Languages in a Globalising World

Edited by
Jacques Maurais
and Michael A. Morris

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Throughout human history, the fate of languages has been closely linked to political power relationships. Political shifts in the international system continue to affect linguistic patterns, which today are still in a state of flux following the end of the Cold War. This book considers the effects of present-day trends in global politics on the relative status of languages, and the directions in which the linguistic hierarchy might develop in the future. What are the prospects for the continuing spread of English? Will other traditionally prominent languages such as French and German gain or lose influence? Will languages such as Arabic and Japanese increase in international status? Will minority languages continue to lose ground and disappear? Part I of the book considers theoretical and practical issues, while Part II focuses on language patterns in the main world regions. Part III considers change and continuity in the global language hierarchy by focusing on six languages of wider communication. With its interdisciplinary approach, this book will appeal to researchers and students of sociolinguistics and language planning as well as of international relations.

Jacques Maurais is currently with the Conseil de la langue française in Québec City. He has edited various works on sociolinguistics and language planning and is the author of more than one hundred specialised articles and chapters in books on language planning, sociolinguistics and terminology, as well as monographs.

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One paper by Abram de Swaan, 'La constellation mondiale des langues', was included in the French but not the subsequent English publication. The co-editors felt that it was important to call the attention of the work of de Swaan on a global linguistic system to a French-speaking audience, but he has already published a number of papers on this topic in English. For example, see:

de Swaan, Abram 1988a, A political sociology of the world language system (1): The dynamics of language spread, *Language Problems and Language Planning*, 22(1): 63–75.

de Swann, Abram 1988b, A political sociology of the world language system (2): The unequal exchange of texts, *Language Problems and Language Planning*, 22(2): 109–128.

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1 Introduction

Jacques Maurais and Michael A. Morris

This book, *Languages in a globalising world*, addresses language changes in the global arena from several interrelated perspectives. Global communication challenges (Part I) are becoming increasingly prominent in a rapidly changing world characterised by rising interdependence. In Part I as well as elsewhere in this volume, theoretical and practical aspects of these challenges are assessed and interrelated. Rising language competition on a global scale varies from geographical region to region as does the spread of the English language (Part II), so that the ongoing impact of globalisation must be examined in general terms as well as from the perspective of the various geographical regions. To a considerable extent, the hierarchy and status of the major languages cut across geographical regions, so that attention must be addressed to them as well (Part III). The status of a number of major languages is analysed as well as how they impact on and are impacted by a rapidly changing international order. The status and resulting hierarchy of major languages encompasses a number of key issues affecting the new global linguistic order. Vitally important as well is how ongoing globalisation affects linguistic diversity or the fate of lesser languages.

This introduction poses several key considerations about each of the three parts of the book as well as the component chapters of each part. A summary follows about the contribution of each chapter towards the part in which it is located as well as towards furthering the overall purpose of the book. Since the interrelation between languages and a globalising world is a very complex one, it is well to stress individual and overall contributions of the various chapters and parts of the book. Many issues are surveyed, numerous regions are covered and a variety of major languages are considered. Such a broad-based survey aspires to assess representative aspects of languages in a globalising world. For example, while the thousands of local languages located in pockets around the world can only be grouped together here to assess the generally adverse impact of globalisation on linguistic diversity, the major languages that have international influence are all given attention. Similarly, every single region around the world cannot be covered fully, but the most prominent regions are assessed here.

Part I: Global communication challenges

Part I surveys the major issues shaping global communication challenges. Moreover, theory and practice are integrated in assessing the present and future of the new global linguistic order while giving due attention to the historical legacy of language competition and interaction. While this survey of the issues identifies the major challenges, at the same time the authors suggest how difficult and even divisive responses may be. For example, how much will English continue to spread and how will this affect lesser languages in different ways and different places (Maurais)? It is possible that a measured spread of 'world English' can promote cooperation and equity, but longstanding linguistic competition threatens to be even more divisive in a globalising world (Fettes). Dominant theoretical paradigms shape thinking about linguistic competition and cooperation, but in practice often lead to distortions in making policy recommendations (Kibbee). Theories such as 'territoriality' provide powerful theoretical underpinning for some language policies, but in fact need to be heavily qualified to adapt effectively to a globalising world (Laponce). Forecasting the fate of languages offers the hope of resolving some of these challenges for policy makers, but in fact such forecasting is very uncertain (Mackey).

Jacques Maurais (Chapter 2) assesses the massive impact of a number of key global events on relationships and competition between the major languages, which together are producing a new international linguistic order. The spread of the English language continues, but here as well as elsewhere trends are uneven and difficult to predict, although all languages – lesser languages like major ones – are generally facing greater competition.

Mark Fettes (Chapter 3) argues for reversing the longstanding approach or practice where nations compete with one another to promote their own languages, which is all the more pressing in a globalising world where linguistic competition threatens to escalate. Instead, he advocates developing geostrategies of interlingualism, i.e. linguistic strategies to foster global communication in cooperative, equitable ways which promote linguistic diversity. A cooperative approach might take any of a number of forms including measured spread of 'world English', promotion of plurilingualism, support for technical solutions enabling easier access to other languages, and greater reliance on an invented language such as Esperanto.

Douglas A. Kibbee (Chapter 4) addresses several major relationships between language policy and linguistic theory. Free-market theorists of global language strategy justify domination by major international languages as a kind of natural selection, while ecological theorists regard the loss of any language as constituting a permanent, irrevocable loss. Both theoretical orientations are based on many linguistic presuppositions that are rarely examined, and lead to distortions in making policy recommendations. For example, promotion of linguistic diversity is a worthy goal, but awareness of shortcomings of theory can help correct inappropriate policy recommendations.

Jean Laponce (Chapter 5) is a very well-known advocate of 'territoriality', i.e. defence of minority languages through consolidation of a solid geographical base. Chapter 5 adds important qualifications regarding the most appropriate kind of defence of minority languages in a highly competitive, globalising world. A pragmatic approach is recommended involving promotion of minority languages in certain kinds of situations while relying on English in others.

The future of major languages as well as lesser ones is of great interest to all concerned, but William F. Mackey (Chapter 6) argues that forecasting the fate of languages is very uncertain. Present predictions may go wrong for a variety of reasons just as past ones have, and pitfalls in each of four broad categories affecting predictions are surveyed. A reliable model for prediction would need to reflect the multidimensional and multifunctional nature of language dynamics.

Part II: Major Areas

Part II is broad-ranging, covering five geographical regions (Chapters 7, 11, 12, 13 and 14) as well as the three most prominent examples of regional economic integration in the world (Chapters 8, 9 and 10). While the focus of each chapter is broad-based and distinctive, taken together they are also mutually reinforcing. For example, the three chapters on regional economic integration not only offer a strong basis for deriving relationships between globalisation, regionalism and languages, but they also contrast major features of language dynamics in Europe, North America and South America.

The European Union (EU) and Mercosur (South American Common Market or *Mercado del Sur*) include language policy within regional integration while the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) does not. Further complicating comparisons between different regional integration approaches, the EU and Mercosur have themselves become major vehicles for promoting major languages with much more success in the case of the former regional grouping than the latter one. A further contrast is that the EU has taken some active measures to promote minority languages while Mercosur has not (and, to repeat, NAFTA has no jurisdiction over language issues other than declaring three official languages). Challenges posed by the continuing spread of English affect all three regional economic integration groupings, but implications seem to diverge. In the EU, the spread of English may have contributed to loosening of the traditional hegemony of major languages such as French and Spanish within national territory thereby helping permit greater leeway for lesser languages such as Corsican, Basque and Catalan. The continuing spread of English in North America does not yet appear to have endangered French in Quebec nor Spanish in Mexico and Puerto Rico but does seem to have further threatened lesser languages within the United States. In South America, Mercosur's efforts to promote Spanish and Portuguese have not reached fruition nor halted the spread of English, but neither of these Iberian tongues is yet threatened.

The intention here is simply to highlight the importance of regional economic integration for the future of languages, and to suggest how comparisons can help yield insights. Comparative regional integration has been recognised as an increasingly important dimension of a globalising world, but comparisons about its related linguistic dimension have been largely neglected.

Similarly, from different perspectives pairs of articles complement one another in assessing language trends in Europe (Fodor/Peluau and Truchot grouped as Chapters 7 and 8), the Americas (Hamel and Morris grouped as Chapters 9 and 10) and Asia (Schlyter and Kaiser grouped as Chapters 11 and 12). Chapter 13 on sub-Saharan Africa by Breton has global as well as regional implications in identifying threats to local languages while English-, French- and Portuguese-speaking zones remain vibrant. Regional as well as global implications are evident as well in Chapter 14 on Australasia and the South Pacific by Baldauf/Djité, which documents the strong position of English.

There is also broad coverage of countries within regions. For example, there is a total of 23 full members in the three regional integration pacts that are assessed in separate chapters (Mercosur: 5; EU: 15; and NAFTA: 3), and all three have some kind of associate membership that adds well over a dozen and perhaps over two dozen countries depending on how associate membership is defined. In addition, as a dependent territory of the USA, Puerto Rico is part of NAFTA, just as some European dependencies are part of the Euro zone. Another example of impressive coverage is Chapter 14 on Australasia and the South Pacific, where Baldauf and Djité compare language patterns of 20 countries. In Chapter 13, Roland Breton includes about twice as many countries in his survey of sub-Saharan Africa.

The broad-based survey covers major countries of the world along with consideration of many lesser countries. For example, a major consideration of Morris is the position of the USA in North America, Truchot includes the European great powers (Britain, France and Germany) in his survey of European Union language trends, and Schlyter analyses the legacy of the language policy of the Soviet Union on former Soviet republics in Central Asia as well as the current position of Russia (see also a complementary chapter on Russia and Russian in Part III by Mikhalchenko/Trushkova). Contemporary linguistic challenges for East Asia including Japan and China are assessed by Kaiser, and the chapter on Central Asia by Schlyter also includes part of China.

Rising powers and their languages in a globalising world are also assessed. For example, Hamel focuses on Argentina and Brazil, Morris considers the linguistic situations of Canada and Mexico (in addition to that of the USA), and Baldauf/Djité include Australia in their assessment of Australasia and the South Pacific. Schlyter suggests that Turkey may have an increasingly important linguistic impact in Central Asia. Various chapters in the book address South Asian linguistic issues. While Hindi has considerable stature within India, it should be emphasised that the international impact of this language is limited whether measured by the number of students studying Hindi abroad, the number of Hindi-speaking migrants abroad who exert some linguistic impact on the countries where they are located, or more generally by the international reach of the language. Even within the South Asian region, English as well as local languages all remain important.

Part II is justified by traditional practice in examining relationships between geography and language, which include how language groups are embedded in different geographical areas as well as how languages cut across geographical regions. While geography may suggest a static relationship with language, in fact ongoing competition between languages within and across regions is by its essence dynamic in nature. At the same time, competition between languages in a globalising world is considerably more fluid and susceptible to change than in a less technologically advanced world. A recurring theme in Part II as well as elsewhere in this volume is that in a globalising world virtual space (or cyberspace) is increasingly impacting on languages, in fact often posing the challenge that languages must either adapt to modern technology or lose ground. For example, this theme is prominent in Chapter 12 by Kaiser (in Part II) and in Chapter 16 by Laroussi in (Part III); it is also addressed by other authors including Maurais and Mikhalchenko/Trushkova.

Ferenc Fodor and Sandrine Peluau (Chapter 7) assess changing language patterns in eastern and central Europe. Substantial documentation in this chapter reveals a general rise in the learning of English and decline of Russian, but language-learning trends vary significantly from country to country. As appropriate, regional, sub-regional and national trends are identified and interrelated in order to determine linguistic realities and their political implications.

Claude Truchot (Chapter 8) focuses on the multiple linguistic dimensions and influence of the EU. The EU approach to economic and political integration will likely have a decisive impact on the linguistic balance in Europe and beyond, so that the future linguistic influence of the EU assumes great political importance for all concerned. The implications of the continuing ascendancy of English within the EU will need to be addressed one way or the other. At the same time, French has managed to retain considerable influence within the EU and German will need to be given a more important role within the EU, all the more so since the influence of the German language has been increasing informally since the collapse of the Soviet Union and unification of Germany.

Rainer Enrique Hamel (Chapter 9) addresses language issues within the major South American integration grouping, Mercosur. The title of this chapter, 'Regional blocs as a barrier against English hegemony?', reflects the aspiration that regional integration can promote regional languages (in this case, particularly Portuguese and Spanish). However, a survey of regional integration practice reveals that in spite of ambitions little has been done to promote mutual reinforcement of the two major regional languages or to curb the continuing spread of English in the eventuality of a Pan-American integration project. The author proposes complementary emphasis on all these languages in Mercosur while cautioning that the other two examples of regional integration covered in this book, the EU and NAFTA, have distinctive settings.

Michael Morris (Chapter 10) analyses and contrasts positive and negative effects of North American integration on linguistic diversity. Effects are considered as positive if they maintain or promote North American linguistic diversity, while negative effects limit linguistic diversity. Linguistic diversity respects language rights of minorities and supports their distinctive cultural contributions. Integration in North America through NAFTA has been fairly well structured to achieve specific economic and political results, but all too often linguistic diversity has not even been considered as an issue.

Birgit N. Schlyter (Chapter 11) analyses the multifaceted sociolinguistic changes in transformed Central Asian societies. Broadly speaking, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the creation of new independent states have increased consciousness of peoples' linguistic destiny and language identities. New legislation has accorded official status to certain local languages, but implementation has been halting. The future of other local languages remains uncertain, as does the fate of the Russian language. Turkey has been emerging as a newly influential actor on linguistic issues in Central Asia. English is becoming more popular, but here, too, future prospects are unclear. What is clear is that languages have acquired greater political importance, and that competition among languages adds to the uncertainty about the future.

Stefan Kaiser (Chapter 12) surveys complexities of languages and script in East Asian countries and resulting problems in adapting to modern information technologies. Japan's situation is given special attention, and the record is mixed. There are some important initiatives to promote Japanese and adapt the language to the needs of the information age, but English continues to spread here as elsewhere.

Roland Breton (Chapter 13) assesses the legacy and future of languages in sub-Saharan Africa. There is a politicolinguistic tripartition (a three-fold partition with political and linguistic implications) between English-, French- and Portuguese-speaking zones, which is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. In contrast, the future of African languages is generally very troubled, particularly the future of hundreds of local languages. Modernisation, including the spread of education, is therefore likely to end the exceptional African linguistic diversity. Some subregional languages may reach an accommodation with the three ex-colonial languages and survive.

Richard B. Baldauf Jr. and Paulin G. Djité (Chapter 14) survey the past, present and future language situation in Australasia and the South Pacific, which is characterised by marked language diversity in numerous polities. English is and promises to remain the dominant international language in the region, although the prospects of certain regional languages (such as Chinese, Indonesian/Malay[1], pidgins) are good. Linguistic diversity in the region has nonetheless been declining, especially local languages. A certain degree of linguistic diversity will continue including various regional languages, some continuation of local languages, and increasing diversity of English.

Part III: Languages of wider communication

Part III covers half a dozen major international languages. In addition, inasmuch as Spanish is included in the chapters by Hamel and Morris in Part II, seven languages in an international leadership position are included. All of these languages are spoken in a number of countries, all have the potential for expansion although some or all may end up declining in a highly competitive, globalising world, and all enjoy some degree of international status. The languages covered are the most important ones in international organisations.

Several additional considerations highlight the decisive role that the major languages play in a globalising world. The coverage of half a dozen major languages in Part III encompasses numerous countries inasmuch as each of these languages either cuts across and/or includes a number of countries. For example, English (Chapter 19) has global reach including three circles of speakers. The figure of 75 countries is cited by Grant McConnell in Chapter 19 for the first two circles (the 'inner' circle and the 'outer' or 'extended' circle). The concept of the third or 'expanding' circle is necessarily vague but might include an equal number of states. Similarly, dozens of countries are Arabic-speaking and/or French-speaking (Chapters 16 and 18). While there are only a few German-speaking countries, they have a powerful international impact especially in Europe.

Some major languages are not included here, such as Chinese and Hindi, but they are covered to some degree elsewhere in this book and are indeed dubious candidates for becoming major international languages. (For example, Table 15.3 in this book documents the low international economic standing of Hindi.)

[1] Bahasa Indonesia (Indonesian) and Bahasa Malaysia (Malay) are the two national languages of their respective countries, but linguistically they can be considered to be dialects, somewhat more different than British English and American English.

While the new international linguistic order will be shaped to an important degree by the major languages and their interaction, lesser languages are numerous, and in the aggregate their speakers are sizable and are greatly concerned by the linguistic destiny of the languages they speak. Numerous chapters throughout the book address lesser languages and challenges to linguistic diversity that they face.

Ulrich Ammon (Chapter 15) introduces Part III by posing the general question, 'What do we mean by the international standing of a language?', which he addresses for the case of German, and subsequent chapters answer for five additional languages. Ammon offers multiple indicators comparing German with other languages to show the international standing of the German language. While a powerful case is made that German is still an important international language, it is recognised that with time the international impact of German may increasingly be limited to Europe. But even this is uncertain, since Germany is the most powerful economic country in the EU, which itself is increasingly a global actor.

Foued Laroussi (Chapter 16) assesses problems posed for Arabic by new technologies with particular emphasis on computer technologies. Linguistic challenges are described, and must be overcome if modernisation of Arabic-speaking countries is to proceed apace and the language is to achieve its due international influence. A globalising world also poses a transnational challenge for Arabic, with important Arabic-speaking populations in France and elsewhere as well as in the Middle East.

Vida Io. Mikhalchenko and Yulia Trushkova (Chapter 17) survey the multifaceted status of Russian in a globalising world. In the Russian Federation, Russian is becoming stronger as a universal means of communication. However, in the former states of the Soviet Union, Russian has lost its dominant position in most spheres of communication controlled by national authorities while maintaining its status in some other spheres. Russian may be maintained by Russian-speaking communities abroad, although study of Russian outside the former USSR will likely remain quite limited.

Robert Chaudenson (Chapter 18) assesses challenges for French in a globalising world. Among other problems, there has been a lack of rigour in determining the number and degree of competency of French speakers in the various so-called Francophone countries (a term for French-speaking countries which itself erroneously implies widespread, high-level competence in French). The international future of French will depend more on how the language fares in Africa rather than Europe, and appropriate language policies to this end must rely more on hard facts. For example, the majority of real or potential French speakers is in Africa rather than in the eastern European countries, which French foreign policy has erroneously courted in the false expectation, save perhaps Romania, that they will swell the ranks of Francophone countries.

Grant D. McConnell (Chapter 19) focuses on development of a strategy for effectively measuring the expansion, contraction and maintenance of languages, which is needed because of the lack of reliability of current data. It follows that there are significant challenges for measuring the prospects of English, since this is the most widespread of any language in the world. A tentative effort to measure the global spread of English is undertaken.

Maria da Graça Krieger (Chapter 20) calls attention to the rising importance of Portuguese as an international language with particular reference to the growing role of Portuguese in Mercosur. Brazil's rise as a major international actor has been central to propelling the ascendancy of Portuguese within Mercosur and beyond. A mutual commitment of South American Spanish-speaking members of Mercosur as well as Brazil to promote the language of each within the territory of the other has reflected a conciliatory approach to the promotion of bilingualism. However, results have been slow to occur and the spread of English has continued. More positively, Portuguese-speaking countries have now formed a Lusophone grouping somewhat similar to the association of French-speaking countries.

Conclusions

In the volume's concluding chapter, Humphrey Tonkin (Chapter 21) synthesises the broad implications of a globalising world for languages. A globalising world poses a challenge of rising interdependence for all languages, since no linguistic sphere is protected or assured and a more tightly integrated world generally favours the spread of English. Language shift is not new, but the contemporary global scope of linguistic competition is. In such a fiercely competitive context, planning for linguistic diversity is called for. This is especially difficult inasmuch as language policy has historically been nationally oriented while current international relations are global in scope. A global linguistic strategy is needed which balances the ongoing spread of English with maintenance of linguistic diversity.

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Part I

Global communications challenges

2 Towards a new linguistic world order

Jacques Maurais

> *There will be, in the twenty-first century, a major shake-up of the global language hierarchy.* Graddol (1997, p. 39)

The idea of dedicating a book to languages in a globalising world, i.e. to their relationships and their competition on the world's checkerboard, is the result of a series of events, such as the reunification of Germany, the break-up of the eastern European bloc of countries, the end of apartheid in South Africa and phenomena that are part of a long-term trend, such as the creation of new economic trading blocs and globalisation. Ignacio Ramonet (1999, pp. 19–20) paints the following portrait of events marking the end of the twentieth century:

> Events of great import – the unification of Germany: the disappearance of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe; the collapse of the USSR (from inexplicable causes); the United Nations crisis; the abolition of apartheid in South Africa; the end of 'smouldering wars' (El Salvador, Nicaragua, Angola, Afghanistan, Cambodia); radical change in Ethiopia, Guyana, Chile; the end of the Mobutu regime in Congo-Zaire . . . ; the mutual recognition of Israel and the Palestinians; the renaissance of China and the return of Hong Kong to China; the emergence of India, etc. – totally change the geostrategy of the planet. Still other slower paced but world-shaking events, like the continuation of European construction, also exert a decisive influence on the general flux of the political life of the world and, at the same time, cause a series of multiple upheavals.
>
> All these changes are added to profound mutations that over the past ten years have destabilised the norms in the organisation of work and methods of production, because of the massive introduction of computers and new communication technology used in factories and businesses.

Several of these events will or have already begun to have an effect on the interrelationships among the 'big' languages. One has only to think of the collapse of the USSR and the end of apartheid in South Africa.

The collapse of the USSR

The collapse of the USSR has already brought about a reorganisation in the market of central and eastern Europe for foreign languages. French has not experienced a boost compared to that of English or, to a lesser degree, that of German (see Chapter 7 of this volume). Russian has lost its status as a lingua franca. As a foreign language, the latter seems now to be losing ground mainly to English, but also to German. In Estonia there is a certain demand for Swedish.

The former Soviet republics speaking Turkic languages, i.e. Azerbaijan in the Caucasus and Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Kirghizstan in Central Asia, are now more closely aligned to the orbit of Turkey.

> In 1991 and 1992 Turkey launched a wide range of activities designed to bolster its ties with and its influence in these new republics. These included $1.5 billion in long-term low-interest loans, $79 million in direct relief aid, satellite television (replacing a Russian language channel), telephone communications, airline service, thousands of scholarships for students to study in Turkey, and training in Turkey for Central Asian and Azeri bankers, businesspersons, diplomats, and hundreds of military officers. Teachers were sent to the new republics to teach Turkish, and about 2000 joint ventures were started. (Huntington 1996, p. 146)

Birgit N. Schlyter (Chapter 11 of this volume) shows the rapid progress of Turkish in Central Asia, even if it has not yet become a lingua franca of the region. At the same time, the difficulty that these countries are having just to establish a common alphabet reveals the weaknesses of such a pan-Turkish movement: in spite of an official agreement, several countries finally made divergent choices.

The decline of Russian has been attested elsewhere than in the former Eastern bloc: in the USA the number of students enrolled in Russian courses dropped 44.6% between 1990 and 1995 (Brod and Huber 1997, p. 55); the decline is also notable in the United Kingdom (British Council 1997; 1999).

The end of Apartheid in South Africa

Elsewhere, the end of apartheid, which renders South Africa politically 'presentable', should favour the diffusion of English in southern Africa:

> South Africa's peaceful and negotiated transition from apartheid, its industrial strength, its higher level of economic development compared to other African countries, its military capability, its natural resources, and its sophisticated black and white political leadership all mark South Africa as clearly the leader of southern Africa, probably the leader of English Africa, and possibly the leader of all sub-Saharan Africa. (Huntington 1996, p. 136)

The Democratic Congo (former Zaire), angered by the policies of France in Africa, seemed to be heading towards a language policy that would limit the role of French. At the Hanoi Francophone summit (1997), Laurent Kabila even announced that his country wished to leave the organisation, but changed his mind later (Calvet 1999, p. 225). The 14 November 1998 Constitution declares: 'Without detriment to the national languages, the official languages are French and English' (Art. 6.3).

In 1996 Rwanda granted English official status (with French and Kinyarwanda) and there is now an English language newspaper in Kigali. English has also been introduced as a medium of instruction in the schools.

> The example of the university is singular, regarding the new English language policy: the university became bilingual when only about 400 students out of a total of 3,000 wanted to opt for studying in English, while the rest continued in French. On the primary level a transition to bilingualism is being considered. (Jucquois 1999, p. 79)

Algeria has decided to reinforce the use of Arabic on all levels of public life, while English is replacing French as the main foreign language taught.

Suzanne Lafage also believes that English will eventually encroach on French in Africa:

> Various political upsets in Central Africa have resulted in an increase in the presence of English. A number of new leaders are graduates of American Universities, who prefer English and may be willing to make deals with the world's superpower. On reflection, it took only about 50 years for French, as an imported and minority language, thanks to the weight of elites educated in France, to become a dynamic and eventually an indispensable force in African affairs. One can therefore very well ask if the threats to abandon French for English (sometimes clearly indicated in press articles) are really impossible to carry out, in spite of the costs of such an operation. (Lafage 1999, p. 168)

In short, according to Lafage (1999, p. 170) 'the choice of language by the African countries is critical for the future of the French language, as much for demographic reasons as for international relations.'

It will not be the intention of the Nigerian Government announced in 1996 to make French the second official language of the country, that will change much for this language in Africa, because the official wording quickly passed from 'second official language' to 'first foreign language'. The decision to teach French to all public servants in the Department of Immigration with the aim of favouring links with the bordering French-speaking countries, or the introduction of French as a required language at secondary school without increasing financial and strategic means, led to pitiful results. Also, the Constitution of July 1999 is silent on the status of French.[1]

An African commentator made the following statement: 'The French language is receding in Africa because of France's Byzantine manner of doing politics'.[2] (Along the same lines of thought, see Robert Chaudenson's opinion in Chapter 18 of this volume on the foreseeable retreat of French in West Africa, to the benefit of the national languages and English; see also Chumbow and Bobda 2000). One should not, however, forget the failings of the education system, especially in the French-speaking countries of sub-Saharan Africa. Pierre Alexandre (CILF 1999, p. 8) wonders if it is normal 'to ask thousands of

[1] see http://www.ciral.ulaval.ca/alx/amlxmonde/afrique/nigeria.htm

[2] AfriqEducation 35/36, July/August 1997. Quoted in the introductory document on the Round Table 'Les turbulences du français en Afrique', University of Montreal, 19 March 1998.

children to acquire the basic tools of knowledge in a language that is not their own and in conditions that are often ridiculous: classrooms of 50 to 100 pupils, with one manual for 10 to 20 teachers'. He concludes (CILF 1999, p. 7) that schooling in French has become a 'factory of the jobless' and that it no longer guarantees improved conditions, even to those few who successfully arrive at the end of their studies after going through what seems more like an obstacle course. In these conditions what is the future of a language that is no longer a guarantee of upward mobility?

Report on the 'universality' of English

The project of dedicating a book on languages and globalisation had hardly been considered when we learned of a report on the future of English, commissioned by the British Council. David Graddol, perhaps in spite of everything less triumphalist than Rivarol in the eighteenth century for French, mentions that English will not hold a monopoly by the middle of the twenty-first century, but that it will be part of an oligopoly with a few other languages, each having its sphere of influence.

According to this report, the languages most susceptible to increase in terms of number of speakers are: Hausa and Swahili in Africa, the regional (state) languages of India, Tok Pisin in Oceania, Russian, Mandarin and Arabic. The 'engco' model, developed in 1995 by the English Company (UK) Ltd (from where it gets its name), shows that French is no longer the second international language together with English (see Table 2.1). It has been bypassed by German, which is not really an international language (the report gives German the status

Table 2.1 *The major languages according to the 'engco' model (a base value of 100 in 1995 was allocated to English)*

1	English	100
2	German	42
3	French	33
4	Japanese	32
5	Spanish	31
6	Chinese	22
7	Arabic	8
8	Portuguese	5
9	Malay	4
10	Russian	3
11	Hindi/Urdu	0.4
12	Bengali	0.09

Source: Graddol (1997, p. 59)

of the preponderant regional language of Europe). In the upcoming decades French should further decline according to the 'engco' model, and in 2050, its role will be further weakened. Further, according to the report we are already heading towards an oligopoly (see Box 2.1 and 2.2).



Fig. Box 2.1 The present hierarchy of languages according to Graddol (1997)



Box 2.2 The predicted hierarchy of languages in the year 2050 according to Graddol (1997)

Most collaborators of this volume felt the need to react to the British Council report often without commenting on a basic element in its conclusions: no language in the twenty-first century would have the hegemonic position that English had in the twentieth century (Graddol 1997, p. 58).

Geographic vs. virtual space

The relationships between languages can no longer be analysed only through a geographic dimension. The arrival of new types of media: the internet, radio and television satellites oblige us to take virtual space into consideration. On this question the Graddol report (1997, p. 36) notes that, if since the Renaissance we had the habit of studying the relationships between languages from a geographical point of view, chaos theory suggests rather that in a world without borders, languages would be better studied in terms of flux. The new technologies point to research in this direction.

In a detailed analysis that he presented at the conference 'Language in the twenty-first century' (University of Hartford, USA, 1998), David K. Jordan highlighted the repercussions for language of the adoption of technical norms for facilitating the transfer of computerised data. Work presently underway to elaborate a norm called Unicode, which would allow for the codification of 65,000 characters, should be able to include all graphical systems used in the world today. However the Unicode consortium has envisaged the allocation of 29,000 codes for Chinese characters, but the most complete Chinese dictionary has nearly 50,000 characters. Moreover, Chinese ideograms do not constitute a closed set, as new combinations are continuously being created. In reality Chinese alone could eventually occupy as large a space as that already allocated for Unicode.

The Chinese example is interesting for yet another reason: indeed, it permits us to see the political involvements that are linked to decisions that are apparently purely technical. Hence, the special characters used to write Chinese so-called ‘dialects’, which are in reality languages in the full sense of the word (Cantonese, Wu or Shanghai Chinese, Xiang, Hakka, Hokkian, etc.) are not (yet?) taken into account in the Unicode norm; each one of these dialects is spoken by several million people, but at the same time the Unicode consortium is now considering the inclusion of characters for Egyptian hieroglyphics, linear B syllabary (Mycenian Greek), cuneiform or Meroitic writing, etc., which are really useful to only a few dozen specialists in the world (see Jordan 1998). The Chinese example demonstrates that competition between languages in virtual space could, eventually, result in a shrinking geographic space for some languages.

As we have just seen, standardisation of new technologies could then have consequences for the destiny of languages. A few years ago, another example came to light when a few ‘Eurocrats’ tried to reverse three Spanish decrees requiring the tilde on computer keyboards arriving in Spain. The incident took place the same year that Queen Elizabeth II announced her ‘annus horribilis’, which is *año horrible* in Spanish. In the height of the polemic the Spanish commentators did not fail to note that the future generations of Spanish speakers would have a very poor opinion of the royal anatomy if the tilde were to disappear.

It is easy to forget that the new information technologies leave many by the wayside in many countries, notably in most francophone countries. The currently high cost of a computer reduces access to the new technologies. Moreover, in addition to a personal computer, in most of these countries one must buy a control box for the regulation of sudden changes in the electric current and a lightning protector.

> In the Ivory Coast one estimates the number of computers owned by individuals at about 2,000; in Egypt just under 10% of households are so equipped; about 0.5% in Equatorial Guinea; between 2% and 5% in Lebanon; less than 1% in Madagascar; 7.7% in Poland . . . [The users of internet are] a few hundred in the Central Africa Republic, in the Dominican Republic, in Djibouti, in Gabon, in Madagascar and in Niger; a few thousand in Benin, Ivory Coast, Haiti, Morocco, St Lucia and Vietnam; several tens of thousands in Lebanon and Poland. (Haut-Conseil de la Francophonie 1999, p. 211)

The situation is strikingly different in the northern countries: 'By 1997 France had over a million personal users and Canada was at two million users' (Haut-Conseil de la Francophonie 1999, p. 211).

This exclusion, which affects numerous countries unable to procure a computer infrastructure, could also affect cultures according to the analyst Jean-Claude Guédon:

We are presently witnessing a massive transfer of all the world cultures to numerical support systems, to the point where in twenty or thirty years at most, anything that has not been coded as 0 or 1 will be completely marginalised to the point of being forgotten, as are medieval manuscripts, which in our time are the unique domain of a few learned specialists with a rare talent. Moreover, in such a transfer process, choices are constantly being made and the transformation takes place at different rates, which are more or less intense, depending on the resources available and on the know-how of the social organisation that carries out the gestures and required acts. All this takes place globally, as in a series of filters that would select the documents to be translated and that would also place them in a waiting line. It is of the highest degree of importance to reflect on the way of setting up this waiting list and of how this wait can be as short as possible. Such an undertaking cannot be limited to a single country nor to an aggregate of disconnected gestures. (Guédon 1995)

In any case, most languages are already excluded de facto from the world wide web, although technically there is nothing in the foreseeable future that should prevent such exclusion. But for the moment the intervention of the nation-state is required:

The small languages – minority or otherwise – are first and foremost handicapped, because they do not represent sufficiently profitable markets for the software giants. Iceland must do battle with Microsoft, because the American giant is not disposed to make software in their language. The Basque Autonomous Government paid huge amounts to Microsoft in order to have Windows and Office in the Basque language. . . . The danger for minority languages – and for all small languages – is to be excluded from a select circle of languages, for which it is commercially viable to develop systems of voice recognition or of translation by computer. Such systems are usually based on the analysis of vast segments of language – the language corpora – the development of which can be extremely expensive both in time and in money. (Thomas 2000, p. 2)

In 1997 the languages 'which counted' on the internet were all European (and also Indo-European) with the exception of Japanese (and Finnish, which is non Indo-European) (see Table 2.2).

On the other hand 'Palmarès des langues de la Toile' (The Language hit parade of the web)[3] of the Babel team, a joint initiative of Alis Technologies and the Internet Society, give only three non-Indo-European languages among the first fifteen on the web: Japanese is in third place, Finnish in eleventh and Malay in fifteenth. It is a fact that the software used by the Babel team could only

[3] http://babel.alis.com:8080/palmares (10 August 1999; document produced June 1997)

Table 2.2 *Languages present on the internet in 1997 (percentage)*

English	84.0
German	4.5
Japanese	3.1
French	1.8
Spanish	1.2
Swedish	1.1
Italian	1.0
Portuguese	0.6
Dutch	0.6
Norwegian	0.6
Finnish	0.4

Source: Le Devoir 1997, p. B-7

pinpoint seventeen languages, among which was Chinese, but not Arabic nor any Indian language.

To allow the appearance of a long list of tools in other languages than English on the web, it is estimated that a 'critical mass' of two million potential users is required (Séguin 1996). In 1966 Japan had passed this threshold, but neither France nor any other French-speaking country had. Since then, the situation has changed greatly, as the data on the Euro-Marketing[4] site demonstrates. As of 15 December 2001, a score of languages had more than two million 'connected' users (see Table 2.3).

As was foreseen (Lockwood 1999, p. 12), the number of non-English internet users was greater in 2001 than the number of English-speaking users (see Table 2.4); but the rating loss for English is only relative, as many of these non-anglophones can at least read the language.

We can conclude this section by recalling the point made in the Graddol report (1997, p. 30): the close linkage that once existed between computers and English has been broken. But out of a billion documents checked on the Web in 1999 by the firm Inktomi, 86.5% were still written in English compared to 2.4% in French[5]; but according to vilaweb.com (see Table 2.5), the proportion of pages in English was only 68.4% in 2001, but it is hard to know if these two different studies are comparable. Whatever may be the case, the hegemony of English, even if it is diminishing, will continue to be felt for a long time to come.

[4] http://euromktg.com/globstats (= glreach.com) (March 1999 and March 2001).
[5] http://inktomi.com (communiqué of 18 January 2000). The communiqué gives only data on English, French and Dutch.

Table 2.3 *Change in the number of internet users by language (in millions)*

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003 (estimated)
German	13.8	19.9	27.5	38.6	49.0
English	103.6	172.3	215.6	228.0	270.0
Catalan			0.6	1.9	2.2
Danish			2.6	3.2	n/a
Spanish	14.2	19.5	20.4	40.8	53.0
French	7.2	13.2	16.6	22.0	28.0
Finnish	1.4	2.2	2.3	2.1	3.5
Greek			1.5	1.6	3.0
Hungarian			0.8	1.3	3.0
Icelandic			0.1	0.2	n/a
Italian	3.2	10	14.2	20.2	27.0
Dutch	4.2	6	9.6	11.8	13.0
Norwegian	1.5	2.2	2.4	2.5	n/a
Polish	0.95	3.1	3.1	6.7	8.5
Portuguese	1.8	7.7	11.5	14.9	26.0
Romanian			0.6	0.8	1.2
Russian	1	7.7	9.3	11.5	15.0
Slovak			0.7	0.7	1.5
Slovenian			0.5	0.6	1.0
Swedish	3.6	3.6	5	6.2	n/a
Czech			0.4	2.2	3.0
Turkish			2.2	3.9	7.0
Ukrainian				0.8	2.0
Total European languages (without English)	55	100.6	131.2	192.3	259.0
Arabic			2.5	4.1	6.0
Chinese	6.4	18.0	40.7	55.5	125.0
Korean	3.5	11.7	19.8	25.2	35.0
Hebrew			1.0	1.9	2.5
Japanese	14.2	27.3	38.8	52.1	75.0
Malay	0.68	2.2	2.8	4.8	7.0
Thai			1	2.3	3.0
Total Asian languages	25.3	63.1	106.6*	146.2*	254.0

Notes: *After 2001 the Asian languages include Arabic and Hebrew.
Source: Global Reach, available at: http://www.euromktg.com/globstats (figures last revised 31 March 2002)

A redefinition of geographic space: Internationalisation and new economic blocs

Much has been made in the past few years of globalisation. It is time to relativise the problem and put it into perspective. Immanuel Wallerstein (2000) claims

Table 2.4 *English-speaking and non-English-speaking users of the internet (percentage)*

	1999	2000	2001	2002
English	56.3	51.3	47.5	40.2
non-English	43.7	48.7	52.5	59.8

Source: Global Reach, available at: http://www.euromktg.com/globstats (last checked 8 July 2002; figures last revised 31 March 2002)

Table 2.5 *Percentage of web pages by language in 2000 (percentage)*

English	68.4
Japanese	5.9
German	5.8
Chinese	3.9
French	3.0
Spanish	2.4
Russian	1.9
Italian	1.6
Portuguese	1.4
Korean	1.3
Other languages	4.6

Source: http://www.emarketer.com/analysis/edemographics/20010227_edemo.html, according to vilaweb.com (17 January 2002)

that the concept is deceptive and that what is included in this term has existed for five centuries. For his part, Göran Therborn (2000) notes the existence in history of five consecutive waves of globalisation, from the time of the spread of the great religions with a universal vocation.

It is generally understood that globalisation and the creation of large economic blocs increase language demand: in the countries of the European Union (EU) two tendencies have been noted regarding language learning and the knowledge of languages, i.e. the generalisation of the spread of English and the teaching of a restricted number of other languages to a minority of pupils (Truchot 1998, p.110). Multilingualism in Europe is expensive (but this claim should be examined in relative terms, see below): the translation and interpretation market in Europe in 1997 was evaluated at 3.75 billion euros.[6] Present economic forces could favour the appearance of a hegemonic language. On this question Renée Balibar and Dominique Laporte (1974), while studying the spread of

[6] *Language International*, June 1999, p. 18.

French in France in the nineteenth century, pointed out the existing link between the uniformity of linguistic practices and the demands of economic production; in order to increase the flow of goods and services, according to the study, one had to eliminate internal tariffs and the different local systems of weights and measures, as well as dialects, patois and local regional languages. It would appear that the uniformisation of the nineteenth century continues in the EU, albeit by other means. So when the European courts on several occasions passed down decisions regarding language, they concluded that language could be a non-tariff type of barrier, preventing the free circulation of goods (see Woehrling, 1993, p. 113–117). In cases concerning the free circulation of people, the decisions were different. In the Mutsch case (Mutsch was a German national who settled in the German-speaking part of Belgium), the European Community's court decided that one should grant migrant workers who speak a language recognised by their new host country the same linguistic rights as citizens belonging to that country have; in the Groener case (Groener was a Dutch teacher of art working in Dublin and with no knowledge of Irish), the court accepted the requirement to know Irish, which was imposed on teachers by the Irish Government, because it is 'part of a policy of promotion of the national language, which is also the first official language' (quoted by Woehrling 1993, p. 121; see also Solé i Durany 1990). Overall, if one puts aside these two cases, European jurisprudence judges linguistic diversity as an obstacle to economic integration.

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has not yet created any jurisprudence concerning language matters. Even if the increasing continental integration favours the spread of English, several factors, such as national language policies, tend to slow down this trend (see Morris's analysis in Chapter 10 of this volume, who reminds us of the limits imposed on English by the cultural and linguistic policy of Puerto Rico, albeit an American dependency). Is the increase in the popularity of teaching Spanish in the USA a result of NAFTA? Even if one does not perhaps witness the same popularity in Canada, in any case the most likely explanation for its popularity is that, in large measure, it is the result of pupils and students who consider it a 'heritage' or 'ancestral' language. Whatever the case may be, Spanish reaps the lion's share of the pupils in foreign language teaching in the USA and the big losers, according to the latest statistics compiled by the Modern Language Association, are French, German and Russian (see Table 2.6; the same tendency is noted by the British Council 1999 and by Barnwell 1999–2000; see also the comments by Compagnon 1999). The Graddol report (1997, p. 58) even foresees that the Americas turn into an English – Spanish bilingual zone, as a result of the extension of NAFTA.

There is a decline in foreign language teaching in the USA (as Spanish should be more and more considered as a second rather than a foreign language[7]). This decline is in part due to the break-up of the Eastern bloc: for the average

[7] This is also Barnwell's opinion (1999–2000, p. 25).

Table 2.6 *Number of pupils enrolled in foreign language courses in the USA, 1990 and 1995*

Language	1990	1995	Percentage variation
Arabic	3,475	4,444	27.9
Chinese	19,490	26,471	35.8
French	272,472	205,351	–24.6
German	133,348	96,263	–27.8
Ancient Greek	16,401	16,272	–0.8
Hebrew	12,995	13,127	1.0
Italian	49,699	43,760	–11.9
Japanese	45,717	44,723	–2.2
Latin	28,178	25,897	–8.1
Portuguese	6,211	6,531	5.2
Russian	44,626	24,729	–44.6
Spanish	533,944	606,286	13.5
Other languages	17,544	24,918	42
Total	1,184,100	1,138,772	–3.8

Source: Brod and Huber 1997, p. 1

American, it is considered that there is no longer any reason to teach their children any foreign languages even for strategic reasons, probably because no single language stands out, neither French, nor German, nor Japanese and still less Russian. Apart from the special position of Spanish, the most frequently taught languages are still French and German. The teaching of Russian is tending to disappear. Among pupils who learn languages considered to be 'exotic', such as Russian, the drop-out rate is of the order of 50% after a first semester. Foreign language teaching generally begins at fourteen years, which is sometimes considered too late for pupils to attain a level of working-language fluency. Americans seem to consider it as an accomplished fact that English will be the universal language of communication (see the comments of Wallraff 2000). In spite of this, in a document entitled *Goals 2000: Educate America Act* (http://www.ed.gov/legislation/GOALS2000/TheAct/), the American Government as early as 1994 fixed as an objective an improvement in the teaching of foreign languages on all levels, and proposed that secondary schools should no longer graduate pupils without knowledge of a foreign language. Forty states passed laws to force public schools to offer at least a two-year course in foreign languages; 26% of colleges and universities made the knowledge of a second language a condition for entry and 35% a condition for graduating. But in spite of the above, more than half of all secondary pupils no longer study any foreign language (Barnwell 1999–2000, pp. 17–20). Globalisation, accompanied by the spread of English, already positions and will continue to position countries having English as a majority language in an ever more special position:

> The seemingly irresistible rise of global English forces other languages on the defensive, as they strive to maintain their space in a rapidly changing world. All countries are affected, but particularly those where English is the majority first language. To what extent will serious and large-scale social motivation for learning other languages be able to survive among first-language English speakers over the next fifty years? (Johnstone 2000, p. 159)

To this can be added that in some English-speaking countries, those responsible are sensitive to the increasing drop in motivation for foreign language learning; the Nuffield report (2000; http://www.ucml.org-uk/members/c4.htm) in the UK, having evaluated the language requirements of the country for the next twenty years, proposed a series of recommendations to counter the decline in foreign language learning.

The studies of Angéline Martel (1995a; 1995b; 1997) show that in Quebec, there is a link between the globalisation of exchanges and the teaching of second and foreign languages. If the increase in the number of students is related to commercial transactions with the main trading partners of Quebec, the increase would appear to be even more linked to the tourist industry. For Martel, other factors enter into the equation, the first being the maintenance of 'heritage' languages, i.e. enrolment in foreign language classes being linked to mother-tongue origins. Moreover, the Quebec government's decision to begin the teaching of Spanish at secondary level has been presented as part of the future plan for the integration of the Americas.

The ongoing discussions regarding the economic integration of the Americas enjoin us to reflect on the possible role of languages and in particular that of French in this new environment. In North America French speakers represent 3% of the total population, Spanish speakers between 25% and 30% and English speakers over 60% (Bouchard 1999); in the whole of the Americas French speakers represent less than 1% (there are more speakers of Quechua than French speakers). Also, Spanish and Portuguese are to a good degree mutually intelligible, at least in writing. Rather than invest time and money in learning another Ibero-Romance language, it could be that Latin Americans decide to concentrate on English.[8] One should also realise that the language

[8] In the Mercosur countries, teaching Spanish in Brazil and Portuguese in the other countries had a slow beginning, even though it is true that the private schools at least in part made up for the deficiencies of the public ones (see Hamel, Chapter 9 of this volume). Brazil foresees the teaching of Spanish everywhere, but the difficulties will be enormous, beginning with the recruitment of a sufficient number of teachers (see the paper by Enilde Faulstich at the colloqium, La diversité culturelle et les politiques linguistiques dans le monde, Laval University, March 2001; http://www.etatsgeneraux.gouv.qc.ca/pdf_journees/Faulstich_2.pdf); moreover, few Argentine pupils seem interested in learning Portuguese (http://www.unidadenladiversidad.com/actualidad/actualidad_ant/2000/junio00/actualid ad280600_02.htm).

teaching situation in Latin America is not as good as in the USA, where conditions are also less than perfect. Furthermore, these countries do not have the necessary human and financial resources to invest massively in the teaching of foreign languages: moreover, the teaching of French has undergone a notable decline throughout Latin America. Given the above conditions, one can certainly question the chances of success of the European model of multilingualism. One could postulate that from this model, only the adoption of the systematic translation of official texts in the main official languages[9] of the region is possible, because NAFTA documents have already been produced in three languages (the Federal Government of Canada is responsible for the French version). By placing the discussion from the point of view of the market area of the Americas, it is difficult to see what arguments could convince Americans and Latin Americans (especially the Spanish speakers) to teach two foreign languages systematically: in particular French, which has little possibility of imposing itself as a first foreign language, except perhaps in English Canada. Elsewhere, it is not evident why French should become a second foreign language; if such is the case, it would only be for a small elite, as is the case today. One issue however appears certain: French speakers – and to a lesser degree perhaps Portuguese speakers due to their numbers – should be vigilant in order to assure the presence of their languages in future institutions. Just before the Summit of the Americas (Quebec City, April 2000), newspapers announced that the documents used in the negotiations of the America Free Trade Zone (AFTZ) were in only English and Spanish, which closely supports the Graddol thesis (1997), suggesting that the Americas may become a vast bilingual zone for English and Spanish.

The linguistic future of the planet: A lowering of diversity? Or, on the contrary, a fragmentation of the big languages?

Contributors to this volume were requested not to make long-term predictions, as this can be hazardous, as shown by Guy Jucquois (1999, n.1):

> . . . would the Latin forecaster, living on one of the seven hills more than two and a half thousand years ago, have had the luck of being able to imagine the success of what would have been in today's terms only a regional language? Or a few centuries later, how to make the Near East student understand the indispensable nature of Aramaic, the great international language of the times, and then what to answer if he had retorted disdainfully that this language would no longer be spoken two thousand years later, except in a few villages of northern Syria?

One could further give the example of English, the 'imperial language' of the day, which would not have been a good bet in 1066 after the battle of Hastings.

9 For example, would one translate into Guarani, an official language of Paraguay?

In 1952 Marcel Trudel and Fernand Grenier predicted: ‘In a half century New Brunswick should be a province with a French majority. The percentage of French today is 38.3%’ (Société du parler français au Canada 1955, p. 57). In 1996, however, the percentage of people in the total population speaking French at home totalled only 30.3. On the other hand, William F. Mackey recalls (Chapter 6 of this volume) that in a conference in 1940 it was predicted that French in America would not live to see the end of the twentieth century. It is perhaps timely to note here that demographers make the distinction between a forecast – which is part of their science – and a prediction – which is the art that the emulators of Nostradamus practise.

But even the greatest experts can be mistaken, when it comes to forecasting. Recall simply the scientifically founded opinions of Meillet on the Slavic languages in his book *Les langues dans l’Europe nouvelle*, written in the last days of the First World War:

> . . . there is a Czecho-Slovak linguistic group; and Czech can easily be considered the language of civilisation of the Slovaks. There is only one obstacle: the Hungarian administration . . . The Slovenian dialects are hardly distinguishable from their neighbouring Serbo-Croatian languages, so that written Serbo-Croatian could also be used by the Slovenian speakers; there is presently a tendency in this direction; the Slovene literary language is an artificial creation of the Austrian administration meant to divide the Slavic peoples . . . In all, there exist five literary Slavic languages, which cannot be confounded: Russian, Polish, Czech, Serbo-Croatian and Bulgarian. (Meillet 1918, pp. 45–49)

At the end of the twentieth century parochialism has produced a linguistic map of the Slavic populations that is quite a bit different from the one that Meillet proposed.

Still, in spite of the dangers involved, some authors did not hesitate recently to make long-term predictions, which we reiterate briefly here. If Graddol limits himself to 2050, Huntington is more daring.

Let us first take a look at English. Will it be able to keep its place, when the West no longer controls the world, which is something that Ramonet (1999, p. 28) suggests is already in the cards? The Graddol report rather foresees that no language will occupy the central place that English did at the end of the twentieth century, and the triumphalism of David Crystal (1997) has with justification been criticised by Robert Phillipson (1999) (see also Wallraff 2000).

As Huntington has remarked (1997a, p. 87) the rise in power of the West has been a slow process, which spanned a period of four centuries and its decline could be just as long. Western languages, such as English, still have a bright future ahead in spite of his statement:

> As the power of the West gradually declines relative to that of other civilizations, the use of English and other Western languages in other societies and for communications

between societies will also slowly erode. If at some point in the distant future China displaces the West as the dominant civilization in the world, English will give way to Mandarin as the world's lingua franca. (Huntington 1996, p. 63)

The expansion and retraction of languages is a social phenomenon, which reflects a position of power. The disappearance of a language always has non-linguistic causes, which are the result of a balance of forces. As a result of a constant media bombardment, the man in the street is well aware of the threat that hangs not only over the environment, but also over all the animal and plant species of the planet. But most people have never heard about the threat to a large portion of the languages presently spoken on earth: indeed, it has been estimated that 90% of all languages will disappear or will be near extinction in the twenty-first century (Krauss 1992, p. 7; see also Hagège 2000). Roland Breton (Chapter 13 of this volume) speaks of a strong reduction in the number of languages spoken in Africa.

According to Mehrotra (1999, p. 105) in India there are presently 442 languages[10] that have only between one and five speakers left. The report published by the International Congress of Linguists held at Laval University (Robins and Uhlenbeck 1991) continued in the same vein. What makes the situation even more urgent is that most languages have not even been the object of a detailed description on the part of the linguistic community:

No more than 5% of the entire possible number of languages (i.e. some 350) are more or less fully described, with more or less comprehensive reference grammars, bothway dictionaries, handbooks, etc. No more than 20% of them have any description, be it partial, outdated, amateurish, and not many more have been recorded in any way. Still, most are known only by their linguonyms, and their true existence is barely admitted. (Majewicz 1999–2000, p. 48)

There are, however, a few opposing opinions that are clearly in the minority. David Dalby is in disagreement with the Graddol analysis, which holds that an important number of languages will disappear in the course of the twenty-first century; according to Dalby the present linguistic diversity is greater than linguists imagine (there may well be 10,000 languages instead of 6,000) and the rate of disappearance is less than has been estimated (British Council 1999, p. 10). Still others believe that big languages like English and French will become the victim of a Babelisation process. Gillian Brown (1999, p. 30) – director of the Research Centre for English and Applied Linguistics in Cambridge – believes that English will take on more and more local colour and Samuel P. Huntington (1997a, p. 63) deplores the fact that already there

[10] It is rather a question of dialectal varieties (mother tongue in the official terminology) than of languages in the full sense of the word, because the Indian census, which establishes a distinction between mother tongues and languages, only identifies less than 200 full-blown languages for the whole country (Grant McConnell, personal communication).

is non-comprehension between different forms of English. Suzanne Lafage is also concerned about the possibility of a break-up of French:[11]

> In order to maintain inter-comprehension and cohesion throughout French-speaking countries, a variety of French that is both current and well adapted to daily communication in both writing and speaking, needs to be spread through high quality teaching, in order to counter the strong current tendencies of differentiation and break-up. The more French becomes a spoken language in Africa, the more its variation increases in all linguistic domains: pronunciation, prosody, morphology, syntax, lexicon and semantics. (Lafage 1999, p. 168)

From this perspective teaching must become part of a strategy of language spread, as mother tongue, as second language and as foreign language. One must admit that such strategies of language spread – which we have called the geostrategy of language – involve only a few languages. What is more, the extension of this phenomenon to the international plane dates from only the end of the nineteenth century, i.e. the moment when the first language promotion institutions appeared (The Alliance Française since 1883, The Alliance Israélite Universelle since 1860). German has the Goethe Institute, Japan the Japan Foundation, English the British Council (whose 2001–02 budget was £440.8 million; see also Phillipson 1994, p. 16) and there was for a time the US Information Service. According to Robert Phillipson (1994, p. 9) never in the history of the world, except during the period 1950–70, has so much been spent on the spread of a language, that is on English.

