped one of his brothers, a national politician who remains missing. Hoyos keeps a low profile during infrequent visits to Colombia, fearing he might also be targeted.

"So now you understand why I fight for freedom for immigrants," he said. "Every person has his own bad nights and nightmares that we don't know."

Social Butterfly

The eighth of 12 children born to two school principals, Hoyos grew up in a town near Cali, Colombia, surrounded by sugar cane fields. He said he was a fair student, strong athlete and a social butterfly. His dance moves made him a hit at *quinceañeras*. But church did not interest him. He was the only one of his brothers who wasn't an altar boy.

Francisco Hoyos said his brother always had deep concern for the needy and a gift for getting things done. As a teenager, he organized parties, parades and beauty contests, producing donations from businesses whose managers he had befriended.

During a religious mountain retreat when Hoyos was 19, a priest told him he had a calling. A year later, he entered the seminary in Bogota.

In 1989, he came to work for one year in the Arlington Diocese and stayed for three. Five years later, after launching several community groups and serving two churches, he moved to Holy Family Catholic Church in Dale City, becoming the first Latino priest to head a parish in the diocese. He was appointed to direct the Spanish Apostolate last summer.

Early on, Hoyos heard horror stories from Salvadoran parishioners, many of them illegal immigrants displaced by brutal warfare in their country. One family invited him to attend the funeral of a relative killed in El Salvador. There, he said, a group of people begged him for help with their postwar sorrows, treating him "like I was a Messiah."

El Salvador became a mission for Hoyos in a way his homeland could not. He contacted *El Diario de Hoy,* a major San Salvador newspaper, and proposed a column on peace, love and forgiveness. Soon radio and television stations were calling. His writing now appears in two Salvadoran papers and in Washington Hispanic, which publishes 55,000 copies weekly.

"However difficult it is for you, it is important that you smile at life," Hoyos wrote in an April column for *Nuevas Raices,* a 14,000-circulation newspaper in the Shenandoah Valley and central Virginia. He finished, "Before you see a rainbow, it has to rain!"

Hoyos visits El Salvador several times a year to deliver money and supplies, preach in stadiums and confer with President Elias Antonio Saca. His nonprofit organization has funded community centers and a maternity ward. His fellow Colombians tell him that his Spanish has taken on a Salvadoran accent.

Immigration Activism

Hoyos has been the "most active player in the human aspect to immigration," Salvadoran Ambassador Rene A. Leon said.

But when it comes to illegal immigrants, Hoyos acknowledged that victories have been few. He counts

among them subtle attitude shifts toward his ideas by some politicians—such as Rep. Thomas M. Davis III (R-Va.), who backed a strict House immigration proposal but who also recently nominated Hoyos for a Prince of Asturias Concord Award, a Spanish prize given to those who battle poverty and injustice. In a nomination letter, Davis cited Hoyos's quest for immigration reform and his dream of seeing North, South and Central America united into "one America."

Hoyos said another success is temporary protected status for Salvadorans—a program that gives some immigrants from disaster- or war-torn countries a renewable one-year U.S. work and residency permit, which he lobbied for. But even that is only a partial victory: He has also come to see it as a curse that gives immigrants the chance to stay in the United States long enough to set down roots but not to stay for good.

When a procession in front of the Capitol began at this month's rally, Hoyos took a spot in the middle. He waved a small American flag and licked a coconut popsicle.

During a lull in chanting about halfway through the march, Hoyos started one of his own.

"We want justice!" he said loudly in Spanish, prompting a few marchers to join in. Their voices quickly died down.

Hoyos was unfazed. The faces around him, he noted, were young—a good sign, he said, for a growing movement.

"I am *satisfecho*," he said, using the Spanish word for "satisfied" as he walked down Independence Avenue after the march. "Mission accomplished. For now."

Article 23

The Hotel Africa

A growing number of Africans are arriving in the United States in search of a better life. But even as these immigrants learn to negotiate a complex new culture, they cannot forget the beloved and blighted lands that sent them forth, yet call them back.

G. PASCAL ZACHARY

I dread phone calls from Africa.

A sister is having a baby, her fifth, and wants us to send cash before the birth. An aunt calls on Christmas Day, hoping to tap our holiday spirit. Can't we pay for human traffickers to sneak her into the United States? The price is "only" $5,000, which strikes me as suspiciously low. My father-in-law rings just long enough to ask for a return call. Another aunt calls to announce that, tired of waiting for us to send money, she's changed her name from Patience to Joy. She really has. Then there is the distant relative phoning for the first time, asking us to pay his rent, his children's school fees, anything.

These people telephone because my wife, Chizo, is an African living in America. To be precise, Chizo is a Nigerian living in northern California. The telephoners are Nigerians too. They don't know California from the Carolinas, but they are poor, needy, and, by comparison with Chizo, in dire straits. They want her help, and usually help means sending cash. Chizo is a hair braider, working long hours for low pay and earning nothing when there are no heads to braid. Her mother and father live in Nigeria's second-largest city, where they can afford to rent only a small, windowless room with no running water, bathroom, or kitchen. Chizo regularly sends money to her parents, her six siblings, and her favorite aunts. She also supports a daughter in Togo, whom we are preparing to bring to America.

No matter how much money Chizo sends, her African relatives are never satisfied, and she feels that her obligations to them remain unmet. She is haunted by Africa, haunted by requests for money and her great distance from the motherland. From all of 8,000 miles away, she misses Africa, and the ache in her heart is not diminished by her support of family members.

When Chizo came to California three years ago, she joined an estimated one million African immigrants living in the United States, many of whom have come in recent years because of changes in U.S. immigration laws. Before 1980, African immigrants overwhelmingly moved to Europe, in part because its former colonial powers left more doors open. That year, Congress made it easier to enter the United States as a refugee, and in 1990 it created visa "lotteries" for high school graduates from nations historically underrepresented in the United States, such as Ghana and Nigeria. "This lottery," notes Salih Omar Eissa, a child of Sudanese parents who has studied immigration law, "quickly became the primary method by which Africans immigrated" to the United States.

As a result of these changes, the African-born population has boomed. More than half of the sub-Saharan, or black, Africans living in the United States today have arrived since 1990. Hailing from Nigeria, my wife is part of the largest single African contingent. More immigrants—an estimated 150,000—have come to the United States from Nigeria than from any other sub-Saharan country. Newcomers from Ghana rank second, Ethiopians third, Liberians fourth, Somalis and Kenyans fifth and sixth. Though these numbers reflect both legal and illegal immigration, they seem to undercount Africans in the United States. No matter what the actual number is, Africans are a tiny part, a mere 2.8 percent, of the foreign-born population legally in the United States, according to the U.S. Census Bureau.

Yet the significance of these new African immigrants eclipses their relatively small number, for it highlights the enormous changes in American society over the past 40 years while reminding us that for centuries Africans came to this country in chains. "More Africans Enter U.S. Than in Days of Slavery," *The New York Times* headlined a front-page article last year. Because of the central role of slavery in American history and the still-vexing problem of black-white relations, African immigrants are worth watching.

To be sure, generalizing about Africans is tricky. Africa south of the Sahara is highly diverse. The term "African" is a construction open to gross misunderstanding. (George W. Bush, during his first presidential campaign, compared Africa to Mexico, as if both were countries.) Travel within sub-Saharan

Africa is frequently difficult, and people from different parts of the region often do not display any immediate solidarity, racial or otherwise. I was reminded of Africa's great diversity when I attended a private party recently at an Oakland nightclub, not far from where Chizo and I live. The guests were mainly from Cameroon and spoke French. In the same club, in the next room, a group of Ethiopians were also partying. The two groups ate different foods, listened to different music, dressed differently, danced differently—and carried on separately. No wonder. Paris and Moscow are much closer to each other than Lagos and Addis Ababa.

Years abroad haven't diminished Ike Nwadeyi's sense of identity. "You can't put a Nigerian in your pocket," he says.

Despite such differences and a tendency to stick close to their own, African immigrants in the United States have much in common. They tend to be highly educated and to come from relatively privileged backgrounds. More than four in 10 hold university degrees; an astonishing 98 percent reportedly have completed high school. One-third of African women and 38 percent of African men hold professional and managerial jobs. Because of their education and because Africans generally live in the largest American cities, where wages tend to be highest, both sexes earn about 20 percent more than the median pay of all American workers. African immigrants are younger than other immigrants. Only 2.6 percent are over 65, the lowest percentage of any immigrant group; more than 70 percent are between 25 and 54.

I talk with Africans regularly in my frequent visits to Africa and in the United States, and so I meet them in Africa dreaming about coming to America and meet them in America dreaming of returning to or saving their motherland. The principal challenge for recently arrived Africans in America is not succeeding in the United States—they are—but realizing their desire to maintain a dynamic relationship with Africa. Their attachment to the motherland arises at least partly from a belief that the enormous outflow of talent from Africa, however understandable given the hardships of life there, poses a great developmental handicap. "Africans are doing incredible things in the U.S.," says Derrick Ashong, a Ghanaian-born Harvard graduate who lives in New York City and is building an African media company. "Would our countries be underdeveloped if our energies were applied back home?" So long as Africa suffers under the burden of poverty and inequity, war and disease, Ashong's question is both a challenge and a reproach to Africans in America.

Ike Nwadeyi is a stickler for manners. He wants his daughter to greet him each day with the words, "Good morning, sir." When she lived in America with him, she told him, "Hi, Daddy." He angrily replied, "You don't tell me, 'Hi, Daddy.'"

This breakfast banter explains why Nwadeyi's seven-year-old daughter is growing up in Nigeria while he works in Washington, D.C., and obtains his American citizenship. "America will spoil my daughter," he insists. "Children have no manners here. By growing up in Nigeria, she'll know what I mean by respect."

Nwadeyi's daughter lives with his wife, a geologist working for Chevron in oil-rich Nigeria. Her job is too well paying and too interesting for her to abandon. So she stays in Nigeria, while Nwadeyi lives in the United States and drives a taxi. "There's no enjoyment in this country," he says. "Nothing. This country has no life." But working in America affords him the chance to visit Nigeria for long stretches when he wishes. His presence in the United States and his American citizenship give his family an insurance policy against the instability that always threatens Nigeria, but he is typical of the many Africans who leave their young children behind in Africa so they can be raised properly.

Before Nwadeyi came to the United States, he lived in Thessalonica, where he studied business at a Greek university. His many years in Europe and the United States, however, have not diminished his sense of identity. "You can't hide a Nigerian," he says. "We are loud. It is natural. You can't put a Nigerian in your pocket."

Nwadeyi's straddle of two worlds is typical of recent African immigrants. "Africans represent a new type of immigrant," writes Sylviane A. Diouf, a scholar of African migration who is a researcher at the Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture in New York City. "They are transnationals, people who choose to maintain their separateness in the host country and retain tight links to their community of origin." Drawing strength from migration, Diouf observes, "they generally view their American experience as transitory, the most effective way to construct a better future at home for themselves and their relatives."

Of course, Diouf's description of Africans might be applied to many immigrant groups. Filipinos, Koreans, Central Americans, Mexicans, Russians, Chinese, and Indians maintain strong ties to their countries of origin. What sets Africans apart is the undeniable marginalization of their homeland. Sub-Saharan Africa is the only major region of the world that has grown poorer over the past several decades and that has seen a dramatic decline in the job market for highly skilled workers. The development arcs of Mexico, China, India, South Korea, and most other countries exporting people to the United States are traveling in the opposite direction. These countries are increasingly sophisticated, wealthy, and accommodative of the needs of talented people. Indeed, in some parts of India and China and elsewhere, job opportunities are now far better than in the United States.

Only in black Africa, among the world's regions, have conditions deteriorated, and not just for the elite. Because of the plights of their home countries, Africans are forced to create a distinctive relationship with both America and Africa. In short, no other immigrant group carries anything like the baggage that Africans carry—a homeland that is a source of embarrassment but also offers an unparalleled opportunity to give back.

Africans feel that the quickest route to becoming "superempowered" individuals capable of giving back to the motherland is success in the United States. The pull of their homeland

paradoxically drives them to greater heights in America. "They are fast learning how to live the American dream," wrote Joseph Takougang, a professor of African history at the University of Cincinnati, in a recent survey. "They are becoming involved in their communities, starting small businesses, and participating in local politics."

As people of African origin have gained visibility in America in recent years, their sometimes-troubled relations with African Americans have belied Americans' monolithic views of race. Many white Americans as well as African Americans have assumed that African immigrants are natural allies of African Americans, and are surprised when tensions surface.

One figure who has put the spotlight on Africa is Illinois senator Barack Obama, son of a Kenyan. In his 2004 senatorial campaign, he had to establish his "blackness" in the eyes of the African-American electorate because he had been raised by a white mother. Even his Africanness was considered attenuated. In his memoir, *Dreams From My Father: A Story of Race and Inheritance (1995),* Obama symbolically reclaims his Africanness by traveling to Kenya. None of these gymnastics in the establishment of identity makes sense in an African context. In the United States, Obama's carefully constructed identity is critical to his public career.

The friction between African immigrants and African Americans is perhaps starkest in applications of affirmative action policies. Often, hiring preferences work to the advantage of people who have just arrived in the United States. Because many African immigrants are highly educated, they can compete for jobs that might otherwise to go to African Americans. Tensions between the two groups are exacerbated by African insensitivity. "Too many Africans are dismissive of African Americans in a general way," says Victor Mallet, a Ghanaian who works with black small-business owners in Philadelphia. He notes that Africans fear being lumped together with African Americans as second-class citizens. They also harbor some of the same stereotypes of African Americans held by many whites.

To be sure, Africans in America experience racism and outrages, such as the death of Amadou Diallo, an unarmed New York street vendor from Guinea who was shot by police in 1999. Events such as the Diallo killing promote a common understanding of what it means to be black in America by reminding Africans that black people still face sometimes-fatal racial prejudice. Mallet, who grew up in Africa with a white mother and a black father, feels obliged to sympathetically hear out African-American objections to mainstream American society. "More Africans need to look past the appealing notion that America is a meritocracy and that there is equal opportunity for all," says Mallet, who first came to the United States to attend the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in the 1990s. "While Africans are right not to hide behind the excuse of racial bias, they also must comprehend the history of African-American exclusion—and how racial awareness continues to distort American life today."

The core division between Africans and African Americans is rooted in radically different notions of identity, and is therefore unlikely to vanish anytime soon. For Africans, ethnic identification—what was once known as tribe—trumps race. When my wife first came to California, she did not view black people as natural allies, but sought help from West Africans, people reared close to her home turf. She visited braiding shops, looking for casual work and new friends, and joined a shop managed by two Cameroonian women and staffed by braiders from Senegal and Gabon. The braiders became Chizo's best friends and the shop a virtual Africa that helped ease her transition to a new and alien country.

My wife is the only Nigerian in the braiding shop, but she found many nearby, even members of her own ethnic group, the Igbo. A local grocery story, run by an Igbo man, sells her favorite foods from home: *gari* (cassava), dried fish, fresh yams, plantains, and an exotic spice called *ugba.* A community of Igbo Catholics holds a monthly Mass in her native language. In our living room, she hangs a Nigerian flag (and the flags of the United States and Ghana, where she and I first met).

Too great an attachment to one's community of origin can encourage provincial thinking, of course. Chizo's own fellow Igbos are quite clannish, and of the scores I have met in America, not one is married to a non-Igbo, and certainly not a white American. To the Igbos I meet, my wife is somewhat suspect. They question why she would marry, not outside her race, but outside her ethnic group. Possessing pride born partly from their communal suffering during the Biafran war, Igbos have the kind of ethnic solidarity found in Armenian, Jewish, and Kosovar communities.

Africans have no monopoly on ethnic narcissism. More striking, actually, is their openness to wide currents and their willingness to draw on materials not indigenous to Africa. A young African writer, Taiye Tuakli-Wosornu, a Yale graduate living in New York, has coined the term "Afropolitan" to highlight the benefits of blending a cosmopolitan outlook with continuing participation in one's African community. "Perhaps what most typifies the Afropolitan consciousness is this … effort to understand what is ailing Africa alongside the desire to honor what is uniquely wonderful," Tuakli-Wosornu writes.

Economic, social, and technological forces are driving Africans in America toward playing a larger role in their home countries.

The Afropolitans must succeed in America, but in a manner that pushes them toward Africa, not away from it. The emergence of a new generation of African writers, who succeed first in the United States and then gain an audience in Africa, illustrates this pattern. In his short-story collection *The Prophet of Zongo Street* (2005), Mohammed Naseehu Ali, who lives in Brooklyn and has spent 17 years in the United States since arriving at the

age of 18 to attend university, rescues the rich folk stories of his Hausa forebears in Ghana and Nigeria. Ensconced in America, by day he works at the database company Lexis-Nexis, and at night he emerges in Brooklyn as a troubadour of the wisdom of his ancestors. "I have great hope for Africa," he says.

Like a number of African writers, Ali published first in the United States and is preoccupied with the African experience, home and away. Uzodinma Iweala, who last year published a celebrated short novel, *Beasts of No Nation,* also draws on African sources in his tale about child soldiers. Shuttling between D.C. and Lagos, he is now building a literary reputation in Nigeria on the strength of his American success. "You can't ever escape being a Nigerian," he told an interviewer in the United States recently, adding:

> If you try to say, 'No, I am not Nigerian,' people say, 'What are you talking about? I know where your father is from. I know the village. There is no way that you can tell me you are not Nigerian.' In fact, if you don't come back and maintain the ties, people start asking questions. It's not as if when you leave you are looked down upon for leaving your country. Most Nigerians that you speak to here expect to return to Nigeria at some point in time—whether or not that will actually happen is not important. It's the mentality.

In the past, many new immigrants to America said they would maintain tight links to their countries of origin, but over time they—and their children and grandchildren—have not. Fidelity to Africa, so intensely felt by most immigrants, may also fade over time. "Are they [African immigrants] going to melt into the African-American population?" historian Eric Foner asked in an article in *The New York Times* last year. "Most likely yes."

The opposite could well happen. Economic, social, and technological forces are driving Africans in America toward playing a larger role in their home countries in the years ahead. The spread of cell phones in Africa and the rise of Internet telephony in the United States make calling back to Africa—once an expensive and tedious task often requiring many connection attempts—inexpensive and easy. Flights to all parts of sub-Saharan Africa, while not cheap, are more frequent than ever. And private companies operating in Africa are beginning to see the pool of skilled Africans working in the United States as a source of managerial and professional talent. Though Africa's brain drain continues, a small but significant number of people are returning to the continent to take jobs or start businesses.

Demographic forces are at play too. As the first big wave of African immigrants from the 1980s approaches retirement, some look homeward. No statistics are kept on Africans who move back for good. But some members of all immigrant groups do return home and always have, even before the days of easy travel, telephone calls, and money transfers. Roughly half of all Italian immigrants to the United States before World War I returned home permanently. Today, because documentation is essential for crossing borders, legal immigrants must first acquire a green card and then, usually, a U.S. passport. Once in possession of papers, an African who leaves the United States invariably will come back to it, if only to work. As they age, some Africans are retiring to their home countries, funding an African lifestyle with American dollars. So many Ghanaians are repatriating, for instance, that a Texas homebuilder has an operation in Ghana that has constructed hundreds of houses for returnees.

Africans commonly travel back and forth, motivated as much by opportunity and nostalgia as by a kind of survivor's guilt. My wife often expresses nagging doubts about the fairness of living affluently in America while her family lives in deprivation back home. "Why did I escape the poverty of Africa," she asks. "What kind of God chooses paradise for me and misery for my loved ones?"

The cries of Africans left behind are difficult to drown out, and they shape the aspirations of Africans in America. Consider the choices made by my friend Guy Kamgaing, an engineer from Cameroon who arrived in the United States to attend graduate school 11 years ago. Now 35, he has built a successful career in Los Angeles in the burgeoning field of mobile telephony. He holds a green card, is married (to another Cameroonian, an accountant), and has two children. He is living, in short, the American dream, and the corruption and difficulty of doing business in Cameroon make him reluctant to return full time. Yet Kamgaing maintains a big African dream. He is renovating a hotel in the Cameroon port city of Douala that his father, now 72 and still living in the city, built and ran through good times and bad. The 160-room hotel is a relic—sprawling, decrepit, a nuisance, and, until recently, shuttered.

One morning, I met Kamgaing on the roof of the hotel. He has opened a café there, and the waiter served us café au lait and croissants. I could see for miles: the Atlantic Ocean, the forests ringing the city, the crowded streets. It was the rainy season, the air was heavy, and I could feel the two of us moving back in time, to 40 years ago, soon after independence, when Cameroon was wealthy thanks to abundant timber, oil, and agricultural production; it was home to tens of thousands of French people; and the future looked bright. The hotel, called the Beausejour Mirabel, is a means by which Kamgaing can honor his father and revive his country.

The task is difficult. He has renovated the lobby and is repairing rooms floor by floor. Soon he will reopen the long-empty pool on the roof. He knows that the project is a drain, robbing him of capital he might invest in his American life, but he finds it irresistible. "Sometimes when I think about this hotel, it brings tears to my eyes," he says. "I am resurrecting my father's pride and joy." The hotel even boasts wireless Internet access, which not even its poshest competitors in Douala offer. Kamgaing wants to establish a mid-priced hotel, but the odds are against him because the city's few foreign visitors usually want luxury, not nostalgia and value.

The cries of Africans left behind are difficult to drown out, and they shape the aspirations of Africans in America.

Back in northern California recently, Kamgaing visited my house for dinner. While he spooned up my wife's goat meat and pepper soup, he admitted that perhaps he has gone slightly mad in reviving the old hotel. But he's proving that he hasn't forsaken the land of his birth.

My wife has yet to find her Hotel Africa. I was reminded of the delicacy of her search one night not long ago, when she and I dined with a Jewish friend and his father, approaching 85, who was visiting from Long Island. As a child living near the home of Anne Frank in Amsterdam, the father had been snatched by the Nazis and sent to a death camp. Chizo told him that his ordeal and that of the Jewish people in Europe reminded her of the suffering of her own people, the Igbo, who tried to secede from Nigeria some 35 years ago and form their own nation, Biafra. Her older brother and sister, then infants, died during the war that followed—along with a million other Nigerians. "Every people suffer," she said. The old survivor smiled.

The persistence of suffering in Africa may bind African immigrants to their homeland in unexpected ways. Perhaps Africans will never forget, and will be defined by memory, just as Jews have been.

G. Pascal Zachary, a former foreign correspondent for *The Wall Street Journal,* often writes on African affairs. His books include *The Diversity Advantage: Multicultural Identity in the New World Economy* (2003), and he is currently working on a memoir of his marriage to an African.

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UNIT 5

Indigenous Ethnic Groups

Unit Selections

Key Points to Consider

- The history of relations between Native Americans and the U.S. government can be described in various ways. How much of the past is significant and consequential?
- Preservation of languages and heritage is on the agenda of many ethnic groups. Discuss the relevance of such activities and the related matter of acquiring a second and third language and a second and third cultural competency. Should schools for such activities be supported by the ethnic groups? Public funds? Philanthropies?
- Gambling/gaming has attracted a large-scale tourist-driven economic foundation for Native American reservations. Are the benefits of such development fairly distributed to the entire tribe or Native American nation?
- Could the National Museum of the American Indian be funded without the capital generated from the gaming industry and profitable casinos?
- Does the widespread practice of evoking and using Native American symbols and rituals in high school, university, and professional athletics constitute ethnic defamation?
- Will the strides of the current Native American community allow the next generation to enter the middle class mainstream of America? Should that be a goal? Does improving economically and in terms of other quality-of-life indicators mean the denial of traditional cultural values and practices?

Student Web Site

www.mhcls.com/online

Internet References

Further information regarding these Web sites may be found in this book's preface or online.

American Indian Science and Engineering Society (AISES)
http://www.aises.org

The contemporary issues of Native Americans can be more deeply understood if one begins with the recognition that their relationship to the United States of America is the ignored and neglected first chapter of international relations, war, and treaty making. The contemporary revival of Native American culture and the new relationship that is currently shaping policies of various states of the Union seems to be part of a worldwide awakening of descendants of all conquered indigenous peoples, in so-called nation-states and political empires in various stages of growth and decay. The voice of indigenous peoples adds its

weight to the claims for cultural justice, equal protection, and due process in American tradition in various states.

Relationships between indigenous peoples in the United States have been marginalized and isolated. Their cultures were articulated in folkloric and touristic ways when interaction with mainstream America occurred. Such traditional relations were challenged during the civil rights era of the 1950s and 1960s. Moreover, the celebration of the bicentennial of the American Revolution in 1976, the empowerment of Native Americans, and their victories in the courts and in legislative authority produced a new threshold from which the renegotiation of relationships could begin. With new cultural confidence and economic capacity, most notably in the gaming industry, the descendants of native peoples entered a new epoch of American pluralism. Some may argue that the reclamation and revival of tradition and power are unique social and political events. A wider view suggests that they are simply another manifestation of an ethnic group's articulation of its power and the pursuit of its agenda within the contexts of the American legal and economic order. Acute popular consciousness of indigenous peoples was heightened when attempts to celebrate the 500th anniversary of Christopher Columbus's voyage of discovery encountered strong resistance from advocates of Native Americans.

In 2004, the National Museum of the American Indian held the grand-opening of a new institution on the Mall in Washington, D.C. This institutionalization of the Native American guiding spirit signified that pluralism among the Native American peoples had entered a new phase of cultural development, one that would engage the American experience alongside and within the framework of a civil culture.

Article 24

Who Is a Native American?

PETER ORTIZ

George Armstrong Custer predicted Native Americans soon would be extinct before he ordered his soldiers to kill them at the Battle of Little Bighorn in 1876. Just as Custer discovered in his fatal encounter with Lakota and Cheyenne warriors, the native tribes proved resilient in surviving impossible odds.

More than 4 million U.S. citizens in 2003 identified as Native Americans, either alone or in combination with another race. This is a little more than 1 percent of the total 294 million people living in the United States, far fewer than the 10 to 25 million believed to be living in North America when European settlers arrived about 500 years ago. Those settlers spread fatal diseases, imposed genocide, forced assimilation, stole land, broke treaties, destroyed cultures and committed other crimes that ravaged indigenous societies.

Centuries of dehumanization resulted in the educational, economic and health disparities evidenced by Native Americans today. But refusal to succumb also nurtured a strong will embodied by many Native Americans who now comprise more than 560 federally recognized tribes and nations spread across 34 states and 140 more tribes applying for federal recognition.

That strong will has empowered Native-American entrepreneurs and those in the corporate world to thrive in a society where mainstream values sometimes run counter to their traditional beliefs. Yet Jackie Gant's frustration is clear when she speaks of how many people only envision slot machines and blackjack tables when they think of Native Americans as an economic force.

Gant, national executive director of the Native American Business Alliance, met Bush administration officials in the White House in September to let them know of the 10,000 Native-American-owned businesses listed in her database. Her organization's mission is to create networking opportunities and promote Native-American businesses as suppliers to corporate America and government agencies. Her group has the support of corporate sponsors including United Parcel Service, Ford Motor Co., General Motors, DaimlerChrysler, Toyota, The Coca-Cola Co., General Mills, Target and The Walt Disney Co. At the meeting, she tried to convey the strength of a people who saved the first white settlers from starvation and influenced the founding fathers in shaping the Constitution. Gant is a member of the Oneida Nation of the Thames, Canada, and Munsee-Delaware Nation.

"As I stood, I felt the weight of Indian country on my shoulders and I knew the words I spoke needed to be heard," Gant says.

Gant and other Native Americans have made great strides in dispelling myths and bringing attention to their issues, but the widespread ignorance of their history still pervades the highest levels of leadership, up to and including the president himself. President Bush displayed a lack of knowledge on the most crucial issue facing Native Americans—sovereignty—when he was asked in August what tribal sovereignty in the 21st century meant to him.

"You are a . . . you have been given sovereignty, and you are viewed as a sovereign entity," Bush told journalists of color gathered in Washington, D.C.

Bush's response rang hollow and was reminiscent of the countless false promises many white men have made to Native Americans over centuries. Sovereignty speaks to the right of Native Americans to control their own land where they are free to shape their economic and spiritual destiny and maintain their traditions and culture. The lack of substance and depth in Bush's answer typified the harmful perceptions, attitudes and actions that have persisted for centuries among white leaders.

Those who say that the wrongs of the past are history and that it is time to move forward frustrate Native Americans, for it is the ignorance of history that defines their present situation and continues to threaten their future. Forgetting and ignoring the past is not an option, but Native Americans live in a white man's world. Their challenge lies in enlightening non-Natives about their history, traditions, cultures and rights as distinct governments, while creating a prosperous future on their own terms.

Entrepreneurial Spirit

Entrepreneurs, such as Margaret Rodriguez, demonstrate the strong desire of Native Americans to succeed. A member of the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian community in Arizona, Rodriguez started her company, Au Authum Kí, 12 years ago when bankers refused to lend her money. Her company generated $24 million in revenue for 2003. Au Authum Kí translates into "the people's home."

Rodriguez's projects have ranged from a $1.9-million contract for rebuilding a high-tech structure to house a weather squadron at a Tucson Air Force Base to having her workers camp within the Grand Canyon, where they installed portable classrooms on the Havasupai reservation. She also started a charity last year that builds homes for members of her tribal community who can't afford them.

The entrepreneurial spirit isn't unique to Rodriguez as the economic muscle of Native Americans continues to grow, according to the Selig Center for Economic Growth and the U.S. Census Bureau. Americans who identified themselves solely as Native Americans and Alaska Natives numbered 2.4 million and 4.1

Table 1 Top 10 Native-American States by Population

California	683,922
Oklahoma	394,831
Arizona	327,547
Texas	239,907
New Mexico	202,529
New York	186,024
Washington	164,642
North Carolina	139,223
Florida	134,036
Michigan	123,322

Source: U.S. Census Bureau

million when they identified with one or more races, according to the 2000 census. Most Native Americans, 43 percent, lived in the West, while 11 states comprised 62 percent of the Native-American population.

Despite their small population, Native Americans are expected to see their buying power jump from $47.7 billion in 2004 to $65.6 billion in 2009. Native Americans will account for 0.6 percent of total U.S. buying power in 2009, up from 0.5 percent in 1990, according to the Selig Center.

The 2001 Survey of Minority Owned Business Enterprises by the Census Bureau reported 197,300 Native-American- and Alaska-Native-owned businesses in the United States that employed 298,700 people. From 1992 to 1997, their numbers increased 84 percent, compared with 7 percent for all U.S. businesses.

But even with successes such as Rodriguez, much of the attention remains focused on gaming. Gant, a Harvard University graduate, credits some casinos for pulling tribal members out of poverty when little economic opportunity existed. About 201 of the 562 federally recognized tribes are engaged in gaming, but most are small operations that provide a few jobs to members in dire need of work. Casinos and gaming operations must be located on tribal lands, and federal law dictates that tribes use gaming revenue to fund services, such as education, law enforcement, tribal courts, health care, social services and infrastructure improvements.

Native Americans must live in a white man's world. Their challenge lies in enlightening non-Natives about their history, traditions, cultures and sovereign rights, while creating a prosperous future on their own terms.

Casinos also have helped spur new small businesses. But the reality is that most Native Americans don't benefit from casinos. About 60 percent live outside of reservations, with the rest living on tribal lands or bordering rural areas. A report by the National Congress of American Indians shows Native Americans ranking last or near last on nearly all social, health, education and economic barometers. Their poverty rate from 2001 to 2003 was 23 percent, similar to that for African Americans and Latinos, while the poverty rate for whites and Asian Americans was about 10 percent. About one-third of the Native-American population on reservations live in poverty. From 2001 to 2003, Latinos, at 32.8 percent, were the only group to surpass Native Americans, 23.8 percent, for those without health coverage.

Native Americans also continue to struggle because of the federal government's early attempts to educate them with a total disregard for their culture. Children were prevented from speaking their language, practicing traditional customs and wearing indigenous dress. Native Americans were not taught the reading, writing and math skills of their white peers and instead were steered toward trades that did not guarantee a secure job because of racial barriers.

About 75 percent of Native Americans 25 years and older earned a high-school degree or more, compared with 84 percent of the U.S. population in 2002. About 14 percent of Native Americans 25 years and older earned at least a bachelor's degree or higher, compared with 27 percent for the overall population.

Maggie Necefer remembers when she was forbidden to speak her language as a student in the 1960s. Necefer's Navajo nation established the first tribal college in 1968 and is now among 34 tribal colleges in the United States. She serves as academic vice president at Dine College, which offers 17 degree programs and includes Navajo language and Navajo studies degrees.

"They paid missionaries to put up these schools and the whole intent was to proselytize, to kill the savage and save the man," Necefer recounts of her border school experience. "Oftentimes, we had missionaries come into the schools and tell us what god to believe in."

Necefer kept her language and culture, thanks to her family, and later completed bachelor's, master's and doctoral programs. She represents a model for students; in her, they can see that a Native American can survive from an imposed educational system and retain their culture.

"It is just taking ownership of our own education and what education should be for our people," Necefer says. "We validate the cultural identity and cultural piece interspersed with Western knowledge to prepare balanced individuals who can live in both worlds."

Corporate America's Gap

Much of corporate America, like society itself, does not understand Native Americans. When corporate America is focused on diversity, rarely are Native Americans mentioned in the same breath as African Americans, Latinos and Asian Americans, Gant says.

"We are able to compete like any other non-Native organizations, provided we are given the opportunity to do so by corporate America," Gant says.

Stormy Hicks, 58, heeded the advice from his father when he told the then 8-year-old that he was of the Shawnee Nation, but to keep that a secret between the two. Thomas Hicks took pride in his native heritage, regaling his son with stories of relatives dressed in buck skin and visiting him near his tribe's reservation

Table 2 Median Income from 2001 to 2003

Asian Americans	$55,089
Whites	$47,957
Native Americans and Alaska Natives	$34,740
Latinos	$33,913
African Americans	$29,987

Source: U.S. Census Bureau

in West Virginia. But Native Americans in the early 1900s often were denied jobs and faced discrimination.

Hicks is president of ITT Automotive Industries, a company that generates $500 million to $600 million a year in sales and makes fuel and brake lines as well as various plastic parts. For 20 years, he worked at Ford, where he started as a design engineer and ran manufacturing plants in Brazil and Mexico. He retired from Ford as executive director in charge of worldwide logistics and transportation in 1998.

For many years, Hicks kept his Native-American heritage a secret, even when some in corporate America realized the value that people of color brought to their ranks.

"I wasn't embarrassed by it," Hicks says. "In the corporate world, they wanted senior executives who were minorities and I never wanted to give that to the corporations I worked for. I just kept it to myself."

Hicks' wife Elizabeth, who was inducted as a non-native member of his tribe, researched her husband's lineage and urged him to acknowledge his heritage to everyone. He took her advice 10 years ago and regrets not doing it sooner.

"She started to realize there was something missing from my life," Hicks says.

Hicks kept true to his Native-American values even as he remained silent. His struggle speaks to the experiences of many Native Americans who must balance two worlds that have historically clashed from the time European settlers arrived. A legendary chief from Hicks' Shawnee tribe, Tecumseh, echoed the anger of Native Americans when he tried to rally them against white land invasion in the early 1800s.

Hicks did not face the life-and-death choice Tecumseh and many Native Americans grappled with in their fight. But



Figure 1 Native-American Buying Power. Projected rate of increase 1990–2009.
Source: Selig Center for Economic Growth

Tecumseh not only called for Native Americans to stand up to white injustice, he also showed compassion by not killing noncombatants. He urged other Native Americans to emulate the same humane treatment. His example survived in future generations.

"I've labored with it throughout my whole career whenever I've had to make big layoffs," Hicks says. "I think as part of Native-American culture, one of our teachings is you always take care of your people, and I'm not sure corporate America does that all the time."

Hicks' success did not come from conforming to the corporate culture, but rather adopting a Native-American approach. He avoided hiring excess employees and trained them in different skills so they could increase their chances of staying employed if layoffs were necessary. Hicks clashed with his supervisors and figures he could be in a higher position if he just played the corporate game.

"I worked with a very senior guy . . . who told me that sometimes I thought more of the people than the bottom line," Hicks recalls. "My response was the people are the bottom line and if you treat them right, they will produce the bottom line you need."

Hicks urges Native Americans entering or in corporate America to find strength in their traditions. "I would tell them to be true to themselves and to their heritage, that the native way does not have to be subjugated by the corporate way," he says.

Tracy Stanhoff, president of the American Indian National Chamber of Commerce, says corporate America and government contractors need to do better to inform Native-American businesses about opportunities and mentorships. Her organization started two years ago and represents the 12-member chamber of commerce nationwide, she says.

Stanhoff is a member of the Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation out of Kansas. She sees her organization supporting mentoring opportunities that she did not have when she started her advertising and graphics design business in 1988 at age 26.

"There are lots of issues that have to do with a lack of outreach from corporate America and their diversity departments," Stanhoff says. "We need to step up and say, 'Hey, don't forget about us.'"

Business on the Reservation

Lois Taylor and Barbara Poley steered clear of corporate America when they joined a nonprofit group to help jump-start tribal businesses on their Hopi reservation. The Hopi Foundation has helped the Hopi realize their entrepreneurial spirit without having to compromise traditions by leaving the reservation.

"Education for our people should validate the cultural identity and cultural piece interspersed with Western knowledge to prepare balanced individuals who can live in both worlds."

Maggie Necefer I Dine College

The Hopi reservation occupies 1.5 million acres in northeastern Arizona and many of its residents live in remote areas. The idea for one business, Native Sun, sprung from the objections of many Hopi who did not want a power company's electrical grid crossing over sacred cultural land. Many choose instead to use kerosene lamps and battery-operated lights.

"They did not want to be subservient to a company that would provide them electricity," he adds. "They are staunchly independent."

The Hopi Foundation in 1988 helped start Native Sun, a Hopi-run business that sells solar panels, batteries and equipment. Two years ago, the company became a limited corporation with a majority Hopi board. Hopi living in remote areas are able to harness the sun's energy via solar panels placed on top or near their homes. When banks denied loans to families who could not afford the solar panels, the foundation started a revolving loan fund and maintained "one of the lowest default rates of any institution," Taylor says.

Like many tribes on reservations, the challenges of high unemployment, poor health and inadequate educational opportunities are a daily reality. In some Hopi villages, unemployment can reach as high as 55 percent. Reservations were created by the federal government with the promise of sovereignty and protection. In exchange, Native Americans had to relinquish land as white settlers hungered for more property. The reservations often consisted of the worst land, but today, Hopi and other Native Americans refuse to leave, saying the reservation serves as the spiritual connection to their ancestral roots.

"The Hopi people have a year-long religious calendar . . . and one of the key and important principles was for us to work with micro-enterprises that were compatible with the Hopi lifestyle," Taylor says.

Out of that desire, another business, Gentle Rain Designs, was born. Hopi women already sewing from their homes created the cooperative and now design fleece items ranging from jackets and vests to pillows and purses, all from recycled plastic. The women operate a small shop on the reservation and sell their clothing to boutiques outside the reservation, allowing them to work around their tribal ceremonies.

"If we are going to have survival on our own reservations, we have to build up the capacity and sustainability with businesses we produce on the reservation," Poley says.

Fred DuBray does not dwell on monetary gain when he talks about the growth of the InterTribal Bison Cooperative he directs in South Dakota. DuBray, a member of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, watched the cooperative grow from 1,000 bison in 1990 to 15,000 today with 53 tribes from 18 states participating. The buffalo provide a healthy food source that could help alleviate some of the serious health problems that afflict many Native Americans.

"The most important aspect . . . is recognition that buffalo is such an important and vital part of Indian culture," DuBray says. "If we can't allow them to exist, we probably can't exist as a people."

White settlers knew of the spiritual bond between the buffalo and Native Americans when they systematically tried to wipe out the animal. Native Americans treated the buffalo and other animals with respect and thanked the animals they slaughtered for providing for their families. That concept was foreign to many whites who only hunted the buffalo for food, profit or to further destroy the Native-American way of life.

Cultural Competency: Understanding Native Americans in Business Dealings

PETER ORTIZ

The great divide between Native-American and corporate culture doesn't mean the two sides can't find common ground to conduct business.

One of Patty Dimitrious missions is helping non-Natives understand proper social and business etiquette when dealing with Native Americans. Dimitriou 35, is a member of the Dine (Navajo) Nation and owner of Alternatives/Alternativos, a multicultural advertising agency in Phoenix, Ariz., specializing in Native American and Latino marketing communications. She offers the following suggestions to clients who do business in "Indian Country."

Making your presence known through direct eye contact or a strong handshake can be interpreted as disrespectful and dominating in Native American circles. Dimitriou advises a more modest tack that does not boast of your presence. It's also a good idea to let your Native-American contact know more about your own family background and personal interests. "It's really important to understand each others' roots and background so that we know how to communicate with each other," Dimitriou says. "By sharing where you and your family are from, you support the Native-American custom of building a sense of relatedness."

Dimitriou decided to pursue a degree in communications after leaving her Navajo Nation, in part to help her better understand how to succeed in a dominant white culture. She since has advised non-Natives who are concerned that they might have offended Native Americans at business encounters.

"Say, for example, a developer goes to meet with a tribal council and he really wants to close the deal, so he is . . . trying to be direct and engaging in the type of behavior white America would say is assertive and knowledgeable," Dimitriou says. "But with his conduct, he is coming across as very combative, aggressive and very disrespectful and he creates the exact opposite outcome he is seeking."

And don't be surprised if you stay long at a tribal council business meeting. Dimitriou has heard of visitors who expected to present at a 5 p.m. meeting and waited until 1 a.m. the next morning. But she encourages clients to appreciate the cultural reasons for longer meetings. "One of the things I think is wonderful about Native-American communication is that everyone is invited to speak freely and express themselves without someone cross-talking them," she says. "The most important things are that everyone is in agreement and that everyone has a chance to share."

A big challenge faced by the cooperative is avoiding the idea of domesticating animals, a concept white settlers brought to the Americas. Native Americans viewed themselves, as well as other living beings, as temporary tenants of land that owned them. DuBray says buffalo need to roam freely, as their ancestors did, and that this is necessary to strengthen the spiritual bond they share with the animal.

"We are working toward restoring them as a wildlife resource, not as a commodity," DuBray says. "For them to provide a healthy source of food, they need a healthy source of food themselves like medicinal plants."

DuBray, 54, acknowledges that individual tribes must make tough decisions about how to use limited land. The Native-American way of raising buffalo requires lots of space that some tribal members may want to use for other economic projects. He has 100 buffalo, while his tribe owns several thousand. But despite the success of the cooperative, suspicion remains of the federal government or real-estate interests wanting to take over the land.

"There are still people out there developing ingenious ways to strip away what is left, so we can't let our guard down," DuBray says. "The only promise the white man kept is the promise to take our land. He took it."

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Article 25

Guiding Spirit

American Indian Museum Curators Look beyond the Objects to the Power Within

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To interpret the objects in the National Museum of the American Indian, you need to know their language: the history of a tribe, the meaning of its ceremonies, the names of the ancestors. Or you need a translator, someone like George Horse Capture, one of the museum's senior curators, to tell you what things mean—how colors and designs and bear claws can carry energy; how the inspiration for what to put in sacred medicine bundles comes to people in dreams.

If you believe in the power of objects, you see a war shirt in terms that are decidedly unshirtlike. It is a poem of sorts that tells of "pain, massacres, diseases, hope," Horse Capture says. It is a living object, as those at the museum like to say. It tells the story of an ancestor.

"He wore that shirt and then, through all of his activities, he sweated and he transferred some of his body onto that shirt," Horse Capture says, standing in the museum, which he's been working to make real for 11 years. Imagine touching that shirt, Horse Capture says, as he reaches over and tugs your sleeve. "The connection is made, a direct and physical connection. A bridge is formed between our ancestors and us."

Throughout the new museum, which opens Tuesday, is the explicit message that its displays have layers of meaning, that many objects here have spiritual dimensions greater than their aesthetic value. In a collection known as "Our Universes," a beaded pouch in the shape of a turtle turns out to be a navel amulet. A Lakota object that holds a child's umbilical cord acts as spiritual protection. In the Lelawi Theater there are several red stone pipes on display. The stems are separated from the bowls because many Indians believe it is only during ceremonies that they should be connected, and their full power realized.

Horse Capture, 66, a member of the Montana tribe known as the A'aninin (or Gros Ventre), draws his hands toward his belly when he talks about power, as if it's a force he can feel in his gut. He says that when he curated the Plains Indian Museum in Cody, Wyo., he put together a show that included a cane that had belonged to Sitting Bull. "When no one was looking, I took off my glove—it was lunch time—and I held that cane like this and *bzzz*! You could feel the power."

But how do you quantify a feeling? What if not everyone feels it? The challenge of the new museum is the scope and diversity of the stories it must tell, on behalf of millions of people with different notions of what is beautiful and meaningful and holy. In its collections are brightly colored Hopi kachina dolls, whimsical-looking figures carved from cottonwood root that are traditionally given to children to teach them about kachinas—beneficent spirit messengers. Some Hopis believe these dolls need to breathe, so their heads should never be covered. Some call the dolls "sacred" and "living," and say they should never be sold.

Other Hopis sell them to tourists as souvenirs.

What's sacred? Words get slippery here. You start talking about the museum's objects and an Osage scholar corrects you. He doesn't like that word, *object.* It is too utilitarian, perhaps, too stripped of power. As if a war shirt could be just a shirt.

'Life in All of Nature'

The way many American Indians see it, an object can carry the energy of a person who once owned it. An item decorated with an eagle feather can carry the spirit of that eagle. A rock can be seen as having power because it belongs to the natural world. Because of their histories and their associations, objects tell stories.

"There is a very important respect in which Native American people see objects as being living, as animate instead of inanimate," says W. Richard West Jr., director of the museum. There is "life in all of nature," West says, and therefore life in things people craft out of nature. West, a Southern Cheyenne chief, says the buckskin shirt he wears to powwows has a connection to the animal it came from.

Objects used in ceremonies also have power. When West was recovering this winter from prostate cancer surgery, he kept close a shawl his brother had used in a Cheyenne sun dance, an annual summer ceremony of renewal. "It was a comfort to me, and it was strengthening," he says. "It was an object that had been prayed over, if you will, by the leaders of the sun dance, and it had been around the sun dance fire."

Suzan Shown Harjo, a former museum trustee who is Cheyenne and Muscogee and heads an Indian-rights advocacy

group in Washington, expresses reverence for the connection between people and their objects.

"I would never walk into any place, any home and touch a doll or a mask or anything where I didn't know what it was," she says. "There is about the reality of a doll for a child that is about as spiritual as you can get. I mean, that's a real being. And you don't know what happened to that child. … You don't know what that doll represents."

In other words, you don't know its power.

Out of Harm's Way

Consider the dangers of ignorance.

Rosita Worl, a Tlingit and museum trustee who teaches anthropology at the University of Alaska Southeast in Juneau, recalls curating an exhibit that included shamanic objects from other Tlingit clans. She asked her clan leader how to deal with these, and he advised her not to touch them at all. Handling them, he said, could put her at the mercy of potentially harmful spirits.

In 1994, Jim Volkert was curating the inaugural exhibition for the Indian Museum's New York branch, the George Gustav Heye Center. He had three Crow shields that he wanted to show, and he asked a Crow elder if there was any reason they couldn't be displayed in public.

"He said, 'Not a problem'," remembers Volkert, now an associate NMAI director. Then the elder paused and added, "But the shields really can't see each other." The shields' powers had to be kept from "colliding," as Volkert understood it. He built dividers between them.

The Indian Museum is filled with artifacts whose power is not known. Most of its more than 800,000 objects were collected by a wealthy eccentric named George Gustav Heye during the first half of the 20th century. So now there are items that have been separated from their original owners for decades. There are medicine bundles—collections of objects of deep personal importance to individuals and tribes—whose stories and associations are mysterious. Some objects in the collection have been repatriated to the tribes. For the rest, the museum consults with tribes on how best to care for them, how best to respect their power.

Most of the museum's objects, including its most sensitive ones, are housed at its Cultural Resources Center in Suitland. It has artifacts that cannot be handled by men because they were created for women alone, and artifacts that cannot be handled by women. There are artifacts that shouldn't be near water, so they are housed away from pipes. Artifacts that shouldn't be stepped on or walked over are housed in open areas instead of under a ceiling, to avoid the footfalls of people one floor above.

There are sacred kachina masks, worn in ceremonies. These are vastly more potent than kachina dolls, which some consider child's play. Hopis believe the masks are living spirits. They are stored behind muslin screens so they can breathe, and are ritually "fed" corn pollen. They are not displayed in the museum, and indeed, few Hopis wish to discuss them for publication. They are considered sacrosanct.

Most objects in the Suitland facility have a mount of some sort that they rest upon, because being handled too much could affect not only their physical integrity but their metaphysical integrity, says Jim Pepper Henry, who as assistant director for community services helps oversee the Suitland facility's more sensitive collections.

"They're dormant, they're asleep, and what we don't want to do is wake them up inadvertently," he says.

That's why many of Suitland's sacred medicine bundles are kept high up, out of the way of anyone passing by, because "there's still a life force with those bundles, and there may be spirits" that shouldn't be meddled with, Pepper Henry says. There is a bundle in the collection that belonged to his great-grandfather, but he's never opened it to find out what items are inside.

"I don't have all the knowledge it would take," he says, "to open it properly or close it properly."

The Power of Symbols

Those who work for the new museum, many of whom are American Indian, use language that reflects the conviction that they are temporary caretakers of artifacts with lives of their own.

"We try to make the objects as comfortable as possible while they're in our possession," says Pepper Henry, a Kaw and Muscogee. He says museum staffers don't consider themselves owners of the collection, but its "stewards."

"We consider the Cultural Resources Center to be the home for our collections," West says. "It is not a warehouse. We don't even like that term, because that sort of connotes dead storage."

Terminology is important at the museum because those who run it are interpreting their collection for two audiences. They need to be sensitive to the concerns of the Native Americans whose heritage they house, and they must also cater to the many non-native people who come through, who may have a hard time understanding how—from a Native American perspective—cultural and spiritual interests are interwoven.

The Smithsonian's acquisition of the Heye collection was authorized in 1989. During the more than four years it took to ship those artifacts from a storehouse in the Bronx to the museum's Suitland facility, each truck was blessed upon its departure and arrival. There have been blessings marking major moments in the museum's life: upon its groundbreaking, upon the placement of the final steel beam in its dome. The Cultural Resources Center has a fire pit where visiting tribes can perform smudging ceremonies.

But Pepper Henry says he worries that the museum might be perceived as "New Agey." Referring to a specific blessing ceremony, Thomas Sweeney, the museum's spokesman, labels it a "cultural, not a religious rite." For some American Indians, that distinction may be a false one, but it underlines the thorny path their museum must navigate.

It is easy, perhaps too easy, to view American Indian ideas about powerful objects as outside mainstream Western beliefs.

The way some scholars tell it, once upon a time, Europeans assigned objects a sacred quality. Over time, various forces interceded, according to different theories. The Reformation deemphasized the power of the religious image. In art, aesthetics became more important than devotion—the actual worship of icons of the Virgin Mary declined. Modern science and faith in the scientific method put the notion of the supernatural under a microscope.

In non-native culture, there are few items considered so holy, so forbidden, that they cannot even be looked at, says David Freedberg, a professor of art history at Columbia University who wrote "The Power of Images" in 1989. "There's certainly nothing like the kind of sacredness and inviolate aura which is attached to medicine bundles," he says.

But there are religious symbols that maintain their power: crosses, relics, altars. There is our national flag, a secular object with such totemic power that there is substantive debate over whether it should be illegal to burn what is, in fact, a piece of cloth. The Great Pyramid has a magical quality that surpasses its bigness, its oldness, its ingenuity. Certainly, a secular object like the flag is not the same as kachina masks to the devout. But there is a common human reality here. It has to do with reverence.

Freedberg argues that images still have the power to arouse and anger us. It is human nature to "conflate the image with what it represents," he says.

Thus, spurned lovers rip up the pictures of those who betrayed them. In 2001 the Taliban destroyed statues of Buddha in the Afghan desert. Last year Iraqis and U.S. Marines toppled that statue of Saddam Hussein. Some anthropologists argue there are hard-wired reasons we look for faces in tree bark, that we see a man in the moon. We imbue inanimate objects with an animate quality—a spirit, if you will.

We love our inanimate objects. We believe in them. Our cars make us powerful. Our clothing makes us desirable. Margaret Wiener, a professor of anthropology at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, suggests that maybe Karl Marx had it right when he spoke of the fetishism of commodities.

"We're enmeshed in objects," she says. "What is consumerism but a vast set of practices that treats objects as highly significant, highly powerful to the making of ourselves?"

Defining Sacredness

Back to words again. Sticky words like *object* and *church* and *own.* This time, the word is *sacred.*

The most recent and public difference of opinion over sacredness occurred just this summer, and it concerned a substance called pipestone. Also known as catlinite, this stone is used by Plains and other Indians to carve ceremonial pipes. The pipes are considered so powerful that when they're put on display in the museum their pieces are separated.

"The stem represents the male and the bowl represents the female," says Arvol Looking Horse, a Lakota spiritual leader who lives on the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation in South Dakota. When "they're put together, they're starting life."

A few months ago, the museum installed a small circle of the red stone in the floor by the main entrance. The idea, says Richard West, was to lend importance to a central location by using a material that is both beautiful and revered. It was meant to evoke a fire pit, the center of family and communal life.

When word got out that the stone was being used in this unorthodox fashion, West started receiving complaints. Looking Horse is one of those who objected. He says that according to legend, pipestone was formed by the blood of ancestors. It is too sacred to be sold and too sacred to be placed in the floor.

"You can't walk over or on sacred things," says Looking Horse. "It's totally disrespectful."

But Travis Erickson, a Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota stoneworker who carved the floor installation, sees sacredness in different terms. "This is how I survive and support my children," says Erickson, who has eight kids and lives in Pipestone, Minn. The fourth generation of his family to sell or trade pipestone, he prays before he begins his quarrying work, and treats the stone with respect.

"My family, in my mind," he says, "is a sacred thing, because God gave me these children."

The pipestone from the floor is now in storage, and the hole in the museum's floor has been filled with sandstone. It is the same sandstone that was used in the Smithsonian castle, West says. This seems appropriate. In some sense, it is the Smithsonian's sacred stone.

"This is complicated business," says West, who himself uses a pipestone pipe during ceremonies. "The National Museum of the American Indian is essentially a constituency-driven organization." West says such disputes will happen from time to time.

"One is inevitably going to have differences of opinion," he says. "We are only human in the end."

Article 26

Playing Indian at Halftime

The Controversy over American Indian Mascots, Logos, and Nicknames in School-Related Events

CORNEL D. PEWEWARDY

Every school year, classroom teachers face the reality and challenge of educating diverse children in a multicultural society. Teaching multiculturally requires educators to examine sensitive, diverse topics and cultural issues. It means looking at historical and contemporary events from various perspectives, rather than a single one. Teachers and administrators whose knowledge of history and current events is monocultural in scope and who are unaware of their own prejudices are likely to hinder the academic success and personal development of many students, however unintentional this may be (Bennett 1999). Multicultural teaching encourages students to investigate the institutional racism, classism, and sexism that have served different populations in discriminatory ways. Educators can help monocultural classes and schools examine their own biases and stereotypes related to different cultural groups. Although one's ethnic group is just one of a number of possible identity sources, ethnicity is at the heart of the equity problem in American society. Therefore, discussions about achieving educational excellence should address those ethnic groups that have been consistently cut off from equal access to a quality education.

Educators have a professional responsibility to eliminate racism in all aspects of school life. Accordingly, educators should not ignore multicultural issues in school. Instead, these issues should become teachable moments in which these concerns are confronted and discussed. Accurate information can begin to displace the myths that many students hold about others. Today, one teachable moment is the controversy over using American Indian mascots, logos, and nicknames in school-related events. Supporters of such mascots claim they honor American Indian people, embody institutional traditions, foster a shared identity, and intensify the pleasures of sports and athletics. According to those who oppose them, however, the mascots give life to racial stereotypes, as well as revivify historical patterns of appropriation and oppression. These results often foster discomfort and pain among American Indian people (Springwood and King 2001).

Non-Indian people may not be culturally aware that some American Indian symbols used by cheerleaders and cheering fans—war chants, peace pipes, eagle feathers, war bonnets, and dances—are highly revered or even sacred in many American Indian tribal communities. Many mascots, logos, and nicknames represent stereotypical and racist images that relegate American Indian people to a colonial representation history. The exploitation of Indian mascots, logos, and nicknames in schools is, in reality, an issue of decolonization and educational equity.[1]

This article discusses the creation of stereotypical Indian mascots, how our society reinforces and accepts those stereotypes, how negative stereotypes have affected the relationship between American Indians and the rest of society, and it suggests solutions educators might use to eliminate these mascots from school-related events. In writing this article, I hope not to demean schools but to provide a rationale and approach by which ethnocentrism, elitism, sexism, and racism effectively can be eradicated in schools.