In opposition or parallel to the question of the disappearance of languages, there is another theme dear to Meillet that seems to have been all but forgotten today, that of the uniformisation of languages:

> To the degree that civilisation becomes more unified, languages are forced to express by different but parallel material ways, things that are in reality the same; concepts do not vary as do the words by which they are expressed, and as different as they are by the means they use, all the languages of Europe tend to be, by what they express, a faithful copy of each other. (Meillet 1918, p. 11)

To take an example, in spite of the order of the morphemes the Hungarian *nemzet-köz-i* is a loan translation of the Latin *inter-nation-alis* (French, English *inter-nation-al*, Spanish *inter-nacion-al*, etc.) as is the Russian *mezhdu-narod-nyi*; and the *souris* of French, the *ratón* of Spanish, the *topolino* of Italian and the *ratolí* of Catalan translate literally the English computer mouse (in this last example a semantic borrowing). Stefan Kaiser (Chapter 12 of this volume) demonstrates that the same procedure is ever at work in the languages of the Far East, but the copies are based on Chinese.

[11] The analysis of Chumbow and Bobda (2000, p. 57) is similar.

Language problems at the dawn of the twenty-first century

Can language problems and communication problems across the globe be resolved by the promotion of one or a few languages of wider communication or by technological innovation? Mark Fettes addresses this issue in Chapter 3 of this volume. For a more detailed review of these problems, one should refer to the forthcoming proceedings of the colloquia on languages in the twenty-first century organised by the University of Hartford and Yale University in 1998 and 1999 (Tonkin and Reagan, forthcoming). In the following, we raise just some of these issues.

For Claude Piron (1994, p. 23), 'the idea that language problems can be easily resolved, either by the spread of English, by electronic media, or by teaching, has nothing to do with reality. It is a myth.' Let us comment on the three points raised by Piron. We do not overly emphasise the solution that he promotes, that of Esperanto, which seems hardly realistic at the moment, in spite of the rational arguments which he develops. Moreover, for that school of thought, the situation can easily be summed up: 'neither utopic universal multilingualism, nor hegemonic world monolingualism, can satisfy our communication needs and cultural identities. The real answer is in an auxiliary international language' (Flochon 2000, p. 111). We can add to the Esperantist thesis, an argument of Majewicz (1999–2000): the cost of solving the communication problem is also a moral issue (for example, the enormity of the translation and interpretation costs for the EU, where all speeches in the monthly sittings of the Parliament have to be translated into all official languages; concerning these costs, see Chapter 8 of this volume and Kibbee's opinion in Chapter 4) when millions in the world live in squalor and die of hunger. But one should add to this argument the following necessary nuances: not all discussions in the regular meetings of the EU's institutions, nor all documents are regularly translated into all languages, as each institution has adopted a more supple policy, so that often only two or three languages are used; moreover, it is estimated that the costs of multilingualism represent only 0.2% of the EU's total budget (Yves Gambier, personal communication) or just over 2% according to other sources (see Chapter 8 of this volume, in which Claude Truchot states that this latter figure is not very likely). As Yves Gambier noted in a discussion session at the Laval University Conference of 24–25 March 2001, Cultural Diversity and Language Policies in the World, all expenses linked to multilingualism in the many institutions are equivalent to the cost of two cups of coffee per European, per year, and the annual costs of translation services of the European Commission are equivalent to a day's costs in the 1991 Gulf War.

- First solution: The spread of English: 'English is the least adapted of any to the demands of the international community' notes Claude Piron (1994, p. 90), for a number of reasons: 'idiosyncrasies, vague grammar, fragile phonetics, unwieldy vocabulary'. He adds that the choice of the second or foreign language to be taught is not made on a rational basis. If it was not for its writing or its phonetics, Chinese should be chosen because of its simple grammar. Piron suggests that Indonesian/Malay would be a better rational choice than English. At one point one would have thought that Esperanto could serve as the common international language, which would have helped to maintain and develop national languages and cultures. In the 1920s the Secretary General of the League of Nations considered the possibility of adopting Esperanto as a working language; the country that manoeuvred most against the project is the one that today has become the champion of worldwide cultural diversity (see Piron 1994, p. 162; Tonkin 2001, p. 273).

- Second solution: Recourse to technology: It is hardly realistic to believe that technology will help solve the linguistic problems of the world, either in the short or medium term, or even in the long term (see Fettes, Chapter 3 of this volume; see also Schneider 2000). As a participant at the Hartford Conference *Language in the twenty-first century* (1998) noted, only fans of Star Wars or Star Trek believe in such a solution . . . Our personal computers will not be replaced by R2D2 (Star Wars droid) clones tomorrow. Automatic translation still continues to confront numerous difficulties, the least of which is not semantics. Even with the best of scenarios, a person is required to intervene and correct the translation produced by the machine: someone in the translation service of the European Commission had noted that: 'after a euphoric period, it is now admitted by the computer ayatollahs that a professional translator is required to correct the machine translated text before sending it out.' (Heynold 2000, p. 103). Present efforts are now concentrated on 'controlled languages' to simplify to the greatest degree the text to be translated. In Canada, the automatic translation of weather bulletins, which is considered a success story, is 93% reliable, and this is in spite of the fact that the subject is quite specialised and the vocabulary repetitive (on these questions compare Allen 2000 and Schneider 2000). As Claude Piron points out (1994, p. 127), 'generally a translator gives 90% of his [or her] time to resolving problems that are found in 10% to 15% of the text'; and he adds: 'all the research dedicated to automatic translation is 85% to 90% on work that does not constitute a problem for professionals'.
- Third solution: Teaching: Much is made of teaching, which is purported to solve the language problems of the world. In recent years several voices have been raised, proposing in Europe as in America the obligatory teaching of two foreign languages, at least at the secondary level (note that India has set up a comparable language policy, the 'three language formula'). Others have also proposed beginning the teaching of a second or foreign language at an early age. The proposal is confronted with major difficulties: a lack of teachers, insufficiently trained teachers, insufficient budgets, lack of manuals

and methods well adapted to the teaching situation, etc. As much has been done in Europe to promote this position, it may be instructive to examine the situation of the most powerful economic country in the region, Germany.

> Less than 5% of the pupils in the general teaching programme study French as the first foreign language, compared to 94% for English. Some 95% in the general teaching programme learn English as first, second or third foreign language compared to French at 25% . . . Of the 12 million German pupils, some 40,000 study Spanish, 1,200 Italian, 211,000 Russian, 1,000 Turkish, 6,400 another foreign language. (Olbert 1996, p. 94)

And Jürgend Olbert adds: 'That is how this generation is prepared for Europe!'

Note, however, the diffusion of English in the higher levels of education, not only in Europe but in the world (see Bollag 2000). To have a clearer picture of the use of English as a language of teaching in European universities, we will have to await the results of a study by Ammon and McConnell (2002).

We have already alluded to the problems raised by the teaching in and of French in Africa. The Graddol report also notes that there is penury of qualified personnel for the generalised teaching of English at an early age.

At the moment of the integration of the Americas through NAFTA, the teaching of foreign languages leaves a lot to be desired. For all scholastic levels two billion dollars were spent in the USA on the teaching of foreign languages in the 1990s; this is forty times less than Switzerland, adjusted accordingly.[12] One can add also that the teaching of foreign languages is less well done in Latin America; these countries do not have the required human and financial resources to invest heavily in the teaching of foreign languages. And note that in many countries, in spite of programmes that go on for ten years, the teaching system badly fails to produce a sufficient number of graduates that can read and speak fluently the foreign language taught.

To this picture one should not forget to add an essential element: illiteracy. Illiteracy continues to increase in the world, even in the developed countries; in 1990 it was found that about one third of the world's population was illiterate. In his report on illiteracy to the President of the French Republic, Alain Bentolila (1997) concludes that one in three pupils in France, having spent 10–12 years in school, leaves illiterate. In Quebec, 24% of all adults have difficulty in reading a text that is the least bit difficult, and the cost of importing illiteracy into business is estimated at 1.2 billion dollars.[13] The hopes of UNESCO in the 1950s to obliterate illiteracy were not realised.[14] When teaching of the mother

[12] Evaluation provided by François Grin, University of Geneva, during the conference 'Language in the twenty-first century' (University of Hartford, 1998).

[13] See the references given in Maurais (1999, p. 250–251).

[14] Lecture by Andrée Tabouret-Keller, Professor of the University of Strasbourg, at the Office de la langue française, 14 May 1998.

tongue reveals so many deficiencies, how can one contemplate investing heavily in the teaching of a foreign language, let alone a second foreign language?

The Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe declares that the participating states express their intention:

> To encourage the study of foreign languages and civilizations as an important means of expanding communication among peoples for their better acquaintance with the culture of each country, as well as for the strengthening of international co-operation; to this end to stimulate, within their competence, the further development and improvement of foreign language teaching and the diversification of choice of languages taught at various levels, paying due attention to less widely-spread or studied languages. (CSCE Final Act, Helsinki, 1 August 1975; available at: http:// www.hri.org/docs/Helsinki75.html#H3.45)

Nothing indicates that progress has been made in this direction, and still less for languages that are less widespread and studied. In this area there seem to be more words and political wishful-thinking than real results.

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3 The geostrategies of interlingualism

Mark Fettes

Since the end of the fifteenth century, when the printing press delivered the means of linguistic standardisation into the hands of centrist rulers (Illich 1981; 1983), the field of language policy and planning has been dominated by what I call the politicostrategies of languages. Developing in tandem with theories of the nation and the state (Anderson 1983), linguistic politicostrategies have generally aimed to entrench the use of a single language in public administration and education, either across an entire state territory or within well-defined internal borders. As the processes of modernity have expanded through the twentieth century, ushering in a period of turbulent global change, the politicostrategists of language have continued both to defend the old national linguistic monopolies and to seek to establish new ones through corpus, status and acquisition planning (Cooper 1989).

In reality, however, such 'politostratégies des langues' are no longer adequate instruments of national or community policy. As late as the early decades of the twentieth century, it was possible for new national languages to play catch-up with the flagbearers – English, French and German – as measured in terms of their integration within a modern industrial economy and all of the standardised textual communication practices that accompany it (Smith 1990). Since then, however, a number of changes have taken place. National economies have become far more integrated in the global economy; money and workers have become much more mobile; the pace of technological change has accelerated to an unbelievable extent; and the explosive growth of communication and information networks is on the verge of 'annihilating space', as one current catch phrase has it. Increasingly, every language community must become aware of its position in a 'dynamic world system of languages' characterised by vast and expanding differences in status and use (de Swaan 1988a; 1988b).

The future evolution of this system depends, in part, on the means used to transmit information and ideas across language borders: these include mediation by human or electronic translators, widespread plurilingualism, and the spread of lingua francas – either languages with a powerful political and economic base, such as English, or 'planned' international languages, such as Esperanto. In an earlier publication, Jonathan Pool and I suggested (Pool and Fettes 1998) that all of these means might contribute to bringing about a world characterised by high levels of linguistic diversity, integration, equity, efficiency and sustainability: in our terms, an interlingual world. Unfortunately, research and thinking in this area to date has been largely concentrated among the advocates, developers and practitioners of each particular approach: 'world English' people have little time for 'Esperantists', advocates of 'plurilingualism' are out of touch with the 'technologists', and professional 'language brokers' have little incentive to venture outside the boundaries of their field.

Yet as 'politostratégies' give way to 'géostratégies des langues' – that is, as the defence of local interests becomes inextricably tied to the definition and protection of a particular niche in the global linguistic ecosystem – linguistic policy makers need to understand the potential impact of these various interlingual ideas and technologies, singly and in combination, on the system as a whole and on particular communities within it. The politicostrategic era led to an acutely hierarchical distribution of linguistic skills and language resources, both within and between states. National elites, for instance, typically have a very different linguistic profile from rural or working-class populations; such national profiles in turn differ markedly between the industrialised (OECD) countries and the struggling former colonies of the South; and among the languages themselves, the spectrum runs from the system of interlinked varieties known as standard English, which now occupies an unprecedented and unrivalled range of niches in the global linguistic system, to the many oral indigenous languages presently undergoing a precipitous decline. The rampant inequity and dubious sustainability of this system reflects, I believe, the 'legislative impulse' of modernity, leading politicostrategists to confuse integration with assimilation, and efficiency with mechanisation (Bauman 1987; 1992). Interlingualism offers an alternative vision.

Plurilingualism and world English

Pool and I described the first interlingual idea in this way:

> Plurilingualism: A world in which knowing many languages is as normal as knowing many people might be an interlingual world. If breakthroughs in the methodology of language teaching could be verified and propagated, and if multilingual competence became widely valued, people who needed to communicate across language barriers would normally have or could easily develop the ability to do so. (Pool and Fettes 1998, p. 2)

A variant of this idea, which might be termed 'elite plurilingualism', has long been current among the industrialised countries, particularly the smaller ones. Even where foreign language teaching has been widespread or even compulsory in the national curriculum, there has been a tacit acceptance of the idea that only a small minority need achieve functional plurilingualism; and even where the national population includes numerous native speakers of other languages, there has been a tacit refusal to consider them as a linguistic resource, because who is plurilingual – and in what settings – matters more than the fact of linguistic competence. Only in exceptional cases, such as Luxembourg, has individual plurilingualism become a marker of national identity, and here three languages (Letsburgish, French and German) parcel out the domains of language use between them. Widespread plurilingual competence in functionally equivalent languages – what might be termed 'civic plurilingualism' – is presently no more than an idea.

Ideas, however, have power. So far the European Union (EU) has merely formulated a universal goal of individual competence in three languages, without doing a great deal to make it a reality (Labrie 1993). If, however, this became a widely accepted ideal, it could lead to far-reaching changes in national education systems, along the lines of the European School model or other experiments in multilingual and multicultural education (Skutnabb-Kangas 1995). In order to forestall a stampede towards the larger languages, students might be required to choose both a large and a small language in addition to their own. Some versions of this system could include European regional and minority languages, others could include immigrant or foreign languages. Great though the range of educational possibilities is, however, the range of political possibilities appears much more restricted, thanks to the legacies of the politicostrategic era and the spread of a rival interlingual idea: world English. Pool and I summed up this concept as follows:

> World English: The most widespread second language of the present day, English, might make the world interlingual by becoming so well integrated in educational and social systems worldwide that it was accessible to all at minimal cost. One variant of World English is unilingualism; however, if the world's majority were motivated to keep cultivating their autochthonous languages, and if any related economic or social costs could be compensated, English might become the world's 'second native language', transcending but coexisting with a multiplicity of other languages. (Pool and Fettes 1998, p. 2)

The ideas of world English and plurilingualism both originated in the politicostrategic era, but the former, influenced by the intellectual and vernacular traditions of the USA, retains a popular allure that the latter never acquired. Where plurilingualism is associated with national cultures and a 'high' style of communication, world English is associated with the international forces of the market and a popular, 'democratic' style (compare Dasgupta 1987). Furthermore, however complex the linguistic and social realities underlying it, world English is a simple idea. In an era when the visual evidence of globalisation is no further away than a soft drink stand or a television set, English is a perfectly matched 'name brand' among languages. And its proponents have many facts on their side: English is increasingly required for high-skill jobs anywhere in the world; it is the most widely studied foreign language; it dominates satellite TV programming; and so on (Crystal 1997; Graddol 1997).

These two interlingual ideas come into direct competition in national education systems. Both imply radical reforms to well-entrenched bureaucracies and pedagogical cultures, reforms that require long-term political commitment in order to succeed. Although plurilingualism may superficially appear more complicated and therefore harder to implement, the uniformity of world English may in fact pose greater problems, for instance in the training of vast numbers of teachers in a language distant from both indigenous and regional languages. (It is notable that the European countries that approximate the world English model – the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands – are also the closest to the Anglo-Saxon world, both linguistically and culturally.) Politically, trends towards decentralisation within states and regionalisation among states will also favour plurilingualism, in which case English may retain a special status as the default language for use whenever national or regional languages do not suffice. This function may be extremely important in certain kinds of transnational enterprise, but only marginally relevant to the economic and cultural activities of the vast majority of people.

On the basis of such considerations, I conclude that the niche that English occupies in the global economy, in popular culture and in most national education systems is unlikely to expand to the extent required by world English. Nonetheless, the latter idea will continue to exert considerable influence on national and regional geostrategies, so that even where plurilingualism has been formulated as an ideal, the reality may be quite different. In Europe, the most likely result in the medium term appears to be a combination of 'elite plurilingualism' with what might be termed 'consumer English': active competence in several languages for the upwardly mobile, and limited, primarily passive competence in English for the rest. This trend may well be replicated elsewhere in the world as national and regional languages move into the economic, technological and cultural niches pioneered by English (Graddol 1997). Unfortunately, such a compromise, which fits relatively well with existing educational systems and practices, would fall far short of the standards for diversity, integration and equity envisioned in the two interlingual models.

Language brokers and technologism

While plurilingualism and world English are based on personal competence in two or more languages, monolinguals are also able to communicate across language barriers as long as the necessary tools or services are at their disposal. For a century or more, linguistic politicostrategies have fostered the growth of 'language industries' serving their monolingual populations, and with them an interlingual idea that Pool and I described as follows:

Language Brokers: Professional translators and interpreters might achieve an interlingual world by enabling people without a common language to communicate with success, despite greatly dissimilar experiences and beliefs. If appropriate conditions for such work became normative, and if translators and interpreters were efficient and numerous enough, they might make it possible for most people to cultivate their own languages and communicate interlingually without the burdens and risks of widespread language learning. (Pool and Fettes 1998, p. 2)

The political dimensions of language brokering are most evident in multinational institutions such as the League of Nations, the United Nations and the European Union, where the equitable use of the working languages is a perennial bone of contention (Lapenna 1969a; 1969b; Tonkin 1996). In fact, all three of these organisations have historically relied on elite plurilingualism to supplement the efforts of the language services: if all of the representatives and technical experts insisted on using only their 'official' language, the system might well grind to a halt. As it is, only English speakers generally take for granted their right to use their language in all circumstances (compare Pearl 1996). This *de facto* inequality underlying a theoretically equitable system is mirrored in the translation industries, which help to maintain equal status among the larger and more prosperous language communities while widening the gap between them and a vast number of minority, indigenous and oral languages.

In order for the language brokers to promote the high levels of diversity, integration and equity required by interlingualism, their services must become far more efficient and affordable. This is the promise held out by a related interlingual idea:

Technologism: Invention might resolve the apparent incompatibilities of interlingualism. If the intricacies of grammar, meaning, and communicative strategy could be understood and codified, language barriers might disappear altogether in the presence of fully automatic translation between the world's tongues, or be superseded by novel, automated, non- or pan-lingual means of communication. (Pool and Fettes 1998, p. 2)

Before the advent of high-speed desktop computers and internet connections, machine translation and multilingual software existed primarily as specialised and expensive services for large corporations and governments. Today crude translations between the major languages are available online, multilingual capabilities are built into major software products such as Microsoft's Office 2000, and the internet is progressing towards compatibility with every written language in the world. At the same time, insiders' assessments of the potential of multilingual technology have become considerably more sober (e.g. Zaenen 1996). 'Fully automatic translation' is now considered to require human-like artificial intelligence, an extremely remote goal (Melby and Warner 1995).

Much work is now focused on the development of 'controlled languages' for specific purposes, while the quest for instantaneous translation of informal, spontaneous speech has been abandoned, for the moment, to science fiction.

It is the combination of human and machine translation that increasingly offers an approximation, at least in certain circumstances, to the interlingual ideal. Following Minako O'Hagan (1996), I refer to this as the 'teletranslation' idea. Her thesis is that the explosive growth of telecommunications is creating both an unprecedented demand for language services and new means of delivering those services. The interlinking of translators around the globe with subject-matter experts, intelligent multilingual databases, machine translation systems and telecommunication service providers will soon make 'language brokers' accessible at any time, from any point on the planet, at rates that are readily affordable for small businesses and perhaps even for individuals. Teletranslation will not wipe out language barriers, but it will greatly lower them, at least for the languages that are equipped to participate in this technical revolution. It is already possible to envisage a time, for instance, when the disadvantages of publishing an article or a database in the national languages of the smaller industrialised countries will have largely vanished, because abstracts and references will circulate freely in the languages of the industrialised world and good quality, affordable translations will be obtainable on demand.

The great question is how far down the language hierarchy this revolution will extend. Teletranslation is market-driven and relies in part on language-specific investment: will it benefit hundreds or thousands of languages, or only a few dozen? The answer to this, as in the case of plurilingualism, depends on political will and economic circumstance. If teletranslation came to be regarded as a basic service – an extension of the 'right to communicate' (MacBride *et al.* 1980) – then national governments and international institutions might guarantee a certain level of infrastructure and service provision for a wide range of languages, even though more and higher quality services would be available in the larger languages. On the other hand, teletranslation might remain a business-oriented industry, of relevance only for those few languages that have already occupied key niches in the industrial economies. The challenges and costs involved in developing sophisticated language tools and training skilled language brokers in minority, indigenous and oral languages should not be underestimated, nor the difficulty of integrating such services in language communities that have traditionally met their interlingual needs through other means.

Even in the least radical scenario, however, teletranslation seems likely to weaken the appeal of elite plurilingualism as an interlingual idea: the investment of time and energy to acquire limited proficiency in several standard languages will increasingly be seen as costing more and delivering less than high-quality professional services. Plausibly, this development could strengthen world English, as the seekers of active bilingual competence converge on the most widespread second language; yet translation into and out of English also constitutes the most tempting market for language technology, meaning that the marginal benefits of learning English are likely to fall faster than those for learning other languages. This may be particularly significant for the speakers of Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Thai and other major Asian languages, for whom the active mastery of English is especially costly. As teletranslation spreads throughout the Asian region, it may gradually erode the use of English and thereby the credibility of world English as an interlingual idea. Will a regional ideal of civic plurilingualism then open up? Even if it does, continued reliance on traditional educational structures and market forces is likely to restrict the outcomes of language learning and language brokering to levels far below the interlingual ideal.

Esperantism and language ecology

Arguably the greatest discrepancy between ideal and reality is to be found in the fifth interlingual idea, which Pool and I characterised thus:

> Esperantism: An invented language (not necessarily Esperanto itself), designed as a global auxiliary language in which fluency can be achieved at low cost; might make the world interlingual. If it became customary to use such a language for all translingual communication, the burden of linguistic accommodation would be both small and equal for all. If the language retained its auxiliary status, bilingualism would become a near-universal condition. (Pool and Fettes 1998, p. 2)

Esperanto is a living reality for its community of users, who argue for its viability as an interlingual idea on the basis of their own experience. In qualitative terms, the evidence is in their favour: the Esperanto community does indeed manifest the high levels of linguistic diversity, integration, equity and efficiency required by interlingualism (Piron 1994; Fettes and Bolduc 1998). Quantitatively, however, the evidence is anything but convincing. The Universal Esperanto Association currently has just over 7,000 individual members and somewhat fewer than 20,000 members in its various national affiliates; even if this represented only 20% of the active users of Esperanto (which strikes me as a reasonable guess), the latter would number fewer than 150,000, or about one person in 40,000 among the world population. Undoubtedly this compares poorly with the global prevalence of plurilingual individuals, speakers of English as a second language, and users of texts translated by human and mechanical means.

Although there are many factors to consider in explaining the very limited acceptance of Esperanto (and the still more limited acceptance of its rivals), what most clearly distinguishes it from the other four interlingual ideas is its inconsistency with politicostrategic thinking. Plurilingualism, world English, language brokers and technologism all grew out of state-sponsored efforts to combine national monolingualism with international trade and diplomacy; all of them display a hierarchical bias, tending to favour elites over the masses, wealthy languages over the poor. Esperantism developed in a reverse of these trends: it began as an appeal for justice towards less privileged language groups, and evolved in response to the needs of a relatively egalitarian, transnational community of individuals. As a consequence, its sociolinguistic profile is very different from that of the national and minority languages with which national policy makers are concerned. Even in countries and international organisations where Esperanto associations have received official approval and support for their activities, Esperanto itself has never been regarded as relevant to the politicostrategic priorities of the day (Fettes 1997).

The question, then, is whether this may change in the geostrategic era, and what a realistic version of Esperantism might entail. As for the other interlingual ideas, there is no clear evolutionary route from the present world language system to Esperantism in its pure form. On the other hand, in an increasingly interconnected world where plurilingualism remains a privilege of national elites, world English is bound up with global consumer culture, and teletranslation is oriented to the demands of the industrial economies, the interlingual niche of Esperantism has enormous potential for growth. The geostrategists of the largest and wealthiest languages will probably pay it little attention, but further down the language hierarchy it may eventually receive serious consideration as an element in a collective geostrategy that draws on all five interlingual ideas.

This overarching geostrategy might be termed 'language ecology'. It will be a strategy designed not to impose one particular language or language type over another – as in politicostrategic approaches – but to ensure their coexistence. In keeping with the principles of interlingualism, it will seek an optimal balance between linguistic diversity, integration, equity, efficiency and sustainability, integrating solutions at levels from the local to the global. In general, it will resist uniformity and the drive to make all languages intertranslatable: the functions of the standard national languages will not be taken as a universal yardstick of linguistic value, but as one small part of a vast range of linguistic possibilities to be explored and developed. Its concept of linguistic rights will stress the need to protect and strengthen the reciprocal relationships that bind individuals into communities, as part of a broader political project of 'fraternités' (Attali 1999). Superficially, the linguistic mosaic it seeks to sustain will resemble that of the present, with large languages and small, national and stateless, standardised and vernacular. It is the relationships among these language communities that will change, through the impact of plurilingual schooling, teletranslation and the wider use of Esperanto – not as a substitute for world English, competing at the top of the politicostrategic hierarchy, but as a global vernacular that can flourish alongside languages at any level of the world language system.

As the name implies, language ecology – if it becomes a reality – will be part of that wider transformation in human awareness that Fritjof Capra has called 'ecological thinking' or 'the systems view' (Capra 1982). To some extent such a change is being forced on us by the ecological and social impacts of globalisation, but old discursive patterns will long persist in our political and intellectual systems, making the transition a drawn-out, conflict-ridden and uncertain one. Unfortunately many of the world's languages may not be able to wait that long, to say nothing of the vast numbers of people currently suffering under linguistic discrimination of various kinds, or from the huge inequities and inefficiencies that continue to beset interlingual communication in the internet era. I hope, at least, that this tentative mapping of interlingualism helps to convey the urgent need for further discussion, exploration, quantification, criticism and debate; and that it will, perhaps, establish the value of such an approach to developing realistic and sustainable geostrategies of language.

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4 Language policy and linguistic theory

Douglas A. Kibbee

As the new millennium begins, predictions about the future of languages are proliferating. Two models that have strong political popularity – i.e. 'free-market' theory of unfettered capitalism and 'green' theory of ecological protection – correspond to two linguistic geostrategies: the race for 'market share'[1] among the governments representing the major international languages and the protection of endangered languages undertaken by linguists and by those interested in linguistic human rights. On the one side are aligned the British Council and the Haut Conseil de la Francophonie; on the other, the Linguistic Society of America and MERCATOR (among many others).

These two strategies are based on many linguistic presuppositions that are rarely if ever put to the test, even by linguists: the individuality of languages, the equality of languages, the evolution of languages, etc. These notions derive, ultimately, from theories concerning what is natural, and what is not, in linguistic behaviour.

The two linguistic geostrategies mentioned above both make use of a strong theory of the so-called 'Sapir–Whorf' hypothesis, according to which languages impose limits on the ways in which their speakers conceptualise the world. For the free-market theorists of global language strategy, this theory would justify the domination of the great international languages as a kind of natural selection. English would be the language of capitalism, French – as was often claimed during the French Revolution – the language of republicanism, or in more recent times as the language of human values.[2]

For ecologists, this hypothesis is used to claim that the loss of a language is the permanent, irrevocable loss of a certain vision of the world, comparable to the loss of an animal or a plant. Losing a language, however few the number of speakers, takes away part of our human heritage.

Both approaches have a Darwinian component, and thus are related to linguistic theories of the nineteenth century. For this reason it is useful for us to

[1] Such management jargon in the British Council report only adds to the fears of scholars and partisans of language rights.

[2] See, for example, the report on 'patois' by the Abbé Grégoire (16 prairial II; 4 June 1794), and Duron (1963).

look at the history of these ideas, a process that forces us to confront some unjustified and unjustifiable presuppositions involved in the 'language equals species' equivalency that supports these linguistic geostrategies.

In *The Future of English* David Graddol (1997) explains the dominance of English worldwide as the result of inherent characteristics of the language:

English is remarkable for its diversity, its propensity to change and be changed . . . Some analysts see[3] this hybridity and permeability of English as defining features, allowing it to expand quickly into new domains and explaining in part its success as a world language (1997, p. 6–6)[4]

Another explanation for the position of English in the world is the supposed ease of learning English (compared to German and French):

Apart from the suitability, similarity, and robustness of a language, there is a fourth intrinsic or linguistic property: the ease with which a language may be learned, especially in the early stages. This characteristic may explain a preference among students for English, rather than the apparently more complicated *Kunstsprachen* German or French. (de Swaan 1993, p. 223)[5]

The dominance of English would thus be the result of a process of natural selection, and would result in the economic and military dominance of Anglophone countries. The linguistic qualities of hybridity and permeability have never been, and probably cannot ever be, defined in scientific terms.

Graddol, then, defines how the governments of Anglophone countries can maintain this position of superiority, just as the Haut Conseil de la Francophonie would like to maintain the 'market share' of French. Graddol seeks the means to guarantee the development of British English services, especially for the teaching of English as a second or foreign language: 'careful strategic planning,

[3] Graddol often hides behind such rhetorical devices ('Some analysts see . . .') in order to present an idea he supports, without openly declaring his support. The expression 'in part' leaves unexplained the role that these supposed qualities of the language would play in determining the success of a given language as an international language.

[4] Some French commentators, ignorant of the diverse sources of French vocabulary and structure, find such 'hybridity' a defect in a language. For instance, Lalanne-Berdouticq condemns English for its supposed openness to borrowing: 'Amalgame de débris linguistiques échoués sur la côte anglaise comme les épaves qu'apporte la marée, l'idiome de l'Angleterre n'eut jamais à raidir sa défense contre le langage d'un envahisseur: il les accueillit tous, les intégrant au mieux et au plus commode de son évolution' (Lalanne-Berdouticq 1979, p. 107).

[5] This notion reflects the preoccupation with verbal morphology and the syntax of agreements as the measure of the complexity of a language, a concept that dates back to nineteenth-century classification of the 'complexity' of languages as a sign of how far a language has 'evolved', in a perspective derived from social Darwinism. Even if English verbal morphology is simpler than that of the languages cited, it seems to make up for this supposed lack with other complexities, equally confusing to the foreign learner.

far-sighted management, thoughtful preparation and focused action now could indeed help secure a position for British English language services in the twenty-first century' (1997, p. 62).

The same concerns are common among Francophone language planners, who would like to maintain the domination of French in the national educational systems of France's former colonies, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, and the position of French in international agencies and organisations (the United Nations, the European Union, the Olympics, etc.).[6]

At the end of his report, Graddol recognises that the ever-broadening use of international languages threatens the survival of thousands of local languages. For him, the main concern with this is that it could lead to a reaction against English:

> Public attitudes towards massive language loss in the next few decades, for example, is [sic] unpredictable. It would be easy for concerns about this issue to become incorporated into the wider environmental consciousness, which seems to be spreading around the world. The spread of English might come to be regarded in a similar way as exploitative logging in rainforests; it may be seen as providing a short-term economic gain for a few, but involving the destruction of the ecologies which lesser-used languages inhabit, together with the loss of global linguistic diversity. (Graddol 1997, p.62)

The disappearance of these languages is not as important as the effect that their disappearance might have on attitudes towards English.

This is where the 'British' and the 'French' positions part company. The French proclaim that the use of French is a defence against linguistic homogeneity. In this way, and rather incredibly, the French language is placed among victims of linguistic oppression, conveniently ignoring the legacy of the 'civilising mission' that France and Belgium undertook in their colonies, to the serious detriment, if not complete destruction, of local languages.[7]

Astonishingly, Graddol, while celebrating the triumph of English around the globe, finds the position of English threatened by demographic facts, and the position of British English menaced by the economic and military dominance of the USA. It is just this threat that he would like to stave off through the language planning efforts of the British Council. Clearly the role of the victim is very popular.

On the other side of the battle line are deployed the 'ecolinguists', who would like to protect all languages and especially those considered endangered.

[6] See, for example, the exchange of letters between Hervé Lavenir de Buffon and Juan Antonio Samaranch, President of the International Olympic Committee, reproduced in Lavenir de Buffon (1999, pp. 12–13).

[7] We return later to this aspect of global linguistic strategies, in which dominant languages present themselves as victims. Equally specious arguments are often presented in the USA by proponents of 'English-only' laws.

Ken Hale estimates that all languages that do not have 100,000 speakers are condemned to die (Hale 1998, p. 192) and Karttunen and Crosby have established that half of the languages of the world have fewer than 6,000 speakers (1995, p. 162), including almost all Amerindian languages and languages of Oceania. Roughly 90% of the languages of the world are threatened. Those that colonisation has not killed, will succumb to the poison of modern technologies of communication. Michael Krauss describes these media as 'cultural nerve gas' (1992, p. 6). To sustain these languages, the most common approach has been to rely on the principles of linguistic human rights, which go back at least as far as the so-called 'minority treaties' imposed on the countries formed from the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World War.[8]

What are the linguistic bases of these attitudes and their corresponding language planning strategies? Let us begin with the Sapir–Whorf hypothesis that every language, by its structure, presents a unique vision of the world; the hypothesis is named after Edward Sapir and Benjamin Lee Whorf, two American linguists studying Native American languages in the first half of the twentieth century. Whorf observed that each linguistic community chose to name only an infinitesimally small part of its experience, and that each language gives an even smaller number of concepts grammatical salience. Through the structures of language, languages provide a means of perceiving the world of which the speakers are unaware. Those who believe in the superiority of one particular language believe in a deterministic version of this theory, according to which a standard national language is the only language, for example, that can express democratic ideals; i.e. standard English according to Honey (1997) or standard French according to Grégoire, Barère and other revolutionary leaders in parliamentary debates of 1794 (Balibar and Laporte 1974).[9]

The ecolinguists also derive their arguments from a deterministic version of the Sapir–Whorf hypothesis, but this time attributing negative characteristics to the international languages. Phillipson and Skutnabb-Kangas (1996, citing Tsuda 1992) see English as the expression of capitalism, technology, modernisation, ideological globalisation, Americanisation and the worldwide homogenisation of cultures; the language inherently expresses linguistic, cultural and media-based imperialism (1996, p. 436). In this instance linguistic determinism means that the spread of English automatically results in the spread

[8] The winners who imposed these conditions did not feel obliged to follow their own precepts at home. In France, Breton and Alsatian activists tried in vain to introduce these practices in their own country.

[9] During and after the First World War this type of logic pushed many states in the USA to ban the teaching of languages other than English to children under the age of 14. The proponents of such measures feared that children who spoke another language before puberty might learn the 'un-American' values supposedly inherent in those languages; see Luebke 1980.

of an ideology, a political system and a culture, all of which are attached to that language. The death of the languages threatened by the spread of English means that there will be no further variety of ideas, and this loss of variation will bring about an imbalance in the ecology of languages.[10]

I am firmly in favour of ecological movements to protect our natural environment, and would prefer that all languages currently in existence remain so forever; I support linguistic human rights, even as I recognise the weakness of the results obtained through this means. Nonetheless, I reject the equivalence of language to species, and the notion that the loss of a language is equivalent to the loss of a natural species. The non-equivalence of language and species has been recognised since linguistic debates in the 1860s and 1870s concerning the relationship between historical linguistics and the theory of evolution. (For the history of the debates in the nineteenth century, see Alter 1999; Nerlich 1990; Desmet 1996). The 'language equals species' equivalency does not work any better now than it did then. A language is a behaviour, not a physical characteristic. If two languages are in contact, then they influence each other. If a dog lives in the same house as a bird it does not grow wings, nor does the bird sprout paws. If two languages are in contact, they create a new language. Thus, the genealogical tree produced to illustrate the descent of the human species works very poorly to illustrate the relationships between languages. A very grave danger on the part of geostrategists from both camps – the free-market language capitalists and the ecolinguists – is that they perceive influences between languages as degradation of those languages.

The loss of a species, or its introduction into an environment where it has no place, does have direct repercussions on environmental balance that are not replicated in language, unless any 'outside' influence is perceived as a degradation. The introduction of zebra mussels in the North American great lakes has meant a severe interruption in the food chain and the loss of many other species. The increased popularity of nominal compounding in French, attributed to influence from English (see Picone 1996), has not destroyed the French language. Has the popularity of the -ing suffix, borrowed into French from English, brought about the downfall of the French language? (see Söll

[10] Mühlhäusler makes a distinction between the 'ecology of languages' (as presented by Einar Haugen in 1972) and 'linguistic ecology'. 'Ecology of languages' presupposes that one can easily distinguish one language from another, while the second, which Mühlhäusler prefers, includes all forms of communication (1996, pp. 2–8). After reading his arguments for making this distinction – based on the difficulty of describing the linguistic situation in Oceania – we are surprised to see him accepting the figure of 4,000 languages in the area (1996, p. 9). More recently, Louis-Jean Calvet (1999) has used the term 'ecology of languages', but defines it differently and explicitly rejects the approaches proposed by Mühlhäusler, Mufwene (1998) and others. For Calvet the term is a metaphor for conceiving of interactions that take place within and between linguistic communities, and is an effort to gain greater respectability for sociolinguistics within the community of linguists.

1968; Spence 1991). On a grander scale, did the disappearance of Dalmatian in the nineteenth century upset the ecological balance between the languages in that region? Can we claim, as does Abram de Swaan, that 'the languages of the world together constitute a single, evolving, global system'? (1993, p. 219). In a system, one change entails others. Did the death of the last speaker of Dalmatian influence Croatian? Or influence other Romance languages along the Adriatic? Or bring about the loss of the language faculty of others living in this region?

One of the most complete studies of linguistic ecology is to be found in Peter Mühlhäusler's *Linguistic Ecology, Language Change and Linguistic Imperialism in the Pacific Region* (1996). It is a fascinating study, one which questions many of the fundamental presuppositions of western linguistics, presuppositions that deserve such questioning. However, the choice of the term 'linguistic ecology' seems to me ill-advised, for several reasons. First, the metaphor is chosen for its political rather than its scientific content:

> I have found that the ecological metaphor is particularly productive and a great deal more appealing than a systems metaphor. The latter suggests that we can hope for mechanical, albeit complex, explanations or that it is indeed legitimate to study a self-contained system or language as part of a larger system. An ecological view, on the other hand, suggests that we can at best achieve partial and local explanations, but that we can hope for understanding and empathy.
>
> The ecological metaphor in my view is action oriented. It shifts the attention from linguists being players of academic language games to becoming shop stewards for linguistic diversity, and to addressing moral economic and other 'non-linguistic' issues. (1996, p.2)

I can applaud his call for linguists to be engaged politically, but find that this is not sufficient justification for using a misleading metaphor. Second, in an ecological conception of languages, all lexical, phonological, morphological or syntactic borrowings are attacks against a language, an artificial deformation that can be contrasted with a 'natural' development (historical evolution without external influence). This type of purism, as we noted above, constitutes a serious error in the 'language equals species' equivalency, and thus a serious error in the ecological metaphor.

How do languages die? Languages die when the speakers of those languages die out, or when they stop using the language. It is a premise of the ecolinguists, based on the Sapir–Whorf hypotheses, that those who change languages automatically alter all the distinctions that were important to them in their first language. For that to happen we must believe that languages have no flexibility, that one cannot insert into the new languages distinctions that one still finds important.

However, it is this very flexibility of languages that underlies the notion of linguistic relativity: all languages are equal because they can express the same things, even if by circumlocution. Einstein can be translated into Wolof, as was done by Cheikh Anta Diop in the 1950s. According to the principle of reciprocity, if the notions of western science can be translated into Wolof, then the distinctions important to Wolof speakers can be translated and incorporated into the linguistic practices of Wolof speakers who learn French. The only requirement is that the need for those features be felt strongly enough by those who change languages. Such distinctions then would form the basis of the local version of a language, which will develop, sooner or later, into a distinct language in its own right.[11]

Another argument put forth by the ecolinguists is that the loss of languages will eliminate linguistic variation, which is equated with genetic variation. It is inconceivable that only one language would remain in the world. Even if one were to admit this fantastical vision of the McDonaldisation[12] of the languages of the world, that would hardly bring about the end of linguistic variation. If we believe that the great variety of human languages present in the world today developed from one, or at most a few, original languages, do we not have to believe such a process could be repeated? Even if an international language did eliminate all other languages (an unimaginable occurrence) for a given period, this would not be the end of linguistic variation.

The arguments for artificially preserving languages are based on a certain notion of linguistic justice, and on a desire to preserve the raw data for linguistic research. However, the means to achieve these goals risk imposing new injustices, and the promotion of such efforts, on the part of western linguists and western language planners – including non-westerners trained in the western tradition – includes a certain non-negligible element of neo-colonial paternalism. If the speakers of these languages choose to furnish their children the linguistic means to live a life that they find, rightly or wrongly, desirable, then these ideologues denounce them as traitors to their language. Western researchers remain the judges of what behaviours undertaken by non-westerners will be considered 'authentic'.

The planning efforts to re-establish an imaginary linguistic ecology proposed by western researchers can very easily give rise to new injustices. The use of

[11] Mühlhäusler denies this principle of effability (that all languages can express all things). Such a position entails other difficulties, for it would justify teaching only in western European languages for those who want to take part in the global economy. If such subject areas can only be learned in the western European languages that first developed them, and cannot be expressed in other languages (Oceanian languages in his case), inhabitants of those areas would not be able to participate in the global economy without learning one of the 'international' languages. Some might claim that this would be a desirable lack of choice, but ultimately this is a paternalistic position, which would deny people the opportunity to make such choices on their own, in order that they remain good subjects for research by western linguists and anthropologists.

[12] This term is frequently invoked to describe US influence around the globe, as if all cultural production of the USA could be reduced to this symbol of mediocrity.

any given local or regional language as the language of the state and as the language of education requires the standardisation of those languages, an effort that reproduces at a local level the same procedures condemned by Phillipson and Skutnabb-Kangas on an international scale. For example, Côte d'Ivoire recognises four national languages (Bete, Baoule, Senufo and Malinke) and one official language (French). Suppose Baoule were to be imposed as the only official language. First, a standard form of Baoule would have to be created from among the many varieties and imposed within the Baoule-speaking region. Then Baoule would have to be imposed on all the other regions of the country, endangering not just the three other national languages but the roughly fifty other languages spoken in the country. The linguistic human rights as described by proponents of that approach would be no closer to being realised for the overwhelming majority of Ivoirian citizens.

There is a human as well as an economic cost to bringing endangered languages up to the level some consider necessary to ensure their survival. If survival requires the provision of formal education and government services in each of these languages, the economic costs are beyond the ability even of developed countries, much less of developing countries. The multilingual model of the European Union, which Phillipson and Skutnabb-Kangas support even as they criticise its application (1996, p. 444), consumes an enormous part of the operating budget of that organisation. If that policy were applied in the way they desire, the price would be even higher.

The human costs are equally daunting. If a given language has only 500 or 5,000 or even 50,000 speakers, the demands of creating a full educational system in the language, and a full range of government services, would require all adults to devote all their time to these two activities.

There are thus theoretical and practical objections to the conception of linguistic justice promoted by some ecolinguists. On the theoretical side, the notion of linguistic purity – just as dangerous as notions of racial purity – lie just beneath the surface. On the practical side, the human and economic cost of providing all services in all languages is beyond the means of even the richest nations, and most of the world's endangered languages are found in the developing, rather than the developed, world.

There is also a risk to these legal remedies. All too often, law, including human rights law, is used to protect the interests of the rich and the powerful. The protection of minority languages was invoked to protect the rights of Anglophone Quebeckers (McIntyre v. Canada, decided 31 March 1993 by the Commission of Human Rights of the United Nations). The judicial system, national or international, cannot realise the hopes of the downtrodden; it serves goals more educational than corrective.

Another argument for the protection of endangered languages concerns the future of the linguistic profession. Ken Hale argued that linguistic diversity is important because it permits linguists to discover, with greater certainty, the limits of the human language faculty:

> While a major goal of linguistic science is to define universal grammar, i.e., to determine what is constant and invariant in the grammars of all natural languages, attainment of that goal is severely hampered, some would say impossible, in the absence of linguistic diversity. (1998, p. 192)

Reduced diversity thus complicates the task of the researcher. As a linguist I can sympathise with this argument, without, for all that, finding this a sufficient reason to protect all the languages of the world. At most this argument calls for the recording of as many languages as possible since, as Hale himself admitted, most of these languages are, for want of a sustainable number of speakers, doomed. Such a process would certainly provide employment to many linguists, but it still makes these languages interesting only insofar as they help western science, and the intrusiveness of the means of western science disrupts the very societies supposedly helped.

The problem on either side of this language power coin – the free-market approach or the ecological approach – is that it is impossible to define what is natural when one speaks of power relationships between linguistic communities. History teaches us that as far back as we have records languages have split off, and sometimes joined, according to the power relationships between the communities speaking them. What is driving the current rate of extinction is the facility of contacts between these communities.

This aspect of modern life – the rapid development of modern mass communication – is what has set off the current 'imbalance', as it is perceived by the ecolinguists. New information technologies grant certain languages – those allied with powerful and technologically advanced countries – new powers of influence. However, these technologies also permit speakers of endangered languages, perhaps now dispersed around the world, to maintain their contact and their linguistic community. Karttunen and Crosby cite, for example, the efforts of Australian and Amerindian groups (1995, p. 163) and Gutiérrez (1998) has noticed how access to the home language might slow down the assimilation of new immigrants to the USA.

I am certainly not in favour of the disappearance of languages or for the imposition of a single international language. I see no need for the efforts described by Graddol (1997) in his report for the British Council, nor for those of the Haut Conseil de la Francophonie (1998). As a linguist I lament with Ken Hale the effect of the loss of languages on future linguistic research. However, there is more than a little neo-colonial paternalism involved when westerners advise citizens of the developing world not to learn international languages so that western researchers have richer data to work with. How can one ask parents to risk the economic future of their children if they feel that knowledge of an international language gives their children hope for a higher standard of living? (If they wish to turn down this concept of success, that is their business, not ours.) No such advice would be tolerated within the developed world.[13] To such paternalism, Phillipson and Skutnabb-Kangas (1996) add a heavy dose of idealism that offers little real-world promise.

The two geostrategies we discuss in this chapter are based on concepts of language that linguists have difficulty accepting. These strategies, based on bad science, are then used to justify language-planning measures with little hope of bringing about the desired goal of either side. While recognising the weaknesses of some of the ecolinguists' arguments, an option that promotes the respect for diversity has to be preferable to one that sees diversity as an inconvenience. But let us always be aware of, and wary of, our own presumption. As researchers we can and must help those who wish to sustain their linguistic heritage, but we have no right to judge those who choose not to do so.

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[13] A good example is the reaction of African-Americans during the 'Ebonics' controversy in December 1996 and January 1997. For the reaction of the research community (largely white), which did not correspond to the reaction of the black community, see *http://linguistlist.org/topics/ebonics/* and *http://www.cal.org/ebonics/*. For example, the leader of the Black Caucus of the US House of Representatives declared 'The obligation of the school is to teach children proper English so they will be able to excel when given standardised tests or job interviews' (Branson 1996).

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5 Babel and the market: Geostrategy for minority languages

Jean Laponce

Assuming that a language has some control over its destinies will help us outline the appropriate actions to be taken by a political decision maker who, typically, makes the same assumption of governability when he or she wishes to guide a minority language towards security and prosperity.

Of course, most languages are far from having the control of the functions of goal setting, integration, adaptation and socialisation required by Parsonian theory to distinguish a system from a set. Most languages lack pilots; most of them are like leaves in the wind. But major standardised languages have at least some control over their own evolution, and those that are supported by a government have ways of steering their relations among the other languages with which they are linked by communication, competition, cooperation and conflict. What should the geopolitical survival strategy of such a language be when it is confronted with a more powerful competitor?

From Babel to Adam Smith

The social sciences are often said to abound in theories but to be short of laws. That this be so makes it all the more important that we give due attention to one of these laws, a law that governs language contact: the ancient law of Babel (Laponce 1984; 1992; 2001).

Yahweh, having finally noted what the sons of men were doing, said:

> 'Behold, they are one people, they have only one language; and this is only the beginning of what they will do: and nothing that they propose to do will now be impossible to them. Come, let us go down, and then confuse their languages, that they may not understand one another's speech. So the Lord scattered them abroad from there over the face of the whole earth . . .'

The sons of men who were building a high tower had a well-integrated social system, they were tied by a common project, they were concentrated territorially, within a single city, and they spoke the same language. To destroy their enterprise, God breaks their language. But that is not enough. Additionally, He disperses them geographically. The implication is clear. If the sons of men had stayed in Babel, they would have eventually gone back to speaking the same tongue.

This law of Babel is sufficiently robust to be used as a foundation for the strategy and related tactics of a major minority language facing the challenge of an even more powerful competitor, say French or German under the pressure of English.

If one's goal is to maintain language distinctiveness, if one's goal is to favour multilingualism, then one should adopt Yahweh's strategy of geographical separation since, in a well integrated social system, it is the more powerful language that leads, in its own favour, the return to Babelian unilingualism.

What determines the power of a language? Historical linguistics is unanimous: that power does not reside in the language itself; it lies in its demographic, economic and political correlates (Mackey 1973; Laponce 1984, Chapter 3).

In non-democratic social systems and in systems with a high level of internal segregation, power need not turn into dominance when languages that coexist within the same territory have very little contact with one another. In such a case, the linguistic cleavage is reinforced by other cleavages; religious or racial cleavages, for example. But in democratic systems – especially so in capitalist systems that favour labour mobility – language cleavages tend to collapse. In those systems, capitalism and democracy, both say: mix, work, marry and think across social boundaries. In those non-segregative systems, the systems that characterise modernity, the Babel unilingual effect is particularly strong. Consequently, it is in those very political and economic systems that favour mobility that we find the clearer examples of public policies favouring language territoriality. While unable, because of their democratic ideology, to tell their citizens where to live, the Swiss and the Belgian states have no such inhibitions concerning the languages that the citizens speak. Those two states tell their people:

> you can move, and settle, and vote wherever you want; but, when you cross our rigidly defined internal language boundaries, you must adopt the language of the area, if not in private of course, at least in public life, and notably in the schools. (McRae 1983; 1986; 1998)

By territorialising their official languages, Switzerland and Belgium – and one can predict, the federal European Union (EU) in the making – separate and will continue to separate the regulation of culture from the regulation of the economy. They follow the prescriptions of the Bible in one domain and those of Adam Smith in the other, fearing, with good reason, that if they were to adopt a 'laissez-passer' policy in matters of language, the languages in competition would specialise their usage. The more powerful would gain control of the higher functions, while the less powerful would be relegated to the private sphere and eventually fade away.

Should one conclude that territorial exclusiveness is always the optimal solution? Are there not cases when it would be more advantageous to follow the prescription of Adam Smith? I shall answer those questions by means of examples showing that radical territorialisation and radical language autarchy may indeed be quite dysfunctional.

The market as a moderator of territorialisation

Let us imagine a minister of culture in a non-English-speaking country who has to decide how to allocate his or her funds and how to regulate language use in a particular scientific field. Let us take chemistry as an example.

I select chemistry, not only because of its importance but also because it is, to my knowledge, a field that offers the most complete survey of the languages in which its findings are published. For the year 1998, *Chemical Abstracts* reported more than half a million articles published in 48 different languages ranging from 460,924 in English to only four in Basque and two in Estonian (Esperanto had last scored with only two articles in 1992). Should a hypothetical French or a German minister try to improve the poor scores of either French or German?

The answer is in the statistics of Table 5.1. The formerly dominant languages of science, German and French, have declined steadily. Russian is the only language other than English to have had high scores recently, but that was before the fall of the USSR; and Chinese is the only language to record a steady increase in the past twenty years. Would a more systematic application of the principle underlying the French language laws of the 1980s and 1990s (Jastrab de Saint Robert 1994) or a systematic favouring of publication in French or

Table 5.1 *Language of articles indexed by* Chemical Abstracts *by year (percentages)*

	1978	1982	1987	1992	1998
English	62.3	67.6	73.0	79.3	82.5
Russian	19.5	16.5	12.0	7.6	3.1
Japanese	4.7	4.2	4.5	4.7	4.5
German	5.0	3.8	2.9	2.3	1.6
Chinese	0.3	1.7	2.7	3.2	5.9
French	2.4	1.6	1.1	0.6	0.5
Polish	1.1	0.6	0.6	0.4	0.3
Other languages	4.7	4.0	3.2	1.9	1.6
Number	363,196	382,257	384,141	430,247	559,009

Note: The list includes only the languages that scored at least 1% in at least one of the years considered. I thank the American Chemical Society for making these statistics available to me.

Table 5.2 *Dominant language, minority language and support of scientific research in a field such as chemistry. (What language should be helped in the interest of the minority language? A theoretical example.)*

			Production		
	Information	Creation	Novel type	Textbook type	Consumption
English			×		×
French		×		×	

German have helped these two languages to catch up with Russian? Suppose it had had such an effect, would it have been beneficial to either French or German? I doubt it. The better scores of Russian before the 1990s are more likely a measure of the loss of potential influence in the 1990s than a success, and the increased scores of Chinese more likely to characterise a period of transition marking the entry of Chinese scientists into the worldwide market of science. To devote funds to promoting publication or paper presentation at congresses in French or German or to give preferential treatment to the local language when a meeting is held locally means engaging in symbolic shadow acting and wasting resources. When a language maintains its overall international influence thanks to the prestige of the culture to which it is attached (that is the case for German as well as French), supporting the language means supporting the culture – here the scientific culture – but supporting the culture may mean, on occasion, not supporting the language. Let us unbundle the paradox.

Since the contact between English and French is often stressful (French is selected as an archetype to simplify and to stand for other major languages in minority situations), it is rational to avoid contact as much as possible. For example, it is rational not to insist that international congresses be bilingual when such bilingualism is bound to be a bilingualism of humiliating politeness.

The statistics in Table 5.2 address the various phases of scientific research: information, creation, production and consumption. Let us argue the case for language support in each of these four phases.

Indexing of the *Chemical Abstracts* indicates that it would be superfluous to duplicate in French what is already well done by an American publication. That would not be true in the social sciences and the humanities since their major indexing service, the *Social Sciences and Humanities Citations Index*, is strongly biased against languages other than English. But, since all the languages of chemistry are well served by an Adam Smith strategy, let us leave empty the two cells in the 'information' column of Table 5.2.

By contrast, in the domain of Table 5.2 labelled 'creation', resources should be expended in favour of the minority language. Rare are the researchers who do not need to be surrounded by local scientific settings that take the form of seminars and face-to-face networks. Strengthening the institutions based on these local French-speaking groups may be essential to creativity. It is sometimes claimed that the process of innovation takes the path of metaphorical thinking, of what is also called horizontal thinking in opposition to rational linear reasoning. If so, we should be better at this type of intuitive thinking in our dominant language. Let us not exclude such a possibility and, in the interest of both chemistry and French, let us mark the French cell under 'creation' as a candidate for expenditure.

We have divided the heading 'production' in Table 5.2 into two subtypes: high-level research and textbook type of publication. For the latter, French will need to be supported, since it is essential that basic knowledge in the field be available in the local language, even if one uses English textbooks at university. At the more advanced scientific level, at the Nobel prize level, promoting publication in French would be pointless and wasteful of resources. Our hypothetical French minister would be rational in supporting publication in English: by covering the cost of English copy editing, for example, thus increasing the chances of acceptance of articles by English language journals. The Institut Pasteur was quite logical in 1989 in shifting its language of publication to English. Interestingly, that decision – a decision that outraged some French as well as Canadian politicians and language activists – led the Canadian Prime Minister, Brian Mulroney, to promise, at a summit of the Francophonie (French-speaking world), that Canada would launch a bilingual scientific journal. The Royal Society of Canada obtained generous funding to publish it. The journal lasted a few issues but did not rise above the level of scientific populariser and disappeared.

The last heading of Table 5.2, 'consumption', covers both oral and written access to information. Here no action is needed to help French since we assume that French chemistry consumers know their own language. The expenditure should be on the side of English as a second language in order that French scientists and students have universal access to the findings published in the language of chemistry.

The information presented in Table 5.2 is very rough. What applies to chemistry would not be applicable to anthropology or history. Our objective is not to make a comparative case study, but simply to point out that the dominant strategy of protection of a minority language – the strategy of territorial and functional separation – when carried to extremes will have perverse effects and weaken the culture of which the language is a carrier, hence, in turn, weaken the language itself. The best defensive geopolitical strategy of a minority language rests in the proper blend of Babelian unilingual exclusiveness and 'laisser-faire–laisser-passer' exceptions.

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6 Forecasting the fate of languages

William F. Mackey

In the early 1940s at a Rockefeller-funded symposium at the University of Wisconsin on the fate of minority languages in America, the linguists present concluded that on the face of their evidence most of these languages, including French, would not survive to the end of the twentieth century. Today one can report that the status of French in Quebec is higher than it was at the time the prediction was made. Yet the same prediction had been made a century earlier in the 1840s by a British colonial administrator who had witnessed the dismemberment of the Napoleonic empire. Moreover, four centuries earlier, some English academics had come to the conclusion that once people were better educated (in Latin and French) English would not be needed as a language of learning.

If one looks at what happened to these past predictions one wonders if our present ones will fare any better. Could they go wrong and, if so, how and why? They could, indeed, go wrong in many ways and for different reasons. I have tried to group these into four broad categories concerning:

- their demographic assumptions;
- their choice of decisive factors;
- their methods of extrapolating present trends; and
- their appropriation of models from different disciplines.

Demographic projection

The future of a language depends on the number of people using it: if people can no longer speak or read a language its future is bleak. The importance of a language has often been determined by the number of people who use it. This number is generally derived from population studies based on census surveys, some of which may include one or more language-related questions. Some countries either have no census or no language question in it, either for economic reasons, or for political reasons, as in Belgium where, in 1962, a law was passed prohibiting the inclusion of a language question in the national census.

In countries that do maintain a language question in their national census, its form, meaning and content vary from one country to the next. So that a country can categorise its population according to either ethnicity, identity, maternal or paternal language, home language, usual language, or first language used. These are not the same. The most usual language of millions of people throughout the world is not their first language spoken but the one in which they were schooled, usually a regional, national or colonial language.

Assessing the accuracy of a demographic projection of the future use and distribution of a language depends on answers to three questions:

- What counts as a user?
- What counts as a language?
- What counts as a country?

What counts as a user?

Projections of the number of users of a language are generally confined to the population of native speakers. One entity (a speaker) is identified with another entity (a language). But unlike persons and things, a language is not an entity, but a form of conventional behaviours changing in time and place. Since demographers count persons as entities, it is difficult for them to count someone twice or three times according to language use.

Most census-based language statistics maintain a one-person-one-language figure based on a person's 'main' language as defined by the census criterion. Even when there is more than one language question – as in Canada and India – people are still labelled by language.[1] This may be of little import to the language of a small monoethnic country with a small minority; however, in assessing widespread languages, these census-data inconsistencies can make a significant difference since the most usual language of millions of people in many countries is not the language they first learned at home or the language of their mother or father or that associated with their ethnicity.

Take, for example, a recent prediction on the future of French. Based on standard demographic projections (one-person-one-language) the number of French speakers at the middle of the twenty-first century (2050) would remain within the seventy-million range (Graddol 1997, p. 26). This projection fails to take into account the fact that non-native speakers of French as their everyday language far outnumber the native-speaking population on which the projection was made. French is one of the few international languages in the world along with English where this is the case. This means that when we take these non-native speakers into account along with the fact that French is the language of secondary schooling in so many countries, the projected figure might be closer

[1] It is true that in countries like Canada, where the census has consistently included a number of different language questions whose form and meaning have not varied, it is possible through different types of statistical manipulation to establish short-term trends for the use of main languages. Examples can be seen in the work of Henripin, Castonguay, Kralt, Paillé, Cartwright, and others (Mackey and Cartwright 1979).

to 200 million (McConnell and Roberge 1994). Many of these countries are in the Third World where life expectancy is likely to continue rising and, in spite of a projected decrease in the rates of fertility, total population tends to increase faster than in the rich countries. This means that, in the next fifty years, the population of Africa would triple to a projected two billion, while that of Europe falls by 12% to about 640 million.

The role of these non-native users in the propagation of a language is in no way inferior to that of the 'native speakers'. Many are leaders in the fields of education, commerce, science and literature: as the winners of scientific and literary awards have attested. In fact, more and more literature is being written in the second or third language of their authors (Mackey 1993). For a world language is no longer the property of a nation-state; it can be adopted by citizens of any country.[2] Scientists, writers and creative artists want to publish in a language accessible to the greatest number of potential clients (de Swaan 1998).

In the distant past, a language used to be the property of its users (*lingua anglica*, *lingua theotisca* (>*deutsch*), *lingua romana rustica*). But with the rise of the nation-state it became associated with the land in which it was spoken: French became the language spoken in France; English, the language spoken in England, etc. It was as if the language belonged to the state. This is beginning to change. As a result of the phenomenal increase in the mobility of populations and the breakdown of nation-states, we may be reverting to the idea that a language belongs to the people who use it. And people seem to identify with the languages they know best and use most (Bauvois and Bulot 1998, p. 75).

More and more of these people are spending their lives far away from their place of birth. In the 1990s, for example, about 100 million workers migrated from China's interior to its coastal economically developing zones located in areas where other languages like Wu and Cantonese are dominant. In many parts of the world migrants tend to converge on the big cities where they form part of language minorities that maintain their native tongue through same-language networks (Li 1996). They may even constitute their own schools, media and services. Some are populous enough to rank as a city within a city. The second largest Mexican, Cuban and Puerto Rican cities may be in Los Angeles, Miami and New York, respectively. Yet these Spanish-speaking populations are not accounted for in the census of Mexico, Cuba or Puerto Rico.

What counts as a language?

The same official demographers who determine what counts as a speaker are often the same people who decide what counts as a language. As a matter of

[2] For example, a German publisher (Bertelsmann) is now the world's biggest producer of books in English (*The Economist*, 24 April 1999). Sellers prefer languages understood by most potential buyers. They seldom sacrifice their livelihood to their language loyalty.

policy they may maximise the importance of an official language by incorporating all languages remotely related, even though mutually unintelligible. This, it seems, is what happened after the 1961 Indian census where the number of Hindi speakers registered a remarkable increase.[3] When the resulting incremental curve is projected into the future, by 2050 it reaches a level that surpasses that of English as a world language (Graddol 1997, p. 26, Figure 18). There may also be differences in the projections for other languages (Graddol 1997, p. 27, Table 7), including German (91 million), Malay (80 million) and French (76 million) compared to figures cited in Table 1 (Graddol 1997, p. 8) for 1996 (after *Ethnologue*; available at http://www.ethnologue.org/) for German (98 million), Malay (47 million), French (72 million) and Italian (65 million). These tables and figures omit some important major languages, as different as French is from Italian: languages like Wu (90 million), Cantonese (70 million), which are mutually incomprehensible to each other and to speakers of Mandarin, the official language into which they have presumably been incorporated along with overseas ethnic Chinese (50 million). This may explain the gee-whiz curve projected for 'Chinese' (1.123 million). If by 'Chinese' one means not speakers but readers, it may include people whose usual spoken language is Wu, Min, Gan, Yue, Xiang, Hakka or languages of unrelated language families (75 million) like Mongolian. These speakers may read newspapers in the national Putonghua (standardised on dialects related to Mandarin) assuming that they are literate in what is really for them a second language (Kerang and McConnell 1995). Since this reading criterion was not applied to the other languages, the different projected figures cannot be compared.

What counts as a country?

A nation has been defined as a mental construct made up of affinities with thousands of imagined people united by symbols that promote the feel-good benefits of belonging and being encompassed within borders that are seldom seen (Anderson 1983). And yet these borders are considered permanent and sacrosanct, even though they may have been fashioned by the hazards of war or the accommodations of peace. While uniting an imagined community, they divide real communities sharing the same language and culture. If the languages of these communities are remotely related to the national language, they are simply categorised as varieties or dialects, even though they may enjoy a much older literary tradition.

[3] Figures for more than two dozen languages, some with literary traditions of their own, were added to those of the national languages. After 1961, for example, Bhojpuri, Maithili and Magahi were grouped under Bihari, which in turn was included under Hindi. At the time, the abandonment of the Grierson classification in favour of a policy of *Sprachbund* may have resulted in the progressive 'obfuscation of mother-tongue returns . . . while interpreting Hindi in the broadest perspective' (McConnell 1991, pp. 51–52).

Subsuming all sister languages under a politically dominant tongue has long been the practice of nation-states, giving credence to that facetious definition of 'language' as a dialect with an army and a navy. Far from coming to an end, this practice is likely to multiply as an increasing number of new states try to forge a national identity through a dominant language, culture or ideology. If we look back to the beginning of the twentieth century, we can count only sixty sovereign states in the entire globe; today there are 193, most of the increase having taken place after the end of the Second World War when there were still only seventy-four sovereign states.[4] But this three-fold increase does not even equal the remarkable multiplicity of new self-governing or semi-autonomous regions all founded on the right to be different, including the growing number of language academies, both regional and extraterritorial.[5] This trend seems to be accelerating (Mackey 1975). To give an example of a new state, in April 1999 Nunavut, came into being as a new state (territory) in the Canadian North. Its official language de jure and de facto is Inuktitut, along with French and English.[6]

As a consequence of this increasing number of new states and self-governing regions, there has been an increase in the number of national languages often at the expense of others. Yet in spite of how well a new official language is standardised and promoted, regardless of the productivity of its writers and educators, the fact remains that the economic viability of many a new state may well depend – at least for the foreseeable future – on people with a type and amount of education not possible within the written corpus of a new standardised language. This means that the use of materials in available and sufficiently elaborated written languages may be inevitable. Consequently, an increase in the average level of education worldwide is likely to accelerate the use of these already widespread languages (Mackey 1992a). And the higher the level, the

4 This remarkable increase in the number of autonomous states was forecast in the late 1940s by the Austrian political scholar Leopold Kohr (Kohr 1957). If the trend continues, the number could conceivably grow should the right to national self-determination be implemented by all peoples, each with its distinctive language, culture or ethnicity. Yet becoming a sovereign state would not necessarily make each of them count for more in the books of the few countries that count most in the global marketplace which, by its very nature, tends to intensify all sorts of inequalities (Breton 1998, p. 109).

5 Like the Piedmont Language Academy (*L'Academia dla lengua piemontèisa*) promoting one of the first written Romance languages. With offices in Italy and Argentina, it maintains its headquarters in Montreal and also its publishing house, which for the past decade has produced the annual proceedings (*L'Arvista dla Academia*) and now a newsletter (*Ël Boletin ëd l'Academia*).

6 The population of Nunavut is scattered over an area greater than that of western Europe but is held together by satellite communication. This young population (half under twenty-five) has one of the highest birth rates and an increasingly higher level of education. This is also true of some of the other Amerindian land claimants (some 200). In 1971, the Amerindian population of Canada was some 600,000, only twenty of whom had some post-secondary education; in 1996 it had grown to 800,000 of which 30,000 had post-secondary education. The population projection for the next decade is one million.

fewer the available languages. Therefore, independent of any decline in the number of native speakers, this means more and more readers for a limited number of languages. This would seem to bode well for the future of languages in which there is much to read and much being written. If the past is any indication, it may indeed be the readers more than the speakers who prolong the vitality of a language.

This multiplication of new states and autonomous language communities is taking place at the same time as speakers of different languages move from one country to another. The twentieth century witnessed an enormous increase in the displacement of persons; and the trend continues. There are now more refugees, immigrants, tourists, long and short-term resident workers, business people, foreign students and expatriate retired folk than ever before. In the past decade, for example, the flow of refugees documented by the UNHCR has ranged from twenty million to twenty-seven million persons a year. During the year 2000, the number of refugees, asylum seekers and regionally displaced persons totalled about forty-two million. Never before have so many people gone so far so fast and so often. No longer when we travel can we expect to meet people in the same place in which they were born. Already by the middle of the twentieth century in America less than 15% of the deceased were buried in the towns of their birth (Packard 1972). In 1996, two Brazilians out of five no longer lived in their home towns. In many countries, foreign-born residents have increased in number during the past decade. In 1990, some 120 million people were no longer living in the countries in which they were born. Such immigrants accounted for a significant percentage of the population of countries like Australia (23.4%), Canada (15.5%), France (10.4%), the USA (7.9%) and Argentina (5.2%), areas where English, French and Spanish are dominant languages. Coupled with the higher life expectancies in these countries of seventy-five to eighty years vs. thirty to fifty in Africa, this increasing immigration has somewhat compensated for their decreasing birth rate of 2 to 1.5 vs. 7 to 6.5 births per woman in central Africa.

Key-factor fixation

Language expansion is often attributed to some decisive factor like military domination, economic power, technical and scientific superiority and the like. Let us examine some of these claims.

Military domination

In one recent study we read this quotation: ‘If Hitler had won World War II . . . we would probably today use German as a universal vehicular language’ (Eco 1995, p. 331). Or, probably not, if the linguistic consequences of past Germanic military conquests are any indication: particularly the ones that converted Gaul into a Germanic kingdom. Remember that the Germanic Salian Franks who conquered Gaul in 486 (of our era) secured political but not linguistic domination of that country even though they numbered some 100,000 and were joined later by far more numerous hordes of Rhine Franks who moved into eastern Gaul with their families. Although the kings and their army who dominated the court maintained their Germanic tongue for several generations, the people lost it in favour of low Romance (or early French) to such an extent that this vernacular became known as the language of the Franks ('lingua franca') which flourished as the vehicular language of the early Crusades.[7]

Although this language loss of the Germanic conquerors took several generations to complete, this does not mean that it has always taken that long for a conquering people to replace their mother tongue by the language of the conquered. When the Norse-speaking Vikings conquered northern France, renaming it the Land of the Northman (Normandy), their descendants took less that two generations to adopt the language of the people they had conquered. So that, when one of their descendants (called William the Bastard) conquered England, it was French that was imposed as the official language throughout the land and was maintained by the presence of some 20,000 French-speaking knights who replaced nearly all local aristocracies. French did profoundly transform Anglo-Saxon into what was to become a new and virtually distinct language.[8]

It is doubtful whether deterministic theories of history are applicable to the life and death of languages, even though it has been fashionable to believe that they are.[9] In the real world significant events are more unpredictable, complex and haphazard. Yet the 'what if' question is not always an idle one; it may be our

[7] It is true that this language was interspersed with Germanic words and expressions, some of which have survived in modern French; words like *riche* (< *reich*) bâtir (< *bastjan*), *haïr* (< *hatjan*) and some 200 others, in addition to a few suffixes like the augmentative *-ard* (< *hard*) in words like *bavard*.

[8] Although French remained England's official language for three centuries, it did not replace English. But it did profoundly transform the vernacular – already deeply destabilised by a century of Scandinavian admixtures – into an efficient quasi-creole, unburdened of most of its redundant grammatical baggage, yet enriched with a far-ranging foreign vocabulary, without having sacrificed its Anglo-Saxon potential and proclivity for word creation, as the new vocabularies of the past decades can amply attest (Mackey 1992b).

[9] If one were to look for a convincing example of the linguistic consequences of military domination, one would have to turn to the spread of Arabic. It was indeed by military conquest in the seventh century of our era that it so rapidly spread over such vast areas of the Near East and North Africa, eventually extending from most of Spain to Madagascar. Yet one cannot discount the zeal of a new monotheism on an early Christendom rife with mutually persecuting sects (Arians, Nestorians, Jacobites, Manichaeans, Eutychians, Monophysites, Monothelites, etc.). And this was coupled with a new written standard language over an area accustomed to vernaculars similar to Arabic, a standard that became the language of learning in much of Medieval Europe along with Latin and Greek.

only guide to the future, particularly where an alternative had been probable. What is worth finding in the history of language spread is that 'fork in the road' that has 'made all the difference'. And by examining it we may arrive at a better perception of current trends and alternatives affecting our choices of options in language policy and planning. Since the collapse of the Soviet Empire and the fall from grace of Marxist and Hegelian historical determinism, the practice of counterfactual reasoning is beginning to enjoy some academic respectability, especially after the publication of Oxford historian Niall Ferguson's *Virtual History* (1998).

In order to mark the tenth anniversary of the *Quarterly Journal of Military History*, its editor Robert Cowley invited a few dozen eminent historians to submit an article based on a counterfactual question. Later, in an interview he illustrates how counterfactual reasoning can take the measure of what in fact had been at stake as a potential consequence of an event (e.g. the weather), which, I may add, would have had enormous consequences for the future of English. And I quote:

> If the Spanish Armada in 1588 had won the key naval battle at Graveline in the English Channel (and it was much closer than people like to think) the Spanish army could have crossed the Channel to England. There was nothing to stop them from marching right to London deposing Queen Elizabeth. England would have been Catholic again. There would probably have been no British colonies in the New World, and if there are not British colonies in the New World you have no United States. (Kavanagh 1998, p. 2)

Does that imply that without the English presence in America, Spanish today would be the leading international language? Not if we factor in the policies and actions of Spain's arch-rival, Francis I of France.[10] Extending our counterfactual reasoning beyond Cowley, it is just as likely that had the weather favoured the Spanish at Graveline in 1588 most of North America would have been French-speaking. It is true that the power of Spain at the time was such that its language was beginning to replace Latin as the medium of diplomacy (Hauser 1933). But the tenacity of France, over the repeated objections of the Habsburg Empire to having French replace Latin, eventually won the day (Mackey 1994a).

In sum, a single military victory can, indeed, have complex and far-reaching but unpredictable consequences for the future of a language. Other examples could be drawn from the military history of Persia, Greece and Rome. Is what is true of military domination also applicable to economic power, technical and scientific dominance, and cultural superiority?

[10] Remember that he was the one who sent Jacques Cartier to America, setting the stage for two centuries of exploration and colonisation and for French dominion over vast stretches of America extending from the western shores of Hudson Bay to the Gulf of Mexico, including Acadia and all the territory in between, excepting only Florida and the Atlantic seaboard (Louder and Waddell 1992).

Economic power

Much has been made of the influence of economic power on the future of languages. The measure used is the relative growth of the GNP of different countries. This abstract and often imperfect indicator may be ill suited to the spotting of early economic trends. One has to examine a number of specific economic indicators.[11] The variables that make up this measure may be more important than the indicator itself. Their accelerating rates of change are themselves due to the interplay of many factors, such as the increasing rapidity of communication, the rise in the mobility of populations and the growing globalisation of production and consumption. Yet the rates of change are not global; they vary from one area to the next.

It has become increasingly futile, however, to attribute economic power to different countries and their language. Within a global economy, sovereign states lose economic sovereignty (Mackey 1991). We have to consider the growing power of trade blocs like the European Union, Mercosur (South American Common Market or *Mercado del Sur*), the North American Free Trade Area and the World Trade Organisation, the controls exercised by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank and the influence of extraterritorial multinational corporations, some fifty of which are each richer than any one of fifty of the smaller sovereign states, including such countries as Denmark and Norway. Moreover, a third of wealth is now in the hands of some 200 corporations, which hire only a third of one percent of the world's workforce.

This globalised economy seems to be motivated by a product-oriented 'more is better' philosophy of the good life based on limitless growth and fuelled by the promotion of conspicuous consumption and an insatiable demand for new goods and entertainment, leading people to spend money they do not have to buy more things that they do not need. This has been sustained through policies of calculated obsolescence, competitive value-added brand marketing and perpetual indebtedness. Contrary to a current economic theory, prosperity has not always 'trickled downward'; it has rather accumulated upwards. So far, this free and open global market seems to have enriched the rich of poorer countries, seeming to confirm the dictum of Lacordaire: 'Entre le fort et le faible, c'est la liberté qui opprime' ('Between the strong and the weak, it is freedom that oppresses').

All this inflates the importance of the languages of trade and business, both global and urban, at the expense of the languages and cultures of hundreds of rural communities that will exchange their modest self-sufficiency for insecure

[11] Such as rate of growth in car sales in which, for example, in 1977 English-speaking countries ranked 14th–17th. In global competitiveness in 1998, the USA ranked 8th. In manufacturing potential, English-speaking countries in 1997 ranked 20th in use of robots (77,000 in the USA, for example, as compared to 413,000 in Japan) (*The Economist*, 17 October 1998 and 10 September 1998).

jobs in enterprises directed at the global economy. In the future this is bound to create different sorts and varying degrees of psychosocial backlash.

Psychosocial factors

Language minorities all over the world are now clamouring to be heard in their own language, many claiming the right to have their children schooled in their mother tongue. They often cite the UNESCO proclamation of 1947, which advanced this right. Elsewhere, especially in cosmopolitan urban centres, this right is being asserted by coalitions of language minorities intent on obtaining the balance of power, the so-called ethnic swing vote. We may indeed be entering a period characterised not only by freedom of movement but also by demands for cultural freedom (Caratini 1986) fuelled by resentment against the monopoly of dominant languages.

But the voice of resentment is not confined to city halls; it is also being heard in the halls of power and learning. Not everyone is enchanted with a language that dominates all international conferences and all meetings of learned societies. Thousands of scientists and intellectuals throughout the world are faced with the necessity of presenting their work in an international language that is not their own (de Swaan 1998). Alternatives would be preferred, even by some English speakers, like the Irish delegate to the League of Nations who was quoted as saying 'I can't speak my own language and I'll be damned if I'll speak in English' (Large 1985). Dominant languages have often provoked jealousy if not resentment against their native speakers whose monolingual indifference sometimes passes for arrogance, while at times it may be simply due to diffidence. Like the Greeks of old, they may speak no other language because they do not have to, and even if they did want to speak in a foreign tongue, they do not feel secure enough to be accepted. By not making the effort, however, they sometimes create an impression of smugness, which is also resented. For this reason, some writers on international languages, like Albert Guérard, have not found the idea of global English an attractive one; citing the past experience of French, he writes:

> The universality of French in the eighteenth century proves that universality is a mixed blessing, perhaps a curse in disguise. It breeds self-satisfaction and by making the study of other languages less useful, it favours ignorance and one-sidedness. For many years, the French smiled contemptuously at whatever was not French, unaware that they were smiling away the respect of the world. (Guérard 1923, p. 44)

Could such feelings today feed a trend towards the use of an alternative international language other than English? Where would it lead?

In addition to fixation on the importance of economic power promoting the use of a language, we find fixations on the dominance of culture, religion, education or science and technology (see below). In the absence of a method for differently weighting each of the factors, we are left for the time being with the alternative of weighting them equally (Mackey 1976).

The extrapolation of trends

Extrapolation is widely practised in the physical and biological sciences. It has also been applied to predicting the future of languages. This can lead to faulty predictions because these different types of phenomena are not compatible. In the physical sciences the accuracy of the extrapolation is limited only by our tools of observation and interpretation. The physical phenomenon being observed cannot of its own accord decide to change the trend or start a new one. Because human beings can and do change trends, their behaviour is less predictable. It was impossible to predict, for example, that one day a schoolboy at Rugby would suddenly pick up the football and run, thus revolutionising the game (Winch 1958).

Can we really entertain the possibility of predicting human behaviour of this sort? We are dealing here with degrees of probability that the language behaviours of populations will continue as in the past, especially if there is no alternative. But where more than one language is involved, we can perhaps assess the probability that one of the languages may assume a new or different function.[12]

Today, what is most favoured in projections is the continued growth of English as a world language. This is based on a trend that goes back to the Industrial Revolution and especially to the beginning of the twentieth century.[13] And, indeed, by the middle of the twentieth century, English was the language of half the world's magazines and newspapers, three quarters of its mail and three fifths of its radio stations. Since then the trend has continued into the rest of the century having gathered momentum through the export of films, popular songs, video cassettes, computer software and, more recently, the expansion of the internet. Is the continuation of this trend inevitable? Let us examine what is involved. To begin with, what we have here is not one but several trends in different fields of entertainment, information and communication. Each trend has to be examined separately. Let us begin with broadcasting.

Multilingual broadcasting

In the past decade, global radio networks and multilingual airways have become commonplace. But because television carries so much non-verbal content, its

[12] To what extent could one have predicted when writers in Chaucer's day would begin writing in English rather than in French, Italian or Latin as they had already done? Had Chaucer been born a decade earlier, the odds might not have favoured English.

[13] This had already been observed by H.G. Wells in *The Shape of Things to Come* (1979).

globalisation has a different effect on the languages and cultures of the world. In 1991, the Star TV satellite began broadcasting in English to thirty-eight countries in Asia housing some 2.7 billion people. But it eventually became evident that the potential viewership was less than 5% of the population. So it began adding Cantonese, then Hindi, then Mandarin and other languages, having come to the realisation that there is no such thing as a uniform Asian market. With the advent of compression technology using high-speed low-cost digital systems, more languages could be easily added. TV Asia began broadcasting in Punjabi, Bengali, Gujarati and Urdu in addition to Hindi. Yet even a one-language network depends on the availability of hundreds of films and videos a year, which only the largest well-equipped production centres can supply. These are concentrated mostly around Los Angeles and Bombay (Hollywood and Bollywood), which decide what the world's interests should be. Anything local or peripheral was discounted. So, one can already find dozens of channels blaring out in different languages monothematic repetitions of the same content. The far is drowning out the near while people try to maintain their language code at the expense of their culture.

The language of computer software

What we have here is a language linked to a technological monopoly. What is the future of this link? Here again the past can be enlightening. There have been comparable cases in the history of languages. Take, for example, Aramaic, the language of a small tribe, which was incorporated into the Babylonian Empire whose administration required the keeping of copious records. Each had to be impressed on heavy wet clay tablets in cumbersome cuneiform pictograms. The Arameans in contact with Phoenician traders adapted their cursive writing system into the twenty-four-letter shorthand-like Aramaic alphabet written on scrolls. This technological breakthrough gave them and their language a competitive advantage, if not a monopoly, in record keeping, trade and international relations, helping diffuse Aramaic as the international vehicular language over a vast area, extending from Egypt to India. But the monopoly was not to last, for once this new way of writing was adapted to languages like Hebrew, Arabic, Etruscan and Greek, the eminence of Aramaic as an international language came to an end.

By the same token it is unlikely that English will maintain its monopoly in computer software programs. As these are adopted and adapted in different parts of the world, they will necessarily be used to answer the more immediate needs of people in their everyday languages. If it was still true in 2000 that 80% of the world's computers used English (McRae 1995), it was because 90% of the world's computers were in English-speaking countries. Yet already one can observe a loosening of the links between the English language and computers.

There has been a slow but steady increase in the amount of software available in Arabic, Chinese, French, German, Italian, Japanese, Russian and Spanish. What was produced in French, German and other languages in 1998 was almost half of what was being developed in English. Yet in the foreseeable future, all this labour on language-related programming may become redundant when software is no longer language dependent. The promise is in hardware with reconfigurable logic cells, which adapt themselves to different networks.

Wired communities and satellite societies

The internet is another issue. Its initial and rapid expansion from the military to the academic to the managers to the consumer-producer took place mostly in North America. As foreign users began to log on, English remained the dominant language. In 1995 there were already some four million non-English-speaking users out of a total of 40 million; in 1998 there were some 80 million out of a total of 200 million. This admittedly does not take into account actual language use and intensity of contact. Active (four-hours-a-week-plus) users would account for half that number, of which an estimated 50% (47 million) were non-English-speaking (*E-Business Journal*, May 1999, p. 23). Since their numbers have been increasing more rapidly than those of the English speakers (from 10% to 50% in four years) the rate and extent of increase in internet use would be in their favour.

Between January 1998 and January 1999, there was a 46% increase in the number of websites. Although many non-English users log on in English, there is evidence that other mutually understood languages are used, thus creating the foundation for extraterritorial language communities just as there are now web groups formed around other common affinities (Cosgrave 1999, p. 21). Yet, it was unlikely that the internet, even as englobing as it seemed, would be able to keep its monopoly on the formation of extraterritorial communities. Its weakness was that it had been fed through wires and cables, while most people in the world outside Europe and America are not yet wired, and may remain so. Although about 90% of North American households were wired to a phone plug, only 3% of Chinese households had a phone. So the unwired world is tending to go directly into mobile means of communication.

In 1998 there were an estimated 200 million internet users, of which 20% were in Europe; for owners of mobile phones the number was 180 million. But if we compare the rate of increase of the two technologies, we find that mobile ownership was fast outpacing the number of new internet subscriptions. Language-wise, it is not how much mobile-phone ownership that is decisive; what counts more is phone use. This varies from one language group to the next. Although the average amount of use in 1999 was about 130 minutes a month, in Lebanon where 45% of phones were mobile, the average use was much higher (750 minutes per month) (*The Economist*, 10 April 1999, p. 45).

This switch in telecommunication from land to air could bring about faster changes in multilingual language use. For example, a mobile phone and its number become as personal as a credit card in a wallet. It is more independent of place and time, enabling speakers of the same vernacular to talk to each other no matter where they are or where they go. Phone talk between people of different vernaculars falls under what Zipf called the 'speaker–hearer economy' where the norm is not correctness but consensus and intercomprehension (Zipf 1949) independent of reliance on the written word. This encourages a wider use of purely oral vernaculars. It promotes the primacy of orality over literacy.

For the foreseeable future, however, it would seem that both technologies have the potential to extend the global reach of many languages hitherto confined to their speech communities. In the unwired world, what emerges are hybrid systems of internet, mobile and radio similar to those in the telecentres being tested in rural Ecuador and Colombia by the Canadian International Development Research Centre for the Enhancement of Local Economies, Languages and Cultures (Fontaine 1999). The rapid and massive multidirectional spread of these horizontal systems of instant interaction in business, finance, information and know-how is already undermining the traditional vertical systems of transmission of authority and control in the implementation by the state of its economic, social and language policies. Widespread availability of these horizontal interaction systems may well retard the demise of some of the world's 6,600 languages, half of which – it is predicted – will not survive the twenty-first century (Robins and Uhlenbeck 1991).

The uses of these tools of communication tend to multiply the linguistic effects of other trends like population mobility, urbanisation and cosmopolitanism. The pattern of this displacement is not only from poorer to richer countries but also from rural areas to big cities. Already half the population of the world is now living in cities (up from a third in the 1960s) and the cities are getting bigger; some city populations already exceed twenty million. It is in these cities that we can see the multilingual cosmopolitanism of the multicultural 'mega-polis' of tomorrow. Although these cities may have a dominant language, they are far from monolingual. Almost half (1.1 million) of Toronto's 2.4 million inhabitants, coming from 169 different countries, were born outside Canada. Studies of school populations in cities like Toronto, New York and Los Angeles have identified more than a hundred different home languages. The latest count for London was over 300 languages (Baker and Eversley 2000). As we have seen, the trouble with extrapolating trends and counter-trends in human behaviour is that they have a disconcerting habit of changing direction without warning.

The appropriation of models

The trouble with most appropriated models of language change is that they fail to reflect the multidimensional and multifunctional nature of language dynamics. They treat language and its use as an entity, when in fact it comprises four activities that are practised independently by individuals and societies; these are: listening, reading, writing and speaking. Within a single language, the practice of one of these skills can spread while another is continually regressing. For example, during the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, the reading of Latin was expanding at the same time as the practice of speaking this same language was declining. For long after the last of its native speakers had died, the Latin language continued to expand as a written language far beyond the borders of the Roman Empire. And it remained the learned language of Europe for a millennium thereafter. During the Second World War, thousands of Europeans who never spoke English used to listen to it regularly on their short-wave radios. Listening, reading, writing and speaking are separable components of language use, each deserves its own place in any dynamic model of language behaviour.

Second, as a result of a unitary view of language, most models fail to include the use of a language or language skill for one or more specific purposes. This is perhaps because in monolingual communities all of these functions (F) are covered by a single language (L). In most countries of the world and for most of its languages and dialects, this is not the case (Mackey 1989). Different languages or language varieties – as used in reading, writing and speaking – may have different functions such as education (F_1), work (F_2) and religion (F_3), and different domains like the universities (D_1), the courts of law (D_2), the government (D_3) and so on.

In many parts of the world, two languages and two or more dialects coexist with different functions in patterns like: L_1 (F_1, F_2) + L_2 (F_3, F_4) + L_3 (F_5, F_6). In much of North Africa, Colloquial Arabic, Berber, French, English and Koranic Arabic coexist with different functions within the same community. At any one time any one of these languages may be expanding by assuming new functions at the expense of the other languages. One would need a model that takes all this into account while giving each language its own dynamic of change and interaction.

Third, most dynamic models seem to assume a unidirectional Cartesian cause-and-effect framework rather than a more fitting cyclical one with room for multiple causation and mutual reinforcement, affecting the status, function and prestige of each language, so that any change in one may affect the others. Multiplying the number of functions of a language, for example, increases its status, which re-enforces or stabilises its place in society in a sort of upwards spiral of expansion; or, inversely, a downwards spiral of regression (Mackey 1994b).

In such a model, one would factor in all the forces (vectors) promoting an upwards movement towards the expansion of the language: geographical, social, political and psychological factors affecting a likely increase in territoriality, immigration, acculturation, urbanisation, life style, endogamy, economic prosperity or self-esteem.

Or one would factor in a downwards spiral towards obsolescence, where a language gradually loses its social functions through emigration, famine, disease, genocide, falling birth rate, exogamy, joblessness, lack of schooling, poverty or language interdiction. Such, it is predicted, will be the fate of half the world's languages (some 3,000) in the twenty-first century (Robins and Uhlenbeck 1991). But, again, maybe not, for between these two extremes lie most of the world's languages: the presence of one positive force may compensate for the lack of another; for example, a high birth rate and rural poverty.

These forces make up the environments in which a language is used both as code and as behaviour. If language as code is a system of systems, language as behaviour is a multidimensional and multifunctional system of mutually modifying practices. If we could quantify these practices and plot the results on a time scale, we could perhaps extrapolate the curve with a tolerable margin of error over the short term. But whatever is projected would still be subject to changes in its own environment, which by the nature of things could be triggered by the unpredictable behaviour of people and compounded by the hazards of history. The fate of a language as code has been quantified as the interplay of choice and chance (Herdan 1956). These are also the forces that determine the fate of language as behaviour. Because of the role of chance, the ecological drift models that might picture the past and present of a language cannot accurately predict its future. This is true even for world languages like English. Today, an apparently unstoppable trend towards global English usage could change direction in the future as a consequence of a surprisingly minor event (Graddol 1997, p. 21) or, more probably, a chain of consequences of a sequence of events affecting the evolution, modification or replacement of one language function after another.

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at http://www.ethnologue.org/), *Linguistic Composition of the Nations of the World* (Heinz Kloss and Grant D. McConnell, eds.).

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Part II

Major areas

7 Language geostrategy in eastern and central Europe: Assessment and perspectives

Ferenc Fodor and Sandrine Peluau

The western world harbours a stereotype of the countries of central and eastern Europe; for example, the tendency to characterise all countries in this area as belonging to the 'East bloc countries'. This distortion might be explained by the fact that this part of the world was part of the former Soviet bloc for over forty years. However, at the start of the twenty-first century, ten years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, national characteristics often continue to be ignored in news about the eastern part of the European continent.

This chapter is an attempt to clarify this situation from a particular point of view, that of teaching and learning foreign languages. Convergences as well as divergences are noted, including variations in national culture, history and current legislation of the countries under review, namely: Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia (formerly Czechoslovakia), Romania, and Bulgaria.[1] A focus on these countries is especially interesting since the situation of the major languages of international communication in central and eastern Europe changed considerably in the 1990s, following the politico-economic upheavals of 1989.

Historical overview of the situation of foreign languages in central and eastern Europe

The importance of foreign languages during the first half of the twentieth century

For centuries, knowledge of foreign languages was a constituent of the general culture of educated eastern Europeans. Before the Second World War, learning of one or two living foreign languages (in addition to Latin) was widespread in the area. Moreover, certain parts of central Europe (as, to a certain degree, Transylvania, for example) were long characterised by multilingualism. But

[1] In this chapter we do not include the countries of the former Soviet Union nor those of the former Yugoslavia. With regard to Albania, we merely cite one relevant statistic: in 1994, the number of students of French was 90,000 out of a total of 750,000 and this figure had not changed as of 1997–98 (Haut Conseil de la Francophonie, 1997–98).

after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian empire, the creation of new states and frontiers was made as a result of sometimes debatable linguistic criteria. The result of this policy is the near monolingualism of certain countries (Hungary) and the multilingualism of other states (like Romania, where significant Hungarian and German minorities live).

Certain countries have traditionally expressed their preference for a particular foreign language (for example, Romania and Bulgaria for French; Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland for German and also, to a lesser degree, French). However, this does not solely reflect a linguistic preference. The choice of one foreign language over another usually arises from criteria other than purely linguistic ones. The attraction of a foreign civilisation and literature, for example, involves placing value on the language expressing that culture. Aesthetic judgements about languages:

> are based on sentiments that one experiences about the nation that uses the language in question, about the nature of contacts that one has established with its users, about the preference one has for a country. (Martinet 1969, p. 48)

Likewise the geopolitical, economic and historical context impacts in a decisive way on the choice of a foreign language, whether at the individual or institutional level. Romanians express a certain loyalty in speaking a Romance language in their traditional preference for French, the first foreign language taught in Romania. In Hungary, several factors long favoured the learning of German: the geopolitical situation of the country, the long domination by the Habsburgs, and very frequent contact with the German-speaking world. In sum, 'contacts between civilisations, when they extend over time, establish roots expressed through mental images and behaviours' (Hagège 1992, p. 89).

Teaching of foreign languages during the communist period

The end of the Second World War spelled the beginning of a new period in the history of central and eastern European countries. They fell under the domination of the Soviet Union, which required them to break contacts with Western Europe and conform to the demands of 'big brother'. The university departments of western languages and literatures were practically all suppressed (a single department of French existed at that time in Hungary, at the University of Budapest). Also, the imposition of Russian as a compulsory subject at all levels of education from the end of the 1940s onwards resulted in Russian becoming the first foreign language.

At the same time, the lack of qualified Russian teachers led to farcical situations. Those who had been teachers of French or German before the war no longer had the right to teach these languages; but since they were language teachers, it was considered that they could teach Russian, which they did not know. They did learn Russian little by little along with their pupils (or, more aptly, they did not learn, and nor did their pupils). Consequently, for a long time the level of Russian teaching left much to be desired.

Lack of motivation as well as antipathy toward the Soviet model led to a more or less conscious refusal to learn Russian. Consequently, knowledge of this language never became widespread in the countries of central Europe, in spite of the political will of communist leaders who wanted to make Russian the lingua franca not only of the Soviet empire but also of the satellite countries. Thus, while Russian became the common vehicle of communication between the different peoples of the multilingual Soviet Union (and likewise one of the conditions for upward mobility), in central Europe, on the contrary, after eight or ten years of learning the language, most students remained unable to express themselves in Russian.

Even under Soviet domination, this part of the centre of the continent remained European and continued its relations with the western world, save during the years of hard-line Stalinism starting in 1949. With the process of destalinisation from about 1955, as well as the introduction of a second foreign language in the educational systems if only on a voluntary basis, study of foreign languages became easier and then expanded, especially from the 1970 onwards. A second foreign language (English, German, French) became standard, especially in secondary education (and particularly in general high schools or schools specialising in foreign languages, but much less so in vocational high schools). However, Russian remained the top foreign language taught because of its compulsory status until the end of the 1980s, apart from Romania after the change in political orientation. The change in political orientation in Romania means that under the Ceaucescu regime the official line of Moscow was not fully respected and that during part of the 1970s Romania became the example for the west of more liberal conduct than in most of the rest of the eastern bloc countries. Thus, teaching of Russian was not required in Romania as in the other neighboring countries. Nonetheless, this strategy of Ceaucescu allowed for imposition of a kind of personality cult.

Increased learning of western languages should not be exaggerated. Pupils approached these languages like any other subject that one needs to learn in order to get a satisfactory grade. The lack of motivation derived from the distinctive political context, inasmuch as French and English were not true tools for communication for the peoples of central Europe living under authoritarian regimes. These people met westerners only rarely, there were extremely limited opportunities to go to capitalist countries, and in most cases knowledge of western languages did not offer any advantage in their work.

This phenomenon was less true for German, which was the official language of a ‘brotherly country’, East Germany. This political consideration as well as the geographical proximity of German-speaking countries contributed to the position of German as the second foreign language after Russian in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary (for the Hungarian situation, see Table 7.1). In contrast, the learning of French was considered much more as an intellectual task, 'art for the sake of art', without any utilitarian merit. Nonetheless, there were two historical bastions of French in the region: Romania and Bulgaria. Both learning and teaching French in those countries were carried out vigorously, even during difficult historical periods.

The situation of a moderately enhanced interest in western languages characterises the 1960s and 1970s. The opening of certain countries towards the West from the 1970s onwards, as well as the possibility of travelling without excessive restrictions (Hungary in particular comes to mind) contributed further to the enhanced value of foreign language learning. Economic changes also acquired momentum. Moreover, the arrival of western tourists in relatively large numbers had an impact.

The creation of specialised schools or classes for intensive foreign language learning became more and more frequent. This phenomenon was even evident in Bulgaria, which remained a hard-line country until the end of the old regime. In Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, the second foreign language taught after Russian remained German, but competition with English intensified, and English ultimately gained at the expense of German. A positive image had an impact, since:

> English appeared to anticommunist intellectuals of the East bloc countries as a language of liberty and of reliable information, which one could use in public presentations and even specialised writings as a sign of political affirmation. (Hagège 1992, p. 46)

French was in fourth position far behind German and English (and Russian). But the Romanian case continued to be different with French as the first foreign language taught. The popularity of French remained equally strong in Bulgaria. This situation continued until the 1990s, until the beginning of new trends, discussed below.

The creation of several bilingual high schools (Russian, French, English and German) in Hungary should be mentioned. The Hungarian Education Ministry established fifteen bilingual high schools in 1986 in which five subject areas were taught in a foreign language (history, geography, mathematics, biology and physics). They were very successful. New bilingual institutions were created later, the most recent one being the French-Hungarian high school in Veszprém, which had its first intake of pupils in 1999. This phenomenon was not unique to Hungary, inasmuch as examples of this kind can be found in several countries of the region.

Table 7.1 and Figure 7.1 show the evolution of the number of pupils (in percentages) learning foreign languages other than Russian (which remained

Table 7.1 *Evolution of the number of pupils (in percentages) in Hungary learning foreign languages other than Russian*

Year	1960	1970	1980	1990
French	5.2	6.8	9.8	3.0
English	13.5	23.7	52.6	40.0
German	81.3	69.5	37.6	57.0

Source: Statistics of the Ministry of Education, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990



Fig. 7.1 Evolution of the number of pupils (in percentage) in Hungary learning foreign languages other than Russian
Source: Statistics of the Hungarian Ministry of Education, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990

compulsory until the school year 1989–90) between 1960 and 1990 at the primary school level in Hungary.

French has never succeeded in rising above 10%, while the number of English learners has grown strongly in comparison to 1960 in spite of some fluctuations. German had a big lead in 1960, and retained a significant position throughout the subsequent three decades in spite of a relative decline.

Legislation and teaching of foreign languages after 1990

Teaching of western foreign languages in central and eastern Europe has experienced expansion since the politico-economic upheavals of 1989. With the end of Russian as the only compulsory foreign language at all levels of teaching, three languages entered into competition to dominate the linguistic market place: English, German and French. Italian and Spanish as well as Japanese have increasingly numerous followers.

Since 1990 a number of central European countries have clearly indicated their intention to join the Council of Europe, the OECD, NATO and the European Union. With the dissolution of COMECON, the planned economies of the east also opened to the western market economies, which brought in its wake an important number of foreign investments. Some countries attracted more than others (Hungary obtained more than 50% of direct foreign investments in the region until 1995), but all face the challenge of opening towards the outside world. In addition to foreign investments, joint ventures and the arrival of western tourists, the proliferation of television channels in foreign languages contributed to an increase in demand for knowledge of foreign languages.

Below, we give details on a country-by-country basis of the respective position of foreign languages, including a description of legislation and an analysis of new orientations.

Country-by-country situations

In the majority of the countries of central and eastern Europe, the learning of a foreign language is available yet optional from the earliest year of schooling. From the ages of nine and eight years, the learning of a foreign language is compulsory in the Czech Republic and Romania, respectively. In the lower and upper general high school levels,[2] obligatory teaching of a foreign language is recommended, except in Romania, where this obligation depends on the subject options chosen by the pupil. In Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Poland the study of two languages in the upper general high school is compulsory. In Hungary, Poland and Slovakia during the high school years a second language option may be added to compulsory foreign-language study.

Hungary According to various surveys (for example, during the population census), the overwhelming majority of Hungarians are monolingual. About 10–12% of the population declare themselves able to speak a foreign

[2] This distinction is made in the school systems in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania. Lower high school includes pupils between ten and fourteen years, while upper high school encompasses those between fourteen and eighteen years. It should be noted that modifications and reforms are underway.

language, less than 5% can express themselves in two languages, and the number of those that are able to communicate in three languages is less than 1%.

The main languages learned are English, German, French, Russian, Italian and Spanish. The languages of national minorities or of countries bordering Hungary are: Slovak, Romanian, Serbian, Croatian[3] and Ukrainian.

The teaching of modern languages in Hungary has significant geographical variations. French is taught in three areas in particular: in Budapest, in the regions bordering the Ukraine to the east and in the region of Csongrad in the southern part of the country. In the western parts of the country and at the primary level nationally, German remains significant and learners of German may even outnumber those of English.

> However, the most popular and most taught foreign language at the national level is English, even though oral communication skills are often unsatisfactory. It is the language not only of very popular American movies and music, but also and especially of commerce, of new technologies (such as the Internet), of sports, and more and more of international diplomacy, of international colloquia, and of scientific publications. It is the new lingua franca (Graddol 1997)

Teaching of French experienced a relative revival at the beginning of the 1990s. France is the third largest foreign investor in the country, and has made serious efforts, especially up to 1996, to promote the study of French (for example, through scholarships for studies, sending foreign language assistants abroad, teaching aids and assistance in providing refresher courses for former teachers of Russian). The image of an exclusively literary and elitist language was modified little by little by emphasising the utilitarian side of French. French is the third foreign language taught in Hungary with 50,000 learners, behind English and German which each has about 500,000 pupils. From the mid-1990s there has been a stagnation and even decline in the number of learners of French in high schools.

Pupils learning Russian continued to decline markedly throughout the 1990s. After the long period of imposed study of Russian, the rejection of the study of Russian has perhaps been excessive in view of the geographical proximity, cultural heritage and economic potential of Russia and the countries of the former Soviet Union.

Table 7.2 and Figure 7.2 show the evolution of the number of pupils for each of the four main foreign languages taught in high schools and vocational high schools in Hungary between 1989 and 1997.

The significant rise in the number of pupils of western foreign languages has been accompanied by official declarations underlining the importance of

[3] Serbian and Croatian constitute a single language, Serbo-Croatian. The distinction between them is the result of conflicts of various kinds between Serbs and Croats, but from a linguistic point of view the differences are minimal.

Table 7.2 *Evolution of the number of pupils for four main foreign languages in high schools and vocational high schools, Hungary, 1989–97 (percentages = parentheses)*

Year	1989–90	1990–91	1991–92	1992–93	1993–94	1994–95	1995–96	1996–97
English	93,385 (34.20)	120,286 (41.20)	146,556 (47.40)	171,232 (53.00)	186,023 (56.30)	196,195 (58.10)	210,142 (60.20)	223,474 (61.80)
German	76,547 (28.00)	100,786 (34.50)	128,258 (41.50)	148,922 (46.10)	161,075 (48.70)	170,280 (50.50)	181,137 (51.90)	192,972 (53.40)
French	18,896 (6.90)	24,342 (8.30)	27,751 (9.00)	29,380 (9.10)	29,050 (8.80)	28,098 (8.30)	27,995 (8.00)	27,701 (7.70)
Russian	222,373 (81.30)	166,688 (57.10)	101,599 (32.80)	56,657 (17.60)	35,266 (10.70)	24,219 (7.20)	18,000 (5.20)	13,352 (3.70)
Total	273,392	291,779	309,289	322,912	330,586	337,301	349,299	361,395

Note: Totals do not represent the sum of pupils for each language since many pupils study more than one foreign language.
Source: Statistics of the Hungarian Ministry of Education, 1990–97.



Fig. 7.2 Evolution of the number of pupils in Hungary for four main foreign languages in high schools and vocational high schools, 1989–97
Source: Statistics of the Hungarian Ministry of Education, 1990–97

knowledge of these languages. In addition, the number of foreign language assistants in secondary and higher education increased considerably from the beginning of the 1990s. Universities, higher schools and high schools all expressed interest in diverse projects of international development and they frequently added foreign language options.