Countering the Assault of American Indian Mascots, Logos, and Nicknames

Using the word *countering,* which means to confront defensive or retaliatory attacks or arguments, to describe certain behaviors and thinking in our society is a strong indictment of the existing social fabric of the United States. Many educators in this country are serious players when it comes to countering racism, thereby protecting the mental health of school children today. However, many more teachers are unresponsive to or unaware of the issues of racism in schools today. Like these teachers, parents, educators, and liberals who deny being racists but remain silent when confronted with the issue also allow institutional racism to continue.

This issue has turned into a debate and torn schools and communities apart. Administrators spend months fending off angry alumni on both sides of the issue, calming students, and dealing with mainstream news media that oversimplify these issues. After it is all over, school districts often must spend additional time and energy healing the wounds and community ruptures left in the wake of efforts to counter institutional racism by

eradicating American Indian mascots, logos, and nicknames in schools (Riede 2001).

Still "Playing Indian" in School

Many schools around the country "play Indian" by exhibiting American Indian mascots, logos, and nicknames at sporting events: school bands play so-called "Indian" fight songs (for example, "One-little-two little-three-little Indians . . .") during both pregame and halftime entertainment; mascots dress in stereotypical cartoon character-like costumes and beat hand drums and/or carry foam tomahawks; and fans do the "tomahawk chop"[2] in unison. These all are inauthentic representations of American Indian cultures. Many school officials claim they are honoring American Indians and insist that the activities are not offensive. I argue otherwise and contend that these racist activities are forms of cultural violence in schools (Pewewardy 1999; 2001).

After studying this issue for fifteen years, I found that groups outside the American Indian community imposed most Indian mascots, logos, and nicknames on athletic teams. Even in the earliest U.S. government boarding schools, Indian children had no involvement in choosing their schools' mascots, logos, and nicknames. For example, the first recorded instance of an "Indian" nickname for a sports team was in 1894 at the Carlisle Indian School, an off-reservation U.S. government boarding school for American Indian students, located in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Mainstream sports journalists praised the team's football performance in the early years of their program. From 1894 until 1917, the Carlisle football team defeated the major power football team of the day (Adams 1995). Subsequently, opposing college football teams and sports media nicknamed team members the Carlisle "Indians." Ironically, most American Indians have always opposed the use of "Indian" mascots, logos, and nicknames for sports teams. Yet, these traditions of doing so are enthusiastically supported by most European Americans (Muir 1999).

Although images of Indians in mainstream sports culture have become as American as apple pie and baseball, educators should be aware that American Indians never would have associated sacred practices with the hoopla of high school pep rallies and halftime entertainments.

How American Indian Mascots, Logos, and Nicknames Become Racist

The unfortunate portrayal of Indian mascots in sports today takes many forms. Some teams use generic Indian names—such as Indians, Braves, Warriors, or Chiefs—while others adopt specific tribal names—such as Seminoles, Comanches, or Apaches. Indian mascots exhibit either idealized or comical facial features and native dress, ranging from body-length feathered (usually turkey) headdresses to fake buckskin attire or skimpy loincloths. Some teams and supporters display counterfeit Indian paraphernalia, including foam tomahawks, feathers, face paints, drums, and pipes. They also use mock "Indian" behaviors, such as the tomahawk chop, dances, war chants (for example, at Florida State University), drum beating, war-whooping, and symbolic scalping. Many European Americans rely on these manufactured images to anchor them to the land and verify a false account of a shared history. These "Indians," however, exist only in the imagination: they provide a self-serving historical connection that leaves actual American Indian people untethered and rootless in or erased from the historical accounts of European Americans (Spindel 2000).

Many school officials are all too familiar with the current legal and educational battles toward eliminating Indian mascots, logos, and nicknames from school related events. The U.S. Commission of Civil Rights (CCR), the highest official governmental body of its kind, issued a strong statement in 2001 condemning their use and recommending that schools eliminate Indian images and nicknames as sports symbols (U.S. Department of Justice 2001). Grassroots efforts of thousands of American Indian parents nationwide prompted this decision among CCR members. Moreover, the critical mass of American Indian educational organizations and professionals supported the CCR statement. American Indian educators showed school officials that negative images, symbols, and behaviors play a crucial role in distorting and warping American Indian children's cultural perceptions of themselves, as well as non-Indian children's attitudes toward and simplistic understanding of American Indian culture. Hollywood scriptwriters originally manufactured most of these stereotypes. Over time, they have evolved into contemporary racist images that prevent millions of school-age students from understanding American Indians' past and present experiences.

How Stereotypical Images Impact Young Children's Self-Esteem

Children begin to develop racial awareness at an early age, perhaps as early as three or four years old. Clinical psychologists have established that negative stereotypes and derogatory images engender and perpetuate undemocratic and unhealthy attitudes in children, plaguing them for years to come. Many non-Indian children exposed to these Hollywood stereotypes at early ages grow into adults who may unwittingly or unknowingly discriminate against American Indians. These children have been prevented from developing authentic, healthy attitudes about Indians. Moreover, Indian children who constantly see themselves being stereotyped and their cultures belittled grow into adults who feel and act inferior to other people. These racial and inauthentic behaviors mock Indian culture and cause many Indian youngsters to have low self-esteem and feel shame about their cultural identity. School environments should be places where students unlearn negative stereotypes that such mascots represent and promote. However, athletic events where Indian mascots are frequently used teach children the exact opposite.

Perhaps some people at these sporting events do not hear the foul language being shouted out in the stands and seating arenas associated with the usage of Indian mascots, logos, and nicknames. The most obvious offenses are the terms *redskins* (lady redskins) and *squaws.* According to one explanation, the word *redskin* originated in early colonial times when European colonists paid bounties for Indians' red skins—thereby coining the term *redskin.* The word *squaw* is a French corruption of the Iroquois word *otsiskwa,* meaning female properties. Both words are almost always used in a derogatory fashion in sporting events. Although these terms may be facing increasing social disdain, they certainly are far from dead. These words accentuate the differences in appearance, culture, gender, nationality, or sexual orientation of people and underplay—if not to deny—the similarities between people.

Given this background, no one, especially those associated with schools, should allow students to adopt a cartoon version of American Indian cultures as a mascot or logo. Educators and students need to be more educated about the negative effects of racist Indian mascots and logos on American Indian people. Many students do not recognize that the Indian mascot issue is as important in the American Indian community as alcoholism, substance abuse, and poverty. Some people excuse their ambivalence on the issue by saying there is "too much fuss over team names," "we're just having fun," "we're not harming anybody," or "what's the point?" They miss the connection because they are removed from the issues of American Indian education. It is hard to take American Indians seriously or to empathize with them when they are always portrayed as speaking in old, broken, stoic Indian clichés, such as "many moons ago"; dressed up in Halloween or Thanksgiving costumes; or acting crazy like a "bunch of wild Indians." These make-believe Indians are prohibited from changing over time to be like real people. On athletic fields and in gymnasiums, they are denied the dignity of their tribal histories, the validity of their major contributions to modern American society, and the distinctiveness of their multitribal identities.

In 1998, Children Now initiated a study of children's perceptions of race and class in the media, focusing on images of American Indians presented in national news and entertainment. The Children Now study revealed similar results to the perceptions survey conducted by the League of Women Voters in 1975: most children in America view American Indians far removed from their own way of life.[3] Not only do these studies have to be conducted and their results disseminated, but the misconceptions and stereotypes about American Indian people, which bombard the child from outside of the classroom, need to be counteracted.

Making Racism Visible in School-Related Events

Despite years of cultural diversity teacher training and integration of multicultural education lesson plans into the school curricula, children still play "cowboys and Indians" at some schools. Most teachers, undoubtedly, have seen (or perhaps even supported) children running around in turkey feathers and cardboard headbands, carrying homemade bows and arrows, patting a hand against their mouth and yelling "woo-woo-woo," or raising their hands over their shoulder and saying "how." The perpetuation of these invented Indian behaviors reflects the influence of peer socialization, schooling, and mainstream movies. They mock American Indian cultural practices, demean actual human beings, and treat American Indian people as subhumans incapable of verbal communication. This manufactured image of the Indian as something wild and inferior implies white superiority, a value judgment made namely by Hollywood scriptwriters (Rollins and O'Connor 1998).

Another popular character born of the racist images of American Indian people is the clown. Traditional clown societies of many tribes (for example, Apaches, Pueblos) attempt to make their people laugh during celebrations and ceremonies. On the other hand, the contemporary clown, born of American popular culture, is more like the jester or the fool, the inferior one responsible for making his superiors laugh. The use of clowns has always been a major way to assert dominance over a particular person or a certain group of people. During ballgames, the exaggerated images of Indians become clown-like, serving to manipulate and keep in place negative images during school-related events.

However, I hypothesize that the use of American Indian mascots in sporting events was influenced by the philosophical views of the Enlightenment and the developing Romantic movement. During those periods, American Indians were seen either as amusing exotics or as Noble Savages, excellent types for representing ideas in literature, in film, or on the stage. But the reality was that these figures were never more than white characters with cliché comic or noble personalities, thinly disguised in red skins and feathered costumes. American Indian people were never considered real human beings whose existence might be dramatically interesting (Jones 1988).

Defensive Tactics and Attributes

Who should decide what is demeaning and racist? Clearly, the affected party determines what is offensive. Unaffected members of society should not dictate how the affected party should feel. Moreover, efforts to retire Indian mascots, logos, and nicknames should not be met with ugly alumni and student backlashes that label grassroots complainants as troublemakers, activist, militant, gadflies, or practitioners of politically correctness. Therefore, educators who advocate and affirm cultural diversity must be ready for a challenge. Only a concerted effort to debunk Hollywood's mythology can alter the distorted image of the American Indian people for the better.

Educators should examine the biases and stereotypes their students hold. These stereotypes, caused by ignorance, hard times, and folk wisdom socialization, can be countered by accurate and culturally responsive information. Education can become a tool for liberation from bigotry—rather than a facilitator of racism (Corntassel n.d.).

Large School Districts and Organizations as Trailblazers

Hope for change can be found in two large school districts in the United States. Both Dallas Public Schools and Los Angeles Public Schools have already eliminated Indian mascots from their school districts as the result of active parent and education advocacy groups working [together] with school officials. The states of Wisconsin and Minnesota also have recommended that publicly funded schools eliminate the use of Indian mascots, logos, and nicknames deemed offensive to American Indians.

Professional organizations dedicated to the unique problems of American Indians must take forthright positions on this issue as well. As a teacher educator, I show future teachers why Indian mascots are one cause of low self-esteem among American Indian children in schools. Throughout my practical experience working in K–8 schools, I have learned that self-esteem fuels academic performance. Educators must realize that this issue is detrimental to the academic achievement of all students. As such, negative Indian mascots, logos, and nicknames are harmful to both Indian and non-Indian students. American Indian students endure the psychological damage and dehumanizing effects of seeing caricatures of themselves embodied in school mascots, logos, and nicknames. It is no coincidence that American Indians have the highest suicide, school dropout, and unemployment rates of any ethnic group in the U.S. (Rider 1999). To illustrate my point, I refer to the mental health organizations that have rushed to support the elimination of negative Indian mascots used in schools (for example, the American Indian Mental Health Association of Minnesota in 1992 and the Society of Indian Psychologists of the Americas in 1999). They drafted statements condemning the presence of ethnic images as psychologically destructive to the minds of American Indian children. Other professional organizations that have passed resolutions in support of eliminating negative Indian mascots used in school-related activities and events include the National Indian Education Association, United Indian Nations of Oklahoma, Governors' Interstate Indian Council, Great Lakes Inter Tribal Council, National Congress of American Indians, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, and National College Athletic Association.

Although such resolutions exist today, political and cultural leaders in many states (such as Oklahoma) have hundreds of Indian mascots and logos in use in school-related events but remain unconcerned with this national issue. They are uneducated about the issues or have little educational leadership to initiate transformational change toward truly honoring American Indians. Consequently, there is a critical need for experts to monitor more carefully these destructive influences in our shared physical, mental, social, and spiritual environments. Educators, parents, and community leaders must build coalitions to preserve the reality of our shared history. Educators must develop educational materials, artistic productions, economic structures, fashions, and concepts that counteract these damaging stereotypes.

What Must Be Done

The recognition of embedded racism in the English language is an important first step. Consciousness of the influence of language on our perceptions can help negate much of that influence. But it is not enough to simply be aware of the effects of racist language in conditioning attitudes. Although society may not be able to change the entire language, educators can help students change their use of many unkind words. Educators should not use degrading and dehumanizing words and should make a conscious effort to use terminology that reflects a progressive, rather than distorting, perspective. Most important, educators should provide students with opportunities to increase their cultural awareness by exploring racism in language and also should teach terminology that is culturally responsive and does not perpetuate negative human values and experiences.

To correct these negative stereotypes, concerned individuals or groups should consult the local school Title IX Indian Education Program coordinator, curriculum specialist, cultural resource librarian, university professor, or the National Indian Education Association to assist in the elimination of negative ethnic images and materials from the academic curriculum and school-related events. Some complainants of Indian mascots and logos have also filed complaints with the U.S. Department of Education, Office of Civil Rights. Every public school district is required to have a complaint procedure adopted by the school board for residents to use.

One of the finest award-winning reference books on this topic is *American Indian Stereotypes in the World of Children* by Arlene Hirschfelder, Paulette Fairbanks Molin, and Yvonne Wakim (1999). Robert Eurich also maintains a comprehensive Web site on American Indian sports teams mascots at http://earnestman.tripod.com/fr.2001.retrospective.htm. This Web site tracks all schools that have Indian names as well as those schools that have been changed to a non-Indian mascots.[4]

Every school year, American Indian students, parents, educators, and other allies must continue the hard work to educate our young people and us about how Indian mascots are used in school-related events. We must find every opportunity to celebrate ourselves, challenging the fear that causes us to hesitate in taking control of our own ethnic images. We must work together and have faith that our struggle will be successful, regardless of the opposition.

Conclusion

The ongoing use of Indian mascots in school-sponsored events is an issue of educational equity. Therefore, my professional challenge is to educators. As long as such mascots remain within the arena of school activities, both Indian and non-Indian children are learning to tolerate racism in schools. By tolerating the use of demeaning stereotypes in our public schools, we further desensitize entire generations of children (Milner 1991, 67). As a result, schools reinforce the stereotypical negative images projected in the broader mainstream American cultural imagination. Sport teams with Indian mascots, logos, and

nicknames teach them that it is acceptable to demean a race or group of people through American sports culture. Educators must turn the use of these mascots, logos, and nicknames into powerful teaching moments that could help counter the fabricated images and manufactured pictures of Indians that most school-age children have ingrained in their psyche by one hundred years of mass media. Finally, I challenge administrators and policymakers to provide the intellectual school leadership that truly embraces multicultural education, helping to eliminate the cultural violence associated with and triggered by the use of American Indian mascots in school-related events.

As a former kindergarten teacher and principal, I have a profound respect and admiration for teachers and administrators. The work they do is honorable, although rarely cherished. At the same time, I recognize that many teachers and administrators have not been given the time or support to help them teach in the most culturally responsive way. I hope this explanation of why educators should not ignore Indian mascots is a tool both teachers and administrators can use to help children think critically about multicultural issues in another school year.

Notes

1. Many of the contemporary Indian mascots, logos, and nicknames of today originated at the turn of the twentieth century. However, crude stereotyping of these ethnic characters became more and more obvious as the first half of the century progressed, even surviving the social reconstruction of the Civil Rights Era.
2. The tomahawk chop is a social phenomenon created by those sports fans who perceive the need for a supportive physical display of action to cheer on the favored athletic team. It is the extension of a single arm out in front on an individual—swinging the hand and forearm in an up and down motion. The act of the tomahawk chop usually takes place in large crowds in sport stadiums accompanied by a so-called Indian war chant. The tomahawk perpetuates the negative stereotype of the Noble Savage that falsely represents American Indians, and it certainly is not reflective of modern America.
3. See Children Now: Native American children's perceptions of race and class in the media. http://www.childrennow.org/media/nativeam/report.html.
4. See Robert Eurich's Web site dedicated to educating individuals about Indian mascots. http://members.tripod.com/earnestman/getinvolved.htm.

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UNIT 6

African Americans

Unit Selections

27. **Who Is an African American?,** Yoji Cole
28. **Cracking the Genomics Code,** Sonya A. Donaldson
29. **Why I Gave Up on Hip-Hop,** Lonnae O'Neal Parker

Key Points to Consider

- Characterize relationships between ethnic and racial groups on your campus.
- Is race-based violence increasing? Defend your answer.
- What are the most compelling issues that face African American communities?
- In what respects are desegregation, integration, discrimination, and prejudice woven into the discussion of contemporary issues related to African Americans?
- What role will new African immigrants play in the African American community?
- What social, economic, and political conditions have supported the expansion of an African American middle class?
- What factors explain the persistence of an African American underclass? In what respect is this question related to integration?
- In what respect is attention to education an answer to economic and social integration of African Americans?

Student Web Site

www.mhcls.com/online

Internet References

Further information regarding these Web sites may be found in this book's preface or online.

National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)
http://www.naacp.org

AIDs and Black New Yorkers
http://www.villagevoice.com/issues/0024/wright.php

The legal framework established by the original U.S. Constitution illustrates the way that the American founders handled ethnic pluralism. In most respects, they ignored the cultural and linguistic variety within and between the 13 original states, adopting instead a legal system that guaranteed religious exercise free from government interference, due process of law, and freedom of speech and the press. The founders, however, conspicuously compromised their claims of unalienable rights and democratic republicanism with regard to the constitutional status of Africans in bondage and indigenous Native Americans. Even after the Civil War and the inclusion of constitutional amendments that ended slavery, exclusionary practices continued. Decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court helped to establish a legal system in which inequality and ethnic discrimination—both political and private—were legally permissible.

The Supreme Court's attempt to redress the complex relationship between our constitutional system and the diverse society it governs is mediated by a political leadership that has not persistently sought "equal justice under the law" for all persons. Moreover, the history of American immigration legislation, from the Alien and Sedition Laws at the founding to the most recent statutes, reveals an ambiguous legacy. This legal framework mirrors political forces that influenced the definition of citizenship and the constitution of ethnic identity and ethnic groups in America.

Revisiting the legislative history of the civil rights era can shed new light on our national public understanding of the thrust of that period. By reviewing the congressional deliberation in support of the Civil Rights Act and its goal of equal protection and equality before the law and then juxtaposing the contemporary legal arguments and current politics of equal protection, the reader will discover a complex set of considerations. A careful analysis of the moral foundations of our legal system and its expectations and attention to the practical consequence of defining and achieving an epoch of equality and the limits of legal remedies will emerge from these re-considerations and the attendant search for new remedies and assurance of fairness and non-exclusionary practices.

This unit's glimpses of the African American reality, its struggles for freedom, its tradition and community, its achievements, and the stresses of building bridges between worlds reveal a dense set of problems. More importantly, they suggest pieces of authentic identity rather than stereotype. Becoming a healthy ethnic society involves more than the end of ethnic stereotyping. The basis of ethnic identity is sustained by authentic portrayals of positive personal and group identity. The cultivation of ethnicity that does not encourage disdain for and self-hatred among members and groups is an important psychological and social artifice. Progress on issues of race involves examination of complex historical, social, cultural, and economic factors. Analysis of this sort requires assessment of the deep racism in the American mentality, that is, the cultural consciousness and the institutions whose images and practices shape social reality. These patterns of change within African American populations compel discussion of the emerging black middle class. The purpose and influence of the historically black university, the reopening of the discussion of slavery and the separate-but-equal issue, and the renewed attention to Afro centric education are clear evidence of the ambivalence and ambiguity inherent in the challenges of a multi-cultural society. Earlier dichotomies—slave/free, black/white, poor/rich—are still evident, but a variety of group relations based on historical and regional as well as institutional agendas to preserve cultural and racial consciousness have complicated the simple hope for liberty and justice that was shared by many Americans.

Article 27

Who Is an African American?

YOJI COLE

To answer the question in 21st-century America, look back to 17th-century British America and the colony of Virginia:

> In the early 1620s slave traders captured a man in Angola, gave him the name Antonio, and brought him to the Americas, where he was sold to a colonist in Virginia. During these early days in British North America, before the system of slavery was strictly codified, some bound Africans were treated much like indentured servants and were freed after a period of servitude . . . By [1650] Antonio, a free man known as Anthony Johnson, was the owner of . . . about 250 acres and the family held servants of their own . . . When Anthony died in 1670 . . . A white planter was allowed to seize the Virginia land because, the court said, as a black man, Anthony Johnson was not a citizen of the colony."
>
> —*Hard Road to Freedom: The Story of African America*

Johnson's story illustrates the life Africans faced after they were forcibly brought to this country, stripped of any connection to their families or cultures and forced to eke out an existence at the whim of people who considered them second-class human beings or sometimes less than human. Out of this system, enslaved Africans created a set of socially acquired values, beliefs, language, music, food and rules of conduct that created today's African Americans.

It is poetic justice that African-American culture has come to define the United States as much as the nation's white culture. Throughout their years in this country and through personal and cultural name changes, African Americans have shunned mainstream stereotypes and conventions, redefining their culture through music, fashion and educational and economic attainment.

"The United States has a two-category system, white and non-white, that comes out of the slave code," says Robert Allen, professor of ethnic and African-American studies at the University of California, Berkeley. "Race is a political category and not a biological category."

While biology only recognizes one race—the human race—politics recognizes several. The United States has been mired in racial politics since the 17th century, when the Virginia colony created laws that made slavery a birthright of black people. This construct remains today as Americans are asked to check off boxes to reveal their racial heritage.

The Evolution of Blackness

The creation of the African-American community, known during different times in history as the Negro, colored and black community, is conjoined with the evolution of whiteness in the United States. Around 1676, laws were enacted that separated African slaves from European indentured servants. Slavery not only became inheritable for "Negroes," but black people were punished more harshly for crimes and poor whites were given new rights and opportunities, including jobs as overseers to police slaves. As the importance of slavery grew, colonial laws that conflated being "white" with freedom created a culture based on white privilege and black subjugation. The Transatlantic Slave Trade was the first system in which all slaves shared similar physical characteristics and thus provided slave owners, legislators and judges a "race"-based reason to justify forced, life-long service.

Those mores became the basis of national law. For example, the U.S. Naturalization Law of March 26, 1790, mandated that states only could confer citizenship on aliens who were "free white persons." Citizenship was not extended to African slaves, indentured servants and most women, according to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services.

"Race is a political category and not a biological category."

Robert Allen, University of California, Berkeley

"The nation's answer to the question 'Who is black?' has long been that a black is any person with any known African black ancestry," wrote F. James Davis, author of *Who is Black?: One Nation's Definition.* He continues, "This definition reflects the long experience with slavery and later with Jim Crow segregation. In the South it became known as the 'one-drop rule,' meaning that a single drop of 'black blood' makes a person black."

The "one-drop rule" made it impossible for the racially mixed children of an African slave and a white slave owner to claim they were white and, therefore, free. Most half-black and half-white children had black mothers. English law stipulated that a child's human status depended on the status of the father. In the course of the 17th century, however, the Virginia colony changed that law so that mixed children inherited the status of their black mothers. Then the Supreme Court legitimized the "one-drop rule" nationally with its ruling in *Plessy v. Ferguson* (1896), effectively establishing that whiteness meant no link to African blood.

Laws that defined who was white and black corralled black people into one non-white category that did not allow many opportunities for success. The Jim Crow era (beginning around 1877 and continuing into the 1960s) that created separate facilities for

Figure 1 African-American Statistics.

blacks and whites further entrenched the notion in the nation's collective conscious that people who had African blood were inferior to people who were white. Such laws and judicial decisions, along with a legal system that kept people captive based on their African features and lineage, effectively created the Negro community—today, the African-American community.

African Americans have been defining and redefining who they are since the abolition of slavery provided the freedom to do so—remember, Antonio changed his name to Anthony Johnson once he became free. As with Anthony Johnson, the constant renaming of the community is indicative of a people seeking to define themselves on their own terms. Historically, African Americans fought for their rights from the time they were enslaved. That struggle became the community's signature cause with the civil-rights movement, which largely was organized and led by the African-American church.

"The church was the only independent black institute and [the] only place where black folk could assemble that white folk couldn't control," says the Rev. Walter A. McCray, associate pastor of the Chicago-based First Baptist Congregational Church and president

of the National Black Evangelical Association. "So the church became the hub of life in the black experience in America."

It should come as no surprise that the African-American community's most influential leaders came out of organized religion, whether it's the Christian church with leadership such as the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. and the Rev. Jesse Jackson or the Nation of Islam with leaders such as Malcolm X.

"Black males who wanted a leadership role found it in the church, while white society precluded black males from that," says McCray.

Segregation was dealt a severe blow in 1954 with the Supreme Court's decision in *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka.* That ruling made illegal all segregation in public schools, effectively overturning *Plessy v. Ferguson.* The African-American community continued to demand equality, however, and in 1964, President Johnson signed the most comprehensive civil-rights act to date. The act finally killed segregation by prohibiting discrimination in voting, education and the use of public facilities.

Names and Notes of Pride

As African Americans gained power, the community again sought a name that identified its pride. The term "black" rapidly replaced "Negro" in general usage in the United States as the Black Power Movement peaked toward the end of the 1960s. And, in the 1980s, "African American" became popular as leaders such as the Rev. Jesse Jackson felt its ethnic label ascribed a culture to black people. Today, there is more support in the African-American community for the term "African American," 23 percent to 15 percent, but most, 59 percent, say it does not matter if people use the term "African American" or "black," according to a survey conducted by Gallup Poll News Service June 12–18, 2003. Immigration and intermarriage have made "black" a more universal term for Americans of color, many of whom may have no direct African ancestry.

"Black males who wanted a leadership role found it in the church, while white society precluded black males from that."

The Rev. Walter McCray, First Baptist Congregational Church

African-American culture, which always was a curiosity to whites, has become more accessible. The vanguard culture of the 1940s and 1950s was jazz; white jazz fans would drive to the African-American sections of cities to listen to African-American jazz musicians. But now the vanguard culture is hip hop, which is characterized as multicultural.

"Almost everything we have in the United States is African-derived, especially popular culture," says Jacqueline Cogdell DjeDje, professor of ethnomusicology and director of UCLA's ethnomusicology archive.

"African-derived," DjeDje explains, connotes traits such as improvisation and ornamentation, melody in music and pitches used by African-American musicians in the jazz, blues and gospel genres. Africans emphasize multipart rhythms; in an African drum ensemble, individuals layer their play so the sounds interact with one another. In West and Central Africa, where many enslaved Africans originated, the cultures emphasize group traditions where drum ensembles improvise together, switching parts throughout the cadence. Such elements are intrinsic in jazz and bebop, which encourage improvisation from its musicians.

Jazz is defined by *The Columbia Encyclopedia* as: "The most significant form of musical expression of African-American culture and arguably the most outstanding contribution the United States has made to the art of music."

The improvisation implicit in African-American music is "different from other cultures where the emphasis is not on creating culture but on how well you can duplicate what happened before," says DjeDje, a piano major in college who remembers having to duplicate Bach. "But when I played gospel music, no one wanted to hear me play gospel the way other musicians did; they wanted me to tell my story."

To illustrate how African-American music has influenced all forms of American culture, DjeDje contrasts the relationship between rock performers with their audiences and classical performers and their audiences.

"When you go to a rock concert, the people in the audience are jumping up and responding to what they see on stage—that's very African and creating a dialogue between the performer and the audience," says DjeDje. "Go to a symphony and they're playing Beethoven and everyone is quiet and the emphasis is on the individual."

African-American music also is known for its soul. Soul was born out of the Negro spirituals, once the defining music of the African-American church. Spirituals infused elements of African music, such as syncopation, polyrhythmic structure, the pentatonic scale and a responsive rendition of text with patient, profound melancholy. Such elements of sound and mood reflected the feeling of oppression and evolved into soul. It is common for people who feel oppressed to relate with the music and the despair in the lyrics and melodies of spirituals, blues and gospel. For example, the African-American gospel standard "We Shall Overcome" was sung by thousands in Suhl, East Germany as the Berlin Wall that separated East and West Germany was torn down in 1989. Now, hip hop is considered popular music and, according to Nielsen Soundscan, counts whites as 70 percent of its consumers, making African-American artists legitimate pop-culture idols.

"Almost everything we have in the United States is African-derived, especially popular culture."

Jacqueline Cogdell DjeDje, University of California, Los Angeles

It is not uncommon when traveling abroad to see an African-American celebrity plastered on billboards throughout foreign countries to sell products.

"A few years ago, I went to Hong Kong for my birthday and I was amazed that in every mall I was confronted by a life-size cutout of Michael Jordan," says Edward Rutland, executive vice president of New York-based Matlock Advertising and Marketing. "I knew he was popular, but to see a cutout of someone looking like me hawking sports apparel in China was a mind-blower."

African-American culture has increasing influence over corporate America and its decisions on how to market products, says Rutland.

Consider this: In New York City, a 2004 advertising campaign for clothing company Akademiks plastered on city buses a picture of a thin girl in briefs on her knees with books all around her. The caption read: "Read Books, Get Brain." It seemed to be a G-rated use of sexuality combined with a positive message of developing intellect through reading. However, African-American slang connoted "getting brain" with receiving oral sex. Akademiks, a hip-hop clothing line, was well aware of the slang meaning but hoodwinked city administrators who vowed to pull the ads.

African-American street slang influences major advertising campaigns because white kids are paying attention to what African-American kids consider cool. This relationship evolved throughout the nation's history, but in the past 15 years, as more African Americans integrated white neighborhoods, the taboos each racial group has held for one another have almost completely disappeared.

"It's very clear that African Americans today set many of the trends in consumer behavior," says Harvard Business School Professor David A. Thomas, who investigates the role social identity, family circumstances and developmental relationships play in careers.

Thomas sees African Americans now entering corporate America with enthusiasm as companies seek to diversify their employee pool in response to the African-American community's increasing size, influence and economic largess.

"As I look at corporate America today, you're hard-pressed to find, at least at entry level, an industry that African Americans are absent from," says Thomas.

African-American educational attainment is rising and, along with buying power, has made African Americans stakeholders in corporate America.

African Americans are achieving throughout corporate America as well. Notable African-American CEOs include Richard Parsons, chairman and CEO of Time Warner; Stanley O'Neal, president, chairman, COO and CEO of Merrill Lynch; and Ken Chenault, chairman and CEO of American Express. Such success is motivating more African Americans to consider careers in corporate America, says Thomas.

"If you survey a set of students today and you ask them what occupations they want to go into, you don't find much difference between what African-American students say and what white students say," says Thomas. "Go back 30 years to when I was in college, [and] the majority of bright African Americans saw their futures in the professions such as law, medicine and dentistry as opposed to corporations."

Thomas, who has studied the results of companies creating diverse work groups, says recruiting African Americans is creating a culturally competent work force. He cautions, however, that African Americans should not be hired to only service African-American communities. African-American executives usually fare better among groups of white clients than white executives do among groups of clients of color. That's because African-American executives come from a culture that has learned how best to deal with white culture through its history.

One of the best results of employing a diverse group of employees is that white employees who work in an office that features a racially diverse work force learn the cultural competencies that make them effective in addressing consumers outside of their white ethnic group, says Thomas.

"Cultural competency is learned through the transfer of knowledge among colleagues in the workplace and that's when diversity becomes a dynamic resource to the company," says Thomas. "We shouldn't draw the picture that people can't sell across racial lines."

Besides joining corporate America, African Americans are launching private businesses in record numbers. African Americans are 50 percent more likely than others to forgo a traditional 9-to-5 career to go into business for themselves. Seventy-six percent of African Americans say they want to own their own business, compared with 53 percent of whites, according to the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation.

"As with the culture, it's a strive for freedom," says Rutland. "It's about self-expression and self-reliance."

While African Americans are enjoying new levels of success, preconceived notions based on antiquated racial stereotypes still persist. For example, African Americans on average struggle with achieving high scores on standardized tests, such as the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT), created in the 1930s to admit white males to Harvard. The test has become the standard by which a high school student's ability is judged. And, an increasing number of businesses are requiring college graduates to submit their high-school SAT scores as a means to gauge an applicant's future employment success.

Research into the SAT has revealed, however, that African Americans fare better on its harder questions since hard questions are based on classroom knowledge, while easier questions use language that is susceptible to different interpretation depending on the English dialect used in the person's community. This finding is up for debate by the College Board, which distributes the SAT and contends it does everything in its power to ameliorate racial bias. At any rate, using the SAT, which is taken in one's junior or senior year of high school, to judge the future success of an applicant rather than only judging the applicant's college record or job experience places African Americans at a disadvantage because of the test's cultural gaps.

Including communities of color is this nation's secret weapon. African Americans, because of their unique history in this country, sometimes feel like stepchildren whose past everyone wants to forget. To do so would be to ignore the results, both positive and negative.

". . . The African-American community in this country has made major sacrifices for people all over the world," says James Jennings, professor of urban and environmental policy and planning at Tufts University. "People from all over the world can come to this country and thrive because the civil-rights struggle, led by the African-American community, challenged this country's apartheid."

From *DiversityInc*, February 2005, pp. 54–60.

Article 28

Cracking the Genomics Code

Genetic research isn't just for prime-time dramas or high-profile criminal cases. Here's how African American DNA detectives are employing scientific research to change our lives.

SONYA A. DONALDSON

For generations, the question of origin has been especially important to African Americans. With ancestors that were transported throughout the New World, stripped of their identities, and enslaved, there was never a way for us to answer the age-old question, "Where did I come from?" That is, until now.

Christopher Rabb, a 36-year-old writer and entrepreneur, began researching his family tree in 1994 armed with stories that had been handed down as well as documents from the national archives in Washington, D.C., that listed his ancestry as African. But Africa is a big continent, and Rabb—who also happens to be a genealogist—wanted to know which country or countries his ancestors hailed from.

"I had hit a brick wall," he says. Enter DNA testing. Popularized in the early 1990s through celebrity cases such as the O. J. Simpson trial and the ever-popular TV talk show paternity tests, the science and technology has taken quantum leaps toward helping African Americans locate a history beyond slavery. In 2003. Rabb took DNA tests for both his matrilineage and patrilineage lines through AfricanAncestry.com.

Rabb underwent two DNA tests, and then encouraged, cajoled, and persuaded family members (nine so far) to take the tests as well. Each test cost roughly $350. Through testing, Rabb has discovered 11 ancestral lines. Ten of them go back to Africa, with ancestors from as far north as present-day Morocco to as far south as Cameroon, where he discovered his connection to the Tikar people. "I would never have guessed that I descended from eight or nine different African ancestries," he says. Rabb adds that the testing has allowed him to "embrace Africa in a more nuanced and deeper way" by driving home the reality that it is a vast land with thousands of different cultures and ethnic groups. DNA testing, for him, is like a bridge that connects histories, continents, and cultures.

No one would argue with the significance of ancestry research for African Americans in terms of recognizing and claiming a culture and history based on a particular place or places, in much the same way white Americans have been able to proudly trace and claim their European heritage. And while scientists are turning ancestry research through DNA into lucrative business opportunities, they are also involved in investigating diseases that plague African Americans at a higher rate and with greater severity such as prostate cancer, breast cancer, Type II diabetes, heart disease, and asthma.

The current and potential applications arising from this science are endless. Researchers hope that genetic research can increase life expectancy as well as improve quality of life. Several prominent African Americans are at the cutting edge of this research. Among them: Georgia Dunston, founding director of the National Human Genome Center at Howard University; Bruce Jackson, founder of the African-American DNA Roots Project; and Charles Crutchfield, a clinical dermatologist who used genetic research to develop a treatment for psoriasis. Like CSI detectives, these geneticists tackle the prevailing questions of the 21st century in their quest to help us understand and transform our lives.

Dr. Georgia M. Dunston

> I am involved in the genetics of health disparities because African Americans MUST be involved in research on the human genome if our communities are to benefit optimally from the rapid growth in scientific knowledge on health and disease AND opportunities for economic growth and development.
>
> —Georgia Dunston

Addressing Disparities

For Georgia Dunston, Ph.D., a genome research center at Howard University was not simply an item on a wish list for the venerable institution—it was a necessity. "I knew that this, of all arenas, was one in which African Americans had to be engaged. And whatever the path, I was willing to walk it," says Dunston of her determination to have the university and the African American community participate in DNA-based research.

In 2001, the university launched the National Human Genome Center as a research site for the genetic study of diseases that are prevalent in African Americans and the African diaspora, as well as other people of color.

Dunston has been instrumental in recruiting some of the nation's top geneticists to the university and has been a force in ensuring that Howard and other historically black institutions play art instrumental role in DNA research. And she is ensuring that those HBCUs that offer doctorates in health-related sciences get the needed funds to recruit scientists, train students, and participate in research on a playing field equal to that of their mainstream counterparts.

Dunston funded the genetic research program through the Research Centers in Minority Institutions program, an entity at the National Institutes of Health created in the 1980s following legislation by Congress that addresses funding disparities. The legislation mandated that the NIH invest money to build infrastructure for research on minority campuses. To date, the Center has received about $20 million in grants.

Why the need for a separate institution at Howard? Dunston notes that the participants in the Human Genome Project were Europeans with a traceable pedigree, yet prevailing scientific research informs us that the oldest populations—and therefore the populations with the greatest degree of genetic variations—originated in Africa.

Dunston is currently researching variations within the genome. She says she is awed by the project and its implications. "Less than one-tenth of a percent of our total sequence is what we use to distinguish ourselves from each other," she says. "There are stretches in our sequence that if you looked at one portion, you wouldn't be able to distinguish us from bacteria. That speaks to the universality, the interrelatedness of all life."

Dr. Bruce Jackson

> The Roots Project began as a personal effort to determine my African ancestry in the scientific field in which I was trained, molecular genetics. In my wildest dreams I did not forsee it evolving into the international project it now is.
>
> —Bruce Jackson

The Genetic Detective

Bruce Jackson, Ph.D., might not necessarily agree with the quick move to the for-profit arena in which DNA research is heading, but the geneticist at the University of Massachusetts Lowell remains cautiously optimistic about what the research can do. At the university, Jackson investigates genes that are linked to the onset of prostate cancer—a disease that disproportionately affects African Americans. He is also cofounder of the Prostate Cancer Alliance, a national team of African American scientists searching for a cure for the disease.

Through the biotechnology program at Massachusetts Bay Community College, Jackson, who serves as department chair of science and director of the biotechnology and DNA forensics programs, created the world's first forensics DNA science degree program. Jackson is also engaged in DNA-based ancestry research, launching the African-American DNA Roots Project in 2001, partly out of curiosity about his own ancestry. He is currently working on a project to trace the black descendants of James Madison, one of America's founding fathers.

When word got out that the geneticist was using DNA to conduct ancestry research, the project was flooded with hundreds of e-mail requests a day. "When it got to 5,000 in the queue, we knew we were in trouble," says Jackson of the overwhelming response. To deal with the backlog, Jackson has directed potential participants to the Washington, D.C.-based National Geographic Genographic Project (www.nationalgeographic.com/genographic). which analyzes either Y chromosome or mitochondrial DNA and charges a nominal fee.

Jackson's approach to research incorporates not just the examination of DNA but other factors such as history, culture, food, migration, and so on. He does not see DNA as the definitive answer, but rather, as part of the answer. "There is an overreliance on the DNA data," he says. "It's a powerful tool but it was never meant to be used by itself."

Instead, Jackson incorporates other fields in order to get a clearer understanding of what the DNA is telling us. For example, he is in the process of putting together a consortium of geneticists, historians, writers, and anthropologists to move toward linking African Americans to Africans on a broad front. "There is a perception of DNA as undeniable proof, which is simply not sensible," he adds. "We are just laying the foundations for this type of research."

Dr. Charles E. Crutchfield III

> I practice medicine to treat human disease. I conduct DNA research to better understand what causes it.
>
> —Charles Crutchfield

Going to Market

Charles E. Crutchfield III, M.D., is one scientist who decided to take his research into the marketplace. The Minnesota-based clinical dermatologist, who founded Crutchfield Dermatology in 2002 (www.crutchfielddermatology.com), conducts research to develop drug treatment for psoriasis, a chronic and often painful skin condition that affects roughly 7 million people in the U.S.

Crutchfield's research examines how psoriasis operates at the genetic level. "If you have abnormal skin and you make it turn into normal skin [through drug treatment], you're probably turning off some genes and turning on others," he says. "I can take a sample of the skin while it's healing to see which genes are being turned on and which are being turned off to get a better understanding of what is causing psoriasis." Through research and testing, "we discovered that one of the proteins that binds to DNA to cause DNA transcribing is a key factor in psoriasis research."

Based on his studies, Crutchfield has developed a treatment called CutiCort Spray, which patients use twice a day, for two to four weeks, to treat their psoriasis. He is currently in discussions with several drugmakers to sell or license the patent and develop additional medicines to treat psoriasis.

The clinical dermatologist is in an enviable situation, because he is able to offer a research division within his medical practice with profits from the practice funding the research. Because of his unique position—specializing in skin conditions particular to persons of color, such as keloids, pseudofolliculitis barbae (razor bumps), dermatosis papulosa nigra, and vitiligo—Crutchfield is able to leverage his expertise into business success. He has spent more than $100,000 of his own funds on DNA-based research to develop the treatment for psoriasis and is in preliminary discussions with his partners to offer patients a percentage of the profits from the research and development of biological medicine based on their participation. "Eventually [the investment] should come back to us as we sell our patent rights," he says. "I look at it as an investment in something that might have a lucrative benefit—it's a win for the patients, a win for the drug companies, and it's good for the practice."

Crutchfield received his medical degree and a master's degree in molecular biology from the Mayo Clinic Graduate School of Medicine and is currently a clinical associate professor of dermatology at the University of Minnesota Medical School.

Article 29

Why I Gave Up on Hip-Hop

LONNAE O'NEAL PARKER

My 12-year-old daughter, Sydney, and I were in the car not long ago when she turned the radio to a popular urban contemporary station. An unapproved station. A station that might play rap music. "No way, Syd, you know better," I said, so Sydney changed the station, then pouted.

"Mommy, can I just say something?" she asked. "You think every time you hear a black guy's voice it's automatically going to be something bad. Are you against hip-hop?"

Her words slapped me in the face. In a sense, she was right. I haven't listened to radio hip-hop for years. I have no clue who is topping the charts and I can't name a single rap song in play.

But I swear it hasn't always been that way.

My daughter can't know that hip-hop and I have loved harder and fallen out further than I have with any man I've ever known.

That my decision to end our love affair had come only after years of disappointment and punishing abuse. After I could no longer nod my head to the misogyny or keep time to the vapid materialism of another rap song. After I could no longer sacrifice my self-esteem or that of my two daughters on an altar of dope beats and tight rhymes.

No, darling, I'm not anti-hip-hop, I told her. And it's true, I still love hip-hop. It's just that our relationship has gotten very complicated.

When those of us who grew up with rap saw signs that it was turning ugly, we turned away. We premised our denial on a sort of good-black-girl exceptionalism: They came for the skeezers but I didn't speak up because I'm no skeezer, they came for the freaks, but I said nothing because I'm not a freak. They came for the bitches and the hos and the tricks. And by the time we realized they were talking about bitches from 8 to 80, our daughters and our mommas and their own damn mommas, rap music had earned the imprimatur of MTV and Martha Stewart and even the Pillsbury Doughboy.

And sometimes it can seem like now, there is nobody left who is willing to speak up.

I remember the day hip-hop found me. The year was 1979 and although "Rapper's Delight" wasn't the first rap song, it was the first rap song to make it all the way from the South Bronx to Hazel Crest, Ill.

I was 12, the same age my oldest daughter is now, when hip-hop began to shape my politics and perceptions and aesthetics. It gave me a meter for my thoughts and bent my mind toward metaphor and rhyme. I couldn't sing a lick, but didn't hip-hop give me the beginnings of a voice. About the time that rap music hit Hazel Crest, all the black kids sat in the front of my school bus, all the white kids sat in back, and the loudest of each often argued about what we were going to listen to on the bus radio or boombox. Music was code for turf and race in the middle-class, mostly-white-but-heading-black suburbs south of Chicago.

One day, our bus driver tried to defuse tensions by disallowing both. Left without music, some of the black kids started singing "Rapper's Delight." Within a couple of lines, we all joined in:

Now what you hear is not a test
I'm rappin' to the beat.

Then the white kids started chanting: *Dis-co sucks, dis-co sucks, dis-co sucks, dis-co sucks* , repeating the white-backlash, anti-rap mantra of the era.

The white kids got louder: *DIS-CO SUCKS, DIS-CO SUCKS, DIS-CO SUCKS, DIS-CO SUCKS.*

So we got louder, too:

YA SEE, I AM WONDER MIKE AND I LIKE TO SAY HELLO

TO THE BLACK, TO THE WHITE, THE RED AND THE BROWN

THE PURPLE AND YELLOW.

Then the white kids started yelling until their faces suffused with color.

And so we started yelling rhymes that I still know to this day, some of which my kids know and, I bet, so do some of the kids of those white kids who screamed at us from the back of my junior high school bus, raging against change, raging against black people, or, who knows, maybe just not appreciating our musical stylings.

SO I RAPPED TO THE BEAT LIKE I NEVER DID BEFORE.

We rhymed and the white kids disappeared before our eyes because we were in another world—transported by the collective sound of our own raised voices, transfixed by our newfound ability to drown out their nullification.

We felt ourselves united, with the power of a language we didn't begin to understand. "Rap at its best can refashion the world—or at least the way we see it—and shape it in our own image," said Adam Bradley, a literature professor at Claremont McKenna College who is working on a book about hip-hop poetics. It has the capacity "to give a voice that's distinctively

our own and to do it with the kind of confidence and force we might not otherwise have."

I grew older, and my love affair with the music, swagger and semiotics of hip-hop continued. There was Kurtis Blow, Melle Mel and the seminal Grandmaster Flash and the Furious Five:

Don't push me 'cause I'm close to the edge
I'm tryin' not to lose my head.

I learned all the rhymes played on black radio, because do you remember when MTV wouldn't touch black music at all? I got to college and started getting my beats underground, which is where I stayed to find my hip-hop treasures. Public Enemy rapped "Fight the Power" and it could have been the soundtrack to CNN footage of Tiananmen Square or the fall of the Berlin Wall:

Got to give us what we want
Gotta give us what we need
Our freedom of speech is freedom or death
We got to fight the powers that be.

I was young and hungry and hip-hop was smart, and like Neneh Cherry said, we were raw like sushi back then, sensing we were onto something big, not realizing how easily it could get away from us.

Of course, the rhymes were sexy, too, part of a long black tradition starting with the post-emancipation blues. It was music that borrowed empathy and passion from exultations of the sacred, to try to score a bit of heaven in secular places.

It was college, and in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the post-civil rights, post-sexual revolution, newly grown hip-hop generation imagined that we had shed our momma's chastity-equals-black-uplift strictures anyway. So when MC Lyte rapped, "I ain't afraid of the sweat," well, you know, we *waved our hands in the air.* Besides, it was underground music, adult music, part of a wide range of expression, and it's not like we worried that it could ever show up on the radio.

Hip-hop was still largely about the break-beat and dance moves and brothers who battled solely on wax. It was Whodini, Eric B. & Rakim, Dana Dane, EPMD, A Tribe Called Quest. And always and forever, Lonnae Loves Cool James. I knew all LL Cool J's b-sides and used to sleep under a poster of him that hung on my wall. I still have a picture of the two of us that was taken one Howard homecoming weekend.

And if, gradually, we noticed a trend, more violence, more misogyny, more materialism, more hostile sexual stereotyping, a general constricting of subject matter, for a very long time we let it slide.

In 1988, EPMD rapped about a woman named Jane:

So PMD (Yo?) Why don't you do me a favor?
Chill with the bitch and I'll hook you up later
She's fly, haircut like Anita Baker
Looked up and down and said "Hmm, I'll take her."

But by last spring, it was Atlanta-based rapper T.I.:

I ain't hangin' with my niggaz
Pullin' no triggaz
I'll be back to the trap, but for now
I'm chillin' with my bitch today, I'm chillin' with my bitch today.

Nearly 20 years later and T.I. can't even be bothered to give his "bitch" a name.

We were so happy black men were speaking their truth, "we've gone too long without challenging them," as Danyel Smith, former editor of Vibe magazine, put it. And now, perhaps, hip-hop is too far gone.

At the 2003 MTV Video Music Awards, rappers Snoop Doggy Dog and 50 Cent embellished their performance of the song "P.I.M.P." by featuring black women on leashes being walked onstage. This past August, MTV2 aired an episode of the cartoon "Where My Dogs At," which had Snoop again leading two black bikini-clad women around on leashes. They squatted on their hands and knees, scratched themselves and defecated.

The president of the network, a black woman, defended this as satire.

Hip-hop had long since gone mainstream and commercial. It was Diddy, white linen suits and Cristal champagne in the Hamptons. And it was for white suburban boys as well as black club kids. And it now promoted a sexual aesthetic, a certain body type, a certain look. Southern rappers had even popularized a kind of strip-club rap making black women indistinguishable from strippers.

I don't know the day things changed for me. When the music began to seem so obviously divorced from any truth and, just as unforgivably, devoid of most creativity. I don't know when my love turned to contempt and my contempt to fury. Maybe it happened as my children got older and I longed for music that would speak to them the way hip-hop had once spoken to me.

Maybe as the coolest black boys kept getting shot on the streets while the coolest rappers droned: *AK-47 now nigga, stop that.*

Maybe as the madness made me want to holler back: *"Niggas" can't stop AK-47s, and damn you for saying so.*

Last year, talk show host Kelly Ripa gushed to 50 Cent, a former drug dealer turned rapper, about how important his movie "Get Rich or Die Tryin' " was while black women around the country were left to explain to their own black sons, "*Sometimes, darling, black boys get shot nine times and they don't live to brag about it on the mike.*"

And a few weeks ago, watching the Disney Channel cartoon short "Fabulizer," I seethed when the little white character lamented that his "thug pose" wasn't working.

While the mainstream culture celebrates the pimped-out, thugged-up, cool-by-proxy mirage of commercial rap, those of us who just love black people have to be a little more discriminating. "Sometimes," writes sociologist Mary Pattillo-McCoy,



Figure 1 Who's Listening? Rap/hip-hop buyer demographics, January 2002–August 2006

Note: The NPD Group surveys about 1,000 music buyers every week about their purchases. The demographic information is then weighted to meet U.S. census figures. Total number surveyed is 23,452.

Source: The NPD Group, Inc.

"when you dress like a gangsta, talk like a gangsta and rap like a gangsta often enough, you are a gangsta."

My husband, Ralph, and I try to tell Sydney that rap music used to be fun. It used to call girls by prettier names. We were ladies and cuties, honeys and hotties, and we all just felt like one nation under the groove. Sydney, I tell her, I want you to have all the creativity, all the bite, all the rhythms of black rhyme, but I can't let you internalize toxic messages, no matter how cool some millionaire black rappers tell you they are.

Sydney nods, but I don't know if she fully understands.

I was born to be the Lyte
To give the spark in the dark
Spread the truth to the youth
The ghetto Joan of Arc

—MC Lyte

Last spring, I got together with some other moms from the first generation of hip-hop. We decided to distribute free T-shirts with words that counter some of the most violent, anti-intellectual and degrading cultural messages: *You look better without the bullet holes. Put the guns down.* Or my favorite: *You want this? Graduate!* We called it the Hip-Hop Love Project.

Others are trying their own versions of taking back the music. In Baltimore, spoken-word poet Tonya Maria Matthews, aka JaHipster, is launching her own "Groove Squad." The idea is to get together a couple dozen women to go to clubs prepared to walk off the dance floor en masse if the music is openly offensive or derogatory. "There's no party without sisters on the dance floor," she told me. In New York, hip-hop DJ and former model Beverly Bond formed Black Girls Rock! to try to change the portrayal of black women in the music and influence the women who are complicit in it. "We don't want to be hypersexualized," said Joan Morgan, a hip-hop writer and part of the group, but we don't want to be erased, either.

Finally, it feels like we've gotten back to what black women are supposed to have always known: that it is better to fight than to lie down.

My daughter says I don't like black voices and I could weep that it's come to this. But instead I listen to the most conscious hip-hop that comes my way: Common, Talib Kweli, the Roots, KOS, Kanye West, who blends the commercial with commentary. I close my eyes to listen as Mos Def says:

My Umi said shine your light on the world.

And still, always and forever, Lonnae Loves Cool James.

I keep my CD player filled with old-school tracks and I fill my kids' heads with the coolest, most conscious, most *bang-bang the boogie say up jump the boogie* songs from when hip-hop and I were young. Sydney says I don't like black voices and I say: *Ax Butta how I zone/ Man, Cleopatra Jones.*

I make Sydney listen to songs from when rap said something, but my daughter is 12 and she laughs at me. Rap says something now, Mommy, she says.

Lean wit' it
Rock wit' it
Lean wit' it
Rock wit' it

She snaps her fingers and I just nod. Change is gonna come. Meanwhile, her song is catchy. And there are no bitches!

At least not in the chorus.

Lonnae O'Neal Parker, a *Washington Post* staff writer, is author of "I'm Every Woman: Remixed Stories of Marriage, Motherhood and Work" (Amistad/HarperCollins), out in paperback this month.

UNIT 7

Hispanic/Latina/o Americans

Unit Selections

Key Points to Consider

- What does the debate about the use of the words Hispanic and Latino/a suggest about cultural agenda of minority groups?
- Does television programming, film, and entertainment adequately address our understanding of pluralism within the Hispanic and Latino cultures?
- When do ethnic and racial issues foster understanding? Does the charge of racialism within the Hispanic/Latino community expose the limits of solidarity? How about the existence of color consciousness that is present in the population? Does the historical anti-immigrant position of African Americans explain this matter, or does such an argument simply fuel allegations of discrimination?
- In what respects is Hispanic/Latino American culture becoming part of mainstream American culture? What can be expected for relationships between Hispanic ancestry populations and the newest immigrants from Spanish-speaking countries?
- Hispanic voters are concentrated in California, Texas, Florida, and New York. How significant or crucial to electoral success are these states for presidential elections? Explain.

Student Web Site

www.mhcls.com/online

Internet References

Further information regarding these Web sites may be found in this book's preface or online.

Latino American Network Information Center (LANIC)
http://lanic.utexas.edu

National Council of La Raza (NCLR)
http://www.nclr.org

The following collection of materials on Hispanic/Latino Americans is a composite of findings about ethnicities. The clustering of these ethnicities and nationalities, as well as their relationship to the Spanish language, seems to be sufficient evidence of the commonalities that constitute the shared expression of this complex of past and contemporary politics. Yet the use of the terms “Hispanic” and “Latino”, which differentiates them from Anglo-American foundations and their social expression as they search for a cultural and political terrain, are but the surface of the process of intergroup dynamics in the United States.

A comprehensive survey of Hispanic/Latino Americans, sponsored by the Pew Hispanic Center and the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, confirmed what many observers of race and

ethnic relations have long noted: Rather than being an ethnic population, Hispanic/Latino Americans are an artifact of the U.S. Census. In reality, this U.S. Census category or data cluster comprises significantly diverse groups. With differences arising from experiences in different countries of origin, the cultural and political perspectives suggest that this fastest-growing population in various locations and distinct communities with varied agendas is certainly not homogenous and monolithic. The survey found that respondents representative of immigrants and descendants of immigrants from Mexico, Puerto Rico, Cuba, and other Central and South American countries fully appreciated that learning English was essential to success in the United States. Moreover, 60 percent of this population usually and predominantly speaks English. Such fine-grain analysis of ethnic and racial populations tends to reveal the malleability of identity and the problem of census data and categorization (1980 census).

The articles in this unit propose angles of vision that enable us to view the process of accommodation and change that is articulated in political practice, scholarship, advocacy, and art. The issues presented provocatively shift traditional perspectives from the Eastern and Midwestern mindset toward the Western and Southwestern immigration of the United States. The Immigration Act of 1965 induced a process not unlike the period of large-scale eastern and southern European immigration between 1880 and 1924. This immigration includes scores of various ethnic groups; and cultural/geographic descriptions are not the clearest form of ethnic identity. Hispanic/Latino Americans are not a single ethnic group. The designation of various ethnic populations whose ancestry is derived from Spanish-speaking countries by the words Latino and Hispanic is a relatively recent phenomenon in the United States.