Poland In 1989–90, Russian was still being taken as a compulsory subject by the majority of pupils in primary and secondary schools. English and German were each at 8.8% and French trailed at 2.1% (Haut Conseil de la Francophonie, 1997–98, p. 69). Freedom of choice of the foreign language to be learned at school began in Poland, as in most other countries of central Europe, at the start of the 1990s. Learning of one foreign language is mandatory in primary school and two are mandatory in secondary school.

The decline in the number of pupils learning Russian during the first half of the 1990s was slowed down by the lack of qualified teachers of western languages. At present, those preferring English (65% in 1994–95) and German (55%) are substantial in number, while those choosing French have remained stable (20%) (Haut Conseil de la Francophonie, 1997–98, p. 122).

French language evolution has been very slow (400,000 learners or 100,000 more than in 1994; Haut Conseil de la Francophonie, 1997–98, p. 69), especially in relation to English. The status of French in Polish mentality remains that of 'the language of nobles and the aristocracy', and still suffers from an image as an elitist language. Frenchmen do not easily correct those who hold this linguistic stereotype, since normative pressure plays an extremely important linguistic role in France. For the French, it is often considered that there is only one correct kind of French: that found in grammar books and dictionaries. This attitude continues to be expressed through scorn for new language uses and terms used in other French-speaking countries in the name of sacrosanct good usage of the Parisian bourgeoisie.

In contrast, English is seen as the language of modernity, of new technologies and of communication in the broad sense of the word. As in Hungary, German is considered as a useful language especially because of Germany's geographical proximity and the intensity of relations between Poland and Germany.

The lack of qualified teachers of western languages is a recurring concern expressed in various reports. This is due in part to financial problems within the Polish educational system, although new types of higher educational establishments that include the employment of certified language teachers have been created. Official declarations also highlight the political will to reinvigorate foreign language study in order to ease into eventual national integration with the European Union.

The learning of particular foreign languages reflects geographical variations of Polish regions as well as the kind of educational institution. The teaching of French is strong in the region of Cracow–Bielsko–Katowice. English dominates in urban primary schools and high schools. German is prominent in general and vocational schools. Russian is especially present in rural primary schools and in the first cycle of vocational schools.

Czechoslovakia (Subsequently the Czech republic and Slovakia) As with most other countries of central and eastern Europe, the teaching of western languages experienced very significant advances after the end of the period of imposed study of Russian under the influence of the Soviet Union. The situation of the major foreign languages in the Czech Republic and Slovakia resembles that already observed in Hungary and Poland. Although French is the best taught foreign language, competition from English and German is very strong, as witnessed by the opening of numerous private schools to meet this demand.

The main language taught after primary school is English, but that is followed closely by German, which is considered as a useful, practical language (geographical proximity and frequent contact with the German-speaking world throughout the history of these two countries). French always suffers, as in Poland and Hungary, from the image of a language with little value and reserved for elites even if a certain positive evolution may be observed. One could argue that if Renault had been successful in taking over the Skoda car factory, the knowledge of French would have been more highly valued. But Volkswagen ultimately bought Skoda, and this very probably contributed to the reinforcement of the position of German. As for Russian, the decline in interest is very marked.

Romania Because of the image of French in Romania as the great 'language of culture and opening' to the world, this language remains the first foreign language learned (60% of pupils or 2.1 million French language learners), in spite of a new interest for English (1.3 million learners). The fact that Romanian, like French, is a Romance language lends support to the latter. While English is in second position nationwide, it holds first place in the capital, Bucharest. Russian holds third place with 470,000 learners, and German is relegated to fourth place with less than 10% of Romanian pupils (260,000 pupils) studying it.

The 1990 decree that made the teaching of a foreign language mandatory from eight years of age was significant. At the primary level, 61% of those between seven and eleven years of age choose French. At the secondary level, 48% of those between eleven and nineteen years old study French (of which 5,500 are in fifty-nine bilingual sections), while in higher education more than 6,000 students study in one of the sixteen French departments. About 1,500 pupils learn the language in French-speaking affiliates (Haut Conseil de la Francophonie, 1997–98), and 25% of pupils enrolled in disciplines other than French choose the language, in contrast with 30% for English. To this should be added forty-four high schools that are bilingual or that offer intensive French (Haut Conseil de la Francophonie, 1993, pp. 69–70).

While the demand for English continues to increase, there is a severe shortage of qualified English teachers. Moreover, few modern languages graduates choose teaching because of the low remuneration of teachers.

Bulgaria The opening of the country to the West produced a new context for foreign languages. As indicated above, Bulgaria constitutes one of the pillars of French teaching in this part of central Europe. In 1991–92, French was the first modern language taught at the secondary level with 234,436 learners (or 38.9%), in contrast with 233,581 for English (38.7%) and 133,792 for German (22.7%) out of a total group of 603,305 pupils. Bilingual courses have existed since 1945 and number fifty at present (Haut Conseil de la Francophonie, 1997–98, p. 68), while there are French-speaking professional tracks in chemistry, electrical engineering, management, hotel management and wine production.

However, the opening of the country to the west led to a decline in interest for French (percentages less than 2% at the primary level and 16% at the secondary level) and an even more marked decline of Russian in favour of English. A recent

Table 7.3 *Number of pupils (in thousands) learning English, French and German in six central European countries, school year 1994–95*

	English	French	German
Bulgaria	145.5	67.4	59.8
Czech Republic	113.8	15.4	88.5
Hungary	107.0	20.0	83.0
Poland	421.0	118.0	334.0
Romania	424.9	574.0	73.9
Slovakia	59.0	7.0	47.0

Source: Les chiffres clés de l'éducation dans l'Union européenne, 1997



Fig. 7.3 Number of pupils (in thousands) learning English, French and German in six central European countries, school year 1994–95
Source: Les chiffres clés de l'éducation dans l'Union européenne, 1997

survey indicated that 69% of parents want their children to learn English, 8% German, 7% French and 1% Russian.

Table 7.3 and Figure 7.3 show the number of pupils (in thousands) learning English, French and German in the six countries under review for the school year 1994–95 (general secondary school level but not vocational schools).

Conclusions

Until 1990, learning of foreign languages was governed for each country by distinctive constraints and obligations generally favouring Russian and discouraging the study of western languages. With the collapse of the communist regimes, the study of languages diversified at the same time as a progressive reform of the educational systems was undertaken.

Two groups of countries can be identified, each with distinctive trends in the learning of foreign languages. The first group includes Poland, Czechoslovakia (the Czech republic and Slovakia since 1993) and Hungary, and the second includes Romania and Bulgaria. The countries of the first group give great importance to the teaching of German, which ranks first among foreign languages taught at the primary level. Even at the secondary level this language is strongly represented and since the beginning of the 1990s its number of language learners has increased each year. This first group of countries is likewise distinguished from the majority of the European Union countries where German continues to lose ground especially to English.

The second group of countries is distinguished by the importance accorded to French. The case of Romania is especially marked although Bulgaria also allocates much more attention to French study than countries of the first group. Nonetheless, statistics concerning the evolution of learners reflect the growing influence of the English language through its advance to second place in Romania and first place in Bulgaria.

More broadly, the strongest trend in those six countries is the increase of English learners. Russian has been the big loser in the 1990s, struggling for third or fourth place after English, German and sometimes French. German has made strong advances and follows English in importance in most of the countries. Its success is due mainly to external geopolitical, economic and historical causes.

In spite of certain advances, French has not been able to overcome its image as the language of culture of elites.

It may be concluded that the big winner in central Europe since 1989 is English, which has benefited massively from the new politico-economic environment. The role of external factors is evident in the progression and popularity of this language. The alleged ease of acquisition of the language could in this case influence language choice. The frequent choice of basic English – which, it can be argued, has scarcely anything to do with the language of Shakespeare and Byron – demonstrates the importance of linguistic images and attitudes. While some interesting hypotheses may be proposed, further detailed sociolinguistic surveys would be needed to test these hypotheses. However, the aim of this chapter has been to present an overview of the major international languages taught in eastern and central European countries.

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8 Languages and supranationality in Europe: The linguistic influence of the European Union

Claude Truchot

European Union and supranationality

Economic integration

During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, national economies in Europe were closely interlinked with nation-states. The borders of these countries protected their economies and, for the strongest of them, their colonial and post-colonial policies opened up markets for their products and services. The process of internationalisation and globalisation deeply transformed relations between the states and the economy. The creation of a European Community (and since 1993 of a Union) accelerated this transformation. Since the Treaty of Rome in 1957 it has consisted in opening an area for the free movement of capital, goods, services and people by creating a common, and later a single, market. The Community was first made up of six countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands), plus Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom in 1973, Spain, Greece and Portugal in 1984 and, as the European Union, incorporated Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995. Others, such as Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, will join them in the near future. In regulating the relations between this market and the different countries EU legislation is followed and laws of the individual states have to conform to it. This legislation is the basis of supranationality. Community institutions are its instruments. The European Commission implements measures and objectives defined by the treaties, proposes programmes and monitors them when adopted. Proposals made by the Commission have to be approved by the states in the European Council, which brings together their representatives. The European Parliament adopts the budget and is a consultative authority. The Court of Justice safeguards the application of Community law.

Political integration and Community values

In Europe, European integration is generally defined as a commitment to a common project of peoples who were often opposed to each other in the past and who undertook to unite and build a community of destiny. In 1992 the Maastricht Treaty tried to give shape to this commitment by starting a process of political integration and by symbolically adopting the term European Union (EU). This treaty also affirms a principle of European citizenship. Thus, it undertakes to give a new dimension to supranationality, other than an economic one. However, there is greater commitment to integration in areas that have direct economic impact or are extensions of the unification of the economic market (for example, the single currency in the form of the Euro and the Common Agricultural Policy) than in other fields. Nevertheless, the many programmes of co-operation are intended to realise the idea of integration by encouraging exchanges. This commitment to common integration has motivated public opinion, or at least a proportion of it, to support the process of economic integration. Its ideological influence can be considered as a tangible manifestation of its political reality. Thus, this ideological dimension also contributes to supranationality. It provides emblems: the flag, the anthem and the style of EU passports; and it is used as a reference at cultural and linguistic levels.

In this chapter, we look at the linguistic influence of the European Union at two levels. The first one is the linguistic relations between the EU, member states and citizens. The second one is the competence that EU institutions have given themselves to make decisions about linguistic issues arising from the implementation of Community law for the setting-up of the single market.

The effects on linguistic usage in Europe, generated by the existence of a single market, are not discussed here. The market modifies the forms of exchanges and therefore also affects the ways of communicating. However, studies assessing the linguistic effects of these changes have not yet been undertaken. They would probably show, among other things, the effects on communication and on the use of languages at work caused by mass mergers and takeovers of firms that derive from the introduction of the single currency.

Action has also been taken by EU institutions to foster language knowledge in Europe. Such action, developed under the heading of 'Lingua', are part of education programmes named Socrates and Leonardo, which promote exchanges of learners and teachers and innovative teaching practices (Hermans 1997). The main purpose of the programmes is to make the concept of integration a reality. It is difficult to assess their effects on language teaching and learning in Europe, an area of competence that is still very much the responsibility of member states. In the future, however, they may become an area of transnational influence.

Linguistic relations between the EU, member states and citizens

Official rules governing the languages to be used

The EU is generally presented and readily presents itself as a multilingual institution. In principle, multilingualism was originally guaranteed by the signatory countries of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, recognising the equal value of its linguistic versions produced in each official language of the member states. This equality was recognised in all the following Treaties (the Single Act, the Treaty of Maastricht and the Treaty of Amsterdam). The linguistic regime of the institutions was laid down in Article 217 of the Treaty of Rome stating that 'the rules governing the languages of the institutions of the Community shall . . . be determined by the Council acting unanimously.' Regulation number 1 of 15 April 1958 of the Council determined that the four official languages and working languages would be those languages used in the six initial member states: Dutch, French, German and Italian. This regulation was then automatically modified at each accession of new member states. It was thus successively extended to English and Danish, then to Spanish, Portuguese and Greek, and finally to Finnish and Swedish, i.e. eleven languages since 1995. The Treaty consequently left the states' representatives free to decide upon the languages to be used by the institutions, imposing only the respect of unanimity. The choice of languages stems from this rule as well as from the principle of equality between the member states: the linguistic regime of the institutions includes all the official languages of each state. Moreover, the regulation specifies that official documents should be drafted in all of these languages. It also specifies that the documents sent by a member state to the institutions may be drafted in any of the eleven official languages, and that the reply should be drafted in the same language.

Use of languages in the institutions

As stated in Article 217, the above linguistic regime should apply to all the mechanisms of the EU, especially since no distinction is made between official and working languages. The regime should also apply to all the exchanges between partners, whoever they might be, i.e. states or citizens. The reality is, however, far from this ideal.

First of all, the regime does not concern intra-institutional communication. Each institution (i.e. the European Commission, the European Council, the European Parliament, the European Court of Justice) has its own practices, which are partly defined in internal regulations, based on an article of the official linguistic regime, which states that 'the institutions of the Community may stipulate in their rules of procedure which of the languages are to be used in specific cases' (Article 6). These particular rules favour two main lingua francas: English and French. German is generally chosen as the third language, but its usage remains limited.

Limits of institutional multilingualism

In the relations between the member states, citizens and various partners, the only field the linguistic regime applies to completely is that of official documents: the documents adopted by decision-making authorities and translated into and issued in eleven languages. Aside from this, the level of awareness of multilingualism varies considerably. It is guaranteed at the highest level of political representation. In meetings held at the highest level of the European Council, simultaneous interpretation is provided and all documents are translated into eleven languages. This is also the case in plenary sessions of the European Parliament. But the lower you get in the hierarchy or the less formal the meetings are, the less multilingualism is guaranteed. Ministerial meetings on topical issues and diplomatic meetings (i.e. permanent representatives) are only interpreted into three languages. Meetings that officials of the member states and institutions attend are held in two languages, or sometimes even in a single one. Expert meetings are usually held in only one language.

Empirical usage of languages

Semi-internal and external communication has developed and keeps increasing in a variety of areas. One of the reasons is that – with the single market, the common agricultural policy and numerous programmes – the Commission has increasing responsibility in administration and management. In fact, most of the time the principle of the eleven languages is kept outside these areas of communication. The linguistic regime, which applies to these areas, changes depending on the circumstances. This is the case in working meetings, which are increasing in number and bring together representatives of the member states' institutions. This is also the case in the course of experts' work. Of the 4,000 meetings organised every year, 75% do not benefit from simultaneous interpretation. A great number of reports are given to consultants who generally have to work in English. This practice tends to apply to invitations to tender for signing public contracts financed by the Community budget. Whereas Community regulations explicitly stress the tenderers' right to express themselves in their own language, they are implicitly invited to use English. When they speak in an official capacity, members of an institution tend to comply with its internal linguistic regime and speak either in English or in French according to the circumstances. With respect to relations with external countries, the choice of the languages is based on empirical solutions: French with French-speaking Africa, Spanish with Latin America, English with most other parts of the world. As far as programmes are concerned, most of the time these are dealt with in English.

Official linguistic regime and relations with citizens

The official linguistic regime should apply to the relations with citizens as a way of recognising European citizenship. The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) established the principle that every citizen of the Union may write to any institution in one of the twelve languages of the treaties (all eleven official languages plus Irish) and shall receive a reply in the same language (Article 21). But the implementation of this right depends, of course, on the citizens' will to use it. The majority of people that contact the European institutions use a lingua franca, usually English (DGLF 2000).

In fact, one realises that linguistic relations between the EU and all the institutions and citizens within its geopolitical sphere are not well codified. Apart from the limited number of cases where the linguistic regime is recognised and implemented, the use of languages is the result of an interplay of factors and of various influences. The way lingua francas are used results from such issues.

The dynamic of lingua francas

French French remained predominant in the European institutions from their foundation until the mid-1970s. From the 1970s on, English was introduced as a lingua franca. Nevertheless, French remained the most frequently used language until the early 1990s. Several studies have highlighted this predominant use of French (Gehnen 1991; Schlossmacher 1994). From the 1990s, English acquired an increasingly important role until it became predominant in the late 1990s.

French predominance and its longevity of use (for more than thirty years) is a unique phenomenon in contemporary international communication: there are no other examples of languages that have been able to stand out against English in this type of communication in a free-competition context. The reasons that have most frequently been put forward are that:

- French was the most common language to the six founding states (an official language in three of them and a foreign language broadly taught in the others);
- the United Kingdom was not one of the six founding states; and
- the main institutions were set up in Brussels and Luxembourg.

Even if these factors may explain the reasons why French was used at the creation of the Community, they do not explain why it continued to be used for so long.

Other factors have certainly played a role in explaining this, such as the great number of French-speaking people in the administration (Luxembourgers, Belgian and French people), and the French Government's efforts to ensure that the use of French is maintained. The concept of a 'culture of organisation' within the institutions is also cited, but there is no detailed study that analyses this. The various studies that have been carried out (see above) quantify the use of French compared with other languages, but do not explain its functions within the institutions. The permanence of French can probably be explained

Table 8.1 *Languages used in primary texts of the European Commission, 1986–99 (percentage)*

Year	French	English	German	Other languages
1986	58	26	11	5
1989	49	30	9	12
1991	48	35	6	11
1996	39	45	5	12
1997	40	45	5	9
1998	37	48	5	10
1999	35	52	5	8

Source: After Labrie 1993; Benda-Peter 1999; DGLF 2000

by the organisation of an administration modelled on the French system and of a power partly based on the use of French.

English The introduction of English as a lingua franca is generally attributed to the entry of the UK and Ireland into the EU in 1973. This also coincides with the emergence of English in international communication within Europe. English is first used in sectors such as economy, technologies and sciences. The use of English increased slowly at first, but this accelerated from the end of the 1980s. The proportions of primary texts (languages in which texts were initially written before being translated) drafted in each lingua franca provide the main data for specifying the evolution of language use over time. The European Commission (the EU institution producing most documents with 1.1 million pages a year) is the most significant example (Benda-Peter 1999).

Table 8.1 highlights the growing importance of English and the relative decline of French in the written form over a thirteen-year period. However, it has been asserted that the decrease of French is less significant in its spoken form (Benda-Peter 1999). During the 1980s and 1990s, the factors in favour of the use of English became consistently more numerous:

- results of the globalisation process that led to the use English in the major fields coming within the competence of the EU;
- generalisation of the teaching–learning of English;
- training of a new-generation of diplomats and officials in American and British universities or in Europe through programmes in English; and
- enlargement of the EU in 1995 to include countries where English is the second language.

It is likely that diplomats and officials who have a much better command of English than of French are not keen to accept a power system in which French plays a significant part and favour a shift towards the broader use of English. English also benefits from growing semi-internal and external communication since French is mainly used for internal communication. This distribution between French and English occurred progressively. A study by Labrie (1993) showed that officials of the Commission used French up to 63% and English up to 33% of the time. As regards communication with officials and experts from the member states, the study revealed that 22% of spoken communication happened in French, 31% in English; 6% of the written communication was in French and 59% in English.

German Table 8.1 above also shows that English was increasingly used at the expense of the already slight part played by German (11% of documents in 1986; 5% in 1998 and 1999). The use of German may have been expected to increase with the enlargement of the EU to central and east European countries where this language is formally taught in schools and is sometimes better known than English (e.g. in Hungary, Poland, etc.). This has not, however, been the case so far. Programmes aimed at this part of Europe (PHARE, TACIS) are exclusively monitored in English, and English has been the only language used for the negotiations towards enlargement. In terms of using languages other than English, this is a bad omen for the future. It seems that even the setting-up of a European institution in Germany is not a sufficient condition to introduce German in the customs of the institution: the European Central Bank, which is located in Frankfurt and is modelled on the Bundesbank, works almost exclusively in English. Officially nine languages are used, but English is the only one used in decision-making processes (even though the UK is not a member). English is also predominantly used for its external communication.

The linguistic influence of EU policies

Community law and language laws

In the distribution of competence between the EU and the member states, language policies are in principle within the member states' competence. They can decide upon the measures to be taken as regards the status of their languages. The European Commission and the case law of the European Court of Justice tend to recognise this and to respect the principle of subsidiarity in matters of languages. This is what was claimed in France by the constitutional law of 1992 on the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty when introducing the status of French in the Constitution: 'The language of the Republic is French.' In several countries, some laws aim at guaranteeing the use of national and official languages in fields such as consumer protection and health, or set the knowledge of the national language as a condition to enter the labour market. This is the case, at different levels, in Belgium, France, Ireland and other countries.

But the sovereignty that member states claim through language laws is frequently faced with the implementation of Community law. The issue of language usage was soon raised with the opening of the single market. Disappearance of national economic barriers, free movement of goods, services, capital and individuals were organised, but linguistic consequences were not envisaged. The European Commission first considered that when there were language requirements in a particular country, they were aimed at protecting national internal markets. It then admitted to the necessity of finding a balance between the removing of economic borders and the protection of consumers and health by taking languages into account. But instead of recognising member states' sovereignty in this field, the Commission chose to introduce, case after case into directives implementing treaties, provisions determining the type of language measures that member states are empowered to take. There was a hazy period when phrases such as 'language understood by consumers' or 'one of the EU official languages' were used to draw up these directives. But now current measures ensure that the 'official language' of the marketing country is used on labels, operating instructions, contracts, and other official documents, provided the country wishes to do so. Some directives also admit that it is legitimate to require that professionals settling in another member state are proficient in the language of the host country.

A supranational power of language regulation

The sorts of decisions described above are in accord with the official linguistic regime of the EU. However, since it deals with each situation individually, the EU Commission defines the extent of application of the clauses concerning languages and refuses to refer only to subsidiarity; the Commission thereby largely reduces member states' sovereignty and claims to be representative of a supranational legitimacy. This asserted competence is bound to extend since, with the extension of the single market and growing EU prerogatives, Community law applies to more and more fields. Language plays a key role in most fields: information, training, employment, culture, e-commerce, labour law, etc. In 1998, examples of documents in which provisions on languages were introduced were:

- a draft directive on e-commerce;
- a formal notice of the Commission to transpose directives concerning insurance;
- several reports on issues concerning the provision of languages in the directive on foodstuffs; and
- a regulation of patents.

The directives on insurances offer a revealing example of the attitude of the Commission and its relations with member states. These directives allow member states to render their official language obligatory only if the interests of subscribers make it indispensable. In France, the Code of Insurances stated that insurance contracts should be written in French in compliance with the 1994 Language Law. The Commission considered that this was in opposition to the Treaties and warned the French government. A compromise was finally negotiated according to which the use of French was maintained except if subscribers explicitly wanted to use another language (DGLF 2000). This decision is favourable to French but could not be taken without the Commission's consent.

Conclusions and prospects

The EU as an institution regulating language use

Every political entity having powers to rule has a linguistic influence by the simple fact that it rules and uses languages (or one language) for that purpose. This was and still is the case of nation-states, and it is now the case of the EU. The EU's official linguistic regime influences the use of languages outside the institutions. The languages it includes benefit from a kind of international recognition. They are made visible, particularly in the eyes of their native speakers, and their status is strengthened. Communication in the EU includes almost all fields, including the most modern; the languages used in the EU are integrated into all these fields of communication, which foster their usage and diffusion. Their corpus is consequently enriched and modernised. These languages benefit from the most recent linguistic engineering tools (such as terminology databases, translation tools, etc.). These beneficial effects are mostly felt in countries with less widely spread languages that can allocate fewer means to modernise their languages in comparison with larger states.

A linguistic regime using only a limited number of official languages – two or three, and in particular a single one – would have generated great disparities. Countries whose languages were not chosen would have been forced to adapt themselves to the flow of communication coming from the EU, particularly by translating the large number of documents written and published by the institutions. Even supposing that financial compensation were given to cover the costs generated, it is not certain that all the countries would have carried out such adaptation in the same way, nor even that all of them would have done it. As a matter of fact, the official languages would have been institutionalised as supranational languages, which would have given them a status of co-officiality in each country, along with the national languages. This would have had foreseeable consequences on the use of the languages in the public sphere. This institutionalisation would have also given a particular power in the EU to the countries that speak these languages. The official linguistic regime makes it possible to streamline the linguistic adaptation and, to a certain extent, to make it more equal.

Decisions taken by the EU on linguistic usage in the setting-up of the single market favour, in their present form, the official languages of member states. An education programme such as Lingua, designed to extend the learning and the knowledge of languages, is an example of the consideration given to these languages. In taking these decisions and having this influence, the EU plays a part in regulating language use in Europe.

The EU as a pole of language changes

On the other hand, the practices in semi-internal and external communication that are not governed by the linguistic regime are factors of change. The languages used benefit from advantages that the other languages do not have. Decisions are taken, documents are drafted and community information is sought by economic and political decision makers in these particular languages. Delays for translation being long, the information is available in the source language of the documents well before being available in the other official languages. Lingua francas have a more important role, enjoy greater prestige, and their international status is strengthened.

We have already seen that German has not really benefited from these advantages. This considerably reduced its development as an international language in spite of the economic, political and demographic weight of Germany within the EU. By contrast, both the prestige and the status of French have increased. If the place of the teaching of French as a foreign language can be maintained in Europe, this is probably due, to a certain extent, to its prestige as a lingua franca of the European institutions. In any case, initiatives have been taken to strengthen the teaching of French and the number of French learners is rising perceptibly in several countries that have recently joined the EU (Sweden and Finland) or that will be joining soon (Poland).

However, it is neither certain that French will be able to keep this position in the future nor that German will be able to obtain such a position. As for English, this language is the great winner in every field. A large number of factors make its use predominant in the institutions without decisions being taken to counterbalance their influence. English is almost the only language used in external communication, which brings it into the public sphere of the member states. Strong economic and cultural factors are at present acting to promote the usage of English in numerous fields in Europe. Its role in the European institutions gives it *de facto* an institutional legitimacy that interacts with the other factors. This legitimacy would of course be strengthened if English should become the only lingua franca of the institutions. In fact, we can wonder how long the EU will continue to ignore the problems raised by the use of lingua francas. It will sooner or later have to take measures to regulate their use, and to state clearly what their role should be, which languages would be concerned and how the functions of all the official languages should be distributed.

However it is clear that the EU would largely contribute to keeping a linguistic balance in Europe not only by perpetuating but also by strengthening and widening the official linguistic regime. The costs it generates and the human and material means that are needed are often considered as obstacles to its extension and even to its very existence. It is said that the linguistic services managed by the Commission – namely the Translation Service, the Joint Interpreting and Conference Service and the linguist lawyers – represent some 15% of the Commission's workforce, and 3% of its operational budget, that is to say 325 million euros. This is important, but this cost represents only 0.43% of the Commission's global budget. If we add to this the costs generated by the linguistic services of the European Parliament, the European Council, the Court of Justice and the satellite organisms (Committee of the Regions, Central Bank, etc.), they come to 700 million euros. Unofficial estimates mention far higher costs: 1.8 billion euros, which is more than 2% of the total EU budget. But this is considered taboo and cannot be confirmed (Le Monde 1999). These estimates do not seem very realistic, even considering indirect costs such as equipment in interpretation booths, language training and language programmes.

Uncertain prospects

In any case, it is not a financial but a political issue. The EU has changed considerably since it was founded as a Common Market. For a number of years, the functions of its institutions were to bring countries to dismantle their economic borders and to respect the rules of the single market. Now the institutions have the power to govern in a number of fields, just like in the individual states. But in contrast to the states, rules on how to govern have not been clearly stated. And the rules stating which languages to use for government have not been established at a legal level. In consequence, for external communication the institutions tend to adopt the practices of internal communication without feeling bound to conform to old regulations. In fact, the conception that prevails is that Europe should be governed with efficiency at a lower cost, in other words a conception in agreement with the beliefs of liberalism. But there is another conception which says that if the EU is to be developed in ways that actively involve its citizens, then their languages should be fully part of the process, and these languages be given a higher level of legal recognition. At the moment this is a very uncertain prospect.

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9 Regional blocs as a barrier against English hegemony? The language policy of Mercosur in South America

Rainer Enrique Hamel

Latin America and linguistic globalisation

The outlook of geopolitical linguistics is discussed at present at the two poles of the multilingual world continuum. On the one hand, the warning launched by Hale (1992), Krauss (1992) and others regarding the possible death of 90% of the languages of the world by the end of the twenty-first century as a result of linguistic globalisation has strengthened a series of movements and concerns for the most endangered languages. Some of them relate the dangers of a reduction in biodiversity with those involved in linguistic diversity (compare Harmon 1996; Skutnabb-Kangas 2000). In general they are champions of an unlimited defence of all languages of the world, arguing along with Fishman (1991; 2001) and others that the disappearance of any language constitutes an irreparable loss of global linguistic treasures. They particularly defend the fundamental linguistic rights of all citizens of the world to be educated and to have access to other public services in their own language (Skutnabb-Kangas and Phillipson 1994; Skutnabb-Kangas 2000).

At the other end of the continuum we find the debate on the worldwide spread of English: for the first time in the history of humankind one single language has been globalised not only among an international elite, but on a massive basis, posing a threat to many other languages' space. The danger represented by the expansion of English is, however, indirect for the languages at risk of extinction in other latitudes, except for those found in Anglophone countries, due to a general reordering of the complex linguistic mosaic in many countries and regions.

There is little doubt about the role of English as the sole hegemonic language at present. However, regarding the future outlook, there are divergent opinions. Will the dominance of English persist forever, only reversible through a major political earthquake, as claimed by Crystal (1997), or may the monopolistic status of English be changed through other means such as the emergence of new world languages, perhaps in the course of several decades, as argued by Graddol (1997)?

Here we find the second debate, since the worldwide spread of English affects and threatens, first of all, the status of the second-tier languages of the past and present, which to date have played a role as international languages. Among the western languages with this status we have French heading the list, along with Spanish, Portuguese, German, Italian and Russian. Their relevance in the past and in the present can be evaluated, to a great extent, by their role in international communication, their importance as second or foreign languages, and by the role they play in the lives of those who learn them in formal or informal contexts (the scope of the 'outer circle' and 'expanding circle'; see Kachru 1986; Crystal 1997; Graddol 1997). For all the above-mentioned languages a very significant setback of their role as second languages can be observed, alarming in some cases, such as Russian, particularly in central and east Europe after the downfall of the Soviet Union.

Not everybody is in agreement in this debate. Even among those who are opposed to the total hegemony of the English language, there are divergent views and strategies. On the one hand, we have already described the position in favour of the unrestricted defence of each and every one of the world's languages and of the rights of all citizens to be educated in their own language. On the other hand, there are those who feel that the main contradiction is between English and all the other international languages. Within French sociolinguistics some authors point to the risks involved in strengthening local languages to the detriment of national and supranational languages. In his gravitational model Calvet (1999) establishes a typology of four language types and three linguistic functions to which all people ought to be entitled. English is the 'hyper central' language in this model, then we have a limited number of 'super central' languages (e.g. French as the official language of Francophone Africa), others which he calls 'central' such as national languages and regional lingua francas; finally, the fourth group is composed of 'peripheral' languages (first or vernacular languages). For Calvet the three designated functions (official, vehicular and first), which correspond to linguistic rights, may materialise for individuals in the form of one, two or three languages, according to each case. Unlike the previous position, for Calvet not everybody should be entitled – nor is it necessarily an advantage for every person – to be educated in their first language, since the introduction of literacy in illiterate cultures often upsets the pre-existing ecological balance and can accelerate displacement of the vernacular languages (on this issue, see Mühlhäusler 1996).

Calvet's main argument is that the spread of English imperialism can not only coexist with lesser used languages, but can actually benefit from the process of minority language revitalisation, since the strengthening of local languages weakens national and super central languages, which are often an obstacle for the spread of English. In the case of Europe, the emergence of national languages such as Catalan, Basque and Galician in Spain is a contributing factor to the weakening of Castilian Spanish. The transformation of the European Union (EU) from the present community of nation-states into a federation of regional nationalities would mean that English became the only language of communication among them, thus destroying the principle of present-day multilingual communication.[1]

Undoubtedly an outlook of this nature is an attractive argument.[2] In Latin America, however, the debate over the past twenty years has not taken on this bent, since the sociohistorical conditions of its languages and cultures are of a different nature. The struggle for recognition of the Indian (*aboriginal* or Native American) peoples and the transformation of nation-states and their traditional monocultural conception into pluricultural states have opened new spaces for the recognition of the rights of the Indian peoples, including the right to bilingual intercultural education based on the Indian languages. It is only from the most conservative positions that the strengthening of the Indian languages (and, in the case of Brazil, of certain immigrant languages) has been seen as a threat to the nation-state. However, it seems that it is important to take into account global strategic factors that this view implies when discussing the relationship among the different types of languages that dispute their spaces in the Latin American context. The main global and external language conflict in Ibero America[3] is no doubt represented by the relationship between English as a global language and the national and regional (supra-national) languages. This fact should, however, not blur the reality of internal language conflicts between the dominant national languages and subordinate indigenous languages as the

[1] Mon idée est que la mondialisation n'est pas gênée par les micronationalismes et les micro-États, qui lui servent plutôt (paradis fiscaux, etc . . .) mais qu'en revanche elle ne supporte pas les grands ensembles (type Union Soviétique, aujourd'hui éclatée, ou type Europe, qui lui oppose une résistance, voir par exemple l'exception culturelle). Or les micro États se multiplient depuis la chute du mur de Berlin (Croatie, Serbie, Tchéquie, Slovaquie, etc . . .) et avec eux les micro langues. Cette tendance se manifeste également en Europe. Sans l'Amérique Latine et son resérvoir d'hispanophones, l'espagnol serait en voie d'être rétrogradé en Espagne au rang de langue régionale, à côté du catalan ou du basque. C'est d'ailleurs le sens de son changement de nom dans la constitution (castillan et non plus espagnol). Et nous revoilà au corse (depuis hier, les nationalistes basques et breton se sont manifestés, réclamant un statut semblable à celui que se profile pour la Corse). Il y a là une tendance a ramener les langues supercentrales au rang de langue centrale, qui setait la ligne de force de la mondialisation linguistique. C'est à mes yeux la principale raison de lutter contre l'anglais. De ce point de vue, en termes de politologie linguistique, la promotion des langues "minoritaires", ou "régionales", ou "petites", irait dans le sens de l'impérialisme anglophone."

[2] On the other hand, Calvet's position can objectively be used to support the aggressive language policy of the Francophonie, e.g. in Africa, which pushes for 'French only' on all levels, and for French literacy instruction among indigenous peoples speaking their own vernacular languages. Thus, Calvet's view could be seen as part of the 'politically and linguistically correct discourse' – to use his own expression – of the Francophonie itself, notwithstanding his critical view of French international language policy.

[3] In this chapter I use the term 'Ibero America' instead of Latin America when referring to the countries where Portuguese or Spanish are used as the official languages.

main internal and single most important language conflict in most countries, especially in regional areas such as the Andes or Mesoamerica with a high concentration of indigenous populations. In my view there is no theoretical support nor empirical evidence that the strengthening of indigenous languages in Latin America and the teaching of literacy and content matters through them (see Hamel 1996; 2001) could in any way weaken the position of Portuguese and Spanish as national and international languages.

In this debate we must shield ourselves from reductionist perspectives, which view globalisation in unidirectional or dichotomous terms. The head-spinning worldwide spread of the hegemonic language and culture of the USA at the same time implies globalisation of local concerns, the emergence of 'third cultures' with no territories, particularly in massive national and transnational migrations, with multiple expressions of syncretism and hybridisation (see García Canclini 1999). This implies overcoming a somewhat 'military' and strictly territorial view, as though languages move as troops do: where one advances the others take a step backwards.

The dynamics of languages depends to a large extent on collective orientations by linguistic groups (compare Ruiz 1984; Hamel 1999b; 2000), either towards monolingualism or enriching plurilingualism, towards additive or subtractive bilingualism.[4] If we manage, however, to broaden the scope of the 'discourse spaces' of various languages within one territory (Guimarães 1999) which is at stake in the case of Mercosur (the South American Common Market or *Mercado del Sur*), it would be possible to achieve greater plurilingual density.

Ibero America reveals a relatively clear panorama with respect to the distribution and dynamics of its languages. It is the great reserve for Spanish (with more than 250 million speakers[5]) and Portuguese (about 170 million speakers) in a world where the importance and dynamics of these languages have surpassed their countries of origin. They are both in a whirl of development, with growing numbers of speakers, and are in no way endangered territorially nor by functional domains.[6] Linguistic stability in the region depends on the deep-rooted roles of these two languages. The influence of other languages – Indian,

[4] When minorities are schooled in the majority language the linguistic maturation of the first language, especially in writing L1, may be incomplete; this is called 'subtractive bilingualism'. However, members of the linguistic majority are more prone to reap benefits from being taught in the minority language because their L1 has a very strong extra-scholar vitality; this is called 'additive bilingualism' (Mackey 1997, p. 62).

[5] The British Council (1999) states that *Ethnologue* corrected their census data about speakers of Spanish in the world from 266 million in 1998 to 362 million in 1999. GEN comments that apparently *Ethnologue* had corrected a previous underrating, but that the new figure about the speakers of Spanish does not seem realistic either.

[6] Not even on the Mexican–USA border do we find any signs of Spanish language shift. Rather, the opposite occurs: Spanish is making inroads and is conquering significant language domains and territories in the US border states (see Hamel 1999a). As is the case with other European

immigrant and foreign – are defined in relation to the linguistic soundness of these two languages on the sub-continent.

Indigenous peoples who continue to speak their own languages can be found in practically all the continental Ibero American countries with the exception of Uruguay. Their demographic weight ranges between 0.17% of the population in Brazil to over 50% in Guatemala (for more details, see Maurais 1992; Hamel 1994a). It is hard to arrive at exact numbers due to their systematic underrepresentation in most census taking. According to the more optimistic estimates (*América Indígena* 1990), there are some thirty million Indians who speak one of the 1,000 autochthonous languages of the sub-continent. Although there has been an overall loss of these languages, the major languages among them enjoy great vitality, and in absolute figures the number of speakers has increased. From a geostrategic outlook, we would like to emphasise that in all the Ibero American countries with indigenous populations, recognition of the autochthonous people and their political punch has grown enormously over the past twenty years. This is reflected in legislative changes (constitutional reforms in most cases) that recognise their rights, and in bilingual educational programmes which, at least officially, point to the preservation of these languages (compare Maurais 1992; Hamel 1994a; von Gleich 1997; González Gutiérrez 1999).

Also, European immigration – and to a lesser degree Asiatic immigration – have left linguistic marks. Huge waves of European immigration arrived between the mid-nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries and settled mainly in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay and, to a lesser degree, in Bolivia, Central America, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Paraguay and Venezuela. This immigration reached important heights, especially in the countries of the Southern Cone. Even today there are important pockets of 'colonies' of Danes, English, French, Germans, Italians, Japanese and Serbo-Croatians (the Japanese in Brazil). In most cases, the displacement of individuals' heritage languages (i.e. mother tongues) is at an advanced stage, and we find very few speakers who maintain balanced bilingualism. Through their bilingual schools, some of these colonies have contributed to the development of a plurilingual and multicultural educational supply of high standards in Latin America, which in turn has influenced the choice of the main European languages as privileged foreign languages. In general, historical plurilingual offerings – which provided various options and promoted the learning of two foreign languages at school – are today threatened by a growing dominance of English as the sole foreign language. Just as occurs on other continents, the languages most affected by this process are French, followed by German and Italian.

languages (other than English), however, Spanish and Portuguese are losing ground in the domains of science and international communication.

Mercosur: Regional linguistic dynamics

In the Latin American context Mercosur, which comprises Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay as member states,[7] is a unique attempt of cultural integration and geolinguistic dynamics in the whole region. Mercosur is a socio-economic community that includes some of the most important countries along the main linguistic border between Spanish and Portuguese;[8] and it is the only relevant and vigorous community of countries in the Americas that operates outside the control of the USA.

In Mercosur, four countries of very different sizes, power structure and culture have come together. Brazil, the Latin American giant with the greatest economic and technological development, is almost a continent unto itself and covers 47% of the South American surface with 8.5 million square kilometres. About 55% of its 170 million inhabitants (in 1999) are of European descent (especially Portuguese); another 38% are Mulattos, 6% Black and only 1.7% of the population is Indian, but they speak some 195 different languages. Illiteracy is estimated at 18% of the population over fifteen years old. The GDP (Gross Domestic Product) was calculated at US$850 billion in 2000, which represents a per capita income of US$5,000.[9]

Argentina, the second most powerful country in the region, was the first nation to achieve a high level of modern urban and sociocultural development of European style, which began at the end of the nineteenth century, but whose dynamics turned stagnant during the second half of the twentieth century. It has a surface area of almost 2.8 million square kilometres, and a population of 35.7 million people (1997), mostly of European descent. Only 1% of the population is Indian, but twenty-five aboriginal languages are spoken. Illiteracy hovers between 5% to 7% of the population, and Argentina's GDP was US$335.6 billion in 1997, i.e. US$9,400 per capita.

Next in size we have Paraguay, with 406,750 square kilometres, and an estimated population of 5.1 million people in 1997. Around 95% of the population is Mestizo and about 1.5% of the population is Indian. They speak twenty-one languages, without counting Guaraní (alongside Spanish, an official language of Paraguay, which is also spoken as an indigenous language in Argentina and Brazil, where it is spoken by 93% of Paraguay's population). In 1997 the GDP reached US$17.2 billion, or some US$3,480 per capita.

[7] Chile and Bolivia have the status of associated members. In this chapter I deal exclusively with the four founding members of Mercosur.

[8] Mercosur includes the most populated areas of a border of more than 15,000 kilometers that links Brazil with ten out of twelve South American nations. In all of them except Guyana, Spanish is the official language.

[9] Source for these data for all four countries: *L'État du Monde: Annuaire économique et géopolitique mondial*, Paris, La Découverte, 1999, The Library of the Congress Country Studies, 1997 and Grimes (2000).

Finally, we have Uruguay, the second smallest country in South America, with a surface area of 176,215 square kilometres and a population of 3.2 million people (1997). Uruguay is similar to Argentina, with 88% of its population of European descent, 8% Mestizo and 4% Black. Only 4% of the population is illiterate, which is the lowest figure in Latin America. Uruguay's GDP was US$24.9 billion in 1997, or US$7,760 per capita.

Mercosur was established as an initiative of Argentina and Brazil, historical rivals in South America, who realised that they could not continue with a policy of protectionism and import substitution, particularly in the case of Brazil, who had to face globalisation. On 26 March 1991 the four member countries signed a 'Treaty for the Establishment of a Common Market', which foresees domestic trade free of tariff barriers and non-tariff barriers, as well as a unified trade policy with a common external tariff (between 0% and 20%) as of 1995.[10] With the 'Ouro Preto Protocol' signed in December 1994, Mercosur assumed a new legal status based on a system of mutual consensus, but without establishing supranational institutions.

From the Brazilian point of view, the initiative was developed under their hegemony as a new modality for 'reacting and having options in the face of hemispheric integration as proposed by the United States' (Vizentini 1999, p. 3). At the same time Brazil accepted the global guidelines established by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, abandoning the country's traditional policy of national development and import substitution, and created a regional body whose objectives go far beyond trade. Mercosur aims at attaining profound regional integration and at strengthening the international position of its member countries.

Immediately the differences with another common market in the continent – the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) among Canada, the USA and Mexico – becomes apparent. According to the South American point of view, in the dichotomy between 'Pan-Americanism' (economic base without a common cultural foundation) and 'Latin Americanism' (cultural community without a common economic base), Mercosur was born out of cultural convergence, while NAFTA represents a mere market aggregation based on cultural divergence (Ferré 1997; Recondo 1997).

Whether we agree with such a rather black-and-white juxtaposition or not, the truth is that from the very beginning Mercosur set forth a programme of educational integration that took into account cultural and linguistic aspects. In December 1991, the four ministers of education met and constituted the Commission of Ministers of Education. In June 1992, a three-year plan was approved (Ministerio de Educación y Cultura 1997), which established three

[10] For a number of sensitive products (automobiles, sugar, etc.), periods of transition were extended until 2001; for more details, see van Dijck 1999; Vizentini 1999.

lines of action: formation of citizen awareness favourable for integration, training of human resources and harmonisation of educational systems.[11] The plan includes teaching in the two official languages of Mercosur: Spanish in Brazil and Portuguese in Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay, within their respective educational systems.

In summary, a market of four unevenly matched countries emerges, where Brazil represents 71% of the GDP, 71% of the territory and 78.7% of the population. We pick up on the progress made in this area below. To better understand the fairly radical changes that Mercosur means for the cultural, educational and linguistic policies of these countries, we need to know a little more about the history behind their individual statehood that has allowed them to differentiate themselves from each other.

History of linguistic and educational policies in the Mercosur countries[12]

In the past Spanish enjoyed greater prestige than Portuguese as an international language for economic, educational and scientific development within Ibero America. Since Simón Bolivar, San Martín and other liberators freed their countries from Spain at the beginning of the nineteenth century, a Hispano American community was postulated rather than Ibero American unity. The huge Portuguese-speaking portion of the continent, which went through a very different history upon becoming independent, was left outside. From early on Spanish made its presence felt in many Brazilian arenas – including the educational system – through textbooks and abundant Hispanic literature, especially in the most developed regions in the south and central-south of Brazil (Rio, Sao Paulo, Rio Grande do Sul). The opposite phenomenon did not occur: the Hispanic countries maintained a historical barrier in the face of Portuguese, which never went beyond border areas. In was thus that a unidirectional receptiveness and comprehensibility between the two languages came about, which has its foundation in the differentiated complexity that exists between them. The Spanish phonological system in the Americas is undoubtedly simpler than Brazilian Portuguese, but above all there is an asymmetric sociolinguistic prestige factor that comes into play. While Spanish has always enjoyed considerable recognition as a language of culture, science, literature and international communication, Portuguese was considered to be a less important language for international communication in the view of the Hispanic countries, so investing

[11] Information on this topic is taken from *Zona Educativa, Revista 19, La educación en el mundo* (Argentine Electronic Journal), Recondo (1997), and from the Ministerio de Educación y Cultura (1997).

[12] I would like to express my gratitude to Leonor Acuña and Roberto Bein from Argentina, Graciela Barrios and Beatriz Gabbiani from Uruguay and Gilvan Müller de Oliveira from Brazil for their magnificent support in obtaining information, and for their very valuable comments and debates on the situations in their countries.

in learning it was considered not to be worthwhile. Along many border areas in Brazil, however, the opposite trend emerged in the latter part of the twentieth century due to the commercial and industrial dynamics and superiority of this giant country; thus, Portuguese has become increasingly important along border areas with Hispano American countries.

Whatever the case may be, both Brazil and the Hispano American countries have historically felt a stronger inclination towards the more prestigious European languages, above all French, followed by English, Italian and German. Preference was shown for these foreign languages above the language of their neighbour.

Argentina Since its independence in 1810, Argentina's cultural policies were aimed at building a homogeneous nation-state based on European descent and monolingualism in Spanish. To the present day Argentina is the Latin American country that has most intensely tried to model itself after Europe and set itself aside from the rest of the Latin American continent. From 1853 on the state developed an intense policy of European immigration, while at the same time organising military expeditions to annihilate, reduce and subordinate the Indian population in the south of the country. In its imagery of a national identity, all immigrants of European descent were welcome, but not indigenous people. Immigration was at its peak between 1895 and 1914, when the number of foreigners in the overall population reached 42.7%, and in the city of Buenos Aires foreigners comprised over half the population (Bein 1999). In spite of their numerical clout, linguistic assimilation occurred even quicker than in the USA during the same period, especially in the case of the Italians (Fontanella de Weinberg 1979), who numerically (32% of Buenos Aires' population) could well have formed a solid linguistic enclave for preserving their language.

This rapid and peaceful assimilation was fostered by impressive socioeconomic development, based mainly on agriculture and livestock, which allowed immigrant peasants and workers a much higher standard of living than was enjoyed in most European countries. Buenos Aires became the 'European' capital and built a metro railway system at almost the same time as London, Paris and Berlin, whilst in the other Latin American capitals people still rode to the main square on horseback. It is precisely this social, economic and cultural development that is behind the sense of superiority[13] that characterises Argentines with respect to the other Latin American nations to date, in spite of the constant economic decline during the second half of the twentieth century.

[13] This sense of superiority is reflected in stereotypes about themselves and about their neighbours: 'Argentina is the Europe of the Americas,' 'Uruguay is an Argentine province,' 'Brazilians are funny and black,' 'Paraguayans are ignorant.' It can even be found in official documents: 'Argentina, who maintains a clear cultural leadership over all Spanish-speaking communities. . . .' (All examples are quoted from Axelrud 1999, p. 63).

Various Argentine authors (Arnoux and Bein 1997; Bein and Varela 1998; Axelrud 1999; Bein 1999; Varela 1999) maintain that the success behind the assimilationist policy of huge contingencies of immigrants and the construction of an Argentine identity based on monolingualism in Spanish is due to a great extent to a solid academic and scientific level in public schooling, based on models of European positivism.

This educational-linguistic policy included a component of teaching foreign languages that reflected generalised interest in Europe and the influence of the main immigrant groups. The first foreign language during most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was French, followed by English and, to a lesser degree, by Italian and German (Bein 1999).[14] The traditional educational system – seven years of elementary school and five of secondary school – included a 'plurilingual design' that allowed pupils to choose to learn one of several foreign languages for three years, and then continue with a second foreign language for another two years. From the 1980s onwards there was, however, more demand for English than all the other languages combined. Portuguese was never considered a foreign language of importance, although in 1935 a university chair was established for teaching this language (Bein 1999).

By the end of the military dictatorship (1976–83) a new policy was in place regarding the Indian groups in the country (1% of the population divided among twenty-five living languages[15]). Recent constitutional reforms (1994) recognise the ethnic and cultural pre-existence of the Indian peoples and the right to bilingual intercultural education, with instruction in the mother tongue during the first three years of elementary school (Law 23,302, 1985 González Gutiérrez 1999). However, these reforms, no matter how important, have not changed the collective Argentine identity which leaves no door open for the Indian population ('In Argentina there are no Indians').

In summary, linguistic, cultural and educational policies have contributed to shape a relatively homogeneous culture and a unique national identity closely associated with the main European cultures (Spanish, Italian, French and English) and monolingualism based on the Argentine variety of Spanish, all of which, when taken together, lead to a sense of superiority and set them aside from their neighbours.

[14] According to a number of sources (official governmental documents; Roberto Bein, personal communication) there are no reliable data on foreign language teaching. The Alliance Française in Buenos Aires reports an increase in learners of French enrolled in that institution between 1990 (36,172) and 1994 (45,846), and a strong decrease afterwards (31,878 for 1997). These changes are probably due to economic ups and downs of the country and do not reflect a reliable tendency.

[15] According to Grimes (1996), *América Indígena*, vol. 50, 1999 quotes sixteen languages, based on a different system of classification.

Uruguay As the smallest country in Mercosur, its history has been similar to Argentina's. As a matter of fact, in linguistic and cultural aspects there is a Rio de la Plata culture common to both countries. Uruguay is the only continental Ibero American country whose indigenous population was exterminated almost 200 years ago. Lodged between two giants – Argentina and Brazil – its history is marked by efforts to defend its borders and to develop a national homogeneity strong enough to consolidate its territory as a state with its own identity. Uruguay's geographical space was historically a source of conflict between the kingdoms of Spain and Portugal, and between two linguistic poles located in Buenos Aires, capital of the Spanish vice-royalty, and the Portuguese-speaking pole located in Rio Grande do Sul (Elizaincín 1996).

The independence of Uruguay (1828) was not the result of political action by a nation that was homogeneous and clearly defined linguistically and culturally. Quite to the contrary, Uruguay was constituted as the union of two regions with different cultural and linguistic traditions (Barrios 1995; 1996). The central-south region, with Montevideo as the capital, and the western strip, have a Spanish substratum and the strong influence of European immigrants, comparable to the make-up of the Buenos Aires region in Argentina. The north-east, on the other hand, was settled by Portuguese peasants who remained in Uruguayan territory after the borders were defined.[16] Integration of this region came about through colonisation from Montevideo during the second half of the nineteenth century, when the government founded several cities along the border with Brazil to safeguard the frontier. In 1877 the Law of Common Education established obligatory elementary school education in Spanish for the whole territory.

Governmental linguistic policy throughout history has always attempted to homogenise the country based on an emerging variety of Uruguayan Spanish. It used public education as the main vehicle, as was the case in Argentina. In the south this policy was aimed at diverse groups of immigrants, while in the north it was aimed at assimilating the Portuguese-speaking population. To date there is a rural population that speaks 'Portuguese dialects of Uruguay' (PDU or DPU) (Elizaincín 1981; 1992; Elizaincín *et al.* 1987; Barrios *et al.* 1993). These low-prestige dialects are clearly differentiated from the variety of Portuguese spoken by Brazilians; they are the linguistic product of Hispanic colonisation of the Portuguese-speaking population by the Uruguayan state. This was how the rural peasant population went from Portuguese monolingualism to bilingualism with Spanish and DPU. A second kind of Spanish–Portuguese bilingualism among the border area's middle class reflects Brazilian economic influence.

[16] The first national census of 1860 counts a total population of 200,000 inhabitants; 40,000 of them are reported to be speakers of Portuguese (Barrios *et al.* 1993).