The term Hispanic was used in the 1970s and Latino was added to the U.S. Census in 1990. The cultural, economic, and political differences and similarities among various Hispanic/Latino communities, as well as the wide dispersal of these communities, suggest the need for care in generalization about Latino and Hispanic American populations. Does geographic location in the United States significantly influence personal and group issues? The realities of these groups—whether they are political refugees, migrant workers, descendants of residents settled prior to territorial incorporation into the United States, long-settled immigrants, recent arrivals, or the children and grandchildren of immigrants—present interesting and varied patterns of enclave community, assimilation, and acculturation, as well as isolation and marginalization. The Hispanic/Latino experience is a composite of groups seeking unity while interacting with the larger arena of ethnic groups that constitute American society. Convergent issues that bridge differences, as well as those that support ideological and strategic differences, bode a future of both cooperation and conflict.

Article 30

The GOP's Brownout

House Republicans' get-tough immigration bill jeopardized the party's hard-won gains among Hispanic evangelicals.

THOMAS B. EDSALL

House Republicans knew that leaders of liberal Hispanic organizations would castigate them for passing hard-edged legislation last December calling for 700 miles of new fencing on the U.S.-Mexican border and for elevating illegal immigration to a felony and making it a permanent disqualifier for American citizenship. What they didn't foresee was that the Rev. Luis Cortes Jr., one of the most prominent Hispanic evangelicals to support President Bush's re-election, would turn against their party.

The 48-year-old Baptist minister heads Esperanza USA, which bills itself as the nation's largest Hispanic faith-based community-development organization. It controls Nueva Esperanza (Spanish for "new hope"), a Philadelphia-based network of social services, including a charter high school, a community college, and a $28 million economic development program.

After the 2000 election, Bush's political team was determined to boost the president's support among Latino voters and correctly saw evangelical Hispanics—nearly one-fifth of the Hispanic population—as especially promising. Cortes became a focus of that strategy.

When Esperanza USA hosted the first National Hispanic Prayer Breakfast in 2002, Bush was the star attraction; he would return to the annual event year after year. The administration began channeling millions of dollars into Cortes's organizations. The Health and Human Services Department's Compassion Capital Fund for faith-based programs gave Nueva Esperanza three grants totaling more than $7.4 million. Cortes was able to distribute much of the money to Hispanic churches and service organizations nationwide, thereby strengthening his standing within the Latino community. In July 2004, the Labor Department awarded $2.76 million to Esperanza USA for training at-risk Latino youths in Chicago, Miami, New York, Orlando, and Philadelphia.

- The Bush administration channeled millions of federal dollars to Esperanza USA in courting the Hispanic evangelical minister at its helm.
- In 2004, Bush's share of the Hispanic vote rose from 31 percent to at least 40 percent—with Protestant evangelicals providing most of the boost.
- Nearly one-fifth of the Hispanic population in the U.S. is evangelical.

For Bush, the evangelical Latino community proved to be an ideal target constituency, because in pursuing it the GOP could push the hot-button issues of abortion and gay rights in ways that had been powerfully effective among white evangelicals.

In 2004, the Bush administration's courtship paid off. Cortes, who had backed Ralph Nader in 2000, endorsed Bush. And on Election Day, Bush's share of the Hispanic vote rose from 31 percent to at least 40—with virtually all of the increase coming not from Catholics but from Protestant evangelicals like Cortes. After the election, Cortes told *The New York Times,* "I'm not red, and I'm not blue. I'm brown. You want an endorsement? Give us a check, and you can take a picture of us accepting it. Because then you've done something for brown."

But now, House Republicans' hard-line stands on immigration are clearly jeopardizing their party's gains among Hispanic evangelicals. Over the past year, in a shift frightening to GOP operatives, Cortes has become an outspoken critic of the House Republican leadership, warning of a massive exodus of Latinos from the GOP. "The Far Right is using rhetoric to frame [immigration] in a manner that convinces the majority of Americans that the only alternative is to hunt down and punish these 'drug-dealing people,'" Cortes told *National Journal.* Republican House leaders "have gone too far, a sign that they are desperate and have no true agenda for our country. They should be ashamed, and as a person of faith I have to believe that this will backfire, as it is clearly an act of cowardice."

At a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing in Philadelphia on July 5, Cortes testified that "immigration is the No. 1 issue of concern in our communities. For us, immigration is about family values, about work and living productive lives as contributing members of our communities. Millions of our people are known only to many as 'the undocumented.' Forty million Hispanic-American citizens have undocumented grandparents, mothers, fathers, uncles, aunts, and children. They are not criminals, felons, or gang members, but taxpaying, law-abiding, hardworking members of our families and our communities."

The Bush administration and the Republican National Committee have sought to assuage the fears of their Latino supporters, but key Hispanic conservatives aren't sounding mollified. As he left a recent meeting of the RNC, the Rev. Miguel Rivera, president of the National Coalition of Latino Clergy and Christian Leaders, an outspoken advocate of the Right's social agenda, and a Bush loyalist, declared, "I pray for the soul of the Republican Party."

The Glide Path

Throughout 2004, the Bush administration's strategy of expanding its Hispanic support, especially among Protestant evangelicals, was on a glide path. The GOP's conservative stands on social issues, including gay marriage, abortion, and school prayer, resonated powerfully among the growing numbers of Latino parishioners at Pentecostal and Baptist churches. The administration's faith-based initiatives, in turn, funneled hundreds of grants to Hispanic churches and religious groups, many of them Protestant and evangelical.

In 2004, there were 40.5 million Hispanics in the United States, up from 26.6 million a decade earlier and substantially more than the 34.8 million African-Americans. However, in 2004, only half as many Hispanics as blacks voted, according to the American National Election Studies, because of lower registration and turnout rates, and higher percentages of noncitizens and children. But the Hispanic vote is expected to overtake the black vote in little more than a generation.

The Hispanic vote is especially important in the Southwest, which is rapidly becoming a swing region with the power to decide presidential elections. In Arizona in 2004, 12 percent of voters were Hispanic, exit polls found, as were 8 percent in Colorado, 10 percent in Nevada, and 32 percent in New Mexico. And in two other Sun Belt states—Texas and Florida—the continuation of Republican political dominance will likely depend on whether the party can boost its popularity among Hispanics. By 2004, Hispanics already made up 20 percent of the Texas electorate and 15 percent of Florida's. In every one of these states, Latino voters substantially outnumber black voters.

Hispanics are also the major source of new parishioners in many evangelical denominations. For example, of the 2.8 million members of the Assemblies of God USA, about 500,000 are Hispanic, with Latinos accounting for 52 percent of the growth of that church from 1992 to 2002. Richard Land, president of the Southern Baptist Convention's Ethics & Religious Liberty Commission, said that his denomination has succeeded in expanding into the Hispanic and black communities: "Our denomination is now 80 percent Anglo. In 1970, it was 100 percent Anglo. It's changed with direct intentionality."

Bush's courting of Latino religious leaders was well received during his re-election campaign. Just two weeks before the election, leaders of prominent groups on the Religious Right joined with many Hispanic evangelical ministers to hold an "America for Jesus" rally on the National Mall that featured many signs supporting the Bush campaign. Sherry Cropper, 39, of Wilmington, Del., who brought two such signs to the rally, told *The Washington Times,* "President Bush stands for the godly morals and values that founded this country. John Kerry speaks of the interest of the opposing voice to God."

And the rally's organizer, Bishop John Gimenez, senior pastor of the 5,000-member Rock Church in Virginia Beach, warned, "Our nation is in a severe moral decline. From pornography and homosexuality to abortion to racism, this country is out of control."

In addition to Gimenez, Cortes, and Miguel Rivera, the event brought together such Latino religious leaders as the Rev. Dennis Rivera of the Spanish Central District of the Assemblies of God; the Rev. Rudy Hernandez of the Southern Baptist Convention in Texas; and the Rev. Daniel de Leon of Templo Calvario in Santa Ana, Calif. Non-Hispanic sponsors from the Religious Right included televangelists Pat Robertson and Jerry Falwell; pastor Rick Scarborough, national co-chairman of Vision America; and pastor Rod Parsley of World Harvest Church.

Among GOP strategists, the cultivation of the Hispanic evangelical community was viewed as essential to Bush's re-election and to their party's long-range prospects. As far back as Frank Fahrenkopf in the 1980s, Republican National Committee chairmen have stressed the need to win more black and Hispanic votes. Karl Rove, Matthew Dowd, Ken Mehlman, and most other top Republican operatives are now convinced that the parties are at a tipping point and that the GOP can no longer rely on its overwhelmingly white base to win national elections. In 2001, Dowd argued that boosting the GOP's percentages among minorities would be crucial to winning in 2004: "As a realistic goal, we have to get somewhere between 13 and 15 percent of the black vote and 38 to 40 percent of the Hispanic vote."

On Election Day 2004, the Republicans' Hispanic strategy paid off. "It was a perfect storm for us," a Bush strategist recalls. In less than a decade, the percentage of Hispanic-Americans voting for the Republican presidential nominee had doubled. According to national exit-poll data, Latino support rose from 21 percent in 1996, to 31 percent in 2000, to 44 percent in 2004. More-detailed analyses suggest the actual 2004 figure was probably closer to 40 percent.

Virtually all of the growth in the GOP's Hispanic support came from Protestant evangelicals, the Pew Hispanic Center found. Among Catholic Hispanics, support for Bush remained unchanged—33 percent in both 2000 and 2004. Among Protestant Hispanics, however, support for Bush surged from 44 percent in 2000 to a solid 56 percent majority in 2004.

Meanwhile, the number of Protestant Hispanic voters was growing much faster, by nearly 900,000 from 2000 to 2004, than the number of Catholic Latino voters, roughly 460,000, based on extrapolation from Pew figures. And while Bush increased his Hispanic support by 1.1 million votes, Democratic presidential nominee John Kerry received just 280,000 more votes than Al Gore had four years earlier.

The Immigration Schism

Almost immediately after the 2004 election, immigration superseded the culture-war issues that attracted evangelical Hispanics to the Republican Party. This was especially so because of the

fierce national debate over how to deal with the estimated 12 million illegal immigrants already in this country.

House Republicans' demands for a crackdown on illegal immigrants and Bush's seeming inability to get Congress to approve a new path to legalization have fractured the GOP's promising alliance with evangelical Hispanics. And the break is significant enough to threaten the party's future competitiveness.

This certainly isn't where Republicans appeared to be headed on December 20, 2004, when Bush promised at a press conference to use his political capital to win approval of landmark legislation that would allow illegal immigrants already here to become legal temporary workers and that might open the door to citizenship for some. "We ought to have a system that recognizes people are coming here to do jobs that Americans will not do," Bush declared. "And there ought to be a legal way for them to do so. . . . And I'm passionate on it because the nature of this country is one that is good-hearted and compassionate. Our people are compassionate. The system we have today is not a compassionate system."

Bush's remarks raised the expectations of not only millions of undocumented workers but also their children (some 3.5 million of whom are U.S. citizens by birth), relatives, friends, co-workers, employers, fellow church members, and pastors. Bush's announcement appeared likely to solidify Latino evangelical support for Republicans.

Instead, the president's commitment to a more "compassionate" immigration policy provoked a backlash among House Republicans that threatens to wipe out all of the gains that he and his strategists have achieved among Latino voters. The administration's foundering proposal to provide a path to legal status has become Exhibit A in the collapse of Bush's authority within his own party. In the House, Bush lost control of the debate to the hard-line Congressional Immigration Reform Caucus, chaired by one of Bush's harshest critics, Rep. Tom Tancredo, R-Colo.

The tone and substance of the immigration bill that the House passed on December 16, 2005, demonstrated that Tancredo's 104-member caucus had more muscle than the president on this particular issue. The bill, approved 239-182, provides for border fencing and state-of-the-art technology to halt the flow of illegal immigrants into the United States, requires employers to verify the legal status of employees, and calls for hiring and training 1,000 port-of-entry inspectors and 1,500 K-9 border-control teams. Instead of providing a mechanism for illegal immigrants to achieve legal status, the measure would elevate illegal entry to a felony—a provision that heightened the anxiety of undocumented residents and their allies. Republicans voted 203-17 for the measure, while Democrats and the House's lone independent opposed it, 36-165.

In denouncing the House measure, liberal Hispanic organizations, which tend to align themselves with the Democratic Party, were united with the very same Hispanic evangelicals that the Bush administration had long courted. "The issue of immigration is the most important issue in the Hispanic community," trumping abortion, gay marriage, and school prayer, Cortes said. "If the House Republicans get their way and pass their 'border-protection-only/kick-out-the-undocumented' policy, it only serves to better organize us."

In the Senate, most Republicans (32 of 55) voted in May against legislation that would provide an avenue to legal status, but it passed anyway, thanks to overwhelming Democratic support. Republican lawmakers' intense antagonism toward any proposal that could be construed as "amnesty" kept them in sync with conservative white voters outspokenly hostile to the Bush plan. Over the past two generations, these voters—many of them former Democrats drawn to the GOP by its stands on race, crime, welfare, affirmative action, and gay rights—have been crucial to Republican success.

Faced with the possibility of losing control of one or both chambers in November, House and Senate Republicans now consider it far more important to get their white voters to the polls than to try to bolster the party's support among Hispanics. Bush's immigration proposal has increased the chances that large numbers of white conservatives will opt to sit out the election. "You don't know what it's like to go on talk radio around the country and try to defend the president's plan," said a top administration ally who has tried to build support for the proposal. "I can't tell you how many people told me, 'If the Bush plan gets passed, the Republican Party can kiss my white ass goodbye."

Taking a strong stand against legalization is clearly politically advantageous in some states, at least one poll indicates. In Colorado, Tancredo's home state, immigration has been a heated topic in the Legislature and in the gubernatorial race. A Mason-Dixon survey of 625 Colorado voters conducted July 12–13 for *The Denver Post* showed a decisive 39 percent plurality identifying immigration as "the single most important issue facing the state." When asked whether barring illegal immigrants from receiving state services and from obtaining employment was "good" or "bad," 44 percent said good and 35 percent said bad. While pluralities of Democrats and Hispanics opposed such bans (by 49 percent to 31 percent and 46 percent to 31 percent, respectively), Republicans supported them 2-to-1 (52 percent to 26 percent). Independents supported the bans by 49 percent to 28 percent. (Two of Colorado's three House Democrats, John Salazar and Mark Udall, were among the small number of Democrats voting in favor of the tough House immigration bill.)

The Republican backlash against Bush's immigration proposal continues to roil the Hispanic community. The debate gets much stronger and more detailed play by Spanish-language networks and newspapers than by English-language media. Tancredo and members of his caucus are closely tracked by the Latino media. And their crackdown legislation is so well known within the Hispanic community that many Latino leaders routinely refer to it by the bill number, 4437.

The caucus Web site has outraged many Hispanics by spotlighting dangers supposedly posed by illegal immigration: "Sister Helen Chaska was murdered in late summer 2002 by being strangled with her rosary beads—the beads were found imbedded in her neck. She was also raped. . . . Her accused murderer is Maximiliano Esparza, who is in the United States illegally"; "2 in 3 U.S. Teens Snubbed for Summer Jobs in Favor of Cheap Immigrant Labor"; "The Kissing Bug (Vinchuca) attacks a person in the face while he or she is asleep by 'kissing' them

in the fold of the cheek. Within time, the parasite races into the bloodstream to destroy the heart and other organs. . . . It kills 50,000 people per year south of the border"; "Experts Fear Open Immigration Could Result in Tuberculosis Plague in the United States."

Hispanics have responded to the caucus's success in the House by taking to the streets to protest—500,000 strong in Los Angeles, 300,000 in Chicago, 50,000 in Denver, 20,000 in Phoenix.

Liberal, pro-Democratic groups moved quickly to capitalize on the outpouring of opposition to the GOP bill. We Are America, an alliance of immigrant-advocacy groups and such unions as UNITE HERE and the Service Employees International Union, was organized to register naturalized citizens. The alliance's efforts are based, in part, on the assumption that increased mobilization of Hispanics will help Democrats. A 2006 report by the Illinois Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights contends that the "current Republican-led legislative attacks on immigrants and red-hot anti-immigrant demagoguery sparked the spring 2006 immigrant-rights marches. . . . They are also likely to drive increases in the registration and voting rates of U.S.-born children of immigrants. This could dramatically—and negatively—affect the outcome of the 2008 presidential election for the Republican Party, as well as Republican prospects in numerous state elections."

In a development equally foreboding for the GOP, at least in the near term, many Hispanic evangelical ministers are bitter about the direction of the House immigration debate. "The Republicans have dropped the ball. . . . If they lose this one [the Bush immigration plan], they might as well kiss the Hispanic vote goodbye for a long time," said Daniel de Leon, pastor of the 6,000-member Templo Calvario. De Leon has hosted a Spanish-language version of Pat Robertson's *The 700 Club* and is an outspoken opponent of abortion and gay marriage. During the Reagan administration, de Leon changed his registration from Democrat to Republican. In 2004, he appeared with Bush at events advocating amending the U.S. Constitution to ban same-sex marriage. Now de Leon says he intends to change his registration to "independent."

Latino religious leaders say they are particularly disturbed by the anti-Hispanic undertone of much of the Republican opposition to opening a path to legalization—an undertone, they say, that has served to legitimize more explicitly derogatory comments. Manuel Rivera of the National Coalition, who says his organization represents 1,500 small Pentecostal churches, many of them storefront operations, attended hearings on proposed anti-immigrant ordinances in Riverside, N.J., and Hazelton, Pa. He's appalled by what he heard there: "Let's get rid of these people." "These people have destroyed our town; it's like a stain." He blames House Republicans for the proliferation of such rhetoric. "Due to their lack of responsibility, we are going through one of the worst scenarios in many cities of the United States," Rivera said. "It is a shame to see the animosity that members of Congress have created."

Animosity toward illegal immigrants strikes very close to home for Rivera. More than one-third of the members of his coalition's church are undocumented, he says, as are 17 percent of its pastors.

Samuel Rodriguez, president of the National Hispanic Christian Leadership Conference, said that as the immigration debate progresses, "we need to be clear: We don't know if the Republican Party is the party of Tancredo or the party of Bush. . . . Is the Republican Party anti-immigrant, is the Republican Party anti-Hispanic?"

At least three surveys of Hispanics—by the nonpartisan Pew Hispanic Center, the partisan New Democrat Network, and the Republican-leaning Latino Coalition—show significant Hispanic defections from the Republican Party. A Pew poll of 2,000 Hispanic adults conducted July 3–5 found that the percentage saying that discrimination is now a "major" problem has grown to 58 percent, up from 44 percent in 2002. Fifty-four percent say the immigration debate has worsened the problem of discrimination. From 2004 to 2005, the percentage favoring the Republicans on immigration fell from 25 percent to 16 percent, while those preferring the Democrats on immigration policy slipped from 39 percent to 35 percent. Roberto Suro, director of the Pew Hispanic Center, and Gabriel Escobar, associate director for publications, concluded that the Pew study "shows that Latinos to some extent are holding the Republican Party responsible for what they perceive to be the negative consequences of the immigration debate, but the political impact of that perception is uncertain."

In July, the New Democrat Network polled 600 Hispanics whose preference was to be interviewed in Spanish, not English. The survey found that both Bush and his party were viewed negatively: Bush's favorable/unfavorable ratings were 38 percent/58 percent, while the GOP's were 41 percent/51 percent. The Democratic Party was viewed in a much better light: 65 percent favorable to 25 percent unfavorable. On the issue of immigration, these Hispanics preferred the Democratic Party over the GOP by 55 percent to 22 percent. Asked whether they would rather vote for a Republican or a Democrat, 59 percent said a Democrat and only 23 percent said a Republican. That contrasts with a 2004 poll indicating that Hispanics most comfortable answering in Spanish were almost evenly divided, 52 percent to 48 percent, between Kerry and Bush.

For Republicans, the most disturbing results were from the Latino Coalition survey conducted last December just as the House took up H.R. 4437. The survey looked at 2004 findings showing Bush ahead of Kerry among all Hispanic voters on who would do a better job "keeping America safe and fighting terrorism," even with Kerry on "being in touch with the Hispanic community," and trailing Kerry on jobs, health care, and education. The coalition then asked similar questions in 2005, giving respondents a choice between "Democrats in Congress" and "Republicans in Congress." In every case, congressional Republicans fell far short of Bush's numbers while Democrats matched or improved on Kerry's numbers.

"If the Republican leadership in Congress allows an extremist group to control the debate over immigration reform and put partisan rhetoric over real, commonsense legislation, the GOP will eliminate all the progress achieved by President Bush in attracting Hispanics into the GOP," said Latino Coalition President Robert Deposada.

Matt Dowd, the architect of much of the Bush 2004 campaign strategy, warns that the House Republicans' aggressive approach to immigration endangers GOP control of the national policy agenda not only by alienating Hispanics who are conservative on most social issues but also by eroding the party's gains among white swing voters. "From my perspective, looking at all voters, the thing I am most concerned about is that the debate has to be two-handed. House Republican members are all talking about security without any compassion element. That is going to have a negative effect not only with Latino voters but with moderate suburban voters."

But evangelical Hispanic leaders like Cortes are focused not on how the House GOP's immigration legislation could affect the party's future but on how many Latino lives it could turn upside down. "The Republican Far Right," Cortes warns, "will . . . have to answer for their choice of framing the discussion and using the word 'amnesty' in a deceiving and untrue manner. People of faith understand the true meaning of 'amnesty': It is what Christ provides us. It is free and unconditional."

Cortes added, "A prominent lifelong Hispanic Republican, a clergyman from Orange County, California, who has a congregation of 6,000, said to me after a meeting with the RNC on immigration attended by over 50 of our most prominent Latino clergy, that for the first time in his life he is ashamed of being Republican."

Article 31

Inventing Hispanics

A Diverse Minority Resists Being Labeled

AMITAI ETZIONI

Thirty years ago immigrants from Latin America who settled in the United States were perceived in terms of their home nation—as, for example, Cuban Americans or Mexican Americans, just as European newcomers were seen as Italian Americans or Polish Americans. Today the immigrant flow from Central and South America has grown substantially, and the newcomers are known as Hispanics.

Hispanics are particularly important for understanding the future of diversity in American society.

Some observers have expressed concern that efforts to make Hispanics a single minority group—for purposes ranging from elections to education to the allocation of public funds—are further dividing American society along racial lines. But attempts, both incidental and ideological, to forge these American immigrants into a strongly defined minority are encountering an unanticipated problem. Hispanics by and large do not see themselves as a distinct minority group; they do see themselves as Americans.

Hispanics and African Americans

Hispanics are particularly important for understanding the future of diversity in American society. Already they have overtaken African Americans to become the nation's largest minority, and immigration patterns ensure that the number of Hispanics will continue to grow more rapidly than that of African Americans.

U.S. race relations have long been understood in terms of black and white. Until recently, many books on the subject did not even mention other races, or did so only as a brief afterthought. Now recognition is growing that Hispanics are replacing blacks as the primary minority. But whereas blacks have long been raising their political consciousness, Hispanics have only just begun to find their political legs.

Recent increases in minority populations and a decline in the white majority in the United States have driven several African-American leaders, including Jesse Jackson and former New York City Mayor David Dinkins, along with a few Hispanics, such as Fernando Ferrer, a candidate for the 2002 mayoral election in New York City, and some on the white left (writing in *The American Prospect*) to champion a coalition of minorities to unseat the "white establishment" and become the power-holders and shapers of America's future. The coalition's leaders are systematically encouraging Hispanics (and Asian Americans) to see themselves as victims of discrimination and racism—and thus to share the grievances of many African Americans. Whether they will succeed depends much on how Hispanic Americans see themselves and are viewed by others.

Hispanics and the Census

For several decades now, the Census Bureau has been working to make Hispanics into a distinct group and—most recently—into a race. In 1970, a 5 percent sample of households was asked to indicate whether their origin was Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Central or South American, or other Spanish. But it was only in 1980, that "Hispanics" became a distinct statistical and social category in the census, as all households were asked whether they were of "Spanish/Hispanic origin or descent." Had no changes been made in 1980, we might well have continued to think of Hispanics as we do about other white Americans, as several ethnic groups, largely from Mexico and Cuba.

The next step was to take Hispanics, who were until recently multiple ethnic groups that were considered racially white, and make them into a unique, separate group whose members, according to the census, "can be members of any race." This unusual status has had several notable results. One is the flurry of headlines following the release of new census data in March 2001 announcing that "California Whites Are a Minority"—even though 59.5 percent of Californians, including many Hispanics, chose white as their race. The only way for whites to be proclaimed a minority in California is for no Hispanics to be counted as white—even those 40 percent, or more than four million people, who specifically marked white as their race on

the census form. Another curious result is the awkward phrase "non-Hispanic whites," by which the media now refer to the majority of Americans.

Because of their evolving status in the census, Hispanics are now sometimes treated not as a separate ethnic group but as a distinct race. (Race marks sharper lines of division than ethnicity.) Often, for example, when national newspapers and magazines, such as the *Washington Post* and *U.S. News and World Report,* graphically depict racial breakdowns on various subjects, they list Hispanics as a fourth group, next to white, black, and Asian. Much less often, but with increasing frequency, Hispanics are referred to as "brown" Americans, as in a *Newsweek* article that noted a "Brown Belt" across America. The result is to make the country seem more divided than it is.

Should one mind the way the census keeps its statistics? Granted, social scientists are especially sensitive to the social construction of categories. But one need not have an advanced degree to realize that the ways we divide people up—or combine them—have social consequences. One may care little how the census manipulates its data, but those data are what we use to paint a picture of the social composition of America. Moreover, the census categories have many other uses—for college admissions forms, health care, voting, and job profiles, government budget allocations, and research. And the media use the census for guidance. In short, the census greatly influences the way we see each other and ourselves, individually and as a community.

This is not to suggest that the Census Bureau has conspired to split up the nation. The recategorizations and redefinitions reflect, in part, changes in actual numbers (large increases in the nation's Hispanic population might arguably justify a separate category); in part, efforts to streamline statistics (collapsing half-a-dozen ethnic groups into one); and, in part, external pressures to which all government agencies are subjected. To be sure, the Census Bureau is a highly professional agency whose statistics are set by scientific considerations. But there is as yet no such thing as a government agency that has a budget set by Congress, that needs public cooperation for carrying out its mission, and that is fully apolitical. Likewise, the Office of Management and Budget, which sets the racial categories, is among the less political branches of the White House, yet still quite politically attuned.

Hispanics in Their Own Eyes

How do Hispanics see themselves? First of all, the vast majority prefer to be classified as a variety of ethnic groups rather than as one. The National Latino Political Survey, for example, found that three out of four respondents chose to be labeled by country of origin, rather than by "pan-ethnic" terms such as "Hispanic" or "Latino." Hispanics are keenly aware of big differences among Hispanic groups, especially between Mexican Americans (the largest group) and Cuban Americans, the latter being regarded as more likely to be conservative, to vote Republican, to become American citizens, and so on.

America has, by and large, dropped the notion that it will tell you what your race is, either by deeply offensive blood tests or by examining your features and asking your neighbors (the way the census got its figures about race until 1950).We now allow people to indicate which race they consider themselves to be by marking a box on a census form. Many Hispanics resist being turned into a separate race or being moved out of the white category. In 1990, the census allowed people to buy out of racial divisions by checking "other" when asked about their racial affiliation. Nearly 10 million people—almost all of them Hispanics—did so.

When the Census Bureau introduced its "other" category, some African-American leaders objected because, as they correctly pointed out, the resulting diminution in minority figures both curtails numerous public allotments that take race into account and affects redistricting. So the 2000 census dropped "other" and instead allowed people to claim several races (but not to refuse to be racially boxed in). The long list of racial boxes to be checked ended with "some other race," with a space to indicate what that race was. Many of the 18 million people who chose this category, however, made no notation, leaving their race as they wanted it—undefined.

Of those who chose only "some other race," almost all (97 percent) were Hispanic. Among Hispanics, 42.2 percent chose "some other race," 47.9 percent chose white (alone) as their race, 6.3 percent chose two or more races, and 2 percent chose black (alone). In short, the overwhelming majority of Hispanics either chose white or refused racial categorization, clearly resisting the notion of being turned into a separate race.

A Majority of Minorities

As I have shown in considerable detail in my recent book, *The Monochrome Society,* the overwhelming majority of Americans of all backgrounds have the same dreams and aspirations as the white majority. Hispanic and Asian immigrants and their children (as well as most African Americans) support many of the same public policies (from reformed health insurance to better education, from less costly housing to better and more secure jobs). In fact, minorities often differ more among themselves than they do with the white majority. Differences among, say, Japanese Americans and Vietnamese Americans are considerable, as they are among those from Puerto Rico and Central America. (Because of the rapid rise of the African-American middle class, this group, too, is far from monolithic.)

Intermarriage has long been considered the ultimate test of relationships among various groups in American society. Working together and studying together are considered low indicators of intergroup integration; residing next to one another, a higher one; intermarriage—the highest. By that measure, too, more and more Hispanic (and Asian) Americans are marrying outside their ethnic group. And each generation is more inclined to marry outside than the previous ones.

In the mid-1990s, about 20 percent of first-generation Asian women were intermarried, as compared with slightly less than 30 percent of the second generation and slightly more than 40 percent of the third generation. Hispanic intermarriage shows a similar trend. More and more Americans, like Tiger Woods, have relatives all over the colorful ethnic-racial map, further

binding America into one encompassing community, rather than dividing it along racial and ethnic lines.

In short, there is neither an ideological nor a social basis for a coalition along racial lines that would combine Hispanics, Asians, and African Americans against the white majority to fashion a radically different American society and creed.

Diversity within Unity

Immigrants to America have never been supra-homogenized. Assimilation has never required removing all traces of cultural difference between newcomers and their new homeland. The essence of the American design—diversity within unity—leaves considerable room for differences regarding to whom one prays and to which country one has an allegiance—as long as it does not conflict with an overarching loyalty to America. Differences in cultural items from music to cuisines are celebrated for making the nation, as a community of communities, richer.

Highly legitimate differences among the groups are contained by the shared commitments all are expected to honor: the Constitution and its Bill of Rights, the democratic way of government, peaceful resolution of conflict, and tolerance for differences. These shared bonds may change as new Americans join the U.S. community, but will do so in a largely gradual, continuous, and civil process rather than through rebellion and confrontation. I write "largely" because no country, the United States included, is completely free of troublesome transitions and we have had our share.

No one can be sure what the future holds. A prolonged downward turn in the economy (a centerpiece of most radical scenarios) would give efforts to enlist new immigrants into a majority-of-minorities coalition a better chance of succeeding. But unlike some early Americans who arrived here as slaves, most new immigrants come voluntarily. Many discover that hard work and education do allow them to move up the American economic and social ladders. That makes a radicalization of Hispanics (and Asian Americans) very unlikely. As far as one can project the recent past into the near future, Hispanics will continue to build and rebuild the American society as a community of communities rather than dividing it along racial lines.

AMITAI ETZIONI is author of *The Monochrome Society.*

Article 32

The Changing Face of Arlandria

KRISSAH WILLIAMS
Washington Post Staff Writer

Dozens of Hispanic business owners have moved into the closed stores along Alexandria's Mount Vernon Avenue in the past decade, earning the neighborhood the nickname Little Chirilagua after the coastal village many Salvadorans fled during the country's civil war.

There are nearly 20 Hispanic-owned restaurants, bakeries, salons and sellers of books and inexpensive knickknacks that employ dozens and lure Latinos who are nostalgic for home to the six-block area.

The city's economic development planners say they want to build on this, creating a Latino version of the bustling Chinatowns in Los Angeles and New York. The hope is that non-Hispanics looking for authentic Latin food and products will come to Little Chirilagua, which is also known as Arlandria because it borders Arlington County.

"Hispanic folks from everywhere come. It's known in the Hispanic community," said Marc Brambrut, an economic development specialist with Alexandria Economic Development Partnership Inc. "We don't want to change the identity of the neighborhood." The city just wants to spruce it up a bit to make it a destination spot, he said.

Toward that end, a five-year, $2 million economic development package passed by the Alexandria City Council a year ago includes plans to line the streets with trees, place festive banners on light posts and put sidewalk furniture in front of restaurants and bicycle racks on corners.

A community policing program has drastically decreased the neighborhood's crime rate in the past few years, which should make it more attractive to outsiders, city planners say. The city plans to market Little Chirilagua by holding such community events as street festivals. A local business group plans to hold a pupusa cook-off this summer, inviting people from outside the neighborhood to come to Arlandria to try the traditional Central American dish of cornmeal dough filled with pork or beef and cheese.

Brambrut said the city's plan will draw diners and shoppers from more affluent areas to the Hispanic establishments.

"They want to create beautiful, beautiful Arlandria. Okay, we are with you," said Paula M. Coleto, the owner of Huascaran Restaurant, a local Peruvian eatery. But Coleto said she was concerned the effort might cause rents to increase.

Hector Rodríguez Jr., a Guatemalan who manages the Chirilagua Unisex Salon for his father, also said he was nervous about rising rents. "Rent is already so high," he said.

Salvadorans started several businesses in Arlandria in the late 1980s, and Uruguayans, Guatemalans and Peruvians followed suit.

Walking down Mount Vernon Avenue, signs advertising pupusas for $1.50 and telephone calling cards are written in Spanish. English is rarely spoken. The window of a travel agency advertises trips to El Salvador and Guatemala. A half-dozen Latinos in dusty jeans and sturdy workingman's pants walk into the local *cambio de cheques* establishment to cash their paychecks and send money to their families in Central America.

A little farther down the street, a woman fries plantains in La Feria Bakery's narrow kitchen. The bakery sells the fried fruit and sweet breads and employs about a dozen people. This year, the Uruguayan owner of La Feria opened another kitchen to bake and package fresh Salvadoran bread and sweets for *mercados,* or markets, throughout the area.

At the Chirilagua salon, a woman angles a pair of scissors to clip a man's short, brown hair, while a Latina waits her turn in the sparse waiting room. The salon employs seven stylists and says it takes in $2,000 a week. At Huascaran, the ceviche—a cold dish of flounder, shrimp and scallops prepared with salt, pepper and lemon—draws Peruvians hungry for home. A plate costs $12.95.

"We have to do what the neighborhood can afford," Coleto said.

A few non-Hispanic establishments predate the influx of Hispanic businesses. City planners point to RT's Seafood Kitchen, a Cajun restaurant that opened in 1986, as one of the businesses that draws most of its customers from outside the neighborhood. Former president Bill Clinton ate there. Christopher J. Wells, the restaurant's manager, said RT's hasn't really benefited from the Latino influx because most of its customers are non-Hispanic.

Wells said he likes the way the neighborhood is evolving but thinks it "could use more improvement." He said he supports the city's plans to improve the neighborhood but knows that some Latino business owners are wary.

In recent years, with Hispanic businesses reviving commerce in the area, other non-Hispanic businesses have moved in. A Subway sandwich shop and an H&R Block have opened. My Organic Market, a locally owned grocery store that is similar to Whole Foods Market, opened in Arlandria in October 2002.

Economic development experts say that as Latino businesses lose some customers to non-Hispanic competitors, they must learn to appeal to other customers.

"It's great that Latinos sell to the Latinos, but there is more than that," said Alvaro de Moya, a professor at Montgomery College's Hispanic Business Institute and an economic development planner who works with Hispanic business districts in Montgomery County.

It's about marketing, de Moya said, citing a few small businesses he has worked with that have changed their decor and marketed themselves in English to attract non-Hispanic customers.

City officials say that the first test of its efforts to bring non-Hispanics to the area will be a large, city-sponsored street festival Sunday. For years, this annual community celebration has been held in a soccer field nearby, but this year, the streets will be closed for a real fiesta. City officials say they hope non-Hispanics will come to Little Chirilagua to dance to salsa and merengue music and buy the pupusas, Central American snow cones and yuca con chicharron, a starchy potato served with fried pork.

Coleto, of Huascaran, said she had her own plan to woo non-Hispanics. She has applied for a permit to open a second restaurant in Arlandria called Spectrum.

"It will be international, not only Latino, with Mexican and Italian food, mostly seafood," she said. "It will bring in outsiders and more business. Absolutely. We need multiculturalism."

Article 33

15 Years on the Bottom Rung

ANTHONY DEPALMA

In the dark before dawn, when Madison Avenue was all but deserted and its pricey boutiques were still locked up tight, several Mexicans slipped quietly into 3 Guys, a restaurant that the Zagat guide once called "the most expensive coffee shop in New York."

For the next 10 hours they would fry eggs, grill burgers, pour coffee and wash dishes for a stream of customers from the Upper East Side of Manhattan. By 7:35 a.m., Eliot Spitzer, attorney general of New York, was holding a power breakfast back near the polished granite counter. In the same burgundy booth a few hours later, Michael A. Wiener, co-founder of the multibillion-dollar Infinity Broadcasting, grabbed a bite with his wife, Zena. Just the day before, Uma Thurman slipped in for a quiet lunch with her children, but the paparazzi found her and she left.

More Mexicans filed in to begin their shifts throughout the morning, and by the time John Zannikos, one of the restaurant's three Greek owners, drove in from the North Jersey suburbs to work the lunch crowd, Madison Avenue was buzzing. So was 3 Guys.

"You got to wait a little bit," Mr. Zannikos said to a pride of elegant women who had spent the morning at the Whitney Museum of American Art, across Madison Avenue at 75th Street. For an illiterate immigrant who came to New York years ago with nothing but $100 in his pocket and a willingness to work etched on his heart, could any words have been sweeter to say?

With its wealthy clientele, middle-class owners and low-income work force, 3 Guys is a template of the class divisions in America. But it is also the setting for two starkly different tales about breaching those divides.

The familiar story is Mr. Zannikos's. For him, the restaurant—don't dare call it a diner—with its $20 salads and elegant décor represents the American promise of upward mobility, one that has been fulfilled countless times for generations of hard-working immigrants.

But for Juan Manuel Peralta, a 34-year-old illegal immigrant who worked there for five years until he was fired last May, and for many of the other illegal Mexican immigrants in the back, restaurant work today is more like a dead end. They are finding the American dream of moving up far more elusive than it was for Mr. Zannikos. Despite his efforts to help them, they risk becoming stuck in a permanent underclass of the poor, the unskilled and the uneducated.

That is not to suggest that the nearly five million Mexicans who, like Mr. Peralta, are living in the United States illegally will never emerge from the shadows. Many have, and undoubtedly many more will. But the sheer size of the influx—over 400,000 a year, with no end in sight—creates a problem all its own. It means there is an ever-growing pool of interchangeable workers, many of them shunting from one low-paying job to another. If one moves on, another one—or maybe two or three—is there to take his place.

Although Mr. Peralta arrived in New York almost 40 years after Mr. Zannikos, the two share a remarkably similar beginning. They came at the same age to the same section of New York City, without legal papers or more than a few words of English. Each dreamed of a better life. But monumental changes in the economy and in attitudes toward immigrants have made it far less likely that Mr. Peralta and his children will experience the same upward mobility as Mr. Zannikos and his family.

Of course, there is a chance that Mr. Peralta may yet take his place among the Mexican-Americans who have succeeded here. He realizes that he will probably not do as well as the few who have risen to high office or who were able to buy the vineyards where their grandfathers once picked grapes. But he still dreams that his children will someday join the millions who have lost their accents, gotten good educations and firmly achieved the American dream.

Political scientists are divided over whether the 25 million people of Mexican ancestry in the United States represent an exception to the classic immigrant success story. Some, like John H. Mollenkopf at the City University of New York, are convinced that Mexicans will eventually do as well as the Greeks, Italians and other Europeans of the last century who were usually well assimilated after two or three generations. Others, including Mexican-Americans like Rodolfo O. de la Garza, a professor at Columbia, have done studies showing that Mexican-Americans face so many obstacles that even the fourth generation trails other Americans in education, home ownership and household income.

The situation is even worse for the millions more who have illegally entered the United States since 1990. Spread out in scores of cities far beyond the Southwest, they find jobs plentiful but advancement difficult. President Vicente Fox of Mexico was forced to apologize this month for declaring publicly what many Mexicans say they feel, that the illegal immigrants "are

doing the work that not even blacks want to do in the United States." Resentment and race subtly stand in their way, as does a lingering attachment to Mexico, which is so close that many immigrants do not put down deep roots here. They say they plan to stay only long enough to make some money and then go back home. Few ever do.

But the biggest obstacle is their illegal status. With few routes open to become legal, they remain, like Mr. Peralta, without rights, without security and without a clear path to a better future.

"It's worrisome," said Richard Alba, a sociologist at the State University of New York, Albany, who studies the assimilation and class mobility of contemporary immigrants, "and I don't see much reason to believe this will change."

Little has changed for Mr. Peralta, a cook who has worked at menial jobs in the United States for the last 15 years. Though he makes more than he ever dreamed of in Mexico, his life is anything but middle class and setbacks are routine. Still, he has not given up hope. Querer es poder, he sometimes says: Want something badly enough and you will get it.

But desire may not be enough anymore. That is what concerns Arturo Sarukhan, Mexico's consul general in New York. Mr. Sarukhan recently took an urgent call from New York's police commissioner about an increase in gang activity among young Mexican men, a sign that they were moving into the underside of American life. Of all immigrants in New York City, officials say, Mexicans are the poorest, least educated and least likely to speak English.

The failure or success of this generation of Mexicans in the United States will determine the place that Mexicans will hold here in years to come, Mr. Sarukhan said, and the outlook is not encouraging.

"They will be better off than they could ever have been in Mexico," he said, "but I don't think that's going to be enough to prevent them from becoming an underclass in New York."

Different Results

There is a break in the middle of the day at 3 Guys, after the lunchtime limousines leave and before the private schools let out. That was when Mr. Zannikos asked the Mexican cook who replaced Mr. Peralta to prepare some lunch for him. Then Mr. Zannikos carried the chicken breast on pita to the last table in the restaurant.

"My life story is a good story, a lot of success," he said, his accent still heavy. He was just a teenager when he left the Greek island of Chios, a few miles off the coast of Turkey. World War II had just ended, and Greece was in ruins. "There was only rich and poor, that's it," Mr. Zannikos said. "There was no middle class like you have here." He is 70 now, with short gray hair and soft eyes that can water at a mention of the past.

Because of the war, he said, he never got past the second grade, never learned to read or write. He signed on as a merchant seaman, and in 1953, when he was 19, his ship docked at Norfolk, Va. He went ashore one Saturday with no intention of ever returning to Greece. He left behind everything, including his travel documents. All he had in his pockets was $100 and the address of his mother's cousin in the Jackson Heights-Corona section of Queens.



Figure 1 Comparing Poorly. Mexicans are the third largest group of immigrants, after Dominicans and Chinese, who have arrived in New York City since 1990. Here is how the groups compare.

Source: Queens College Sociology Department from 2000 census date

Almost four decades later, Mr. Peralta underwent a similar rite of passage out of Mexico. He had finished the eighth grade in the poor southern state of Guerrero and saw nothing in his future there but fixing flat tires. His father, Inocencio, had once dreamed of going to the United States, but never had the money. In 1990, he borrowed enough to give his first-born son a chance.

Mr. Peralta was 19 when he boarded a smoky bus that carried him through the deserted hills of Guerrero and kept going until it reached the edge of Mexico. With eight other Mexicans he did not know, he crawled through a sewer tunnel that started in Tijuana and ended on the other side of the border, in what Mexicans call el Norte.

He had carried no documents, no photographs and no money, except what his father gave him to pay his shifty guide and to buy an airline ticket to New York. Deep in a pocket was the address of an uncle in the same section of Queens where Mr. Zannikos had gotten his start. By 1990, the area had gone from largely Greek to mostly Latino.

Starting over in the same working-class neighborhood, Mr. Peralta and Mr. Zannikos quickly learned that New York was full of opportunities and obstacles, often in equal measure.

On his first day there, Mr. Zannikos, scared and feeling lost, found the building he was looking for, but his mother's cousin had moved. He had no idea what to do until a Greek man passed by. Walk five blocks to the Deluxe Diner, the man said. He did.

The diner was full of Greek housepainters, including one who knew Mr. Zannikos's father. On the spot, they offered him a job painting closets, where his mistakes would be hidden. He painted until the weather turned cold. Another Greek hired him as a dishwasher at his coffee shop in the Bronx.

It was not easy, but Mr. Zannikos worked his way up to short-order cook, learning English as he went along. In 1956, immigration officials raided the coffee shop. He was deported, but after a short while he managed to sneak back into the country. Three years later he married a Puerto Rican from the Bronx. The marriage lasted only a year, but it put him on the road to becoming a citizen. Now he could buy his own restaurant, a greasy spoon in the South Bronx that catered to a late-night clientele of prostitutes and undercover police officers.

Since then, he has bought and sold more than a dozen New York diners, but none have been more successful than the original 3 Guys, which opened in 1978. He and his partners own two other restaurants with the same name farther up Madison Avenue, but they have never replicated the high-end appeal of the original.

"When employees come in I teach them, 'Hey, this is a different neighborhood,' " Mr. Zannikos said. What may be standard in some other diners is not tolerated here. There are no Greek flags or tourism posters. There is no television or twirling tower of cakes with cream pompadours. Waiters are forbidden to chew gum. No customer is ever called "Honey."

"They know their place and I know my place," Mr. Zannikos said of his customers. "It's as simple as that."

His place in society now is a far cry from his days in the Bronx. He and his second wife, June, live in Wyckoff, a New Jersey suburb where he pampers fig trees and dutifully looks after a bird feeder shaped like the Parthenon. They own a condominium in Florida. His three children all went far beyond his second-grade education, finishing high school or attending college.

They have all done well, as has Mr. Zannikos, who says he makes about $130,000 a year. He says he is not sensitive to class distinctions, but he admits he was bothered when some people mistook him for the caterer at fund-raising dinners for the local Greek church he helped build.

All in all, he thinks immigrants today have a better chance of moving up the class ladder than he did 50 years ago.

"At that time, no bank would give us any money, but today they give you credit cards in the mail," he said. "New York still gives you more opportunity that any other place. If you want to do things, you will."

He says he has done well, and he is content with his station in life. "I'm in the middle and I'm happy."

A Divisive Issue

Mr. Peralta cannot guess what class Mr. Zannikos belongs to. But he is certain that it is much tougher for an immigrant to get ahead today than 50 years ago. And he has no doubt about his own class.

"La pobreza," he says. "Poverty."

It was not what he expected when he boarded the bus to the border, but it did not take long for him to realize that success in the United States required more than hard work. "A lot of it has to do with luck," he said during a lunch break on a stoop around the corner from the Queens diner where he went to work after 3 Guys.

"People come here, and in no more than a year or two they can buy their own house and have a car," Mr. Peralta said. "Me, I've been here 15 years, and if I die tomorrow, there wouldn't even be enough money to bury me."

In 1990, Mr. Peralta was in the vanguard of Mexican immigrants who bypassed the traditional barrios in border states to work in far-flung cities like Denver and New York. The 2000 census counted 186,872 Mexicans in New York, triple the 1990 figure, and there are undoubtedly many more today. The Mexican consulate, which serves the metropolitan region, has issued more than 500,000 ID cards just since 2001.

Fifty years ago, illegal immigration was a minor problem. Now it is a divisive national issue, pitting those who welcome cheap labor against those with concerns about border security and the cost of providing social services. Though newly arrived Mexicans often work in industries that rely on cheap labor, like restaurants and construction, they rarely organize. Most are desperate to stay out of sight.

Mr. Peralta hooked up with his uncle the morning he arrived in New York. He did not work for weeks until the bakery where the uncle worked had an opening, a part-time job making muffins. He took it, though he didn't know muffins from crumb cake. When he saw that he would not make enough to repay his father, he took a second job making night deliveries for a Manhattan diner. By the end of his first day he was so lost he had to spend all his tip money on a cab ride home.

He quit the diner, but working there even briefly opened his eyes to how easy it could be to make money in New York. Diners were everywhere, and so were jobs making deliveries, washing dishes or busing tables. In six months, Mr. Peralta had paid back the money his father gave him. He bounced from job to job and in 1995, eager to show off his newfound success, he went back to Mexico with his pockets full of money, and he married. He was 25 then, the same age at which Mr. Zannikos married. But the similarities end there.

When Mr. Zannikos jumped ship, he left Greece behind for good. Though he himself had no documents, the compatriots he encountered on his first days were here legally, like most other Greek immigrants, and could help him. Greeks had never come to the United States in large numbers—the 2000 census counted only 29,805 New Yorkers born in Greece—but they tended to settle in just a few areas, like the Astoria section of Queens, which became cohesive communities ready to help new arrivals.

Mr. Peralta, like many other Mexicans, is trying to make it on his own and has never severed his emotional or financial ties to home. After five years in New York's Latino community, he spoke little English and owned little more than the clothes on

his back. He decided to return to Huamuxtitlán (pronounced wa-moosh-teet-LAHN), the dusty village beneath a flat-topped mountain where he was born.

"People thought that since I was coming back from el Norte, I would be so rich that I could spread money around," he said. Still, he felt privileged: his New York wages dwarfed the $1,000 a year he might have made in Mexico.

He met a shy, pretty girl named Matilde in Huamuxtitlán, married her and returned with her to New York, again illegally, all in a matter of weeks. Their first child was born in 1996. Mr. Peralta soon found that supporting a family made it harder to save money. Then, in 1999, he got the job at 3 Guys.

"Barba Yanni helped me learn how to prepare things the way customers like them," Mr. Peralta said, referring to Mr. Zannikos with a Greek title of respect that means Uncle John.

The restaurant became his school. He learned how to sauté a fish so that it looked like a work of art. The three partners lent him money and said they would help him get immigration documents. The pay was good.

But there were tensions with the other workers. Instead of hanging their orders on a rack, the waiters shouted them out, in Greek, Spanish and a kind of fractured English. Sometimes Mr. Peralta did not understand, and they argued. Soon he was known as a hothead.

Still, he worked hard, and every night he returned to his growing family. Matilde, now 27, cleaned houses until the second child, Heidi, was born three years ago. Now she tries to sell Mary Kay products to other mothers at Public School 12, which their son, Antony, 8, attends.

Most weeks, Mr. Peralta could make as much as $600. Over the course of a year that could come to over $30,000, enough to approach the lower middle class. But the life he leads is far from that and uncertainty hovers over everything about his life, starting with his paycheck.

To earn $600, he has to work at least 10 hours a day, six days a week, and that does not happen every week. Sometimes he is paid overtime for the extra hours, sometimes not. And, as he found out in May, he can be fired at any time and bring in nothing, not even unemployment, until he lands another job. In 2004, he made about $24,000.

Because he is here illegally, Mr. Peralta can easily be exploited. He cannot file a complaint against his landlord for charging him $500 a month for a 9-foot-by-9-foot room in a Queens apartment that he shares with nine other Mexicans in three families who pay the remainder of the $2,000-a-month rent. All 13 share one bathroom, and the established pecking order means the Peraltas rarely get to use the kitchen. Eating out can be expensive.

Because they were born in New York, Mr. Peralta's children are United States citizens, and their health care is generally covered by Medicaid. But he has to pay out of his pocket whenever he or his wife sees a doctor. And forget about going to the dentist.

As many other Mexicans do, he wires money home, and it costs him $7 for every $100 he sends. When his uncle, his nephew and his sister asked him for money, he was expected to lend it. No one has paid him back. He has middle-class ornaments, like a cellphone and a DVD player, but no driver's license or Social Security card.

He is the first to admit that he has vices that have held him back; nothing criminal, but he tends to lose his temper and there are nights when he likes to have a drink or two. His greatest weakness is instant lottery tickets, what he calls "los scratch," and he sheepishly confesses that he can squander as much as $75 a week on them. It is a way of preserving hope, he said. Once he won $100. He bought a blender.

Years ago, he and Matilde were so confident they would make it in America that when their son was born they used the American spelling of his name, Anthony, figuring it would help pave his passage into the mainstream. But even that effort failed.

"Look at this," his wife said one afternoon as she sat on the floor of their room near a picture of the Virgin of Guadalupe. Mr. Peralta sat on a small plastic stool in the doorway, listening. His mattress was stacked against the wall. A roll of toilet paper was stashed nearby because they dared not leave it in the shared bathroom for someone else to use.

She took her pocketbook and pulled out a clear plastic case holding her son's baptismal certificate, on which his name is spelled with an "H." But then she unfolded his birth certificate, where the "H" is missing.

"The teachers won't teach him to spell his name the right way until the certificate is legally changed," she said. "But how can we do that if we're not legal?"

Progress, But Not Success

An elevated subway train thundered overhead, making the afternoon light along Roosevelt Avenue blink like a failing fluorescent bulb. Mr. Peralta's daughter and son grabbed his fat hands as they ran some errands. He had just finished a 10-hour shift, eggs over easy and cheeseburgers since 5 a.m. It had been especially hard to stand the monotony that day. He kept thinking about what was going on in Mexico, where it was the feast day of Our Lady of the Rosary. And, oh, what a feast there was—sweets and handmade tamales, a parade, even a bullfight. At night, fireworks, bursting loud and bright against the green folds of the mountains. Paid for, in part, by the money he sends home.

But instead of partying, he was walking his children to the Arab supermarket on Roosevelt Avenue to buy packages of chicken and spare ribs, and hoping to get to use the kitchen. And though he knew better, he grabbed a package of pink and white marshmallows for the children. He needed to buy tortillas, too, but not there. A Korean convenience store a few blocks away sells La Maizteca tortillas, made in New York.

The swirl of immigrants in Mr. Peralta's neighborhood is part of the fabric of New York, just as it was in 1953, when Mr. Zannikos arrived. But most immigrants then were Europeans, and though they spoke different languages, their

Caucasian features helped them blend into New York's middle class.

Experts remain divided over whether Mexicans can follow the same route. Samuel P. Huntington, a Harvard professor of government, takes the extreme view that Mexicans will not assimilate and that the separate culture they are developing threatens the United States.

Most others believe that recent Mexican immigrants will eventually take their place in society, and perhaps someday muster political clout commensurate with their numbers, though significant impediments are slowing their progress. Francisco Rivera-Batiz, a Columbia University economics professor, says that prejudice remains a problem, that factory jobs have all but disappeared, and that there is a growing gap between the educational demands of the economy and the limited schooling that the newest Mexicans have when they arrive.

But the biggest obstacle by far, and the one that separates newly arrived Mexicans from Greeks, Italians and most other immigrants—including earlier generations of Mexicans—is their illegal status. Professor Rivera-Batiz studied what happened to illegal Mexican immigrants who became legal after the last national amnesty in 1986. Within a few years, their incomes rose 20 percent and their English improved greatly.

"Legalization," he said, "helped them tremendously."

Although the Bush administration is again talking about legalizing some Mexicans with a guest worker program, there is opposition to another amnesty, and the number of Mexicans illegally living in the United States continues to soar. Desperate to get their papers any way they can, many turn to shady storefront legal offices. Like Mr. Peralta, they sign on to illusory schemes that cost hundreds of dollars but almost never produce the promised green cards.

Until the 1980's, Mexican immigration was largely seasonal and mostly limited to agricultural workers. But then economic chaos in Mexico sent a flood of immigrants northward, many of them poorly educated farmers from the impoverished countryside. Tighter security on the border made it harder for Mexicans to move back and forth in the traditional way, so they tended to stay here, searching for low-paying unskilled jobs and concentrating in barrios where Spanish, constantly replenished, never loses its immediacy.

"Cuidado!" Mr. Peralta shouted when Antony carelessly stepped into Roosevelt Avenue without looking. Although the boy is taught in English at school, he rarely uses anything but Spanish at home.

Even now, after 15 years in New York, Mr. Peralta speaks little English. He tried English classes once, but could not get his mind to accept the new sounds. So he dropped it, and has stuck with only Spanish, which he concedes is "the language of busboys" in New York. But as long as he stays in his neighborhood, it is all he needs.

It was late afternoon by the time Mr. Peralta and his children headed home. The run-down house, the overheated room, the stacked mattress and the hoarded toilet paper—all remind him how far he would have to go to achieve a success like Mr. Zannikos's.

Still, he says, he has done far better than he could ever have done in Mexico. He realizes that the money he sends to his family there is not enough to satisfy his father, who built stairs for a second floor of his house made of concrete blocks in Huamuxtitlán, even though there is no second floor. He believes Manuel has made it big in New York and he is waiting for money from America to complete the upstairs.

Manuel has never told him the truth about his life up north. He said his father's images of America came from another era. The older man does not know how tough it is to be a Mexican immigrant in the United States now, tougher than any young man who ever left Huamuxtitlán would admit. Everything built up over 15 years here can come apart as easily as an adobe house in an earthquake. And then it is time to start over, again.

A Conflict Erupts

It was the end of another busy lunch at 3 Guys in late spring 2003. Mr. Peralta made himself a turkey sandwich and took a seat at a rear table. The Mexican countermen, dishwashers and busboys also started their breaks, while the Greek waiters took care of the last few diners.

It is not clear how the argument started. But a cross word passed between a Greek waiter and a Mexican busboy. Voices were raised. The waiter swung at the busboy, catching him behind the ear. Mr. Peralta froze. So did the other Mexicans.

Even from the front of the restaurant, where he was watching the cash register, Mr. Zannikos realized something was wrong and rushed back to break it up. "I stood between them, held one and pushed the other away," he said. "I told them: 'You don't do that here. Never do that here.' "

Mr. Zannikos said he did not care who started it. He ordered both the busboy and the waiter, a partner's nephew, to get out.

But several Mexicans, including Mr. Peralta, said that they saw Mr. Zannikos grab the busboy by the head and that they believed he would have hit him if another Mexican had not stepped between them. That infuriated them because they felt he had sided with the Greek without knowing who was at fault.

Mr. Zannikos said that was not true, but in the end it did not matter. The easygoing atmosphere at the restaurant changed. "Everybody was a little cool," Mr. Zannikos recalled.

What he did not know then was that the Mexicans had reached out to the Restaurant Opportunities Center, a workers' rights group. Eventually six of them, including Mr. Peralta, cooperated with the group. He did so reluctantly, he said, because he was afraid that if the owners found out, they would no longer help him get his immigration papers. The labor group promised that the owners would never know.

The owners saw it as an effort to shake them down, but for the Mexicans it became a class struggle pitting powerless workers against hard-hearted owners.

Their grievances went beyond the scuffle. They complained that with just one exception, only Greeks became waiters at 3 Guys. They challenged the sole Mexican waiter, Salomon Paniagua, a former Mexican army officer who, everyone agreed, looked Greek, to stand with them.

But on the day the labor group picketed the restaurant, Mr. Paniagua refused to put down his order pad. A handful of demonstrators carried signs on Madison Avenue for a short while before Mr. Zannikos and his partners reluctantly agreed to settle.

Mr. Zannikos said he felt betrayed. "When I see these guys, I see myself when I started, and I always try to help them," he said. "I didn't do anything wrong."

The busboy and the Mexican who intervened were paid several thousand dollars and the owners promised to promote a current Mexican employee to waiter within a month. But that did not end the turmoil.

Fearing that the other Mexicans might try to get back at him, Mr. Paniagua decided to strike out on his own. After asking Mr. Zannikos for advice, he bought a one-third share of a Greek diner in Jamaica, Queens. He said he put it in his father's name because the older man had become a legal resident after the 1986 amnesty.

After Mr. Paniagua left, 3 Guys went without a single Mexican waiter for 10 months, despite the terms of the settlement. In March, an eager Mexican busboy with a heavy accent who had worked there for four years got a chance to wear a waiter's tie.

Mr. Peralta ended up having to leave 3 Guys around the same time as Mr. Paniagua. Mr. Zannikos's partners suspected he had sided with the labor group, he said, and started to criticize his work unfairly. Then they cut back his schedule to five days a week. After he hurt his ankle playing soccer, they told him to go home until he was better. When Mr. Peralta came back to work about two weeks later, he was fired.

Mr. Zannikos confirms part of the account but says the firing had nothing to do with the scuffle or the ensuing dispute. "If he was good, believe me, he wouldn't get fired," he said of Mr. Peralta.

Mr. Peralta shrugged when told what Mr. Zannikos said. "I know my own work and I know what I can do," he said. "There are a lot of restaurants in New York, and a lot of workers."

When 3 Guys fired Mr. Peralta, another Mexican replaced him, just as Mr. Peralta replaced a Mexican at the Greek diner in Queens where he went to work next.

This time, though, there was no Madison Avenue address, no elaborate menu of New Zealand mussels or designer mushrooms. In the Queens diner a bowl of soup with a buttered roll cost $2, all day. If he fried burgers and scraped fat off the big grill for 10 hours a day, six days a week, he might earn about as much as he did on Madison Avenue, at least for a week.

His schedule kept changing. Sometimes he worked the lunch and dinner shift, and by the end of the night he was worn out, especially since he often found himself arguing with the Greek owner. But he did not look forward to going home. So after the night manager lowered the security gate, Mr. Peralta would wander the streets.

One of those nights he stopped at a phone center off Roosevelt Avenue to call his mother. "Everything's O.K.," he told her. He asked how she had spent the last $100 he sent, and whether she needed anything else. There is always need in Huamuxtitlán.

Still restless, he went to the Scorpion, a shot-and-beer joint open till 4 a.m. He sat at the long bar nursing vodkas with cranberry juice, glancing at the soccer match on TV and the busty Brazilian bartender who spoke only a little Spanish. When it was nearly 11 p.m., he called it a night.

Back home, he quietly opened the door to his room. The lights were off, the television murmuring. His family was asleep in the bunk bed that the store had now threatened to repossess. Antony was curled up on the top, Matilde and Heidi cuddled in the bottom. Mr. Peralta moved the plastic stool out of the way and dropped his mattress to the floor.

The children did not stir. His wife's eyes fluttered, but she said nothing. Mr. Peralta looked over his family, his home.

"This," he said, "is my life in New York."

Not the life he imagined, but his life. In early March, just after Heidi's third birthday, he quit his job at the Queens diner after yet another heated argument with the owner. In his mind, preserving his dignity is one of the few liberties he has left.

"I'll get another job," he said while baby-sitting Heidi at home a few days later. The rent is already paid till the end of the month and he has friends, he said. People know him. To him, jobs are interchangeable—just as he is to the jobs. If he cannot find work as a grillman, he will bus tables. Or wash dishes. If not at one diner, then at another.

"It's all the same," he said.

It took about three weeks, but Mr. Peralta did find a new job as a grillman at another Greek diner in a different part of New York. His salary is roughly the same, the menu is roughly the same (one new item, Greek burritos, was a natural), and he sees his chance for a better future as being roughly the same as it has been since he got to America.

A Long Day Closes

It was now dark again outside 3 Guys. About 9 p.m. Mr. Zannikos asked his Mexican cook for a small salmon steak, a little rare. It had been another busy 10-hour day for him, but a good one. Receipts from the morning alone exceeded what he needed to take in every day just to cover the $23,000 a month rent.

He finished the salmon quickly, left final instructions with the lone Greek waiter still on duty and said good night to everyone else. He put on his light tan corduroy jacket and the baseball cap he picked up in Florida.

"Night," he said to the lone table of diners.

Outside, as Mr. Zannikos walked slowly down Madison Avenue, a self-made man comfortable with his own hard-won success, the bulkhead doors in front of 3 Guys clanked open. Faint voices speaking Spanish came from below. A young Mexican who started his shift 10 hours earlier climbed out with a bag of garbage and heaved it onto the sidewalk. New Zealand mussel shells. Uneaten bits of portobello mushrooms. The fine grounds of decaf cappuccino.

One black plastic bag after another came out until Madison Avenue in front of 3 Guys was piled high with trash.

"Hurry up!" the young man shouted to the other Mexicans. "I want to go home, too."

UNIT 8

Asian Americans

Unit Selections

Key Points to Consider

- Examine the origin and sources of misinformation about Asian Americans.
- Does public attention to the activities of Asian Americans associated with Islamic countries seem to be increasing?
- The public passions generated during World War II have subsided, and anti-Japanese sentiment is no longer heard. Do you agree or disagree with this statement? Why? Is this phenomenon related to current perceptions of Arab Americans? Can current detainments be analogized to the Japanese internment camps?

Student Web Site

www.mhcls.com/online

Internet References

Further information regarding these Web sites may be found in this book's preface or online.

Asian American Studies Center
www.aasc.ucla.edu/default.asp

Asian Americans for Equality
www.aafe.org

Asian-Nation
www.asian-nation.org/index.shtml

The Asian American context discussed in this unit provides perspectives on immigrants' adjustment and their reception in various regimes and cultures. Asian Americans are engaged in the ongoing issue of cultural formation, the recovery of tradition, and the incorporation of new ethnicities from Asian into mainstream cultural entertainment. The political and economic forces that frame relationships at the personal and cultural levels pose dilemmas.

The following collection of articles on Asian Americans invites us to reflect on the fact that the United States is related to Asia in ways that would seem utterly amazing to the worldview of the American founders. The expansion of the American regime across the continent, the importation of Asian workers, and the subsequent exclusion of Asians from the American polity are signs of the tarnished image and broken promise of refuges that America extended and then revoked. The Asian world is a composite of ethnicities and traditions ranging from the Indian subcontinent northeastward to China and Japan.

The growth of the Asian American population since the immigration reform of 1965, the emergence of Japan and other Asian nations as international fiscal players, and the image of Asian American intellectual and financial success have heightened interest in this ethnic group in the United States. The variety of religious traditions that Asian immigrants bring to America is another dimension of cultural and moral importance. In what respect are non-Judeo-Christian/Islamic faith traditions issues of consequence? The details of familial and cultural development within Asian American communities compose worlds of meaning that are a rich source of material from which both insights and troubling questions of personal and group identity emerge. Pivotal periods of conflict in the drama of the American experience provide an occasion for learning as much about ourselves as about one of the newest clusters of ethnicities—the Asian Americans.

Article 34

To Be Asian in America

ANGELA JOHNSON MEADOWS

C. N. Le barely remembers fleeing Vietnam for the United States when he was 5. Sketchy images of riding a cargo ship to Guam, having his documents processed and boarding a plane that would take him to Arkansas are all that remain of the life-altering experience.

But the reason for leaving his war-ravaged homeland is crystal clear. After military pressure from communist North Vietnam caused the South Vietnamese government to collapse in 1975, Le's family was in jeopardy.

"The U.S. government knew that those who worked for the U.S. military were going to be persecuted pretty harshly if they stayed back in Vietnam," says Le, whose parents both were U.S. military workers. "So [the U.S. government] made arrangements for their Vietnamese employees and their families to be evacuated."

Le and his family spent their initial days in the United States at Fort Chaffee, an Arkansas military base that served as a processing center for Vietnamese refugees.

"We had a little playground there that kids would play on, so in a lot of ways my experience was more of a typical kid's experience . . . than a refugee experience," recalls Le, a visiting assistant professor at the University of Massachusetts Amherst.

"Adults who had more of a recognition of what was going on would probably tell you, like my parents have said, it was a pretty traumatic experience for them, having to leave their country, leave everything behind and try to start life in a whole new country," Le says.

Le's status as a refugee is different from that of Chinese, Asian Indians, Japanese and some other Asians who have come to America, yet regardless of country of origin or mode or time of arrival, the majority of these immigrants share a common goal—a better life. For some, that means educational or professional opportunities they were denied in their homelands; for others, it's escaping political turmoil; and for others still, it's sacrificing the comforts of middle-class life to provide better chances for their children. It is the quintessential U.S. immigrant story.

"We spoke Chinese in the home and ate Chinese food in the home. The home life was one thing, but going out into the regular world, you have to fit in; there is a certain amount of biculturalism."

Lora Fong, Greenbaum, Rowe, Smith & Davis

There are nearly 12 million people of Asian heritage living in the United States. Asian Americans (a term used by *DiversityInc* to describe both immigrant and American-born Asians) represent East Asian nations such as China, Japan and Korea; South Asian countries including India, Pakistan and Nepal; and Southeast Asian nations such as Thailand, Vietnam and Malaysia.

Still only 4.6 percent of the U.S. population, the Asian-American segment is experiencing astronomical growth. Between 2000 and 2050, the population is expected to surge 213 percent, according to the U.S. Census Bureau. The projected general-population growth during the same time? A paltry 49 percent.

But this growth isn't a 21st-century phenomenon. Historians have traced their presence in the land that evolved into the United States of America as far back as 1763, when Filipinos traveling aboard Spanish galleons jumped ship in New Orleans to escape imprisonment and fled into the Louisiana bayou to establish the first recorded Filipino settlement in America. Some argue their history in the United States dates back to the 1400s.

The Chinese were the first group of Asians to arrive in great numbers, appearing in the mid-1800s. The lure? The potential economic prosperity of the 1848 California Gold Rush and job opportunities associated with agriculture and the building of the intercontinental railroad.

Asian Americans were recruited as laborers—mostly men who were enticed by the opportunity to earn money to support their families or indentured servants who were sent to work off the debts of other Asians back home.

"These people were often deceived," says Gary Okihiro, director of the Center for the Study of Ethnicity and Race and a professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University. "Although these [work and payment] conditions were spelled out to them, they were oftentimes unfulfilled."

Many planned to return to their homelands when their contracted work period ended, but were prevented by U.S. immigration laws.

"They locked those that were here in the U.S.," says Okihiro. "Their remittances were crucial for the sustenance of their families back in Asia, so they were oftentimes trapped into remaining in the U.S."

Subsequent Asians came in waves, with the largest population arriving after the 1965 passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Immigrants and their offspring from China, the Philippines, India, Vietnam, Korea and Japan now account for the largest Asian populations in the country.

A Brave New World

W.E.B. DuBois once described the African-American experience as one of a double-consciousness, rooted in the need to navigate between one's own culture and that of the mainstream. It is an experience that rings true for Asian immigrants and their descendants as well.

"When they arrive, they begin to realize that they're different," says John Kuo Wei Tchen, the founding director of the A/P/A Studies Program and Institute at New York University. "Identities get challenged and they have to deal with what it means to be American or resident alien."

Some Asian Americans relied on assimilation as a means of blending in with American society and as an attempt to escape anti-Asian sentiments that heightened during World War II. "This question about how much they wanted to or did assimilate is a question of how much they were permitted to assimilate," says Okihiro.

Today, ties to home remain strong for new Asian immigrants; however, many families experience acculturation—the process of assimilating new ideas into an existing cognitive structure—with U.S.-born generations.

"Parents would like to think their children are going to be very embracive and very welcoming of the parents' own culture," says Franklin Ng, a professor in the anthropology department at California State University–Fresno. "Parents may have these kinds of supportive mechanisms, encouraging them to go to a temple, or ethnic church, so their children will become familiar with their ethnic culture . . . [but] the youth are having their own trajectory."

Growing up in a Southern California suburb, Le struggled with his Vietnamese name. By the time he reached high school, racial and ethnic tensions had set in and Le decided to go by the name Sean. "At that age, you just want to fit in and be like everyone else," he says.

But a college course on race and ethnicity changed his thinking. "That's when I became more socially conscious . . . and really began to see that my identity . . . was a source of strength . . . rather than a source of embarrassment. I wanted to go back to my Vietnamese name. The name Sean didn't really fit my identity," says Le, who is also the founder of AsianNation.org, an online resource for Asian-American historical, demographic, political and cultural issues.

Today, Le uses his first and middle initials, a way to keep his Vietnamese name—Cuong Nguyen—without having to face the pronunciation problems of non-Asians.

This balancing act isn't limited to language issues. Many struggle with the expectations of both their family and mainstream society.

"We were raised in the family to be in a very consistent way with the traditional Chinese culture," says Lora Fong, a third-generation Chinese American. "We spoke Chinese in the home and ate Chinese food in the home. The home life was one thing, but going out into the regular world, you have to fit in; there is a certain amount of biculturalism."

When Fong's father died in 1984, her Chinese and American worlds collided. She was working at IBM at the time, a company that often assisted employees in making funeral arrangements for loved ones.

"I was a team leader, I was frequently running projects and giving assignments and keeping people on task," says Fong, now an attorney at Greenbaum, Rowe, Smith & Davis in Woodbridge, N.J. Fortunately, Fong had a Chinese-American supervisor who understood that her professional persona was in stark contrast to her status within her traditional Chinese family.

"He knew that I could not take on a role of being in charge [in my family]," Fong recalls. "He just said, 'She's the daughter. She's the youngest. She's not running things. The company does not have a role there, so just back off.' And that was really antithetical to the way the company took on a role in an employee's personal life. That was such a dichotomy."

Striving for Success

Despite viewing America as the proverbial land of opportunity, the path to a better life has not been without roadblocks, particularly for those who arrived prior to 1965. Chinese in the United States were denied citizenship in the late 1800s, while immigration of all Asians, except for Filipinos (whose residence in a U.S. territory gave them the status of nationals), was halted in 1924 through the National Origins Act. It wasn't until the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 that Asian Americans were accepted into the country in larger numbers. The gates to the United States were opened, particularly to those with expertise in the medical, science and technology fields, explaining in part the proliferation of Asian Americans in those disciplines today.

In the face of language barriers, cultural adjustments and government and societal oppression, Asian Americans as a whole appear to have done quite well in America. A look at demographic data shows that Asian Americans as a group surpass all other racial and ethnic groups in the country in median household income and education levels. And while many marketers are turned off by the small size and myriad languages of the population, the buying power of Asian Americans is projected to jump 347 percent between 1990 and 2009, compared with a modest 159-percent increase for the overall population.

For aspirational Asian Americans, social mobility is a priority and education often is viewed as the method of achievement. This focus contributes to the group's economic success.

"Researchers suggest that one legacy of Confucianism in many Asian countries (notably China, Korea, Japan and Vietnam) is the notion that human beings are perfectible if they work to improve themselves," write Yu Xie and Kimberly A. Goyette, authors of *Demographic Portrait of Asian Americans.* "Given this cultural heritage, some Asian Americans may be more likely than whites to believe that hard work in school will be rewarded."

"In China, you have a kind of high-stakes testing," adds Tchen, referring to the country's civil-service system. "The emperor constantly recruits the best to come to the capital or to work . . . It's not so odd for higher education to be seen as the modern variation of that practice."



Figure 1 Asian-American Statistics.

Sources: College Board, U.S. Census Bureau, University of Georgia's Selig Center for Economic Growth.

Mia Tuan's mother and father encouraged higher learning.

"Even though my parents knew nothing about the U.S. educational system . . . it was always assumed that I would go to college," says Tuan, an associate professor of sociology at the University of Oregon.

Tuan's mother wanted her daughter to be the next Connie Chung. "Connie opened that door and parents encouraged us to go through that same door," says Tuan.

"I chose to not be the next Connie Chung, but a whole cohort of Asian-American women did hear that call and answered that call . . . When I told them I was going into sociology, they didn't know what the hell that was, but it was a Ph.D., so that counted for something."

But educational attainment isn't a priority for all Asians in America.

"If you come from a rural society where schooling and education was not such a benefit to your ability to raise crops . . . your emphasis on education would be different," says Tchen. "That would be true for Hmong or Southeast Asians . . . They don't necessarily relate to higher education as a way to better themselves."

This is played out in the educational statistics of Asian Americans. For example, in 2000, 76 percent of Asian Indians and 67 percent of Chinese Americans between the ages of 25 and 34 had a college degree or higher, compared with 43 percent of Filipino Americans and 27 percent of Vietnamese Americans.

The Model Minority and Other Myths

While the myths of universal affluence and intelligence among Asian Americans are just that, it hasn't stopped society from pinning them with the "model minority" label. They are seen as smart, wealthy and successful, and on the surface, it appears to be a positive perception.

"My parents' generation? They liked the model minority stereotype," says Tuan. "In their mind, it has served us well . . . They saw it as the price you pay for being an outsider and it was a price they were willing to pay."

But a look behind the stereotype and its implications reveals a troubling story.

"A lot of these [income] statistics can be misleading," says Le. "Family median income is mainly inflated because Asian-American families tend to have more workers . . . They're more likely to live in urban areas where salaries are higher, but the cost of living is also higher."

Per capital income for Asian Americans in the 2000 census measured $20,719, compared with $21,587 for the overall population.

A look at Fortune 500 companies illustrates that an intense focus on education really doesn't guarantee professional success. Despite high education levels, Asian Americans represent less than I percent of senior-management ranks or corporate boards.

"Everybody cites the success of Asian Americans, yet if you compared the level of education and position with that of white people, they come below white people," says Okihiro. "Their investment in education does not pay off. There's a glass ceiling for them."

Tuan's father was a diplomat with the Taiwanese government; however, after the U.S. office closed, he found it wasn't easy to translate his skills. He ended up opening a pizza shop.

"They lost a lot of status," says Tuan of her parents, whose migration to the United States erased the prestige of their advanced degrees. "That put pressure on the next generation to make it worthwhile."

The belief that Asian Americans can succeed on their own dilutes the notion that some could benefit from programs ranging from Medicaid to affirmative action. Thirteen percent of all Asian Americans live in poverty. Twenty-three percent of Asians outside of the six largest groups are impoverished, rivaling the 24 percent of blacks of this economic status.

"My parents' generation? They liked the model minority stereotyype. In their mind, it has served us well . . . They saw it as the price you pay for being an outsider and it was a price they were willing to pay."

Mia Tuan, University of Oregon

"With this spotlight on the talented tenth, there is neglect of those who may be in the lower tiers," says Ng.

Tuan recalls a meeting with faculty members and graduate students in her department.

"At one point [during the meeting] a graduate student said, 'We take issue with the fact that the department isn't hiring minorities,' " says Tuan, who was one of three recently hired Asian Americans in the department. "I was stunned when the student said that, and I said, 'So, do we not count?' And his answer was basically [that] we didn't, that Asians were this middle category . . . In his mind a minority hire would have been Latino, African American and Native American."

"Everybody cites the success of Asian Americans, yet if you compared the level of education and position with that of white people, they come below white people. Their investment in education does not pay off. There's a glass ceiling for them."

Gary Okihiro, Columbia University

In addition to not being viewed as a traditional minority, Asian Americans also have an imposed identity as "eternal foreigners." Many American-born Asians have at least one story of being asked about their origins. A reply such as Fresno or Washington, D.C., is often met with the incredulous response of: "No, where are you *really* from?"

Even high-profile American-born Asians can't escape the stereotype. When Tara Lipinski defeated Michelle Kwan in the 1998 Winter Olympics figure-skating competition, MSNBC ran a headline that read: "American beats out Kwan." Kwan, who was born in Torrance, Calif., is just as American as Lipinski.

This misconception has some basis in truth, says Le. Approximately two-thirds of Asian Americans are immigrants. "But the social implications are that when someone is judged to be a foreigner, it is easier for that person to be treated as if they're not a real American . . . It becomes easier to deny them the same rights and privileges that are given to real Americans."

Asian Americans also face the perception that they are all the same. When Ng first settled in Fresno, Calif., he was taunted by a group of teenagers who ordered him to "Remember Pearl Harbor Day," an allusion to Japan's attack on the United States. As a child growing up in a Chicago suburb during the Korean War era, Tchen received the label of "gook," a disparaging term for Southeast Asians. Both Ng and Tchen are Chinese.

"The experience of being treated as foreigners, exotics, outsiders, hordes, dangerous, those kinds of images that are recycled in American media . . . perpetuate some kind of basis for people of different backgrounds to come together."

John Kuo Wei Tchen, New York University

But perhaps the most notable misidentification occurred in 1982, when 27-year-old Vincent Chin visited a suburban Detroit strip club to celebrate his impending nuptials. While there, Chin encountered a couple of disgruntled autoworkers, one of whom had recently been laid off. The autoworkers hurled insults at Chin and blamed him for the demise of Detroit's auto industry. After Chin left the club, the two men met up with Chin in front of a fast-food restaurant and beat him with a baseball bat. Chin, who was Chinese—not Japanese, as his attackers had assumed—slipped into a coma and died five days later.

The Asian-American Identity in America

Asian Americans represent nearly 25 countries and speak at least as many languages; however, it is the challenges stemming from stereotypes, misconceptions, discrimination and exclusion that help this disparate group to unite under the umbrella term of "Asian American."

"The experience of being treated as foreigners, exotics, outsiders, hordes, dangerous, those kinds of images that are recycled in American media . . . perpetuate some kind of basis for people of different backgrounds to come together," says Tchen.

"A pan-Asian orientation is useful as sort of an instrument for coalition building for political advancement," adds Ng. "Asian Americans are ignored in the corridors of power, and collectively they can have more impact and can address issues that are more common."

Although Fong identifies first as a Chinese American, she's also concerned about broader Asian-American issues.

"We are all sharing a unique experience in terms of people's pre-conceived notion of who we are and what we should or shouldn't be doing in this society," says Fong, who is a past president of the Asian Pacific American Lawyers Association of New Jersey.

In addition to fighting shared struggles, Asian Americans have been able to collectively celebrate the accomplishments of Asian Americans of various backgrounds. Norman Mineta, U.S. Secretary of Transportation, and Elaine Chao, U.S. Secretary of Labor, are two of the highest-ranking Asian Americans in the Bush administration. Andrea Jung, chairman of the board and CEO of Avon Products, and Indira Nooyi, president and chief financial officer at PepsiCo, are just a few people who have broken what career consultant Jane Hyun describes as the "bamboo ceiling" of corporate America. And the presence of Asian Americans in sports and entertainment continues to flourish.

"When I was growing up . . . there was not exactly a wide range," says Tuan. "But if you were to ask—and I do ask these questions of the students—to name five prominent Asian-American public figures, they can come up with them now . . . I can only see that as being a good thing, because it shifts this notion of what's possible or who or what an Asian American is or what they're capable of. That's very powerful to me."

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Article 35

Lands of Opportunity

Many Chinese are leaving behind their homeland's booming economy for the brand of freedom offered in Maryland and the rest of America

GADY A. EPSTEIN AND STEPHANIE DESMON

It was a quintessentially American scene: a split-level house in the suburbs, with a tree-shaded lawn and burgers on a gas-fired grill for friends and family gathered to congratulate a new college graduate.

The graduate, Kelly Li, citizen of China and future citizen of the United States, was about to go to work for one of the richest corporations in the world, Exxon Mobil.

This party in Lutherville wasn't just a celebration of an American dream realized; it marked the culmination of a plan that began taking shape in Guangzhou, China, some 17 years ago, when Kelly's parents began contemplating an American future for their only child.

Yet from the time Wenhui and Miaolian Li decided they wanted to leave China until they were given permission to do so five years ago, the dynamics had changed. They were leaving behind a new, surging China—departing what is quickly becoming this century's land of opportunity. At a time when the Chinese economy is expanding at a pace of about 10 percent a year, some legal immigrants like the Lis are taking a calculated step down the ladder of opportunity in coming to the U.S.

The Lis traded their white-collar office jobs and middle-class lives in China for blue-collar jobs in the Baltimore area—Mr. Li drives a truck for a company that supplies Chinese restaurants, Mrs. Li packs fruits and vegetables for a business that provides produce to Giant supermarkets. They sacrificed their place on the ladder to secure their daughter's.

For all of the progress in China, some of its citizens still see the U.S. as a better place—for economic reasons, political reasons, educational reasons. History matters, too. To families like the Lis, whose prospects and freedom were cut short by one Communist political campaign after another, America is a place for the next generation to have everything they could not.

Sometimes the reality doesn't match the promise of a nation seemingly brimming with opportunity and freedom. The future can be uncertain. Yet despite the sacrifices most make in taking the leap to a nation that is foreign to them in every way, they continue to come.

Even as prospects improved in China, the number of legal immigrants from there nearly doubled during the 1990s, according to census figures, from 530,000 to 989,000. The small Chinese population in Maryland grew as well.

America's appeal is so compelling that a large number of Chinese who can't wait or don't qualify for visas come anyway, sometimes paying huge sums to shadowy characters who help them enter illegally. Hundreds of thousands may have come this way in the past quarter-century. These immigrants may never realize all their hopes, however, as they face high barriers to success in a country that does not officially welcome them. Often they toil in lives lived mostly underground, as restaurant workers, as housekeepers or nannies to legal Chinese immigrants.

The flow of Chinese into the U.S. shows no sign of abating. Yet a new, albeit small, trend has emerged. In recent years, China's economic boom has enticed back an increasing number of its citizens who have American degrees. For them, moving back to China is the way to move up quickly.

As political leaders in the U.S. argue over immigration policy, they are re-enacting a great historical debate about what it means to be an American, and about who deserves to become one.

The debate today is focused mostly on the impoverished Spanish speakers who sneak across the U.S.-Mexican border. But it often overlooks the question embodied in the Chinese phenomenon: why, even as globalization spreads opportunity, so many people still want to become Americans.

People such as Yaming Luo, Kelly's uncle, who is among the revelers at her graduation celebration. Once a manager of a company in Guangzhou, Luo works in a windowless kitchen in the back of a sushi restaurant in Baltimore County, part of an isolated life lived entirely in the language of his home country. He dreams that one day, years from now, his payoff will come when his grandson—not yet conceived when Luo moved to Lutherville—can immigrate to the United States to study.

Nearby stand Jie and Daisy Zhang, friends of the Li family, who left behind memories of violent repression in China. After tanks rolled into Beijing in 1989 in a crackdown on student protesters in Tiananmen Square, killing hundreds on the

Figure 1

orders of the government, Daisy resolved to leave the country. The Zhangs came to the United States to study. They ended up building fairly typical suburban lives with well-paying jobs, a house on an Ellicott City cul-de-sac and three children, whom they have given the gift of U.S. citizenship.

What the children do with their lives here is up to them. "I never put my mind to my children," Jie Zhang said. "They are American people. They'll decide based on their judgments."

The first Chinese known to have arrived on the East Coast landed as accidental immigrants in Baltimore. In 1785, the trading ship Pallas reached Baltimore from Guangzhou. Three Chinese crew members ended up stranded.

Chinese immigration since then has ebbed and flowed, at times based on the politics of the United States, at others on the politics of China. The largest wave began after the death of Mao Zedong 30 years ago, when Communist China began to modernize and finally open itself to the world. The unlocked doors set off an exodus.

"The political constraints, the difficulty of people leaving, the ideological negative attitude toward the West and all that, all of a sudden all of these things were let loose," said Peter Kwong, a Hunter College professor who is an authority on Chinese immigration. "So there is this tremendous force . . . just wanting to get out of China, and thinking in terms of not just themselves but also their children."

As more people in China developed the financial means to emigrate, immigration to the United States—both legal and illegal—flourished.

Even more Chinese long to leave for the U.S.

Untold numbers of Chinese are regularly turned down for student and tourist visas for fear that they lack sufficient ties to their homeland and may try to stay permanently. Others don't have appropriate connections in the U.S. and can't get visas to immigrate, either because they don't have close relatives abroad, can't get employment or aren't accepted into American colleges. While officials no longer call them quotas, there are complicated, per-country limits for the number of immigrants allowed into the U.S. in any given year.

Those who can navigate the thicket of different visas and who can afford to pack up one life for another are typically those who make the journey halfway around the world. The poorest of the poor in China's vast countryside often lack the means to escape the depth of their poverty.

Legal avenues to the U.S. have broadened significantly in the past 15 years, with new kinds of visas aimed at elite workers and entrepreneurs. But, as it undergoes a historic transformation, China also is bidding to keep them from leaving. Why so many still choose immigration can be traced in part to a history that present-day China cannot transform, no matter how much the country tries to forget.

Family Targeted

If not for China's Communist revolution 57 years ago, Miaolian Li would have been born into privilege. But by the time she was born, in 1954, she was fated to have a much harder life.

She was the daughter of what Chinese of the time called a "big capitalist," the owner of a textile factory in pre-revolutionary Guangzhou. In Communist China, this was a status to be rued, not celebrated. For as in Stalin's Soviet Union, Mao Zedong's China turned its former elites into political fodder. Communist ideology first took away your money and status, then your pride and dignity. Finally, it might take your life. Your children would suffer, too, for the misfortune of having parents who were capitalists or landlords or intellectuals.

For Miaolian and countless others her age, the reckoning was the Cultural Revolution launched by Mao in 1966. Mao turned the normal hierarchy of society upside down, violently setting workers against bosses, students against teachers and, most cruelly, children against parents.

Just 12 in 1966, Miaolian was too young to participate in the worst of the early atrocities. But her family was a target. A slight, often cheerful woman, Miaolian summoned these dark memories as she sat in the Lis' two-bedroom apartment in Catonsville. It's a cozy walk-up with hardwood floors, a 30-inch television, pictures of the Lis and their daughter on the walls and the smell of rice cooking in the kitchen. The year 1966 in southern China might seem most of a lifetime ago, but the act of remembering brought tears to Miaolian's eyes.

"My dad [died] during the Cultural Revolution because he was a capitalist, so I don't like to talk about it," she said. "He was attacked, because most of the landlords and capitalists were attacked during the Cultural Revolution, so my father got very scared, so he committed suicide."

Not long after Miaolian's father jumped from a building to his death, the schools all over China closed, and Miaolian was later sent off to toil in the countryside, along with millions of others with suspect backgrounds.

She stayed there for several years, and because she was a target as a capitalist, she felt the need to become an ardent young Communist, rising to party secretary of her local chapter of the Communist Youth League, asking to join the party that she blames for the death of her father and being rejected because of her capitalist roots. Later, as an adult, when she was working in a Guangzhou factory, she would be invited to join the party—a ticket to a better, privileged life—and she refused.

"I just wanted to do the right thing, and you don't have to be a party member to do the right thing," she said, tears again welling up in her eyes. "In China, if you wanted to have a good career and make lots of money, you had to join the Communist Party and become a party member."

America, Miaolian said, was different, was free and democratic. And in America, her daughter could get the best college education, she said, something the decade-long Cultural Revolution had denied her in China.

"During the Cultural Revolution, we didn't really go to school," Miaolian said. "So we wasted most of our youth."

'Don't Have Fun Here'

Yaming Luo and his family applied for visas to leave China in 1989, when his daughter was about 12 years old. Luo, now 57, wanted just what his relatives the Lis wanted—education, employment and wealth for his only child. But by the time the visas came 12 years later, it was too late for his daughter. She was too old to qualify for a visa. She would have to stay behind.

Her parents still came. In China, Yaming Luo was a supervisor with a transportation company, dispatching trucks on major highway construction projects. His wife, Janet Ji-Hong Li, was an accountant. In Maryland, they are restaurant workers. She makes salad and sushi at the Hunt Valley Japanese restaurant once owned by her sister Fenny Lay. He labors in its kitchen. They work 5 1/2 days a week.

Their lives haven't been broadened by the move from China, only narrowed.

They don't speak English. They have no plans to learn it. They're too old to bother, he says. Besides, behind the heavy swinging doors of the kitchen, they have no interaction with customers, so they don't have much chance to practice the little they know.

They live with Lay in her Lutherville home. They have a car, and sometimes they will venture on an off day into downtown Baltimore, to a Chinese restaurant where they can drink tea and sample some of the dishes. They don't meet people who aren't relatives or in their small circle.

"We just wanted to try out the American experience," Yaming Luo said through a translator. But, he said, "we don't really have fun here. . . . The biggest difficulty for us is we don't understand the language."

There is no real hub of the Chinese community in the Baltimore area.

Of the approximately 1 million Chinese legally living in the U.S. who were born in mainland China, 22,700 live in Maryland, according to census figures, including 3,500 in Baltimore County and under 1,700 in the city.

There was once a Chinatown in Baltimore, centered near Park Avenue and Mulberry Street, but that all but disappeared by the 1970s, as the suburbs opened to people of all races and ethnic backgrounds. Some churches and Chinese schools can be found, but life in the Baltimore area for a new Chinese immigrant can be an isolating experience.

Yaming Luo knows that. But he's here to stay anyway. He figured if he couldn't provide a life in the United States for his daughter, he could provide one for his grandchildren—though Luo had none yet when he left China. Now Luo waits for his U.S. citizenship, which would allow him to apply and wait more years yet to bring over his daughter, now 28, and his grandson, who was born last year.

Now Luo's hopes are not for the next generation but for a generation twice removed, that of this toddler who took his first steps in Guangzhou.

Returning to China

For the many Lis and Luos who make the difficult move to the United States for the next generation, there is a small but growing number of families choosing to return to China for opportunity now, for this generation.

Lu Lin, 40, and his wife Fang Yuxia, 38, recently left Baltimore County, trading a suburban existence, slower pace and quality public schools for the urban fast track and private schools of Beijing. Lu, an ambitious researcher of drug abuse, is among the elite of an already-elite class, the highly educated Chinese who in the past 20 years have come to the United States to study and advance their careers.

Arriving in the Baltimore area in 2001, he worked for the National Institutes of Health at its Johns Hopkins Bayview Medical Center offices and conducted research that led to a major paper in the field of drug abuse research.

If he had come to the U.S. five years earlier, anyone, including Lu himself, would have predicted he would stay in this country. There's more funding here and there are more labs for research than anywhere else in the world.

But Lu is also at the crest of another wave of elites, those who return to China from the United States. Contemplating the prospect of a junior faculty position at a top U.S. college—prestigious but lacking in the space and funding to do major research—he accepted a job as director of China's top drug abuse research institute, at the Harvard of China, Peking University.

Now Lu runs the institute in its six-story building, with a faculty of about 100. The university is constructing an entire floor of laboratory space for him, in addition to a smaller, 500-square-foot molecular biology lab above his office that on its own would be the envy of his former colleagues. "Only a big professor could have that" in the United States, he said.

Using a substantial research budget and his influence as the country's preeminent drug abuse researcher, Lu is supervising several studies, which could enable him to publish more papers

Table 1 Chinese Immigration

Foreign-born Chinese living legally* in the United States:

Year	Population
2000	988,857
1990	529,837
1980	286,120
1970	172,132

*An unknown number of undocumented Chinese also live in the U.S.

Source: U.S. Census Bureau

in the next couple of years than he could have in the United States.

When he goes home, it is in a chauffeured car supplied by the university, to a spacious apartment (also provided by the university), where he might find his 10-year-old daughter, Siqi, studying Chinese after coming home from an international school (half the tuition paid by the university). "That's why so many people come back to China, to realize their dream," said Fang, Lu's wife. "Here they are a real master. China is their homeland."

But as the couple relax in their Beijing living room with their toddler son in front of the family's big-screen TV, and explain what feels good about being back in their native country, their daughter, Siqi, can't help eavesdropping from her room. She stops doing her homework to yell into the living room, "I feel worse."

"The environment is bad. There's too much dust. I have to clean every day. And there's too much homework," Siqi goes on, just warming up. "It's very noisy. And when you're tired, you can't sit on grass. No grass."

Her parents sigh, saying their daughter "doesn't know China."

The China of today bears no visible signs of the physical and psychic wreckage left 30 years ago, when the Cultural Revolution ended. An estimated 200 million people have risen out of poverty since then, cities of glass and steel have risen from fields and dust, and urban centers like Beijing and Shanghai have been torn down brick by brick and remade office tower by office tower.

China is indeed a land of opportunity, a place where almost every tangible indicator of progress seems to go up every year: the Gross Domestic Product, the average urban salary, the number of private businesses, the number of private cars on the road, the number of college graduates, the number of people using the Internet.

The countryside has lagged far behind—utterly neglected by more than a quarter-century of market-oriented policies that favor city dwellers and polluting businesses over farmers and the environment—but that does not change the fact that there are big opportunities in the big cities as never before.

Try explaining those nuances to a 10-year-old. Siqi, after several years in Baltimore County, doesn't feel at home amid the pollution and the culture in Beijing. Even the food seems alien. No mozzarella dippers, no veggie burgers and no pizza. "I hate Chinese food," she says.

Breathing Free

For all of China's recent advancements, some people would leave China and stay away not only to pursue a job or an education, and not just to escape the polluted air or the crowded cities. They leave for freedom.

The Zhangs of Ellicott City decided to leave Guangzhou, at the southern tip of China, after hearing only pieces of information about what happened at Tiananmen Square in Beijing on June 4, 1989. The official, government-sanctioned news said little about the events of that day. But there were purloined tidbits here and there, including from Voice of America, and what Daisy Zhang figured out changed the course of her life.

"I just had this impression—the world is not what they're telling you," she said.

So Zhang, at the time a 25-year-old college graduate working as a computer programmer at the Bank of China, bought a Peterson's college guide and sought out universities with graduate programs that accepted international students.

She ended up somewhere she had never heard of: Virginia Commonwealth University in Richmond. Before the fall semester of 1991, with two suitcases in hand, Zhang arrived there at midnight, starting classes toward her master's degree in biomedical engineering at 7 the next morning. Her newlywed husband was still in China.

She arrived having learned British English in school—a help, but not enough to prepare her for the speed at which Americans can speak. Add to that the Southern accents she encountered in Virginia, and it was a recipe for confusion and isolation. She didn't know any of the basics—how to apply for a Social Security number, how to open a bank account, how to get financial aid.

"My mom kept saying, 'If you don't like it for any reason, come back,' " Zhang said.

But Daisy Zhang, now 42, never turned back. Weary of the China she left behind, where the government can put unexpected obstacles in your way, Zhang believed that in America, if you worked hard, you would succeed. So she worked hard. She learned to keep up with her classes by taping the lectures and replaying them back in her room on her headphones.

And by mid-terms, her professors noticed her academic prowess. They got her a waiver for the $11,000-a-year tuition and found her a part-time job as a research assistant to pay for living expenses. Her husband gave up his job in China, as chief medical examiner in Guangzhou, to join her and start over again with the same diligence.

Life wasn't bad in China, but there wasn't freedom—the freedom to speak your mind, to own your home, to have as many children as you want. No matter how much things have improved in China, it remains a Communist country at its core, and that, to Jie Zhang, means something short of the self-determination he found in the United States, something short of being able to build a deck on your house with simply a permit and a bunch of supplies from Home Depot.

"As long as you work, you can get what you deserve," he said.

The Zhangs ended up in the Baltimore area with good jobs, he working in biostatistics at Johns Hopkins University, she as a senior software engineer in Columbia. They bought a two-story house in Ellicott City in 1998, and in 2002 they became U.S. citizens. Now they have three children, who know only a life of abundant plastic toys and bicycle rides and the consumer society into which they were born.

"I already tell my kids: 'You are lucky,' " said Jie Zhang, 43. " 'Don't compare yourself to your generation. Compare to Mommy and Daddy's generation.' "

American Girl

Kelly Li embodies the new generation in every way, a fresh start without the burden of past hardship.

It was difficult at first in Maryland. Kelly's English was so poor when she arrived that she was placed in ninth grade, though she was just months from high school graduation in China.

But now she is armed with a chemical engineering degree from the University of Maryland, College Park, and a job at Exxon Mobil, where she started in Fairfax, Va., in July.

She hangs out with friends, likes to travel, keeps up on her e-mail and doesn't spend much time assessing how she came to be here. She has little to say about Tiananmen or the Cultural Revolution. Her least favorite subject in school was history.

She is not a political creature. She is Kelly Li, born Li Jiayan 23 years ago in Guangzhou, China, celebrating her graduation in the suburbs, working at the most profitable company in the world, and her parents couldn't be prouder.

She is not quite yet a citizen, but in every other sense, she's an American.

Article 36

Incarceration, Redress, Reconsiderations

Reviewing the Story of the Japanese-Americans

ROGER DANIELS

In the afterglow of the successful campaign for what the Japanese American community learned to call "Redress"—the passage of the Civil Liberties Act of 1988 which tendered a long-overdue apology to Japanese Americans for the war time incarceration of more than 120,000 men, women, and children between 1942 and 1946 and the payment of $20,000 to each of some 80,000 survivors—many community leaders and concerned scholars believed that the resulting heightened public consciousness of the Japanese American wartime ordeal would surely wane. For a variety of reasons this did not occur. Seventeen years later, and sixty-three years after the community's ordeal began, public consciousness about it seemed to be at an all time high. At a time when memory has become an almost obsessive concern among scholars through the world, it is instructive to examine how public consciousness of that complex of events has evolved.

During the war itself, what happened to Japanese Americans was only dimly perceived and little challenged. This was, at least in part, due to the euphemistic language which the government used to describe its actions; for example, the Army, which rounded up the affected population, habitually described United States citizens of Japanese ancestry as "nonalien." Even more importantly, the nation's press, as it almost always does in times of crisis, became cheerleaders for government policy. The *New York Times,* for example, which never challenged the incarceration editorially, printed on February 21, 1942 the text of the fateful Executive Order 9066 under the headline: "Text of Roosevelt's Alien Order."

I shall never forget my personal shock at discovering as a teenager in late 1944 or early 1945 that the young Japanese American whom I met in New York and who had been in a concentration camp was an American citizen. I had read something about what the press often called "Jap Camps," but had assumed that they were for enemy aliens. There were a few flurries of post-war attention, most notably about the passage of a Japanese American Claims Act of 1948, which appropriated a palpably inadequate $38 million to compensate for losses of real property.

After that the wartime events all but disappeared from public consciousness. By 1957, the most liberal college-level American history text in general use (*The United States: The History of a Republic,* by Richard Hofstadter et al.) could only say, in a section headed "Civilian Mobilization" (p. 694): "Since almost no one doubted the necessity for the war, there was much less intolerance than there had been in World War I, although large numbers of Japanese-Americans were put into internment camps under circumstances that many Americans were later to judge unfair or worse."

It should be noted that the inaccurate term "internment" was used and the standard phrase for the event would soon become, and remain,"the internment of the Japanese Americans." I have commented on this phenomenon in "Words Do Matter: A Note on Inappropriate Terminology and the Incarceration of the Japanese Americans," in Louis Fiset and Gail Nomura, eds. *Nikkei in the Pacific Northwest: Japanese Americans and Japanese Canadians in the Twentieth Century* (2005).

Many contemporary texts had nothing at all about Japanese Americans. The U.S. Army's Chief of Military History, Stetson Conn, soon published two thorough accounts ("The Decision to Relocate the Japanese from the Pacific Coast," in Kent R. Greenfield, ed., *Command Decisions,* 1959, and a revised version in Stetson Conn *et al., Guarding the United States and Its Outposts,* 1964), exploding the myth of "military necessity" which had been the official justification for the mass imprisonment. It took decades for that to appear in most history texts. I can remember lecturing at an eastern liberal arts college in the mid-1970s, and being confronted afterwards by a senior history major, who demanded to know if the incarceration had "really happened," and, if it had, why he had never heard about it. By that time, however, as Alice Yang Murray has demonstrated, a kind of master narrative had evolved. That she did so in a commercially-published anthology (*What Did the Internment of Japanese Americans Mean?,* 2000) demonstrates that the subject of the wartime incarceration is now a set piece in many if not most college American history courses.

The tragedy that we have learned to call "9/11" both demonstrated the degree to which awareness of the Japanese American experience had become general knowledge and stimulated further interest among scholars and the general public as the federal government soon reaffirmed its right to incarcerate citizens without trial in the name of national security.

What follows is a select bibliography of books published since the issue of "redress" was resolved. What the sheer volume of work clearly indicates is that even today the wartime experience is still the central event of Japanese-American history.

Alice Yang Murray's anthology, *What Did the Internment of Japanese Americans Mean?* (2000) is the best place to get a notion of what can be called the master narrative. Most of the listed works are, in one way or another, amplifications of that narrative with new data and/or new insights. The rest are "deniers"-authors who either deny that an injustice occurred and/or argue that it was a mistake to pay redress or assert that other ethnic groups, chiefly Germans and Italians who were interned under INS auspices, should have been included. One such author, Michelle Malkin (*In Defense of Internment: The Case for "Racial Profiling" in World War II and the War on Terror,* 2004), a Fox news regular, gained a brief notoriety by arguing that the wartime incarceration and the round-ups of Arab Americans in the wake of 9/11 were both proper governmental activities. The doyenne of deniers, Lillian Baker, claimed in a number of publications (e.g., *Dishonoring America: The Falsification of World War II History,* 1994) that Japanese Americans were free to leave the camps. Those insisting that the selective internment of German and Italian nationals was just as bad if not worse than the treatment meted out to Japanese Americans include Timothy Holian (*The German-Americans and World War II: An Ethnic Experience,* 1996), Arthur Jacobs (*The Prison Called Hohenasperg,* 1999), Stephen Fox (*America's Invisible Gulag: A Biography of German American Internment & Exclusion in World War II,* 2000), and Lawrence DiStasi (*Una Storia Segreta: The Secret History of Italian American Evacuation during World War II,* 2001).

Three scholars who dissent from the master narrative include Page Smith (*Democracy on Trial: The Japanese-American Evacuation and Relocation in World War II,* 1995), who regrets what happened but cannot fault the government. Greg Robinson (*By Order of the President: FDR and the Internment of the Japanese Americans,* 2001) presents the most intense study of FDR's views and actions that we have, and argues that there was a kind of pre-planning by him. Tetsuden Kashima (*Judgment without Trial: Japanese American Imprisonment during World War II,* 2003) also argues that there was pre-planning.

Valuable accounts that focus on the pre-war community are by Valerie Matsumoto (*Farming the Home Place: A Japanese American Community in California, 1919–1982,* 1993); Gordon Chang (*Morning Glory, Evening Shadow: Yamato Ichihashi and His Internment Writings, 1942–1945,* 1997); David Yoo (*Growing Up Nisei: Race, Generation, and Culture among Japanese Americans of California, 1924–49,* 2000); and Susan Smith (*Japanese American Midwives: Culture, Community and Health Politics, 1880–1950,* 2005).

Works focusing on internment in Immigration and Naturalization Service facilities include Carol Van Valkenburg's *An Alien Place: The Fort Missoula, Montana Detention Camp, 1941–1944,* 1995; Louis Fiset's *Imprisoned Apart: The World War II: Correspondence of an Issei Couple,* 1997; *Adios to Tears: The Memoirs of a Japanese Peruvian Internee in U.S. Concentration Camps,* 2nd ed., 2000, by Seiichi Higashide; *Between Two Adversaries: Korean Interpreters at Japanese Alien Enemy Detention Centers during World War II,* 2002, by Hyung-Ju Ahn; *Schools Behind Barbed Wire: The Untold Story of Wartime Internment and the Children of Arrested Enemy Aliens,* 2002, by Karen Riley; and Max Paul Friedman's *Nazis and Good Neighbors: The United States Campaign against the Germans of Latin America in World War II,* 2003.

The largest number of works focus on incarceration in War Relocation Authority camps. Among these are Sandra Taylor, *Jewel of the Desert: Japanese American Internment at Topaz,* 1993; Lane Hirabayashi, *Inside an American Concentration Camp: Japanese American Resistance at Poston, Arizona,* 1995; Harold Jacoby, *Tule Lake: From Relocation to Segregation,*1996; Mike Mackey, ed., *Heart Mountain: Life in Wyoming's Concentration Camp,* 2000; and Jeremy Burton et al., *Confinement and Ethnicity: An Overview of World War II Japanese American Relocation Sites,* 2002. Other recent works on the Japanese American World War II experience include Gary Okihiro, *Storied Lives: Japanese American Students and World War II,* 1999; Lawson Inada, ed., *Only What We Could Carry: The Japanese American Internment Experience,* 2000; Mike Mackey, ed., *A Matter of Conscience. Essays on the World War II Heart Mountain Draft Resistance Movement,* 2002; Erica Harth, ed., *Last Witnesses: Reflections on the Wartime Internment of Japanese Americans,* 2001; Eric Muller, *Free to Die for Their Country: The Story of the Japanese American Draft Resisters in World War II,* 2001; Yoon Pak, *Wherever I Go I Will Always Be a Loyal American: Seattle's Japanese American Schoolchildren during World War II,* 2001; Allan Austin, *From Concentration Camp to Campus: Japanese American Students in World War II,* 2004; Roger Daniels, *Prisoners without Trial: Japanese Americans in World War II,* 2nd ed., 2004; Stephen Fugita and Marilyn Fernandez, *Altered Lives, Enduring Community: Japanese Americans Remember Their World War II Incarceration,* 2004; Brian Hayashi, *Democratizing the Enemy: The Japanese American Internment,* 2004; and David Niewert, *Strawberry Days: How Internment Destroyed a Japanese American Community,* 2005.

The wartime military service of Japanese American men and women is treated in Brenda Moore, *Serving Our Country: Japanese American Women in the Military during World War II,* 2003, and Franklin Odo, *No Sword To Bury: Japanese Americans in Hawai'i during World War II,* 2004.

And finally, the following focus on the aftermath of incarceration: Donna Nagata, *Legacy of Injustice: Exploring the Cross-generational Impact of the Japanese-American Internment,* 1993; Mitchell Maki, Harry Kitano and Megan Berthold, *Achieving the Impossible Dream: How Japanese Americans Obtained Redress,* 1999, and Robert Shimabukuro, *Born in Seattle: The Campaign for Japanese American Redress,* 2001.

Roger Daniels is Charles Phelps Taft Professor Emeritus of History at the University of Cincinnati, and former president of the Immigration and Ethnic History Society. Among his many works on this subject are *Prisoners without Trial: Japanese Americans in World War II* (2nd ed., 2004), and *Guarding the Golden Door: American Immigration Policy and Immigrants Since 1882* (2004).

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Article 37

Thirty Years Later

Reviewing the Vietnamese-American Experience

HIEN DUC DO

April 30th, 2005 marked the 30th Anniversary of the fall of South Vietnam, the end of the Vietnam War, and the sudden arrival of a large number of Vietnamese refugees to the United States. For the last 30 years, this day has been commemorated by thousands of Vietnamese Americans living in communities throughout the United States, from San Jose, CA to Falls Church, VA. It is a day with events that include memories of their homeland, criticisms of the Vietnamese government, celebration of their achievements since their arrival, a reinforcement of their ethnic solidarity, and a day to build a stronger Vietnamese American community. How and why did they resettle here? What has been their adaptation process, and how is it different from that of other immigrant groups? The following essay will offer a brief overview of the literature and recent research regarding these questions.

The 2000 census counted more than one million Vietnamese Americans living in the United States. Most Vietnamese immigrants live in urban and metropolitan areas with well-developed and vibrant ethnic communities. One of the major differences between the Vietnamese immigrants and other more recent immigrant communities is their original status as refugees from an unpopular and divisive war involving the United States. Because of all the controversies regarding that war, their initial reception in 1975 was mixed. Some Americans opposed their resettlement because of their negative views of the war, and because of their fear of negative economic and social impacts on American society. There were others, however, who welcomed the refugees because of their support for people fleeing a communist regime and because of their humanitarian beliefs.

We will not discuss here the many books, articles and films about the Vietnam War itself. One of the triggering events that led to the collapse of South Vietnam was the "Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam," signed in Paris, France on January 28, 1973 by representatives of the United States government, the Government of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam), and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam). Under this agreement, the United States agreed to withdraw its military and economic support, which accelerated the deterioration and the downfall of South Vietnam. The flight of the Vietnamese refugees began within the country with the North Vietnamese military offensive of mid-March 1975, and ended on April 30, 1975 when Saigon, the capital of South Viet Nam, came under the control of the Provisional Revolutionary Government. This resulted in the arrival of the newest Asian refugee group to the United States at the time.

Social scientists have generally divided Vietnamese emigration history into two periods, each with several "waves" (Kelly, 1977; Nguyen, 1985). The first period began in April 1975 and continued through 1977. This period included the first three waves of Vietnamese refugees to the United States. The first wave, with some ten to fifteen thousand people, began a week to ten days before the collapse of the government. The second wave involved some eighty thousand people who were evacuated by aircraft during the last days of April. The final wave during this period involved forty to sixty thousand people who left on their own in small boats, ships, and commandeered aircraft during the first two weeks of May 1975. They were later transferred to Subic Bay and Clark Air Force base in the Philippines and to the island of Guam after having been picked up, in many cases, by the United States Navy and cargo ships standing off the coast of Vietnam.

The second period of the Vietnamese refugees migration began in 1978 and continues even today. Since the fall of South Vietnam, many Vietnamese have tried to escape the political oppression and the major social, political and economic reforms instituted by the new Vietnamese communist government. The numbers are no longer as massive as they once were. A significant characteristic of this period, especially between the years 1978 to 1980, is the large number of ethnic Chinese migrating out of Vietnam and Cambodia (St. Carmail 1983; Whitmore, 1985). There were many Vietnamese who also left during this period. These individuals have been called "Vietnamese boat people" because the majority of them escaped in homemade, poorly constructed boats and wooden vessels (Grant, 1979; Haskins, 1980; Wain, 1981). This was a very dangerous process because of the poor conditions of many of the boats, the escapees' scant knowledge of navigational skills, the limited amount of provisions they were able to bring and, finally, numerous attacks by Thai sea pirates. The death rate of the "Vietnamese boat people" was very high.

To minimize the social and economic impact of the large influx of refugees, President Gerald Ford adopted the Refugee

Dispersion Policy. This policy served four purposes: to relocate the Vietnamese refugees as quickly as possible; to ease the impact of a large group of refugees on a given community; to make it logistically easier to find sponsors; and to prevent the development of ethnic ghettoes (Liu, 1979). This policy was driven by political and financial factors, not social considerations (Kelly, 1977).

As a result, nine voluntary agencies were contracted by the government's Interagency Task Force to handle the resettlement of the refugees in the United States. These voluntary agencies were to find sponsors that were able to fulfill both financial and moral responsibilities and match them with refugees' families. The responsibilities included providing temporary food, clothing and shelter, assistance in finding employment or job training for the head of the household, enrolling the children in school and finally, providing ordinary medical care (Liu, 1979). In short, the sponsors would serve as a resource to introduce the refugees into the society while they become economically independent.