Teaching foreign languages in public education developed in a similar way to what occurred in Argentina and forms part of the assimilation policies in the two directions mentioned. The most prestigious and important European languages offered coincide with the presence of immigrant groups of French, English and Italian origins. However, the official reasoning behind teaching these languages has always been of an instrumental nature, without reference to these immigrant groups, since general policy supported monolingualism in Spanish. French was justified given France's cultural weight, English for its commercial importance, and Italian as the language of law and medicine (Gabbiani 1995). Private bilingual schools (in English, French, German, etc.) maintained by their heritage groups played an important role in education, especially for the socioeconomic elites.

Before Mercosur there were several options, and the learning of two different foreign languages was fostered. From 1885 on French and English were taught during junior high school (seventh to nineth grades) and during senior high school (tenth to twelfth grades); Italian was additional to these languages (Gabbiani 1995). It is significant that, until the beginning of Mercosur, Portuguese – also a European language of culture and of great commercial value – was considered to be a threat, and as such was always excluded from public education since it was perceived to place at risk Uruguayan unity and linguistic homogeneity (Barrios 1999).

At present (1997–2000) an educational reform under way is transforming the composition and weight of each one of the languages. Controversy revolves around preserving plurilingual course offerings – that is, the possibility for pupils to learn more than one foreign language and to choose from various options – or for English to be the only obligatory language, which would in turn practically eliminate other foreign languages. During the first cycle (junior high school), the reform has taken effect and English is the obligatory language, while Portuguese, Italian and French are offered as electives at a 'Second Foreign Language Teaching Centre' located in the capital, Montevideo, with some branches in outlying areas. The greatest demand among them is for Portuguese, followed by Italian and French. During the second cycle (senior high school), the reform is not yet in place. Italian is taught as the obligatory foreign language and there is a choice between English or French as the second foreign language (Barrios 1996).[17]

In summary, Uruguay's linguistic policies have in the past successfully aimed at the unification and standardisation of Spanish and the assimilation of the linguistically different population, the Portuguese-speaking peasantry in the north

[17] Graciela Barrios, personal communication; I could not obtain numbers of enrolled students. The number of learners of French at the Alliance Française dropped from 3,588 in 1990 to 665 in 1997.

and the immigrants in the south. These policies also acted as a homogenising force within the country and as a separatist force to the outside, especially when facing their powerful neighbour Brazil.

Brazil Although the history of Brazil, in its struggle for independence and constitution as a nation, followed a course different from that of Hispanic American countries, it shares with them one fundamental characteristic: Brazil also forged its nation with a view towards creating a homogeneous, monocultural, nation-state, segregated from its neighbours. At the beginning of its colonising efforts, Portugal opted for an expansionist policy extending its borders to territories a papal edict had assigned to the Spanish crown. Its linguistic policy spurred the teaching of Portuguese and Latin, a clear intent at segregation towards Spanish colonisation (Pagliuchi da Silveira 1999). This expansion created the need to standardise Portuguese, the first grammars of which appeared in the sixteenth century (Fernão d'Oliveira 1536; João de Barros 1540). The clergy sought to establish an indigenous *lingua geral* (general language), Guaraní, for the religious mission, which underwent a major expansion and was not displaced until the second half of the eighteenth century by Portuguese (Baranow 1988). At the start, the creation of a huge colonial territory encouraged the development of a European Portuguese purism, a defence of their internal unity in the face of the external threat from Spain, as well as from French and Dutch invasions.

Brazil underwent two quite different types of massive immigration: the importing of 3.8 million African slaves throughout the three centuries up to the nineteenth century, and the voluntary immigration of approximately five million Europeans and Japanese during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The forced assimilation of the slaves, who belonged to different linguistic groups, led them to quickly abandon their languages. In contrast, European immigrants have partially preserved their languages up to today.

Among Latin American countries, Brazil represents a typical case in its indigenous policy. It combined systematic genocide with segregation, as well as the paternalistic tutelage of the indigenous population in legal and political terms. The latter dropped from some 2.5–5 million at the beginning of the colonisation to approximately 200,000 in 1990, representing 0.17% of the overall population.[18] At present, approximately 195 languages survive, comprising twenty-six linguistic families (Rodrigues 1986). Diverse historical studies (Orlandi 1993) show how, since colonial times, the ideological construction of *brasilianidade* has systematically been erasing the existence of the Indians from the national identity. In contrast with the Andean countries and

[18] Only after 1930 did the indigenous population start to grow again in absolute numbers (Rodrigues 1986).

Mexico, this process led to the formation of a mutually exclusive identity between Brazilians and indigenous peoples, similar to what happened in Argentina.

By 1980, only five of the 195 linguistic groups were receiving any specific education from the state, and only 10% of the Indian population received any formal education at all (Melià 1979; Varese and Rodríguez 1983; Montserrat 1989). This situation has changed significantly over the past twenty years. The new Constitution of 1988 considerably expanded the rights of indigenous peoples and reflected a change in the focus of their treatment (Hamel 1994a; 1994b). Article 210 establishes that the language of instruction in public education is to be Portuguese, but indigenous peoples are granted the right to use their own languages and pedagogical procedures for primary schooling. The *Diretrizes e Basas da Educação Nacional* of 1994 and the *Referencial Curricular* of 1998 design a bilingual and intercultural focus for indigenous education, supporting and strengthening the preservation of indigenous languages. However, in a country with a dominant ideology of monolingualism as an ideal and as a constructed reality, the existence of social bilingualism and bilingual education goes unnoticed in national thinking (Cavalcanti 1999).

When Brazil went from colony to empire – headed by the Portuguese royal family who went to Brazil in 1808 with the help of the British – Brazil began to open up to trade with Europe. They started teaching French as a privileged European language. The massive immigration of European colonists began in the nineteenth century, and this fostered a plurilingual linguistic policy. The state supported the immigrants' wishes to preserve their languages of origin and made the teaching of French, English and Spanish official in schools, in addition to Portuguese and Latin, and with German and Italian as options (Pagliuchi da Silveira 1999, p. 432). At the same time, Brazilian Portuguese was being consolidated as the national language and became distanced from Iberian Portuguese.

Only the censuses of 1940 and 1950 report data on the speakers of immigrant languages, since, subsequently, this information was excluded from the national census for political reasons (Oliveira 1998). In the south of Brazil, wide-ranging bilingualism between Portuguese and several immigrant languages had emerged. Both censuses counted more than 500,000 speakers of German born in Brazil, followed by Italians and Japanese. In the first three decades of the twentieth century, a plurilingual policy was maintained in teaching foreign languages, always privileging French and English before Spanish. However, from the 1930s, government policy changed abruptly. A new repressive policy towards immigrant minorities attempted to force their accelerated assimilation, prohibiting their bilingual schools and the use of their languages in public spheres. When Brazil entered the Second World War against the powers represented by the main immigrant languages, repression intensified. This led to a 37% decrease in the use of Italian and a 14% decrease in German between

1940 and 1950. During this period, therefore, the Brazilian state developed a marked assimilation policy towards its aboriginal and immigrant minorities, contrary to bilingual education.

In a third period of time, after the Second World War, linguistic policy was transformed in two ways. In its language planning, the Brazilian state distanced itself all the more from Portugal. In contrast to the Hispanic world – which has maintained its orthographic unity to date – Brazil broke with linguistic unity, establishing its own norms in grammar, orthography and linguistic terminology. Although some authors continue purporting the meaningful unity of Portuguese to date, with attempts to maintain or bring the divergent normativities closer (Baranow 1988), there is little doubt that Brazil established its hegemony over the Lusitanian world. The second aspect refers to the greater orientation of Brazil towards the USA, leading it to abandon its plurilingual policy in favour of a monolingual foreign language approach, so that since the 1960s only English is obligatory in public education (Pagliuchi da Silveira 1999). This trend reflects a new distancing from Hispanic America.

For some Brazilian authors (e.g. Ribeiro 1995), the building of a national identity took a different path from that of the River Plate nations, Argentina and Uruguay. From this view, Argentina and Uruguay are seen as 'transplanted peoples' of European characteristics, while Brazil, as a 'new people', achieved its own, different identity, based on its basic cultural homogeneity, beyond its social and racial inequality.

In summary, a policy of internal homogenisation has developed in Brazil, with a view towards building a nation-state, with strong spurts of linguistic assimilation of its aboriginal and immigrant minorities. Just like its neighbours to the south, Brazil was aiming to distance itself from the Hispanic world, historically privileging the teaching of the most prestigious European languages.

Paraguay Of the four, Paraguay is the county that most distinguishes itself from the European model of nation-state. It is the only country of the Americas with massive bilingualism that constitutes the axis of national identity (see Corvalán 1997). An urbanised, formerly indigenous language, Guaraní is spoken by more citizens than Spanish. To a certain degree, Paraguay was born from a Jesuit 'state', with Guaraní as the general language of the mission, literacy and government (Barros 1993). During their existence and up until their expulsion in 1767 by papal edict, the indigenous Jesuit community developed a feverish activity of oral usage and literacy development, as well as editing and publishing in Guarani (Melià 1969; 1995; 1999). These historical roots of Guaraní, as the merger of regional and functional varieties (Dietrich 1990, von Gleich 1993), constitute the basis for explaining its stability and singular extension. Therefore, the linguistic situation in Paraguay was taken by sociolinguists as a paradigmatic case of massive social, but asymmetric, bilingualism from the very beginnings of the discipline (e.g. Garvin and Mathiot 1956; Rubin 1968).

A comparison of the two censuses from 1950 and 1992 yields significant results: in 1950, 50% of the population was monolingual in Guaraní, while monolingual speakers of Spanish were limited to 4%. In 1992, Guaraní accounted for 37% of the monolingual speakers, while only 7% reported they were monolingual in Spanish, and 50% said they often used both languages. Some 6% spoke immigrant languages (Corvalán 1997, p. 39). These figures are absolutely unique in the Americas and, although they reveal a slight shift of Guaraní,[19] they show likewise the great stability in the relationship between the languages and the degree of massive bilingualism encompassing all social strata.

At present, Paraguay is facing the challenge of incorporating and transforming its national bilingualism into a resource for the modernisation of its economy and educational system. Notwithstanding the ample diffusion of Guaraní, education was offered exclusively through Spanish up until a short time ago. As recently as 1983, bilingual transition programmes were offered, based on initial literacy teaching in Guaraní. According to Corvalán (1997), they were a failure and led to abandoning attempts at bilingual education for quite a while. The new Constitution of 1992, promulgated after decades of dictatorship, gave Guaraní the rank of an official language and placed it on the same level as Spanish for the first time in history.[20] Thus, Paraguay is the only Ibero American country with two languages of equally official status.

A type of dual language bilingual education has been in place ever since: primary education is to be given in the official mother tongue of each child, and the teaching of both languages is compulsory in public education.[21] In contrast to prior transitional programmes, a bilingual maintenance curriculum is now being proposed, with equal treatment for both languages. The two modalities – for pupils speaking Guaraní or Spanish as their first language – have gradually been implemented since 1996 (Melià 1999). The linguistic policy of teaching

[19] Gynan (1997) maintains that these figures reflect a clear tendency of Guarani language shift. He arrives at the conclusion, however, that if the present tendency persists Guaraní would survive for some 120 years.

[20] Article 140: ‘On the languages. Paraguay is a pluricultural and bilingual country. Paraguay’s official languages are Spanish and Guaraní. The law will establish the modalities of their use. The indigenous languages, as well as the languages of other minorities, are part of the cultural patrimony of the Nation.’ (quoted in González Gutiérrez 1999, p. 588). Here, Guaraní is clearly not considered an indigenous language, which reflects its real status as a language that was ‘de-indigenised’ long ago.

[21] Article 77: ‘On the teaching of the mother tongue. In the beginning of schooling, teaching will be carried out in the official mother tongue of the learner who will also be taught in the two official languages of the Republic. In the case of those ethnic minorities whose language is not Guarani, one of the two official languages may be chosen for instruction.’ (quoted in González Gutiérrez 1999, p. 586).

and developing educational content in the mother tongue requires a significant *Sprachausbau* (language development) of Guaraní at the language planning level. Normalisation not only encourages the creation of an educational and scientific language, but also aids the development of a linguistic base, permitting the expansion of Guaraní to the domains of public administration and justice where it had been largely absent except for oral use.

In the mass media, Guaraní has been especially prominent on the radio – just like indigenous languages in other countries (for the case of Bolivia, see Albó 1999) – and also on television, with broadcasts of news and other programmes. Several newspapers have opened their pages to Guaraní, in particular directed towards teachers and students (Corvalán 1997, pp. 40–41).

Foreign-language teaching has experienced limited development in a predominantly rural country, with little higher education and limited contacts with non-Spanish-speaking foreigners.[22] The proposals emanating from the country's National Commission on Bilingualism recognised this field as a pending task for linguistic policy and planning, proposing a gradual programme of foreign-language teaching at whose centre were to be English and Portuguese (Corvalán 1997, p. 46). Undoubtedly, the step towards democracy, the official recognition of Guaraní (*Comisión Nacional de Bilingüismo* 1997; Melià 1997), as well as educational reforms, point towards a revalorisation of Guaraní, not only as a core value of Paraguayan identity – which it has always been and which distinguishes Paraguayans from all their neighbours – but also as a language of the formal spheres of education and public life.

In the light of this panorama, technological innovation and regional integration pose major challenges for Paraguay as the least modern, urban and industrial country in the context of Mercosur. Contact between its own languages and Portuguese is seen as an obstacle in the educational system and in relation to the training of a labour force. The presence of 'Portuguese in full and aggressive expansion in the extensive border area with Brazil' (Corvalán 1977, p. 39) is considered a threat to Paraguay's cultural and linguistic identity, undoubtedly due to the significant economic and technological superiority it represents. In this context, in Paraguay overall modernisation is extremely urgent, including educational reform so as to reduce the disadvantages vis-à-vis its main partners in Mercosur.

The dynamics of integration and changes in state policy: Conflicts and contradictions

What have been the dynamics and new policies of cultural, educational and linguistic integration of the four countries since the founding of Mercosur? As

[22] I was unable to obtain reliable figures about foreign language teaching in Paraguay.

a point of departure, we can see four countries which, although they share major features as collective subjects of Latin American history, have built their own national identity, each one creatively incorporating the most significant elements of their historical components: autochthonous inheritance, colonisation and immigration patterns, languages and cultures. They always sought homogenisation inward and delimitation – sometimes, separatism – vis-à-vis their neighbours. From the point of view of the state, these policies have been successful in forming a national linguistic identity based on standardised and widely accepted varieties of Spanish (Argentina and Uruguay) and Portuguese (Brazil), and of a particular symbiosis of Spanish and Guarani as a bilingual communicative repertoire in the case of Paraguay.

With its dynamics of regional integration, Mercosur encourages these four countries to abandon or, at least, tone down the cultural, educational and linguistic traditions that had lent them stability in the past, presenting them with a paradox (Barrios 1996). Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay – who have experienced the presence of Portuguese inside their borders as a threat (especially Uruguay, because of the historical presence of Portuguese dialects within its territory) – now find themselves in need of promoting the Portuguese language, which they so battled with before, as a language of integration within their own territory. Brazil had always considered Argentina a rival in all spheres. Until a short time ago, the military had impeded setting up large-scale industries within a hundred-kilometre strip of the border because it was a military-deployment zone. Now, with Mercosur, they are forced to open these demarcations and to establish multiple contacts through them.

Furthermore, the dynamics favourable to integration unleashed between the most diverse social sectors, particularly in the border regions, far outstripped not only expectations, but the often-timid policies of their own governments. Before recounting the activities undertaken, we will pause to look at the official policies of education, culture and languages in Mercosur.

Educational and linguistic policies since 1991

As to institutional initiatives, so far there are abundant protocols, agreements, agencies created and, generally speaking, proposals for the future. The start-up of said projects is taking some time and, according to Mercosur experts themselves, it is almost impossible to obtain solid data or consolidated results at the present time.

We summarise here some of the major institutional initiatives regarding educational, cultural and linguistic integration. The main and primary instrument is the Triennial Plan for the Educational Sector of Mercosur approved in 1992. Since that time, it has been renewed every three years. It considers educational and cultural integration a prerequisite for all economic and political integration,[23] and establishes, as we stated, three programmes with their respective sub-programmes (*Ministerio de Educación y Cultura* 1997):

1. Development of a favourable awareness among the citizenry concerning integration, with two sub-programmes:
   1.1 Informing and reflecting on the impact of Mercosur's integration process;
   1.2 Learning official Mercosur languages (Spanish and Portuguese).
2. Training human resources so as to contribute to development, with four sub-programmes for the different educational levels, research and graduate studies.
3. Making educational systems compatible and harmonious. This contemplates the co-ordination of academic, legal, administrative, as well as information, systems.

In 1997, the representative of the Uruguayan MEC (*Ministerio de Educación y Cultura* 1997, p. 29) considered that the first stage had reached its conclusion with institutional consolidation, accreditation of academic titles and credentials, and the coordination of educational sub-systems, with the exception of higher education.

Let us consider the policies referring to language teaching. Their main proposal – the teaching of the two official languages in the respective educational systems – has followed a slower course and even in 2001 no large-scale and successful implementation can be observed. According to the same source, in 1993 'an educational programme was designed for teaching the official languages, promising to earmark adequate financial resources to it' (*Ministerio de Educación y Cultura* 1997, p. 19).

As an element of integration, the Asociación de Universidades del Grupo de Montevideo (AUGM) was created in 1991, made up of the public universities of the member countries. It is characterised as a virtual university or as a 'common expanded academic space' (Guerrero 1995). In 1995 it included the national universities of Paraguay and Uruguay, as well as five universities in Argentina and another five in Brazil. Among their eleven fields of study, one entitled 'Education for integration' is concerned with defining linguistic policies and preparing the basis for implementing the teaching of Spanish and Portuguese as second languages in Mercosur countries. There are two working groups: one, on linguistic policy, is to take over the analysis of data on the topic, as well as intervention through the creation of proposals and consultation for the political actors in that area. A diagnosis of the working group on teaching Spanish and Portuguese (Gabbiani 1999) observes that, in 1999, five years after having made a policy decision thereto (Triennial Plan), the teaching of official languages has

[23] It may be worth pointing out the differences between Mercosur and the two other blocs in the Western world: in the European Economic Community (today, the European Union) the topics of educational and cultural integration were dealt with a long time after its foundation. NAFTA (the North American Free Trade Agreement between Canada, the USA and Mexico), has not established any relevant programme in terms of harmonising the educational systems of the member countries or of teaching their official languages in basic education.

still not been incorporated into the curriculums of member states' educational systems. Likewise reported is an acute shortage of trained teachers and national proficiency tests based on the local varieties of the languages.[24] It is therefore recommended that research be encouraged on these topics, including studies on the images and expectation regarding the languages in Mercosur, the elaboration of linguistic census and adequate proficiency tests. Generally speaking, it was agreed to encourage plurilingual offerings in the educational system, that is, to maintain several foreign-language options at each level.

At this time, it is difficult to evaluate the start-up and results of the proposals. From all the documentation published and the personal information available, it is the large number of institutions that have been created and the meetings held over the past ten years that stand out as being significant; however, little is said about concrete experiences and the proposals implemented. On the other hand, there is a series of extremely interesting initiatives. We can cite, as an example, the designing of specific courses for teaching Spanish and Portuguese in São Paulo (Pagliuchi da Silveira 1999) or a teacher training programme established at Uruguay's national university, with assistance from experts from the Brazilian Campinas University (Gabbiani 1999). As a first stage, programmes for university-level teacher training and language courses were established at institutions in Uruguay (Gabbiani 1995) and in Argentina. A large part of the general demand for language courses is, however, absorbed by private institutions (Gabbiani 1999; Varela 1999).

According to several Argentine critics, political will is missing to implement the teaching of Portuguese in Argentina (Arnoux 1999; Varela 1999). Axelrud (1999) states that the Argentine government is not attempting any real regional integration, but prefers to adapt to globalisation under the hegemony of the USA. In contrast, Brazil is said to be developing a more decisive policy of linguistic integration. In addition, Portuguese competes with other established foreign languages in the educational systems and, in several cases, interferes with the reforms underway. The issue of policy regarding foreign languages – plurilingual or monolingual offerings, specific weight and sequence of teaching them – no doubt reflect divergent cultural and political orientations.

In summary, the area of educational and linguistic policy highlights basic agreements of the political institutions that aim towards a regional integration

[24] In August 2000 the Ministers of Education reinforced the adopted programme, which establishes the teaching of Portuguese in Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay, and of Spanish in Brazil, as compulsory content matter in the state school system. According to *Comunica* (www.comunica.es), which quotes the Spanish newspaper *El País*, France, Great Britain and Italy are said to have protested against this measure. The three countries 'have mobilized their diplomatic machinery in order to prevent Brazil from turning, perhaps irreversibly, to the Spanish world' (*Comunica* 21 June 2000, quoted in Fréchette 2001, p. 12). According to the same source, in 2000 only 200 secondary school pupils out of 340,000 in Buenos Aires had enrolled in Portuguese language courses.

far beyond the economy. This includes programmes of coordinating educational systems, campaigns encouraging a favourable attitude towards integration, and the decision to teach the official languages – Spanish and Portuguese – throughout Mercosur. At the level of implementation, however, there is a lack of necessary resources, and the rhythm is so slow that many observers doubt the governments' resolve to spur real cultural integration. It is clear, on the one hand, that cultural, educational and linguistic aspects are clearly subordinated to economic decisions and to the dynamics of integration, while, on the other, there is quite a bit of resistance to integration itself. This derives both from a historical hesitancy towards neighbours, as well as from orientations towards Pan-American globalisation under US leadership, ever present between the political actors and the governments of the member countries.

The dynamics of integration in civil society

In contrast to the somewhat timid actions of national governments, which often seem to want to curb the processes, the creation of Mercosur has unleashed an unprecedented dynamic in favour of the integration of the most diverse sectors of civil society. These initiatives, occurring especially in border areas, far outstrip the governmental policies of each state.

There has been massive demand for Portuguese courses in Argentina and Uruguay (and to a lesser degree in Paraguay), as well as for Spanish courses in Brazil. This demand, which state institutions have so far proven to be incapable of satisfying, has created a dynamic and growing market for private initiative. Even though among the many academies and schools that mushroomed there are many deficiencies (see criticism by Varela 1999), one cannot deny that they fulfil a positive function for the purposes of integration.

The dynamics of integration, globalisation and transformation of the borders deserve particular attention. In traditional thinking, borders draw a line beyond which all paradigms change abruptly. Nation-states have always considered borders as strategic and threatened places where they have to reinforce the nation's military, demographic, cultural and linguistic presence.[25] Consequently, these areas were the objective of homogenisation policies.

The reality at the borders themselves generally yields quite a different story. Rather than dividing lines, they appear to be areas of ancient interaction, constituting strips of fluid contact and developing hybrid cultures and systems of

[25] In the two Brazilian censuses mentioned above, the immigrant population of Germans, Italians and Japanese amounted to 1.3 million in 1940. This information was included in the census to supply the government with a database to evaluate the 'threat to national security' (Oliveira 1999) in the context of the Second World War. In the case of Paraguay and Uruguay, the presence of speakers of Portuguese in the national territory or on the borders has always caused concerns among the military.

communication. Elizaincín (1998) characterised these border dynamics as a situation of 'pre-integration', which fertilised the terrain for Mercosur's integration policies.[26]

At the borders, trade, cultural contact and exchange were considerably reinforced, together with a reaffirmation of the regionalisms vis-à-vis the central power of each country. Therefore, many of the proposals for trans-border educational cooperation (Barrios 1996; Fedatto 1996; Trinidade and Behares 1996; Behares 1998) oppose homogenising policies regarding the two official Mercosur languages and argue for a differentiated education taking into account local varieties such as Portuguese dialects in the North of Uruguay or regional dialects of Spanish.

To recap, most outstanding dynamics of integration arise from the different economic and cultural sectors, often contrasting with the slow actions of governments and multilateral Mercosur institutions. Noteworthy are the actions taken at the borders which strengthen regional positions in contact and keep a distance from national governments. At the language-policy level, integration will centre on the propagation of the two official languages of the member countries. Pending still is the role of Guaraní – the widespread official language of Paraguay, which is also spoken as an indigenous language in Argentina and Brazil – which some actors have proposed should be included as another official language of Mercosur.

Geolinguistic perspectives in Mercosur

In the emergence of Mercosur we can observe a dynamics of integration and repositioning of the four member states, which bears upon their cultural, educational and linguistic relations as a whole. At the same time these relations constitute a centrepiece of integration itself. A number of policies and specific proposals have appeared over the short time of Mercosur's existence. Their implementation, as we have seen, proceeds so slowly that many observers doubt the governments' political determination to cede some degree of sovereignty in favour of a profound regional integration (Arnoux and Bein, 1997; 1999). Our attention is drawn as well to the lack of coherence between political discourse and the concrete measures to put policy into practice (Axelrud 1999).

Resistance against integration represents, on the one hand, the historical inertia of nation-state policies based on a tradition of monolingualism, cultural homogenisation and segregation from neighbours. It is certainly not easy, as it

[26] Grimson (1999), on the contrary, warns us not to adopt a romantic view of the borders as zones of brotherhood and intensive interaction, as if the borders only existed on maps. He reports the case of a new bridge over the borderline Parana River, which linked two towns, a Paraguayan town and an Argentine town. Since the building of the bridge various local conflicts have become more intense due to Mercosur's policies on tariffs and integration.

is not in the EU or elsewhere, to transit from national identity planning based on one language and culture, towards the construction of a pluricultural regional identity sustained by various national, regional, indigenous and immigrant cultures around the centrepiece of a bilingual, Spanish–Portuguese communicative repertoire. On the other hand, diverse internal and external political forces oppose Mercosur's integration under Latin American leadership, and prefer a Pan-American integration under US hegemony. Clearly, the FTAA (Free Trade Area of the Americas) proposal launched by US President Clinton in the 1990s and revitalised by President Bush in 2001 represents an attempt to undermine any regional integration outside US control.

We must not forget that the Mercosur initiative emerges as a defensive measure in a historical phase of ferocious globalisation. During the 1990s, the member states – particularly Argentina and Brazil – underwent processes of neo-liberal conversion of their economies, which entailed severe social disarray, the loss of sovereignty, and a political and cultural reorientation towards the USA. These contradictory stands – towards a region to be constructed and towards a new subordination under US leadership – bear upon the field of tensions between the languages and cultures involved: national and international, regional, indigenous, immigrant and foreign. As we have seen, no simple, bipolar opposition obtains. The observed dynamics not only resize the spaces of each language, but also their speakers' conceptions of them, and the relations among them. The role of language ideologies and representations becomes evident as foundational components in the struggles about the languages involved.

Let us consider some examples. In the past the states justified the teaching of French, Italian or German without explicit reference to the powerful immigrant groups that identified with them. In the Brazil of the 1940s and 1950s, they were, however, coined as 'immigrant languages', implying a menace to national unity. The label of 'bilingual', was imposed on members of heritage communities, even when they referred to fourth or fifth generation Brazilian citizens, without scrutiny to their real linguistic competence in the language concerned. Conversely, the same label is hardly ever used to refer to someone who has studied and acquired advanced proficiency in a foreign language (Arnoux and Bein 1999). The concept of a 'language of wider communication' fits Guarani in Paraguay, as well as Spanish and Portuguese in the regional, supra-national context, and new definitions arise such as 'language of integration' or 'participation' (Barrios 1996). Thus, the re-conceptualisations and re-definitions of languages play a significant role in the debates about language and educational policies.

In the Mercosur member states the controversies about ideological orientations and language planning in foreign language teaching focus more and more on the opposition between English and the Spanish–Portuguese pair as priorities for the curriculum. These debates go far beyond the educational system itself. Especially in Argentina and Uruguay we can identify two positions. One advocates a plurilingual model, meaning the teaching of more than one foreign language for each pupil, or at least more than one language option in the curriculum. The other one defends English as the only or principal foreign language, given its role as the language of the global world and as international lingua franca.[27] The other traditional European 'languages of culture' are considered of little value and have lost their place in the curriculum, according to this position. Thus, the plurilingual curriculum in force since the nineteenth century is menaced by a 'modern', functional and instrumental view of foreign language learning proposing 'English only' as the answer to educational needs on the level of secondary and even tertiary education.

The defenders of Spanish and Portuguese converge with the 'traditionalists' (who are in turn allied with the international 'Francophonie', the French-speaking world) in their opposition against the total and exclusive hegemony of English and in their defence of a plurilingual option. The two basic positions are associated with two divergent projects of integration and a conflict between a Latin American identity in the first case, and a Pan-American identity in the second, beyond the functional and educational value of each proposal.

> this is foremost a question of the construction of identify – Latin American or Pan American – where English does not reassert its role as an international language; in case it impedes the teaching of Portuguese [in Argentina, R.E.H.], English would assume the symbolic value of submission under the hegemony of the United States of America. (Arnoux and Bein 1997, p. 52)[28]

Should the debate really be reduced to a mutually exclusive opposition between English and Spanish–Portuguese in the Mercosur, serious conflicts may arise that could ultimately slow down the process of cultural and linguistic integration. Therefore, other actors (e.g. Barrios 1999 from Uruguay) attempt to neutralise this polarised opposition. They maintain that both language proposals have different and complementary functions. Barrios redefines the official languages of Mercosur as 'languages of integration and participation', not as 'foreign languages' as is the case of English. To create a new regional identity, a new type of massive bilingualism is needed that would allow free and extensive communication within the common market. The interesting difference with an

[27] Varela (1999, p. 587), an Argentine critic, quotes a governmental document that refers to foreign language teaching: 'English is the language of international communication which unites a universal community in brotherhood with no geographic or political frontiers. English has become the natural lingua franca and has thus gained distance from its cultural roots.' This is a good example of the ideology of 'many Englishes', of a de-territorialised and neutralised language that belongs to nobody and therefore to everybody; as if English were not backed any longer by the world's most powerful army and navy. Varela rightly criticises this inappropriate (and technically wrong) use of the term lingua franca for English.

[28] The other European, Asian and indigenous languages would thus become optional in the system.

international language community such as the Francophonie is that, in the case of Mercosur, integration and communication should not be constructed around one hegemonic language, but on the basis of a bilingual system of communication and identification grounded in two languages that at the same time have national, regional and international status.

The viability and the limits of such a proposal will be determined by political perspectives of the member states, their governments and civil societies, their educational systems and their extramural markets. In my view, the plurilingual position has a weak side in its strategy to place all involved languages in a frame of formal equality, since this does not exist in the real world. In any case, the 'traditional' European languages will be among the losers, since both the educational systems and the open markets have already opted for both English and Mercosur's official languages. A realistic, pro Latin American strategy should foster these three languages and try to avoid any polarity among them. It should stress the complementary functions of English and Spanish–Portuguese, which may fulfil quite different instrumental and identificational functions. Additionally, from a psycholinguistic and educational perspective, the acquisition and teaching of these languages could be planned as different but complementary processes. Learning Portuguese for Hispanophones and vice versa may be based on a method that extends already existing competencies, as well as on reciprocal receptive language skills. Creativity is called for to design methods that combine formal (institutional) and informal ways of learning and practising these languages. And the acquisition of English and Spanish–Portuguese could be differentiated by placing them in early and late phases of the curriculum.

The multipolar tension that operates in Mercosur between the different types of languages may well be conceptualised within Calvet's (1999) framework of language ecology. English is no doubt the hyper central language, but it may have a different and more counterbalanced weight than in some other areas of the world. Spanish and Portuguese are super central languages, Guaraní has the role of a vehicular language in Paraguay with some outreach to Argentina and Brazil; and the vast number of indigenous and immigrant languages occupy the place of local vernacular languages with a significant role in local communication, identity planning and education. Although the other European super central languages (French, Italian, German, etc.) will see their 'outer circle' diminished over time, the door should be left open for them as languages of a certain cultural community, and for specific bilateral relations with their home countries in economy, science, literature and international relations. Although English is certainly not threatening Mercosur's official languages in their vitality or in their traditional domains, Portuguese and Spanish could function as a barrier against the international hegemony of English and its domain invasion, particularly in the fields of international relations, trade, science and technology. On the contrary, regional integration based on the acquisition of the Iberian languages and their massive use – especially in the 'high' domains – could no doubt strengthen their role as relevant American and world languages in significant areas. Conversely, a unilateral language policy of 'English only' in the Mercosur could severely damage regional integration. Last but not least, there is virtually no risk that the revitalisation and institutional support of indigenous and immigrant languages could in any way affect the two official languages, as Calvet maintained in the case of the EU. The integration of Mercosur should, indeed, support each country's effort to consolidate and extend indigenous language education where this is demanded by native populations.

This argument poses a caveat against the generalisation of theoretical models that may have significance and empirical support in some areas but not in some others. Namely, the three processes of regional integration mentioned in this text – NAFTA, Mercosur and the EU – correspond to quite different economic, cultural and linguistic traditions. While a profound knowledge of other experiences is always useful, we should be careful not to transfer models too easily from one place to the other (on this issue, see Born 1999; Fischer 1999; see also Kremnitz 1997).

Finally, the case of Mercosur invites us to reflect on existing language policy models in general. Traditional models rooted in static and rather 'military' views of spaces and territories will probably not be very helpful in explaining dynamic processes characterised by globalisation and massive migration. As in many other places and cases, Mercosur faces the challenge of transforming the linguistic orientations (compare Ruiz 1984) and policies of their actors from a position I have called '*de facto* multilingualism', which conceives of language diversity as a problem, to an orientation of 'plurilingualism', which perceives linguistic heterogeneity in an enrichment perspective (Hamel 1997; 2000). With such a view, the sociolinguistic dynamics do not end up as a zero sum game – where one language enters and the other ones have to leave – but rather in a new integration where the potentials of the languages involved could add up and complement each other. We will therefore have to revise both the principle of territoriality and of personality (as rights to monolingualism) that have sustained traditional models of language policy, even at the risk of new 'perverse effects'.[29]

In other words, we have to counteract the ideology of monolingualism (and of *de facto* multilingualism) which has proven extremely harmful for cultural diversity, massive bilingualism and minority languages. Its credo establishes the incompatibility of several languages in one territory, and it has its correlate on the level of the individual in the psycholinguistic concept of subtractive bilingualism: if minority language children want to acquire the national

[29] See Laponce's (1987; 1989) classical critique of the perverse effects of language planning.

language successfully, their own language must go. In a similar way, as research has shown the fallacy of this view, there is no evidence that, in principle, several languages could not share and coexist in common social and territorial spaces.

As a matter of fact, the new relationship that emerges between Spanish and Portuguese in the Mercosur reflects an orientation that aims to amplify and to enlarge the 'discursive spaces' (Guimarães 1999) of both languages, and to create additive bilingualism and plurilingualism. Any language policy that promotes such an objective could not limit itself to a traditional policy of restricted domains or territories, or language homogenisation and standardisation. New concepts of intercultural communication (Moya 1996; Godenzzi Alegre 1996) are called for that integrate heterogeneous communicative systems based on the interface of diverse dialects, 'interlects' and languages, as well as models of reciprocal receptive bilingual communication. Last but not least, they will have to accommodate and enlarge the discursive and social spaces of subordinate minority languages as well.

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10 Effects of North American integration on linguistic diversity

Michael A. Morris

Complex, cross-cutting effects

Integration in North America has been fairly well structured to achieve specific economic and political effects. In particular, NAFTA (the North American Free Trade Area) purports to promote economic growth and investment as well as political cooperation among the three member states, Canada, Mexico and the USA. During the 1990s investment and trade amongst the three partners have continued to grow quite rapidly, and in spite of various kinds of economic frictions the integration process has tended to strengthen political collaboration between them as well. Judged in terms of achievements regarding these specific economic and political objectives, NAFTA has clearly been successful. The name of a NAFTA-related website (www.naftaworks.org) of the Mexican Ministry of Commerce and Industrial Development at the Embassy of Mexico in Washington, DC reflects this success: NAFTA works!

Opposition to NAFTA has often focused on what was left out of the integration agreement, where there have allegedly been negative results. Concerns about issues largely left out of NAFTA with prejudicial results range widely from political issues (promotion of democracy in Mexico) to socioeconomic issues (job security in the USA and Canada, labour rights in all three countries, migration from Mexico) and cultural issues (protection of national culture and language).

Policy makers from the three partner countries considered such issues extraneous to the specific commercial purposes of NAFTA and consequently excluded them from the agreement in order to avoid unnecessary problems. Political pressures leading up to the conclusion of the 1994 economic integration agreement did result in the inclusion of some non-commercial issues in NAFTA including some labour and environmental standards, although in accord with the narrow, free-trade purpose of the agreement the focus was kept as much as possible on economic issues. Even economic issues were defined fairly narrowly by emphasising promotion of North American trade and investment without intruding into national fiscal or monetary policies or attempting to shape common commercial policies.

One set of interlocking issues left out of NAFTA is of particular interest here. Cultural, language and migratory issues overlap with one another, are all excluded from NAFTA and yet all interact intensely with economic issues included within NAFTA. As people have moved in large numbers across North American boundaries – especially from Mexico to the USA – they have brought the languages and cultures of their native lands with them thereby raising concerns in their newly adopted homeland. Large-scale Mexican migration, it has often been feared, deprives Americans of jobs while also creating and sustaining large Spanish-speaking enclaves, which unlike previous waves of immigrants have remained largely resistant to assimilation with mainstream US culture.

While NAFTA supporters did not wish to overload the agreement with such ancillary issues, they did hold out the promise that integration would affect issues excluded from NAFTA in desired directions. One such expectation has been that sustained wealth generation among all the trading partners would stimulate job creation in each, thereby helping limit migratory flows from Mexico to the USA while promoting assimilation of Mexicans already resident in the USA. In this pro-NAFTA scenario, free-market forces would have a levelling effect in spreading the English language and Americanisation among all major groups resident in the USA. Both Canadians and Mexicans have expressed a related concern that free-market forces on their own will tend to spread American culture and the American version of the English language in their own countries (Labrie 1995, pp. 111–139).

Diverging expectations about such non-NAFTA issues have posed problems. All can agree that NAFTA and non-NAFTA issues tend to interact, and while this interaction has sometimes been positive, at other times it has been negative. There is disagreement about the nature of the dynamics of this interaction as well as whether specific effects produced are predominantly positive or negative. While all of the NAFTA parties have economic incentives to continue collaborating through integration, each has also been concerned that rising interdependence will loosen control of the nation-state over national culture, language and flows of people across borders. The loose relationship between integration and these non-NAFTA issues has left much leeway for polemics. Does NAFTA condone continued large-scale Mexican migration to the USA and turn a blind eye to Spanish-language ethnic enclaves as long as the labour market is satisfied? Or is NAFTA establishing conditions to contain Mexican migration to the USA while establishing an integrated labour market that will increasingly assimilate Mexican-Americans?

Additional, derivative characteristics of the relationship between NAFTA and non-NAFTA issues suggest the difficulty of specifying cause and effect. Without doubt integration impacts heavily on the major languages spoken in North America, although effects tend to be indirect and diffuse. The relationship between NAFTA and non-NAFTA issues accordingly often becomes not just blurred but also prone to tension as emotions infuse expectations. However unclear the relationship may be, the importance of the issues in question demands rigorous analysis.

The common-market approach of the European Union (EU) has faced some similar challenges including contrasting views about maintenance of national (and subnational) cultures and languages as integration has accelerated. Nonetheless, the structure of integration has been different from NAFTA, and so too resulting effects have tended to be distinctive. Integration in the EU has been regarded as a dynamic process in which economic cooperation will gradually expand to encompass other issues in a formal, cooperative framework. For example, the economic agreement among the original six members of the EU (at that time, European Economic Community) has gradually expanded over time to include social policy as well as some language issues. Minority languages have been deemed worthy of maintenance, and multilingualism has been promoted. It remains to be seen how successful the EU will be in balancing increasing interdependence with maintenance of both national and subnational cultures and languages.

NAFTA, in contrast, regards integration as a static situation in which the partners agreed explicitly in a legal document about which issues to include (predominantly economic issues) while largely excluding non-economic issues. While dynamism has been regarded as a healthy trend by advocates of European integration, maintenance of the stability of the static division of issues specified by NAFTA has been regarded by policy makers especially in the USA as critical for the continued viability of the agreement. Issues excluded from NAFTA – such as cultural, language and migratory policies – have been regarded as politically divisive and lying outside the legitimate sphere of a free-trade pact.

A distinction between informal and formal integration calls attention to the complex North American integration process involving *de jure* economic issues (included within NAFTA), which interact with *de facto* non-economic issues (excluded from NAFTA). Increasing interdependence and interaction characterise both spheres. In other words, unplanned or unstructured integration is distinct from yet interacts with more structured, formal approaches to regional integration such as NAFTA. Inasmuch as both structured and unstructured regional integration constantly interact and affect language issues, they are regarded here as related parts of the regional integration process. A related distinction in the context of US–Mexican relations is between 'integration in fact' and 'managed integration' (Weintraub 1999, see especially Chapter 1, 'Exploiting inevitable integration'). Informal integration between the two countries has been increasing but often has been 'anarchic' and 'creeping', whereas the NAFTA process is more rule-oriented and orderly. The clear implication is that 'integration in fact' (unplanned integration) can have unexpected and unsettling effects while formal integration can be effectively managed. Nonetheless, formal integration may or may not be effectively managed, and in any event can be greatly complicated by interaction with informal integration.

Rising interdependence between a sphere of relative order and one of relative disorder is complicated enough, although fault lines can be even less clear-cut than this. In particular, cultural and language policies involve uneven attempts by each party to control this sphere on its own while interaction among the NAFTA parties in the same matters remains disorganised and sometimes polemical. Management of cultural and language issues to mutual advantage in such an asymmetrical, charged setting is especially difficult.

While the intent of NAFTA planners was to cordon off non-economic issues from the economic agreement and to sustain this static division indefinitely, the continuing increase in North American integration is in fact dynamic as the economies as well as the societies of North American countries interact more with one another. Since some of these issues in a process of dynamic interaction are planned and regulated through NAFTA while others are not, the overall result tends to be unpredictable. Language policy like cultural policy is distinctive in that while falling outside the NAFTA purview, it is characterised by varying attempts at regulation by North American countries. North American countries have been impelled to try and control language issues more over time, in part since increasing interaction between them has tended to increase the already dominant role of English. Key questions arising for North American countries that speak languages other than English include whether to counteract effects of integration that tend to diminish the role of their languages and, if so, how this is to be done. The largest North American country, the USA, has not been without language concerns, since increasing interdependence has been regarded by numerous US citizens as promoting the role of Spanish within the country to an unacceptable extent at the expense of English.

While NAFTA includes only three countries, the linguistic situation is still complex. Canada has both federal and provincial language policies, while manifestations of language policies tend to be even more decentralised in the USA. The USA and Mexico interact intensely on all fronts, which has assumed a transnational character in such areas as migration, language spread and maintenance, and cultural affairs. Puerto Rico is subsumed within the NAFTA agreement under the aegis of the USA, and has its own distinctive linguistic situation as interdependence with the mainland and NAFTA partners increases. Moreover, cultural-linguistic interaction between island and mainland Puerto Ricans is complex.

Intra-NAFTA language politics (between members of NAFTA) is further complicated by what might be deemed extra-NAFTA politics or relationships between member and non-member North American countries. An ongoing integration process is taking place throughout the entire North American area particularly centred around the USA. The geopolitical pull of the USA extends to greater North America, including the circum-Caribbean (from Canada all the way to the northern rim of the South American continent including the Caribbean, Mexico and Central America). All these areas are becoming more interdependent on one another with multiple effects resulting in many spheres including language policy. There are other pacts on economic integration in this large area, but NAFTA affects all the others including the need of non-members to adapt to ongoing North American integration even though they are excluded from NAFTA. US involvement has been considerably less pronounced in South America, which influences the different directions that interdependence has taken in North and South America.

While the impact of North American integration on language policies and situations of non-NAFTA members is a pressing matter, the focus in this chapter is on the current members of NAFTA (Canada, Mexico, and the USA including Puerto Rico). Some structure may be given to this dynamic, unpredictable setting by categorising effects as either positive or negative. Effects are considered as positive if they maintain or promote North American linguistic diversity, while negative effects limit linguistic diversity. Linguistic diversity respects language rights of minorities and supports their distinctive cultural contributions. This normative criterion for judging whether effects are positive or negative does not distort analysis even for those who disagree with the virtue of linguistic diversity. For those who disagree, effects deemed positive here would largely be negative and vice versa, so that categorisation of effects can help clarify matters for all concerned. The concluding section provides an overview of both positive and negative effects.

Positive effects

Mexico's decision in the early 1990s to pursue accelerated economic integration with the USA through NAFTA pointed towards a heightened US role in the national economy. With the reorientation of Mexican policy towards closer relations with the USA, the importance of English for the country, including the labour market, has tended to become even more important than it had already been. At the same time, the relative affluence of the US economy has continued to attract millions of Mexican workers to the north, where English is the dominant language. Yet, while Mexico has committed itself to accelerated North American integration with attendant vulnerabilities, the country has also taken a number of measures to reinvigorate national language policy.

The rapprochement of Mexico with its much larger, English-speaking neighbour to the north reflects greater self-confidence in general and in particular with regard to language issues. Changes date back to the 1980s and culminated in NAFTA membership in the 1990s. Lack of confidence had been reflected at home in protectionism because of supposed inability to compete in an integrated North American economy. Abroad, lack of confidence was reflected in neglect of large numbers of Mexicans residing in the USA since eventual assimilation into the American body politic was regarded as inevitable. The gradual opening of the Mexican economy from the 1980s as well as the decision to negotiate NAFTA in the early 1990s consolidated the choice of outward-looking integration over protectionism.

Similarly in the linguistic sphere, language policy has acquired a more active international dimension. For example, the First International Congress on the Spanish Language held in Mexico in April 1997 was inaugurated by the heads of state of Mexico and Spain, President Ernesto Zedillo of Mexico and King Juan Carlos I of Spain (*Primer Congreso* 1997). Various speakers including President Zedillo invoked the responsibility of Mexico, as the largest Spanish-speaking country in the world, to play the leading role in promoting the global status of the language.

There are also some positive trends regarding Mexico and Mexican-Americans. Over time there has been a tendency towards language shift among Mexicans resident in the USA from Spanish to English. For example, of 11,826,999 Mexicans over five years old resident in the USA, 9,054,572 are Spanish-speaking and 4,605,389 do not speak English 'very well' (*1990 Census* 1993, pp. 87–88). By this measurement, nearly three million Mexican-Americans have already lost Spanish and at least half of the remainder may be moving in that same direction. Native-born persons of Mexican origin are more likely to attain competency in English and lose fluency in Spanish, as are those in younger age groups. For Mexican-Americans, language shift towards English has still occurred more slowly than for non-Hispanic migrant groups. Special factors favouring language maintenance include:

- a continuing influx of native Spanish-speakers from Mexico to the USA;
- geographical concentration of immigrants in tightly knit communities, which are often relatively close to the Mexican border; and
- more recently, support received from the Mexican government.

Despite the large size of the Mexican-American community and the steady circular flow of Mexicans to and from the USA, Mexico has traditionally been disinterested in the fate of Chicanos in the USA. With the intensification of bilateral US–Mexican ties in the 1990s, including NAFTA, the Mexican government has taken some important policy initiatives in support of transnational interests including in the linguistic sphere.

In 1990 the Mexican government created the Programme for Mexican Communities Living in Foreign Countries (PMCLFC) in response to a longstanding demand of Chicano leaders, with an extensive network of consulates coordinating activities. (In the same year Mexico also decided to negotiate a free trade agreement with the USA and Canada.) The number of Mexican consulates in the USA has increased to forty-two, including one in Puerto Rico, and there are twenty-one Mexican cultural centres. Educational programmes have 'the highest priority' for PMCLFC, in which language plays a key role (González Gutiérrez 1997, pp. 49–67). Language-oriented activities include adult education in Spanish, distribution of Spanish-language textbooks, bilingual education training for US teachers and donation of bilingual teachers from Mexico. Similarly, a radio soap-opera series sponsored by the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs ('Eres un Sueño [You Are a Dream]') has been widely distributed in the USA since 1996, and emphasises the importance of education and being bilingual.

Some illustrative statistics indicate that PMCLFC has developed a network of activities across the USA, although much more remains to be done among an expatriate community numbering in the millions. In 1997, 4,000 Mexican nationals were attending Spanish language classes in the USA, 250,000 Spanish-language history and geography textbooks were distributed to US schools with a high Mexican population, 550 bilingual US teachers attended seminars in the USA with still others attending summer courses in Mexico, a teacher exchange programme involved about 300 Mexican and American teachers and another 100 Mexican teachers sponsored by the Mexican Public Education Ministry were working between one and three years in American schools to teach immigrant students (speech by Javier Treviño 1997).

Two Mexican constitutional amendments approved in 1996–97 give new rights to immigrants in the USA, both of which have positive implications for linguistic diversity. The first removed a requirement that Mexicans travel to their hometowns to register to vote, which was expected to open the way for Mexicans living north of the border to cast absentee ballots in Mexico's presidential election in the year 2000. Since those who might vote in the USA was expected to be substantial in number, Mexican-American voters would for the first time have have a substantial impact on the Mexican body politic. Because of politics and bureaucratic inertia, this constitutional amendment was not implemented in 2000, so that the expected impact has been deferred to the future.

The other, complementary amendment allows Mexicans by birth to adopt US citizenship without losing their rights as Mexicans. Recognition of Mexican nationality to persons born outside national territory is limited to those who are children of Mexicans born in national territory or children of Mexicans by naturalisation. While Mexico has traditionally required that its citizens renounce any foreign nationality, the new dual-nationality amendment is part of a broader effort to forge closer ties with Mexicans and Mexican-Americans in the USA. Mexicans resident in the USA who had been reluctant to adopt US nationality may now do so without losing their Mexican nationality, while those who have lost Mexican nationality are given five years to recuperate it.

While the recent Mexican strategy of enhancing ties with Mexican-Americans is associated with the Zedillo administration, the dual nationality amendment received broad-based support. All of the country's political parties in Congress supported the amendment, which was approved unanimously in the Senate and the lower chamber of Congress. Longstanding demands of many Mexicans who have migrated abroad for such an amendment helped build this broad-based support.

Both amendments have important cultural and linguistic implications. The changes in voting and citizenship rules give political substance to shared cultural values between Mexicans and Chicanos. Rather than being cut off from Mexican political life, there are now incentives for Chicanos to participate in Mexican politics.

Language is an important part of the Mexican strategy to build bridges between these two communities. Meaningful participation in Mexican political affairs by Mexican-Americans, whether through voting and/or citizenship, necessarily requires ongoing contact with Mexican culture and most particularly fluency in Spanish. For example, it has been speculated that candidates in the next Mexican presidential election will campaign in the USA, and it has been assumed that this will be done exclusively in the Spanish language. Similarly, dual citizenship will encourage Chicanos to continue revisiting their homeland and cultivating other ties there, which would again involve Spanish-language competency.

Integration could constitute an opportunity for Mexican cultural industries. Some commentators have been quite specific in calling attention to the lack of competitiveness in various Mexican cultural industries and the need for reforms (Guevara Niebla and García Canclini 1992, see especially 'Tercera parte: Impacto cultural'). For example, the Mexican film industry has not generally been innovative, and the Mexican publishing industry has been lax in marketing Spanish-language books and magazines outside the country. A national policy is needed, it has been argued, to help Mexican cultural industries realise their potential comparative advantage and to promote cooperation in this area with other Latin American countries (Guevara Niebla and García Canclini 1992, see especially pp. 297–298). Such a policy would be outwards looking and compatible with ongoing integration rather than being protectionist. In addition to having a large national market for cultural industries relying on the Spanish language, Mexico is regarded as being well positioned to promote Spanish-language products among the large Mexican-American and Hispanic communities in the USA. As matters stand, Mexico has adopted neither a protectionist nor an activist cultural policy.

Indigenous languages in Mexico have been subordinated to the dominant language, Spanish, with few rights and measures to maintain these languages until recently. Since the 1980s, federal Mexican language policy has come to place greater emphasis on multicultural, multilingual education for the benefit of indigenous communities. At least at the federal level, language policy has responded in part to demands of indigenous communities for a right to their indigenous cultures and languages, including educational services supporting language maintenance. However, the policy change carried out by a highly centralised state has often had little impact in the field (Patthey-Chavez 1993–94).

Policy makers in Quebec have made a clear, sustained commitment to continental integration, first through the FTA (Free Trade Area) and then through NAFTA, which contrasts with concerns especially in English-speaking Canada that a free-trade pact with the USA would intensify ongoing Americanisation of national culture. French language and culture have tended to lessen the effects of Americanisation in Quebec, while cultural and linguistic similarities between English-speaking Canada and the USA have facilitated cultural intrusion by the larger partner. Nationalists in Quebec have been most concerned about the immediate threat of the country's English-speaking majority to the cultural and linguistic distinctiveness of the sole province in the federation with a French-speaking majority. Continental free trade has been viewed positively by Quebecers as promising economic benefits as well as a larger setting, allowing greater autonomy for the province including in the linguistic sphere (Holland 1995, pp. 71–84). Free trade has accordingly been regarded in Quebec as a way to promote cultural and linguistic diversity, while many in the other provinces who share the English language with the USA are still concerned about US cultural intrusion.