There were four ways for the refugees to leave the temporary refugee camps: resettlement to a third country; obtaining repatriation to Vietnam; demonstrating proof of being financially self-supportive; or finding a sponsor through the voluntary agencies (Kelly, 1977). The method most frequently used by Vietnamese refugees was the family sponsorship method. The other three ways were impractical and difficult. Only a small number of refugees chose to return to Viet Nam. Darell Montero and Marsha Weber (1979) reported that "by October 1975, repatriation had been granted to 1,546 refugees." The majority were military men who were forced to leave their families behind at the time of their evacuation. Similarly, given the nature of their plight, very few refugees had the required resources and few other countries offered their assistance.

As a result, sponsors found by voluntary agencies consisted of religious congregations, parishes or affiliates, individual families, corporations, and companies with former Vietnamese employees. If the refugees had relatives who could fulfill the same requirements, they could qualify as sponsors as well. However, Skinner (1980) reported only 15,000 Vietnamese living in the United States prior to 1975. Most of these individuals were students staying temporarily on visas, former diplomats, or wives of American soldiers. In essence, there was no Vietnamese-American community and thus this method hardly applied to the first waves of refugees.

Nevertheless, the Vietnamese from the first waves used the family sponsorship method more frequently at a later time in order to sponsor family and relatives who were stranded in Vietnam after 1975. The primary ways in which this method was used was through the implementation of two Federal Government sponsored programs that resulted from the Conference on Indochinese Refugees held in Geneva, Switzerland on June 14, 1980. These programs were the Orderly Departure Program and the Humanitarian Operation Program. The goal of these programs, as stated in congressional hearings, was to "provide Vietnamese a 'viable alternative' to dangerous clandestine departure by boat or over land." Many Vietnamese families who arrived during the first and second period, and who now have citizenship or permanent residence status, used the first category to bring family members to the United States.

There were also others who arrived under the Humanitarian Operation Program. The majority of these individuals were older refugees who spent their adulthood as soldiers or civil servants in the South Vietnamese government. They would qualify under the HO Program if they were imprisoned in "re-education" or labor camps for a number of years and could demonstrate this fact. As a result of spending many years doing physical labor with limited nourishment in unbearable conditions, many of the people who came under this program were physically, psychologically and emotionally spent when they arrived. This group within the Vietnamese American community has faced many problems in adjusting to life in the US (Tran, 2000).

Vietnamese American communities have continued to form, develop and expand over the last 30 years. Although the initial group of Vietnamese refugees was dispersed throughout the United States, they have since congregated in several states after their initial arrival. There are many reasons why these communities formed in specific states. First, most communities were a result of the patterns of sponsorship during the initial arrival. In other words, communities tended to form in cities and states that initially received more refugees than others. This created both a critical mass and the opportunity for people to seek out each other for friendship in a new environment. From there, certain needs that were unfulfilled, including food, social services, and religious support, were developed and provided by the people themselves. Family reunification was an important variable that compelled people to migrate. Those with extended families who were originally separated sought ways to live closer to their families in order to receive support from this kinship network.

Second, most refugees chose to migrate to states with job opportunities, especially those that required little English proficiency and specific skills. These tended to be jobs in the high-tech industry, as assembly line workers, as low-level technicians, as quality control workers, in low-end manufacturing positions, in the service sector, and in garment, agricultural, and similar industries. Third, they concentrated in areas where the cost of housing and overall cost of living was reasonable (at the time) so that they could fulfill the dream of home ownership.Fourth, most of the communities were formed in areas where the weather was milder than their original destinations and more like the weather in Vietnam. These and other variables played a significant role in the secondary migration process that led to the continuing development of Vietnamese American communities throughout the United States but concentrated in a few states. Data from the 2000 Census indicate that California is still the state most preferred by Vietnamese immigrants, followed by Texas, Washington, Virginia, Louisiana, Florida, and Pennsylvania. These seven states together include almost 73% of the total number of Vietnamese immigrants in the United States.

One of the benefits that Vietnamese Americans have enjoyed since their arrival in 1975 is a more tolerant climate in the United

States compared to other times in American history. America has gone through tremendous social, political, educational, and religious changes as a result of the civil rights movement, the anti-war movement, and the emergence of minorities of color as a social and political force. In addition, the 1965 Immigration Act had a tremendous impact on race relations in America (Chan, 1991, Warner, 1999, Eck, 2001). This legislation opened the door for immigration by allowing many different immigrants to enter the United States. It also allowed them to bring their own culture, ethnic background, and, more importantly, their religions. In short, for Vietnamese refugees, although there was tremendous pressure to quickly assimilate economically, there was much less pressure to assimilate socially and religiously. As such, they were allowed to practice their religions without much interference and scrutiny and with much more freedom than at any other time in history.

While their initial focus was economic survival and adaptation to life in America,Vietnamese have recently turned their attention to claiming a voice in America by participating in all the available social, political, economic and educational institutions. Although they originally focused on homeland politics and the overthrow of the Vietnamese Communist government, with the coming of age of a new generation they have expanded their activity into issues in the United States as well. While they continue to bring attention to the issues of human rights violations and religious persecution in Viet Nam to Congress and the public with demonstrations, petitions, and full-page advertising in newspapers, they have also focused on issues relating to their status in the United States. To this end, there is an increase in the numbers of Vietnamese Americans engaged in the political process in recent years with a number of Vietnamese Americans running for political office. There are also recent indications of Vietnamese Americans building coalitions and alliances with other groups, especially in demanding more accountability from the local police and legal institutions.

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Article 38

Our Lady of La Vang Parish Turns 25

MEGHAN WALTON

Processing slowly into the church Sept. 3, filling the pews and choir loft so there was standing room only, parishioners of Our Lady of La Vang, Dundalk, raised their voices in praise to the Blessed Virgin Mary as they celebrated the 25th anniversary of their parish.

For parishioners of Our Lady of La Vang, many of whom are former refugees who fled the Communist take-over of Vietnam in the 1970s, the lively Mass marked 25 years of a persevering faith.

When the predominantly Vietnamese faith community first formed in 1981, less than 80 parishioners met in a small school hall in Baltimore City. The community moved to St. Ursula, Parkville, until they saved enough money to purchase a small church on Old Eastern Avenue in Essex.

"They renovated the church building and made it quite nice for liturgy and gatherings," said Sister Constance Gilder, S.S.J., assistant to the eastern vicar. "However, the community grew so rapidly that they were spilling out the doors within a few years."

As the community started to reach the 250-parishioner mark, they began looking for a bigger church. Three years ago the parishioners of Our Lady of La Vang purchased the closed Christ the King church off of Dundalk Avenue.

"To me that is a big achievement. This new place allows us to do everything we need to do," said Anh Dang, who has been involved with the formation of the parish from its beginning. "We now have a rectory for the pastor and guests to stay, a place for Sunday school and a hall for activities."

Mr. Dang said that the parish is more than just a place to celebrate Mass every Sunday—it is where the younger and older generations can come together and keep the Vietnamese culture alive.

"The older Vietnamese people are so lonely in this new culture, and this community helps them adapt," said Mr. Dang. "They can't wait for Sunday to come so they can interact with other people that speak the same language."

The older people are not the only ones who look forward to coming to Mass every Sunday. Parishioners travel from as far away as Howard County just to live out their faith in the culturally-filled Mass they love and adore.

"At present I see a united and lively community of different ages, careers and experiences," said Father Francis Nhi Nguyen, pastor. "I see on the faces of parishioners such pride in their parish, which their contributions of time, talents and treasure have made possible."

In the course of its 25 years, Our Lady of La Vang has supplied the Catholic Church with a Vietnamese priest, two Brothers and three seminarians.

"It is no small wonder that these past years have seen a growth in the church," said Bishop Mitchell T. Rozanski, eastern vicar and one of the celebrants of the Mass. "It is a faith that is not only vibrant in Vietnam but around the world especially in the United States."

After the Mass and before everyone processed out to the sound of Vietnamese drums, parishioners gave thanks to the late Bishop P. Francis Murphy, who was "instrumental in gathering the Vietnamese people into a Catholic community" years ago, said Sister Constance. The community also thanked Bishop William C. Newman, retired eastern vicar; the support of Sister Rosalie Murphy, S.N.D. de N.; Sister Edithann Kane, S.N.D. de N.; Deacon Paul Mann and Father Hy Tan who traveled from Rockville every Sunday for three years until the parish was assigned a pastor.

Parishioners hope that in the next 25 years, the 500 member parish will continue to grow and reach out to the neighboring churches and community.

"We would like to open the door to welcome everyone in the surrounding area," said Mr. Dang. "We would like to attract people to come to our church with activities for the old and young people."

UNIT 9

Eastern European and Mediterranean Ethnics

Unit Selections

Key Points to Consider

- The era of ethnic data collection began with the 1980 Census. A considerable shift toward self-identification began, which allowed persons to claim specific and/or multiple categories. Does the earlier scheme of designating groups have any scientific or political merit? Does personal identification trump all other considerations? How does ethnicity of an earlier era suggest the tension between worlds of meaning discussed in this section?
- What lessons can be learned from the experiences of eastern and southern Europeans?
- Discuss the ways ethnic groups are portrayed in film and video. What are the limits of ethnic comedy?
- Are you surprised by the variety, diversity and intensity of opinions and positions on public policy found within and among various ethnic populations?

Student Web Site

www.mhcls.com/online

Internet References

Further information regarding these Web sites may be found in this book's preface or online.

Africa News Online
http://www.africanews.org

Cultural Survival
http://www.culturalsurvival.org

The North-South Institute
http://www.nsi-ins.ca/ensi/index.html

Order Sons of Italy in America
http://www.osia.org

The National Italian American Foundation
http://www.niaf.org

The Chicago Jewish News Online
http://www.chicagojewishnews.org

Polish American Congress
http://www.polamcon.org

Polish American Journal
http://www.polamjournal.com

Mediterranean and eastern European immigrants entered an industrializing economy that required their labor, much like plantation production in an earlier period required the indentured servant and the slave. But they also met a cultural and political climate of potent challenges and denials of their integrity, religious traditions, and existence.

Ethnicity in America for these immigrants became a complex of identifications and loyalties that included sentimental attachment to home village, region, or nation; a certain religious affiliation; and the notion of being part of a distinct religious culture. But immigration and their ethnicity in America included loyalty to America and an identification with a particular city, district, or neighborhood in which they settled, membership in the local ethnic community and its institutional expressions, and often a sense of belonging to a certain class or distinct occupation. Thus ethnicity was essentially a local identity. The relative saliency of its components and each of these elements of ethnic and religious identity changed under the impact of events and with the passing generations. The emergence of interest in retracing the pathways of these immigrant groups and assessing their participation in intergroup relations in America are topics of many scholarly disciplines. The inclusion of the following articles is but a peek behind the curtain of this neglected dimension of race and ethnic relations in America.

The massive migration of peoples during the past 40 years, which has included significantly large Mediterranean and eastern European populations, has re-engaged the immigrant factor in American politics and the ethnic factor among all Americans. Should ethnic populations be denied their distinctiveness through absorption into the mass or can their distinctiveness accompany them into mainstream modern American identities? This is the pivotal issue of American pluralism.

Not surprisingly most Americans, but especially the children and grandchildren of immigrants, in the process of becoming more conscious of the limiting effects of race in America, began to discover their ethnicity and became increasingly knowledgeable of the roots of their ethnic identities and curious about the group and personal identity that are interwoven in the construction of a pluralistic society. This new perspective on personal and group identity was fashioned from necessity and cultivated within a fresh moral imagination grounded in the recognition that human rights included the various cultural and civilization forms articulated throughout the world which were transplanted and then rearticulated in the social process that transformed American from its origin within the orbit of Anglo-conformity into the reluctant cosmopolitan diversity experienced today. Immigration and new demography of America are defining characteristics and the stunning facts of racial and ethnic realities.

This shift in consciousness regarding race and ethnic relations and the technological capacity, information and data explosion produces new models and explanations of society and culture and further increases awareness of ethnicity and race. The accelerated search for explanations of diversity among and within societies falsified the claims and forecasts that sustained perspectives and social practices about society and its universal determinants derived from the Enlightenment and its sense of common humanity. Though differences between societies and the arrangements of economic production were observable, they were usually explained in terms of theories of progressive development or of class conflict. Unlike these structural causes and determinants, current social practice appears to be motivated by a new horizon and aspiration.

The enormity of the educational effort that is required as we attempt to move beyond the ethnocentrism and racism that bred hatred and destructive relationships between persons and communities is revealed in a number of ways. Philosophic and theological reflection on the foundations of anthropological and epistemological issues associated with explaining human variety and the characteristics of human consciousness is important in this time of national and world crisis. It is precisely at this intersection of social philosophy and science and its grappling with evil uses of power that the crucial breakthroughs in understanding are likely to appear.

Article 39

Miracle

American Polonia, Karol Wojtyła and the Election of Pope John Paul II

JOHN RADZIŁOWSKI

Creating lists of the greatest events of the past is usually viewed as a somewhat facile exercise. For all that, however, "great events" are a common way of periodizing and organizing history, certainly for the general audience, but also for most scholars, whether they admit it or not. In considering the 150-year history of American Polonia, however, few great events are apparent. Polonia's historians have rarely thought of their subject in such terms. However, one candidate for the greatest single event to have affected Polonia was the election of Karol Cardinal Wojtyła of Kraków as Pope John Paul II in October 1978.

This event has heretofore not been covered by Polonia scholars. It was a very recent event, occurring within our own lifetime. The literature on John Paul II's pontificate in English, not to mention his impact in the United States, is large, but curiously there is almost no attempt to understand his impact on American Polonia.[1] This article is an early, tentative effort to survey the impact of Karol Cardinal Wojtyła on American Polonia in the 1970s and after his elevation as pontiff, the impact of the first years of his pontificate on Polish Americans.

Although the "ethnic revival" of the 1970s helped to spark new interest in things Polish, the 1970s were not an easy time for Polish Americans. The problems of urban neighborhoods worsened, further harming many traditional Polonia communities, eroding their geographic centers, and dispersing their members to suburbs where ethnic culture was strongly discouraged. A yet greater problem emerged from the American media and popular culture. With racist jokes directed at African Americans becoming increasingly unacceptable in polite discourse, Polish Americans provided a ready target for attack.[2] From the mid to late 1970s onward, Polonia faced growing anti-Polish sentiment from the media, the entertainment industry, and some quarters of academe. Polonia's organizations themselves faced serious problems in the form of a gradually declining and aging membership. In the larger world, despite some liberalizing trends, the Polish homeland remained under Soviet domination, behind an Iron Curtain that from the outside looked as eternal as the Great Wall of China. These depressing factors did not bode well for Polonia and, as in times past, some predicted its imminent demise, all of which made the events of October 16, 1978 all the more improbable, unexpected, and even providential.

On September 28, 1978, after a short pontificate, Pope John Paul I died in Rome. Eighteen days later, the College of Cardinals elected the first non-Italian Pope in over 400 years: Karol Cardinal Wojtyła of Kraków.

As the word spread to an incredulous world, reaction in major Polonia centers like Chicago was immediate as an account from the *Chicago Tribune* shows:

> Just down the street . . . the women of [the] Polish Roman Catholic Union were working when one of them put down the phone and began to shout.
>
> "We have a Polish Pope. My God. We have a Polish Pope!" And all the women began to cry.
>
> "We cried," one says, "because of what it means for all of us. It has taken so long. One thousand years [the] Polish have been faithful Catholics and now one of our sons has been chosen for the highest honor in the world. We all had the feeling that nothing will ever be the same again for Poland."[3]

Reaction in other Polish-American communities was equally strong. "The election of a Polish Pope is a miracle," said Cleveland activist Ben Stefanski. Richard Jablonski, President of the Union of Poles in America, stated that the news was "so staggering it baffles the mind."[4]

For many Polish Americans the moment would live forever in their memories. Rev. Anthony Iwuc was in Poland with other priests on a bus tour when he heard the news: "I ran to the bus and with goose pimples all over my body, I joyfully shouted 'Cardinal Wojtyła is our new Pope.' Everyone aboard burst into tears, cheers, and song."[5] "I was speechless," wrote *Naród Polski* columnist Sabina Logisz, who had even described Cardinal Wojtyła as a possible papal candidate in 1976. "My first reaction was one of genuine sorrow that my deeply religious mother at whose knee I learned my first prayers—in Polish—and, who frequently reminded me of Grandpa Józef Roszkowski's exemplary Catholicism and patriotism—how he even died on Polish Constitution Day—was not here to share . . . this moment. Then stupor enveloped me and so I remained."[6]

John Paul II's election was one of the few times reporters from the mainstream media in the United States paid attention to Polish-Americans. Requests for interviews from print and electronic media poured into Polish organizations and institutions, especially the Polish center at Orchard Lake. Polish-American community leaders joined National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzeziñski and Sen. Edmund Muskie in the official White House delegation to the papal installation.[7] A large number of ordinary Polish Americans—perhaps 4,000 or more—also made a special journey to Rome for this event.[8] For once, Polish-Americans were pleased with the press coverage they received.[9] The reaction of Polonia's own press was jubilant.[10] One exception to this were the publications of the Polish National Catholic Church, which, while pleased, gave the story little coverage.[11]

Polish-American reactions took two forms. One was a desire to reconnect with both the Catholic and Polish wellsprings of ethnic identity. A letter from a reader, published in journal *Perspectives,* stated "I have never placed much weight upon my origin, taking my Polishness for granted. Yesterday, when in tears, on my knees before my TV set . . . accepting Pope John Paul II's blessing . . . I realized how deeply rooted in me is my Polish nationality."[12]

Many of those interviewed predicted a new era for Polish Americans and especially an end to the hateful anti-Polish "jokes" that were prevalent.

> "The Poles have been downtrodden, treated like dogs, but that's over now, I'll tell ya," says feisty Marie Bykowski. . . ."He is going to be good for us, too. Maybe now people will walk a little taller. . . . Maybe they won't be so quick to change their names so they can get a good executive job. Maybe some won't try to hide that they are Polish."
>
> The women behind her serving rolls and pouring hot coffee into big metal pitchers, nodded in agreement.
>
> "That's right," one said, "maybe now they'll stop all those darn jokes."
>
> "They'll stop," another one said. . . . "It's end of the Polish jokes now."
>
> "The Polish," said Geri Kowalski, stopping. "They came here. They worked hard, stayed quiet, minded their own business. They built their own churches, they bought their little houses, they educated their kids.
>
> "But they were put down. They never got the respect they deserved. That won't happen now. . . . We won't be laughed at anymore."
>
> "It means so much to the older people," says Marie, who is 70 and doesn't look it. "It puts a tear in your eyes. For it's like a final reward for us."[13]

Msgr. Stanisław Grabowski was quoted in *Gwiazda Polarna* saying "now we can look forward to GOOD Polish humor."[14] A Polish activist in Minnesota, Edmund Lukaszewski, told a local paper: "I am so sick of those screwy Polack jokes that I said a Hail Mary (prayer) that for once this stupid Polack thing can come to rest because now there is an internationally respected Polish official . . . we finally made it."[15] Many non-Polish newspaper columnists suddenly discovered the admirable qualities of the Poles.[16]

One of the most crucial factors in Polonia's reaction to John Paul II was that he was relatively well known in Polonia prior to 1978. He was well acquainted with Polonia's leading clergy, including members of the Felician Sister, the Congregation of the Resurrection, and prelates such as John Cardinal Krol of Philadelphia and Bishop Alfred Abramowicz of Chicago. In 1969 and 1976, as Cardinal-Archbishop of Kraków, the new Pope undertook extensive visits in the United States and met at length with Polish-American religious and secular leaders.[17] The future Pope's 1976 visit was particularly important since he spent a great deal of time addressing matters directly related to Polonia.[18]

During the 1976 visit, Cardinal Wojtyła participated in two events, a conference at Orchard Lake and a symposium at the KoŠciuszko Foundation, in which there was an important exchange on the relationship of Polonia to the American Catholic Church. At the KoŠciuszko Foundation, its president, Dr. Eugene Kusielewicz, along with Professors Thaddeus Gromada, Stanislaus Blejwas, Joseph Wieczerzak and Daniel Buczek were able to air complaints about the lack of representation in the American hierarchy.[19] The Cardinal responded to these by asking what Polonia and its clergy were doing to prepare themselves for greater responsibility within the church and pointing out the failure of many traditional Polonia organizations to encourage intellectual and academic achievement.[20] Hard work and patience would eliminate prejudices against Polish Catholics in the United States. "The situation of being penalized because you are Polish will not last," he stated emphatically.[21] He went on to note:

> You can expect much cooperation from us in Poland. But you must yourselves do what you have a right to do. You must be insistent! . . . Polonians must be considered of great value to the church in America. . . . [T]he pastorate must continue to be Polish. Language alone is not the decider. It is the inheritance of culture. The new language can be used but the old one should not be forgotten.[22]

At Orchard Lake, the future Pope stated:

> American and Canadian Polonia is near and dear to our hearts. We look upon you, we the Polish bishops, as an integral part of our responsibility, of our pastoral vocation, of our priestly service. And so that's why we turn to our brother bishops, your American shepherds . . . laying before them your particular needs which came from the common spiritual heritage as ours, as well as from the particular cultures and traditions which you and your forefathers brought with you from your native land.
>
> We therefore ask you to remain faithful to this two-fold heritage. We commend to your special interest and concern the Seminary and School at Orchard Lake. . . . Even though circumstances in the Polonia have changes through the years, this Seminary and these Schools continue to be necessary even though their activities have been extended beyond the limits of bygone decades. . . . During our visit in America we were the guests of many parishes of the Polonia. . . . May they continue to be the guardians of the spiritual heritage of the Catholic Polonia.[23]

Because he was known to Polonia and knew Polonia, the new Pope's election raised tremendous hopes. Some of those hopes were unrealistic. Anti-Polish feelings did not disappear overnight and there were several prominent Americans who felt the new Pope was good material for more "polack jokes." Nevertheless, the new Pope's very public witness and the generally positive coverage he received during the first few years of his papacy made anti-Polonism more difficult to sustain and easier to fight.[24] This was further reinforced by the Holy Father's highly publicized visits to Poland and the United States in 1979, both of which refocused attention on Polish affairs, Polonia, and the remarkable personal charisma of the man himself.[25]

The question of Poles in the American Catholic hierarchy was not resolved to the satisfaction of community leaders, perhaps misunderstanding the role of the Papacy in church governance. Eugene Kusielewicz restated his points, made in the 1976 symposium, in an "Open Letter to Pope John Paul II," just prior to the Pope's visit to the United States in October 1979. It was published in many Polish-American periodicals. "Our hierarchy treats us with contempt," Kusielewicz wrote. "We are treated as if we do not exist." He concluded:

> Your Holiness, I pray that Your forthcoming visit to the United States will make our hierarchy aware of the injustices we are suffering; and not merely our people, but other ethnic groups within the Church. . . . I pray that Your visit will help remedy these injustices; but even more, may Your visit motive an interest in Poland, the country from which we both have come.[26]

For Polish American Congress (PAC) President Aloysius Mazewski the election of a Polish Pope meant new roles for Polonia's leading organizations. It was

> a great and unprecedented honor, but [it] also places upon our shoulders new responsibilities in all our organizational activities which must be conducted with dignity, certain decorum, and a deep sense of history and our responses to it [*sic*].
>
> Because the Vicar of Christ is of our ancestral roots, we must deport ourselves in such a manner as to bring credit and comfort and to the man who stature, greatness and world wide responsibilities light our pathways of living. . . . The time of greatness has arrived for Polonia and for Americans of Polish origin and heritage. This is amply reflected in steadily increasing requests . . . for information and explanation about Poland and Polonia.
>
> To satisfy this urgent need which will keep increasing with the growing status and prestige of Polonia, the Polish American Congress must establish a research and information center which will become the source and depository of all information sought about us and about the land of our ancestry.
>
> Our efforts and attainment in this area have been sporadic and rather poorly correlated [*sic*] and without corrective and expanding efforts we may lose a chance of a lifetime to place Polonia and Americans of Polish origin in proper historical, sociological and cultural perspective. . . . Such [a] research center . . . should be high on our priority.[27]

At the same time, it should be noted, Mazewski effectively vetoed a chance to reform the PAC, also citing the selection of John Paul II.[28]

Polonia's leaders invested a great deal of hope in John Paul II, assuming that he would be like a magic talisman that would solve Polonia's most pressing problems. Of all Polonia leaders, Mazewski seems to have best understood the need for Polonia to undertake some significant response to take advantage of the opportunities that presented themselves. Yet, little seems to have been done to create an information and research center as Mazewski envisioned. Two institutions that should have benefited the most from this unprecedented event were Orchard Lake and Polish Roman Catholic Union of America (PRCUA). At Orchard Lake, a small center to collect information and memorabilia about John Paul II was formed.[29] In the PRCUA, a number of new societies were organized and named after the new pontiff.[30] In neither institution, however, was there an effort to make significant changes or to change the way they presented themselves to Polonia or to the public at large. Why nothing happened on these fronts deserves a fuller discussion than cannot be provided here, but two possible explanations are that even at this stage Polonia was too weak institutionally to undertake major change or that the election of a Polish Pope merely confirmed for some their essential virtue as Poles and thus obviated any need to do things differently.

It is too soon to fully assess the continuing impact of John Paul II's remarkable pontificate. For Polonia, the impact on institutions seems relatively small.[31] There has been no major move to develop new initiatives, find inspiration in the voluminous writings of John Paul II, or to undertake some serious self-assessment. For ordinary Polish Americans, the picture is harder to frame and certainly more complex. The deep connection between being Polish-American and being Catholic was clearly strengthened by the witness of John Paul II and there is some evidence, both in old Polonia parishes and in those founded by newer immigrants, of a more serious devotional life. Although anti-Polish "humor" has not disappeared and hatred of the Pope as a Pole, as expressed in the major media in the years prior to his death in 2005 was also evidence. Nevertheless, anti-Polonism of the kind familiar in the 1970s has declined and is much rarer now than before and the election of John Paul II played a big role in that change.

John Paul II played a major role—*the* major role—in ending communism in Poland and east central Europe. Thus, his greatest impact on American Polonia may be indirect. The fall of communism has created a very new situation for Polonia, one to which it has yet to fully adjust.[32] If and how it does manage to adjust will help determine the true impact of the first Polish Pope on American Polonia.

NOTES

1. Much of the biographical literature is of rather poor quality. The best biography of the Holy Father is George Weigel, *Witness to Hope: The Biography of Pope John Paul II* (New York: HarperCollins, 1999).
2. On the matter of Poles as a stand-in for blacks, see Thomas J. Napierkowski, "The Image of Polish Americans in American Literature," *Polish American Studies,* Vol. 40, No. 1 (Spring 1983), 5–44.
3. *Chicago Tribune,* October 18, 1978, 1, 18.
4. *Cleveland Press,* October 17, 1978, Al, A4. See also, for Minneapolis, Jim Adams, "'Nordeast' Jubilant over Polish Pope," *Minneapolis Star,* October 17, 1978, 1A–2A; for Detroit, see August Gribbin, "Orchard Lake School Recalls Pope's Visits," *Detroit News,* October 17, 1978, 1A, 15A; "Pope John Paul II Brings Special Joy to Area Poles," *Hamtramck Citizen,* November 19, 1978. More generally, see "Cardinals' Choice Delights U.S. Poles" (AP story), *St. Paul Pioneer Press,* October 17, 1978, 2; *Time,* October 30, 1978, 30; and *Duluth News Tribune,* October 17, 1978.
5. *Naród Polski,* November 9, 1978, 2, 6.
6. *Naród Polski,* 2, 5. See also *ibid.,* September 9, 1976.
7. "Remembrances of the Papal Inauguration," undated publication of the John Paul II Center, Orchard Lake, Michigan (copy in the author's possession). This contains a complete list of the U.S. delegation.
8. John Funk, "Poles Here Scurry for Rome Flight," *Cleveland Press,* October 18, 1978, A4; Rick Vernaci, "Local Poles Revel in Audience with Pope," *Oakland Press* (MI), October 24, 1978.
9. Polish American Congress (Illinois Division) newsletter, November.–December 1978, 1–2.
10. See, for example, *Gwiazda Polarna,* October 28, 1978, 2–3; *Zgoda,* November 1, 1978, 1–2; *Zgoda,* November 15, 1978, 1–2; "Habemus Papam Polonicum!" *Perspectives,* Vol. 8, No. 6 (November–December 1978), 1. For a devotional periodical see *Ave Maria* (Buffalo), Vol. 56, No. 595 (January–February 1979), 3–4. Polonia was also inundated with Papal memorabilia. See *Polish American Journal,* issues from December 1978 through 1979.
11. See, for example, "Historyczne Wydarzenie—Polak Papiežiem," *Rola Boža,* October 28, 1978, 20. One curious and now overlooked story that appeared briefly was that the new Pope had actually been married at one time. According to mainstream press reports, "this rumor seemed to have originated in the Polish community in the United States." (See New York Times News Service/Associated Press, supplementary item, October 18, 1978, 46, microfilm copy. The *New York Times* did not publish that week due to a strike, but the report is available on microfilm.) Exactly who in Polonia would have concocted this story and then fed it to the world media is not clear, but the story's details are similar to secret police provocations used against priests in Poland deemed unfavorable to the regime. It is possible that further research in as yet unopened Polish government archives may reveal additional details of this matter.
12. Editorial, *Perspectives,* Vol. 8, No. 6 (November–December 1978), 2.
13. *Chicago Tribune,* October 18, 1978, 18.
14. *Gwiazda Polarna,* October 28, 1978, 3 (emphasis in original).
15. *Minneapolis Star,* October 17, 1978, 2A.
16. Frank Hruby, "Poland Gives the World More than Jokes," *Cleveland Press,* October 18, 1978; *Polish American Journal,* January 15, 1979, 1, and February 12, 1979, 1.
17. See Rev. Adam Boniecki, ed., *Kalendarium życia Karola Wojtyły* (Kraków: Znak, 2000), 294–99, 576–80; Weigel, *Witness to Hope,* 222, 225–26; *Naród Polski,* September 9, 1976; *Pope John Paul II Center Newsletter,* August–September–October 1985, 4–7. Not only did the new pope know

Polonia, but he was well-known by Polonia. Rev. Chester Klocek of Rochester, N.Y., stated after the pope's election: "This man is as well prepared for the job as any man could be," a point later made very strongly by the pope's biographer, George Weigel. See *Polish American Journal,* November 1978, 2.

18. This included participation in a conference on Polonia at Orchard Lake. Other participants included Władysław Cardinal Rubin, Rector Rev. Walter Ziemba, and Msgr Zdzisław Peszkowski. See *Polish American Journal,* November 1978, 2.
19. *Polish American Journal,* November 1978, 2 (reprint from September 1976); Jimmy Breslin column, *Detroit News,* October 29, 1978.
20. *Polish American Journal,* December 1978, 3.
21. Breslin, *Detroit News,* October 29, 1978.
22. *Polish American Journal,* November 1978, 2.
23. "Farewell Letter of Cardinal Wojtyla," *Pope John Paul II Center Newsletter,* August–September–October, 1985.
24 Robert Strybel, "Pope's P.R. Gift to Polonia," *Polish American Journal,* September 1979, 2. See also *Polish American Journal,* December 18, 1978, 1.
25. These visits got wide coverage in Polonia media. See, for example, *Polish American Journal* and *Perspectives.*
26. Eugene Kusielewicz, "Open Letter to Pope John Paul II," *Perspectives,* November–December 1979, 527. Although Polish National Catholic Church periodicals published relatively few items on the new Pope compared to mainstream Polonia publications, this letter was, not surprisingly, one of the items that was printed. See Straž, October 11, 1978, 1.
27. *Zgoda,* December 1, 1978, 1, 7; *Polish American Journal,* December 18, 1978, 1.
28. *Zgoda,* December 1, 1978, 1.
29. *Polish American Journal,* December 18, 1978, 1.
30. See John Radzilowski, *The Eagle and the Cross. A History of the Polish Roman Catholic Union of America, 1873–2000* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), chapter 8.
31. One possible exception is the Polish American Priests Association. See *A Pastoral Plan for Polonia in the USA* ([Buffalo]: PAPA, n.d. [1995]).
32. See John Radzilowski, "Ostanie ofiary zimny wojny?" *Glaukopis,* Vol. 1, No. 1 (2003).

Article 40

Polish Image\Defamation

Our Polish American Self Image: Responding to Its Detractors

To Polish Americans who value our heritage, there is much about our ethnic and national identity and culture that we can rightfully take pride in.

The elevation of the "Polish Pope," John Paul II, in 1978 changed the world and helped bring about the liberation of his homeland through the efforts of the Solidarity movement.

Indeed, it takes no great analytical gift to tick off the many positive features of our Polish heritage. These include a long list of significant historical figures, men and women who have contributed greatly to European and even to world culture, persons like Nicholas Copernicus, Fryderyk Chopin and Maria Sklodowska Curie, Thaddeus Kosciuszko, and Casimir Pulaski, and no fewer than four Nobel Prize winning writers—novelists Henryk Sienkiewicz and Wladyslaw Reymont, and poets Czeslaw Milosz, and most recently, Wislawa Szymborska. Just in the past twenty years, we have experienced the heightened recognition and respect of our heritage that has come from our fellow Americans, who have marveled at the charismatic persona and wise actions of Pope John Paul II and the courage and idealism of the members of the Solidarity movement.

Less well known to our fellow Americans, but just as important in fact, are the qualities of our heritage that we Polish Americans like to believe have contributed to what is good about American life, namely our Polish American family values, respect for the rule of law, our work ethic, and our record of patriotic and military service, among other things. Many of us Polish Americans like to tell our fellow Americans about Poland's historic traditions of constitutional government, religious toleration, and respect for the non Polish peoples who lived within the borders of the great and expansive state that was Poland during its time of national greatness from the 14th to the 18th centuries.

We also like to recall the brave struggles for Polish independence after Poland was partitioned by its imperial neighbors in the years between 1795 and 1918. This heroic tradition is a big part of the memory of the Poland of the Second World War and the Solidarity movement too.

Yet regardless of our own appreciation of these aspects of these and many other positive aspects of our heritage, we cannot ignore a very basic reality. Despite all we know about who we are as Polish Americans, knowledge of our heritage and our culture is not an especially visible part of the American scene.

Yes, we Polish Americans constitute by far the largest ethnic group of east central European heritage—in 1990 the U.S. Census bureau estimated we numbered around 9.4 million members in all and the upcoming 2000 Census survey of national origins of Americans may find we are up to perhaps 10–11 million souls.

But compared to such national ancestry groups as the people of Germany, Irish, British, Italian, and French heritage, we are, in sheer numbers, far down the list. We are also far less numerous and visible than the major ethno-racial populations too, most significantly the peoples of African and of Hispanic heritage. Moreover, because relatively few individuals of Polish heritage have attained high celebrity status in the worlds of mass entertainment, television, radio, film, journalism, or the arts, our heritage is seldom noted in the mass media. Perhaps too, because the Polish American population of New York, though substantial, is still much smaller than those of Jews, Italians, Puerto Ricans, and Irish, we are practically invisible to that city's enormous communications industry. The same is true in Los Angeles, where the predominant ethnic groups are Hispanic and Asian and the European origin Americans are all homogenized into the bland classification of "whites."

There was a time, the 1960s and 1970s, when several Polish Americans rose to fame in American political life, most notably, Senator Edmund Muskie and Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski. Again, this time has passed and while Senators Barbara Mikulski and Frank Murkowski are often seen and heard on CSPAN, they

are hardly household names and practically never appear on the Sunday morning public affairs talk shows.

The fact is that, while Polish Americans account for perhaps 4 percent of the entire U.S. population, ours is not a cultural heritage that is on the radar screen for most of our fellow Americans. Few associate Copernicus with anything Polish, most think that Chopin and Madame Curie were French, and practically none can even pronounce Kosciuszko's name, though everyone can say Kryzewski properly, as the famed Duke University coach insists they do! Ask a non-Polish friend who Pulaski was and be prepared for a disappointment—his and Kosciuszko's heroic exploits no longer even get into our high school textbooks. As for the Nobel laureates, Sienkiewicz and Reymont are unknown and hardly any Americans read poetry anyway. Americans often identify us with polka music, polish sausage, and more recently, paczki. Otherwise, we are practically invisible.

Of course, this is no particularly recent development. Indeed, there was even greater ignorance about Polish Americans and Poland in the decades before the 1960s, when very few members of our community ever got to college or achieved careers in the professions. Until recently, we were, with very few exceptions, a working class people, with origins overwhelmingly out of the Polish villages of an impoverished land under the control of foreign empires. Those empires had no interest in improving their educational or economic conditions.

Our forefathers who organized the Polish American fraternals, the clergymen who built the hundreds of Polish churches, and the businessmen who established the Polish press in America were undaunted. Indeed, they were driven to raise up the masses of immigrants to take greater advantage of the freedoms and opportunities they found in this country and they did achieve much within our Polish American Community, or Polonia. But in general, their accomplishments have been little known about, or celebrated, by the larger American society. The work of our own Polish American Congress, which we rightly recognize and celebrate, is unknown to most Americans. That the Polish American Congress was essential to NATO's expansion in 1999, is something of which even most well educated Polish Americans are ignorant.

Today, we Polish Americans are a people far different from our parents and grandparents of even a generation or two ago. In addition, our children and grandchildren are everywhere moving into positions of professional work and leadership in our country.

All of us know too that we continue to impart our core ethnic values of work, good citizenship, and commitment to family to our country. We know this from surveys about Polish Americans that social scientists conduct from time to time. These show us to be much more likely than the general population to own our own home, to have college educations, and to maintain enduring marriages in which the proper rearing of children is central.

In addition to these observations, however, there is another reality, that of the stereotyping of Polish Americans in American mass culture. It's as if it's not enough that our heritage is unknown to most of our fellow Americans, and to many Polish Americans too; there sometimes seems to be a permanent open season on disparaging our culture. Of course this did not begin recently. We have a free society and freedom of speech; often this freedom has meant the freedom to poke fun and to stereotype Americans along ethnic and racial lines. Along the way, practically every group has been demeaned—Blacks, Latinos, Jews, Irish, Italians, Germans, Scandinavians, and of course, Polish Americans.

"Polish Wedding" is a recent example of the "dumb polack" stereotype that is readily rented at your local Blockbuster store.

In our case the origins of our stereotyping are found, at least in the judgment of the scholar Thomas Napierkowski, in the novels and short stores of Nelson Algren, who focused heavily on the "low lifes" of Chicago's Division street Polonia for his alleged insights into the human condition. His work was bitterly criticized from the 1940s on by our fraternals, whose leaders saw nothing "humorous" or "socially insightful" in his work. Significantly, when Algren's works were portrayed in movies, for example, in "The Man with the Golden Arm," the Polish references were so toned down that it was practically impossible to figure out just what kind of people the film was about. But Algren's stereotype of the low class and dimwitted polack carried forward. Especially in the 1970s, Algren-like characters were familiar figures on such TV comedies, as "Taxi," "Laverne and Shirley," and "Barney Miller." And of course, these shows never stop being rerun to this day. A special word of mention goes here to the incredibly stupid and mean spirited film, "Polish Wedding," a recent example of the "dumb polack" stereotype that is readily rented at your local Blockbuster store.

Given this situation, we should give thanks for "NYPD Blue's" Detective Andy Sipowicz, the street smart cop who repeatedly twists the law to fight crime, but down deep has a heart of gold. Along the way, he has become the most popular and one of the longest lived Polish American characters in TV history.

But Polish Americans have also suffered stereotyping in a second, more ominous way. Here the generalized charge is one that links Poles, and by extension, people of Polish heritage in America, to anti-semitism. Even more serious, because the American general public understands the destruction of the Jews in World War II as an example of the anti-semitic thinking of Hitler and the Nazis, it is not so long a leap for some to somehow connect the Polish people, who were in truth major victims of Nazism, with the crimes of the Nazis. Here are some numbers for us to consider—**6 million** Polish citizens died under Nazi rule, an incredible **20 percent** of the population. **Half** were Poles of Jewish heritage, **half** were gentiles. And Americans' knowledge of these figures is close to **zero.**

Beginning in the 1970s, even reputable scholars like Raul Hilberg began to make the distinction, erroneously, between the perpetrators of the Holocaust (the Germans), the victims of the Holocaust (the Jews), and the bystanders in the Holocaust (the Poles). When the American scholar of Polish descent Richard Lukas, published a book, "The Forgotten Holocaust: The Poles

under German Rule, 1939–1944," which described the extent of the suffering of the Polish gentiles under the Nazis, he was roundly denounced in the American scholarly journal, The Slavic Review. The theme of Polish indifference and indirect if not direct, culpability for the Holocaust also runs through the widely discussed film, "Shoah." Worse, a well reviewed American novel, later a film, "Sophie's Choice," went further and had the Polish woman imprisoned in a German concentration camp identified as the daughter of a Polish academic who dreamed up the final solution. And there have been, then and since, other films in this genre.

The central issue in discussions having to do with allegations of Polish anti-semitism is that the American public has become very sensitized to the subject of the Holocaust. Indeed today, to be labeled an anti-semite is about the worst epithet that can be applied to an individual or a group of individuals in America. Once so labeled, or libeled, individuals or groups may find themselves ostracized or at least marginalized, by our country's leading social institutions.

Here let us bear two things in mind: historically, the phenomenon of anti-semitism was universal, not particularly or solely Polish, before World War II. It was common in the United States, as is clear in the Academy Award winning movie, "Gentleman's Agreement," which appeared in 1947. It was virulent in many places, including, obviously in pre-Nazi and Nazi Germany, and in the supposedly socialist paradise of Stalin's Soviet Union. Second, the word "anti-semitism" simply does not accurately describe Hitler's Holocaust. The appropriate term for his policy was ***genocide,*** "the systematic, state directed effort to annihilate an entire people." And as Dr. Lukas notes, the Poles were slated for this genocide too, like the Russians. This is also the conclusion of scholars Gerhard Weinberg, in his massive and very well received history of the Second World War, and Ian Kershaw, author of the recent and universally praised biography of Hitler.

The question thus before us may be stated in this way: how might Polish Americans deal with these two issues that face us in impeding our efforts to preserve our ethnic heritage for the next generation and to win greater respect for what our heritage is about? Three strategies immediately come to mind.

The first stresses dealing with the misrepresentations of the Polish heritage wherever and whenever they appear, usually in our mass media and in popular entertainment. A second emphasizes the building of coalitions with other ethnic communities so that together we might make a greater impression with the powers that be when we have a concern about our portrayal in our society. A third calls for the building of greater knowledge of our heritage through educational programs of various kinds.

In the PAC we have given a lot of attention to anti-bigotry activities in recent years. These are, I am sure, well intended in their aim. But I am of the opinion that such activities, while sometimes needed, are all too often hopeless enterprises. First of all, they are always reactive in character, responses to someone's statement, an article in a newspaper or magazine, or some television broadcast or movie. They cannot undo what has been said or shown. Moreover, it takes an extraordinary amount of work to be effective in anti-bigotry activities. Sadly, once the job has been done in one place, another problem will pop up the very next day. Thus the work must begin all over. It's like trying to stamp out an infinite number of worms in one's yard. Eventually, one may have to ask, what's the use?

A second strategy makes more sense. There are other people, like the Italian Americans, who share with us certain similar sensitivities about their unfair depiction. If we could build an active dialog with them, we might be able to exert some greater pressure on the companies that promote the most seriously biased material that is hurtful to our communities. We might even win a more sympathetic ear in the general public, so long as we avoid talk about censorship or self-censorship. That sort of idea will always be rejected. Of course, we have many other potential allies in the responsible effort to reach out to win public support for our concerns. But coalition-building takes time and lots of patience. Like Krakow, coalitions aren't built in a single day.

There is a third strategy, the hardest one to do, but in my judgment the one with the greatest potential for long term success. It involves the expansion of our efforts to promote the development of knowledge about the history, culture, current experience, and achievements of the Polish people, and the story of the Polish emigration to America and its descendants. This effort can proceed in a variety of diverse directions, in educational programs at the high school and college level, in the form of adult education and public lectures, in the creation and dissemination of television videos, in the support of Polish studies centers in various parts of our country, in promoting educationally oriented travel to Poland, and in other ways besides. This work isn't easy. It takes money and lots of time. It requires the talents of persuasion and public relations. But it can pay great dividends in gradually creating a genuinely informed American public whose members will reject in principle the denigration of our heritage—because they know better.

Are we up to this task?

DONALD PIENKOS, President Wisconsin Polish American Congress; Chairman, Polish Studies Committee University of Wisconsin, Milwauke

Article 41

‘Bursting with Pride’ in Little Italy

‘Little Nancy’ Pelosi and her political family remembered fondly

KELLY BREWINGTON
Sun reporter

Around the narrow streets of Baltimore’s Little Italy yesterday, the O’Malley and Ehrlich placards were still hanging proudly in the windows of restaurants and Formstone rowhouses.

But no one was talking about the men who duked it out in the race to become Maryland’s next governor. Instead, neighbors were buzzing with pride about one of their own, Nancy Pelosi, who is likely to become the nation’s first female speaker of the House.

They remembered the shy girl who wasn’t allowed on a date without one of her five brothers along as chaperone. They recalled the gracious teenager who never assumed she was better than any of the other neighborhood kids just because her father was Thomas J. D’Alesandro Jr., a legendary Baltimore mayor.

And they marveled that “Little Nancy,” who they said took after her iron-willed mother, also known as Nancy, is poised to ascend to the post that is third in line for the presidency.

“I ate chocolate pudding with Nancy and watched Howdy Doody at night,” said Mary Ann Campanella, 65, who still lives two blocks from the D’Alesandro home, which is at 245 Albemarle St. “That’s how far back I go with Nancy.”

The families actually go back further. In 1930, Pelosi’s father was the best man in the wedding of Campanella’s parents, she said, holding up a sepia-toned wedding portrait. The ceremony was held at St. Leo’s Roman Catholic Church, which has been the center of tight-knit Little Italy.

“I’m bursting with pride for Nancy,” said Campanella, president of the Little Italy Community Organization. “To have her out of this small community, an Italian-American female to hold the third-largest position in our country, I want to say it’s breathtaking to me.”

When Campanella learned that Pelosi, 66, a married mother of five and grandmother of five who represents San Francisco, was likely to become House speaker, she was in awe.

“I turned to my husband and said, ‘A little girl from Little Italy, could you believe it’?”

The tiny neighborhood with its score of Italian restaurants draws tourists and local residents. And to Little Italy natives, the D’Alesandro family is as much a fixture as St. Leo’s, summertime bocce tournaments and the Feast of St. Gabriel.

Two Mayors

Pelosi’s father, known as “Tommy the Elder,” was a congressman, then Baltimore’s mayor from 1947 to 1959. Her brother, Thomas J. D’Alesandro III, “Tommy the Younger” was Baltimore’s mayor from 1967 to 1971. And her mother, Annunciata, ran a tight ship raising six children while serving as the unofficial power in the family Democratic machine.

Pelosi was the youngest child and only daughter in a family that seemed to always be the community’s center of attention.

“You could just open their door and walk in and socialize,” said Angie Guerriero, 74, who grew up several blocks from the D’Alesandro home. “Or they were at our house. We shared jokes. In those days, there wasn’t much else to do. They were just fine people.”

Guerriero and her husband, John, who live a block from St. Leo’s, are Pelosi supporters and offer moral and financial support for her political campaigns.

John Guerriero happily displayed a photo taken at a St. Leo’s function two years ago showing him standing beside Pelosi.

“We just believed in her,” he said. “She’s just a beautiful, charismatic person. You just couldn’t not believe in her.”

John Guerriero’s first call yesterday morning was to congratulate Pelosi’s brother Thomas J. D’Alesandro III.

“She deserved it,” he said, “She’ll do a heck of a job.”

D’Alesandro said he talked to his sister three times Tuesday night as the votes were being counted around the country and political power was shifting to the Democrats, meaning she is likely to become House speaker.

“She was so thrilled, and I was so proud of her,” he said yesterday. “She’s a trailblazer. And you have to understand, she brings to the table a set of credentials that are not matched by many in Congress.”

D’Alesandro said Pelosi was a polite child who developed a head for politics as an adolescent, along with the rest of the family.

'Strict Taskmaster'

When she was growing up, a first-floor room of the family home was converted into a constituent office for Tommy the Elder, and each child took turns at the desk for two hours a day. Failure to report for duty meant that "you were replaced," D'Alesandro said. "My mother was a strict taskmaster."

Pelosi thrived in the position.

"When Nancy turned 13, she took over," he said. "She was just perfect. She loved it."

Pelosi was also remembered outside Little Italy at the Institute of Notre Dame, where Pelosi graduated. The school is the alma mater of another prominent politician from Baltimore, Sen. Barbara A. Mikulski.

Sister Mary Fitzgerald, president of the Institute of Notre Dame, said students there have been inspired by the legacy left by the two politicians.

"It's truly an honor to have two women in such outstanding positions in the U.S. Congress," she said. "It's not every day that a school has that. We are very proud."

Charles Sudano, 64, who lives on High Street, around the corner from the D'Alesandro home, said he was not only proud, but also impressed at the quiet girl who grew up to become a political powerhouse. He said his sister Jackie and Pelosi were "inseparable."

"My father used to scare the heck out of her," he said. "He'd say, 'Nancy eat more pizza. You're too skinny.' "

'She's Tough Now'

"She was real timid, a real nice girl," he said. "She was a little princess. But she's strong now. She's tough now."

In a neighborhood where loyalty mattered, "she never had that thing, you know, 'My father's the mayor' thing. She didn't have that snobby thing," Sudano said. "Besides, we would never let her get away with that."

Where We Stand on Issues

JAMES J. ZOGBY

Politically, large majorities of African Americans, Hispanics and American Jews are Democrats. Asian Americans tend to be independent, while Italian and Arab Americans are evenly split between the two major parties.

Nevertheless, it appears from our polling that neither party identification nor stated political philosophy alone is enough to predict how individuals in the various ethnic communities will define their stances on several important issues.

In our survey, we covered 28 key policy questions and found the results to be quite revealing. For example, in seven areas, large majorities in all of the groups agree with positions that have traditionally been viewed as *liberal.* They agree on:

- Allowing patients to sue HMOs
- Using the federal surplus to provide health insurance for uninsured
- Increasing of the minimum wage by $1 in two years
- The need for new gun control laws
- The United States unilaterally banning nuclear weapons
- The United States paying back dues to the United Nations
- The federal government imposing strict regulations and fines on polluters

On several other issues, however, majorities in almost all of the groups agree with what have been described as *conservative* positions. There is wide agreement on:

- The policy of school vouchers
- Parental notification of girls under 17 who seek an abortion
- Treating children 14–16 as adults if they commit a crime involving a gun
- The need for the death penalty
- Opposition to racial preferences in hiring and college admissions
- Favoring states setting education policy, not the federal government
- Allowing individuals to invest part of their payroll taxes in retirement accounts

There are other areas where there are differences among the six ethnic groups surveyed. (For a closer look at where the six groups stand on some of the major issues of the day, see Table 1).

Issues

a. Providing parents with school vouchers so their children can attend any school they choose.

Providing school vouchers to parents is a very popular issue among Hispanic Americans. More than 80% say they support providing parents with school vouchers. Close to 75% of Asian Americans are for vouchers. Also, almost 70% of African Americans, Italian Americans and Arab Americans support the voucher system. Slightly over 50% of Jewish Americans are in support.

b. There should be a law allowing patients to sue their HMO (Health Maintenance Organization) if they are denied treatment.

Jewish Americans, along with Hispanic Americans, are most supportive of this empowerment for patients, with 90% favoring this position. Close to 89% of Arab Americans, 86% of Italian Americans, and 85% of African and Asian Americans agree that there should be laws allowing patients to sue their HMOs.

c. Using the government surplus to provide health insurance for the working poor and children.

There is a broad consensus on this issue. Close to 93% of Hispanic Americans, more than 90% of African Americans, and almost 90% of Asian Americans favor using the budget surplus to provide healthcare coverage for the poor. Nearly nine in ten Jewish and Arab Americans, along with 85% of Italian Americans are also in favor of the government using the surplus to take care of the healthcare needs of the working poor and children in America.

d. Increasing the minimum wage by $1 an hour over the next two years.

An increase in the minimum wage is a top priority of all the groups with more than four in five supporting an increase.

e. Prosecuting teenagers 14 to 16 as an adult if they have committed a violent crime using a handgun.

Again, there is broad agreement on this issue. Italian, Arab, and Jewish Americans are slightly more likely than the other three groups to want tough laws when dealing with 14 to 16 year-old offenders who use a gun when committing violent crimes. Also,

Table 1 Issue Support (Agreement)

Issue	Italian	African	Hispanic	Jewish	Asian	Arab
School vouchers	67.0	70.0	**83.0**[2]	*52.0*[3]	74.0	69.0
Allow patients to sue HMO	86.0	86.5	**89.5**	**90.0**	74.5	**89.0**
Use surplus for health insurance[4]	84.0	93.5	93.5	86.5	89.5	86.5
Increase minimum wage by $1 in 2 years	82.5	94.0	92.5	85.0	88.0	80.5
Treating 14–16 year-olds as adults if used a gun	85.0	74.0	78.5	81.5	80.0	83.0
$1,000 campaign contribution limit	70.5	63.0	*58.5*	**75.0**	66.0	69.5
New gun control laws	*69.5*	78.0	82.0	83.5	**88.0**	76.0
Death penalty	**78.5**	*64.0*	73.0	67.5	75.5	71.5
Flat tax	**55.5**	43.0	47.5	*34.5*	40.0	50.0
School boards can restrict subjects taught	27.5	32.0	26.0	*19.5*	**41.0**	36.0
Racial preferences in hiring/college admissions	*11.0*	**32.0**	26.0	17.0	20.5	21.0
U.S. unilaterally ban testing of nuclear weapons	66.5	65.0	70.0	68	72.5	65.5
Government impose strict regulations/fines on polluters	93.5	92.0	95.5	92.5	92.5	92.5
Strengthening Social Security and Medicare	94.5	96.0	95.0	94.0	91.5	92.0
Allow individuals to invest part of payroll taxes	84.3	79.0	78.5	76.0	82.5	81.0
Active U.S. participation in global trade	71.0	*69.5*	83.0	76.5	**84.0**	79.5

2 Bold numbers indicate groups that support a position to a much greater degree than other groups.

3 Italicized numbers indicate the groups whose support for a particular issue is significantly lower than the other groups.

4 Shaded categories are those where a near consensus exists among the groups.

Table 2 Abortion Position

	Italian	African	Hispanic	Jewish	Asian	Arab
Pro-choice in all instances	29.0	40.5	*23.5*	**61.5**	39.0	28.5
Pro-choice except for late-term abortion	24.0	12.5	10.0	17.5	12.0	16.5
Pro-life in all instances	8.5	8.5	**16.5**	*3.5*	7.5	7.0
Pro-life except for rape and incest	18.0	13.0	13.5	5.0	11.0	16.0
Pro-life except for life of mother	18.0	22.5	35.0	10.0	25.5	29.5
Total “pro-life”	46.5	54.0	**64.5**	*18.5*	43.5	52.0
Total “pro-choice”	53.0	53.0	*34.0*	**79.0**	51.0	45.5

80% of Asian Americans, 78% of Hispanic Americans, and 74% of African Americans favor tough prosecution of teenagers.

f. Putting a limit of $1,000 on campaign contributions in all elections.

Jewish Americans lead the other ethnic groups in supporting limits on campaign contributions. Three in four (75%) support a $1,000 cap on campaign contributions. They are closely followed by 71% of Italian Americans and 70% of the Arab Americans. More than 65% of Asian Americans, 64% of African Americans and 58% of Hispanic Americans also support the cap on contributions.

g. Passing new gun control laws.

There is significant support across the board for new gun control laws from all groups. Asian Americans are most in favor, while Italian Americans are least in favor.

h. Imposing the death penalty for particularly heinous crimes.

More than three in four (78%) Italians and Asians say they are in favor of using the death penalty as a punishment for terrible crimes. They are followed by about 70% of Jewish, Arab, and Hispanic Americans also in support. Although African Americans did

Table 3 Exceptions to Supporting Abortion

Issue	Italian	African	Hispanic	Jewish	Asian	Arab
Ban abortion except for life of mother	47.0	44.0	61.0	20.5	47.0	53.5
Notify parent if under 18 wants abortion	77.5	77.5	82.5	49.5	79.5	78.5

show support for the death penalty, they are the least supportive, with less than 65% agreeing with this method of punishment.

i. Revising the income tax code so that every individual pays a flat tax regardless of his/her income.

Close to 60% of Jewish Americans are opposed to a flat tax. More than half of Asian Americans, 48% of Hispanic Americans, and 40% of African Americans are also opposed to a flat tax. More than half of Italian Americans are in support.

j. Local school boards have a right to restrict the teaching of topics, such as evolution.