Negative effects

A number of transnational or cross-border factors related to NAFTA have converged to expand the use of English in Mexico (Pellicer 1995, pp. 155–156). English continues to grow as the second language among Mexicans and in technical disciplines the role of English is dominant; rising US commerce and investment further reinforce reliance on English, and US cultural industries are strongly represented in Mexico and reinforce reliance on English. While transnational factors are generally associated with the global spread of English, they are accentuated in the case of Mexico because of the long border shared with the USA, a history of close bilateral ties and now common membership in NAFTA.

Because of Mexican vulnerability to US influence, English-language spread in the country has often been viewed negatively. For example, to one critic a language policy is required to contain the spread of English in Mexico by encouraging Americans who work or live there to learn Spanish and by having the Mexican government promote expanded use of Spanish internationally and especially in the USA (Pellicer 1995, pp. 162, 166). This may be deemed a moderate Mexican view. A more nationalistic view claims that the spread of English in Mexico including through NAFTA reflects a post-imperialist ideology on the part of the USA. Mexican elites are faulted as well from this point of view for sharing responsibility for the spread of English because of their lax nationalism and fervent desire to promote integration regardless of the social or cultural costs (Hidalgo *et al.* 1996, pp. 134–135).

While this nationalistic study carefully documents the spread of English in Mexico in various spheres over recent decades, it does not show that this has undermined the position of Spanish in the country. Nor is it indicated how the Mexican government might have prevented the spread of English in the country nor even that it has been at fault for this spread. The authors in fact acknowledge that personal decisions by Mexican elites in private spheres have played the key role in the spread of English in the country (i.e. private education, reliance on English-language media and publications) (Hidalgo *et al.* 1996, p. 133).

The Zapatista National Liberation Army intentionally initiated an armed conflict in the southern Mexican state of Chiapas on New Year's Day 1994, the very day that NAFTA came into effect. Claiming to speak on behalf of all of Mexico's indigenous peoples, this rebel group portrayed NAFTA as reinforcing the traditional subordination of Native Mexicans to the dominant national culture. According to this view, NAFTA-related reforms for modernising agriculture, including privatisation and emphasis on exports as well as an increase in foreign and national investments in the countryside, would be undertaken at the expense of Native Mexicans. Marginalisation of Native Mexican languages is part of the threat to the cultural survival of indigenous communities.

Since feared intensification of cultural and linguistic subordination helped trigger the rebellion, the agenda for peace negotiations between the rebels and the Mexican government has included cultural and language issues. A key negotiating demand of the insurgents has been recognition by the Mexican government of Native Mexican rights to retain and reinforce their cultures and languages. This has included a demand to have radio and television stations for transmission of programmes in the indigenous languages of Chiapas. A series of 1996 agreements promised qualified autonomy for Native Mexicans, including the right to multicultural education with teaching in their own languages. While the agreements included some significant governmental concessions for Native Mexican autonomy, a lasting peace has remained elusive since the insurgents claim the government has not honoured its 1996 commitments.

Mexican-Americans, as the most numerous Hispanic group in the USA, are at the centre of a controversy over whether language shift to English will continue and even accelerate, whether measures should be taken to reinforce such language shift, or alternatively whether Spanish language maintenance measures are needed. In spite of evidence of some ongoing language shift, it is clear that most Mexicans in the USA still continue to rely on Spanish, and that language shift is much too slow for those who are committed to having all immigrant groups commit fully to English.

Twenty-three US states have made English their official language since the English Only movement gained momentum in the mid-1980s. While these laws reflect widespread concern that all US residents be fluent in English, the laws have mostly had symbolic importance in signalling mainstream Anglo exasperation with the diffusion of the Spanish language. For example, in early 1999 the US Supreme Court ruled that an Arizona law requiring public employees to speak only English on the job was unconstitutional. Of more practical import is Proposition 187 in California limiting benefits to illegal immigrants as well as efforts in the same state to end bilingual education.

The national debate over bilingual education has become so politicised that its advantages of linguistic diversity and cultural pluralism have been overshadowed by concerns about national fragmentation through the perpetuation of linguistic ghettos. Mainstream concerns have even been imbibed by part of the Hispanic community. Increasing numbers of Hispanic parents have come to oppose bilingual education as unnecessarily prolonging the acquisition of English by their children so as to be able to compete effectively in the job market.

Language politics in Puerto Rico has had a long, troubled history. Suffice it to say here that the longstanding adversarial relationship between English and Spanish on the island has constrained the spread of bilingualism. Spanish has remained the common language of the people, while English has remained confined to certain governmental and commercial purposes. While English has been a required subject at all educational levels, about 80% of the island's population remains functionally monolingual in Spanish. This apparent anomaly has been explained as resulting from the sustained, successful resistance of socioculturally oriented Puerto Rican nationalism to US linguistic demands based on political nationalism (Resnick 1993, p. 261). At the same time, many Puerto Ricans on the island with a good command of English have attended private schools where instruction is frequently in English, so that privileged groups value their own bilingualism.

Popular support for perpetuating Hispanic culture and the Spanish language on the island has conditioned the nature of the political debate between those favouring statehood, continuing commonwealth status or independence. Each group has had to assure their respective constituencies that the preferred political status for the island would be compatible with perpetuation of Hispanic culture and the Spanish language. This political imperative has been especially awkward for pro-statehood advocates, who have felt compelled to reassure the US Congress that eventual statehood for the island would involve an easy transition while also reassuring local constituencies that the linguistic and cultural status quo would not be disturbed.

Another large group of Hispanics resident on the US mainland, Cuban-Americans, pose some distinctive challenges for North American integration. Historically, Cuba has been tightly integrated with the continental USA, and prospects are strong that after Castro some kind of formal or informal integration will reassert itself. A number of transnational human bridges between Spanish-speaking areas and the US mainland (i.e. Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic and Mexico) already reinforce the Spanish language within the USA, and sooner or later Cuba will be added to the list. In the case of Cuba, restitution of close ties between Florida and the island will likely reinforce the status of Spanish in that US state while reinvigorating spoken American English on the island. To this extent, a return to integration will likely reinforce linguistic diversity on both sides of the Florida Straits. At the same time, reinforcement of linguistic diversity remains sensitive because of the historical tendency of American culture and language to intrude excessively in the island. A more recent, counterpart tendency in south Florida is for the prominent Latino presence to trigger Anglo countermeasures, including English Only legislation.

The case of English-speaking Canada is distinctive in that integration has been regarded by many there as allowing excessive US cultural intrusion even though the same language is spoken on both sides of the border. Canadian policy has relied on incentives as well as controls to promote national cultural industries including restrictions on Canadian advertisements in Canadian editions of US magazines, which US policy regards as protectionist. A common language in this case has been perceived by the less populous country as potentially threatening for cultural autonomy, while Quebec has actively supported continental integration while also reinforcing the role of the French language in the province. These national and international tugs and pulls are negative insofar as reflecting a lack of consensus about cultural and linguistic diversity.

Conclusions

Inasmuch as the predominantly Anglophone USA is the sole remaining global superpower as well as the dominant partner within NAFTA, there is a tendency for increasing North American integration to spread English throughout the area. Yet, other trends counterbalance this free-market trend that favours the diffusion of English. The contemporary spread of English has been uneven, and has not displaced the established national language in any North American country or territory outside the USA. In other words, in recent times here has been no case of massive language shift in any North American country or territory (including numerous non-NAFTA members in Central America and the Caribbean) from the national language to English. While the spread of the English language has acquired powerful momentum, factors counterbalancing this trend should not be underestimated.

Limits on the spread of English are particularly evident in the case of the US dependency Puerto Rico, where longstanding integration of the island with the mainland would seem to present ideal conditions for cultural and linguistic assimilation. Offsetting factors helping arrest and contain the spread of American culture and the English language have included local nationalism reflected in local cultural and language policies. Other North American examples where local language policies have promoted local languages while limiting the impact of English as integration has proceeded apace are Mexico and the Canadian province of Quebec.

The linguistic destiny of Hispanics within the USA is more precarious, since at no governmental level (i.e. municipal, state or federal) have Hispanic majorities been able to control language policy. Even when Hispanic minorities have benefited from measures maintaining or promoting the Spanish language, this has reflected progressive decisions of non-Hispanic majorities. Hispanics have tended to gain greater political power over time in the USA as they have emerged as the largest minority in the country, but their growing numbers have still not sufficed to institutionalise the status of the Spanish language in the country. US migratory policies favouring Latin American immigration have become more selective in recent years, as free-market trends in North America have continued to push towards assimilation.

The future of the Spanish language in the USA, while of great domestic interest, is likely to have important effects beyond national borders as well. The Mexican publicist Carlos Fuentes has spoken of ‘the three major Spanish-speaking areas’ (‘las tres hispanidades’) meaning that the three main legs of the Spanish-speaking world are Spain, Spanish America and the USA. A linguistically diverse USA, in which a large Spanish-speaking minority would be regarded as an asset, would likely be much more supportive of a linguistically diverse North America. On the other hand, powerful forces within the USA regard monolingualism and cultural homogeneity as essential for national unity, and ascendancy of these forces within the country would likely exert powerful pressure on other North American partners to join the Anglophone bandwagon.

This survey of positive and negative effects has documented that the impact of North American integration on linguistic diversity has been untidy and often unpredictable. There is considerable variety in language policies in North America, both in terms of their approaches and their effectiveness. There is no consensus among the three NAFTA partners about how to deal with cultural and linguistic issues, so that all too often the NAFTA agreement masks disagreements about non-economic areas. This is not to suggest that consensus reigns in the economic sphere, yet economic cooperation would certainly be reinforced to the extent that suspicions and concerns in other spheres could be resolved.

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11 Sociolinguistic changes in transformed Central Asian societies

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Multilingualism – from the point of view of both societies and individuals – is a striking characteristic of Central Asia. An exceptionally high mobility among ethnic populations in earlier periods due to nomadism, wars, trade, migration for political or economic reasons and even deportations has been the natural cause of language contact and the interference of one language into another or the functional dominance of one language over the other. In addition to this, throughout the twentieth century linguistic patterns in Central Asia have been in a constant process of politicised and rapid reorganisation. Finally, with the new large-scale sociopolitical developments taking place in the region since the Soviet collapse, traditional language settings are subject to considerably different conditions from those of the past. To a much greater extent than before future research on not only major languages and public language practice, but also minority language settings in Central Asia, will have to take into account the overall sociopolitical conditions and official programmes of the societies to which these settings belong.

In contemporary research Central Asia is generally given a wide definition delimiting a territory almost as large as that of Canada, from the Caspian Sea in the west to the Hinggan Mountains to the east of Mongolia, and from the Iranian Plateau, the Himalayas and Tibet in the south to the Siberian steppe lands in the north. In the western part of Central Asia there are now, for the first time after centuries of foreign interference and hegemony, truly independent states: the former five Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. Together these five republics make up more or less half of the large Central Asian region specified above. As independent states they are expected both by their own citizens and by the international community to work out their own ideologies and policies. See Figure 11.1.

This chapter is first and foremost a survey of official language policies in the former Soviet Central Asian republics. In addition to this there are brief comments on linguistic trends in the Central Asian region as a whole.[1]

[1] In some of the ensuing sections, language samples and certain comments have been extracted from Schlyter (1997; 1998a) as well as from two previous lectures by this author: 'Language



Fig. 11.1 Map of Central Asia
Source: Forum for Central Asian Studies, Stockholm

Contact-induced linguistic variation and language policy

Although linguistic diversity is a characteristic feature of most areas of the world where there is a fairly large number of people, the situation in Central Asia could nevertheless be regarded as outstanding with respect to the great number of language families represented in the region. First and foremost, Turkic languages are represented, but Indo-European – primarily Slavic and Iranian languages – and Semitic languages, as well as Chinese languages and others are also present in the region. Of equal significance is the fact that Central Asian dwellers are typically bilingual or multilingual rather than monolingual, and that language contact thus occurs to a very high extent within one and the same speaker as much as between different speakers and speech communities. This raises the potential for interference between languages still further. Several types of interference and language mixing that are identified in the linguistic literature can be found in this region (see, for example, Thomason and Kaufman 1988; Bakker 1996).

Lexical interference in terms of relexification (where a lexical element from one language enters the lexicon of another language) is a very common phenomenon in Central Asia. The different degrees of such lexical reorganisation range from limited numbers of lexical transfers to advanced stages of relexification, where most lexical elements originating in one or a number of languages are combined with the grammar of another language. One example of advanced relexification is offered by the language variety spoken by the Abdal or Eynu people, an ethnic minority in Xinjiang, China (Ladstätter and Tietze 1994; Lee-Smith 1996a). Most of Abdal vocabulary is of an Iranian stock, whereas morphology and syntax are Uighur:

Abdal (from Lee-Smith 1996a; bold indicates Uighur elements; this device was added and word-by-word translations were altered by the author of this chapter):

pedir**im** hatta**din** jɛk saŋ atɛʃ yn**di**
father+1SG.POSS. market+ABL. one stone fire come+PRET.
'My father brought a flint-stone from the market.'

χani**da** mikɛ hɛs**mu** nist **mu**?
home+LOC. goat exist+QUEST.MARKER not exist QUEST.MARKER
'Are there goats at your home?'

policies and language movements in present-day Central Asia,' delivered at The International Convention of Asia Scholars (ICAS), Leiden, June 1998 (a summary is given in Schlyter 1998b), and 'Language contact in Central Asia and the linguistic definition of mixed language,' delivered at ESCAS VI, European Society for Central Asian Studies, Venice, October 1998. As to the chapter in this volume, I am obliged to William Fierman, Stéphane Grivelet, Brigitte Heuer, Seung-Chul Hur, German Kim, Elisabeth Özdalga, Jonathan Persson, Ingvar Svanberg, Merrick Tabor and Franz Wennberg for helping me to gain access to documents and data that would have been otherwise difficult to obtain.

Relexification may be combined with or accompanied by another type of interference, where one language adjusts itself structurally to another language while retaining and redefining its own grammatical elements. In the following two examples, Tajik (an Iranian language) grammatical structures have been mapped onto Turkic ones together with a redefinition of Tajik grammatical elements. In the first sentence, the preposition *ba* has been postposed and behaves as a postposition or even a suffix, like postpositions and case endings in Uzbek (a Turkic language). The genitive expression in the next example has the same structure as an Uzbek genitive construction: a noun in the genitive followed by a noun marked by a possessive suffix; this is contrary to standard Tajik and Iranian genitives, with reversed order between possessor and possessed (compare the following with the phrase below: *čašmoni duxtar*, 'eyes+marker (-i) of *ezafe* girl', 'the girl's eyes').

> *Uzbek–Turkic interference in Tajik* (redefined Tajik elements and corresponding Uzbek suffixes bold)
>
> | | | |
> |---|---|---|
> | šahr**ba** | rafta | omadam |
> | town+to (from Tajik PREP.) | go (PAST PTCL.) | I came |
>
> 'I've been to town.'
> (Uzbek šahar**ga** borib keldim)
>
> | | |
> |---|---|
> | duxtar**a** | čašmon**aš** |
> | girl+POST.PARTICLE (from **ro**) | eyes+3SG.POSS. |
>
> 'the girl's eyes'
> (Uzbek qiz**ning** kŭzlar**i**)

Both such reallocations of prepositions and the Turkic type of genitives seem to have become more or less standard in Tajik dialects mingling with Turkic dialects over a fairly large area on both sides of the present-day border between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.[2]

Pidgin languages brought about by means of relexification and structural readjustment combined with morphological and syntactic simplification can also be found in the Central Asian region. An example is the Kyahta language, originally a medium of communication between Tsarist-Russian and Chinese tradesmen to the south of Lake Baikal (Neumann 1966; Nichols 1980); another example is the Turkic-Chinese hybrid language Hezhou (Lee-Smith 1996b).

The examples of language interference and language mixing mentioned above are the results of long historical processes conditioned by migration and interethnic communication developed as a natural course of events without much intervention from bureaucratic mechanisms. For example, Uzbeks and

[2] Doerfer (1967) refers to the most turkified Tajik dialects as a 'Türksprache in statu nascendi'.

Tajiks – or, in a broader sense, Turkic-speaking and Iranian-speaking nationalities – in Turkestan have been living together for centuries with bilingualism and multilingualism that is generally considered to be an irreducible feature of their cultural life, albeit at times under great tensions. Apart from difficulties in the linguistic classification of language varieties at advanced stages of interference, the results and further development of such contact-induced linguistic changes are far from easy to predict and explain. As soon as one considers contacts between languages belonging to larger communities and anchored in some literary tradition, the interlinguistic relationship often appears to be a two-way process of influence and even, to some extent, indeterminate as far as dominance and interference are concerned. Uzbek–Tajik language contact is a good illustration of this point. Given these two languages, lexical interference between the languages is bidirectional rather than unidirectional. This can be explained at least in part by referring to status relationships between speech varieties on the one hand and structural similarities between the two languages as well as the presence of a common Islamic Arabic–Persian stock of concepts and lexical items on the other hand (compare Uzbek *namoz ŭqimoq* and Tajik *namoz xondan* for 'pray', where Iranian *namoz* 'prayer' is used in both languages). Likewise, permanent structural changes in one language as a result of influence from the other also indicate different directions of interference for different parts of the large region where language communities with Uzbek–Tajik contacts can be found.[3]

In contrast, contact-induced linguistic changes in modern-day Central Asia have more obviously been conditioned by bureaucratic power. For a long time language contact and language policy have already been and continue to be interrelated as two sides of the same coin, albeit under varying conditions and with different results.

Soviet language policy was a radical reform programme which by no means reached its goals and which was modified and redefined several times during the Soviet era. Its course of development went from comprehensive reform work on local vernaculars to a multilingual *modus vivendi* between the all-union Russian language and other languages, at times accompanied by ideological and linguistically obscure visions of the 'rapprochement' (Russian *sbliženie*) and 'merging' (Russian *slijanie*) of nationalities (see, for example, among many others Lewis 1972; 1983; Crisp 1989; Kreindler 1989; Pool 1992; Haarmann 1995).

Despite all declarations of the equality of languages, especially in its initial stage, Soviet language policy upheld and favoured the privileged status of Russian of the former Tsarist imperial order (Blank 1988). Typically enough,

[3] For Iranian influence on Uzbek–Turkic grammatical structures, see, for example, Menges 1945; 1946–1949; Reichl 1983.

due to the unchallenged status of Russian as a prestige language throughout the eras of Tsarist-Russian and Soviet hegemony in the Central Asian region, language interference has been consequently unidirectional from this language to local Central Asian languages (see, for example, Krippes 1994a; Akiner 1997). There are ample cases of relexification, where Russian-based elements have been integrated with the lexicon of the target language. For example, Russian *ostanovka* ‘stop/stopping place’ seemed at one time to have replaced the indigenous term *bekat* in Uzbek language material. This would then have justified the integration of this Russian word into the Uzbek lexicon, although the old and with time less and less used lexeme was still registered there. At the same time, with Russian being one of the most widely spread and used languages in the region, spontaneous Russian interference with speech in other languages has been frequent, as it continues to be even following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, involving a great number of Russian expressions where there is a native-language option still in use. Interference of this type is not relexification affecting language corpus but, rather, ‘code-switching’ (Krippes 1994b) or – from the point of view of the complete utterance – the intrusion of another language into performative acts conducted in another language. Such interference is to a considerable extent fortuitous depending on topic, situation and – not least – the individual speaker and his or her command of and attitude towards the respective languages. Sentence-independent adverbials and performatives from Russian in Central Asian native-language speech are very common (e.g. *ladno* ‘all right’, *xorošo* ‘good’, *naoborot* ‘on the contrary’, used in Uzbek instead of the older Uzbek lexemes *majli, jaxši* and *teskari*, respectively, all of which are as frequently used). It is also easy to find examples of interfering Russian elements more deeply embedded in the sentence constituency; for example: Russian *perevesti* ‘translate’, used with Uzbek *qilmoq* ‘do’ to form the verb phrase *perevesti qilmoq* ‘translate’, a synonymous expression being *taržima* (from Arabic) *qilmoq*. Another example is the Russian augmentative modifier *sovsem* ‘completely’ and Uzbek *bošqa* ‘different’, in *sovsem bošqa* ‘completely different’; compare Uzbek *bombošqa* ‘completely different’ with the augmentative prefix *bom-*.

Given another historical context, language policy in multilingual settings may have the opposite aim: that of neutralising or revoking the results of previous language contact. The language renewal processes developing in Central Asia at present are examples of this. First, they are aimed at neutralising the role of Russian in Central Asian linguistic settings.

One novelty of great relevance in this context is the fact that current Central Asian language renewal processes are being launched by political entities that are for the most part independent states, where the geographical delimitation of a particular language policy – e.g. the Uzbek one – becomes well defined and comprehensive and affects all linguistic settings within the political borders of the given state. This will certainly also affect minority language settings in a fundamental way. There may now be a greater risk for such settings becoming absorbed by or integrated into the official standard language setting of the state or some other independent political unit. The impact of the new Uzbek language policy on minority languages in Uzbekistan – such as Karakalpak (a Turkic language) and Tajik – is already visible. The development of the Karakalpak alphabet reform shows a growing adjustment to the Uzbek one (see the section on 'Issues in corpus planning' below), one effect of which may be that Karakalpak will become more differentiated from its close sister language Kazakh than is motivated from a linguistic point of view. The conditions for Uzbek–Tajik bilingualism are gradually changing as a result of the requirement that inhabitants of Uzbekistan will have to show some proficiency in standard Uzbek. In the Tajik departments at the universities of Samarkand and Buchara, for example, Tajik-speaking students studying Tajik are obliged to take a certain amount of standard Uzbek lessons during their university education. For most of these students this Uzbek language variety differs both in form and function from the Uzbek that they have hitherto used side-by-side with their Tajik dialect in their home language community. Consequently, a new status relationship between the two languages will develop for a great number of speakers, and this will both change the conditions for the influence of one language on the other and will also affect the choice of language for different speech situations. Moreover, although from the Tajik point of view the state-border separation of Tajik language communities from Uzbek ones may provide stronger protection against continued 'uzbekification' on the Tajik side of the border, the new political reality may have a disruptive effect on Tajik speech and writing across this border.

Language as a pawn in the political game

In most of its uses and definitions the notion of 'language policy' normally refers to cases where language is to be viewed as an object acted upon in terms of different aspects of language planning.[4] This does not, however, exhaust the political dimensions of language. Language may also be a factor determining or influencing political decisions, in which case it is an acting subject rather than object. For the sake of distinction between, on the one hand, language policy and language planning presupposing a passive object role for language and, on the other hand, political processes where language is mainly an agentive component, in this chapter the latter will be referred to as 'language-based politics'.

[4] For further comments on this notion and references, see Schlyter 1997; 1998a. For an attempt at a theoretical framework for research on language planning, see Haarmann 1990.

The links between these two dimensions of the involvement of language in sociopolitical matters are often very close and even interdependent. Language is like a pawn in a game where it is made to move for the achievement of certain goals, as a result of which language itself may very well be affected in various ways. Three examples are presented in this section in order to illustrate this point. The first one is the so-called 'national delimitation' of Turkestan in the 1920s, when the first decisions were taken for a delineation of the former Soviet Central Asian republics. The second and third examples are the role of Russian as a symbol of Soviet unity and the present-day creation of new linguistic symbols of statehood and nationhood in Central Asia.

Although it is far from historically proven, there is reason to believe that these new borders between republics, provinces and districts in the former Tsarist-Russian Turkestan were to a large extent based on ethnolinguistic criteria, where language would thus be a determining political factor, i.e. an acting subject (compare Lewis 1972; Kreindler 1995). Once these borders had been established, they generated in their turn new conditions for linguistic development in the region. For example, the ongoing assimilation of Tajik speakers to the numerically dominant Turkic language environment was most probably slowed down by the creation of an autonomous Tajik republic, which was at first within the borders of the union republic of Uzbekistan and then, in 1929, converted into a union republic of its own (Carlisle 1994).

The status of the classical Turkestanian literary languages Chaghatay (Turkic) and Persian (Iranian) was further undermined as the new republics primarily became concerned with the linguistic environment of their own territories, respectively, and felt the need for linguistic improvement and homogenisation under conditions different from those of neighbouring republics and regions. Local language planning was developed, such as the establishment of new literary languages (e.g. Karakalpak) and the standardisation of already existing literary languages involving among other things script changes from modified Arabic alphabets to Latin scripts (Kazakh, Uzbek, Tajik, etc.). The development of local languages apparently had specific pragmatic aims. Literacy, which was very low (less than 5%) in Central Asia at the time of the foundation of the Soviet state, had to be increased for the political mobilisation of the masses. The Bolshevik leaders, not least Lenin himself, seemed convinced that the quickest way to accomplish this was to make people literate in their mother tongues. A further step in the same direction was the policy, pursued throughout the 1920s and early 1930s, of promoting members of the indigenous population for mainly native-language careers in local administration; this was called *korenizacija* ('rooting').[5]

[5] See Fierman 1991, Chapter 8, 'Nativization,' pp. 166–192.

The parallel promotion of Russian and eventually the predominance of this language in the former Soviet Union is another instance of both language-based politics and language policy. Throughout the entire period of Soviet power, Russian was never given the formal status of official or state language. However, it soon became the *primus inter pares* and the lingua franca of the Soviet Union. One important measure enforcing this development was the decree issued on 13 March 1938 by the Soviet central government that made Russian a compulsory school subject in all union republics. In addition to this, the substitution of Cyrillic alphabets for the merely ten-year-old Latin ones during the early 1940s facilitated the introduction of words in Russian–Cyrillic spelling into Central Asian languages. With time, especially after Khrushchev's ascension to the top of the leadership in the 1950s, Russian was launched as a primary hallmark (*priznak*) of Soviet socialist unity. As communist ideology gradually became void of meaning, the Russian language was made use of as a unifying factor in its own right and as a symbol of 'Soviet culture' and the 'Soviet people'; Russian was to be either the one and only mother tongue or at least the 'second' mother tongue of every Soviet citizen (see, for example, Kreindler 1982). After the education reform laws of 1958–59, there was no longer a requirement that children should be taught in their local native tongue during their first years of school. This was a serious blow for minority languages since parents soon tended to choose the favoured 'career language', Russian, for their children's education. In twenty years, roughly between 1960 and 1980, almost half of the approximately seventy languages that had been used as media of instruction during earlier periods lost this function. The Central Asian languages were not affected; however, the proportion of school hours devoted to Russian was increased. At the same time the number of native-language publications decreased considerably.

Thus, being the undisputedly most prestigious language of the union and a language of power and hegemony, Russian was exploited by the Soviet leadership for new political purposes with due 'language-policy' effects on the choice between languages and, furthermore, the command of languages. It is by now a well-known fact that the Russian-language teaching programmes launched during the last decades of the Soviet era were not a great success. In instances where there were actually other languages involved, these programmes did not always lead to bilingualism but to semilingualism as well (Kirkwood 1991; Kreindler 1995).

The symbolic function of Russian as an 'amalgamating factor' (Moskovich 1989) or the 'linguistic glue' (Fierman 1985) of the Soviet Union lost its *raison d'être*, as the union was disintegrating and yet another political reality emerged reducing Russian to the status of second language or even foreign language in Central Asia and other former Soviet republics, where now new local language policies are being developed.

Within less than a year, between July 1989 and May 1990, and as part of a political development that led up to the final dissolution of the Soviet Union, five Central Asian languages – Tajik, Kazakh, Kirghiz, Uzbek and Turkmen – were proclaimed official languages, or state languages, in their respective eponymous republics and would-be sovereign states. This was no surprise to anyone. It was part of a general trend in the Soviet republics. Similar developments were witnessed in other parts of the union. Furthermore, it was generally believed, or expected, that this was but a natural course of events, and part of endeavours made by groups of people – possibly the majority of people in the republics – to gain autonomy, or even independence. Once again, language acquired a decisive symbolic function.

In 1991, as the Soviet Union split up and new states came into existence, the ideas of nation-state – or rather 'one state–one nation' – and nation-building grew strong. This was by no means a trivial issue to resolve. For seven decades, the inhabitants of the newly-independent Central Asian states had had their experience of nation-building as members of the Soviet state. However, they had never experienced it as a sovereign people left with the responsibility to identify and act on the features of nationality for themselves.

Following Soviet and more generally western traditions of making language one of the main components in definitions of ethnicity and nation, Central Asian policy makers have attributed a prominent ideological role to language. The transition from old Soviet-style language policy to local Central Asian language policies under altered sociopolitical conditions is still in a state of a gradual shift of paradigms, generating conflicts of interest not only between individuals or groups of individuals but also within individuals. Most of the men and women in charge of current language laws and public debate on linguistic issues in the Central Asian states were brought up with centralised Soviet language policy, designed and controlled by Moscow and most strongly characterised by the dominance and influence of the Russian language. Their own careers have in the majority of cases been based on Russian, and the regional languages that their new sociolinguistic planning is to be applied to are, to varying degrees, former standardised Soviet languages and, as such, more or less russified languages. In other words, part of the Soviet legacy that this generation of language reformers have to revisit involves their own linguistic skills.

In the wake of Central Asian state language laws

In accordance with general practice during the Soviet era, the five state language laws passed by the Central Asian Supreme Soviets in 1989 and 1990 were issued in two or three different language versions, the first of which was in the titular language of the respective republic and the second one in Russian.

All of these laws were much alike as to the basic principles and issues. They were in the first place language status laws laying down rights and obligations in the use of languages and the choice of language in specific public settings and official functions. Certain spheres of linguistic intercourse were exempted from the regulations put down in these laws, such as religious ceremonies (the Tajik, Kazakh and Uzbek laws) and activities in the armed forces (the Kazakh, Kirghiz and Uzbek laws). To a much lesser extent and merely in terms of general comments or recommendations the laws referred to language corpus issues, such as alphabet, vocabulary and grammar. These matters were later to be regulated by additional laws and proposals within the next few years after the first round of enactments of state language laws, at the same time as they were at the focus of attention in the public debates sparked off by the work on establishing state languages. In the years to come much attention was to be devoted in the mass media as well as among ordinary people to the 'impoverishment' of indigenous languages in Central Asia during the final Soviet 'period of stagnation' (*turghunlik davri* in the Uzbek language debate).

Before the final adoption of the state language laws, drafts were published creating much discussion and even postponements on the passing of the laws. For example, the first draft for an Uzbek law on language appeared in May 1989 and was made known to the public in Uzbek-language and Russian-language newspapers in June. It was met with strong opposition, mainly because of the treatment of Russian, which according to its critics had been given as prominent a position as the Uzbek language and thus made into a de facto second official language in Uzbekistan. The public discussion was extended and a new draft was presented where the position of Russian was much weakened. Finally, as a compromise between these two drafts, a third version was passed as the state language law of Uzbekistan on 21 October, with an immediate amendment to the constitution of the republic (paragraph 75.1) concerning the new formal statuses of Uzbek and Russian.[6] By that time the three republics of Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kirghizstan had already adopted their language laws, on 22 July, 22 September and 23 September, respectively. The Turkmen law, which had also stirred up people's emotions, was not enacted until 24 May 1990.

[6] *Ŭzbekiston Sovet Socialistik Respublikasining Qonuni: Ŭzbekiston SSRning davlat tili haqida* [Law of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Uzbekistan: Concerning the State Language of the Uzbek SSR], Tashkent 1989. In the first constitution of independent Uzbekistan, dated 8 December 1992, only Uzbek is mentioned at the beginning of the law, in paragraph 4, together with a general provision on the right for every nationality to use and develop its own language. A revised and much shorter version of the state language law was issued on 21 December 1995: 'Ŭzbekiston Respublikasining Qonuni: Davlat tili haqida (jangi tahrirda)' [Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan: Concerning the State Language (New Edition)] published in *Xalq Sŭzi*, No. 250, on 29 November 1995.

In the preambles of the language laws, after the declaration of the new official language, guarantees were provided for the free use of languages other than the official language and for the equal rights of citizens independent of language. Russian was given the epithet 'cross-national language' (Russian *jazyk mežnacional'nogo obščenija*) and was referred to throughout the laws as the prime lingua franca between nationalities within a republic as well as for communication across republican borders. Except for Turkmen in the language law of Turkmenistan,[7] no other language was afforded this status.

Four of the language laws – the Tajik one being the exception – included timetables for the implementation of the laws. Such general provisions as the status of languages and equality issues were put in force on the same date as the laws themselves went into effect. As to articles prescribing changes in language usage, transition periods of ten years or less were envisaged for the complete implementation of the language laws, with different deadlines for different articles (Carlson 1994). It soon became clear that most of these deadlines were too optimistic, in many cases even unrealistic. As could be expected, the greatest delays have occurred for changes which in addition to other difficulties are dependent on language proficiency among citizens for their realisation. For example, the change-over to indigenous languages in official documentation and organisational meetings at the state-bureaucracy level, where the use of Russian has been the rule more or less to the exclusion of other languages, has proceeded at a very slow pace, not only for economic reasons and due to political opposition but also because a great many persons participating in these activities – irrespective of their nationality – simply do not know the prescribed non-Russian language well enough to be able to carry out their duties in this language. Consequently, state language laws have been revisited and their implementation – if further commented on at all – postponed to specific future dates in the twenty-first century (Eschment 1998, Fierman 1995a; 1995b; Huskey 1995, Schlyter 1997; 1998a; Smith *et al.* 1998).

The terminology employed in Central Asian language laws and language debate for the distinction between language statuses needs some comment. The indigenous terms used for the specific status of the five titular languages in their respective state language laws contain either one of two originally Arabic words, *daulah* meaning 'state/government' and *mamlakah* meaning 'state/country/sovereignty' (Tajik *zaboni davlatī*, Turkmen *dɵvlet dili*, Uzbek *davlat tili*, Kazakh *memlekettik til*, Kirgiz *mamlekettik til*). In the Russian versions of the language laws the corresponding designation is *gosudarstvennyj*

[7] *Turkmenistan SSR Ëkary Sovetining Karary: Turkmenistan SSR-ning Dil hakyndaky Kanuny* [Resolution by the Supreme Soviet of the Turkmen SSR: The Language Law of the Turkmen SSR], Ashgabat No. 202–XII.

jazyk. The broadest possible English translation would be 'official language', alternatively 'state language' with 'state' interpreted as 'government/official'. Since the titular languages were the only languages given this title with respect to the whole territory of their republics, their status has also – perhaps even preferably – come to be interpreted as 'state language' where 'state' means 'country'. As state languages in this sense of the word they would qualify as representatives, or symbols, of their country-states. Furthermore, in combination with the notion of nation-building, where the entire state is to be somehow defined as one nation, such an interpretation easily leads to ideas of the state language being also a national symbol. This is what is happening in Uzbekistan today, where Uzbek in public reports and debates is promoted as a national symbol of the country and is called not only *davlat tili* but also *millij til* in the sense of 'national language', although this latter expression so far has been and still is used in the sense of 'nationality language'; *millij* is Arabic and is used in many recipient languages for both 'state-national' and 'ethnic'. The development in Uzbekistan is further complicated by the fact that within its borders the country has the Autonomous Republic of Karakalpakistan, which in the Uzbek 1989 state language law was granted its own autonomous language policy. In the first draft of the Uzbek state language law of 18 May 1989 (paragraph 5), Karakalpakistan was explicitly granted the right to call its titular language, Karakalpak, *davlat tili* (Uzbek) within the confines of the Karakalpak territory. By this statement Uzbekistan would then have been given two official languages designated by the same name, the interpretation of which, however, differed from one language to the other; in the case of Uzbek it stood for both 'official' and 'state', whereas in the case of Karakalpak it was to be interpreted merely as 'official'. In the final law passed by the Uzbek Supreme Soviet on 21 October, the designation of 'state language' for Karakalpak was not repeated. However, the Karakalpak republic was still granted the right to 'decide on all linguistic issues within its own territory'. The status granted to the Karakalpak language through this provision must be differentiated from the status of 'local official language' (Russian *mestnyj oficial'nyj jazyk*) as mentioned, for example, in the Kazakh state language law of 1989 (paragraph 4),[8] where this status was generally recognised, without any specific references, for ethnic languages other than the state language and the cross-national language in areas densely populated by speakers of such languages. In Karakalpakistan, by contrast, as a consequence of the autonomous language policy of the republic, the Karakalpak language could be – and seems in fact to be – given the status of official language in all of

[8] 'No. 112. 22 sentjabrja 1989 g. Zakon Kazaxskoj SSR: O jazykax v Kazaxskoj SSR,' in Ajbasova *et al.* 1997, pp. 267–276.

Karakalpakistan, even though the Karakalpaks are not in the majority in the republic as a whole.[9]

Thus, in the state language laws under consideration, three different levels of 'official language' can be distinguished:

- the official language of an independent state;
- the official language of an autonomous province; and
- the official language of local administration.

Especially at the first level, but also to a considerable extent at the second level, the language in question acquires an important symbolic load by representing not merely an ethnic group of people but also a political unit defined in terms of both physical space and social organisation.

The only other republic besides Uzbekistan acknowledging an autonomous language policy for a part of its territory alongside its statewide language policy is Tajikistan. In the Tajik 1989 state language law (paragraph 3) the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast was given the right to determine policy on its own language issues.[10] Except for announcements concerning policy for the development and preservation of particular languages (e.g. Yaghnobi in Tajikistan), no further provisions are envisioned in the language laws for a geographically based autonomy in language issues which has, at times, led to unrest and demands from language minorities, especially in densely populated and ethnically homogeneous areas in the region; for example, Uzbeks in the Kirghiz province of Osh and – not least – the numerous Russian population.

In spite of significant emigration of Russians since independence, this minority group remains in large numbers all over the Central Asian republics and still constitutes – as in Soviet times – a particularly large proportion of the populations in Kazakhstan (35%) and Kirghizstan (20%), where the status of Russian has consequently become a sensitive and complex language issue. The uncertainty as to the formal status of Russian in relation to their titular languages has caused more ambivalence in the language policies of Kazakhstan and Kirghizstan than in the other republics. Apart from designating Russian as the language of cross-national communication, the Kazakh 1989 language law also provided guarantees for the use of this language on equal terms with the state language Kazakh (Carlson 1994; Fierman 1998). In the new Kazakh constitution of 1995 the status of Russian became even more ambiguous, as it was prescribed that Russian was to be used officially on equal terms with the state language in state bureaucracy. The same provision was made in the new language law passed by the Kazakh Parliament in the summer of 1997

[9] The Karakalpaks constitute less than one third of the total population of the Karakalpak Autonomous Republic. By the time of the Soviet demise, the number of Uzbeks residing in this republic was slightly larger than that of its eponymous population.

[10] *Qonuni zaboni Džumhurii Todžikiston* [Language Law of the Republic of Tajikistan], Dushanbe 1989.

(paragraphs 5 and 8).[11] To many people this statement meant that Russian was now a de facto official language (*oficial'nyj jazyk*) in Kazakhstan, as it had been called explicitly in the draft versions (1990) of the 1991 Declaration of Independence. At the same time, it was clear that Kazakh remained the sole state language (*gosudarstvennyj jazyk*) of Kazakhstan (Dave 1996a; 1996b; Fierman 1998). Even though the difference in status between Kazakh and Russian is still formally retained, the elevation of Russian has strengthened the position of this language in the republic. The new status of Russian could be regarded as yet another level of 'official language', in addition to the other three levels mentioned above: the status of official language in all-state administration without at the same time being a language representing the specific state as a political unit.

A similar development can be reported for Kirghizstan as regards the formal status of Russian. Especially in higher education, this language retains a strong position. An exclusively Russian-medium International School of Management and Business was opened in Bishkek in 1992 and a new 'Slavonic' university was opened in 1993, both in the Kirghiz capital Bishkek (Huskey 1995). Through a presidential decree in 1994, Russian was given the status of official language in certain regions of the country. In 1996 a constitutional revision was made to the effect that Russian could henceforth be used as an official language in the whole republic (Pannier 1996). These measures were in direct contrast with instructions given in the decree accompanying the 1989 state language law concerning the implementation of the law. According to one point (no. II) in this decree, government and office work specified in the law (paragraphs 11, 17 and 19)[12] should be carried out exclusively in the state language from 1 January 1999, after a transition period of ten years, during which Russian and other languages could still be used.

The Russian dominance in Kazakhstan and Kirghizstan in terms of both people and language, combined with a relatively low share (about 50%) of the titular populations in the total populations of these republics, constitutes a serious impediment to the consolidation of the state languages of these two republics. As much as one third of ethnic Kazakhs in Kazakhstan, for example, are believed to know Russian better than Kazakh. In contrast, the state languages in the other former Soviet Central Asian republics are in a better position, with higher shares for their titular populations:

- nearly 75% of Uzbeks in Uzbekistan, where most other ethnic groups are smaller than 1% and none larger than 10%, including Russians (8%) and Tajiks (5%);

[11] 'O jazykax v Respublike Kazaxstan', signed by President Nazarbaev on 11 July and published in *Kazaxstanskaja Pravda* on 15 July 1997.

[12] 'Zakon Kirgizskoj Sovetskoj Socialističeskoj Respubliki: O gosudarstvennom jazyke kirgizskoj SSR,' *Nationalities Papers* 23, 3: 631–637.

- 63% of Tajiks in Tajikistan, which has a fairly large Uzbek population (about 23%); and
- 73% of Turkmens in Turkmenistan, where the two largest minorities are Russians and Uzbeks, each constituting just under 10% of the republic's total population.

Issues in corpus planning

Much of the follow-up work of language law implementation in Central Asia at the present moment is concerned with not the status but the state of languages. In this connection arguments are often put forward concerning the necessity of improving not only people's proficiency in the state language of their republic but also the very corpus of this language. In Kazakhstan, a state commission was appointed soon after the passage of the 1989 language law with the task of working on a programme for the development of Kazakh and other nationality languages of the Kazakh SSR up to the year 2000 (Ajbasova *et al.* 1997, pp. 276ff.). One of the most influential bodies following and evaluating the work on this programme, which was made public on 1 June 1990, was the Kazakh Language Association, an association founded in October 1989 which operates on a broad popular basis mainly through its own linguistic journal *Ana Tili* 'Mother Tongue' (Carlson 1994; Dave 1996b). Similar activities can be witnessed for the other republics (Carlson 1994). In the Uzbek language debate much emphasis has been put on the importance of good language courses, and manuals have been issued for teaching Uzbek to adults, especially Russian-speaking students and professionals.

The results of work on improvements in language proficiency have not been very impressive so far. Nevertheless, they are important as the initial stage of a process towards a fundamental sociolinguistic transformation of Central Asian society. Likewise, work so far on language corpus is also characterised by great uncertainty. This is especially true for issues about vocabulary but also to a considerable extent for attempts at script reforms.

In the lexical field, the general picture is, on the one hand, moderateness among responsible linguists, who caution against the threat of 'anarchy' if too much 'spontaneity' is allowed in this field, and, on the other hand, greater eagerness among language users in general to resuscitate older vocabulary or create words from indigenous language material in order to counterbalance the Russian influence on the Central Asian lexical stock; e.g. Kazakh *egemendik* (Turkic) instead of *suverenitet* (from Russian) 'sovereignty', Turkmen *otly* (Turkic) instead of *poezd* (from Russian) 'train' and Uzbek *tajëragoh* (from Arabic and Persian) instead of Russian *aeroport* 'airport'. In the fields of new technology and new sociopolitical and economic paradigms, the principle of 'internationalism' seems to be favoured and there is little or no aversion against western, including Russian, terminology; e.g. Uzbek *komp'juter* (from Russian), *biznes, menežer* (from English).[13]

In none of the five Central Asian state language laws from 1989–1990 was there any statement or stipulation concerning the present-day and future alphabets of languages referred to in the laws, even though this was already a much debated issue when the laws were passed. Scripts and alphabets were commented on merely from a historical point of view. The great value of older scripts, especially the Arabic one as part of the Central Asian cultural heritage, was generally recognised in the laws, and provisions were made for future courses in older scripts at Central Asian schools and institutes of higher education (paragraph 27 in the Tajik law, paragraph 25 in the Kazakh law and paragraph 16 in the Uzbek law[14]).

All of the five state languages had experienced attempts in using the Arabic script during their first few decades as literary languages, before they entered a short period of latinisation in the mid-1920s (Baldauf 1993). In the political upheavals at the time of the Soviet break-up and the enactment of the state language laws, a return to Arabic script was on the agenda of some parties, for example the *Birlik* opposition group in Uzbekistan. Proponents of the Arabic script in Kirghizstan pointed to the successful use of this script by their Uighur and Kirghiz brethren in Xinjiang, China, and the well-known Kirghiz-Soviet writer Dzhengiz Aytmatov was cited in a Turkish newspaper (*Türkiye*, 19 February 1992) saying that a resuscitation of the Arabic script for the Turkic languages of Central Asia would facilitate communication between the users of these languages. After independence, however, the call for both the study of Arabic script and a complete change-over from Cyrillic to Arabic script for Central Asian Turkic languages has faded away almost completely. Instead, what is considered and discussed today is whether the current Cyrillic alphabet of a language should be retained, possibly with some modification, or whether this should be replaced by a Latin one. The Latin alphabets that have been proposed to date are listed at the end of this section. The only former Soviet Central Asian state where a change-over to Arabic script is still an option is – as might be expected – Tajikistan. A statement in the Tajik 1989 state language law concerning the study and publication of Tajik literature in the Arabic script (paragraph 27) could in fact be interpreted as a provision for such a future development.

[13] For further details on Uzbek vocabulary reform, see Schlyter 1997, pp. 36–39; 1998a, pp. 166–169.

[14] As regards Uzbekistan, it was stipulated in an amendment to the 1989 state language law that within three years after its ratification, i.e. in 1992, the teaching of Arabic script should be started in Uzbek-medium secondary and higher education. In the Uzbek 1993 law prescribing a change-over to a Latin alphabet (see below), both the Arabic and the Cyrillic scripts were mentioned as part of the Uzbek historical heritage.

As far as Latin script for Turkic languages is concerned, endeavours have been made to reach a joint solution for the whole Turkic world, including Central Asia. The first multinational conference on Turkic alphabets after the split-up of the Soviet Union was held in November 1991 at the Marmara University in Istanbul. All of the four officially Turkic-speaking Central Asian states were represented at the conference, which ended with a unanimous decision on a joint Turkic alphabet consisting of thirty-four letters (Devlet 1992). Subsequent conferences were held, including one in Ankara (8–10 March 1993) and one in Antalya (21–23 March 1993); the same alphabet as that of November 1991 was agreed upon at both conferences with only one letter form being changed (*ä* became ə).

The idea behind the decision on a common Turkic set of Latin letters was that future alphabets would be devised for different Turkic languages within this framework, including the letters needed for any particular language and excluding the ones not needed. Significantly enough, the proposed all-Turkic alphabet contained the entire Turkey Turkish alphabet that has been in use since 1928, with five additional letters not present in this alphabet. The intention was thus to create new Turkic Latin alphabets in harmony with the Turkish one, where one particular letter sign would correspond to fully identical or partly identical phonological features across the different Turkic languages; for example, the letter *y* would represent a semivowel /j/ and *c* a voiced affricate /ʤ/.

Within the next year after the conferences mentioned above, three Central Asian parliaments passed laws for a change-over to new Latin alphabets for the titular languages of their republics. The only alphabet adhering to the general Turkic framework established and reinforced at the Turkey conferences was the Karakalpak one of 24 February 1994 (Ercilasun 1995). The Karakalpaks, who had not had a representative of their own at the Istanbul conference of November 1991, selected thirty-one out of the thirty-four letters of the all-Turkic alphabet. Not only did they present a Latin alphabet of their own but they apparently also did this independently of the central government in Tashkent, thus demonstrating the possibility of conducting an autonomous policy in linguistic issues internal to the Karakalpak Republic, a right that had been granted in the Uzbek state language law of 1989. The autonomy of Karakalpak language policy was further demonstrated by the fact that the Tashkent Parliament had passed an alphabet law just six months earlier introducing a new Latin alphabet for Uzbek that was of a different design from the all-Turkic and Karakalpak one.[15]

The Karakalpak alphabet was a subset of the all-Turkic one without any phonological redefinition of letters or introduction of new letters. The Uzbek

[15] *Ŭzbekiston Respublikasining Qonuni: Lotin ëzuviga asoslangan ŭzbek alifbosini žorij etiš tŭghrisida* [Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan: Concerning the Introduction of an Uzbek Alphabet Based on the Latin Script], Tashkent 1993.

alphabet, on the other hand, did not comply with the principles behind the all-Turkic alphabet. By carrying over idiosyncrasies from the Uzbek Cyrillic alphabet it included distortion of vowel phoneme distinctions with respect to the letters *a*, *o* and *ö* (in Uzbek written as *õ*) and the use of the letter *c* exclusively for the representation of a phonetic sound corresponding to Russian ц [ts], with no relationship to the phonological system of Uzbek. An innovation in comparison to both the current Uzbek Cyrillic alphabet and the 1991 all-Turkic alphabet was the introduction of a totally new consonant letter *Ɉɉ*. This letter was introduced in order to distinguish phonetic [ʒ] from [ʤ], both of which are represented by one and the same sign, ж, in the Uzbek Cyrillic alphabet. The affricate sound [ʤ] was to be represented by the regular letter *Jj*. In this way, Uzbek *Jj* and *Ɉɉ* would correspond to all-Turkic *Cc* and *Jj*, respectively. Another deviation from the all-Turkic alphabet was the retention of the Cyrillic hard sign ъ, placed at the end of the 1993 alphabet chart and usually rewritten as an apostrophe.

Two years later, in August 1995, a major revision was made of the new Uzbek Latin alphabet.[16] As well as dropping the purely phonetic letter signs *c* for Russian [ts] and *ɉ* for [ʒ], the main motivation for changing the alphabet was the desire to eliminate diacritic signs, which were considered to cause problems for using standard computer keyboards in the future. Instead of these diacritics, an inverted apostrophe or another full letter was to be written after the original plain letter (e.g. *o‘* instead of *õ*, *g‘* instead of *ğ* and *ch* instead of *ç*[17]).

A modified Karakalpak Latin alphabet showing the same type of changes (apostrophe or additional letter instead of diacritic) was introduced by a Nukus Parliament law in December 1995.[18] This may be an indication of a change in the autonomy of Karakalpak language policy, at least as far as alphabet reform is concerned. Both languages have the same deadline (September 2005) for completing the change-over to Latin script and the formal abolition of the Cyrillic alphabets.[19]

The first post-Soviet alphabet for Turkmen, which belongs to the same subgroup of Turkic languages as Turkish, was adopted on 12 April 1993 (Şimşir 1995). What caused the greatest consternation over this alphabet was not the fact that it deviated from the already agreed-upon all-Turkic alphabet but rather the choice of some letter signs, the oddest ones being the capital letters £ (i.e. the

[16] *Ŭzbek tilining asosij imlo qoidalarining tasdiqlaš haqida* [Concerning the Ratification of the Principal Orthographic Rules of the Uzbek Language], Decision No. 339, 24 August 1995, by the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Tashkent 1995.

[17] One oddity in this version of the future Uzbek Latin alphabet is that the letter *c* exists only as part of the digraph *ch* but not as a letter in its own right.

[18] *Latyn grafikasyna tijkarlanghan qaraqalpaq alfavitin engiziw haqqynda* [Concerning the Modification of the Karakalpak Alphabet Based on the Latin Script], Nukus 1995.

[19] For further details and comments on the Uzbek alphabet issue, see Schlyter 1997, pp. 31–36; 1998a, pp. 163–166.

currency symbol for pounds), ¥ (Japanese yen) and $ with non-capitals variants ɾ, ÿ and ¢ for the phonemes /ʒ/, /j/ and /ʃ/, respectively.

The Turkmen and Uzbek alphabets as well as the subsequent adjustment of the Karakalpak alphabet must have been great disappointments to the advocates of a common procedure for the latinisation of Turkic languages, not least Turkish linguists and politicians (see, for example, Musaoğlu 1994; Şimşir 1995) who worked very hard to take the lead on this issue in its initial stage. At a Turkic youth conference in the Crimean city of Bakhchisaray, August 1994, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan were officially urged to abide by the principles of the all-Turkic alphabet (Ercilasun 1995). So far, no government decision has been taken in either of the two states to such an end. On the other hand, implementation work has slowed down and modifications may be expected. The Turkmens have so far abolished two of the odd pairs of letters, $¢ and £ɾ, the former of which has been replaced by the Turkish and all-Turkic *Şş* and the latter by Ƶƶ (Clark 1998). As of November 1999 the new Turkmen Latin alphabet was still being used to a small extent. The Uzbek alphabet has been met with much criticism even within the country, and the whole idea of introducing another script is still being questioned by many people including intellectuals and scholars who obviously think that the linguistic and perhaps also the sociopolitical advantages of an alphabet reform are not proportional to the high costs for changes that are needed, especially in the field of new technology.

The reluctance to abandon the Cyrillic alphabet in favour of a Latin one in Kazakhstan and Kirghizstan is still less surprising with regard to the sociodemographic structures and the strong position of Russian in these two states (see comments above). No alphabet laws have yet been passed by their parliaments, but commissions have been appointed and projects have begun for investigations and proposals regarding both revisions of the current Cyrillic alphabets and the introduction of new Latin alphabets.

As to Tajik alphabet revisions, no decisions have been made official so far in Tajikistan, although the Arabic script has made its way back more strongly in this republic than in the others. One particular concern and maybe a future dilemma in this connection is the Tajik presence in Uzbekistan, where the Uzbek officials have been acting as if the Latin alphabet proposed for Uzbek could actually be used ubiquitously for any language spoken in the republic. Another question is what directives would be given to the large Uzbek population in Tajikistan regarding their mode of writing? During encounters in Samarkand and Bukhara in May 1996, some of my Tajik interlocutors at the universities in these cities were of the opinion that there should be cooperation and coordination on the alphabet issue between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, since the Uzbek and Tajik languages and literatures are closely intertwined and ought to employ the same type of script; such a venture would, however, be a great challenge.

Post-Soviet Latin alphabets for Central Asian Turkic languages

- All-Turkic alphabet, adopted at the International Symposium on Contemporary Turkic Alphabets, Istanbul, 18–20 November 1991 (this is equivalent to the Turkey Turkish alphabet with five additional letters; these are shown here with underscoring):
  Aa Bb Cc /ʤ/ Çç /ʧ/ Dd Ee <u>Ää</u> Ff Gg Ğğ /ʁ/ Hh <u>Xx</u> Iı/ɨ/ İi Jj/ʒ/ Kk <u>Qq</u> Ll Mm Nn <u>Ññ</u> Oo Öö Pp Rr Ss Şş /ʃ/ Tt Uu Üü Vv <u>*Ww*</u> Yy /j/ Zz
- Turkmen alphabet, adopted 12 April 1993
  Aa Bb Çç Dd Ee Ää Ff Gg Hh Ii Jj /ʤ/ £ſ /ʒ/ Kk Ll Mm Nn Ññ Oo Öö Pp Rr Ss $¢ /ʃ/ Tt Uu Üü Ww Yy /ɨ/ ¥ÿ /j/ Zz
- Uzbek alphabet, adopted 2 September 1993
  Aa Bb Cc /ts/ Dd Ee Ff Gg Hh Ii Jj /ʤ/ Kk Ll Mm Nn Oo Pp Qq Rr Ss Tt Uu Vv Xx Yy Zz Çç /ʧ/ Ğğ/ʁ/ *Ɉɉ* /ʒ/ Ññ /ŋ/ Õõ /o∼ɵ/ Şş /ʃ/.
- Karakalpak alphabet, adopted 26 February 1994
  Aa Bb Dd Ee Ää Ff Gg Ğğ Hh Xx Iı İi Jj Kk Qq Ll Mm Nn Ññ Oo Öö Pp Rr Ss Şş Tt Uu Üü Ww Yy Zz
- Revised Uzbek alphabet, adopted 24 August 1995
  Aa Bb Dd Ee Ff Gg Hh Ii Jj Kk Ll Mm Nn Oo Pp Qq Rr Ss Tt Uu Vv Xx Yy Zz O‘o‘ G‘g‘ Shsh Chch Ngng[20]
- Revised Karakalpak alphabet, adopted 29 December 1995
  Aa A'a' Bb Dd Ee Ff Gg G'g' Hh Xx Iı İi Jj Kk Qq Ll Mm Nn N'n' Oo O'o' Pp Rr Ss Tt Uu U'u' Vv Ww Yy Zz Shsh

The role of foreign interests in Central Asian language issues

Turkey’s engagement in the work on Turkic alphabet reform gives a clear indication of the ambitions nourished by this country vis-à-vis the ‘Turkic World’ (Turkish *Türk Dünyası*) in Central Asia and neighbouring regions. With the Turkic peoples constituting nearly 65% of the ex-Soviet Central Asian population, Turkey saw itself as the unquestionable foreign ally of the Central Asian republics as soon as they became independent at the start of the 1990s. A possible exception was Tajikistan, where Iran was expected to act in a similar

[20] Even though it is generally not included in charts of the 1995 Uzbek Latin alphabet, the apostrophe referring back to Cyrillic ъ (‘hard sign’) is retained for Arabic ‘*ain* and *hamzah* and is to be written as a single quotation mark turned to the left in order to distinguish it from the right-facing apostrophes of the letters *o‘* and *g‘*. The ‘hard sign’ apostrophe is dropped in words where it would follow immediately after one of these two letters (for example, мўъжиза ‘miracle’, should be rewritten as *mo‘jiza*).

fashion for the same historical and ethnocultural reasons; note, however, that Turkic groups constitute a quarter of the republic's total population. The Central Asian states have themselves also shown some eagerness to take guidance from these two countries, although contacts and cooperation undertaken have not been completely free from conflicts.

From a linguistic point of view and in comparison to the relationship between Turkey and the Turkic societies of Central Asia, the Tajik–Iranian relationship is less complicated, as the Tajik language without further ado could be treated as a variety of Persian. This connection was made explicit in the Tajik 1989 language law, where the titular language of Tajikistan was called (Tajik) *zaboni todžikī* (*forsī*), 'Tajik (Farsi)', in two instances when referred to by name and not simply as the state language. That is, Tajik would be part of the Persian language (Farsi) and would, consequently, have a share in classical Persian literature. In the Turkic case, apart from the linguistic fact that all languages except Turkmen belong to different subbranches of the Turkic language family rather than Turkish, such a straightforward connection could not be established between Turkey Turkish and Central Asian languages, of which the latter are to be connected not with Ottoman-Turkish but rather with Classical Turkestanian literary tradition.

Turkish is, on the other hand, the largest Turkic language with more than sixty million speakers and, furthermore, until the dissolution of the Soviet Union it was the only Turkic language to have been used and developed as the official language of an independent state during the twentieth century. This fact may throw some light on the assertiveness demonstrated by Turkish authorities in their urge for joint Turkic linguistic actions (see, for example, Musaoğlu 1994). However, it became very clear at an early point in time that these Turkish–Turkic contacts create a dilemma from the point of view of the Central Asian states. Although they put forward a generally positive attitude towards all-Turkic cooperation, at the same time they want or even feel obliged to act more independently in language matters, concentrating on their own state-building and nation-building.

Things thus standing, Turkey has been more successful in its contacts with the newly-established Central Asian states on a bilateral basis.[21] As well as business agreements and Turkish commitments to aid in reconstruction work, agreements on cooperation in matters concerning culture and education have been signed with all of the Central Asian states, including Tajikistan. As a consequence of these Turkish activities, Turkey Turkish is spreading in Central Asia at a fairly rapid speed, although it is still far from being a lingua franca in the region. The most effective measures for strengthening the position of Turkish in the Central Asian region have been daily Turkish-language television broadcasts from Ankara to all of the five republics and the establishment

[21] See, for example, Landau 1995, Chapter 7, 'From irredentism to solidarity,' pp. 194–234.

of boarding high schools, so-called *litse*s, where the pupils are taught partly in Turkey Turkish and the administrative language is mainly Turkish.[22] Joint Central Asian–Turkish scholarships to Central Asian students for university education in Turkey, at times impeded by strained political relations, have been another means of strengthening the position of Turkey Turkish language and culture in Central Asia.

At the start of the twenty-first century it is too early to make any definite forecasts as to the future balance of power between different foreign interethnic or international languages in the Central Asian region. Russian will remain in a leading position for a considerable length of time, as a natural corollary of the Soviet legacy and the fact that the Russians still total about ten million, or 17%, of the population in the former Soviet Central Asian republics.[23] At the same time there is today a growing interest in formerly largely ignored world languages from the West, first of all English. English-medium university education has been initiated at several locations, e.g. Bishkek, Kirghizstan.

Far Eastern languages may also become important foreign languages in Central Asia in the future depending on new developments in trade and business (see, for example, Rashid 1998). With China being an immediate neighbour with a large Turkic population of its own (seven million Uighurs and other minor groups; Enwall 1999) in the border province of Xinjiang and an already ongoing transit of both goods and people across the border, a future spread of Chinese in the Central Asian region is something that should be reckoned with. South Korea is another Far Eastern country that is currently intensifying its business activities in Central Asia, mainly in the two largest and most influential states, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, both of which have their own Korean minority constituting 0.6% and 1% of their total populations, respectively. It

[22] According to information obtained in October 1997 from Turkish school authorities in Tashkent, the total number of Turkish *litse*s in Uzbekistan was sixteen, out of which five schools were in the capital; the number of pupils enrolled was around 3,000. At that time these schools were very popular and attracted thousands of applicants for their entrance exams. As regards Turkish *litse*s in the other states, the following figures were given in the Turkish weekly *Aksiyon* of 9–15 November 1996: Kazakhstan had twenty-nine schools (5,000 pupils), Kirghizstan had eleven schools (2,200 pupils), Turkmenistan had fourteen schools (2,400 pupils) and Tajikistan 680 pupils (the number of schools not given). The number of schools and pupils specified for Uzbekistan in this magazine differs slightly from the figures presented above: eighteen (3,428 pupils).

[23] With their great share in technological know-how and white-collar professions, the Russians are recognised by the Central Asian leadership as an important and desired population group. However, due to difficulties, or even unwillingness, to participate in local Central Asian state- and nation-building, Russians now find themselves in a situation very different from the one that prevailed before independence. Their integration in Central Asian social life is not least hampered by the low proficiency in local languages among Russians. According to scores cited in Landau (1996), from the early 1990s 4.5% of the Russians in Uzbekistan spoke the titular language of the republic, whereas for the other republics the percentage was even lower: 3.4% for Tajikistan, 2.3% for Turkmenistan, 1.25% for Kirghizstan and 0.9% for Kazakhstan.

can be observed already that these business activities encourage a still stronger engagement in Korean culture, including both language and religion and – not least – the history and present-day life of the Central Asian Koreans, most of whom have their origin in the Korean population that was deported from the Soviet Far East during the Stalinist terror of the late 1930s.[24] During the 1990s, Korean studies at universities have increased in both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Besides expanding university departments, two large Korean education centres have been established, one in Almaty in 1991 and the other in Tashkent in 1992.[25] These centres are financed and provided with textbooks by the South Korean government. As to language teaching there has been an interesting shift from a Korean variety previously taught normally by teachers from North Korea to a variety of Korean that is obviously much closer to or even identical with standard South Korean. This development also further aggravates the threat to the special Central Asian speech variety *Koryo mal* (or *Koremar*)[26] which, for historical reasons, with respect to the area of origin of the Central Asian Koreans in the Korean peninsula, should be closer to North Korean dialects.

Concluding remarks: Linguistic identity crisis leading to new paradigms?

On several occasions in the twentieth century, language has been at the political forefront in Central Asia. Its significance as a symbol of identity and unity has been paramount. The establishment of new republics in Turkestan after the Bolshevik assumption of power was based on ethnocultural conditions largely defined in linguistic terms. Language was also the last resort for Soviet politicians in their attempts to create and maintain a sense of all-union Soviet nationalism.

The role of language in the sociopolitical reform work after the Soviet demise has not been less significant. Once again language is a pawn in the political game used for moves towards new social orders, where language itself will also be reshaped (i.e. language-based politics and language policy combined; see pp. 163ff. above).

[24] The deported Koreans were sent mainly to the countryside, where they were forced to stay till the mid-1950s, after the death of Stalin, when they could finally obtain domestic passports and were given permission to travel and even relocate from one place to another. With dispersion and urbanisation, the Koreans started losing their Korean language. By the end of the 1970s, 55% of the Soviet Koreans claimed Korean as their first language, or mother tongue (Hur 1988). Since then the percentage has decreased still more. The Korean population in former Soviet republics amounts to almost 500,000 and is the fourth largest Korean diaspora in the world. Around 90% of these Koreans live in Central Asia.

[25] By the end of 1998, there were in total thirty-seven such Korean Education Centres in thirteen countries around the world, according to information obtained from the Ministry of Education, Seoul, on 14 December 1998.

[26] See, for example, Kho 1987, Chapter 4, pp. 101–139.

Current language policies in Central Asian states developed in parallel with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and were left in the hands of persons trained in Soviet-style state bureaucracy. Such bureaucracy – paired with post-independence work on state- and nation-building with officially recognised state languages as consolidating and unifying symbols – merely enforces the centralism of decision-making on linguistic issues and language planning in the Central Asian republics.[27] The standardisation of not only language corpus but also language usage by introducing one language variety that dominates over all other varieties – both other varieties of the same language and other languages – means linguistic reidentification for most people, not least language minorities.

So far, very little research has been carried out on the effects of Central Asian language policies on minority languages. It is also obvious that the Central Asian authorities themselves have paid little attention to the fate of minority languages under the new conditions created by their post-independence language policies.[28] Depending on an array of varying sociopolitical and sociolinguistic preconditions, the process of linguistic reidentification among language minority groups will develop at different stages, affecting their own native languages in different ways.

The Karakalpaks number about 400,000 in Uzbekistan and constitute 2% of the republic's total population. In other republics their number is infinitesimal. They are thus a small Central Asian minority. However, being members of the dominating Turkic family and having their own autonomous region with the right to preside over their own language policy within the confines of this region, as far as the maintenance and development of their native language is concerned, they are in a far better situation than many other minorities of a comparable size. The Central Asian Koreans number approximately as many as the Karakalpaks, but their situation is rather different from that of the latter. Without being closely related to any near-by population, they belong to or are descendants of a group of people once deported and scattered over the Central Asian region. Although there were at one time Soviet collective farms dominated by Koreans and their language, most of these are now discontinued, and most of their population has long since assimilated to other – first and foremost Russian – language communities. With the arrival of South Korean business, on the other hand, new encounters between Central Asian Koreans and Korean culture are encouraged. Thus, with all of the new conditions taken into consideration, the linguistic reidentification of many Koreans in Central Asia may pass from russification to not only an adjustment to the state language in their republic of residence but also 're-koreanisation' in compliance with

[27] On Kazakh language policy, see Fierman 1998, pp. 184–185; on Uzbek language policy, see Schlyter 1997, pp. 40–42; 1998a, pp. 169–171.

[28] Fierman (1998, p. 180) even notes a growing disregard of 'other' languages in Kazakh language laws and language documents issued after the first 1989 state language law.

South Korean parameters. By contrast, the Central Asian Russians – who are by no means a small minority, numbering some ten million people – appear unaffected and confident in their traditional Russian linguistic identity, Russian being the primary *lingua franca* in the region and, furthermore, linking its native speakers to the immense Russian language area in the north. At the same time, the status of Russian is irrevocably changing into that of a foreign language, and its speakers will have to pay more respect to the state language of their republic.

Still more intriguing, perhaps, is the question of what will happen to dwindling minorities that, in contrast to the ones just mentioned, have not received any special attention in language laws and have no access to cultural support from any larger linguistically related language community. The old Arab population of Central Asia serves as an example. This is a small population (Fourniau 1991), although it is probably larger than what is sometimes stated in foreign sources and may amount to tens of thousands of people. Most of the Central Asian Arabs live in Uzbekistan, where densely populated Arab areas can still be found. As typically static rural environments, such communities have so far been able to maintain an 'Arab' identity to varying degrees. When asked about their customs and language during a visit by the present author in September 1997, the inhabitants of the village of Zheynov – a former collective farm to the west of the city of Qarshi in the southern part of Uzbekistan – described themselves as an ethnic group of their own with their own language. Their language, which they called Arabic, is most probably a strongly relexified Arabic language variety or possibly an Arabic–Tajik mixed language. Being an isolated rural community with low mobility, their linguistic assimilation has been limited to the nearest environment, a predominantly Tajik-language but a typically bilingual Tajik- and Uzbek-speaking environment. According to their own historical writing (Saidov and Ravšanov 1996), during the Soviet era their ethnic identity was to a large extent officially denied. After independence they now expect greater opportunities to assert their ethnicity. However, what is not taken into account by these people is a future scenario where they are very likely to become more and more exposed to and integrated in sociopolitical orders set up by a new central government that is no longer as far away as during the old regime. What will happen to such a language setting as the Arab one of Zheynov (or, for that matter, that of the small Turkic–Iranian Abdal population in Xinjiang, which was mentioned at the beginning of this chapter) with changes such as language standardisation and citizenship education?

Even though the implementation of Central Asian language laws is slow and hesitating – and despite much disagreement as to the aims and goals of current language policy – the intensified preoccupation with linguistic matters in the newly-independent states of the region has made people more conscious of their own linguistic destiny and language identities. The public attention devoted to statements made in the language laws and to linguistic issues in general has had its effect, and changing language attitudes can be observed. In the Kirghiz 1989 state language law, for example, Kirghiz was stated to be one of the oldest Turkic languages and the disseminator of great cultural richness. This statement was followed by the claim that special measures ought to be taken for the preservation and development of the Kirghiz language, the use of which had allegedly been restricted in all spheres of Kirghiz society as a consequence of previous, i.e. Soviet, language policy. As regards individual language users, persons who have so far recognised Russian as their first and most important language and who seem to have been quite content with this situation can be heard today complaining about the fact that they never had the opportunity to learn their own indigenous language properly. Even individuals who use their non-Russian native language extensively in their daily lives may experience the shortcomings of their idiolect in this language more strongly than just a few years ago. To give an example, a university teacher in Tashkent commenting on new directives concerning the substitution of Uzbek for Russian in work reports from her department was surprised to feel that her own Uzbek had deteriorated, despite the fact that she was compelled to use her native and first language more than ever before. Her problem is, of course, that she is now expected to use Uzbek in situations where she has no habit of speaking or writing this language and where she is forced to choose standard Uzbek instead of the colloquial Uzbek that she had been speaking before in private before the changes.

The enhanced linguistic and cultural awareness in Central Asia today reaches beyond the former Soviet republics to regions that are also affected by the new comprehensive sociopolitical reconfiguration of the Asian continent. Script reform is as much a political issue in Mongolia at present as it is in the former Soviet republics (Campi 1991; Grivelet 1999). Native language movements – or at least attempts at such movements – can also be observed in China among ethnic groups like the Uighurs (Bellér-Hann 1991; Dillon 1995; Rudelson 1997) and the Tibetans (Goldstein-Kyaga 1993). All of these activities will add further dynamism to linguistic issues and will influence both official language reform work and developments for which there are not yet any definite plans.

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12 Language and script in Japan and other East Asian countries: Between insularity and technology

Stefan Kaiser

The East Asian countries of China, Japan and Korea (Republic of Korea, ROK) are unique in the modern world in that they continue (to varying degrees) to use a non-phonetic script. This is a reflection of their past, when they shared a common heritage in the form of shared use of Classical Chinese.

Until about 100 years ago, Classical Chinese was the language of the educated in these countries (and also in Vietnam), although the respective forms of the vernacular were used for everyday and literary purposes. However, the situation altered significantly in the first half of the twentieth century due to changes in language policy. The most dramatic differences are that Vietnam changed to the Roman alphabet in 1910 (Tuttle 1996, p. 691), and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) abolished the use of Chinese characters altogether in 1949 (King 1996, p. 219); there were various minor changes too.

As a result of more than a millennium of language contact, plus centuries of language modernisation using Chinese loan translations, China, Japan and Korea (as well as Vietnam) now have a large body of cognate vocabulary that is based on Chinese morphemes (for an example, see the section 'Policy regarding foreign words' below).

Any discussion of future developments of these East Asian languages needs to take into consideration two points:

- the degree to which there are shared elements in the vocabulary (and their written representation) of the three languages, and to what degree this is magnified or diminished by national language/script policy;
- the problems that non-phonetic writing systems cause for computer input (these issues are of varying magnitude, depending on the language).

Below, these points and their historical background are discussed in detail, but attention is also paid to developments in the spread of the internet and, in Japan's case, policies supporting the teaching of Japanese internationally, including the recently proposed 'internationalisation of the Japanese language'.

Historical background

Similar to the use of Latin in Europe, the lingua franca of the educated in East Asia has traditionally been a form of Classical Chinese. This language is mutually intelligible in its written but not spoken form, making written communication between different language speakers possible. The high status of Classical Chinese also meant that official documents in Japan and Korea were drawn up in this language.

The high status of Chinese culture also meant, since about the sixth century, that there has been a substantial influx of Classical Chinese vocabulary into both Japanese and Korean.

In terms of language structure, Chinese (an SVO or subject–verb–object language) is very different from Japanese and Korean, which are SOV. There has been much discussion on genetic affiliation between Japanese and Korean, but the issue is still unresolved. Positions range from 'language isolates' to 'distant members of the Altaic language family', but in terms of structure as opposed to cognate vocabulary (other than Sino-based words), Japanese and Korean share a number of prominent characteristics, which include word order, the use of postpositional particles to indicate case relations, agglutinative morphology, rich systems of honorifics and sound symbolism.

In Japanese and Korean, the situation regarding the proportion of Sino-based vocabulary is essentially similar, and similar paths of development can be identified. There is, however, one significant exception: whereas in Japanese Chinese characters are used for both Sino-Japanese (S-J) and Native-Japanese (N-J) vocabulary, including proper nouns, Korean uses Chinese characters only for Sino-Korean words and proper nouns.

To give an example of the way this works, in Japanese the S-J morpheme *shin* 'new' (*xin* in Mandarin) is used in S-J kanji compounds (e.g. *kaku-shin* 'reform', 'innovation'), but the same kanji is also used to represent what is essentially the stem of inflected N-J translation equivalents: *atara (shii)* and *ara (ta na)* 'new' (the agglutinative morphology in parentheses is written in the kana syllable script). Furthermore, the derivative *arata (meru)* 'to renew' is written with a different kanji. Nouns have no inflectional endings, so that the same kanji usually represents a free morpheme in N-J (*yama* 'mountain') and a bound one in S-J (*fuji-san* 'Mount Fuji'). This is essentially the reason why the Japanese script is said to be the world's most complicated (Sampson 1985; Inoue 2001).

Some 60–70% of the total lexicon of both Japanese and Korean consist of Sino-based words (incidentally, this happens to be similar to the percentage of Latin/French-derived vocabulary in the English language).

According to surveys (National Language Research Institute 1962–64, 1976) conducted for the years 1956 (magazines) and 1966 (newspapers), the percentage of S-J words in Japanese magazines and daily newspapers was 47.5% and 44.3% respectively, whereas N-J was 36.7% and 38.8% (the remainder is made up by loan words from western languages and mixed formations). However, in the case of magazines, these figures varied greatly according to the type of magazine (i.e. content), ranging from about 39% for 'house-keeping' type magazines to over 60% for business and popular science magazines.

One reason for such high percentages of Sino-based vocabulary is that the Chinese language, in the form of Chinese character morpheme combinations, was used extensively in the modernisation of the Chinese, Japanese and Korean languages (see below).

In the more recent history of the East Asian countries there is an additional issue, which came about through Japanese colonialism in the years leading up to and during the Second World War. In the wake of the Japanese annexation of parts of China (Manchuria, Taiwan, etc.) and Korea, Japanese was taught in the schools there, with the result that Japanese was spoken over a fairly large area. However, far from promoting the Japanese language after the war, the resentment caused by this policy locally for a long time held back the study of Japanese in these areas, although it has become more popular in the past decade or so.

Influx of foreign words and government policy

How the East Asian languages deal with foreign words

Chinese uses Chinese characters (hanzi) only. The official People's Republic of China (PRC) romanisation system (pinyin) is used for auxiliary purposes only, such as hanzi instruction in schools and for road signs.

In Taiwan, on the other hand, a National Phonetic Alphabet was devised at the start of the twentieth century on the mainland and was adopted in Taiwan in the middle of the twentieth century. It is now widely used in books, newspapers and journals alongside hanzi to indicate pronunciation of the characters. However, for computer input of hanzi, form-based systems are popular (see the section 'Chinese and Korean input' below).

Since hanzi are still the only official form of writing, loan words need to be translated (loan translations), or have their approximate pronunciation represented by hanzi (direct loans), which is also how most proper nouns are rendered.

Loan translations using hanzi morphemes have been coined widely since the seventeenth century, when western sciences were first introduced to East Asia by Jesuit missionaries. This process was an important part of the language modernisation of these three countries, and has given rise to a large body of shared vocabulary between the three languages, although the pronunciation differs to a degree (Chinese tones are ignored throughout this chapter); for example:

Chinese	Japanese	Korean	meaning
dian-zi	den-shi	chon-ja	‘electron’

In the above example, the meaning of the first character-morpheme is ‘lightning’ (in modern times used for ‘electricity’) and the meaning of the second is ‘child’ (or ‘small unit’).

These loan-translation creations are widespread and follow the Chinese word-formation processes, so that from their form alone it is impossible to tell whether a term has been coined in China, Japan or Korea.

More recently, direct loans (mostly from English) have increased greatly, especially in Japan, where they now by far outnumber loan translations in newly introduced words. A comparison (Nomura 1984) of an annual publication listing new words in 1960 (total entries 9,920) and 1980 (total 23,448) shows that, in 1960, 43.1% were direct loans compared with 40.2% S-J loan translations; in 1980, the figure had risen to 57.6% direct loans and 28.8% S-J creations. Of the remainder, the majority are mixed formations, as N-J formations were few even in 1960 (3.6%), reducing further (1.9%) in 1980.

Policy regarding foreign words

As the Chinese language uses Chinese characters exclusively, hanzi morphemes need to be employed for foreign words and names, either in the form of loan translation, or to render their approximate sound. Even everyday words such as ‘piano’, which are used as direct loans in both ROK and Japan, become loan transactions in Chinese, where ‘gang-qin’ (literally ‘steel harp’) is used. All foreign names, as well as titles of literary and other works, are transliterated into hanzi (or translated); e.g. Canada becomes ‘jia-na-da’, written with morphemes meaning (‘add’, ‘catch’ and ‘big’).

The DPRK has a ‘language purification’ policy, whose main aim is to replace Sino-Korean words with creations using native roots (foreign words such as English terms were excluded from the start of the founding of the DPRK), but efforts are also being made in the ROK to use native roots in new terminology.

For direct loans, the ROK has an official policy on how to transliterate words into hankul. Hankul is based not on spelling, but on the pronunciation using a system based on the International Phonetic Association (IPA.)

In Japan, on the other hand, there is no official policy regarding direct loans (apart from a few rules about which syllabary letters are permissible to render selected letters/sounds not existing in Japanese, such as English ‘v’). Consequently there are cases where the same English word has two forms depending on factors such as when it first entered the language, e.g. ‘airon’ and ‘aian’, both from ‘iron’ (the former, a rendering based on spelling, is used for ‘ironing’ clothes; the latter, based on the pronunciation, is used in golf). There are also competing forms, such as ‘konpyuutaa’ vs. ‘konpyuuta’ for computer. Unlike in China, proper names are rendered almost exclusively in katakana, the square-looking variant of the syllabary script.

Government administrators are periodically issued with directives to avoid excessive use of direct loans. The most recent instance of this is the reinstatement of the Committee for Terminology Rationalisation by the Ministry for Health and Welfare in 1997, which divided foreign words for use in official documents into three groups: those to be avoided, those to be used with a Japanese explanation added and those that can be used as they are. Examples of those to be avoided (the use of S-J or N-J terms is recommended instead) include English words like ‘project team’, ‘follow-up’ and ‘guidelines’.

Japanese also uses a number of terms coined from English roots (known as Japlish or Janglish), such as *kyaria appu* (‘career up’, i.e. ‘improving one’s promotion prospects’), *wanman* (‘one man’ for ‘autocratic leader’) and *neeru meeku* (‘nail make[up]’) for ‘manicure’.

Script-related issues

Chinese characters only, mixed with syllabary/phonemic script and phonemic script alone

Like the PRC and Taiwan, Japan uses Chinese characters, but (unlike China and Taiwan) in combination with syllabic writing (see the section ‘Japanese input systems’ below for details). Korea used to have a similar system, but the use of Chinese characters has been abolished entirely in the DPRK, and largely so in the ROK, although in the ROK some 1,800 or so are taught at junior-high and high school level, largely for recognition only, and with little commitment as entrance examinations do not use them.

Newspapers and most other forms of written language in the ROK use almost no hanja, although some are used in headlines and in brackets to avoid ambiguity. However, in February 1999 the Ministry of Culture and Tourism proposed a policy of joint use of hanja for road signs and legal documents, the former for the benefit of tourists (who come largely from Japan, the PRC and Taiwan) and the latter to help better understanding.

The Korean peninsula has long been torn between sole use of hankul and joint use with hanja. The hankul script – which is said to be the world’s most advanced phonetic script because of the way the individual phoneme symbols are systematically based on articulatory information, similar to the Pitman shorthand system – was created by a group of scholars through royal decree in 1443 and completed in 1446. Until the mid-nineteenth century, the low status of hankul compared to Classical Chinese meant that it was used only marginally; however, thereafter it came to be used widely as the vernacular script, typically with hanja mixed in for Sino-Korean vocabulary and agglutinative morphology. Hanja alone, meanwhile, was still used for official documents.

During the Japanese colonisation period (1910–45) the Japanese enforced the use of Japanese in public schools, and from the 1930s restricted the use of hankul, eventually outlawing its use in 1940. Partly as a backlash to this experience, the position of hankul strengthened further, and in 1948 the use of hankul for official documents was legalised, although joint use of hanja was permitted 'for the time being.' In 1970, official documents were limited to hankul alone, and in 1991 this decree was extended through an administrative control rule that all documents must be written exclusively in hankul. This also had an effect of dramatically reducing the use of hanja in newspapers and technical books.

In the education system, the use of hanja in schools was discontinued due to US occupation pressure, but the use of 1,000 hanja was reintroduced around 1950, increasing to 1,300 by 1957. This situation continued until 1970, when hanja were removed from all school textbooks. However, this immediately gave rise to further discussions by the general public and specialists alike and, as result, from 1975 hanja were reintroduced in restricted form at junior high and high school level, alongside hankul (i.e. usually in brackets after hankul words). Incidentally, of the main East Asian scripts, hankul is the only one that uses word spacing.

Official character sets and codes[1]

A major problem with Chinese characters (hanzi) is that they constitute a non-finite set. To illustrate this problem, the largest Chinese character dictionary contains some 60,000 characters, of which the majority are no longer current; many others are used only very rarely. On the other hand, frequency counts of printed matter reveal that the most frequent 1,000 hanzi are sufficient to cover 90% of text, and 2,400, 99%. In China, in 1988 two official sets of characters of 3,500 and 7,000 (the latter includes the former set) for common use and current use were published; these sets are based on frequency.

[1] In the following, the term 'Chinese characters' (general) is used alongside the words 'hanzi' (Chinese), 'hanja' (Korean) and 'kanji' (Japanese) for referring to their use in individual languages. The author wishes to thank Chung Inho for information on Korean, Takemichi Hara on Chinese input, Jacques Maurais for providing internet data and Jian Yang for suggestions regarding Chinese.

In Japan, there has also been a chequered history of kanji use, and a number of sets of kanji have been used. Of the more recent lists, a set of 1,850 characters for daily use was introduced in 1946, and this was superseded by a set of 1,945 kanji in 1981. The important difference between the two sets is that the former was prescriptive for all areas of public life, whereas the latter was designated as a non-restrictive guideline only. In other words, not only was the number increased, but the ultimate aim of reducing (or even abolishing) kanji has also been abandoned.

The official list is taught in schools and is followed in most official documents, but magazines, specialised books, fiction, advertisements, etc. use a far larger number of kanji. In order to make such kanji accessible for word-processing and electronic processing, a much larger set of characters has been codified (see below).

Japan, South Korea, China, Taiwan and Vietnam have separate character codes. Japan's JIS code of 6,802 characters (6,349 kanji, revised later to 6,355) was the first one (1978), followed in 1980 by the PRC GB code (7,445 characters) and in 1984 by Taiwan's BIG5 (13,495 characters). Taiwan has in fact four separate codes, but BIG5 is the most commonly used. The ROK followed a few years later, with the 1989 KS code of 4,620 characters. All have since been revised and expanded.

The shape of Chinese characters differs between the PRC, where a large number of simplified hanzi are used, and Taiwan, Hong Kong and Korea, where the full forms are used. Japan is also different in that the official list of kanji for general use only, and also the JIS code, include a large number of simplified kanji, which are for the most part different from the much more radical PRC simplifications. Another important difference (and source of confusion) is that kanji outside the official list include elements originally identical to those simplified in the official list, and these kanji are used in their full forms.

The above codes are not interchangeable, which is one reason for the Unicode project (see below). However, they can be converted, as is done for instance in a number of PRC online publications of newspapers and magazines in Japan, but this is not possible for the general user at present.

It may be said that the whole question of whether or not to simplify characters (in handwritten form, simplifications have also been a feature of Chinese characters) as a matter of language policy is a form of linguistic nationalism and national identity.

Problems with codes

In Japan the kanji that can be chosen for naming children have to be chosen from an official list. However, this does not apply to surnames and place names, where many variant forms are used that are not part of the JIS list. The JIS list also does not cover historical use, i.e. classical literature and historical documents. JIS has in fact a third and fourth level of an additional 3,685 ‘auxiliary kanji’, making a total of 10,040, but these are generally not supported by commercial software.

In response to demand (kanji for proper nouns and historical use, but also for multilingual processing), a project called TRON is underway at the University of Tokyo to create a fully inclusive set of some 64,000 kanji. The fonts for all kanji were completed and made available for general use in 1999.

Unicode

In international business, there is a growing need for preparing documents in a multilingual environment. In response to this need, an international character set called Unicode was developed, mainly through the efforts of a consortium of US computer companies, and issued through the International Standards Organization (ISO) in 1993. Besides other character sets from around the world, this code includes some 20,902 Chinese characters, significantly fewer than the total of 58,000 characters originally proposed by the East Asian countries concerned. The way this was achieved was to provide one code for characters that differ somewhat in shape between the East Asian countries (and Vietnam) and to list the ‘local’ code numbers and shapes under that unified code. Characters that are essentially interchangeable in meaning and use, but have different complexity due to degrees of simplification, have been assigned different code numbers.

Chinese and Korean input

Korean word processing is mostly carried out in hankul, which is a writing system organised vertically and horizontally into syllabic clusters (ranging from two to six phonemes each) that are equivalent to morphemes in the language (as hanja are). This is illustrated below for the word *hankul* (but in Roman script):

ha	k
	u
n	l

Keyboard input is affected by typing the individual phonemes (in hankul). Where hanja are required (usually in brackets for clarification of meaning), the word processor first has to be instructed that a hanja is required, then the appropriate hanja (individual or compound) needs to be chosen from a list of candidates.

Chinese input of hanzi is affected in two major ways.

Shape-based input This includes many forms and variations of the four-corner method, which is especially common with those who are not conversant with the phonetic systems (see above) or, as applies to a large part of the population, are not confident regarding the exact pronunciation/tones of Mandarin. This method uses a non-phonetic system, where a combination of numbers (or alphabet letters) is used to represent the shape of a hanzi (its four corners, etc.), and is used widely in Taiwan and Hong Kong, and also in the PRC.

Sound-based input This is affected by typing the pronunciation of a hanzi in the pinyin system of romanisation (or, in Taiwan, the National Phonetic Symbols) with Arabic numbers indicating tones, and subsequent conversion to hanzi (where there is more than one candidate, which is usually the case). This method appears to be used mainly by non-Chinese fluent in Mandarin.

Comparative data for input speed are hard to come by, but it is reported that in an ROK project (creating a database of the Korean Tripitaka, which is written in hanja exclusively), typists who use a shape-based inputting system can on average reach a speed of 60 characters per minute, with the fastest reaching 80. This is roughly equivalent to 30–40 words per minute (significantly slower than English touch-typing, which ranges from about 55–100 words per minute).

Japanese input systems

The Japanese writing system uses a mixture of kanji and kana, a syllabic script where one letter typically consists of a consonant plus vowel, or a vowel alone.

When purchasing a word processor in Japan, the customer can choose between a kana (Japanese syllabary) keyboard and a QWERTY arrangement. In the early days of word processing in Japan (the first word processor came out in 1978), typists were trained to type in kana, but nowadays the vast majority use QWERTY with its superior touch-typing speed.

When using a kana keyboard (there are about fifty letters plus a few diacritical marks), a string of kana is input. This is then converted to a mixed kanji/kana string. The way this is effected depends on the software used, e.g. each time one hits the full-stop key, or each time a conversion key is hit.

A QWERTY keyboard has a toggle key enabling the user with the necessary software to switch between alphabetic word processing in English (and other alphabetic languages) and a Japanese mode. In the Japanese mode, the user types in alphabet form (i.e. romanised Japanese), which is automatically converted into kana on screen. The kana string must then be further converted into the kanji/kana mixture required by normal Japanese writing.

Like Chinese, Japanese writing uses no spacing between words. However, the function of spacing in Japanese (a language with largely suffixing agglutinative morphology) is more or less affected by kanji, which would typically appear after a word boundary if there were one, i.e. kana tend to appear at the end of a word rather than the beginning. The internal structure of kanji words typically consists of two morphemes (represented by kanji), and the word processor, when instructed to convert such a unit into kanji, presents the user with a list of homophone candidates for the unit, from which the user must choose the appropriate one. This process is further complicated by the existence of types of morpheme combinations other than two. If a three-morpheme unit consists of the customary two with the addition of a suffix, i.e. 2+1, then conversion poses relatively few problems, but the addition of a prefix (i.e. 1+2 combinations) often results in an incorrect conversion, i.e. a 2+1 conversion, giving a nonsense word, which further slows down the inputting process.

The restrictions of modern technology such as information processing are putting pressure on systems using non-finite large character sets in terms of how to provide both a multilingual environment and cost-effectiveness of input. Projects are underway to create spoken input systems, which would make it possible to bypass some of the above-mentioned problems. However, further standardisation is also needed, especially for Japanese, which lacks an orthography in the sense that many words can be written in more than one way.

Spread of electronic media

China and Korea

According to the website of Global Internet Statistics (http://global-reach.biz/globstats/refs.php3), the latest access estimates for Chinese and Korean are as follows:

There are 33.7 million people online in mainland China, plus 4.31 million in Hong Kong and 11.6 million in Taiwan. In Singapore and Malaysia there are 2.26 million and 1.2 million people online, respectively. The users access the internet in Chinese, English and the local dialect. In the USA and Canada 2.43 million people are estimated to access the internet in Chinese from home. This gives a total of 55.53 million Chinese-speaking people online.

The number of Korean internet users is estimated at 24.1 million, with another 800,000 Americans estimated to access the internet in Korean from home, giving a total of 24.9 million Korean speakers online worldwide.

Japan

Japan is said to be the world's second largest internet country after the USA; however, see below for data indicating that Japanese is being overtaken by the combined figure for Chinese.

A white paper on telecommunications, released by the Public Management Ministry on 2 July 2002, estimates the number of internet users in Japan to be 55.93 million, reporting the number of users to be the second largest in the world after the USA (*The Daily Yomiuri*, 9 July 2002). However, telephone survey data published on the same day by two private research organisations (The Internet Association Japan and Impress Corporation) give a much lower figure of 46.19 million, also pointing out that in Asia Japan is second to China (*The Daily Yomiuri*, 9 July 2002).

The Global Internet Statistics homepage (31 March 2002) has a figure of 52.09 million Japanese speakers online for Japan and the USA/Canada, but excluding Europe, which would mean that Japanese is currently being overtaken by Chinese as the world number two. Internet use is highest amongst the younger generations.

Mobile phone penetration rate for Japan is 52.8%. With increasing facilities for internet connection, this is an important factor for the further spread of the internet, as is the popularity of computer games accessed over the internet.

The percentage of cable TV connections in Japan is estimated to be 27% (March 2002), as compared to 69% in the USA (February 2002). Meanwhile, the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications plans to fully digitalise cable TV between 2005 and 2010. TV stations, both satellite and ground-based were planned to go over to digital by 2001, but delays for the latter were announced recently. This would make high-speed connections for computers, TVs and telephones possible. (Source: Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Post and Telecommunications.)

An inhibiting factor for the internet in Japan is the fact that the company NTT still has a monopoly on ordinary telephones, with expensive local phone calls (no flat rate), and NTT's monopoly is said to hinder the spread of internet use. The press release mentioned above (and recent pressures from the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications) urges introduction of fixed-rate local-call charges. Pressure to introduce lower rates is also being applied by the USA and recently the UK. As a response, NTT has recently announced that it will introduce fixed rate charges on a trial basis, but only for its ISDN subscribers.

A recent survey by the US-based company Telegeography (for details, see http://www.carrierhotels.com/news/October2001/nethubs1030.shtml) on 'internet hubs', which lists cities that have the largest concentration of internet connections, ranks Tokyo sixth in the world after New York, London, Amsterdam, Paris and San Francisco, but with less that 17 gigabits/second, compared to nearly 150 for New York; this may be partly a reflection of the cost factor.

Cable TV is beginning to cash in on this situation by offering cheaper internet access. It has been pointed out that in Japan installation of fibre-optic cable is relatively cheap and speedy because overhead rather than underground cables are being used; however, a recent change in government policy insists on underground cables.

Japan's policies for spreading Japanese language learning

Japan is the only East Asian country where policies aimed at the spread of the country's main language internationally have been formulated. Japan is essentially a monolingual country (although there are some 1.6 million foreign residents, including Korean-speaking communities). Apart from Japan, the Japanese language is spoken among Japanese posted overseas (there are many Japanese schools abroad), which amount to about one million, and to an ever-diminishing degree (due to language loss) in immigrant communities in the USA and South America.

Japanese has, however, become a relatively popular foreign language taught at school. Every few years, the Japan Foundation (see http://www.jpf.go.jp), an agency of the Foreign Affairs ministry, conducts a survey of numbers of learners abroad. The most recent one (Kokusai Koryū Kikin Nihongo Kokusai Sentaa 2000) has figures for 1998–99, according to which more than two million people study Japanese around the world, an increase of 29% over the 1993 figures (Kokusai Koryū Kikin Nihongo Kotusai Sentaa 1995). The countries with the greatest concentration of learners are the ROK with about 45% of the total, followed by Australia (15%), the PRC (11%) and the USA (5.5%). Looking at a break-down of the figures, however, there is a noticeable decline in the number of learners in some sectors for many countries, especially in the adult education sector. This could be due to factors such as Japan's economic down-turn, and the growing popularity of Chinese. Various support systems to encourage the increased study of Japanese internationally are in place. For example, the Japan Foundation has established a number of language centres and cultural institutes around the world (namely, in Bangkok, Cologne, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, London, Los Angeles, Paris, Rome, Sao Paulo, Sydney and Toronto with a further centre planned for Seoul), whose main function is to teach Japanese and to assist with local teaching, especially at the secondary level. The Japan Foundation also runs various programmes to train and refresh overseas teachers of Japanese in Japan, and sends Japanese teachers of Japanese abroad to teach the language.

In a more indirect way, the Japan Exchange and Teaching Programme (JET), which was launched in 1987, aims to improve foreign language teaching in Japan while also promoting international exchange and 'internationalisation' of Japan's regions. This programme invites young university graduates to Japan to teach English (for a maximum of three years) or to be attached to a local government office. The programme has expanded significantly in numbers and countries involved, with a total of 5,800 participants in JETs in Japan during

1999–2000 from 37 countries. The bulk of participants comes from the English-speaking world.

There are also plans for a one-month exchange programme involving 500 teachers and 500 students per year, administered through UNESCO and funded by the Japanese government. A plan to increase Japan's foreign student intake (currently about 79,000) to 100,000 a year is also being revived, with the aim of achieving this mainly through scholarships for short-term university exchange programmes.

English and the 'internationalisation' of Japanese

The spread of global English is accelerating in Japan, too. Apart from the presence of foreign firms in Japan that use English as the working language, there is an increasing trend towards international business, often in the form of mergers and acquisitions. An example is the Nissan/Renault tie-up that took place in March 1999, where English is also used as the working language. English is also used by businessmen in other Asian countries, in particular Southeast Asian countries, which are using English as the official language for ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) business.

However, despite widespread teaching of English from the junior high school level, the English ability of the average Japanese leaves a lot to be desired (see, for example, Mancuso 1998). A variety of factors may be at work here; e.g. the small number of sounds (five vowels and sixteen consonants) and simple syllable structure (no consonant clusters as a rule), resulting in only 115 possible syllables compared to some 3,000 in English, all of which makes English pronunciation a challenge for Japanese speakers. Antiquated teaching methods based on translation may also play a role.

Meanwhile, the media and certain politicians have been demanding improvements in English teaching because the average TOEFL scores (for 1997–98) for Japan were the lowest (with North Korea) of all twenty-six Asian countries listed. This result is obviously not complimentary for a country that considers itself as the most westernised and progressive in East Asia. Such figures are not really comparable, given that the number of takers and other conditions vary greatly from country to country. If one looks at the figures only, however, the PRC is high up the ranks, and the ROK and Taiwan also exceed the Japanese performance significantly. Recently, a committee to advise on policy regarding the 'internationalisation' of Japanese has been set up by the Agency for Cultural Affairs. A document on their home page (www.bunka.go.jp) mainly emphasises the need for better communication skills in Japanese, restraint in the use of foreign words from English, and a proposal to use the traditional family-name – given-name order when romanising Japanese; this is a move that so far is being ignored by the public and English media in Japan alike.

Conclusions

The East Asian countries' common heritage of the Chinese writing system and cognate Chinese vocabulary has diminished over the last century. There are now substantial differences in character shape and lists between the PRC, Taiwan and Japan, while the DPRK has abandoned hanja altogether and its use in the ROK is marginal. There are some indications of attempts, however, to reverse this trend, as in the ROK proposal to use hanja in road signs (see above).

There is also a growing gulf between these languages in the way they incorporate words from English, ranging from a very low number of cognate forms in Chinese (where loan translations are still the norm) and Japanese, where western loans are rampant (but distorted because of the differences in the sound system). ROK Korean ranks somewhere in between, but lies closer to Japanese (for more details, see www.toefl.org).

Currently – and this will probably remain the case for decades to come – none of the East Asian languages has regional significance, with the possible exception of Chinese, which has a fairly large body of overseas speakers in both Southeast Asia and the USA. However, the situation is complicated by the fact that the majority of overseas Chinese speak Cantonese and Hokkienese rather than Mandarin, i.e. standard Chinese.

Technical problems due to the non-finite nature of Chinese characters prevail, and computer input is substantially slower than with alphabetic systems. Due to the large number of homophones, there are also no spell-checkers for Chinese characters.

Whereas knowledge of English is rapidly becoming a condition for a well-paid job in China and the ROK, Japan is still very much a monolingual country, painfully aware of its lack of English skills. To address this problem, state schools are introducing English as part of the new comprehensive study course, although it is by no means clear how teachers can be secured for this purpose. Measures planned to this end include assigning JET teachers to primary schools, sending Japanese teachers on training courses, and employing part-time teachers. (Source: Ministry of Education, Culture, Science, Sports and Technology.)

The most likely scenario for the future is that English will enhance its status as a language for international communication in East Asia, necessitating the acquisition of good English skills alongside the local languages. Japan is currently lagging behind its neighbours on this score, as is evident from the notion in Japan that the Japanese language is being 'threatened' by the largely English-based internet and the large number of book translations into Japanese, with textbooks in translation being used as a rule in university courses.

On the other hand, Japan is the only East Asian country with an active policy of promoting the study of the country's native language abroad through bodies like the Japan Foundation. Japan is also creating a body of Japanophiles through extensive scholarship schemes to attract foreign students, and by exposing young graduates from around the world to Japanese by encouraging them to work in Japan for up to three years under the JET scheme.

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13 Sub-Saharan Africa

Roland Breton

'Sub-Saharan' or 'south Saharan' Africa?

Physically, Africa is a 'continent' or, rather, one of the five parts of the world, and for the United Nations Organisation (UNO) a 'region', with its own international structure, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), having its seat in Addis Ababa. But, nevertheless, it is currently subdivided – on anthropological, cultural and geopolitical grounds – into two distinct spheres, separated by the barrier of the Sahara, which isolates North Africa from Black Africa. North Africa, oriented towards the Mediterranean sea, is characterised by its sub-arid temperate climate, and its populations, overwhelmingly Arabian and Islamic, are tied to those of the Asian Middle East, who have historically shared the same great area of civilisation. Black Africa, where Black African population predominates, extends from the Sahara through the tropical and equatorial climatic zones to the far south of the continent. Due to this major climatic, anthropological and cultural divide, separated by the Saharan desert, Black Africa is currently referred to as 'sub-Saharan', which is a rather inexact characterisation, because it literally means 'immediately bordering the Sahara'. Thus, because of its continuation for thousands of kilometres to the south, it would be more appropriate to name it 'South Saharan'.

Whatever would be the designation, this southern part of Africa, having its own anthropological, historical, cultural and political homogeneity, is markedly other than that of the North Saharan one, and may in turn be divided into two groups. Its northern part, most properly 'sub-Saharan', extending from western to central Africa, constitutes a natural continuum of tropical savannas and forests, extending from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean. Austral Africa, the temperate southern extremity of this continent, is characterised by similar populations and civilisations as well as similar colonial domination, but is nowadays strongly pulled economically and politically towards the Republic of South Africa. In these conditions, we may call these two parts of Black Africa the 'sub-Saharan' or, better, 'south Saharan', one part influenced by the north and the austral one quite otherwise oriented.

Black Africa presents a specific geolinguistic situation that distinguishes it from all other parts of the globe. First of all, there is an extraordinarily diverse autochthonous linguistic landscape, tied to a very slow development of the corpus as well as of the status of nearly all of these languages, which constitute the cultural patrimony of 500 million Black Africans. Moreover, because of this weakness, there is a prevalent position, in all essential domains of public life, of the three foreign languages inherited from colonisation: English, French and Portuguese, not counting Spanish (in Equatorial Guinea and South Sahara). Therefore, three major linguistic areas are interwoven on the map of Black Africa. The resulting cultural tripartition of the states of sub-Saharan Africa has such heavy geopolitical implications that it may be qualified as a politicolinguistic divide, that is, one with deep political and linguistic implications.

The most burning questions concerning the future of this situation are: will the non-development of African languages worsen and lead to their growing elimination from the functions they may, or currently do, occupy and then to their eventual extinction? Or, to the contrary, are there any indications of their potential wellbeing, at least of some of them? And besides that, do we see any sign of evolution of the present politicolinguistic tripartition?

The exceptional linguistic African diversity

The geolinguistic situation of present and future Black Africa can only be understood by taking into account the historical and geopolitical evolution that is peculiar to this continent. Examples of the decisive factors in this singular linguistic landscape are as follows: the settling of traditional societies, the subsequent trauma of about one century of colonial domination, followed by half a century of troubled independence accompanied by different post-colonial policies of former colonial powers.

The genesis of African languages is, as for other languages, tied to the genesis of the societies that use them. One of the striking characteristics of Black Africa is that its societies were, generally speaking, broken up into numerous societal and ethnical formations with a segmentarian type of structure, i.e. without a strong internal hierarchical or social structure. They were thus tending to subdivide, having few or no hierarchical links and even no institutional coordination. This resulted in most African lands having a large collection of societal and ethnolinguistic units with very limited power, mostly at the level of the village or the village group, i.e. the chiefdom. Most of these structures have persisted outside the aegis of any state established on a wider territory. And, thus, from this break-up into small living units, a possible extreme divergence of local speeches might naturally ensue. This divergence was often expressed by the will of the communities to manifest their identity through orality, while their other habits – economical, social, architectural, in clothing and so on – were common to rather larger sets of population.

An ambiguity results about the notion of 'cultural areas' (*Kulturkreise* or *cercles de civilisation*), used by the first anthropologists who discovered in Africa some middle-sized human and territorial units corresponding to natural and ecological settings allowing the diffusion of ways of life, whether sedentary or nomadic. And that could sometimes be approximately assimilated to certain linguistic units, which were also of middle size: branches of four linguistic families. Yet there were not close links between territorial setting, production types, genetic descent and linguistic kinship of the considered populations.

In Africa as everywhere, ethnic groups, even neighbouring ones, were characterised by different or converging common traits, that could be qualified as 'cultural'. But, in Africa more than elsewhere (Papua excepted), due to weak extension of state traditions, linguistic fragmentation was marked. With hundreds of authentically distinct languages, some village linguistic groups have corresponded to a few thousand speakers. And these speakers have been all the more jealous of their linguistic singularity, since their community of settlement and life belonged to an apparently very wide cultural circle.

Whatever could have been the basis – ecological, racial, societal, economical or linguistic – of the larger groupings discovered by researchers and the designations given by them to these various units, none of them was, generally speaking, perceived by their members as a living reality. Larger units were not the goal of any conscious movement of unification, either from the concerned masses or from the conquering and dominating will and ambition of some particular groups or individuals. State constructions and imperial expansions have been rare within African society. They appeared mostly on the margins of Black Africa, brought by Islam or by expansionist ethnic groups. It is among the latter ones that we find rare languages such as Amharic or Malagasy, which crystallised the expression of a national will before European intervention. Elsewhere, even Songhai, Bornuan or Fulani expansions, Yoruba power or Mossi resistance only tentatively pointed towards an ethnic or ethnolinguistic consciousness that hardly had time to strengthen and emerge through any linguistic development supported by a collective consciousness.