Localizing the authority over what topics are taught at the school board level is not a popular issue with these ethnic groups. More than 75% of Jewish Americans oppose allowing local school boards deciding what can and cannot be taught in schools. A majority of all other groups agree.

k. Racial preferences in hiring or college admissions.

Close to 70% of Hispanic Americans and more than 64% of African Americans oppose taking into account racial preference when hiring or admitting students to a college. In addition, 87% of Italian Americans, 80% of Jewish Americans, 76% of Asian Americans and 75% of Arab Americans are also opposed to racial preferences.

l. The United States should unilaterally ban underground testing of nuclear weapons.

Asian Americans and Hispanic Americans are most in support of a unilateral ban of nuclear weapons testing. More than 67% of Jewish Americans, 65% of Italian, Arab, and African Americans also support a unilateral U.S. nuclear test ban.

m. The government should impose stricter regulations and tax penalties on factories that release harmful pollutants into the air.

There is overwhelming support across the board for getting tougher with polluters, with more than nine in ten in each group supporting stricter regulations and penalties.

n. Strengthening the Social Security and Medicare Systems.

More than 90% of all groups showed strong support for a federal focus on these two important retirement benefits. African Americans and Jewish Americans are among the most supportive.

o. Allowing individuals to invest a portion of their Social Security pension in personal retirement accounts.

Again, there is strong support across the board for allowing private investment of Social Security funds.

p. Active United States participation in the global free trade agreements.

Asian (84%), Hispanic (83%) and Arab Americans (80%) are most supportive of U.S. participation in global free trade agreements. They are followed by Jewish (76%), Italian (70%), and African Americans (69%).

The Question of Abortion

Jewish Americans are the most pro-choice, with more than 60% saying that it should always be up to the woman whether she should get an abortion. Least pro-choice are Hispanic Americans.

The group with the most pro-life attitude is Hispanics—16.5% are opposed to abortion in all cases, and 64.5% define themselves as "pro-life" in particular cases. Between 43%–54% of Asian, Italian, Arab and African Americans term themselves pro-life. Only 18.5% of Jewish Americans would describe themselves as such.

a) Banning all abortions, except for the life of the mother.

More than 60% of Hispanic Americans are supportive of a ban on abortion, except in cases where the life of the mother is in danger. About 50% of Arab Americans support the ban, except for life of mother.

More than 75% of Jewish Americans are opposed to a ban except in cases of risk to the mother, followed by 50% of Italian Americans. Almost half (48%) of African Americans and 47% of Asian Americans are also opposed.

b) A physician should be legally required to notify parents of a girl under the legal age who requests an abortion.

More than four in five (82%) Hispanic Americans, close to 80% of Arab and Asian Americans, and 77% of African and Italian Americans all support the notion that a physician be legally required to notify the parents of a girl under the legal age who is seeking an abortion. Less than half of Jewish Americans support it.

Article 43

American Jewish History

A Chance to Reflect

JONATHAN D. SARNA

This year Jews across the United States are commemorating the 350th anniversary of Jewish life in America. Books, exhibits, lectures, conferences, television and radio programs, films, concerts, even dance recitals are planned to mark the occasion. The U.S. Congress interrupted its business to produce an official commemorative resolution, and a national commission brought together for the first time the Library of Congress, the National Archives, the American Jewish Historical Society, and the Jacob Rader Marcus Center of the American Jewish Archives "to foster and sponsor a variety of historical activities that advance our understanding of the American Jewish experience as it marks this milestone anniversary." See http://www.celebrate350.org for a complete list of events.

The events of 350 years ago seemed far less momentous to contemporaries. Sometime in the late summer of 1654, a small boatload of Jews, expelled from Recife, Brazil, when the Portuguese recaptured it from the Dutch, arrived in New Amsterdam seeking a new home. The authorities in New Amsterdam, led by Gov. Peter Stuyvesant, sought to compel the impoverished refugees "in a friendly way to depart." Stuyvesant sought to promote morality and social cohesion in his colony by enforcing Calvinist orthodoxy while rooting out nonconformity. He understood that granting Jews liberty would make it impossible for him to deny it to other religious dissenters who were clamoring for rights, like Lutherans, Catholics, and Quakers. Moreover, he considered Jews to be "deceitful," "very repugnant," and "hateful enemies and blasphemers of the name of Christ." He worried that they would "infect and trouble this new colony," making it even less governable than it already was.

The Jews appealed to the Dutch West India Company back in Amsterdam. They also appealed for support to their wealthy coreligionists in that city—some of them principal shareholders in the West India Company. Recognizing the "considerable loss" that Jews had sustained back in Brazil and fully aware of the "large amount of capital" that Jews had invested in the company, the Dutch West India Company sustained the Jews' appeal. It ordered Stuyvesant to permit Jews to "travel," "trade," "live," and "remain" in the colony, provided that "the poor among them shall not become a burden to the company or to the community, but be supported by their own nation." Little did they know that this decision, affecting fewer than two dozen Jews at the time, would pave the way for 350 years of Jewish communal life in North America.

It was by no means a foregone conclusion that American Jews would commemorate the 350th anniversary of these long forgotten events. After September 11, 2001, in the United States, and the heavy toll of death and destruction in Israel, some considered any notion of celebration untimely. Others questioned why Jews, who largely immigrated to the United States in the 19th and 20th centuries, should care about a remote chapter in American Jewish history that none of their own ancestors had experienced. Still others wondered whether, in 2004, history of any kind would be of interest to the American Jewish community. Would it not be wiser to look ahead and plan for the community's future?

Advocates for the commemoration (like me) naturally offered answers to all of these objections. We pointed to Jews' obligation to posterity, the importance of "explaining what has come before us to those who will carry it on after us." We observed that most people had no idea that the history of Jews in America dates back 350 years, and needed to be informed of that fact. We argued that American Jewish history contextualizes contemporary challenges facing American Jews and makes Jews appreciate that they are part of a continuing community larger than themselves. And we reminded audiences that *not* to commemorate the anniversary would be read as a statement of communal failure, particularly since both the 250th and the 300th anniversary of Jews in America had been celebrated enthusiastically.

Most important of all, we argued that the celebration could help to counter the renewed tendency throughout the world to view Jewish history in tragic or lachrymose terms, as a history of persecution, expulsion, tragedy, mass murder, and now terror. The 350 years of American Jewish history, we pointed out, stands as the great exception to this melancholy story. Episodes of anti-Semitism notwithstanding, American Jewish history provides the opportunity to explore how Jews have fared in a free and pluralistic society where church and state are separated and where religion is entirely voluntary.

Whether for these high-minded reasons, or simply because most people actually enjoy the opportunity to celebrate themselves, the 350th anniversary commemoration eventually took off. As a result, for American Jewish historians like myself, the

year ahead promises to serve as a "teachable moment"—an all-too-rare opportunity to reach beyond the academy and excite a larger public about what it is that we do. Already, the anniversary has stimulated curiosity and wonder ("American Jews have been around for 350 years! Who knew?"). It has created a welcome opportunity for learning, reflection, and taking stock. It has allowed us to explain how the subject that we have spent our lifetime studying might actually be relevant to the community at large. Most importantly, it has helped us to advance the study of American Jewry by stimulating scholarship and making possible a wide range of conferences that (at their best) promote creative ideas and lively academic interactions.

Dangers, of course, continue to lurk. Whenever a group seeks to celebrate itself, the risk arises that scholarship will be pushed aside: accuracy, objectivity, and dispassion giving way to filiopietism and boosterism. One imaginative Web designer actually produced a "symbolic portrayal" of the events of 1654, depicting Jews in pseudocolonial dress, holding aloft a Torah scroll, and marching past the Statue of Liberty (!) as they crossed over into the promised land of New Amsterdam. Similar exaggerations and anachronisms are certain to make historians' blood boil as the year progresses.

For the most part, though, the 350th anniversary promises to highlight the great advances that the field of American Jewish history has experienced in recent decades. Thirty years ago, when I first became interested in the field, there were only five tenured positions in American Jewish history and only a handful of reputable scholars in the field. Last June our biennial scholars' conference, held at American University and the Library of Congress, drew more than 100 scholars. When I entered the field, American Jewish history was something of a stepchild in Jewish studies, possessing far less prestige than ancient, medieval, or modern European Jewish history. Today at least two Ivy League universities boast chairs in American Jewish history, and in the last year alone, at least 10 university presses, including Harvard, Yale, and Princeton, have published scholarly books by historians of American Jewish life.

The subject matter of American Jewish history has likewise evolved. Once upon a time, a disproportionate number of volumes dealt with Jewish "contributions" to America and with the history of Jews in local communities. Jews, like many another American minority ethnic and religious groups, sought through such books to legitimize their presence in the United States, display their patriotism, and undermine prejudice directed against them. They attempted to prove, as the author of an early book on the Jews of Iowa explained, "that Israel, if only let alone, is capable of contributing everything good to the common cause of mankind, that every accusation against him was prompted by bigotry and narrow-mindedness, that anti-Semitism has no footing in this country."

Today, even though volumes of local American Jewish history remain popular, the apologetic motive has largely disappeared. The goal instead is to highlight the diversity of the American Jewish experience, to provide a sense of what is distinctive about particular communities, and to explore the complex interrelationship between Jews and the places where they reside. A recent volume titled *California Jews,* edited by Ava F. Kahn and Marc Dollinger (Brandeis University Press, 2003), illustrates this new trend. Its essays are composed by a new generation of scholars "immersed in the academic world of the last 30 years and committed to bringing the California Jewish experience into the world of contemporary historical debate." It highlights the differences between California Jewish life and the better-known Jewish experience of New York, and it speaks, revealingly, of California's "rich contribution to the American Jewish experience," rather than, as an earlier generation would have insisted, the other way around. Most significant, the volume includes examples of California Jewish failures, not just success stories. Thus, in a chapter that would have been unthinkable in such a volume years ago, the historian Ellen Eisenberg analyzes the painful silence of the organized California Jewish community during the World War II incarceration of Japanese-Americans—an incarceration, she shows, that Jews refused officially to support but were also reluctant to condemn.

California Jews also illustrates a second trend in recent American Jewish historical writing: Much of the volume focuses on the era from World War II to the present. Back when I was studying American Jewish history, in the 1970s, the era of the Holocaust represented the new historical frontier, while most of the literature we read ended either with World War I or with the imposition of strict quotas on immigration in 1924. Jacob Rader Marcus, until his death in 1995 the acknowledged dean of the field, led the way here. Brobdingnagian seven-volume history of American Jewish life—*The Colonial American Jew* (three volumes) and *United States Jewry 1776–1985* (four volumes), published by Wayne State University Press from 1970 to 1993—relegates the era from 1921 to 1985 to a comparatively brief "epilogue."

Today, by contrast, books on the era following World War II are all the rage—witness such titles as Jack Wertheimer's *A People Divided: Judaism in Contemporary America* (Basic Books, 1993); Deborah Dash Moore's *To the Golden Cities: Pursuing the American Jewish Dream in Miami and L.A.* (Free Press, 1994); Stuart Svonkin's *Jews Against Prejudice: American Jews and the Fight for Civil Liberties* (Columbia University Press, 1997); Marc Dollinger's *Quest for Inclusion: Jews and Liberalism in Modern America* (Princeton University Press, 2000); Eli Lederhendler's *New York Jews and the Decline of Urban Ethnicity, 1950–1970* (Syracuse University Press, 2001); and Michael E. Staub's *Torn at the Roots: The Crisis of Jewish Liberalism in Postwar America* (Columbia University Press, 2002). Rather than seeing the crucible of American Jewish life in the immigrant period, as earlier scholars did, the new historiography locates that crucible in the years between World War II and the end of the 1960s, when Jews embraced liberalism, moved out to the suburbs and the Sun Belt, and divided politically and religiously in new ways.

It goes without saying that the experience of women figures significantly in all new histories of America's Jews—*California Jews* included. Indeed, it comes as something of an embarrassment to recall that in 1954, the theme of the 300th anniversary of American Jewish life was "Man's Opportunities and Responsibilities Under Freedom"; the role of women scarcely

figured in that commemoration. Fifty years later, a shelf of excellent books details the experiences of Jewish women in America, focusing particularly on activists, and on the changing role of women in American Judaism. Two recent readers summarize this large literature: *American Jewish Women's History: A Reader,* edited by Pamela S. Nadell (New York University Press, 2003), and *Women and American Judaism: Historical Perspectives,* edited by Pamela S. Nadell and myself (Brandeis University Press, 2001). The most important contribution of all to American Jewish women's studies is the two-volume, award-winning reference work titled *Jewish Women in America: An Historical Encyclopedia,* edited by Paula E. Hyman and Deborah Dash Moore (Routledge, 1997)—a far superior work, ironically, to any reference book dealing with American Jewish men. The Jewish Women's Archive (http://www.jwa.org) and the Hadassah-Brandeis Institute (http://www.brandeis.edu/hbi) further this study of Jewish women's lives, the former with an explicit commitment "to ensure that women's stories find a prominent role in the narratives of American Jewish history that will emerge during the national 350th Anniversary celebrations."

Popular culture forms another new focus of scholarship in American Jewish history. Barely noticed 50 years ago, it is central to the study of American Jewish life today. Steven Carr's *Hollywood & Anti-Semitism: A Cultural History Up to World War II* (Cambridge University Press, 2001) illustrates the trend. The volume examines how the public perceived American Jews in the entertainment industry from the turn of the century to the outbreak of World War II. Other recent studies focus on Jews in television and the Jewish role in musical theater. David Zurawik in *The Jews of Prime Time* (Brandeis University Press, 2003) shows how Jewish characters were first obscured and later rediscovered by television, while Jeffrey Shandler in his award-winning *While America Watches: Televising the Holocaust* (Oxford University Press, 1999) demonstrates that even knowledge of the Holocaust among Americans owes much to TV. Meanwhile, Andrea Most's *Making Americans: Jews and the Broadway Musical* (Harvard University Press, 2004) discusses how "the Jewish creators of the Broadway musical established not only a new sense of what it means to be Jewish (or 'ethnic') in America but also a new understanding of what 'America' itself means." The most ambitious of all the recent studies of American Jewish popular culture is *Entertaining America: Jews, Movies, and Broadcasting* (Princeton University Press, 2003), a comprehensive, well-illustrated history (based on an exhibit at the Jewish Museum) edited by J. Hoberman and Jeffrey Shandler. Examining the way in which the subject of Jews and the entertainment media has been presented from the beginning of the 20th century to the start of the current one, the volume serves as the baseline for all subsequent scholarship in the field.

The celebration could help to counter a renewed tendency to view Jewish history in tragic or lachrymose terms.

Finally, students of American Jewish history have, in recent years, focused renewed attention on the subject of religion. An earlier generation of scholars, many of them avowedly secular and trained in American studies or ethnic studies, eschewed this subject. Immigration, Yiddish culture, social activism, Zionism, or what was often termed "Jewishness" dominated the field—think of Irving Howe's best-selling *World of Our Fathers* (1976). As American Jewish life shifted from a focus on peoplehood to a more sustained focus on religious life, however, scholarship followed suit. *California Jews* illustrates the new trend with articles on synagogue architecture and Jewish wedding contracts. A spate of other recent books likewise illustrates the trend, including Etan Diamond's *And I Will Dwell in Their Midst: Orthodox Jews in Suburbia* (University of North Carolina Press, 2000), Jack Wertheimer's *Jews in the Center: Conservative Synagogues and Their Members* (Rutgers University Press, 2000), Dana Evan Kaplan's *American Reform Judaism: An Introduction* (Rutgers University Press, 2003), and Karla Goldman's *Beyond the Synagogue Gallery: Finding a Place for Women in American Judaism* (Harvard University Press, 2000). Coming months promise books that focus on new themes in the study of American Judaism, including Orthodox Jews and sports (Jeffrey Gurock); spiritual healing and American Jews (Ellen Umansky); rabbis' wives as American Jewish leaders (Shuly R. Schwartz); and Jews and the American soul (Andrew Heinze).

The American Jewish community itself has many reasons to be nervous as it commemorates its 350th anniversary on America's shores. Rising intermarriage rates threaten its distinctive identity, declining birthrates suggest that its numbers will decline, and a range of "Jew vs. Jew" controversies threaten to split it asunder. But the 350th-anniversary celebration coupled with the exciting new scholarship now being produced offer a ray of hope. As the Norwegian novelist Ole Edvart Rølvaag wrote on a parallel occasion, "when a people becomes interested in its past life [and] seeks to acquire knowledge in order to better understand itself, it always experiences an awakening of new life."

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Article 44

Young U.S. Muslims Strive for Harmony

9/11 Spurred Action, Helped Define Beliefs

TARA BAHRAMPOUR
Washington Post Staff Writer

Standing in the small, fluorescent-lighted room that served as George Washington University's Muslim prayer area, Amin Al-Sarraf pointed to the six-foot-high plastic partition dividing the space.

It had been a point of contention at the university's Muslim Students' Association. Some members thought the partition, common in mosques to separate men and women when they pray, was a necessary part of their religion; others disagreed, saying women had trouble hearing the imam.

"Some see it like the Great Wall of China in the middle of the room," Al-Sarraf explained, adding that there was a fear "freshmen will get a bad taste in their mouth—like this is how the MSA's going to be."

Al-Sarraf didn't want to alienate anyone. In his post last year as president of the Islamic Alliance for Justice, a political group under the umbrella of the MSA, he'd heard of Muslim groups at other universities making students feel excluded for not dressing a certain way, for example. Perhaps, he mused aloud, his MSA could come to a compromise: Keep the partition, but make it shorter.

For Al-Sarraf, 22, a student of international relations who graduated in May, the partition quandary was part of a larger debate taking place among American Muslims, especially young ones: how to incorporate their religion into daily life. The question has become more pressing—and more pressured—since Sept. 11, 2001, linked Islam, in the eyes of many Americans, with acts of fanaticism and murder.

Immediately after the terrorist attacks, Muslims began to feel the heat. Women in *hijab* became targets of hostile remarks; mosques were sprayed with graffiti and vandalized. Some Muslim immigrants were required to register with the government, and families got unexpected knocks on the door from immigration and FBI officers.

In some communities, resentment swelled as Muslim men disappeared, deported to their home countries or swallowed into a law enforcement system many Muslims felt had convicted them of ill-defined crimes. The United States went to war, first in one Muslim country, then another.

To many Muslims, it seemed that the United States was going to battle against them. "These policies create the impression in the minds of many people . . . that to fight the war on terror you have to fight some kind of war on Islam," said Ibrahim Hooper, a spokesman for the Council on American-Islamic Relations.

Until 9/11, being Muslim in the United States had not necessarily meant taking a special stand or explaining the actions of others. But in a new social climate, Muslims had to decide, more concretely, what it meant to be both Muslim and American.

For two young Muslim men in the Washington area, the process of refining the balance between faith and country, set in motion by the attacks, has played out differently.

Al-Sarraf, raised in a multiethnic family that frequently discussed how Islam fit into mainstream America, was propelled into a leadership role aimed at integrating Muslims into broader society.

Basim Hawa, son of Palestinian immigrants, went from ignoring many tenets of his religion to thinking actively about what they meant to him and, ultimately, throwing off the trappings of American life that didn't fit with Islam.

'Ambassadors of Their Culture'

Al-Sarraf grew up the eldest of four children in leafy Pasadena, Calif., with an Iraqi father and a mother who is half Palestinian and half German American. His parents signed up the children for hockey and soccer and took them to deliver food to the homeless on Thanksgiving.

"We wanted our children to grow up feeling comfortable in their skin as Muslims and as Americans," said his mother, Amira Al-Sarraf.

At his secular private high school, Al-Sarraf started a Muslim club, which was popular, he said, because it gave out free pizza. He gave annual presentations during Ramadan, but few people focused on his religion.

Then, during his senior year, terrorists struck the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. His principal asked him and his brother to give schoolwide talks about Islam, which their mother said "validated their role as ambassadors of their culture."

Al-Sarraf said 9/11 "gave me extra motivation. I think all Muslims felt extra pressure—to be the token of what Islam really is, to defend Islam."

His light skin, cleanshaven face and green eyes make it hard to guess his background. But sitting in a Starbucks at the GWU student union, he spoke authoritatively of the challenges Muslims growing up in the United States have faced since 9/11.

"The natural trend of immigrant communities," he said, is that "the first generation comes, establishing itself. Then the next generation has a different set of issues, figuring out who they are and how they fit in."

The terrorist attacks accelerated that process. "There was this pressure on the Muslim community to grow up in a year, when it's a 20-year process."

Last year, when Al-Sarraf awoke to hear that four young Muslims had blown themselves up in the London subways and killed 52 other people, he felt chilled. The four were not unlike him and his friends: middle class, educated, raised in the West. And yet the bombers were so alienated from their environment that they had sought to destroy it.

Just as after 9/11, Al-Sarraf's impulse was to take action, feeling "that we need to address the issue before it gets as far here as it did in other places." Al-Sarraf did not see extreme isolationist Islamic groups in the United States, but he felt it was up to his generation to take a stand.

"Who's going to be the ones to address it?" he asked. "And the realization was that . . . it's us."

After the bombings, he and 15 friends, mostly students of political and international affairs, sent out a news release to U.S. campuses, condemning the attack. The next month, they started an initiative to encourage young Muslim Americans to get involved politically, to develop a collective identity, to vote and to consider forming lobbying groups or running for office.

Longing for Change

For Basim Hawa, religion had been built in but not deeply felt.

He grew up in a house on the border of Arlington and Fairfax counties, the middle of five children. Every morning and evening, his father went to Dar al Hijrah, a mosque in Falls Church, to pray.

"He used to try to make us go when we were younger," recalled Hawa, a strapping 27-year-old with closely cropped black hair, a full beard and an easy smile. "We went to Saturday school to learn to study Koran in the Arabic language, and my dad would always try to make us speak it around the house. He would always make us pray, so that was something built into us from an early age."

Hawa prayed five times a day because he was supposed to. But he often postponed the prayers until nighttime and would rush through without concentrating. "I never had doubt of my religion," he said. "But it just wasn't always on my mind."

Other things were. At J.E.B. Stuart High School and in college at Virginia Tech, he said, he hung out with friends who "went out a lot, went out to clubs, dated, partied. My parents until today still do not know a lot of the things I did."

For years, he tried to excuse his behavior. "Because I prayed, because I fasted at Ramadan, I always used to think to myself that what I'm doing is not so bad."

But he was tormented by thoughts of the life he felt he should be leading. At night, he prayed to God to change him. "I would wake up and feel guilty. And as I went through life, I felt more guilty and more guilty and more guilty."

When the terrorists attacked, Hawa said, he didn't feel affected personally. He didn't have a beard, he said, and he didn't experience much backlash.

Then, a few weeks later, he traveled with his father to Jerusalem to visit relatives. While they were gone, government agents knocked at the family's door in Fairfax to ask his mother questions. Why had the father and son left the country? Where had they gone? What were they doing?

The visit jarred Hawa. He was as American as anyone, but now he was suspected of acting against national security. The agents didn't come back, but other Muslims he knew didn't get off so easily.

Hawa had attended Dar al-Hijrah, the same mosque as some of the men who were prosecuted as the "Virginia *jihad* network," although he said he didn't know them well. And he had listened to taped lectures by Ali al-Timimi, who was sentenced in 2005 to life in prison for inciting young Muslims to wage war against the United States.

Hawa dismissed the prosecutors' argument that the men were dangerous, saying although he does not know all the facts, he does not think the evidence was sufficient to convict them.

"I think it's a misunderstanding of what 'jihad' means. I think people now associate it with wars, but there's the inner jihad, the struggle that people go through with work, their families, " he said.

In the year after 9/11, friends and co-workers began asking Hawa questions, such as "What does Islam say about the bombers?"

"The news was now 'Islam, Islam, Islam,' " he said. "It was on my mind a lot more often now because of the questions being asked." He said he believed the attacks were "100 percent" wrong, but he didn't know enough to answer the questions as well as he wanted to.

During Ramadan in November 2002, Hawa signed up with a local spiritual leader, Imam Mohamed Magid of the All Dulles Area Muslim Society, for a trip to Mecca. He wanted to see whether he could embrace Islam more wholly.

The sheer scale of the experience awed Hawa. Walking in an ocean of fellow believers, he felt they were part of something greater than themselves—or even their countries.

"You have 3 million people all in the same area who are all dressed in the same outfit. It's very peaceful, with people helping each other. Everybody's there for the same reason."

He came back changed.

"I never stepped back into a club; I never stepped back into a casino; I never touched alcohol; I never dated or approached a girl."

The next month, strolling through Tysons Corner mall on Christmas Eve, he ran into Tiffany Ballve, whom he'd known at J.E.B Stuart as an athlete who wore T-shirts and jeans. When he saw her at the mall, he was startled.

"I was like, 'Wow, you're wearing a scarf,' and she's like, 'Yeah, I became Muslim.' "

They married three months later.

Avoiding Isolation

Last year, after Al-Sarraf and his friends sent out the call for Muslims to get involved, Muslim groups at 15 universities promised to help spread the ideas of their initiative, the Muslim American Project.

"Many young Muslim Americans, particularly those who have been raised in primarily immigrant religious communities, struggle to reconcile the seemingly incompatible aspects of their identities," the message said. "At the core of the struggle lies the question, Can one be both Muslim and American? . . . Isolating ourselves by remaining within the safety nets of familiar groups, or allowing ourselves to become lost in the crowd will prevent us from establishing a thriving community in this nation."

Al-Sarraf said they were criticized on both ends—by non-Muslims who didn't trust them and by Muslims who asked: "What are you doing? Why are you compromising your religion, talking to these people in Washington?"

U.S. Muslims had for many years avoided politics, Al-Sarraf said, pointing their children toward such fields as engineering or medicine. "They say going into politics is dangerous, you'll get corrupted, you'll lose your religion."

As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan continued, he said, the idea that "hey, we're killing Muslims" troubled many students.

The communities were also debating whether paying taxes or voting supports a system that is "oppressing Muslims abroad," said Ahmed Younis, national director of the Washington-based Muslim Public Affairs Council and a friend of Al-Sarraf's.

But Younis said Al-Sarraf and his friends represent an evolution of that debate. "9/11 has changed the conversation," he said. Before, people thought they could choose political isolation. But post-9/11, "their political integration is a prerequisite for their ability to make a change in both domestic and foreign U.S. policy."

Integrating with Mainstream Culture

Early on a Friday morning, the sky still dark, a few cars filed into the ADAMS Center's parking lot. Hawa, in a white T-shirt and red sweats, was there for 5:15 prayers, which he attends most days before going to his job as a software company consultant.

Imam Magid led the prayers and then taught a religious class. Hawa had suggested the topic: the life of the prophet Muhammad.

Sitting on the carpet in a small circle of men, wearing a beige robe and knitted cap, Magid put the prophet's view into a 21st-century context.

"No one will enter paradise if his or her neighbors will not feel safe from them," said Magid, his lively cadence accented by his native Arabic. "My neighbor, whether Muslim or not Muslim, must feel I am not doing harm to him, whether by having loud music, or having a fight over a parking space or having water sitting around breeding mosquitoes."

Sitting cross-legged beside his mentor, Hawa took notes.

Afterward, Magid said that he worries when young people go to extremes, staying in the mosque all day and calling movies or sports or social activities *haram*, forbidden. To him, these are part of a balanced spiritual life.

"All the extremism now in Britain, all this is because people have the wrong idea of what religion is. I tell young people, 'You have three choices in America—isolate yourself; assimilate and do everything in popular culture that you're going to do; or integrate'—and that's what we're advising people to do."

Magid does not sanction all mainstream American activities—adult co-ed swimming and shopkeepers selling alcohol are not all right with him. But he is troubled by those who preach against a long list of American activities, from celebrating Thanksgiving to shaking hands with non-Muslims.

Hawa is constantly making decisions on when to participate and when to excuse himself. He and Ballve don't celebrate birthdays, but they play soccer and go to her parents' house for Thanksgiving.

"Everybody has their own little ways," he said, sitting with his wife and 7-month-old son, Hamza, in their Sterling apartment. "For example, if a female put out her hand to shake it, then I would, but maybe someone else I know who celebrates birthdays wouldn't shake a woman's hand. These are forms of jihad—struggles we go through."

Hawa votes but has stayed away from public life. His friends send him letters on Muslim causes to forward to elected officials, but he sheepishly admits he's never sent one.

"I don't agree with all the decisions that our government makes. But the reason why I'm here is I do love the country. And it's a land of opportunity. And the life here is much easier than life overseas. I do consider myself an American Muslim."

'Humanizing One Another'

Over the winter holidays, Al-Sarraf visited London and was struck by how second-generation Muslims viewed themselves as more tied to their parents' native countries than to England.

"I didn't get the sense of the British identity being an important aspect," he said.

The isolation among European Muslim communities resurfaced last month when British Muslims were arrested for planning to blow up transatlantic flights. Some experts have said that isolation, and living in tight enclaves, has made young Muslims in Europe more likely to be drawn into such plots.

The ADAMS Center and GWU's Muslim Student Association try to combat that by holding events with Jewish and Christian groups. The MSA has held Eid banquets with campus Jewish organizations and sponsored a dialogue between Muslim and Jewish students.

Al-Sarraf called the meetings "a way of humanizing one another."

He has taken his mission into his professional life. This summer, he worked at the State Department's Israel and Palestinian Affairs Office. This semester, he entered Whittier Law School in Costa Mesa, Calif.

GWU's MSA never did resolve the question of the partition. The debate continues each year, as new people come and go.

From *The Washington Post,* September 4, 2006, pp. A1, A11, by Tara Bahrampour.

Article 45

For 'Borat' Audience, First Come the Gasps, then the Laughs

MICHAEL SRAGOW

The new TV ads for the cutting-edge reality comedy *Borat* focus on shots of packed opening-weekend audiences stunned into silence by some hugely offensive statements about women, Jews, gays or slavery, then breaking into convulsive laughter. On the phone from Los Angeles, producer Jay Roach said the filmmakers knew they would get this reaction: "We tested and tested it with audiences."

The testing proved that most audiences would respond with exasperation at *Borat's* racism, homophobia, anti-Semitism and misogyny, while retaining their sympathy for the clueless Kazakh TV reporter making a documentary about America and becoming obsessed with Pamela Anderson along the way.

Of course, the B'nai B'rith, the Russian government and other, less-vocal, groups have registered everything from sheer outrage to worry over whether some audiences will take *Borat's* antics straight. Russia, in fact, has announced a ban on the film, out of concern for the feelings of neighboring Kazakhstan.

The uproar mystifies seasoned cinematic provocateur John Waters, who says the film "gives us a politically correct way of being politically incorrect." Talking to Roach, a director of such mainstream smashes as the *Austin Powers* and *Meet the Parents* movies, you feel Waters nailed it. "There is an aspect of political correctness which is correct," Roach says. "People should be more respectful of others." But Roach thinks political correctness can mask the "social dysfunction and ignorance" that breed racial and ethnic stereotypes, until they become more mysterious and "much more sinister."

The glory of *Borat,* says Roach, is that Sacha Baron Cohen "plays a proud idiot who has idiotic attitudes, so the audience gets that anti-Semitism and misogyny are a backward set of superstitions or fears." As a buffoon, *Borat* has a license to kill social and political fears and prejudices with his comedy. Whether he's asking an all-too-helpful gun-shop owner for the best weapon to use on Jews or cajoling a van full of drunken frat boys into waxing nostalgic about slavery, "What he's doing is outing the dysfunction in our culture." As Borat, Baron Cohen makes U.S. audiences uncomfortable with their own complicity in the dark side of America. Then he dispels their awkwardness with his comedy.

"Borat' viewers get the joke: Being offensive can be funny.

L.A.-based critic David Ehrenstein—the half-Jewish, half-Catholic, African-American and gay author of a history of gays in Hollywood, *Open Secret*—agrees with Roach: "Borat throws a wild card into a culture that's become increasingly monolithic and authoritarian."

"It has anarchy, and I'm a fan of anarchy," Waters says. "It shows how weird people are: They can be uptight about one thing and not about another; [during one risible dinner sequence] they can be OK about teaching a man how to wipe himself and then get uptight when there's a hooker at the door. People's limits are very strange."

Many of the movie's fans know that Baron Cohen is an observant Jew who attended Christ's College at Cambridge. As Borat, he intersperses Hebrew and Polish with gibberish. (Roach says the subtitles deliberately have nothing to do with the spoken foreign languages.) Roach admits it comforted him to know that Baron Cohen is Jewish, but he also thinks a viewer's enjoyment shouldn't depend on that information.

Baron Cohen, with the help of his director, Larry Charles (who did some of the best episodes of *Seinfeld* and *Curb Your Enthusiasm*), employs what Roach dubs "anti-anti-Semitism." They strategized using "specific aspects and details of [historical] anti-Semitism" to show the ludicrous outer limits "that have been reached in the depiction of the Jewish people." For example, they patterned images of the giant, horned Jewish heads in the notorious "Running of the Jew" sequence after anti-Jewish propaganda films made before World War II.

In Baron Cohen's ability to bring Jewish humor to the screen even when depicting anti-Semitism, Roach sees the impact of the early Woody Allen. "When I saw *Annie Hall,* I decided to go to film school. What moved me was his way of having comedy work with layers, including ones about Jews and Gentiles, a big part of his personal anxiety dreams." Baron Cohen's humor, he says, is in the tradition of Jewish comics like Allen: poets of anxiety "who have access to those levels of worry that I don't find as honest or true in a lot of other comedians."

The anxieties of outsiderdom also resonate with gay culture. "In the gay community, [Baron Cohen's] satire of homophobia has been welcomed and seen as the send-up that it is, especially since all the gay comedy we've been getting lately has been provided by the Republican Party," Ehrenstein says.

And Waters says that when Borat spews his ignorance about gay life "while he's going around kissing all the men on the lips, it's hilarious."

Roach had a far different upbringing. Raised as a Southern Baptist in New Mexico, he now considers himself an agnostic and an amateur student of comparative religion. He has always been simpatico with Jewish thought and culture, and is married to a Jewish woman and his children practice Judaism. He thinks his background is irrelevant though, because he and director Charles dedicated themselves to serving Baron Cohen's vision.

What makes that vision doubly compelling, says Roach, is the question of whether "Sacha Baron Cohen can survive the high-wire act of sustaining his fake character while bringing all those things up, with people who actually think he's filming them for TV in Kazakhstan."

No one could predict how Borat's comic persona would collide with reality.

"All the people who seem real in the film are real," Roach says, and the abhorrent or admirable attitudes they display emerge spontaneously from Borat's interaction with them.

Roach says all the real-life co-stars signed release forms *before* the crew put them on film. (Any time a person recognized Borat from Baron Cohen's TV work, they stopped shooting.) Roach has praise for Mike Psenicska, a Perry Hall driving instructor, for embodying the side of America that is "hopeful and open and patient and tolerant." But even those who provoke mixed reactions in the audience (and the moviemakers) often could be genuinely compassionate. They expressed concern for Borat's safety and worry that he'd survive his trek across the country—which also proves Baron Cohen's amazing persuasiveness in the role.

To Waters, the difference between the *Jackass* phenomenon (which he also loves) and *Borat* is that the *Jackass* jokers goof on each other while Baron Cohen pulls unsuspecting marks into his game. Waters thinks that's the genius of the movie: "Some of them deserve to be victims [of Borat] and some don't—and the ones that don't come off as heroes. The filmmakers don't write it that way. The characters write it by what they say, and the audience decides whether they're heroes or villains."

UNIT 10

Understanding Race and Ethnic Relations: Exploring Challenges

Unit Selections

Key Points to Consider

- Will the ethnic and religious conflict that is emerging in Iraq overshadow the American formulation of its future as a free market and democracy?
- What can and should be done about genocidal violence? By whom?
- Does China run a parallel risk as it attempts to extend the influence of the central government into its western regions where Islamic populations and a range of ethnic groups seem to be intent on maintaining their autonomy?
- Are political solutions to pluralism and military/economic regimes in support of free markets and democracy compatible?
- Do regional organizations and/or international organizations such as the United Nations have the capacity and the rightful authority to intervene in ethnic group conflicts? Or to prevent the wholesale destructions of ethnic groups within countries? Why or why not? Are there human rights that are beyond the claims of sovereignty? Explain.
- Are religious affiliations and state citizenship as well as a single ethnic tradition, a defensible goal and a worthy political objective? In what ways are religious representation and participation related to public affairs and social policy?
- How will increased immigration, technological advances, and more competitive world markets affect the relationships between religious and ethnic groups?

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www.mhcls.com/online

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Further information regarding these Web sites may be found in this book's preface or online.

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The International Center for Migration, Ethnicity, and Citizenship
http://www.newschool.edu/icmec

The articles in this section invite us to pursue the search for fresh insight into the social and symbolic formation of cultures. The debate regarding the relationship of various ways of knowing invites us to search for understanding and particular skills, competencies, and rules for dialogue among religious, ethnic, and political traditions. Support of civilization and peaceful means of resolving differences are clearly imperative. While the situation of these issues is worldwide, understanding and action in this arena is nearly always local and specific to the particularly social history and interaction of cultures and political leadership. The American Constitution initiated and institutionalized the divisive tradition of exclusionary race relations. For generations, slaves and their descendants were not considered, nor legally warranted rights, as persons. American legal and political entities supported a race-conscious culture that sustained its economy. This fundamental pattern continued even as a more complex web of cultures and economic development changed the social composition of the population. Aided by an open immigration policy that sought the benefits of large-scale population growth, industrialization, and urbanization, America began to transform itself. The transformation yielded American ethnicities and a new free-associational form of religiosity—a traditional alien to the dominant Protestant churches. When Catholicism and Judaism become socially effective, new claims were woven into the deep structures of a changing cultural and social fabric.

The theory and practice of developing a new political culture and an inclusive constitutional tradition drew its energy and inspiration from a wellspring of hope articulated in American aspiration to "liberty and justice for all" manifested in the Declaration of Independence. In the United States, after nearly a century of social and regime construction and reconstruction, our understanding of pluralism, at best, yields the following finding: Ethnicity is one of the modern identities developed by the largely peasant migrants who poured into the United States during the last two centuries.

For most immigrants, their ethnicity became a cultural modality that emerged as they became Americans, and their religious faith and institutions were influenced by the new dynamics of American development. This new notion of peoplehood replaced loyalty to village or region as the reference point around which they organized their sense of life, located the place of their family in the moral and physical universe, and shaped their community. The continual mismeasures of intelligence and misreading of meaning indicate the long-term need for critical reformulation of the very ideas of race. Concrete strategies for improving this situation call upon both the public and the private sectors in areas of relief, institution building, education, employment, and training. The emergence of new findings and scholarly contentions in genetics and its applications to medicine are intersecting race, ethnicity, and religion. The outcome of this great debate may establish new horizons for which our understanding of the human condition, in an era of science and human rights, may enable us to perceive the wonders of pluralism with deepened insight and respect for its awesome complexity and profound unity.

Article 46

The Trouble with Tolerance

STANLEY FISH

Some years ago, just after Salman Rushdie was made the object of a *fatwa,* I found myself at an academic conference listening to a panel address the issues raised by his situation. A member of the audience rose and, without a trace of irony, gave voice to this question/accusation: "What's the matter with those Iranians? Haven't they ever heard of the First Amendment?" The empirical answer to the question was maybe yes, maybe no. Some individual Iranians and many members of the Iranian legal community would have heard of (and studied) the First Amendment, but even those who had read it could not have been counted on to affirm the assumptions informing it—the assumption that expression as an abstract category is to be valued over the content of what is expressed; the assumption that no content is to be either stigmatized or embraced in advance of its having been subjected to the test of rational scrutiny; the assumption that contents (ideas, ideologies, opinions, hypotheses) are equal before the law, and none is to be prohibited unless it is put into (dangerous) action; the assumption that religious pronouncements, even those that issue from revered authorities, are in no way privileged, exempt from criticism, or entitled to a place in the policy deliberations of the state; the assumption that the holding of views, however unpopular or even sacrilegious, cannot be a reason for the denial of rights, the withholding of privileges, or the distribution of rewards.

Each and every one of those assumptions was seen by the person who asked the question to have been flouted by the government of Iran, and that government, accordingly, was regarded as backward, retrograde, myopic, and hopeless. (How little has changed.) Ignored was the possibility that what appeared to be an entirely negative and unprincipled act might be the product of an alternative set of principles—preferring community to individual rights, positive morality to respect for all points of view, truth to tolerance, the sanctity of God to the sanctity of choice.

Earlier this year, pretty much the same scenario was played out around the publication in Denmark of cartoons poking fun at the person and beliefs of the prophet Muhammad. Many Western commentators were simply unable to see why mere words or pictorial representations could be received as grievously wounding—after all, "sticks and stones may break my bones, but…"—especially given that those who reacted most vehemently (and, on occasion, violently) were not directly the target of the cartoons (they were not being libeled, so what's the big deal?). The idea that you could be so identified with a religious creed that criticisms of it would lead you to actions that might be appropriate if you were being physically assaulted (there is, after all, the speech-action distinction, isn't there?) is simply inconceivable to those who have been taught (by everyone from Locke and Kant to John Rawls) that tolerance of views you oppose is the highest morality.

This has been going on for a long time, at least since Locke declared (in *A Letter Concerning Toleration,* 1689) that "every Church is orthodox to itself" and concluded that, in the absence of an independent mechanism for determining which among competing orthodoxies is the true one, toleration is the only rational policy. Locke then asked, What about the churches and orthodoxies that value tolerance less than they do the truth and political supremacy of the faiths they espouse? Do we tolerate them? The answer he gave is still being given today by the guardians of Enlightenment liberalism: "No opinions contrary to human society, or to those moral rules which are necessary to the preservation of civil society, are to be tolerated."

But the question of which opinions are "contrary to human society" does not answer itself, for if it did, if there were universal agreement on what views were simply beyond the pale, tolerance would be unnecessary. The category of interdicted opinions must be established by an act of authority and power, an act Locke performed later in the tract when he made his own list. He thus made it clear that in the liberal tradition he initiated, tolerance, rather than being a wholly benevolent and inclusive practice, is an engine of exclusion and a technology of regulation.

The triumph of toleration as the central liberal value, and the attendant inability of liberals to see the dark side of their favorite virtue, is the subject of Wendy Brown's insightful and illuminating new book, *Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire* (Princeton University Press). Brown sets out to understand "how tolerance has come to be such an important justice discourse in our time." The "conventional story," she reports, goes this way: "[T]he combined effects of globalization, the aftermath of the cold war, and the aftermath of colonialism have led to the world's erupting in a hundred scenes of local and internecine conflict, roughly rooted in identity clashes, and tolerance is an appropriate balm for soothing those conflicts." In a world where difference seems intractable and irreconcilable, parties are always poised for

conflict (Brown notes the Hobbesian antecedents of this picture), tolerance appears to be a "natural and benign remedy"; natural because, given what men and women are (irremediably) like, it seems the only way to go, and benign because while it reins in differences, it accords those difference a space in the private sector. You know the commonplace aphorisms and slogans: Live and let live, different strokes for different folks, can't we all just get along?

Sounds good, but Brown isn't having any. Her critique of tolerance challenges the common assumption that the differences the sharp edges of which tolerance is supposed to blunt "took their shape prior to the discourse called on to broker them." No, she insists, those differences are *produced* by a regime of tolerance that at the same time produces a status quo politics built on the assumption that difference cannot be negotiated but can only be managed. When difference is naturalized, she explains, it becomes the mark not of an ideological or political divide (in relation to which one might have an argument), but of a cultural divide (in relation to which each party says of the other, "See, that's just the way they are"). If people do the things they do not because of what they believe, but because they are Jews, Muslims, blacks, or gays, it is no use asking them to see the error of their ways, because it is through those same ways—*naturally* theirs—that they see at all. When President Bush reminds us of "'the *nature* of our enemy,"' he is, in effect, saying there's no dealing with these people; they are immune to rational appeals; the only language they understand is the language of force.

"This reduction of political motivations and causes to essentialized culture," Brown says, "is mobilized to explain everything from suicide bombers to Osama bin Laden's world designs, mass death in Rwanda and Sudan, and the failure of democracy to take hold in the immediate aftermath of Saddam Hussein's Iraq."

And, she adds, it does more than that: It legitimizes, and even demands, the exercise of *in*tolerance, when the objects of intolerance are persons who, because of their overattachment to culture, are deemed incapable of being tolerant. Live and let live won't work, we are often told, if the other guy is determined to kill you because he believes that his religion or his ethnic history commands him to. Liberal citizens, Brown explains, will be tolerant of any group so long as its members subordinate their cultural commitments to the universal dictates of reason, as defined by liberalism. But once a group has rejected tolerance as a guiding principle and opted instead for the cultural imperatives of the church or the tribe, it becomes a candidate for intolerance that will be performed in the name of tolerance; and at that moment any action against it—however violent—is justified. Tolerance, then, is a virtue that liberal citizens or those who are willing to act as liberal citizens are capable of exercising; and those who refuse to exercise it cannot, by this logic, be its beneficiary.

Nor, according to Brown, are the regulating and stigmatizing effects of tolerance limited to a nation's relations with foreign states and actors; the liberal state does the same thing to its own citizens, at least to those citizens who, by being identified as the appropriate beneficiaries of tolerance, are at the same time marked as deviant and potentially dangerous. If it is "a basic premise of liberal secularism that neither culture nor religion is permitted to govern publicly," Brown says, then those Americans who refuse to leave their sectarian beliefs and convictions of core identity at home when they venture into the public sphere—fundamentalist Christians, Orthodox Jews, strongly observant Muslims, gays and lesbians, etc.—must be made to understand that only by relaxing the hold of those personal commitments and promising to act as liberal citizens (rather than as Southern Baptists, Hasidic Jews, or citizens of the Queer Nation) in public spaces will they be welcomed into the fold. Should they resist the requirement to live a double life—apostles of individualism, progress, profit, and secularism in the courthouse and the ballot box, devout upholders of religious and cultural imperatives at home—they will either be tolerated and marked as "other" (the Amish) or made the objects of surveillance and profiling (anyone wearing a turban or a *burkha*) or detained and perhaps deported.

If people do the things they do not because of what they believe, but because they are Jews, Muslims, blacks, or gays, it is no use asking them to see the error of their ways.

The state preaches tolerance, but because it has identified tolerance with those who have a certain set of (liberal, secular) beliefs, those who do not display such beliefs and the practices they subtend will be regarded with suspicion and become the "natural" subjects of intolerant actions: From roundups, detention, and deportation of illegal aliens to racial profiling in airport security searches, the state "engages in extralegal and prosecutorial actions toward the very group it calls upon the citizenry to be tolerant toward," Brown says. Moreover, as she sees it, that is not a contradiction of the tolerance the state proclaims, but an inevitable result of a tolerance that cannot itself tolerate persons or practices that do not respect the boundaries and distinctions—between secular/religious, public/private, mind/body—it presupposes.

To this point, I have been summarizing Brown's analysis of tolerance (not all of it; there are more turns to her argument than can be dealt with in a brief review) and her denial to that resonant word of the good press that it typically receives in the Western world. As my readers will no doubt have surmised, I find the analysis trenchant and the critique persuasive.

What follows from Brown's deconstruction (a term she uses) of tolerance? The question has an obvious answer if it is put to Herbert Marcuse's "Repressive Tolerance" (1965), an essay Brown cites as one of her two main inspirations (the other is Michel Foucault's *The History of Sexuality*). Marcuse anticipates Brown when he declares that "the conditions of

tolerance are 'loaded': They are determined and defined by the institutionalized inequality (which is certainly compatible with constitutional equality), i.e., by the class structure of society." Marcuse emphasizes the difference between a legal or procedural equality that treats persons alike ("constitutional equality") and the inequalities that result from long-in-place structures of privilege, discrimination, and inherited wealth. Those inequalities, he says, are left in place by a legal system that turns a blind eye to them. Brown sharpens and extends Marcuse's point by observing that when difference is essentialized in the liberal state and made unavailable to negotiation, it is also depoliticized, relegated to the private sphere, where it is at once above and below judicial scrutiny. Hence its effects multiply in a political "underworld" where the damage done escapes official notice although millions experience it.

But Brown and Marcuse part ways when it comes time to draw a conclusion. Marcuse puts his up front at the beginning of his essay: "The conclusion reached is that the realization of the objective of tolerance would call for intolerance toward prevailing policies, attitudes, opinions, and the extension of tolerance to policies, attitudes, and opinions which are outlawed or suppressed." That is to say, and Marcuse says it, anything the right does is bad and should not be tolerated; anything the left does is good and should be welcomed. Marcuse's reasoning follows from his wedding of tolerance and truth. ("The *telos* of tolerance is truth.") The argument has the form of a syllogism. Only the truth should be tolerated. Truth resides on the left. Therefore tolerance cannot be extended to the right. In a world where the forces of good and bad vie for supremacy, "suppression of the regressive ones is a prerequisite for the strengthening of the progressive ones."

Once a group has rejected tolerance as a guiding principle and opted instead for the cultural imperatives of the church or the tribe, it becomes a candidate for intolerance.

Again Brown agrees with Marcuse that liberal tolerance, emphasizing as it does formal equality and the inclusion of all points of view, is unresponsive to the question of truth as it is posed by liberalism's opponents. She thinks it a mistake, as does Marcuse, to "retreat from substantive visions of justice," which makes room for fundamentalist social movements to rush in to fill the void created by liberal proceduralism. But Brown cannot embrace the logic of Marcuse's syllogism because she does not want to smite her enemy hip and thigh. She wants a more general, more theoretical yield. She wants a vision that is at once substantive and alert to the truth of things and inclusive and alert to the injustices done to marginalized peoples. It would hardly be an advance to replace the "othering" of minorities and foreigners with the "othering" of liberals, conservatives, and libertarians.

But unless she follows her critique of liberal tolerance and her embrace of substance with some statement of who and what should and should not be tolerated, Brown will be left with noble-sounding phrases like "the fashioning of a democratic culture," phrases that are vague to the point of being empty. Once she takes the notion of truth seriously—which means taking the notion of falsity seriously—Brown is in a difficult position. If she localizes truth—finds it here but not there, alive and well in Palestine but abandoned and dead in Israel and Washington—she abandons a capacious theoretical discourse for a narrowly partisan one. Either she is for truth in general and nothing particular follows, or she is arguing that the truth lies here not there. Either she's making a theoretical argument about tolerance, in which case her opponents are those who would describe tolerance differently, or she is making a policy argument, in which case her opponents are those who would advocate different policies.

What she wants is to be doing both; she wants to derive a specific policy from a general, theoretical account. But you can't get from a general account of a matter to a particular program of action because the general account, if it is really general and not already partisan, is descriptive not normative. It tells you what is, not what to do. A general account can be more or less accurate—when reading it, you can say to yourself, for example, "This is the way liberal tolerance works"—but it cannot generate a moral on the order of, "Now do this and not that." Brown's account of liberal tolerance tells us how it works not only in this instance, but whenever and wherever it is deployed; but it doesn't tell us whether liberal tolerance is a good thing, or whether there is something better.

Assume, for example, that you are persuaded (as I am for the most part) by Brown's analysis of tolerance and now believe that, far from being a simple, benign virtue, tolerance is the technology or governmentality (a word Brown borrows from Foucault) of an ideology that privileges some values—individual will, autonomy, choice, procedural (not substantive) justice, rationality, freedom of expression, freedom of markets—and stigmatizes or marginalizes others—group loyalty, religious obedience, the law of God, tribal traditions, the national ethos, blood, culture. It is perfectly possible that you could say, "Yes, now I see, thanks to Brown, exactly what substantive values inform liberalism despite its denial (at least in some versions) that it harbors any; but those values are fine by me, and I will continue to affirm them even if it means being intolerant toward those who reject them." Or, let's say you have read Brown's scintillating chapter on the Los Angeles Museum of Tolerance and find yourself agreeing with her conclusion: The museum celebrates respect for different beliefs, but at the same time its exhibits identify Israel as the only Middle East actor that embodies that respect, and thereby authorize and justify Israel's disrespect (and worse) toward those it deems insufficiently respectful. You could think that Brown is right on target and still believe that the museum's message is the right one and that Israel should not change its policies until the Arabs mend their ways and get a better set of ideas. Or you could accept my argument, made at the beginning, that Western commentators are

incapable of understanding (except as misguided, crazy, or evil) the motivations of those who passionately protested the Danish cartoons, and you could nevertheless conclude that their incapacity is all to their credit. My point is that the demonstration that an ideology—liberalism, organicism, whatever—will have effects favorable to some interests and injurious to, or dismissive of, others will not be a reason to repudiate it if the favored interests are yours.

But, someone might object, what about values that are universal rather than local or parochial? Shouldn't we be trying to identify them and work for their realization in the political structures of the world? One of Brown's criticisms of liberalism is that it pretends to just such a universality even though its recourse to toleration is an implicit acknowledgment of the many who dissent from it: Cultural "conflict itself exposes the nonuniversal character of liberal legalism." (Not as powerful a point as she thinks: The claim that liberal values are universal is not undercut by the millions, perhaps billions, who reject them. You can say that it's just a matter of time, or that they are blinded by a particularistic ideology, or a hundred other things. Whether or not a value is universal is a matter not of votes, but of arguments.) But it's not always clear whether Brown is rejecting universalism in favor of a particular policy—as seems to be the case when she suggests that we replace tolerance's "therapeutic" project (let's be nice even to those who have funny ideas and wear funny clothes) with a justice project—or whether she is rejecting liberalism's false universalism for a truer one—as seems to be the case when she talks of "developing deep knowledge of others in their 'difference'."

On balance, I think it is the latter; she wants a better universalism than liberalism's, but her articulations of it are without content, as they will necessarily be if she thinks to derive it from her critique of liberalism and liberal tolerance. That critique, to repeat the point made earlier, tells you what liberal tolerance is made of; it doesn't tell you whether it is bad or good, and it certainly doesn't tell you what should be put in its place. A phrase like "deep knowledge of others" is a teaser: Deeper than what? Deep, how? How deep do we go? If the knowledge is deeper than the surface differences—of religion, ideology, culture, tradition—that now divide us, then what it brings us to is the "thin" personhood of liberalism and a politics in which substantive beliefs are subordinated to some form of Kantian proceduralism, precisely what Brown has been arguing against. And if the knowledge is deeper than the caricatures that fill our political rhetoric, and what we're supposed to do is really understand, say, the Islamic temperament from the inside, then we would either have to become Muslim (in which case we would inherit the exclusionary as well as the generous aspects of that faith), or we would have to view Islam from a perspective above all faiths, and that would again bring us to classical liberalism and its claim (denied by Brown) to occupy a position that is not one.

The same difficulties attend Brown's call for a "project of connections across differences." On what bridge? Built by whom? It's a little late to be saying (with E.M. Forster), "Only connect." Or consider this question, which Brown seems to believe is a call to action: "[W]hat if autonomy were recognized as relative, ambiguous, ambivalent, partial and also advanced by means other than law?" OK, I stipulate all those (theoretical) points, but now what? Do they direct us to do anything? Is the relativity or ambiguity of autonomy the answer to any question posed by circumstances in the world? If there is a particular problem to resolve or decision to make, is saying, "Autonomy is relative and ambiguous" going to help or point you in a particular direction? I think not. And what are we to make of Brown's hope that "liberal regimes" might become open "to reflection on the false conceits of their cultural and religious secularism, and to the possibility to being transformed by their encounter with what liberalism has conventionally taken to be its constituitive outside and its hostile Other"? If a liberal regime were to decide first that the procedural virtues it promotes—fairness, tolerance, formal equality—were in fact substantive, and second (this would be crucial) that the substance is one it wants to disavow, then it would no longer be a liberal regime. If the "conceits" (not a word Brown earns) it lives by were rejected as false, it would in that very gesture of rejection reconstitute itself as a regime informed by other conceits. In short, a softer liberalism, a liberalism alert to difference in a way that does not privatize or naturalize it, wouldn't be liberalism. It would be something, but what that something is Brown does not tell us.

Nevertheless, what she does tell us is valuable and illuminating. Her account of how liberal tolerance (and therefore liberalism) works is nuanced and bracing. The fact that her analysis does not (and in my view could not) deliver a program for improving the world (or even a set of reasons for rejecting liberal tolerance) makes it no different from any other effort (always doomed) to derive a politics from the discourses of postmodernism, anti-essentialism, and anti-foundationalism.

Brown is still trying in the final paragraph, when she declares that "we can contest the depoliticizing, regulatory, and imperial aims of contemporary deployments of tolerance with alternative political speech and practices." Yes, we can. Alternative political practices are always a possibility, but they will not be generated by the realization that the practices you oppose are regulatory and imperial. Rather, they will be generated by the realization that the regulations and the imperialism now in place take forms you dislike; and the alternative practices you urge will bring new regulations that are similarly imperial; the difference is that they will be yours.

Here and elsewhere in the book, Brown makes what I have called the "awareness" mistake (otherwise known as the mistake of theory, or the mistake that *is* theory), the mistake of thinking that awareness is a general condition of consciousness that, once achieved, enables you to see past and through what members of the Frankfurt School called the "prevailing realm of purposes." But it is within the prevailing world of purposes—the present one and the one you want to substitute for it—that awareness is possible. Awareness is a local not a global cast of mind, dependent always on constraints and limitations even as it attempts to overcome them. Awareness, in short, is particular and produces particular insights that are not universally generalizable.

Wendy Brown's book makes us aware of some important things; it alerts us, for example, to the fact that by privatizing and essentializing difference, the discourse of tolerance tends to prevent us from searching for the political and social solutions to the problems difference presents both locally and globally. It is a genuine service to have made that clear, and it is enough for one book, even if the book doesn't tell us, or even give us a hint of, what those solutions are.

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American Self-Interest and the Response to Genocide

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For 20 years, I taught a course on genocide: What is "genocide," why does it happen, who is responsible for it, and how could this ultimate crime be prevented? I told students that genocide—intentional acts to eliminate in whole, or in substantial part, a specific human population—had claimed the lives of some 60 million people in the 20th century, 16 million of them since 1945, when the watchword was "Never again." Genocide has, in fact, been so frequent, the number of victims so extensive, and serious attempts to prevent it so few, that many scholars have described the 20th century as "the age of genocide." Some have wondered if genocide is not itself a product of modernity, the dark energy of civilization.

But what my students wanted to know was: Why had the nations of the world, and particularly the United States, which they thought of as both powerful and just, not prevented the killing of millions of innocent people? Where was American power and moral commitment when a million Armenians were being slaughtered in Turkey in 1915, six million Ukrainians starved to death by Stalin in 1932–33, two million Bengalis murdered by Pakistan in 1971? What was America doing when still more millions were killed in Cambodia, Bosnia, and Rwanda, not because of what they had done, but because of who they were? And, of course, there was the much-discussed question of whether more could have been done to prevent the Holocaust.

My students also wanted to know why it had taken the United States 40 years to ratify the Genocide Convention, which the United Nations endorsed unanimously in 1948, with strong U.S. support. The convention defined genocide and declared it a crime against international law. Why, as soon as the United States finally did ratify the convention, in 1988, did it support Saddam Hussein's regime despite evidence that the dictator had committed genocide against the Kurds in Iraq in 1987–88?

Today we continue to hear about genocide. As before, however, few Americans pay much attention. What is happening in Sudan? In Congo? With indigenous peoples in many other regions? Can you tell me? My students' questions—and my own—are increasingly important to all of us, both morally and politically.

Unfortunately they are not easy to answer. Sometimes the response hinges on factual information, but more often on judgment, an assessment of competing responsibilities, and context.

Key Works Discussed in This Essay

Arguing About War, by Michael Walzer (Yale University Press, 2004).

The Burning Tigris: The Armenian Genocide and America's Response, by Peter Balakian (HarperCollins, 2003).

A Century of Genocide: Utopias of Race and Nation, by Eric D. Weitz (Princeton University Press, 2003).

Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century, by Leo Kuper (Yale University Press, 1982).

The New Killing Fields: Massacre and the Politics of Intervention, edited by Nicolaus Mills and Kira Brunner (Basic Books, 2002).

"A Problem From Hell": America and the Age of Genocide, by Samantha Power (Basic Books, 2002).

"Provoking Genocide: A Revised History of the Rwandan Patriotic Front," by Alan J. Kuperman, in the *Journal of Genocide Research,* Vol. 6, No. 1, March 2004:61–84.

The Specter of Genocide: Mass Murder in Historical Perspective, edited by Robert Gellately and Ben Kiernan (Cambridge University Press, 2003).

At the outset we can reject claims that relieve all bystanders, whether states, organizations, or individuals, of responsibility for attempting to prevent or mitigate genocide. One argument, coming from perpetrators, is that victims of genocide (although the term is avoided) bear responsibility for their own destruction, having brought it upon themselves through provocation. Genocide is strictly an internal matter, this argument goes. Outside powers should mind their own business. Two immediate objections arise: First, provocations, when they exist at all, stem from a minority of the group of victims. Most of those who will be killed are innocent. Second, genocide is seldom without international consequences, ranging from a vast outpouring of refugees, with the need for large amounts of humanitarian aid, to regional instability and war.

Some have wondered if genocide is not itself a product of modernity, the dark energy of civilization.

A recent article in the *Journal of Genocide Research* provides a chilling variation on the argument about the responsibility of victims. In "Provoking Genocide: A Revised History of the Rwandan Patriotic Front," Alan J. Kuperman states: "In most cases of mass killing since World War II—unlike the Holocaust—the victim group has triggered its own demise by violently challenging the authority of the state." Kuperman adds that he does not use provocation to excuse genocide. Nor does he deny that there is an international responsibility to prevent genocide. But the obligation takes a bizarre turn: Intervention by third parties should not be directed against those we perceive as perpetrators; they, after all, are only defending themselves. Rather, intervention should be aimed at changing the behavior of the victims. In other words, in the Rwandan genocide of 1994, the international community should have ignored the Hutu preparations for genocide and focused, instead, on the intended Tutsi victims. The upshot of that *Alice in Wonderland* argument is that the victims become the perpetrators.

Claims are also made that genocides are inevitable, the result of ancient hatreds, conflict over scarce resources, or the advance of progress. A version of the inevitability thesis that found favor with some international planners in the 1960s was that genocide is simply a byproduct of development, and benefits to the surviving group outweigh the costs to the group that is decimated, or perhaps eliminated. Over the years that argument has been applied not only to the elimination of indigenous peoples (the Yanomami in Brazil, the Chittagong Hills tribesmen in Bangladesh), but also to the destruction of the Armenians in Turkey, which, we are told by some historians, paved the way for a more unified and stronger nation, one allied with the United States during the cold war.

Genocide, however, is never inevitable: It is always the result of choice. And surely lives are not interchangeable.

Another argument is that genocides should be allowed to run their course: It is best to let the violence complete itself, reducing the chance for further violence and, hence, any need for intervention. That proposition, devoid of even animal pity, was advanced to me by a student in international relations after I mentioned that Rwanda had had recurrent genocides. Had the killers not been restrained, he asserted, unity and peace would have been established. When I asked him if he would maintain his position if he were a member of the group slated for victimization, he replied that he lived in the United States, and that therefore the question wasn't relevant. That was shortly before September 11.

The field of genocide studies itself is relatively new, dating to the late 1970s. Several factors were involved: a growing emphasis on the protection of human rights, the frequency of genocide in the 1960s (Rwanda, Indonesia) and 1970s (Bangladesh, Burundi, Cambodia), a rediscovery of the Armenian genocide and a new awareness of how it had been denied. Not last: a disenchantment with the emphasis in the social sciences on methodology at the expense of substance.

One of the best works is still Leo Kuper's 1982 *Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century,* which discusses the nature and history of genocide, its treatment under international law, the conditions that promote it, and the inability of the United Nations to suppress it. But since the book's publication, new genocides have been committed, extensive research on genocide has been conducted, and explanations of why genocides occur have taken on new sophistication. Three recent books provide essential, updated information about genocide in the 20th century.

The first, *The New Killing Fields: Massacre and the Politics of Intervention,* edited by Nicolaus Mills and Kira Brunner, is perhaps the narrowest, yet the most contemporary, focusing on four cases of genocide: Cambodia, Bosnia, Rwanda, and East Timor. Most of the essays are by journalists, some of whom were present as genocide was taking place around them. Their accounts, mostly descriptive and personal, provide a wealth of information. *The New Killing Fields* also includes two essays, by Michael Walzer and Samantha Power, that suggest how we can begin to evaluate international responses to genocide. When, where, how, and at what cost should outside states intervene? More on that later.

Eric D. Weitz's *A Century of Genocide: Utopias of Race and Nation* also concentrates on four cases of genocide in the 20th century: the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, Cambodia, and Bosnia/Kosovo. Systematic in his comparisons, Weitz concludes that those genocides were the result of "ideologies of race and nation, revolutionary regimes with vast utopian ambitions, moments of crisis generated by war and domestic upheaval." What is distinctive about his thesis is that he maintains that genocide has a dual character: It is organized by states but is possible on a vast scale, as in the 20th century, only with widespread participation by the population. The book is also strong in its emphasis on the rituals of degradation and cruelty that occur in genocide. Its weakness is that it omits the Rwandan genocide altogether, and its concentration on the Soviet Union gets bogged down in party purges and political repression, which Weitz admits are not examples of genocide. (Many of those sent to the gulag were released, and Soviet officials often thought they were pursuing "reform" rather than annihilation, he notes.) On the other hand, the Stalin-induced famine in the Ukraine in 1932–33, intended to destroy the kulaks as a class, end Ukrainian nationalism, and force peasants into collective farms, receives virtually no attention, though most scholars regard it as genocide.

If the other books are selective in the cases of genocide they focus upon, *The Specter of Genocide: Mass Murder in Historical Perspective,* edited by Robert Gellately and Ben Kiernan, strives to be comprehensive. It discusses the Armenian genocide, the Holocaust, and genocides against indigenous peoples in Africa, North America, and Australia, and is particularly strong on its coverage of genocides in the post-1945 period: Indonesia, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Bosnia, Rwanda, East Timor,

and Guatemala. The cumulative impact of the book is to demonstrate just how prevalent state-sponsored mass murder has been in the 20th century. Rather than an aberration, genocide has been commonplace, occurring in most parts of the world. Oddly, however, at least two major examples are omitted: the mass killing in East Pakistan, and Saddam Hussein's gassing of the Kurds. Those are important in their own right, but also, as we shall see, in terms of the U.S. response to them.

Almost from the beginning, the field of genocide studies has been concerned with two questions: Not just, Why does genocide take place?, but also, How can it be prevented? One early idea seemed to offer great promise: a "genocide early-warning system." Comparative analysis would provide indicators to predict where imminent threats of genocide existed; intervention could follow immediately. Naïvely, scholars assumed that individual states or international organizations would act on evidence of when and where genocide was likely to occur. It didn't take long to realize that the problem wasn't about knowing, but about doing. It was a matter of political will.

Inaction and political will became the major topics of discussion in genocide studies as of the mid-'80s. But as often happens in academic life, we were talking mainly to each other. There was little attempt to engage either policy makers or the public in a dialogue. Nor was there an effort to provide a comprehensive account of American policy toward genocide over the course of the 20th century. Some of us thought about doing such a study, but the idea seemed so huge that it was shelved. Then in 2002, the book did appear and, significantly, addressed not so much the academy as the public and the political establishment.

Samantha Power's *"A Problem From Hell": America and the Age of Genocide* won a Pulitzer Prize for its thorough documentation of the dark history of the American inaction to stop genocide in the 20th century and its explanation of why the United States had failed to act. Only rarely did the U.S. government even condemn the killing as it was taking place. For Power, "What is most shocking is that U.S. policy makers did almost nothing to deter the crime." Of course, there were individuals, both in government and in society, who sought to change policy, but, Power notes, their efforts failed. The United States, on the other hand, has been both generous and effective in providing humanitarian aid after a people has been decimated.

It is not just a question of inaction. Power tells us that on several occasions, the United States "directly or indirectly aided those committing genocide." We provided $500-million in agricultural and manufacturing credits to Iraq as that country was destroying thousands of Kurdish villages and gassing Kurds. After Vietnam had ousted Cambodia's Pol Pot regime, the United States, in an effort to deny Vietnam influence in that country, took the lead in the United Nations in recognizing the genocidal Khmer Rouge as the legitimate government of Cambodia. The United States also led the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims, even though it was clear that doing so would prevent them from defending themselves. And it did everything in its power to remove U.N. peacekeepers from Rwanda and prevent their return. Some 800,000 persons died as a result; the violence also spilled over into neighboring countries, setting off local and regional wars. Other examples pile up.

How can we explain the U.S. response to genocide? Those who made the decisions not to act typically argued that they didn't know what was going on, that the facts were unclear, that any effort to stop the killing would have been futile, that the United States lacked the means to do so, that intervention would have made the situation even worse. Power rejects such claims: "Simply put, American leaders did not act because they did not want to. They believed that genocide was wrong, but they were not prepared to invest the military, financial, diplomatic, or domestic political capital needed to stop it." On the other hand, when it seemed to be in the national interest, those same policy makers could collaborate in genocide either by giving permission (East Timor) or by active support (Indonesia, Guatemala).

For the most part, genocide in the 20th century seemed to be something that happened to other people, in other parts of the world, with little effect on American interests, narrowly defined. It was seldom a subject of public debate. There has been, Power says, a mutual failure in the democratic process: An uninformed public makes no demands for the suppression of genocide, and politicians, having done what they can to silence the public, cite the lack of public demand as a basis for inaction as genocide claims its victims.

There has always been, however, a problem about how public opinion is related to public policy. I would argue that relatively small, well-organized lobbying groups are more likely to be effective in moving policy makers to act against genocide than broad, but somewhat amorphous, public opinion. Public opinion may be reported, but it doesn't get direct access to policy makers the way human-rights lobbyists sometimes can. Moreover, human-rights groups have the expertise to be persuasive and the commitment to stay with the issue as public opinion—easily manipulated by those with power and an ideological agenda—waxes and wanes.

But the reverse is also true: Farm and manufacturing interests were able to defeat the legislation that would have prohibited credits to Iraq after the gassing of the Kurds. Nearly 25 percent of American rice production annually went to Iraq, along with a million tons of wheat, insecticides, fertilizers, tractors, and so on. Agricultural lobbyists argued that Iraq was not an enemy, but an opportunity. Suspending credits would not punish Iraq—other countries would supply Saddam Hussein. American businesses would be the real victims. The Reagan administration, also claiming that "engagement" with Iraq would allow a gentler dictator to emerge, seconded those arguments.

We can see the impact of public opinion, and its limitations, in Peter Balakian's important book, *The Burning Tigris: The Armenian Genocide and America's Response.* There are several interrelated themes and narratives in *The Burning Tigris.* First, there are the detailed, heart-wrenching accounts of the Turkish massacres of some 200,000 Armenians in the 1890s, and of the genocide, beginning in 1915, that claimed the lives of at least a million Armenians. At the same time, the author describes the dedication and courage of American diplomats, who tried, with little support from the State Department, to end the carnage. But there is also the story of a broadly based American humanitarian movement that sought to provide relief to the

Armenians in their desperate condition, and that demanded that the U.S. government protect them from further violence. Balakian, however, shows that by the beginning of the 1920s there was a growing conflict between public opinion, which strongly supported an independent Armenia, and a Congress and White House that had other interests. In his final chapter, he documents Turkey's continuing denial of the Armenian genocide and its efforts, largely successful, to enlist the White House and State Department in defeating Congressional resolutions that would publicly recognize the genocide.

But the point to emphasize here is that while public support was crucial for the relief efforts and helped save many lives, it was not able to carry the day politically. The United States did not declare war on Turkey in World War I, even though Turkey and Germany were allies. An influential group of missionaries and their supporters argued that their colleges and schools would be seized by Turkey, and that relief supplies would not be allowed in the country. After World War I, although the public strongly supported an American mandate to protect the fragile Armenian state, a growing isolationism in Congress put an end to the project. From 1920 on, where Armenia was concerned, it was through the voice not of the people, but of big oil. As one Senate critic summarized the Harding administration's attitude: "Show this administration an oil well, and it will show you a foreign policy." Shades of the past continue. Did Iraqi oil help blunt criticism of what was happening to the Kurds?

Whether the issue is about taxes or human rights, elites and their interest groups tend to prevail. In part that is because most human-rights organizations in the United States have small budgets. And in part because the major humanitarian organizations have differing agendas: Amnesty International focuses on individuals, Human Rights Watch on policy and institutions. Other groups focus on humanitarian aid once the slaughter has commenced. As a result resources and efforts are scattered. What recent scholarship helps us see is that those who want the United States to take a more active stance against genocide have no choice but to create organizations that can lobby more effectively than they have in the past.

In addition, it is crucial that policy makers redefine "national interest" to include the prevention of genocide abroad. How such a conceptual revolution can come about is problematic, but without it, we can expect only more of the same: the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people while Uncle Sam takes a hike. The case for an expanded understanding of the national interest is not new. It has had a prominent place in scholarly discussions for at least the past 20 years, but it has either been ignored or viewed with skepticism by most in power.

The argument rests on two elements. The first is moral: Genocide is a crime committed upon a particular people, but by its very nature, it is also a crime against humankind, permanently diminishing the biological and cultural possibilities of human existence. It is an outrage to our sense of justice. Since when can we support, allow, defend the mass killing of the innocent? The second reason: Genocide leads to war, regional and international instability, disruption of trade, an enormous outflow of refugees, and if not stopped, sends a message to would-be perpetrators that they can go ahead with impunity. Further still, as Power reminds us, survivors of genocide may become a threat in the future, harboring a thirst for vengeance and having learned that violence is an acceptable way to "solve" social and political problems. In that sense, the case for the prevention of genocide is rooted in enlightened self-interest.

A major barrier to an expanded notion of national interest or, more generally, a willingness to prevent or mitigate genocide, is that "intervention" is widely thought to mean solely military intervention. That is, in fact, how the political theorist Michael Walzer understands the term in his essay in *The New Killing Fields.* He would limit military intervention to cases of genocide and ethnic cleansing; other violations of human rights, however egregious, would be left to the local population. Whether he would approve of Britain's recent military intervention in Sierra Leone is uncertain.

Moreover, Walzer insists that the task of intervention is limited: "Once the massacres and ethnic cleansing are really over and the people in command are committed to avoiding their return, the intervention is finished." He notes that "when intervention is understood in this minimalist fashion, it may be a little easier to see it through." But in his new book, *Arguing About War,* Walzer supports intervening countries' staying for the long term: "Humanitarian intervention radically shifts the argument about endings, because now the war is from the beginning an effort to change the regime that is responsible for inhumanity." That position may be logical, but it also suggests the difficulties that make countries and international organizations unwilling to commit themselves.

There are other ways of thinking about intervention. Actual military intervention may sometimes be necessary to stop a continuing genocide, as it was in East Pakistan in 1971 and East Timor in 1999. In some cases intervention may prevent genocide: Gen. Roméo Dallaire, the U.N. commander in Rwanda, thought that 5,000 troops would have been adequate to thwart the impending genocide. But nations can also respond to genocide, or the likelihood of genocide, short of military intervention, with all of its human and political risks. The options are not confined to either doing nothing or waging full battle with the genocidal regime.

The war against terrorism is taking center stage, helping to push genocide to the back of our consciousness.

Part of the problem is to identify in advance the countries most likely to commit genocide and take steps to mediate conflicts; to transform, as much as possible, the conditions that give rise to genocide; and to use a variety of incentives and threats to affect decisions in the potentially genocidal regime. Once genocide begins, there are also steps that intervening nations or groups can take. Samantha Power provides a compelling list of such actions. She urges countries to "respond to genocide

with a sense of urgency, publicly identifying and threatening the perpetrators with prosecution, demanding the expulsion of representatives of genocidal regimes from international institutions such as the United Nations, closing the perpetrators' embassies in the United States, and calling upon countries aligned with the perpetrators to ask them to use their influence." Other actions might include economic sanctions, freezing financial assets, and, to prevent incitement of genocide, jamming radio and televisions channels that spew out messages of hate. Ultimately, military intervention may nevertheless be necessary, although that would not have to be undertaken by just one nation.

Multilateral intervention provides greater legitimacy, reducing the perception that action has more to do with self-interest than with humanitarianism, and thus helps to securely establish the right to intervene to stop mass killing. It also distributes the burden of intervention. But intervention by a single state may be justified, as when India used force in adjacent East Pakistan in 1971.

Yet, if the U.S. government has a dismal record on responding to genocide, there have been signs in the past 10 years of possible change. After a very late start a U.S.-led NATO force intervened in Bosnia, first with air power, then with the orchestration of the Dayton Accords; that was followed by military intervention in Kosovo. Then in 1999, the United States supported U.N. intervention in East Timor to protect the right to self-determination and what was left of a people still under assault by militias and the Indonesian army. For several years a joint CIA-State Department genocide early-warning system has been in place.

At present the State Department is discussing whether the mass killing, razing of villages, and burning of crops in the Darfur region of Sudan, by government-supported Arab militias against non-Arabs who live in the region, constitutes genocide. (However, possible sanctions mentioned publicly, like freezing the killers' assets in the United States, are more symbolic than likely to have a real impact.)

But there have also been countersigns: the steadfast refusal to recognize the International Criminal Court that could try, as a last resort, persons accused of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Moreover, the war against terrorism is taking center stage, once more helping to push genocide to the back of our consciousness.

Even if the political will to prevent genocide suddenly appears, another problem exists. Most genocide scholars and human-rights advocates believe that, unless the United States takes the lead, other countries will stay on the sidelines, as they have in the past. But American power is not enough. To enlist others in the effort to prevent genocide, moral authority is required. Therein lies the issue: What is left of America's moral credibility after Iraq?

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Article 48

Ethnic, Religious Fissures Deepen in Iraqi Society

Tensions Escalating over Land, Power and Loyalties

RAJIV CHANDRASEKARAN AND ANTHONY SHADID
Washington Post Foreign Service

Haifa, Iraq—The Kurds who descended upon this hard-scrabble Arab village in northern Iraq 11 days ago were so confident they would be able to evict everyone and seize the surrounding farmland that they brought along three tractors.

But instead of responding by fleeing, as thousands of other Arab villagers in northern Iraq have done when confronted with similar Kurdish demands, the residents of Haifa refused to budge. "Our people went to them and said, 'What the hell are you doing here? This area doesn't belong to you,'" recalled Kadhim Hani Jubbouri, the village sheik.

Words were exchanged. Threats were hurled. When the Kurds began tilling a field lined with golden flecks of harvested hay, gunfire erupted.

Arabs contend the Kurds shot first. Kurds maintain it was the Arabs who opened fire. Both agree, however, that the 15-minute firefight was one of the clearest signs of the growing fissures between Iraq's two dominant ethnic groups—its Arab majority and its Kurdish minority—since the fall of former president Saddam Hussein's government.

At the same time, in central and southern Iraq, fault lines have widened between the country's two principal religious communities: Shiite Muslims, who are a majority of the country's approximately 24 million people, and Sunni Muslims, Iraq's traditional rulers and Hussein's principal supporters.

Although a rift between Sunnis and Shiites is relentlessly discouraged by leaders of both communities, tensions have escalated in recent weeks, raising new prospects of strife. Small bombs have been planted at a handful of mosques in Baghdad. In Khaldiya, a Sunni-dominated town west of Baghdad, unknown assailants ransacked the green-domed shrine of a Shiite saint and set off an explosive last month that damaged his brick tomb. In Basra, Iraq's second-largest city, some residents suspect that recent killings of former Baath Party members are inspired by religious zeal, and leaders of Shiite religious parties openly argue that vengeance is warranted against officials of a government that subjugated Shiites, particularly in its last decade of rule.

Hussein's Baath Party, which was in power for 35 years, was dominated by Sunni Arabs and treated Shiite Arabs, Kurds and ethnic Turkmens as second-class citizens. Although Hussein's ethnic and religious favoritism fostered animosity, those feelings and past grievances were largely kept in check by his iron-fisted rule. When he was deposed, Iraqis suddenly found themselves with the freedom to redress old grudges—and many have sought to right what they regard as injustices of the past.

The deepening divisions between Iraq's principal ethnic and religious groups have unsettled many Iraqis, who generally oppose the idea of their country breaking apart. They contend that U.S. and British occupation forces have played down or ignored many warning signs of a larger conflict that have bubbled forth in the tumult of postwar Iraq.

Many of the confrontations have taken place not in large cities where U.S. reconstruction specialists have their offices, but in tiny villages such as Haifa where there are no soldiers or prominent Iraqi leaders to defuse tensions. "I am sure," Jubbouri said, "the Americans have no idea what is happening here."

"Relations in our country have become very tense," said Anwar Assi Hussein Obeidi, a Sunni Arab who is a leader of the Obeidi tribe, one of Iraq's largest. "If the Americans don't resolve these problems soon, the people will start killing each other."

In the North, Whose Land?

The problem in Haifa is all about land.

Hassan Abid, a farmer with a weathered face and gray-streaked hair, said he moved to Haifa in 1974 along with dozens of other Shiite Arabs fleeing a drought in Diwaniyah, their ancestral home in southern Iraq.

"It was a wonderful new home," he said as walked through Haifa, a village of mud-brick houses and dirt streets 20 miles northwest of Kirkuk, a city in northeastern Iraq known for its oil fields.

To Kurds, however, the steppe around Kirkuk is Kurdish territory. Tens of thousands of Kurds had lived in the area until Hussein's government, in a campaign against a group he deemed subversive, pushed many of them out and resettled the area with Arabs.

But Abid contends Haifa was open land until the Arabs arrived. "There was nobody here before us," he said. "We did not displace the Kurds."

He noted that the Arabs of Haifa arrived in 1974, before Hussein's forced relocations began. And, he said, the villagers are Shiites, while those moved under the Hussein government were typically Sunnis.

"There should be no dispute here," he said.

After Hussein's government collapsed in April, thousands of Kurds moved down from the northernmost regions of Iraq, where they had lived in an autonomous enclave since 1991. They came to reclaim property they deemed to be theirs. Entire villages were commandeered by armed Kurds, who sent scores of Arabs fleeing.

On April 19, Arabs said, a band of armed Kurds arrived in Haifa. Panicked residents initially fled on foot and settled on the plain a few miles away, where they set up a tent camp.

The Arabs returned in May, when the Kurds had moved on for reasons that are not clear. As the Kurds left, the Arabs said, they ransacked the village, peeling off roofs, ripping out doors and windows and looting whatever else they could.

Then the Kurds came back Sept. 18. This time, the Arabs resolved they would not leave again. The land was theirs, they insisted. "This village belongs to us," said Mohammed Nafad Jabara, an 80-year-old retiree. He pointed to a grove of towering date palms which were planted, he claimed, upon his arrival in 1974, as proof of his residency.

Armed with that conviction and dozens of AK-47 rifles, the men of Haifa took positions in a trench between the village and the fields where the Kurds had arrived with their tractors and two pickup trucks mounted with machine guns. As the bullets whizzed by, recalled Mohammed Kadhim, "it felt like we were fighting a war."

After a 15-minute firefight, residents said, the Kurds drove away.

Nobody was killed or seriously wounded, a fact that amazes people who participated in the skirmish.

Arabs in Haifa view the firefight as the opening skirmish of an impending battle. "We're expecting them to come back," Abid said. "And we'll be ready for them. We'll greet them with bullets."

Who Should Control Tuz Khurmatu?

Kurdish militiamen swooped into the town of Tuz Khurmatu on April 9, the day before Kirkuk fell. Their mission, according to Kurdish leaders, was to protect the town from looters and Hussein's loyalists.

The militiamen, known as *pesh merga,* seized government buildings and deployed along the town's main streets. "We came to care for Tuz," said Karim Shukor, the local director of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, one of Iraq's two largest Kurdish political parties.

Tuz Khurmatu, built in the shadow of rolling brown hills about 110 miles north of Baghdad, is a nondescript way station of stucco buildings on the road connecting the capital to Kirkuk.

Kurds contend that it used to be an entirely Kurdish area. Ethnic Turkmens, who migrated south from present-day Turkey hundreds of years ago, insist that the village was exclusively Turkmen until 1975.

The Turkmens in Tuz Khurmatu viewed the arrival of the Kurdish militia as a power grab. The jobs of mayor and police chief, formerly held by Hussein-appointed Arabs, were claimed by Kurds. So were other powerful government posts. "They came with arms and took everything," complained Ali Hashem Mukhtar, the local director of the Iraqi Turkmen Front, a coalition of Turkmen political parties.

The dispute in Tuz Khurmatu is about political power, not land. Both Kurds and Turkmens believe they are in the majority in this area of about 70,000 people.

Shukor argued that records from Hussein's Baath Party, which repressed both groups, lists Kurds at 52 percent of the population and Turkmens at 32 percent. Mukhtar insisted those figures include outlying villages. Within the town, he said, Turkmens are in the majority.

Turkmens argue that Kurds are trying to expand the area under their control so towns such as Tuz Khurmatu will be deemed part of a future Kurdish state in a federal Iraq. Kurds, in turn, claim that the Turkmens are agitating at the behest of neighboring Turkey, which opposes Kurdish aspirations for autonomy in the north.

Although U.S. forces in the area attempted to quell the tension by creating a town council with equal numbers of Kurds and Turkmens, the powerful posts of mayor and police chief were given to Kurds, leading Turkmens to complain that the Americans were favoring the Kurds in return for their help during the war.

As spring turned into summer, the animosity on both sides escalated. Finally, in late August, the town erupted.

The spark was the destruction of green-domed Shiite shrine in the khaki-colored hills east of town. The shrine, which had been destroyed during the Hussein era and recently rebuilt, is venerated by the town's predominantly Shiite Turkmen population. In the early hours of Aug. 22, the shrine was blown to rubble with explosives.

Turkmens blame the Kurds. The Kurds deny responsibility for the attack. The precise reasons for the blast are not known but Kurds, who are Sunnis, insist that the conflict with the Turkmens is about politics, not religion.

Later that morning, hundreds of angry Turkmens flocked to the town's main Shiite mosque for a demonstration that turned into a protest march through the main market.

A video now sold at the market shows what happened as the protesters made their way through the town: Amid the shouts of "God is great," shots rang out. It is not clear from where.

Turkmens claim that the first shots were fired from Kurdish party offices. Kurds contend their security forces started shooting after Turkmen mobs began hunting down Kurds in the street.

A battle ensued, with both sides shooting from rooftops and behind corners. U.S. soldiers in the town also began firing, in an attempt to halt the violence. Five Turkmens and three Kurds were killed. It was the worst ethnic clash since the end of the war.

Now, Tuz Khurmatu is a town on the brink. There is open talk of revenge. And Turkmens who once welcomed Americans as liberators said they now regard U.S. forces as the enemy because of their perceived favoritism toward the Kurds.

"After the war, I was so happy I was ready to put up a picture of [President] Bush in my house," said Muzhir Kassim Jaffar, a pharmacist whose 21-year-old son, Ashraf, was killed in the protest—by what he believes were bullets from U.S. soldiers. "If I see Americans now, I will try to kill them," he said. "I only care about revenge."

He is equally bitter about the Kurds. "Five months of them," he said, "is worse than 35 years of Saddam."

Near Basra, the Muslim Divide

The trouble began in the hamlet of Hamdan on Sept. 14, just as southern Iraq's summer heat was wilting. Along dusty roads lined with adobe huts and the palm groves for which the region is famous, hundreds of Sunni mourners marched, armed and angry, according to Shiite residents. Hamdan is a village about a half-hour's drive south of Basra, where the Shatt al Arab river flows into the Persian Gulf. It is the only city in Iraq's Shiite south where Sunnis make up a substantial minority.

The Sunnis were marching in a procession to bury five men they believed had been killed a week earlier by members of the Dawa party, a Shiite Muslim movement.

In a 15-minute rampage at the local Dawa headquarters, the Sunni mourners ransacked the building, a former schoolhouse. They shot up the cream-colored stucco walls and tossed a grenade inside. They tore down pictures of Shiite clergymen from the entrance, stomped on them, then carted them away. Fires were lit in the mostly vacant rooms and, residents recalled, shots were fired randomly at the concrete and mud-brick houses that line Hamdan's parched groves and farmlands.

The residents, who stayed indoors, still recall the insults: Shiites are cowards—and worse. And they still recall the chants.

"There is no god but God," the Sunni mourners cried. "The Dawa party is the enemy of God."

Residents call the trouble in Hamdan over that week in September *fitna,* a resonant word in Arabic that translates as strife, but suggests anarchy. In Islamic lore, fitna and the chaos it brings will precede the Day of Judgment.

"Hundred percent, there will be more fitna," said Sayyid Murtada Hussein, a Shiite farmer who witnessed the rampage.

In Hamdan and its nearby hamlets, the population is split almost in half between Shiite and Sunni residents, some of their neighborhoods separated by centuries-old canals that snake along farms. Now, a gulf of fear, suspicion and resentment divides them.

As Hussein walked through the looted party headquarters, he acknowledged the deaths of the five Sunnis, but said the village had nothing to do with it. He blamed Wahhabis—members of an austere Sunni sect dominant in Saudi Arabia and a term often used as code for any militant Sunni—for inflaming the anger. He contended that a majority of the Sunnis in Hamdan and nearby villages follow the Wahhabi sect. Given the history of enmity between Shiites and Wahhabis, a feud that dates to the 19th century when Wahhabi tribesmen from Saudi Arabia regularly attacked and pillaged southern Iraq, Hussein predicted more troubles in hamlets where government exists in name only and police keep to themselves.

"We can recognize them in the streets. They have long beards and dirty faces," said Hussein, a 46-year-old wearing a white gown and thumbing black worry beads. "If they return," he warned, "it will be a bloody fight. It will be killing."

'This Will Bring Trouble'

A 10-minute drive away, in the neighboring village of Abu al Khasib, Asad Shihab sat in his mud house, its roof built with trunks of palm trees and dried fronds. Green water collected in a metal bin. A rusted door leaned at the entrance.

"If you say we are taking money, look at my roof, look at my water tank," he said. "What's your impression?"

It was the death of Shihab's relatives that prompted the funeral march and rampage in Hamdan. Shihab blamed Sayyid Salman Sayyid Talib, the local representative of the Dawa party, one of Basra's largest Shiite political groups. The Dawa party acknowledges that Talib is a member, but denies having ordered him to take any action. Talib is now in hiding.

On Sept. 7, Shihab said, Talib captured Shihab's uncle and two brothers in a nearby village after evening prayers. Then, escorted by 30 armed men, Talib headed down a dirt path, past okra plants and a pile of harvested dates, to arrive at Shihab's house, shrouded in dark by a blackout. Two white pickups were parked outside. Talib's men blocked escape routes.

"They claimed that there were armed Wahhabis in the house," Shihab said.

Shihab hid. But his father and 12-year-old brother were taken away. Two days later, police found two brothers in a busy street in Basra with gunshot wounds to the head, Shihab said. His father and the two others were tortured and killed by throwing acid on them, he said, their bodies dumped in a cesspool of engine oil and stagnant water near a fertilizer plant. He pulled pictures out of a black plastic bag, showing the bloated corpses in a row before the police station. Some had blindfolds; others had their legs bound.

"Those people are trying to ignite sectarian fitna between the people," he said, wearing the long beard of religious devotion and a face grim with smoldering anger. "These are not good tidings. This will bring trouble."

Shihab said he took part in the funeral procession on Sept. 14. While he denied shooting up the Shiite neighborhood in Hamdan, he acknowledged the damage done to the party headquarters. They were angry, he said, and they deserved vengeance.

"You found five people who were killed. They were innocent, and they were killed in a terrible way," he said.

"Sayyid Salman," he added, "should die."

In conversations in Hamdan and Abu Khasib, the degree of mutual suspicion is matched by the divide in how they remember the past and how they envision their future.

Shiites in Hamdan celebrate their majority status, and insist that Sunnis should understand they are the minority. While Sunnis in the villages insist they were treated no differently by Hussein, Shiites there point out they were deprived of jobs, promotions and land rights. Sunnis are reluctant to talk about religious divisions; they are all Muslims, they insist. The presence of Wahhabis, they say, is a myth fabricated by the most militant Shiites to further their own agendas.

The British who occupy Basra say religious differences are under control. The deaths and the protest that followed probably had "something to do with a tribal dispute," said Maj. Charlie Mayo, a military spokesman.

As for sectarian strife, "I'd say the lid is on it at the moment," he said.

Shihab's grandfather, Ahmed Ismail, said he was not so sure. Sitting on a rickety porch, he said fitna had already arrived.

"We are Sunni, we pray in the mosque, and they hate us," the 76-year-old said. "We don't know why they hate us."

Rajiv Chandrasekaran reported from Haifa and Tuz Khurmatu. **Anthony Shadid** reported from Hamdan and Abu Al Khasib.

Article 49

Never Underestimate the Power of Ethnicity in Iraq

AMY CHUA AND JED RUBENFELD

Sick to death of "identity politics" at home, Americans ironically find themselves dealing with a tinderbox of ethnic division in Iraq. We may be the least well-equipped nation in the world to manage the kinds of group hatreds that threaten Iraqi society today. Because of our beliefs in the "melting pot" and the United States' own relatively successful—though halting and incomplete—history of assimilation, Americans don't always understand the significance of ethnicity, both at home and especially abroad. In Iraq, our obliviousness to the realities of group hatred was on display from the first days of the occupation, when U.S. officials appointed former members of the almost-exclusively-Sunni Baath Party to the highest government and police positions, apparently unaware that these appointments would provoke the fury of Iraq's Shiites, Kurds and others, who make up more than 80 percent of the population. The outraged reactions forced the Americans to rescind the appointments.

British colonial governments, by contrast, were fastidiously conscious of ethnic divisions. But their policies are a dangerous model. When it was the British Empire's turn to deal with nation-building and ethnicity, the British engaged in divide-and-conquer policies, not only protecting but favoring minorities, and simultaneously aggravating ethnic resentments. As a result, when the British decamped, time bombs often exploded, from Africa to India to Southeast Asia.

The U.S. government's ethnic policy for Iraq has essentially been to have no policy. The Bush administration's overriding goal is the transfer of power by the end of next June from the U.S.-led coalition to a new Iraqi government selected, in theory, through some kind of democratic process. The administration seems strangely confident that Iraq's ethnic, religious and tribal divisions will dissipate in the face of rapid democratization and market-generated wealth. In President Bush's words, "freedom and democracy will always and everywhere have greater appeal than the slogans of hatred."

Unfortunately, recent history suggests just the opposite. Rapid democratization has been attempted in many poor, ethnically divided societies in the last two decades, and the results are sobering. Democratic elections in the former Yugoslavia produced landslide victories for the hate-mongering Franjo Tudjman in Croatia and the genocidal Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia. In Rwanda in the early 1990s, democratization fomented ethnic extremism, yielding the majority-supported Hutu Power movement and the ensuing ethnic slaughter of Tutsis. In Indonesia in 1998, sudden democratization after the fall of Suharto's 30-year dictatorship produced a wave of anti-Chinese demagoguery and confiscations, leading to the devastating flight of more than $40 billion in Chinese-controlled capital.

It is impossible to predict who would win free and fair elections in Iraq, but given the demographic and economic conditions, it is extremely unlikely that such elections in the near future would produce a secular, pro-American outcome.

Iraq's ethnic and religious dynamics involve conflicts that cut across and among Kurds, Turkmens, Shiites, Christians and Sunnis; many horrendous massacres; wholesale confiscations; and deep feelings of hatred and the need for revenge. Iraq's Shiites represent a 60 percent majority, which has suffered cruel oppression at the hands of the Sunni minority. While Iraq's Shiites are far from homogeneous, liberation has already fueled religious demagoguery among vying Islamic clerics and unleashed powerful fundamentalist movements throughout the country. Needless to say, these extremist movements are intensely anti-American, anti-secular, anti-women's rights and illiberal. Meanwhile, Iraq's 20 percent Kurdish minority in the north, mistrustful of Arab rule, represents another source of profound instability. Finally, as many have pointed out, Iraq's oil could prove a curse, leading to massive corruption and a destructive battle between groups to capture the nation's oil, its main source of wealth.

None of this is democracy's fault. The blame for Iraq's current group hatreds rests largely with the fascistic regime of Saddam Hussein, which systematically terrorized and murdered Shiites and Kurds. In addition, Hussein's sadistic secularism spurred the growing fundamentalism among Iraq's Shiites.

Blaming Saddam, however, does not alter the facts. Given the conditions today in Iraq—conditions created by colonialism, autocracy and brutality, not to mention the historical schism between Shiite and Sunni Muslims—hasty national elections could very well produce renewed ethnic radicalism and violence; an illiberal, Islamist regime in which women are murdered by their relatives for the crime of being raped (already happening in Shiite Baghdad); and an anti-American government

determined to oust U.S. firms from Iraq's oil fields. Any of these results would create, at best, an awkward moment for the Bush administration. Combined, they could be catastrophic for American interests, for the Middle East and for Iraq.

Perhaps for these reasons the Bush administration is trying to create a "democratic" government by June without popular elections.

What is to be done? Retreating from democracy is not an option. Unfortunately, few good models exist to guide U.S. ethnic policy in Iraq. The British strategy might have been to pit Shiites against Sunnis, and perhaps Kurds against both. But if we want an Iraq not divided and conquered, but united and self-governing, the way forward will be considerably harder.

The polar opposite of no ethnic policy would be a plan for explicit ethnic and religious power-sharing. For example, a new Iraqi constitution could contain a Dayton-style formula guaranteeing Sunnis and Kurds major government posts. Such a plan might have salutary short-term effects, but enshrining ethnicity and religious division in the constitution would be a perilous strategy. It could harden group identity at the cost of national unity. The one thing potentially worse than rushing to national Iraqi elections might be rushing to such elections while clumsily manipulating combustible ethnic dynamics that few in the United States even understand.

All this suggests a very different alternative: Put the brakes on national democracy, and focus much more energy and resources on local democracy. To date, astonishingly, there have been virtually no city or town elections anywhere in Iraq. Apparently, U.S. policy calls for implementing national self-government first and worrying about local self-government later. The order of priority should be exactly the opposite.

Democracy at the national level will essentially pit the Shiite majority against the hated Sunni minority and autonomy-seeking Kurds in a battle for control over the country's destiny and oil wealth. By contrast, many Iraqi towns and cities are relatively less divided along ethnic and religious lines, and the electoral stakes there would be much lower. In elections for city councils and other municipal positions, the competing candidates and parties would have much less incentive to define themselves along sectarian lines or to engage in ethnic demagoguery.

To sow the seeds of democracy, better to think locally.

Local democracy is the best instruction for national democracy. British and American democracy started locally, not nationally. The message of the U.S.-led coalition to Iraqis should be: We are turning over governance to you, right now, in every one of your neighborhoods, towns and cities. Although oil and certain other national policy matters would be taken off the table—they could not possibly be decided at the town level—local self-government would still represent an enormous transfer of sovereignty. Most of the Iraqi reconstruction effort will be local: providing water; restoring electricity; building and staffing schools; fostering commerce; establishing town courts; and of course policing. Billions of dollars will be spent on these things over the coming years; crucial policy decisions will be made about priorities, jobs for women, and the distribution of goods and services.

To its credit, after the war, the U.S. military created district and town councils to assist in local governance all over Iraq. Coalition officials refer to these councils as "inclusive" and "democratically selected," but there is a big difference between selected and elected. In fact, the councils appear to have been selected by U.S. military authorities. As one U.S. official candidly acknowledged, "In terms of actual elections, we are not focused on that in our assistance at this point." An October poll indicated that half of all Iraqis did not even know the councils existed.

To be sure, some Iraqi towns might elect fundamentalist clerics as their lawmakers. The coalition must not try to suppress such results. Let Iraqis see their decisions respected. Let them see some towns where fundamentalism reigns and some where it does not. The hopes of a democratic Middle East may depend on it.

Local self-government will not be easy to achieve. Ethnically diverse cities such as Baghdad and Kirkuk could present special challenges. But local governance is a far more realistic goal than trying in the next six months to establish national, democratic government. Instead of premature national elections, the coalition should pursue an interim Iraqi constitution establishing the framework for immediate local self-government. During the ensuing period, coalition authorities would have the job of ensuring fair elections, a free press and freedom of movement (so that Iraqis can also "vote with their feet"). Because they would also retain control over Iraq's oil for an additional year or so, coalition forces must credibly demonstrate that they are keeping the country's oil wealth in trust for the Iraqi people. National elections would be postponed until Iraqis agreed on a permanent constitution, a process that would profit enormously from actual experience with local democracy.

Before she was assassinated, Iraqi Governing Council member Akila Hashimi warned against top-down efforts to remake her country. "Culture creates laws, not the other way around," she said. If democracy is to flourish in Iraq—and elsewhere in the Middle East—it must spread from the bottom up.

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Article 50

Correlated Conflicts

The Independent Nature of Ethnic Strife

JONATHAN FOX

There is little agreement on the role of religion in ethnic conflict, or, for that matter, its role in politics and society in general. While some argue that it is a central factor, others claim that religion has little or no influence. The belief that religion is not important dominated the social sciences for most of the 20th century. Schools of thought such as modernization theory in political science and secularization theory in sociology had their origins in the formation of the social sciences as a basis for providing a rational and scientific basis for society and politics. These theories were supposed to replace the previous "primordial" religious and ethnic bases for society and politics. Only in the past two decades have social scientists begun seriously to question the assumption that modernity was causing religion to become an epiphenomenon.

Among those arguments that claim that religion is central, Samuel Huntington's "clash of civilizations" theory is perhaps the most widely known. Huntington posits that the majority of conflicts in the post-Cold War era, including ethnic conflict, will be between several civilizations with differing religions. While Huntington's specific theory is controversial, there are many other less disputed formulations that religion is important. This brief description does not nearly do justice to an extensive and varied literature, but it is sufficient to show that contradicting conceptions of the role of religion exist in the modern era.

One way to sort truth from misconception is to identify religion's impact on a more narrowly defined aspect of modern politics and society: ethnic conflict. Too often are religion and ethnicity grouped together; to evaluate the importance of religion, each factor must be considered independently. Instead of using anecdotes, a systematic analysis of ethnic conflicts provides a better basis for analysis. This is done through a review of the general trends found in an extensive analysis of a data set gathered by Minorities at Risk (MAR), which contains information on 337 ethnic minorities which were politically active at some point in time between 1945 and 2000. While there are clearly more ethnic minorities in the world than this—some estimates run as high as 20,000—these 337 minorities represent all of those that have been politically active on a mass level and, therefore, all of those who have been involved in serious ethnic conflict. Unless otherwise noted, the analyses discussed here focus on the 1990 to 2000 portion of the data. It is important to note that the analysis presented here is a summary of a considerably more extensive, in-depth analysis of the MAR data than can be presented in this context.

Religion's influence on conflict can take one of four forms. First, conflicts can involve identity issues which, in turn, can be based in part on religion. Second, conflicts can involve religious issues like religious discrimination, complaints over that discrimination, or the demand by a minority for more religious rights. Third, religious institutions can involve themselves in a conflict directly. Fourth, religion is often used by either or both sides of the conflict to legitimize their actions.

It is important to clarify some terms that frequently arise in such discussions. The term ethno-religious refers to those ethnic minorities that belong to different religions or denominations than the majority group in their state. Religious discrimination refers to restrictions on religious practices, not political or economic discrimination against religious minorities. Religious grievances are complaints about religious discrimination. Demands for more religious rights refer to demands that are not related to religious discrimination, such as demands for privileges not given to other religions.

The basic argument presented here is that while religion influences ethnic conflict in a number of ways, it is not the primary driving factor behind ethnic conflict. These results can be broken up into eight general trends.

In Ethnic Conflict, Religion Is a Factor, Not a Cause

Of the 337 minorities in the MAR data set, 53 percent belong to the same religion and denomination as the majority group in their state. Another 11 percent belong to different denominations of the same religion as the majority group. Thus, most ethnic conflicts do not even have the potential to involve issues of religious identity. In addition, most ethno-religious conflicts do not involve religious issues. Among a sample of 105 ethno-religious minorities, for which more detailed data is available, in only 12 cases is religion an issue that is of equal or greater significance than other issues. In an additional 27 cases, religion is a significant issue but is less important than other issues. Combining this with the fact that only a minority of ethnic conflicts are between groups who belong to different

religions means that religion is a significant issue in only about 17 percent of ethnic conflicts. This trend of religious conflicts being a minority of ethnic conflicts is consistent throughout the 1945 to 2000 period, with little change over time.

However, religious factors are present in a majority of ethno-religious conflicts. During the 1990s, of the sample of 105 ethno-religious minorities, 43 percent experience religious discrimination, 69 percent complain of past or present religious discrimination, 22 percent demand more religious rights in their state, and 72 percent live in states where the use of religion in political discourse is considered legitimate. Overall, only 18 percent of these conflicts do not involve at least one of these factors. In short, while most ethnic conflicts are not primarily about religion, most ethno-religious conflicts involve some religious factors.

Ethno-Religious Conflicts Occur in Ethnic Conflicts

The mere fact that a conflict involves an ethno-religious minority changes the dynamics of the conflict. Ethno-religious conflicts tend to involve higher levels of discrimination and grievances over political and cultural issues, both of which are important causes of ethnic protest and group mobilization. They are also more likely to involve issues of self-determination, which, as discussed below, is a primary cause of ethno-religious conflict.

Self-Determination Causes Ethnic Conflict

One of the most dramatic results from the analysis of the MAR data is that, unless an ethno-religious minority expresses a desire for self-determination, it rarely engages in terrorism, guerrilla warfare, or civil war. The only exceptions to this during the 1990s are the Shi'a minorities in Bahrain and Afghanistan and the Maronite Christian minority in Lebanon. The other 45 ethno-religious minorities that engage in this level of violent conflict all express some desire for autonomy during the 1990s. Even those groups that suffer from the highest levels of religious discrimination but do not express a desire for self-determination, like the Ba'hai minority in Iran and the Christian minorities in Egypt and Iran, do not engage in any of these forms of organized violence.

However, among those ethno-religious minorities who do express a desire for self-determination, the average level of political violence is considerably higher during the 1990s. During the late 1990s, ethno-religious-separatist conflicts were 67 percent more violent than were other separatist conflicts. Furthermore among ethno-religious-separatist conflicts, those in which the minority expressed religious grievances were 52 percent more violent than those in which no such grievances were expressed.

The only conclusion possible from this set of results is that ethnic conflict is not caused by religion, but rather by self-determination. But once the potential for conflict exists because of a minority's desire for self-determination, religion significantly exacerbates that conflict. Self-determination is also an important element in non-ethno-religious conflicts: among non-ethno-religious groups, those that express a desire for self-determination engage in violence almost twice as often as those who do not.

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However, it is important to emphasize that religion and self-determination are not the only causes of ethnic violence. Ted R. Gurr, the founder of the MAR project, in an analysis of the entire MAR data set, found that the factors that most contribute to violent ethnic rebellion are persistent protest in the past, repression against the minority, mobilization by the minority, instability in the state in which the minority resides, international support for the minority group, self-determination, and the spread of conflict across international borders.

Role of Religion Can Expand in Ethnic Conflict

The relationship between religion, self-determination, and rebellion described above was not always the case. Between 1945 and 1979, among ethnic minorities who expressed a desire for self-determination, the average level of rebellion for ethno-religious minorities was about the same as the average for other ethnic minorities. Only in the early 1980s did religious factors begin to exacerbate ethnic conflicts. This exacerbation increased steadily during the 1980 to 2000 period; those who predicted that modernity would eventually make religion an epiphenomenon apparently got it backward. Since 1980, at least as far as ethnic conflict is concerned, religion's impact has been increasing.

Religion Can Facilitate and Inhibit Ethnic Conflict

Religious factors do not always exacerbate ethnic conflict; sometimes they inhibit it. In fact, some religious factors have both effects under different circumstances. For example, while religious grievances exacerbate rebellion, they inhibit ethnic protest. That is, the more an ethno-religious minority is upset over religious discrimination against it, the less they protest. This relationship remains constant even when controlling for other factors including regime type, repression, self-determination, grievances expressed over political, economic, and cultural discrimination, economic variables, international intervention, and the spread of conflict across borders. In fact, no variable in the entire MAR data set can explain away this relationship. The only explanation is the argument of scholars such as

René Girard that violence is an intrinsic element of religion because religion provides a way for people to express their psychological need for violence in a socially acceptable manner through rituals, ceremonies, and belief systems that incorporate violent imagery. For this reason, violence is preferred, at least subconsciously, over peaceful protest.

Another example of religion's dual role in violence is the role of religious institutions in mobilization. When religious grievances are low, religious institutions cause protest to drop over 40 percent, but when religious grievances are high, these institutions can double protest. In other words, religious institutions tend to benefit from the status quo and thus support it, but when religion is involved in a conflict, they tend to support mobilization for that conflict.

Religious legitimacy also occupies a dual role in the formation of ethnic grievances. When religion is not a major issue in the conflict, grievances over secular issues more than double. However, when religious issues are significant, the presence of religious legitimacy is associated with a 27 percent drop in grievances over secular issues. Regardless of whether religion is a key issue in a conflict, religious legitimacy is associated with an 85 percent rise of religious grievances.

This dual role that religious institutions and legitimacy play in ethnic conflict represents a deeper trend of religious elites using religion to benefit religious institutions. In the case of religious institutions and mobilization, most religions benefit from government support or at least an absence of government interference. It is only worth risking this status if the religion itself is at risk, as is likely the case if a minority is expressing religious grievances. In the case of religious legitimacy, casting a religious light on grievances expressed by a group over other issues is a good way to increase the relevance of religious institutions within that group. However, if religious issues are at stake, the priority is to defend the religion rather than use resources on other issues.

International Intervention Is Influenced by Religion

The MAR data set contains information on two types of international intervention in ethnic conflicts between 1990 and 1995. The first type is political intervention, which includes the following activities by a foreign state on behalf of a minority: giving ideological encouragement, providing non-military financial support, providing access to external markets and communications, using peacekeeping units, and instituting a blockade. The second type is military intervention by a foreign state on behalf of a minority, which includes: providing funds for military supplies, making direct military equipment donations or sales, providing military training, providing military advisors, carrying out rescue missions, engaging in cross-border raids, providing cross-border sanctuaries, and sending in-country combat units.

The impact of religion on intervention can be seen in two ways. First, political intervention occurs more often on behalf of ethno-religious minorities. Political intervention by foreign states benefits 60 percent of ethno-religious minorities as compared to 39 percent of other ethnic minorities. However, religion seems to have little impact on whether ethno-religious minorities benefit from military intervention. Second, states who intervene do so most often on behalf of minorities religiously similar to themselves. Interventions by states that were religiously similar to the minority group on whose behalf they intervened represent 76 percent of political and 78 percent of military interventions. This trend is even stronger for Muslim states, 92 percent of whose political interventions and 89 percent of whose military interventions are on behalf of Muslim minorities, as opposed to 70 percent and 78 percent respectively for intervention by Christian states on behalf of Christian minorities.

World Conflict Has Not Become More Civilizational

Samuel Huntington predicted that with the end of the Cold War, world conflict, including ethnic-conflict, would become more civilizational. For the purposes of the MAR data set, this means that the percentage of ethnic conflicts that are civilizational should increase, and civilizational ethnic conflicts should become more violent in comparison to non-civilizational ethnic conflicts. Neither of these predictions, in fact, came true. During the Cold War, 37 percent of ethnic conflicts could be termed civilizational, which increased slightly to 39 percent in 2000. However, this slight increase is nowhere near the paradigmatical shift Huntington predicted. In fact, the mean level of ethnic rebellion in civilizational conflicts was lower than the mean level of rebellion in non-civilizational conflicts from 1950 until 2000.

Furthermore, all the quantitative studies of Huntington's theory of which I am aware unanimously contradict his predictions. In addition to analyses of the MAR data set, this includes analyses of the Uppsala and State Failure data sets on domestic conflict, the Militarized Interstate Dispute data set, the International Crisis data set, and both the domestic and international conflict versions of the Correlates of War data set. These data sets together constitute the majority of the most widely recognized data sets on conflict in political science and international relations. The unambiguous and consistent refutation of Huntington's "clash of civilizations" thesis is as clear a refutation of the theory as is possible using such data.

This opens the question of how religion is shown to influence conflict while Huntington's concept of civilizations, which is largely based on religion, does not. (The overlap between the two in the MAR data is between 78.5 percent and 82.8 percent, depending on how it is measured.) The answer is in the nature of the claims made. The claim made here is that religion is not the primary cause of ethnic conflict, but it does have an influence. Huntington makes the more ambitious claim that his civilizations will become the defining factor in world conflict. The evidence falls short in proving Huntington's paradigmatic claims but is more than sufficient to prove the less extreme claims made here.

Civil Conflict

Huntington uses the term "civilization" to refer to the broadest grouping of people. A person living in Rome can be counted as a Roman, an Italian, or a Westerner. The grouping "Westerner" refers to his "civilization" because one cannot generalize beyond that. He posits that the future source of conflict will primarily be due to "civilization" rather than ideology for six reasons:

I. Differences in civilization are deeply rooted because they define the way humans view the world.
II. Globalization has led to increased interaction between different civilizations, intensifying hostilities between groups.
III. Globalization has caused individuals to identify less with the nation in which they reside in and more with the cultural group to which they belong.
IV. Western nations dominate the global arena, inspiring jealousy and anti-Western movements.
V. Ideological values can be altered (e.g. China's move toward the free market), while basic cultural ideas cannot.
VI. Regional blocs are caused by a reinforced unity of civilization (e.g. the Baltic states' inability to be accepted for NATO membership).

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Furthermore, in head-to-head comparisons of the impact of religion and civilization on ethnic conflict, religion usually provides a better explanation than civilization can. Huntington's civilization thesis falls short even as a surrogate variable for religion.

Religion Is More Important in Muslim Conflict

Another of Huntington's claims, among others, is that Muslim groups will be more violent. There is some statistical evidence for this assertion. During the 1990s, Muslim minorities engaged in higher average levels of rebellion than did other ethnic minorities. They are also more likely to be involved in ethnic conflict than groups of other religions when taking their proportion of the world population into account. In addition, religion is more important in ethnic conflicts involving Muslims. Religious discrimination by Muslim majorities is 4.7 times the average level by Christian majorities, and religious legitimacy in Muslim states is 1.7 times that in Christian states. Also, Muslim minorities' demands for more religious rights are 3.4 times higher than those of Christian minorities.

However, even these results are not fully in line with Huntington's predictions. There was little change in conflict patterns involving the Islamic civilization with the end of the Cold War. During the Cold War, Islamic groups constituted 24 percent of all groups involved in conflict. While this rose to 28 percent in 2000, this is hardly the increase in conflict one would expect of groups said to have increasingly "bloody borders." Furthermore, during the Cold War, 52 percent of conflicts involving Muslims could be considered civilizational, this dropped to 47 percent by 2000. Therefore, while Islamic groups may be disproportionally violent, this is not new to the post-Cold War era, and much of this violence is intra-civilizational.

Religion As a Prevailing Factor

Four decades ago, Karl Deutsch warned of the dangers of relying upon "introspection, intuition, and insight" in order to analyze social phenomena. He believed that this anecdotal approach often resulted in people seeing what they expected or wanted to see rather than what is actually there. In any case, such a methodology is not verifiable among researchers. The exceptionally large differences of opinion over the role of religion in conflict, including the vigorous debate over Huntington's "clash of civilizations" theory, show that in this case Deutsch's fears have been realized.

Deutsch proposes systematic quantitative analysis as the solution to this problem. The methodology applied here shows that the truth regarding ethic conflict, as best as it can be determined from the MAR data, is somewhere between the predictions of religion's demise and the predictions that it will be the defining factor in world conflict. This brief review of the larger body of analysis shows that while religion is not the defining factor for ethnic conflict, neither is it absent. Rather, it influences ethnic conflict in a number of ways. In some cases religious factors exacerbate conflict and in others they inhibit ethnic conflict. Also, Muslim and Christian groups have different conflict patterns. Thus, while ethnic conflict cannot be fully understood without taking religion into account, religion cannot provide the sole explanation for ethnic conflict.

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Article 51

The Geometer of Race

In the eighteenth century a disastrous shift occurred in the way Westerners perceived races. The man responsible was Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, one of the least racist thinkers of his day.

STEPHEN JAY GOULD

Interesting stories often lie encoded in names that seem either capricious or misconstrued. Why, for example, are political radicals called "left" and their conservative counterparts "right"? In many European legislatures, the most distinguished members sat at the chairman's right, following a custom of courtesy as old as our prejudices for favoring the dominant hand of most people. (These biases run deep, extending well beyond can openers and scissors to language itself, where *dexterous* stems from the Latin for "right," and *sinister* from the word for "left.") Since these distinguished nobles and moguls tended to espouse conservative views, the right and left wings of the legislature came to define a geometry of political views.

Among such apparently capricious names in my own field of biology and evolution, none seems more curious, and none elicits more questions after lectures, than the official designation of light-skinned people in Europe, western Asia, and North Africa as Caucasian. Why should the most common racial group of the Western world be named for a mountain range that straddles Russia and Georgia? Johann Friedrich Blumenbach (1752–1840), the German anatomist and naturalist who established the most influential of all racial classifications, invented this name in 1795, in the third edition of his seminal work, *De Generis Humani Varietate Nativa* (On the Natural Variety of Mankind). Blumenbach's definition cites two reasons for his choice—the maximal beauty of people from this small region, and the probability that humans were first created in this area.

> *Caucasian variety.* I have taken the name of this variety from Mount Caucasus, both because its neighborhood, and especially its southern slope, produces the most beautiful race of men, I mean the Georgian; and because . . . in that region, if anywhere, it seems we ought with the greatest probability to place the autochthones [original forms] of mankind.

Blumenbach, one of the greatest and most honored scientists of the Enlightenment, spent his entire career as a professor at the University of Göttingen in Germany. He first presented *De Generis Humani Varietate Nativa* as a doctoral dissertation to the medical faculty of Göttingen in 1775, as the minutemen of Lexington and Concord began the American Revolution. He then republished the text for general distribution in 1776, as a fateful meeting in Philadelphia proclaimed our independence. The coincidence of three great documents in 1776—Jefferson's Declaration of Independence (on the politics of liberty), Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* (on the economics of individualism), and Blumenbach's treatise on racial classification (on the science of human diversity)—records the social ferment of these decades and sets the wider context that makes Blumenbach's taxonomy, and his subsequent decision to call the European race Caucasian, so important for our history and current concerns.

The solution to big puzzles often hinges upon tiny curiosities, easy to miss or to pass over. I suggest that the key to understanding Blumenbach's classification,

the foundation of much that continues to influence and disturb us today, lies in the peculiar criterion he used to name the European race Caucasian—the supposed superior beauty of people from this region. Why, first of all, should a scientist attach such importance to an evidently subjective assessment; and why, secondly, should an aesthetic criterion become the basis of a scientific judgment about place of origin? To answer these questions, we must compare Blumenbach's original 1775 text with the later edition of 1795, when Caucasians received their name.

Blumenbach's final taxonomy of 1795 divided all humans into five groups, defined both by geography and appearance—in his order, the Caucasian variety, for the light-skinned people of Europe and adjacent parts of Asia and Africa; the Mongolian variety, for most other inhabitants of Asia, including China and Japan; the Ethiopian variety, for the dark-skinned people of Africa; the American variety, for most native populations of the New World; and the Malay variety, for the Polynesians and Melanesians of the Pacific and for the aborigines of Australia. But Blumenbach's original classification of 1775 recognized only the first four of these five, and united members of the Malay variety with the other people of Asia whom Blumenbach came to name Mongolian.

We now encounter the paradox of Blumenbach's reputation as the inventor of modern racial classification. The original four-race system, as I shall illustrate in a moment, did not arise from Blumenbach's observations but only represents, as Blumenbach readily admits, the classification promoted by his guru Carolus Linnaeus in the founding document of taxonomy, the *Systema Naturae* of 1758. Therefore, Blumenbach's only original contribution to racial classification lies in the later addition of a Malay variety for some Pacific peoples first included in a broader Asian group.

This change seems so minor. Why, then, do we credit Blumenbach, rather than Linnaeus, as the founder of racial classification? (One might prefer to say "discredit," as the enterprise does not, for good reason, enjoy high repute these days.) But Blumenbach's apparently small change actually records a theoretical shift that could not have been broader, or more portentous, in scope. This change has been missed or misconstrued because later scientists have not grasped the vital historical and philosophical principle that theories are models subject to visual representation, usually in clearly definable geometric terms.

By moving from the Linnaean four-race system to his own five-race scheme, Blumenbach radically changed the geometry of human order from a geographically based model without explicit ranking to a hierarchy of worth, oddly based upon perceived beauty, and fanning out in two directions from a Caucasian ideal. The addition of a Malay category was crucial to this geometric reformulation—and therefore becomes the key to the conceptual transformation rather than a simple refinement of factual information within an old scheme. (For the insight that scientific revolutions embody such geometric shifts, I am grateful to my friend Rhonda Roland Shearer, who portrays these themes in [her] book, *The Flatland Hypothesis.*)

Blumenbach idolized his teacher Linnaeus and acknowledged him as the source of his original fourfold racial classification: "I have followed Linnaeus in the number, but have defined my varieties by other boundaries" (1775 edition). Later, in adding his Malay variety, Blumenbach identified his change as a departure from his old mentor in the most respectful terms: "It became very clear that the Linnaean division of mankind could no longer be adhered to; for which reason I, in this little work, ceased like others to follow that illustrious man."

Linnaeus divided the species *Homo sapiens* into four basic varieties, defined primarily by geography and, interestingly, not in the ranked order favored by most Europeans in the racist tradition—*Americanus, Europaeus, Asiaticus,* and *Afer,* or African. (He also alluded to two other fanciful categories: *ferus* for "wild boys," occasionally discovered in the woods and possibly raised by animals—most turned out to be retarded or mentally ill youngsters abandoned by their parents—and *monstrosus* for hairy men with tails, and other travelers' confabulations.) In so doing, Linnaeus presented nothing original; he merely mapped humans onto the four geographic regions of conventional cartography.

Linnaeus then characterized each of these groups by noting color, humor, and posture, in that order. Again, none of these categories explicitly implies ranking by worth. Once again, Linnaeus was simply bowing to classical taxonomic theories in making these decisions. For example, his use of the four humors reflects the ancient and medieval theory that a person's temperament arises from a balance of four fluids (*humor* is Latin for "moisture")—blood, phlegm, choler (yellow bile), and melancholy (black bile). Depending on which of the four substances dominated, a person would be sanguine (the cheerful realm of blood), phlegmatic (sluggish), choleric (prone to anger), or melancholic (sad). Four geographic regions, four humors, four races.

For the American variety, Linnaeus wrote "*rufus, cholericus, rectus*" (red, choleric, upright); for the European,

"*albus, sanguineus, torosus*" (white, sanguine, muscular); for the Asian, "*luridus, melancholicus, rigidus*" (pale yellow, melancholy, stiff); and for the African, "*niger, phlegmaticus, laxus*" (black, phlegmatic, relaxed).

I don't mean to deny that Linnaeus held conventional beliefs about the superiority of his own European variety over others. Being a sanguine, muscular European surely sounds better than being a melancholy, stiff Asian. Indeed, Linnaeus ended each group's description with a more overtly racist label, an attempt to epitomize behavior in just two words. Thus the American was *regitur consuetudine* (ruled by habit); the European, *regitur ritibus* (ruled by custom); the Asian, *regitur opinionibus* (ruled by belief); and the African, *regitur arbitrio* (ruled by caprice). Surely regulation by established and considered custom beats the unthinking rule of habit or belief, and all of these are superior to caprice—thus leading to the implied and conventional racist ranking of Europeans first, Asians and Americans in the middle, and Africans at the bottom.

Nonetheless, and despite these implications, the overt geometry of Linnaeus's model is not linear or hierarchical. When we visualize his scheme as an essential picture in our mind, we see a map of the world divided into four regions, with the people in each region characterized by a list of different traits. In short, Linnaeus's primary ordering principle is cartographic; if he had wished to push hierarchy as the essential picture of human variety, he would surely have listed Europeans first and Africans last, but he started with native Americans instead.

The shift from a geographic to a hierarchical ordering of human diversity must stand as one of the most fateful transitions in the history of Western science—for what, short of railroads and nuclear bombs, has had more practical impact, in this case almost entirely negative, upon our collective lives? Ironically, Blumenbach is the focus of this shift, for his five-race scheme became canonical and changed the geometry of human order from Linnaean cartography to linear ranking—in short, to a system based on putative worth.

I say ironic because Blumenbach was the least racist and most genial of all Enlightenment thinkers. How peculiar that the man most committed to human unity, and to inconsequential moral and intellectual differences among groups, should have changed the mental geometry of human order to a scheme that has served racism ever since. Yet on second thought, this situation is really not so odd—for most scientists have been quite unaware of the mental machinery, and particularly of the visual or geometric implications, lying behind all their theorizing.

An old tradition in science proclaims that changes in the theory must be driven by observation. Since most scientists believe this simplistic formula, they assume that their own shifts in interpretation record only their better understanding of newly discovered facts. Scientists therefore tend to be unaware of their own mental impositions upon the world's messy and ambiguous factuality. Such mental impositions arise from a variety of sources, including psychological predisposition and social context. Blumenbach lived in an age when ideas of progress, and the cultural superiority of European ways, dominated political and social life. Implicit, loosely formulated, or even unconscious notions of racial ranking fit well with such a worldview—indeed, almost any other organizational scheme would have seemed anomalous. I doubt that Blumenbach was actively encouraging racism by redrawing the mental diagram of human groups. He was only, and largely passively, recording the social view of his time. But ideas have consequences, whatever the motives or intentions of their promoters.

Scientists assume that their own shifts in interpretation record only their better understanding of newly discovered facts. They tend to be unaware of their own mental impositions upon the world's messy and ambiguous factuality.

Blumenbach certainly thought that his switch from the Linnaean four-race system to his own five-race scheme arose only from his improved understanding of nature's factuality. He said as much when he announced his change in the second (1781) edition of his treatise: "Formerly in the first edition of this work, I divided all mankind into four varieties; but after I had more actively investigated the different nations of Eastern Asia and America, and, so to speak, looked at them more closely, I was compelled to give up that division, and to place in its stead the following five varieties, as more consonant to nature." And in the preface to the third edition, of 1795, Blumenbach states that he gave up the Linnaean scheme in order to arrange "the varieties of man according to the truth of nature." When scientists adopt the myth that theories arise solely from observation, and do not grasp the personal and social

influences acting on their thinking, they not only miss the causes of their changed opinions; they may even fail to comprehend the deep mental shift encoded by the new theory.

Blumenbach strongly upheld the unity of the human species against an alternative view, then growing in popularity (and surely more conducive to conventional forms of racism), that each major race had been separately created. He ended his third edition by writing: "No doubt can any longer remain but that we are with great probability right in referring all . . . varieties of man . . . to one and the same species."

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As his major argument for unity, Blumenbach noted that all supposed racial characteristics grade continuously from one people to another and cannot define any separate and bounded group. "For although there seems to be so great a difference between widely separate nations, that you might easily take the inhabitants of the Cape of Good Hope, the Greenlanders, and the Circassians for so many different species of man, yet when the matter is thoroughly considered, you see that all do so run into one another, and that one variety of mankind does so sensibly pass into the other, that you cannot mark out the limits between them." He particularly refuted the common racist claim that black Africans bore unique features of their inferiority: "There is no single character so peculiar and so universal among the Ethiopians, but what it may be observed on the one hand everywhere in other varieties of men."

Blumenbach, writing 80 years before Darwin, believed that *Homo sapiens* had been created in a single region and had then spread over the globe. Our racial diversity, he then argued, arose as a result of this spread to other climates and topographies, and to our adoption of different modes of life in these various regions. Following the terminology of his time, Blumenbach referred to these changes as "degenerations"—not intending the modern sense of deterioration, but the literal meaning of departure from an initial form of humanity at the creation (*de* means "from," and *genus* refers to our original stock).

Most of these degenerations, Blumenbach argued, arose directly from differences in climate and habitat—ranging from such broad patterns as the correlation of dark skin with tropical environments, to more particular (and fanciful) attributions, including a speculation that the narrow eye slits of some Australian aborigines may have arisen in response to "constant clouds of gnats . . . contracting the natural face of the inhabitants." Other changes, he maintained, arose as a consequence of customs adopted in different regions. For example, nations that compressed the heads of babies by swaddling boards or papoose carriers ended up with relatively long skulls. Blumenbach held that "almost all the diversity of the form of the head in different nations is to be attributed to the mode of life and to art."

Blumenbach believed that such changes, promoted over many generations, could eventually become hereditary. "With the progress of time," Blumenbach wrote, "art may degenerate into a second nature." But he also argued that most racial variations, as superficial impositions of climate and custom, could be easily altered or reversed by moving to a new region or by adopting new behavior. White Europeans living for generations in the tropics could become dark-skinned, while Africans transported as slaves to high latitudes could eventually become white: "Color, whatever be its cause, be it bile, or the influence of the sun, the air, or the climate, is, at all events, an adventitious and easily changeable thing, and can never constitute a diversity of species," he wrote.

Convinced of the superficiality of racial variation, Blumenbach defended the mental and moral unity of all peoples. He held particularly strong opinions on the equal status of black Africans and white Europeans. He may have been patronizing in praising "the good disposition and faculties of these our black brethren," but better paternalism than malign contempt. He campaigned for the abolition of slavery and asserted the moral superiority of slaves to their captors, speaking of a "natural tenderness of heart, which has never been benumbed or extirpated on board the transport vessels or on the West India sugar plantations by the brutality of their white executioners."

Blumenbach established a special library in his house devoted exclusively to black authors, singling out for special praise the poetry of Phillis Wheatley, a Boston slave whose writings have only recently been rediscovered: "I possess English, Dutch, and Latin poems by several [black authors], amongst which however above all, those of Phillis Wheatley of Boston, who is justly famous for

them, deserves mention here." Finally, Blumenbach noted that many Caucasian nations could not boast so fine a set of authors and scholars as black Africa has produced under the most depressing circumstances of prejudice and slavery: "It would not be difficult to mention entire well-known provinces of Europe, from out of which you would not easily expect to obtain off-hand such good authors, poets, philosophers, and correspondents of the Paris Academy."

Nonetheless, when Blumenbach presented his mental picture of human diversity in his fateful shift away from Linnaean geography, he singled out a particular group as closest to the created ideal and then characterized all other groups by relative degrees of departure from this archetypal standard. He ended up with a system that placed a single race at the pinnacle, and then envisioned two symmetrical lines of departure away from this ideal toward greater and greater degeneration.

We may now return to the riddle of the name Caucasian, and to the significance of Blumenbach's addition of a fifth race, the Malay variety. Blumenbach chose to regard his own European variety as closest to the created ideal and then searched for the subset of Europeans with greatest perfection—the highest of the high, so to speak. As we have seen, he identified the people around Mount Caucasus as the closest embodiments of the original ideal and proceeded to name the entire European race for its finest representatives.

But Blumenbach now faced a dilemma. He had already affirmed the mental and moral equality of all peoples. He therefore could not use these conventional criteria of racist ranking to establish degrees of relative departure from the Caucasian ideal. Instead, and however subjective (and even risible) we view the criterion today, Blumenbach chose physical beauty as his guide to ranking. He simply affirmed that Europeans were most beautiful, with Caucasians as the most comely of all. This explains why Blumenbach, in the fist quote cited in this article, linked the maximal beauty of the Caucasians to the place of human origin. Blumenbach viewed all subsequent variation as departures from the originally created ideal—therefore, the most beautiful people must live closest to our primal home.

Blumenbach's descriptions are pervaded by his subjective sense of relative beauty, presented as though he were discussing an objective and quantifiable property, not subject to doubt or disagreement. He describes a Georgian female skull (found close to Mount Caucasus) as "really the most beautiful form of skull which . . . always of itself attracts every eye, however little observant." He then defends his European standard on aesthetic grounds: "In the first place, that stock displays. . . the most beautiful form of the skull, from which, as from a mean and primeval type, the others diverge by most easy gradations. . . . Besides, it is white in color, which we may fairly assume to have been the primitive color of mankind, since . . . it is very easy for that to degenerate into brown, but very much more difficult for dark to become white."

Blumenbach then presented all human variety on two lines of successive departure from this Caucasian ideal, ending in the two most degenerate (least attractive, not least morally unworthy or mentally obtuse) forms of humanity—Asians on one side, and Africans on the other. But Blumenbach also wanted to designate intermediary forms between ideal and most degenerate, especially since even gradation formed his primary argument for human unity. In his original four-race system, he could identify native Americans as intermediary between Europeans and Asians, but who would serve as the transitional form between Europeans and Africans?

The four-race system contained no appropriate group. But inventing a fifth racial category as an intermediary between Europeans and Africans would complete the new symmetrical geometry. Blumenbach therefore added the Malay race, not as a minor, factual refinement but as a device for reformulating an entire theory of human diversity. With this one stroke, he produced the geometric transformation from Linnaeus's unranked geographic model to the conventional hierarchy of implied worth that has fostered so much social grief ever since.

> I have allotted the first place to the Caucasian . . . which makes me esteem it the primeval one. This diverges in both directions into two, most remote and very different from each other; on the one side, namely, into the Ethiopian, and on the other into the Mongolian. The remaining two occupy the intermediate positions between that primeval one and these two extreme varieties; that is, the American between the Caucasian and Mongolian; the Malay between the same Caucasian and Ethiopian. [From Blumenbach's third edition.]

Scholars often think that academic ideas must remain at worst, harmless, and at best, mildly amusing or even instructive. But ideas do not reside in the ivory tower of our usual metaphor about academic irrelevance. We are, as Pascal said, a thinking reed, and ideas motivate human history. Where would Hitler have been without racism, Jefferson without liberty? Blumenbach lived as a cloistered

professor all his life, but his ideas have reverberated in ways that he never could have anticipated, through our wars, our social upheavals, our sufferings, and our hopes.

I therefore end by returning once more to the extraordinary coincidences of 1776—as Jefferson wrote the Declaration of Independence while Blumenbach was publishing the first edition of his treatise in Latin. We should remember the words of the nineteenth-century British historian and moralist Lord Acton, on the power of ideas to propel history:

> It was from America that . . . ideas long locked in the breast of solitary thinkers, and hidden among Latin folios, burst forth like a conqueror upon the world they were destined to transform, under the title of the Rights of Man.

For Further Reading

Daughters of Africa. Margaret Busby, editor. Pantheon, 1992. A comprehensive anthology of prose and poetry written by women of African descent, from ancient Egyptian love songs to the work of contemporary Americans. The collection features the work of Phillis Wheatley, the first black to publish a book of poetry in the United States.

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Article 52

Trading Left Jabs

As Northern Virginia's clout in statewide politics increases, the Old Dominion is losing its Southern drawl.

THOMAS B. EDSALL

Two issues have defined Virginia's Senate election: insinuations by Democrats that Republican incumbent George Allen is racist, and charges by Republicans that Democratic challenger Jim Webb is sexist. Both assaults come not from the right but from the left—an unexpected development in a red state that was once part of the Confederacy.

Traditionally liberal social issues have managed to grab center stage because of the demographic transformation of the suburban-exurban collar surrounding the nation's capital. Virginia's portion of this terrain, covering the southwest perimeter of the Greater Washington metropolitan area, has become the single most influential factor shaping Virginia politics. Northern Virginia, which casts more than a quarter of the state's votes, was crucial to the Democratic gubernatorial victories of Mark Warner in 2001 and Tim Kaine in 2005.

"Virginia has become more and more like a Southern state with New Jersey and Connecticut suburbs attached to it," observes Robert Lang, founding director of the Metropolitan Institute at Virginia Tech. "Who would have guessed candidates would be answering questions from the left and going through these kinds of PC [politically correct] rituals? Northern Virginia is incrementally making it less of a red state," Lang said.

Northern Virginia, which is growing much faster than the state as a whole, is the southern extremity of an urbanized Atlantic Coast running all the way north to Boston, a coastline that has become reliably Democratic. Northern Virginia gained some 270,000 residents from 2000 to 2005; many of the newcomers work in the region's information industries. Hispanics and Asian-Americans have flocked to the area in recent years. According to 2005 census data, more than 30 percent of the adults in Northern Virginia's two largest counties, Fairfax and Arlington, speak a language other than English at home.

Qian Cai, director of demographics at the University of Virginia's Weldon Cooper Center, reported recently that "10 localities in Virginia grew by more than 10,000 in the last five years," and that half of them are in Northern Virginia. "Loudoun County heads the list with a phenomenal population increase of 82,700—up 49 percent, followed by Prince William County (an increase of 74,500), and Fairfax County, the state's largest jurisdiction, with 52,400 new residents. Nearby Stafford and Spotsylvania counties each gained close to 25,000," Cai wrote. In addition, Northern Virginia stands apart from the rest of the state in its two dominant sources of employment: high tech and public administration (government, trade associations, lobbying). In every other region, manufacturing employment exceeds high tech; in Northern Virginia, the technology sector employs four times as many workers as does manufacturing, according to the Weldon Center.

The voters of Northern Virginia have become especially important in gubernatorial elections, enabling Democrats to use such meat-and-potatoes issues as transportation and education to trump Republicans' wedge issues, such as the death penalty and abortion. University of Virginia political scientist Larry Sabato takes the analysis a step further: "Virginia is no longer a Southern state; it's a Middle Atlantic state. In a couple of presidential cycles, Virginia will be purple."

Northern Virginia's changing political allegiance is clear in gubernatorial contests. In 1997, when Republican James Gilmore won, he carried Fairfax County with 53 percent, Loudoun with 60 percent, and Prince William with 63 percent. Just eight years later, Democrat Kaine carried all three—winning Fairfax with 60 percent of the vote, Loudoun with 52 percent, and Prince William with 50 percent. In between those two elections, Democrat Warner won while carrying Fairfax with 55 percent but losing Loudoun with 46 percent and Prince William with 47 percent.

Just the Facts

- Northern Virginia is the southern extremity of an urbanized Atlantic Coast running all the way north to Boston.
- One-quarter of the state's votes are cast in Northern Virginia.
- Today, the 11 states of the Old Confederacy send just four Democrats to the Senate, down from 20 in 1964.

The Allen-Webb race will test whether Northern Virginia can produce a statewide Democratic victory in a federal election. Democrats haven't won a Senate race in Virginia since 1994 and haven't carried the state in a presidential election since 1964. Senate elections tend to be far less about easing traffic congestion and building new schools and much more about national issues that have, at least until recently, proven fertile ground for the Republican Party, especially when voters have focused on national security and terrorism.

The ranks of the Senate's Southern Democrats have dwindled. Today, the 11 states of the Old Confederacy have just four Democrats in the Senate. In contrast, when landmark civil-rights legislation passed in 1964, the Senate had 20 Southern Democrats. It's not surprising, then, that of the eight most competitive Senate races this year, the Democrats' prospects look weakest in Tennessee and Virginia. And the Virginia race is probably the steepest climb for Democrats. An October 10–12 *Washington Post* poll indicated that Webb had pulled statistically even with Allen; the incumbent's 2-point advantage was less than the margin of error. But across all recent public polling, Allen runs an average of 5 points ahead, according to *Pollster.com.*

Stumbling out of the Starting Gate

By most estimations, the Virginia race would never have become a real contest if not for George Allen's missteps—most famously, his videotaped reference to a Webb aide as "macaca." The macaca controversy, and allegations that Allen, while in college, had routinely used a racial epithet to describe African-Americans, strengthened Webb's prospects in much of the state, especially in Northern Virginia. But Webb supporters privately acknowledge that the Democrat's lack of cash prevented him from effectively capitalizing on Allen's vulnerability while the Republican's fumbling on racial, religious, and ethnic issues was dominating local and national news.

Peter Brodnitz, Webb's pollster, noted that Allen "shot himself in both feet and then in the head." But instead of burying its opponent, the Webb campaign allowed Allen time not only to regain his footing but also to retake the offensive. Webb, who began the contest as a virtual unknown in the state, has been forced to invest most heavily in what Brodnitz describes as "defensive" ads responding to Allen's attacks on two fronts: taxes and Webb's past opposition to allowing women to enroll in U.S. military academies and to serve in combat roles.

"The funny thing about this race is that, in important ways for us, we are not fully up to speed yet," Brodnitz said, adding that as of October 16, with only 22 days left, the campaign had not yet run television commercials presenting Webb's agenda on such issues as Iraq, income inequality, and vanishing jobs, and it had not invested in a large-buy, full-scale biographical commercial introducing the candidate to voters.

Webb's biography is his crucial selling point: a decorated Vietnam War veteran; a Reagan Democrat who served as secretary of the Navy; a gun-loving Scots-Irish American with deep family roots in rural Virginia—and, perhaps most important, a renegade who will not be a guaranteed vote for his party's leadership, an ideal image for a Democrat running statewide in Virginia.

The Allen campaign's success in trumping Webb's bio and regaining the initiative came as no surprise to those familiar with Allen's top three strategists, all hardball players who specialize in destroying their adversaries. Chris LaCivita engineered the creation of the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth, the organization that smeared John Kerry, winner of three Purple Hearts, as a coward in Vietnam. Media consultant Scott Howell won fame for his 2005 gubernatorial campaign ads suggesting that Tim Kaine would commute a death sentence for Adolf Hitler. Dick Wadhams, Allen's manager, described by his last client as "the best pit bull out there," goes by the motto: "Always get and stay on the offensive. Never let them get ahead of you."

George Allen, their current client, the son and namesake of the former Redskins and Los Angeles Rams coach, is no slouch himself when it comes to bare-knuckled political fights. At the Virginia Republican Party's 1994 convention, then-Gov. Allen gleefully declared, "My friends—and I say this figuratively—let's enjoy knocking [Democrats'] soft teeth down their whiny throats."

In unexpected ways, Webb presented the Republican incumbent and his trio of strategists with an ideal target. Despite his considerable achievements, Webb was largely unfamiliar to Virginia voters, and the cash-rich Allen operation was positioned to launch a pre-emptive strike, flooding the airwaves with ads portraying Webb as supportive of same-sex marriage, backed by labor bosses in a right-to-work state, and financed by Hollywood liberals.

As it turned out, though, the Allen offensive got delayed: In the crucial weeks before and after Labor Day, the campaign suffered through a series of setbacks. Instead of flexing their tough-guy muscles, LaCivita, Howell, and Wadhams were stymied by Allen's self-inflicted wounds. Their candidate threw himself on the defensive, over and over again. "We have all been frustrated," Wadhams told *National Journal* in mid-September.

The Allen camp's problems began at an August 11 rally in rural Breaks, Va., when the senator single-handedly changed the course of the campaign. He pointed to Webb aide S.R. Sidarth, 20, who was videotaping the event, and told the crowd, "This fellow over here with the yellow shirt, macaca or whatever his name is, he's with my opponent." Smiling directly into the camera, Allen added, "Let's give a welcome to macaca here. Welcome to America, and the real world of Virginia." Allen later offered an apology. He was forced to repeat it almost everywhere he went, including in debates and appearances on local and national television.

Then, on September 24, *Salon,* a Web-based publication, reported that former associates of Allen accused him of repeatedly using the word "nigger" as a college student and a young adult. In addition, a former friend said that Allen had placed the severed head of a deer in an African-American family's mailbox. Allen, supported by members of his family and a number of former college teammates, adamantly denied both the deer head story and the racial epithet allegations.

But for seven weeks, the racial-ethnic controversies handcuffed the Allen campaign. "I must tell you that as a strategist, I have never been through anything like this," Wadhams said.

An unexpected sequence of disclosures concerning Allen's concealed Jewish ancestry on his mother's side compounded his difficulties. Allen initially claimed ignorance of his religious heritage, and when he told reporters in mid-September that he had recently learned that his mother was Jewish, he said it had not changed his daily life. Allen mentioned that he "still ate a ham sandwich" that day, and noted that his mother made "great pork chops."

Seemingly on the ropes, Allen and his aides bounced back with a vengeance. On September 28, just four days after the furor over the *Salon* racial epithet report, the Allen campaign began running a statewide TV ad in which three female graduates of the Naval Academy bitterly criticized Webb for a 1979 *Washingtonian* article in which he wrote, "I have never met a woman, including the dozens of female midshipmen I encountered during my recent semester as a professor at the Naval Academy, whom I would trust to provide those men with combat leadership." In the article, Webb, an Annapolis graduate, described the academy's Bancroft Hall, "which houses 4,000 males and 300 females," as "a horny woman's dream."

In the Allen ad, Kathleen Murray, class of 1984, tells viewers that the Webb article "was demoralizing from a perspective that only a woman could understand." Carolyn Slowikowski, class of 1982, said, "James Webb accused the women of the Naval Academy of being promiscuous," and Mara Matthes, class of 1982, added, "Mr. Webb's viewpoints absolutely showed disrespect toward women."

The commercial, damaging in its own right, was particularly destructive to Webb's ability to carry Northern Virginia by a large enough margin to compensate for expected losses in other regions of the state. Northern Virginia, according to Virginia Tech's Lang, has an exceptionally high percentage of working women. In addition, among socially liberal suburban voters, accusations of sexism against Webb mitigated some of the harm done to Allen by charges of racism.

Allen's ad attacking Webb's 1979 views on women at the Naval Academy forced the challenger to defend himself with a commercial featuring testimonials from military women. Retired Army Brig. Gen. Clara Adams-Ender tells viewers, "George Allen's attacks on Jim Webb are a disgrace." Christine Gromek, U.S. Naval Academy, class of 1984, adds, "Jim Webb broke down barriers, and he changed things as Navy secretary."

Before Webb could take back the offensive, however, Allen was on the air pushing another line of attack: With pictures of Democratic Sens. John Kerry, Hillary Rodham Clinton, and Edward Kennedy on-screen, the announcer says, "There are some people in Washington who think you don't pay enough taxes, and they all support Jim Webb. Jim Webb wants to raise taxes on married couples and families with children, costing the average Virginia family $2,000."

Once again, the Webb campaign was forced to play defense. And, once again, it ran a counter-commercial, this time declaring, "George Allen's lying again. This time, about Jim Webb. The press calls Allen's ads 'political sewage,' 'short on honesty.' Truth is, Jim Webb's plan cuts taxes for middle-class families and veterans. It's George Allen who voted to raise taxes on retirement savings, make college more expensive, and give billions in tax cuts to oil companies."

The problem for Webb, even as both campaigns' ads flash by on voters' TV screens, is that he is not well known to Virginia voters. An enigmatic figure who wrote well-received novels after serving in Vietnam, Webb switched to the GOP shortly after Ronald Reagan won election to the White House in 1980. He switched back to challenge Allen.

Although Webb's advocacy of gun rights, his criticism of some Democratic orthodoxies, and his military credentials provide him with the kind of resume that can help a Democrat running in Virginia, his campaign has gotten very little of this information out to most of the state's voters. In addition, Webb is by no means a natural politician. Rather than bounding into political gatherings to woo potential supporters, he cautiously holds back. In debates, he has performed adequately but lacks the ease of a politician experienced in that sort of give-and-take. And his positions on issues of economic fairness and other domestic matters were hurriedly stitched together after he entered the contest, late in the season.

In an interview, Webb said that he was drawn back to the Democratic Party while researching the history of Scots-Irish Americans, and especially the views and politics of Andrew Jackson, for his most recent nonfiction book, *Born Fighting: How the Scots-Irish Shaped America.* "I'm like a lot of people. Call them Reagan Democrats. I was sort of looking for the best place to identify. . . . I just decided that the answer would be in the traditional Democratic Party." Jackson, according to Webb, believed that "you measure the health of a society not at its apex, but at its base." And by that measure, Webb says, American society is suffering and needs new leadership.

The War Takes a Backseat

Webb's strong opposition to the war in Iraq was the driving force behind his decision to challenge Allen. The former secretary of the Navy, whose 24-year-old son, Jimmy, is serving in Iraq, was against the war from the start, believing that the invasion would inevitably lead to a quagmire that would weaken the United States. "The invasion of Iraq was a double strategic blunder," Webb states in a campaign position paper. "First, it was a diversion from, not a response to, the war against international terrorism. Second, it has tied down our military in a costly occupation, fighting an insurgency that has strengthened not only the Shia population of Iraq, but also Iran itself." According to Webb, Allen, whom he supported in his 2000 Senate race, "has made it clear that, no matter how things are going [in Iraq], he will not question, let alone review and re-examine, the policies of the Bush administration."

On his Web site, Allen declares: "In Iraq, our troops have done a tremendous job helping Iraqis build a democracy in a formerly oppressive, terrorist-friendly dictatorship. Immediately withdrawing our military from Iraq would be forfeiting to the terrorists, and I disagree strongly with those who suggest that we should leave precipitously."

Despite Webb's original intention, this contest has focused more on personal character traits and domestic policy than on the war. Webb says that one overarching principle helps him know where to take a stand on such controversial issues as sexual privacy, abortion, and gun ownership: "My belief is that the power of the government stops at the front door unless there is a compelling reason for it to come inside." That belief led him to come down on the side of abortion rights, and to declare that the nation needs "to do better on rights for gays" by, for example, approving civil unions. And, he says, "I am pro-gun. I got my first rifle when I was 8 years old."

On affirmative action, Webb has developed a politically risky position. He argues that because, in his view, affirmative action is meant to remedy wrongs inflicted by slavery, such programs should be restricted to African-Americans and should exclude all other groups, including women. In the case of women, Webb says, "I think that situation [of discrimination against women], whatever inequities were in it, has been resolved."

But though Webb now supports affirmative action for African-Americans, he has been sharply critical of race-based preferences in the past. Virginia's black political community gave him only lukewarm support during the primary. The Allen campaign, seeing an opportunity to capitalize on Webb's problems with black voters—and to try to get beyond its own—has put together a compilation of Webb quotes that includes the following excerpt from an article Webb wrote in the May 22, 2000, *Wall Street Journal:*

"Affirmative action, which originally sought to repair the state-induced damage to blacks from slavery and its aftermath, has within one generation brought about a permeating state-sponsored racism that is as odious as the Jim Crow laws it sought to countermand. A Soviet-style bureaucracy of political commissars now monitors every level of our society to ensure that racial and gender 'diversity' matches preordained models, using the awesome powers of government to make certain that white males are not 'overrepresented' in education, employment, or government contracts."

Although the Allen campaign is spotlighting Webb's misgivings about affirmative action, Wadhams told *The Washington Post* that Allen favors only a very mild, nonintrusive form of affirmative action: He "supports affirmative recruitment, actively seeking out opportunities for minorities. He does not support quotas."

As the contest enters its closing weeks, polls indicate that most voters have already made up their minds. *The Washington Post's* mid-October poll of likely Virginia voters showed the race tied, with just 2 percent undecided. And, ironically, women will likely determine whether Jim Webb gets to have a career in politics. According to detailed analyses by the Webb campaign, the undecided are disproportionately white, churchgoing women—a demographic group that in past elections has supported the Republican Party generally and Allen specifically. So, even though Allen's own blunders put a serious scare into his campaign and his party, the GOP is likely to hold on in the Old Dominion, despite Northern Virginia's growing clout.

Article 53

Colorblind to the Reality of Race in America

Ian F. Haney López

How will race as a social practice evolve in the United States over the next few decades? The American public, and indeed many scholars, increasingly believe that the country is leaving race and racism behind. Some credit *Brown v. Board of Education,* the revered 1954 U.S. Supreme Court decision pronouncing segregated schools unequal, and the broad civil-rights movement of which the decision was a part, with turning the nation away from segregation and toward equality. Others point to changing demographics, emphasizing the rising number of mixed-race marriages and the increasing Asian and Hispanic populations that are blurring the historic black-white divide.

My sense of our racial future differs. Not only do I fear that race will continue to fundamentally skew American society over the coming decades, but I worry that the belief in the diminished salience of race makes that more likely rather than less. I suspect that the laws supposedly protecting against racial discrimination are partly to blame, for they no longer contribute to racial justice but instead legitimate continued inequality. We find ourselves now in the midst of a racial era marked by what I term "colorblind white dominance," in which a public consensus committed to formal antiracism deters effective remediation of racial inequality, protecting the racial status quo while insulating new forms of racism and xenophobia.

The Jefferson County school district, in Kentucky, covers Louisville and surrounding suburbs. A target of decades of litigation to eradicate Jim Crow school segregation and its vestiges, the district has since 2001 voluntarily pursued efforts to maintain what is now one of the most integrated school systems in the country. But not everyone supports those efforts, especially when they involve taking race into consideration in pupil assignments. In 2004 a white lawyer named Teddy B. Gordon ran for a seat on the Jefferson County School Board, promising to end endeavors to maintain integrated schools. He finished dead last, behind three other candidates. Indifferent to public repudiation, he is back—this time in the courtroom. Gordon's argument is seductively simple: *Brown* forbids *all* governmental uses of race, even if designed to achieve or maintain an integrated society.

He has already lost at the trial level and before an appellate court, as have two other sets of plaintiffs challenging similar integration-preserving efforts by school districts in Seattle and in Lynn, Mass. But Gordon and the conservative think tanks and advocacy groups that back him, including the self-styled Center for Equal Opportunity, are not without hope. To begin with, over the past three decades the courts have come ever closer to fully embracing a colorblind Constitution—colorblind in the sense of disfavoring all uses of race, irrespective of whether they are intended to perpetuate or ameliorate racial oppression. More immediately, last June the Supreme Court voted to review the Louisville and Seattle cases—*Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of Education* and *Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District.*

Roger Clegg, president and general counsel of the Center for Equal Opportunity, is thrilled. As he gleefully noted in *The National Review,* there's an old saw that the court does not hear cases it plans to affirm. The Bush administration, too, supports Gordon and his efforts. The U.S. solicitor general recently submitted a friend-of-the-court brief urging the justices to prevent school districts across the country from paying attention to race.

At issue is a legally backed ideology of colorblindness that could have implications beyond schools—for higher education and the wider society. Yes, in a narrowly tailored decision three years ago, the Supreme Court allowed the University of Michigan to consider race as one factor in law-school admissions. But since then, conservative advocacy groups have used the threat of lawsuits to intimidate many institutions into halting race-based college financial-aid and orientation programs, as well as graduate stipends and fellowships, and those groups are now taking aim at faculty hiring procedures. This month Michigan voters will decide whether to amend the state constitution to ban racial and gender preferences wherever practiced. And looming on the horizon are renewed efforts to enact legislation forbidding the federal and state governments from collecting statistics that track racial disparities, efforts that are themselves part of a broader campaign to expunge race from the national vocabulary.

Gordon predicts that if he prevails, Louisville schools will rapidly resegregate. He is sanguine about the prospect. "We're a diverse society, a multiethnic society, a colorblind society," he told *The New York Times.* "Race is history."

But the past is never really past, especially not when one talks about race and the law in the United States. We remain a racially stratified country, though for some that constitutes an argument for rather than against colorblindness. Given the long and sorry history of racial subordination, there is tremendous rhetorical appeal to Justice John Marshall Harlan's famous dissent in *Plessy v. Ferguson,* the 1896 case upholding segregated railway cars: "Our Constitution is colorblind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens."

Contemporary proponents of colorblindness almost invariably draw a straight line from that dissent to their own impassioned advocacy for being blind to race today. But in doing so, partisans excise Harlan's acknowledgment of white superiority in the very paragraph in which he extolled colorblindness: "The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time." That omission obscures a more significant elision: Harlan objected not to all governmental uses of race, but to those he thought would unduly oppress black people.

As viewed by Harlan and the court, the central question was where to place limits on government support for the separation of racial groups that were understood to be unequal by nature (hence Harlan's comfortable endorsement of white superiority). He and the majority agreed that the state could enforce racial separation in the "social" but not in the "civil" arenas; they differed on the contours of the spheres. Harlan believed that segregated train cars limited the capacity of black people to participate as full citizens in civic life, while the majority saw such segregation only as a regulation of social relations sanctioned by custom. The scope of the civil arena mattered so greatly precisely because state exclusions from public life threatened to once again reduce the recently emancipated to an inferior caste defined by law.

For the first half of the 20th century, colorblindness represented the radical and wholly unrealized aspiration of dismantling de jure racial subordination. Thus Thurgood Marshall, as counsel to the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People in the late 1940s and early 1950s, cited Harlan's celebration of colorblindness to argue that racial distinctions are "contrary to our Constitution and laws." But neither society nor the courts embraced colorblindness when doing so might have sped the demise of white supremacy. Even during the civil-rights era, colorblindness as a strategy for racial emancipation did not take hold. Congress and the courts dismantled Jim Crow segregation and proscribed egregious forms of private discrimination in a piecemeal manner, banning only the most noxious misuses of race, not any reference to race whatsoever.

In the wake of the civil-rights movement's limited but significant triumphs, the relationship between colorblindness and racial reform changed markedly. The greatest potency of colorblindness came to lie in preserving, rather than challenging, the racial status quo. When the end of explicit race-based subordination did not eradicate stubborn racial inequalities, progressives increasingly recognized the need for state and private actors to intervene along racial lines. Rather than call for colorblindness, they began to insist on the need for affirmative race-conscious remedies. In that new context, colorblindness appealed to those *opposing* racial integration. Enshrouded with the moral raiment of the civil-rights movement, colorblindness provided cover for opposition to racial reform.

Within a year of *Brown,* Southern school districts and courts had recognized that they could forestall integration by insisting that the Constitution allowed them to use only "race neutral" means to end segregation—school-choice plans that predictably produced virtually no integration whatsoever. In 1965 a federal court in South Carolina put it squarely: "The Constitution is color-blind; it should no more be violated to attempt integration than to preserve segregation."

Wielding the ideal of colorblindness as a sword, in the past three decades racial conservatives on the Supreme Court have increasingly refought the battles lost during the civil-rights era, cutting back on protections against racial discrimination as well as severely limiting race-conscious remedies. In several cases in the 1970s—including *North Carolina State Board of Education v. Swann,* upholding school-assignment plans, and *Regents of the University of California v. Bakke*—the court ruled that the need to redress the legacy of segregation made strict colorblindness impossible. But as the 1980s went on, in other cases—*McCleskey v. Kemp,* which upheld Georgia's death penalty despite uncontroverted statistical evidence that African-Americans convicted of murder were 22 times as likely to be sentenced to death if their victims were white rather than black, and *City of Richmond v. Croson,* which rejected a city affirmative-action program steering some construction dollars to minority-owned companies despite the fact that otherwise only two-thirds of 1 percent of city contracts went to minority companies in a city 50 percent African-American—the court presented race as a phenomenon called into existence just when someone employed a racial term. Discrimination existed *only* but *every* time someone used racial language. Thus the court found no harm in Georgia's penal system, because no evidence surfaced of a specific bad actor muttering racial epithets, while it espied racism in Richmond's affirmative-action program because it set aside contracts for "minorities."

That approach ignores the continuing power of race as a society-altering category. The civil-rights movement changed the racial zeitgeist of the nation by rendering illegitimate all explicit invocations of white supremacy, a shift that surely marked an important step toward a more egalitarian society. But it did not bring into actual existence that ideal, as white people remain dominant across virtually every social, political, and economic domain. In 2003 the poverty rate was 24 percent among African-Americans, 23 percent among Latinos, and 8 percent among white people. That same year, an estimated 20 percent of African-Americans and 33 percent of Latinos had no health insurance, while 11 percent of white people were uninsured. Discrepancies in incarceration rates are particularly staggering, with African-American men vastly more likely to spend time in prison than white men are.

Or forget the numbers and recall for a moment the graphic parade of images from Hurricane Katrina. Or consider access to country clubs and gated communities, in-group preferences for jobs and housing, the moral certainty shared by many white folks regarding their civic belonging and fundamental goodness. Or, to tie back to Louisville, reflect on what you already know about the vast, racially correlated disparities in resources available to public (and still more to private) schools across the country. Racial dominance by white people continues as a central element of our society.

What may be changing, however, is how membership in the white group is defined. The term "white" has a far more complicated—and fluid—history in the United States than people commonly recognize. For most of our history, whiteness stood in contrast to the nonwhite identities imposed upon Africans, American Indians, Mexican peoples of the Southwest, and Asian immigrants, marking one pole in the racial hierarchy. Simultaneously, however, putative "racial" divisions separated Europeans, so that in the United States presumptions of gross racial inferiority were removed from Germans only in the 1840s through 1860s, the Irish in the 1850s through 1880s, and Eastern and Southern Europeans in the 1900s to 1920s. The melding of various European groups into the monolithic, undifferentiated "white" category we recognize today is a recent innovation, only fully consolidated in the mid-20th century. Now white identity may be expanding to include persons and groups with ancestors far beyond Europe.

Perhaps we should distinguish here among three sorts of white identity. Consider first persons who are "fully white," in the sense that, with all of the racially relevant facts about them widely known, they would generally be considered white by the community at large. (Obviously, racial identity is a matter not of biology but of social understandings, although those may give great weight to purportedly salient differences in morphology and ancestry.) In contrast to that group, there have long been those "passing as white"—people whose physical appearance allowed them to claim a white identity when social custom would have assigned them to a nonwhite group had their ancestry been widely known. Of people of Irish and Jewish descent in the United States, for example, one might say that while initially some were able to pass as white, now all are fully white.

Today a new group is emerging, perhaps best described as "honorary whites." Apartheid South Africa first formally crafted this identity: Seeking to engage in trade and commerce with nations cast as inferior by apartheid logic, particularly Japan, South Africa extended to individuals from such countries the status of honorary white people, allowing them to travel, reside, relax, and conduct business in South African venues that were otherwise strictly "whites only." Persons who pass as white hide racially relevant parts of their identity; honorary whites are extended the status of whiteness despite the public recognition that, from a bioracial perspective, they are not fully white.

In the United States, honorary-white status seems increasingly to exist for certain people and groups. The quintessential example is certain Asian-Americans, particularly East Asians. Although Asians have long been racialized as nonwhite as a matter of law and social practice, the model-minority myth and professional success have combined to free some Asian-Americans from the most pernicious negative beliefs regarding their racial character. In part this trend represents a shift toward a socially based, as opposed to biologically based, definition of race. Individuals and communities with the highest levels of acculturation, achievement, and wealth increasingly find themselves functioning as white, at least as measured by professional integration, residential patterns, and intermarriage rates.

To actually move toward a racially egalitarian society requires that we forthrightly respond to racial inequality today. The alternative is the continuation of colorblind white dominance.

Latinos also have access to honorary-white identity, although their situation differs from that of Asian-Americans. Unlike the latter, and also unlike African-Americans, Latinos in the United States have long been on the cusp between white and nonwhite. Despite pervasive and often violent racial prejudice against Mexicans in the Southwest and Puerto Ricans and other Hispanic groups elsewhere, the most elite Latin Americans in the United States have historically been accepted as fully white. With no clear identity under the continental theory of race (which at its most basic identifies blacks as from Africa, whites from Europe, reds from the Americas, and yellows from Asia), and with a tremendous range of somatic features marking this heterogeneous population, there has long been relatively more room for the use of social rather than strictly biological factors in the imputation of race to particular Hispanic individuals and groups.

It seems likely that an increasing number of Latinos—those who have fair features, material wealth, and high social status, aided also by Anglo surnames—will both claim and be accorded a position in U.S. society as fully white. Simultaneously, many more—similarly situated in terms of material and status position, but perhaps with slightly darker features or a surname or accent suggesting Latin-American origins—will become honorary whites. Meanwhile, the majority of Latinos will continue to be relegated to nonwhite categories.

The continuing evolution in who counts as white is neither particularly startling nor especially felicitous. Not only have racial categories and ideologies always mutated, but race has long turned on questions of wealth, professional attainment, and social position. A developing scholarship now impressively demonstrates that even during and immediately after slavery, at a time when racial identity in the United States was presumably most rigidly fixed in terms of biological difference and descent, and even in the hyperformal legal setting of the courtroom, determinations of racial identity often took place on the basis of social indicia like the nature of one's employment or one's choice of sexual partners.

Nor will categories like black, brown, white, yellow, and red soon disappear. Buttressed by the continued belief in continental racial divisions, physical features those divisions supposedly connote will remain foundational to racial classification. The stain of African ancestry—so central to the elaboration of race in the United States—ensures a persistent special stigma for black people. Honorary-white status will be available only to the most exceptional—and the most light-skinned—African-Americans, and on terms far more restrictive than those on which whiteness will be extended to many Latinos and Asian-Americans.

Those many in our society who are darker, poorer, more identifiably foreign will continue to suffer the poverty, marginalization, immiseration, incarceration, and exclusion historically accorded to those whose skin and other features socially mark them as nonwhite. Even under a redefined white category, racial hierarchy will continue as the links are strengthened between nonwhite identity and social disadvantage on the one hand, and whiteness and privilege on the other. Under antebellum racial logic, those black people with the fairest features were sometimes described as "light, bright, and damn near white." If today we switch out "damn near" for "honorary" and fold in a few other minorities, how much has really changed?

In the face of continued racial hierarchy, it is crucial that we understand the colorblind ideology at issue in the school cases before the Supreme Court. "In the eyes of government, we are just one race here," Justice Antonin Scalia intoned in 1995. "It is American." That sentiment is stirring as an aspiration, but disheartening as a description of reality, and even more so as a prescription for racial policies. All persons of good will aspire to a society free from racial hierarchy. We should embrace colorblindness—in the sense of holding it up as an ideal. But however far the civil-rights struggle has moved us, we remain far from a racially egalitarian utopia.

In this context, the value of repudiating all governmental uses of race must depend on a demonstrated ability to remedy racial hierarchy. Colorblindness as a policy prescription merits neither fealty nor moral stature by virtue of the attractiveness of colorblindness as an ideal. In the hands of a Thurgood Marshall, who sought to end Jim Crow segregation and to foster an integrated society, colorblindness was a transformative, progressive practice. But when Teddy Gordon, Roger Clegg, the Bush administration, and the conservative justices on the Supreme Court call for banning governmental uses of race, they aim to end the efforts of local majorities to respond constructively to racial inequality. In so doing, they are making their version of colorblindness a reactionary doctrine.

Contemporary colorblindness is a set of understandings—buttressed by law and the courts, and reinforcing racial patterns of white dominance—that define how people comprehend, rationalize, and act on race. As applied, however much some people genuinely believe that the best way to get beyond racism is to get beyond race, colorblindness continues to retard racial progress. It does so for a simple reason: It focuses on the surface, on the bare fact of racial classification, rather than looking down into the nature of social practices. It gets racism and racial remediation exactly backward, and insulates new forms of race baiting.

White dominance continues with few open appeals to race. Consider the harms wrought by segregated schools today. Schools in predominantly white suburbs are far more likely to have adequate buildings, teachers, and books, while the schools serving mainly minority children are more commonly underfinanced, unsafe, and in a state of disrepair. Such harms acccumulate, encouraging white flight to avoid the expected deterioration in schools and the violence that is supposedly second nature to "them," only to precipitate the collapse in the tax base that in fact ensures a decline not only in schools but also in a range of social services. Such material differences in turn buttress seemingly common-sense ideas about disparate groups, so that we tend to see pristine schools and suburbs as a testament to white accomplishment and values. When violence does erupt, it is laid at the feet of alienated and troubled teenagers, not a dysfunctional culture. Yet we see the metal detectors guarding entrances to minority schoolhouses (harbingers of the prison bars to come) as evidence not of the social dynamics of exclusion and privilege, but of innate pathologies. No one need talk about the dynamics of privilege and exclusion. No one need cite white-supremacist arguments nor openly refer to race—race exists in the concrete of our gated communities and barrios, in government policies and programs, in cultural norms and beliefs, and in the way Americans lead their lives.

Colorblindness badly errs when it excuses racially correlated inequality in our society as unproblematic so long as no one uses a racial epithet. It also egregiously fails when it tars every explicit reference to race. To break the interlocking patterns of racial hierarchy, there is no other way but to focus on, talk about, and put into effect constructive policies explicitly engaged with race. To be sure, inequality in wealth is a major and increasing challenge for our society, but class is not a substitute for a racial analysis—though, likewise, racial oppression cannot be lessened without sustained attention to poverty. It's no accident that the poorest schools in the country warehouse minorities, while the richest serve whites; the national education crisis reflects deeply intertwined racial and class politics. One does not deny the imbrication of race and class by insisting on the importance of race-conscious remedies: The best strategies for social repair will give explicit attention to race as well as to other sources of inequality, and to their complex interrelationship.

The claim that race and racism exist only when specifically mentioned allows colorblindness to protect a new racial politics from criticism. The mobilization of public fears along racial lines has continued over the past several decades under the guise of interlinked panics about criminals, welfare cheats, terrorists, and—most immediately in this political season—illegal immigrants. Attacks ostensibly targeting "culture" or "behavior" rather than "race" now define the diatribes of

today's racial reactionaries. Samuel P. Huntington's jeremiad against Latino immigration in his book *Who Are We?: The Challenges to America's National Identity* rejects older forms of white supremacy, but it promotes the idea of a superior Anglo-Protestant culture. Patrick J. Buchanan defends his latest screed attacking "illegal immigrants," *State of Emergency: The Third World Invasion and Conquest of America,* against the charge of racism by insisting that he's indifferent to race but outraged by those with different cultures who violate our laws. My point is not simply that culture and behavior provide coded language for old prejudices, but that colorblindness excuses and insulates this recrudescence of xenophobia by insisting that only the explicit use of racial nomenclature counts as racism.

Contemporary colorblindness loudly proclaims its antiracist pretensions. To actually move toward a racially egalitarian society, however, requires that we forthrightly respond to racial inequality today. The alternative is the continuation of colorblind white dominance. As Justice Harry Blackmun enjoined in defending affirmative action in *Bakke:* "In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race. There is no other way."

IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ is a professor at the Boalt Hall School of Law at the University of California at Berkeley. New York University Press has just issued a 10th-anniversary edition of his *White by Law: The Legal Construction of Race,* with a new chapter on colorblind white dominance.

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