The vulnerability of these ethnic nebulae with rare points of monarchical convergence and so many spaces of divergence allowed colonial conquest to advance rapidly in the second half of the nineteenth century. These nebulae suffered for a long time from the various systems of slave trade – trans-Saharan, erythrean, omanian and transatlantic – that competed to disrupt and polarise them towards external dependency. Along with this competition, the European languages supplanted the diffusion of Arabic which had conveyed Islamisation; these languages – Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, French, English, Danish, Swedish, German, Italian – brought in the roman alphabet that dethroned the Arabic script, which had started to give some African languages – like Fulani, Swahili or Malagasy – their first written form. These European languages became the only expression of the new imperial functions allotted to the conquerors. Alongside them, hybrid forms – creoles and pidgins with a Portuguese, Dutch, English or French base – appeared on the islands and along the coast and were propagated inland through trading and working relations among populations directly in contact with Europeans. Simplified forms of African languages – like Lingala, Swahili, Sangö and Fanagalo – were also used in a vehicular role, and they then relied on colonial powers to train and shape an autochthonous working or military force.

From the supremacy of the three colonial languages to the politicolinguistic tripartition

With the dividing-up of all African lands decided at the Berlin Conference of 1885 between European powers, the European colonial languages became the only vehicles of administration and teaching and of all written transactions. Only Christian missions, for the purpose of evangelisation, tried to use African languages, and initiated the creation of their written corpus: lexicons, grammars, bibles, etc. But the division of Africa between European powers did not at all take into account the delimitation of any autochthonous preexisting ethnolinguistic population groups. Political boundaries, generally drawn at a right angle to the coastline, were only oriented towards gaining access to the hinterland through roads and railways radiating from the trading harbours. Nobody seemed to think of considering linguistic or ethnic areas, nor former kingdoms, when delimiting the zones of influence.

Only rivalries between powers would divert or slow down the expansion of some colonial areas for the benefit of some other, more assertive ones, for example, stopping of the transversal Portuguese or French pushes from one ocean to the other across the British North–South axis from Cape Town to Cairo. Then, both after the First World War and the Second World War, the defeated empires were eliminated from Africa, for example, the German presence in 1919 was divided between the British, the French and the Portuguese. Simultaneous eviction of the German language from the whole public sector occurred, and it was replaced by the language of the inheriting empire. In 1946, there was a similar elimination of Italian presence and language.

But, after 1945, decolonisation began and gradually affected every imperialism in Africa. Each one faced decolonisation with its own strategies and elaborated a more or less efficient post-colonial or neo-colonial policy, including certain forms of cultural or linguistic domination. The first armed struggles appeared in Kenya with the Mau-Mau and in French Cameroon in 1955. Their repression did not slow down the irresistible independence process initiated by Ghana in 1957 and ex-French Guinea in 1958, followed in 1960 by all other French trusteeships and colonies plus Nigeria, the former Belgian Congo and the two Somalias. Later all remaining British colonies became independent, ending with Zimbabwe in 1970.

The decolonisation strategies

Between British and French imperialisms, differences of style have been clear. For London, independence meant a definitive break, expressed in giving full sovereign functions – monetary, economic and military – to the new authorities, which became members of the Commonwealth of Nations. Paris, under Charles De Gaulle, in 1958, first started an autonomy process within the ‘Communauté’ (French translation of Commonwealth) created to this end by the Constitution of the Fifth Republic. The Communauté resulted in the Overseas Territories (TOM), which were mostly African and joined within two federations of West and Equatorial Africa (AOF and AEF), which were split, less than two years later, into more than a dozen new independent states. These new states generally had low populations, small revenues and a tiny national economy, without any institutional past nor any strong political structure other than that inherited as a member of a colonial federation.

This proliferation of new African states was a setback for proposed federations, but the resulting ‘balkanisation’ was a success of neo-colonial Machiavellian policy. About fifteen small republics in the French sphere remained tied to the former metropolitan country through three common institutions: the Franc zone, the Francophonie (French-speaking world) and military alliance. The first involves a convertible currency that made these states ‘poor countries with a currency of rich people’ (De Gaulle) and allows them to benefit from numerous programmes of help and cooperation, since they stayed within a market where French exports have had a preferential position. The second institution joined these countries in a cultural market with political implications sustained by the entirety of French-speaking states of the North, from Europe to Canada. And the third institution supported, through the system of French air-force bases, possible intervention to rescue friendly heads of state if they were menaced. All three institutions allow French diplomacy to have at its disposal on the international scene – and notably at the UN – the support of faithful African client-states, assisted by many programmes of financial aid in the short, medium or long terms. They enable these assisted heads of state to fear neither possible revolutionary movements nor sudden budgetary crises. It is from this strategic position that France has still played the role of a sub-hegemonic power on the international scene, including allowing itself to police this part of Africa.

The exit of the Belgian and Portuguese colonial powers was especially disruptive. Belgium, which had never foreseen a process towards self-government for the Congo, waited until the first 1959 riots to promise independence; this happened one year later through a hasty exit, leaving the country in internal turmoil for several years. Portuguese colonies, legally considered as benefiting from a status equivalent to metropolitan provinces, had to struggle during ten to fifteen years of guerrilla wars starting in 1959 in Angola, in 1963 in Guinea-Bissau and in 1964 in Mozambique, ending only with the 1975 'revolution of the carnations' in Portugal. These last colonial wars did not question the existing linguistic supremacies; for instance, the nationalist war propaganda in Guinea-Bissau displayed images of guerrillas taking accelerated, intensive revolutionary literacy classes in Portuguese.

Thus, after independence the linguistic Luso–Anglo–Francophone tripartition was maintained as it was, allowing some reciprocal influences. Institutional Francophonie gathered the former French and Belgian domains into one continuous set of sixteen states within Black Africa, not counting the Indian Ocean ones. This is a set to which, later on, the smaller states of Iberian tradition appointed themselves: Lusophone Cape Verde Islands, Guinea-Bissao and Sao Tome-Principe participating in Francophone summits or Hispanophone Equatorial Guinea entering the Franc zone. For their part, Anglophone countries felt the need for some alignment with the surrounding Francophonie. Even Nigeria – the African colossus whose population of more than a hundred million people surpasses the whole Francophone area – has since adopted the right-hand driving system of all its neighbours, and took the decision in the 1990s to make French its second language, a purely formal decision until it has the required number of teachers. In an opposite direction, the awkward support by French diplomacy and military forces of the protagonists of the Rwanda genocide against their opponents coming from Kenya and Uganda, motivated, after liberation, the proclamation of a bilingual Rwanda where English was supposed to reach equality with French. There has also been a certain diffusion of Arabic, as an official language, outside the Arabophone countries, at least on the margins of Black Africa, with states – such as Djibouti, Somalia and Comoros – becoming members of the Arab League. There has also been a diffusion of Arabic in Chad, where a strong Arab minority lives.

The penetration of new international actors on the African scene has not affected the different levels of the politicolinguistic situation to a great extent: Soviet Russia, China and Japan slipped easily through the new net with their already multilingual experienced teams. In spite of a certain temporary Soviet political seizure of Guinea, Benin, Congo-Brazzaville, Somalia and Ethiopia, it was out of the question to implant the Russian language on African lands, except marginally through students sent to Lumumba University in Moscow. The most symbolic fact has been that Russian trusteeship over the Ethiopian dictatorship led to the guided development of all minority languages by giving them a writing code in Amharic script, in the same way that the Russian Cyrillic alphabet was introduced for all minority languages in the Soviet Union. As far as the Anglophone powers are concerned (i.e. Britain, Canada, India and the USA), they relied easily on English but there was a sprinkling in Africa of French-speaking Canadians and Afro-American citizens. And, finally the privileged economic relations between the European Union and ACP (African–Caribbean–Pacific) countries may have contributed to revive some of the old links established in colonial times with Dutch, German or Italian cultures. However, Dutch in its Flemish variety in the Belgian colonial zone or Afrikaans in South Africa have always been viewed negatively by African masses, who refused their imposition beside French or English, as was demonstrated in protests and riots in Soweto in 1976.

Deficient language planning

With the former colonial languages enjoying official status in independent states – and dominating in essential areas such as politics, economy, education and science – African populations never ceased to be mainly taught in these languages and, through them, in exogenous cultures. Increasingly, through extension of schooling, not only have the dominant languages continued to be the vehicle of expression of African elites, but they could also penetrate the masses far more deeply than during the colonial period. This certainly assures the opening of Africa to the rest of the world, but, at the same time, this general reliance on colonial languages could be criticised as leading to neglect and repudiation of the autochthonous cultural heritage represented by ancestral African languages.

Everywhere African languages have been celebrated by passionate homages exalting their richness, their originality and their necessary link with Africanness. But it would be quite another thing to take positive measures to develop them for the modern world, that is to say to develop and promote a policy of 'language planning'. Most states, in the name of safeguarding African languages, have not gone beyond the level of political discourse. The first imperative constraint has been that any language planning policy requires a budget – for teaching, publishing, training, etc. – and that, in Africa, the priority sectors for development are believed to lie elsewhere, firstly in economics. A second constraint has been that the multiplicity of autochthonous languages in most states would have led to choices that would inevitably, if even temporarily, have given advantage to some groups and would very probably have affected electoral behaviour in a way that no political leader was prepared to risk. Thus, in most states political discourse in favour of 'our languages' was not followed up with concrete measures. At the same time, real cultural development remained the monopoly of the official ex-colonial language.

The main exceptions to this general domination by exogenous languages and cultures, i.e. emphasis on endogenous languages, are easily identifiable. The first, historically and fundamentally, is Ethiopia, where Amharic was and has remained for centuries the national and cultural language. The pro-Soviet regime encouraged the development of the principal minority languages, Tigrinya and Oromiya, a move continued by the successor regime within a federal framework corresponding to the main linguistic regions.

The rare African states with a monolingual homogenous population have been naturally the theatre of more assertive indigenous language policies. Somalia and Madagascar, both independent since 1960, could promote their unique languages as their national languages without dissent, and keep the former colonial languages in an auxiliary position, although not without controversy. Somalia also needed to take into account Italian and English, to which was then added Arabic because of joining the Arab League. In Madagascar, the Malagasisation of the civil service and education remained a permanent motto. A similar case is Arabisation in the Maghreb (northwest Africa, including Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia), but with somewhat more violence. The young generations opposed the traditional Francophone elites, as in May 1972 when the slogan spread: 'French language, language of slaves', aiming to completely replace the colonial language by the national one. In Rwanda and Burundi, where the whole population only speaks two sister tongues, Kinyarwanda and Kirundi (officially considered as the same language), the promotion of this language under its two designations as national languages was easily accepted. But French remained the official language in Rwanda and the 'second administrative language' in Burundi, with Kiswahili as a commercial lingua franca; in Rwanda, however, after the civil war of 1994 English was promoted to the same level as French.

Only one other state in Black Africa, Tanzania, undertook to give itself a national language coming from African stock, under the guidance of President Nyerere. Kiswahili, the vehicular Bantu language all along the Indian Ocean coastline, has incorporated so much lexical borrowing from Arabic brought by the navigators and the slave trade that some linguists consider it as a kind of Creole. It has reached a vast hinterland as a lingua franca through the network of commercial routes up to the African great lakes and beyond. German colonisation had used Kiswahili as the language of lower administration of Ostafrika, facing Zanzibar, the English protectorate, and that was maintained by the new British mandate over Tanganyika after 1919.

Independent in 1961, Tanganyika became Tanzania through its federation with Zanzibar, and adopted Kiswahili as its national language, leaving to English the role of a second state language. Thus, Kiswahili entered the entire educational system throughout national territory, though it was the mother tongue only of those in the coastal fringe of the country and elsewhere was merely a lingua franca. The deep homogenisation that was thus carried on through its adoption on a national basis made Kiswahili the first cultural language of the whole population having access to schooling, with English in second position, except in higher education, politics and science, where it remains dominant. The consequence has been that an increasing part of the population all over Tanzania now speaks Kiswahili to their children at home, so as to better prepare them for schooling and social advancement. That has created a mass of Swahilophone mother tongue speakers in the interior, not akin to the coastal population: they are the neo-Baswahili people. This is the exceptional success of a well-specified policy of language planning favouring an African language.

However, it should be emphasised that this policy initiated by Nyerere was sustained by a strong, explicit African ideology that could mobilise all means and energies necessary for its implementation, including a healthy budget and mass participation encouraged by ongoing national efforts. It must also be stressed that this language development was based on a monopoly status in favour of Kiswahili and that the creation of a huge corpus of texts and books in this language was conditioned by the stopping of any publication or teaching in other Tanzanian autochthonous languages, all expected to defer to the single national language. The choice for Kiswahili openly implied that other African languages would not be promoted, even if they had initially many more speakers, like Nyamwesi and Sukuma.

Elsewhere in Black Africa, language planning policies were far more hesitant. In the wake of Tanzania, the spread of Swahili was more or less recognised by the other states which relied on it. Kenya and Uganda put it in an official place beside English, but with much less support for teaching and administration. And far less effort was made in Rwanda and Burundi. Congo-Kinshasa (ex-Zaire) counted it among its four regional languages, but it was the local form, Kingwana, that has benefited. Farther south, the adoption by a state like Malawi of its main autochthonous language, Chichewa, was more formal and limited in practical importance.

Continuity of linguistic policies, from colonial times to the present

The linguistic policy of most African states remains currently in the line defined in the colonial era by each dominant power. The Latin tendency (France, Portugal) of gradual assimilation of indigenous population to the people of the metropolis did not leave, in French or Portuguese zones, any place for local languages in practical terms, because it was considered that any general development as any individual advancement could only be achieved through the unique language of civilisation and progress of the tutelary power. Rather different was the Germanic perception of 'the other' that inspired German, Dutch or Flemish people freely to admit language barriers as social degrees separating the autochthonous masses from their 'dominant masters'. British indirect rule, like German or Dutch segregation, was inclined to concede an intermediary role to certain African languages, yet the purpose was not linguistic nor cultural nor social nor matrimonial assimilation between the two groups.

Thus, even today is it possible to feel a rather deep behaviour cleavage between the Francophone and Lusophone area, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the Anglophone area that covered most of the former Germanophone and Dutch–Afrikaans zones plus the Belgian area where Flemish-inspired colonisation was quite distinct from the French Republic formal assimilationist policy.

In the Latin French–Portuguese area, African tongues never received effective recognition within administrative or educational systems. The only recent exception has been the Central African Republic where, since independence, Sangö, the local vehicular language of the capital region, achieved the status of national language. In Congo-Kinshasa, Belgium, after declining to introduce Dutch (Flemish) alongside French, raised the four main African languages – Lingala, Kituba, Tshiluba and Kiswahili – to regional status of intermediary means of communication, from the army command to the media. This status predisposed the languages to be proclaimed national languages after independence, under French, the only official language, and over scores of local languages.

Some rare attempts to promote African languages occurred in other Francophone states. For instance in Guinea, Sékou Touré, illustrating his will to break with France and Francophonie in 1958, brought eight Guinean languages into the educational system. This policy was, however, abandoned on the death of the dictator in 1984, under the pressure of the population wanting to return to all-French education since it offered them upwards mobility. A parallel attempt under the regime of Colonel Thomas Sankara (1983–87) in Burkina Faso met with the same prejudices and opposition. In Senegal and Niger, where linguistic diversity does not extend beyond about ten languages, programmes have been gradually applied to give to some languages a limited position, as in Mali for Bambara, which has a large body of speakers. In Togo, the Éwé language, spoken on the coast, has benefited from written use for about three centuries, and ascendancy has been promoted but in equality with Kabyé, the language of a small, remote island community, which not by coincidence is the homeland of the present President. This, of course, in any event would be under French paramountcy.

Generally speaking, in Francophone states the issue of national languages has never been given priority. For instance, in Cameroon, where research in applied linguistics received important support and where more than two hundred living languages were surveyed, some private efforts succeeded, after much difficulty, in introducing half a dozen languages at the primary level on a limited basis and in addition to French or English. At the secondary level one school in Douala offers optional courses in three African languages. But at the university level the only African language whose introduction has been attempted was Swahili, which is widely spoken more than one thousand kilometres away.

Anglophone states generally continue or sometimes extend the British system of using local languages at the primary level, as a transition towards English, which fully reigns at the secondary and university levels. However, none, except Tanzania, introduced any African language in its public service. Nigeria – which is maybe the most liberal and also the most linguistically diverse African state – leaves its thirty-six federated states and inner subdivisions the right to use some of the several hundred languages in elementary schooling and also in public audio-visual media. But the three major languages – each of which has more than twenty-five million speakers and a longstanding written tradition – have a very reduced corpus of texts and books and no written mass media.

Why this linguistic non-development of Black Africa?

This worrisome situation of African languages regarding their development and their future is due to a whole series of factors that appear to paralyse local actors. One may mention, first, the general weakness of most African states that have generally too small a population to handle long-range, large cultural programmes. All the more so since economic crises in the countries demand much attention. Under these conditions, the UNESCO mandate to develop national languages, at least those of subregional size (that is to say, covering a subdivision of the 'region' which is Africa and thereby overlapping several states, as do Swahili, Fulani, Bambara, etc.) receives limited support whether nationally or internationally.

The general African reliance on external verdicts on their economic situation, which are conditional for any international aid – either from the former colonial powers or from international organisations requiring structural adjustments – does not favour cultural considerations. The grouping of states into blocs according to politicolinguistic areas, the inclusion of many of them inside international or even planetary feudal client systems, tied to far away strategies and dependencies, does not pay much attention to the plea of field researchers, Africanists, linguists or UNESCO in favour of a future for Africa in harmony with its traditions. The linguistic non-development of Black Africa is not directly tied to its economic semi-development, but the negative dynamics of both are the same.

What are the prospects?

The diffusion of teaching through only official ex-colonial languages threatens to lead to the disappearance of African languages. They will survive among the illiterate population, but they will be given up by the population taught in English, French or Portuguese. They will disappear more slowly in Anglophone states if the elementary transitional system maintains local languages, and far more quickly in Francophone and Lusophone zones where these languages are of no use for reading and writing. Within three generations the language shift may be completed. As elsewhere, grandchildren sent to school will not understand their illiterate grandparents, especially if the parents have brought them up at home in the language of the school. African languages will be limited to the decreasing part of the population that does not go to school. They will tend to deteriorate due to their more and more limited use and competition in all fields with the lexicon and expressions of the 'language of progress and development'. They will become residual languages or 'hut languages', retaining their very peculiar flavour, like most loved products of 'hut gardens', and 'languages for joke', symbolic rallying signals, allowing mutual recognition among akin but unknown people. But the essential part of social communication will increasingly pass through the official state languages, the only ones used throughout the school curriculum. Through them will be delivered most messages, as through them will be accomplished most functions of elaborated thought.

East South-Saharan Africa, where national languages – Amhara, Tigrinya, Somali, Kiswahili, Ikinyarwanda-Kirundi and Malagasy – are developed, taught and used at various levels of administration and media, could escape this threat of disappearance. Elsewhere the conditions of language survival will be extremely variable. Most widespread African languages already benefit from a certain status, at least at the regional level. Development of their written corpus is starting; the languages are already being introduced to some degree in elementary schooling, and they have a minor place in the media, so they may still occupy a secondary position in the cultural life of their country. But that may apply at most to a few dozen languages. The other hundreds of minor languages occupy a limited area, with few speakers often numbering hardly in the thousands. Authorities are paying them purely theatrical attention, without any financial support, so that they are condemned to be forgotten as much and as quickly as schooling introduces other languages and other cultures. 'Progress' will mean for them acceleration towards their complete demise, by people as by the state. The only hope will lie in convergent efforts of enough speakers, cultural grass-roots associations, linguists, missionaries and various researchers, supported to a greater or lesser degree by national or international institutions.

A similar fate menaces pidgins, creoles and vehicular languages. Those already recognised and introduced inside cultural systems of modern society may preserve their minor situation, while others will be condemned to atrophy and absorption, as has already happened for most of the Cameroon pidgins.

A distinctive, innovative case involves evolution and strengthening of some local variants of the official ex-colonial languages. They are unique and exclusively African and thus constitute endogenous variations of the three exogenous dominating languages. Popular, hybrid forms of some urban dialects, especially among younger groups, mingled with African borrowings, have interested numerous observers from Congo to Ivory Coast and further. 'Africa French' is a definite variant of standard French, with specific lexical or syntactical traits, parallel to those of other regional French styles, like, for instance, Quebec, Acadia or Louisiana French. Some have seen in them the sign of the birth of one or several new languages, which could influence Africa in the future.

Answers to the above issues, in Africa as elsewhere, are tied more to the superposition of uses than to pure competition between layers of tongues in a same society. The popular, or even the consciously populist, or 'basist', layer differentiates linguistic uses as symbols of social identifications, and towards this end is currently spreading in marginalised and suburban strata, particularly among the youth and in the street. The upper layer of the standard language, both written and official, remains the major social indicator of participation in 'civilised' society. Competition between the two forms is general and affects many individuals, who practise the different registers with more or less proficiency and who are thus led to a form of diglossia according to the various situations they meet. But it is rather doubtful that Africa French could find any written form forecasting its social promotion as a prestigious language beyond certain famous comics read every morning in some African dailies. Like the much-simplified *français-tirailleur* ('infantrymen French'), which was used as the command language for native troops, it has been living a kind of rebirth in some popular songs of the next generation.

While the acrolect will remain the only useful model, not only of upward mobility, but for any economic, cultural, political or other major activity, the basilects, as far as they are diverging and complicated, have little hope of becoming accepted means of communication of a whole society. Between the polished Academy French or Queen's English and the Franco-English street slangs, the mesolect of the middle classes is alive and well, aiming at accepted correctness and only affected by local colour. The Franco-African, Anglo-African or Luso-African speech – the new street pidgins – are without any doubt very far from the development reached in modern Greece by people's Greek (Demotic) before it replaced the 'pure language' (Katharevusa) in 1976. And they cannot yet be compared with the status and corpus of Tok-Pisin ('talk-pidgin'), which is already official in Papua and serves as intermediary between standard

English and the innumerable ethnic tongues of the local communities designated as Wantok ('one-talk').

Most probably sub-Saharan Africa in the twenty-first century will continue to be characterised by, if not more and more marked by, its politicolinguistic tripartition between Franco-Africans, Anglo-Africans and Luso-Africans, as far as general education in the three languages will dominate. Besides that, the maintenance of some African national languages will continue to characterise especially its eastern part, while the emergence of some subregional languages is more doubtful in its central and western parts. The general twilight of hundreds of its local minor languages is unfortunately the surest expected event, unless some unprecedented measures at the national or, better, international level are taken.

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14 Australasia and the South Pacific

Richard B. Baldauf Jr. and Paulin G. Djité

This chapter briefly reviews the past and present and examines the possible future language situation for the group of polities in the area bounded by Southeast Asia to the west, Australia and New Zealand to the south and Melanesia and Polynesia to the north and east. Kaplan (1999) has indicated some of the difficulties in defining this as an entity as this is a diverse region of the world. A summary of some salient points of the current language situation for each polity in the region is provided in Table 14.1. A number of these polities are discussed in Baldauf and Luke (1990) and Kaplan and Baldauf (2002), while references to the language situation can be found in Kaplan and Baldauf (1997).

Pool and Fettes (1998) and Fettes (Chapter 3 of this volume) have suggested six broad possible 'geostrategies of interlingualism' that might characterise the development of languages in the future. We examine each of these in terms of their past and present impact on the region, before providing what we believe are likely future general language development trends.

World Englishes

Table 14.1 indicates that English is the dominant LWC (language of wider communication) in the region with fifteen of the twenty polities giving the language some official role (also see Kaplan 1987). This is not to say that these Englishes follow one standard. In fact, it can be argued that one of English's great strengths has been that it is pluricentric; no one 'owns' English.[1] Polities are free to adopt the model of English they choose to follow or they can support and develop a model of their own, creating variation around the standard core, thereby marking their identity. Crystal (1995, p. 110) characterises English internationally as a balance between 'internationalism' (standardisation) and 'individuality' (variation) while Baldauf (1998) suggests that this variation is an increasingly important aspect of language diversity.

[1] It could be argued that one of the great threats to English dominance is that the USA might formally try to establish such a standard (Kaplan and Baldauf 2001), thereby fracturing the 'unity with diversity' of English.

Table 14.1 *Summary language situation for polities in Australasia and the South Pacific*

Polity	Population	Role of English	Usage estimate (Crystal 1997, pp. 57ff)	Other languages	Role of other languages	Largest LWC in schools
Australia	18,025,000	de facto	L1: 15,316,000	c. 150 migrant	community	Japanese
			L2: 2,084,000	c. 120 Aboriginal	community	French
						German
						Chinese
						Italian
						Indonesian
Brunei	291,000	national	L1: 10,000	Malay	national	
			L2: 104,000	Chinese	community	
				local/regional	community	
Cook Islands	19,000		L1: 1,000	Maori		
			L2: 2,000			
Fiji	791,000	official	L1: 5,000	Fijian	community	
			L2: 160,000	Hindustani	community	
French Polynesia	200,000			French	official	
				Tahitian	community	
Indonesia	184,500,000	foreign		Indonesian	official	English
				Javanese	community	Dutch
				Sundanese	community	
				c. 583 local/regional	community	
Malaysia	19,948,000	second	L1: 375,000	Malay	national	English
			L2: 5,984,000	Chinese	community	
				Tamil	community	
				local/regional	community	
New Caledonia				French		
				local/regional		
New Zealand	3,568,000	de facto	L1: 3,396,000	Maori	official	
			L2: 150,000	Pacific languages	community	
				Migrant	community	
Papua New Guinea	4,302,000	official	L1: 120,000	Tok Pisin	lingua franca	
			L2: 2,800,000	Hiri Motu	lingua franca	

				c. 717 local/regional	community	
Philippines (Gonzalez 1999)	68,431,213	official	L1: 15,000 L2: 36,400,000	Filipino Tagalog Cebuano Ilocano c. 120 local/regional	official community community community community	Spanish (limited use) Chinese (limited use)
Samoa, American	58,000	official	L1: 2,000 L2: 56,000	Samoan	official	
Samoa	166,000	second	L1: 1,000 L2: 86,000	Samoan	official	
Singapore	2,989,000	official	L1: 300,000 L2: 1,046,000	Malay Mandarin Tamil Chinese dialects	national official official community	
Solomon Islands	382,000	second	L1: 2,000 L2: 135,000	Melanesia Pisin c. 120 local/regional	lingua franca community	
Thailand	56,300,000	foreign		Thai Chinese Lao Malay Mon-Khmer	official community community community community	English
Tonga	96,800	second	L2: 30,000	Tongan	community	
Tuvalu	9,300	second	L2: 600	Tuvaluan	community	
Vanuatu	168,000	official	L1: 2,000 L2: 160,000	Bislama French 81 local/regional	national official community	
Vietnam	69,200,000	foreign		Vietnamese French Chinese Khmer local/regional	official LWC community community community	English French

Notes: L1 = first language; L2 = second language; LWC = language of wider communication

Graddol (1997; also see Lockwood 1998) examines the present position of English as the dominant language in the world and asks whether its status will remain the same in the twenty-first century in a world of unprecedented global, social, political and economic change. He defines the three current types of English speakers as:

- first language (L1) speakers, or those for whom English is a first – and often only – language;
- second language (L2) speakers; and
- those who are learning English as a foreign language (EFL).

Following Kachru (1986), Graddol considers the first group as members of the 'inner circle' (estimated at 375 million speakers). The second group is considered as members of the 'outer circle' (also estimated at 375 million speakers). Pakir (1999, p. 107) calls these 'English-knowing bilinguals'. The third group is called the 'expanding circle' and is estimated at 750 million speakers. Pakir (1999, p. 107) refers to the third group as the 'English-using bilinguals'.

Graddol (1999) predicts that in the twenty-first century the centre of gravity for speakers of English will shift from L1 speakers to L2 speakers, and the largest number of English users will be found in the outer circle. While English will probably remain a world lingua franca for at least fifty years, the future of the English language may become much more dependent upon the outer and expanding circles than upon those who speak it as a first language. As the figures in Table 14.1 show, in Australasia and the South Pacific this shift is already occurring: English is increasingly being used by English-knowing and English-using bilinguals, and varieties of English are beginning to assert themselves as legitimate ways of speaking. Denying the assertion of English imperialism at work (e.g. Phillipson, 1992), Chew (1999) argues that this rapid adoption of English in polities like Singapore has been predominantly for instrumental reasons – as an auxiliary language – and that ultimately this will not be at the expense of local languages, cultures and values.

Lockwood (1998) acknowledges the importance of English as a global language (a community of around 1.5 billion people) in areas such as book publishing (more than a quarter of all output), scientific, periodical, corporate, technical and business publications and, most significantly, trade. She believes that English will continue to be either a lingua franca or a pivotal language for international communication and that the other widely spoken language, namely French, will be replaced by Chinese, Hindi/Urdu, Spanish and Arabic by 2050. Graddol *et al.* (1999) provide some evidence of the impact of English on one of these areas, i.e. on popular (hip) culture, indicating this may also be an important factor that may impact on English usage. In Southeast Asia the mixed use of English in music and advertising, and the subtitling of English language films and CDs in other languages provides wide exposure to English, but in an Asian context.

English will continue to strengthen in this region for pragmatic reasons, and the number of native speakers will grow, on the South Asian model, as some of the elites become English-dominant bilinguals. At the other end of the scale, the pragmatic use of English and its presence via the media will probably create a large group of English-conscious bilinguals, individuals who can understand the language in limited contexts. These will complement Pakir's English-knowing and English-using bilinguals creating a continuum of English language use. But what English will be used? Regional Englishes may see the biggest gains, but many English users will be bi-dialectical, being able to code-switch between, for example, Singlish (Singapore English) or Taglish (a mixture of English and Tagalog) and an international standard.

Plurilingualism

Language diversity has been a major characteristic of Australasia and the Pacific since historical times. Countries such as Australia, Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, Indonesia and the Philippines have been known as a cradle of hundreds of languages for a long time. Although there has been a strong movement towards the adoption of a standardised language(s) in each of these countries, the diversity of languages still remains a reality, albeit for different historical reasons in different polities. While much of the plurilingualism in the region is naturally occurring, since the Second World War, Australia has, for example, absorbed an increasingly diverse immigrant population and added to its original language diversity (mainly of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander origins) with a new mix of languages from around the world. Thus, while Fettes (Chapter 2 this volume) talks about the predominance of 'elite plurilingualism' (top-down development) in places like Europe, the situation in the region might best be described as 'folk plurilingualism' (bottom-up diversification) overlaid with increasing LWC use.

In many polities in the region, local languages exist in a context dominated by an official language, often English (or including English). Over the last two decades this has increasingly led to a form of unbalanced diglossia that predominantly favours English and/or the local standardised language and therefore leads to language shift away from the smaller local languages (for Australia, see Clyne 1991; Bettoni 1998). As a result, the natural language variation that has existed in many polities has been considerably reduced over time, while the position and predominance of local standard languages and English as a LWC has been reinforced.

Based on these trends linguists believe that language extinction will be common in the region. For example, Crocombe (1989, p. 47) estimates that about twenty of the 1200 plus languages of the Pacific will survive while Dixon (1989, p. 30) states that 'every Aboriginal language in Australia is currently at risk.'

Mühlhäusler (1996) suggests that unless changes are made to provide a more supportive language ecology in the region for small languages, the current fragile language ecology will collapse extinguishing many hundreds of languages.

The need to learn one or more of the increasingly powerful LWCs – English in particular, but also Chinese and French or, regionally, Indonesian/Malay[2] plus a national language – is putting pressure on lesser spoken languages. Furthermore, as the pidgins of the region creolise, they lose their buffer role (see the section on Esperantism below) and become additional antagonists for these languages. Some of the lesser spoken languages under threat are probably more resilient (Crowley 1998) than some commentators would suggest, and we are seeing, for example, an interest in introducing some of these in schools in Vanuatu while Kadazandusan was introduced in schools in Sabah (Malaysia) in 2000 (Lasimbang and Kinajil 2000). Thus, the region is likely to remain plurilingual, but the degree of linguistic variation will be significantly reduced. Much of the plurilingualism is likely to include a LWC (primarily English), a lingua franca/national language and one vernacular, rather than a number of vernaculars as is currently the case, particularly in Melanesia.

'Esperantism'

The use of 'artificial' languages has a strong tradition in the region; this tradition is not in the sense that Pool and Fettes (1998) have suggested (i.e. that a language like Esperanto might serve as a communicative bridge between speakers of other languages; see Chapter 3 of this volume), but rather through the development of pidgins, particularly in Melanesia. A pidgin, Bislama, is the national language of Vanuatu. Tok Pisin and Pisin are the lingua francas in Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, respectively, and there are more locally based pidgins like Hiri Motu in Papua New Guinea and Kriol (central northern Australia). Pasar Malay, a widely spoken lingua franca, has formed the basis for Indonesian/Malay (for details on pidgin and creole development in the region, see Wurm *et al.* 1996).

Mühlhäusler (1998, p. 154) hypothesises that pidgins are important to balanced language ecologies as they have provided a 'buffer' that has helped to 'protect the diversity of local languages'. Their function has been to allow wider

[2] Bahasa Indonesia (Indonesian) and Bahasa Malaysia (Malay) are the two national languages of their respective countries, but linguistically they can be considered to be dialects, somewhat more different than British English and American English. Indonesian/Malay is a general term often used by linguists to refer to the languages spoken in Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. Different colonial histories (Dutch, British) and developments from the root language 'Malay' mean that there are differences in colloquial usage across the four polities. The countries adopted a common spelling system in 1972 and have a Language Council that coordinates language issues, particularly for new scientific and technical vocabulary development (Kaplan and Baldauf, 2002).

communication for essential purposes without creating an indefinite ability to communicate, which is reserved for local language. As pidgins creolise, they lose this buffer function and become predators in their own right, competing for space in all language domains. This is increasingly likely to be the trend. While some new pidgins may arise, it seems likely that Esperantism faces a declining future in the region. In a region of the world rich in languages where plurilingualism is the norm, artificial languages are not likely to prosper. Esperanto itself is not widely known in the region and given the competition for language resources, it is unlikely to gain a foothold.

Language brokers

Although the general trend has been to adopt a LWC, and in most cases English, many countries in the Pacific acknowledge the importance of language diversity, the positive consequences of language maintenance, and the manifold communication needs of their multilingual population. In addition to some innovative efforts of language resurrection (e.g. language nests for the Maori language in New Zealand), many of these countries (Australia, Fiji, Vanuatu, Malaysia) are trying to meet a variety of communication needs.

One aspect of this effort at language brokerage has been the provision of community interpreters (especially court interpreters) and translators who serve as go-betweens in institutions such as the police, the courts, the social security service, the immigration service, the health service or schools. In Australia, the provision of such services including telephone interpreting services is one of the four core principles of the country's National Language Policy. However, as immigration laws are tightened (e.g. with the re-introduction of an English test before migrating to Australia) and the actual pattern of immigration in the late 1990s changes (a proportional increase of business migrants vs. family reunion), and as the generational language shift occurs (with a shift to the dominant language), there may be less need for these language brokers in the next fifty years or so, at least at the community level.

However, in the region more generally, as trade and communication increase, the demand for elite language brokers at all levels will probably increase. However, up until now the provision of language brokers has tended to be a bottom-up or folk plurilingualism enterprise. Unlike the elite plurilingual tradition of language brokers in Europe, communication needs have come from the plurilingualism of the region.

Roles of other world languages

Other world languages come far behind English as languages of everyday communication (L1 and L2) in most Australasian and Pacific countries. Evidence for this is in the general lack of foreign language teaching in most countries beyond the study of English in non-native-English speaking countries. This is perhaps quite understandable given the number of local languages that need to be attended to. There is no doubt that major languages such as Japanese, Chinese and Indonesian/Malay are alive and well in the countries where they are spoken as first languages. Chinese is increasingly being studied as a language of trade. While French remains the first language in New Caledonia, a French overseas territory, it has undergone some changes (pidginisation), comparable to those that are occurring in many other Francophone countries. There are remnants of French in Vanuatu; but for all practical purposes, this language has virtually lost its status on this island, whereas English and Bislama are the two dominant languages of everyday communication. French has also virtually disappeared from Cambodia and Vietnam, and for speakers of standard French, it can be very difficult to understand most of those who still claim to speak French in these countries.

No other regional language – Japanese, Chinese, Indonesian/Malay or French – is learnt and spoken as a second or foreign language in the region to the extent that English is. To use Pakir's terminology, the volume of English-knowing bilinguals far outweighs that of any other language combination in Australasia and the Pacific. While the rise of the new, rapidly growing 'Asian tiger' economies in the 1990s has increased interest in languages like Japanese and Chinese, the relative increase in demand has been small, meaning that English is likely to dominate as a LWC for some time to come.

Technologism

Where economic circumstances permit and programming skills are widely available, technology has a high take-up rate in the region. However, much of the technological development related to languages is at present occurring outside the region in terms of LWC, not in terms of the several thousand languages of the region. At the moment, individuals in the region are adapters, not innovators, in terms of language technologism. Unless cheap, high-powered and general automatic tanslators, e.g. based on Chomskian deep structure, are developed in the next several decades – a prospect which seems highly unlikely – technology (even in combination with language brokers) is not likely to be as useful for the small or medium-sized languages, as technological solutions will probably be first applied to major languages, gradually becoming more available for lesser used languages. For this reason, advances in technologism are likely to come too late to save much of the language diversity in the region. While technology could provide a Mühlhäusler-type 'pidgin' buffer between many LWCs and vernaculars, this is likely to occur only between English and other major regional languages (e.g. Chinese and Indonesian/Malay).

The beginnings of teletranslation (see Chapter 2 of this volume) are already important in much of the region. The subtitling of film in much of Asia to make it accessible to different language audiences is already common. Furthermore, radio and TV programmes like the news are repeated in different languages to meet community needs. A big problem for teletranslation in the region will be the cost, especially if such services are to be available beyond the elites and for the lesser learned languages. The likelihood that such services would be available between English and major regional languages will put even more pressure on the lesser learned languages. Technologism may only serve to hasten the decline of languages and dialect variation in the region. However, cost and the slow introduction of technology into some rural areas may cushion the effect on languages in those areas.

Conclusions

Historical factors in the region have already set many of the directions for change in motion. With the exception of Indonesia – which is more a federation than a nation-state – most of the polities in the region are relatively small in size, in population and in economic impact, thus reducing their potential for language impact. This is likely to mean more passive rather than active roles when it comes to global language change. English as an LWC is likely to continue to strengthen, as will the stronger regional languages like Indonesian/Malay and Chinese. While lesser spoken languages will probably be more resilient than linguists predict, language death is likely to be a frequent occurrence in the region, unless a diglossic language ecology can be developed which maintains local languages and cultures as heritage carriers (Dixon 1998).

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Part III

Languages of wider communication

15 The international standing of the German language

Ulrich Ammon

This chapter discusses the present situation and future prospects of the German language, with emphasis on the international standing of the language. Measuring (in whatever loose or more rigorous sense) the international standing of languages in comparison to other languages is a hazardous task even for any point of time for which reasonably reliable data are available, since it is easy to question the validity of any data for the ideas that they supposedly represent. Uncertainty increases in the case of prediction, the more so the further into the future that such predictions are made (see Chapter 6 of this volume). There are, however, numerous data available with respect to the international standing of languages, even data that enable some sort of prediction; see, for example, Truchot 1990; Ammon 1991; 1998; Crystal 1997; Graddol 1997).

What do we mean by the 'international standing of a language'?

We may mean a host of different things when we use this phrase: we may be referring to countries around the world where we find substantial groups of speakers of the language, native or non-native, to the countries in which the language has some sort of official status or official function, where it is learned as a school subject or serves as a medium of instruction, and so on. The terms in the previous sentence can all be interpreted in various ways, or designate a range of possible meanings. This makes it difficult to compare data, or to judge precisely what they mean. These issues should be kept in mind with respect to the data presented here, which are nevertheless assumed to provide a balanced picture.

More specifically, when using the phrase 'international standing of a language', we may think of the extent to which the language is actually used for international communication, i.e. for communication, literally speaking, between different nations, or first of all their individual members. Let us, for the present purpose, identify nations – in a simplified manner – with countries (rather than ethnic groups). International communication then occurs between the citizens of different countries. Another matter, which appears relevant in this context, is communication between different language communities, or between



Fig. 15.1 Language Choices Between Speakers of Different Nations and Languages
Notes: uppercase = mother tongue; lowercase = foreign languages; boldface = language used

their native speakers. It can be called 'interlingual', in contrast to 'intralingual' communication, which takes place between native speakers of the same language. Thus, if for instance a German and an Austrian communicate in German (usually the native language of both), they use the language internationally, but intralingually, the latter being of minor interest for this chapter. If a German-speaking Swiss person and a French-speaking Swiss person communicate in one of their languages, they use it interlingually, but not really internationally (being citizens of the same country). If, however, a French-speaking Swiss person and a German (native speakers in each case) communicate in one of their languages, they use it internationally and interlingually. We can call this 'internationally in the narrower sense', to emphasise the importance in our context. These conceptual distinctions are illustrated in figure 15.1.

Figure 15.1 contains the further distinction between 'asymmetric' and 'symmetric' use of the language. The former means the use of a language that is native to one side but non-native to the other. (Here I use native tongue and mother tongue as synonyms.) Symmetric use can be further distinguished into the 'polyglot dialogue' and the 'lingua franca'. In case of the former, both sides use their native tongue of which the partner has a passive command. This has been proposed as a partial solution to European multilingualism, but seems to be limited to closely related languages; otherwise, understanding the language is nearly as hard as speaking it. However, even then, keeping up polyglot dialogue requires determination, because it makes conversation unnatural. For the speaker to receive an answer in another language seems not to function as a sufficient signal of having been understood. The more generally applicable symmetric choice is a lingua franca, which is non-native to both communicators.

These distinctions help to clarify our concept to some degree: we consider a language the more international the more it is used asymmetrically or as a lingua franca and between citizens of different countries. It would, for instance, be insufficient if a language had substantial groups of native speakers in numerous countries if it were not, at the same time, used internationally in the above sense. We can now imagine, vaguely at least, how one could rank languages according to internationality or even measure their degree of internationality. We can further distinguish regional from global internationality, to which we refer in the present context (where misunderstanding seems unlikely) by the terms regional language or global language, respectively. A global language has to be used – as an additional language, not exclusively – all around the world, or between all, or at least most, countries and language communities. Accordingly, a universal language would have to be used by all human beings. Constructing reliable and valid scales for the degree of internationality (international use) of languages requires of course much more. We would have to distinguish communication between individuals from communication between institutions (or individuals representing institutions). We would also perhaps determine how to weight different institutions, and to specify what counts as a single as opposed to two communicative events or how to weight mass vs. individual communication.

Instead of precise measuring, which is difficult, one has come to rely on indicators, which have often not even been formally validated. An example is the number of scientific publications in a given language, which has been used as an indicator of degree of internationality as a language of science. If scientific publications are more numerous in language L_a than in language L_b, then we assume that more international communication occurs, at least in writing, in L_a than L_b. If a whole number of such indicators are available, they probably provide us with a reasonably true overall picture, in spite of considerable uncertainty in each single case.

The international standing of German according to various indicators

Some basic indicators of the international standing of a language probably function at the same time as factors which influence a language's international standing. Some of them relate to large fields of international communication like economic, diplomatic, and cultural or scientific contacts (cf. for early lists of such indicators, Kloss 1974; Mackey 1976, pp. 199–220).

Table 15.1 *Number of native speakers of major languages (in millions)*

	Muller (1964)		Grimes (1984)		Grimes (1996)		Prediction for 2050; Graddol (1997)	
1	Chinese	515	Chinese	700	Chinese	1,123	Chinese	1,384
2	English	265	English	391	English	322	Hindi/Urdu	556
3	Hindi/Urdu	185	Spanish	211	Russian	288	English	508
4	Spanish	145	Hindi/Urdu	194	Spanish	266	Spanish	486
5	Russian	135	Russian	154	Hindi/Urdu	236	Arabic	482
6	German	100	Portuguese	120	Arabic	202	Portuguese	248
7	Japanese	95	German	119	Bengali	189	Bengali	229
8	Arabic	90	Arabic	117	Portuguese	170	Russian	132
9	Bengali	85	Japanese	117	Japanese	125	Japanese	108
10	Portuguese	85	Indonesian	110	German	98	German	91
11	French	65	Bengali	102	French	72	Malay	80
12	Italian	55	French	.63	Italian	63	French	76

Numerical strength

Perhaps the most basic of the indicators is numerical strength, i.e. number of native speakers that a language has. It seems plausible to assume that – everything else being equal – the native language of a large community has a better chance of becoming an international language than the native language of a small community. The former is more likely to be studied as a foreign language, because it opens up more opportunities for contacts than the language of a smaller community. Even a superficial consideration reveals that practically all international languages have, or – as for instance in the case of Latin – once had, relatively large communities of native speakers (with the exception of the special case of Esperanto). Table 15.1 places German into an overview of the numerically strongest languages according to different sources, including a prediction for the middle of the twenty-first century.

The divergences are due to difficulties with the precise definition of 'native speaker' of a language and to lack of reliable data (for instance up-to-date censuses). They could also indicate changes in time, which is even intended by the (highly speculative) prognosis. With all these uncertainties in mind, German, together with Japanese and French, counts among the languages that are contracting or stagnating, in contrast to the expanding Chinese, English, Spanish, Hindi/Urdu, Arabic, Portuguese and Bengali. This corresponds to the difference in population growth between developed and developing countries. If we step back further in history, the relative numerical decline of German becomes even more noticeable. Around 1920 it was equal to Russian, and around 1800 surpassed all the other European languages including English (Jespersen 1926, p. 229). Therefore, in the past the factor 'numerical strength'

Table 15.2 *Number of native speakers of official EU languages within EU*

1	German	89,413,000
2	French	63,948,000
3	English	61,631,000
4	Italian	57,154,000
5	Spanish	39,551,000
6	Dutch	21,137,000
7	Greek	10,408,000
8	Swedish	9,035,000
9	Portuguese	9,832,000
10	Danish	5,173,000
11	Finnish	4,753,000

Source: Fischer Weltalmanach 1997, 1996

has worked more in favour of German than it does today. It should be added that German is still the numerically strongest language within the European Union (EU), without a noticeable tendency of decline within this frame (see Table 15.2).

Economic strength

Although a language's numerical strength is undoubtedly of some importance for its international standing, our data betray its limited value as an indicator. We know from various sources (e.g. Graddol 1997) that English is a more important international language than Chinese, or French than Bengali. There must, therefore, be other relevant factors involved. One of these is economic strength. This is usually measured by the GNP (Gross National Product) of the language's native speakers worldwide, which can be quoted country by country, or for multilingual countries in proportion to the size of the respective language community (compare Mackey 1976, pp. 205; Ammon 1991, pp. 47–51). Other things being equal, an economically strong language spreads internationally to a greater extent than an economically weak language. Economic strength seems to carry more weight than numerical strength, as may for instance be concluded from the significant recent spread of Japanese (see Coulmas 1989). Japanese is numerically weaker but economically stronger than Chinese; however Japanese has spread more than Chinese. An economically strong language is attractive to learn because of its business potential; its knowledge opens up an attractive market. Table 15.3 gives an overview of the economically strongest languages according to different sources.

English reigns supreme economically, but the table shows that German holds a relatively strong position, similar to Japanese. The economic factor seems to be

Table 15.3 *Economic strength of languages (GNP of speakers in billions of US dollars)*

	Ammon (1991; 1995)		Graddol (1997, p. 29)		Graddol (1997, p. 29) (traded GNP) ('engco' model*)	
1	English	4,271	Chinese	7,815	English	2,338
2	Japanese	1,277	Japanese	4,240	German	1,196
3	German	1,090	German	2,455	French	803
4	Russian	801	Spanish	1,789	Chinese	803
5	Spanish	738	French	1,557	Japanese	700
6	French	669	Chinese	985	Spanish	610
7	Chinese	448	Portuguese	611	Italian	488
8	Arabic	359	Arabic	408	Portuguese	138
9	Italian	302	Russian	363	Malay	118
10	Portuguese	234	Hindi/Urdu	114	Arabic	85
11	Dutch	203	Italian	111	Russian	73
12	Hindi/Urdu	102	Malay	79	Hindi/Urdu	25

Note: *The 'engco' model, developed 1995 by the English Company (UK) Ltd

the main backbone of German on the international scene. Particularly within the 'engco model' (Graddol 1997, pp. 29, 64), which is based on languages' share in international trade, German performs remarkably strongly. (Unfortunately, there is no publication that details this model by its components.) However, Graddol (1997, p. 59) mentions a prognosis on the same basis according to which Spanish will rise most quickly in the future, while 'the nearest rivals to English – German, French and Japanese – will grow much more slowly.' The unexpected economic slowdown in some areas in recent times shows, however, that economic predictions are difficult. Within the EU, German is again the economically strongest language (Table 15.4).

One result of the economic strength of German is the considerable numbers of individuals who have learned the language informally through contacts and during stays in German-speaking countries, especially in southern Europe including Turkey and more and more also in eastern Europe. These speakers number millions, but statistics have not been seriously quantified through research. These people are often migrant workers or engaged in business, mostly of a smaller scale or related to tourism, for which their foreign language skills prove useful. They continue to spread the idea that knowledge of German is rewarding, perhaps – in the European context – more so than of any other language but English.

As soon as business reaches beyond Europe, English generally becomes the dominant international language. Even the global players among German companies use English as their, often sole, official language. An example is

Table 15.4 *Economic strength of official EU languages within EU (GNP of speakers in billions of US dollars)*

1	German	2,243,021
2	French	1,462,394
3	English	1,151,760
4	Italian	1,105,000
5	Spanish	484,800
6	Dutch	483,212
7	Swedish	202,221
8	Danish	146,076
9	Finnish	91,594
10	Portuguese	87,257
11	Greek	77,721

Source: Fischer Weltalmanach 1997, 1996

Daimler–Chrysler for which English became the sole official language from the day the companies merged, in spite of the greater economic weight of the German side. Yet this does not mean that all communication takes place in English. German continues to play a role in relations amongst German-speaking countries, and a few American executives will probably now learn the language who would not have done so in the past. The economic weight of languages other than English shows in bilateral contacts. Thus, French companies use German quite regularly vis-à-vis German companies (compare Vandermeeren 1998: Tables 15.3 and 15.4 'Deutschgebrauch ausländischer Unternehmen' and 'Deutschgebrauch ausländischer und deutscher Unternehmen im Kontakt miteinander').

Smaller companies with contacts limited to certain areas or countries often use languages other than English. In general, employees of European companies try to acquire more skills in English, but in many cases they also do so for smaller languages. Such skills are important for selling goods, which – for reasons of politeness, convenience or economics – is generally most successful in the customer's own language. Britain has repeatedly been warned of missing business opportunities because of insufficient language skills resulting from the wrong assumption that English would be sufficient for doing business everywhere (see Ammon 1991, pp. 163, 192–195).

There are, however, different expectations of language choice from the side of customers, depending on the size of their own language community or the international standing of their language. Thus, the Dutch tend to accept use of a foreign language more readily than the French, the German or the Spanish. The latter also generally have poorer foreign language skills. Generally speaking,

Table 15.5 *Number of countries with language of correspondence for German business contacts, 1997 (1989 data in parentheses)*

		Sole or co-language	Sole language	Co-language
1	English	144 (122)	61 (64)	73 (58)
2	French	63 (57)	23 (25)	40 (32)
3	German	38 (26)	1 (1)	37 (25)
4	Spanish	26 (26)	15 (17)	11 (9)
5	Russian	17 (1?)	–	17 (1?)
6	Arabic	14 (12)	–	14 (12)
7	Portuguese	8 (8)	–	8 (8)
8	Italian	5 (4)	–	5 (4)
9	Dutch	3 (4)	–	3 (4)
10	Danish	2 (1)	–	2 (1)
11	Chinese/Turkish	2	–	2
12	Belorussian/Croatian/Czech/Estonian/ Georgian/Greek/Indonesian/Icelandic/ Latvian/Lithuanian/Norwegian/Persian/ Philippino/Polish/Romanian/Slovakian/ Slovenian/Swedish/Ukrainian/Uzbek	1	–	1

Source: Handelskammer Hamburg, 1989, 1977

markets with languages of a higher international standing are harder to penetrate in a foreign language, including English, than are markets with languages of a lower or minor international standing. These rules of thumb can partially be derived from the recommendations of language choice for business correspondence issued by the German Chambers of Commerce (Table 15.5).

Of the countries for which German is recommended, thirty-three are European (in a broad sense, including Russia and Turkey) and only five non-European (Afghanistan, Chile, Kazakhstan, Mongolia and Namibia). The larger western European countries do not appear on the list (Britain, France and Spain). Most of the small languages are newcomers and were not included in former editions. The Chamber has learned that it is preferable to use the customer's own language rather than a foreign language. Such lists, based on experience, also raise expectations of language choice. German companies tend to expect the use of German from the side of these countries' companies, particularly if these companies want to sell products.

The eastern European and the neighbouring small European countries are rather part of the 'German-speaking business area' than are the larger western European countries. This is confirmed by foreign language requirements in the job market (Table 15.6). In Hungary and Poland the demand for German is close to that for English, while in Britain, France, Italy and Spain it trails way behind it, and also behind French.

Table 15.6 *Required languages skills in newspaper advertisements, 1991 (percentages)*

	English	French	German	Spanish
Britain	–	15	7	6
France	71	–	11	5
Italy	69	9	6	1
Spain	60	21	7	–
Hungary	37	3	40	1
Poland	46	7	26	1

Source: Glück 1992

Political strength

Another important indicator of a language's international standing is its strength as an official language of countries. If it has official status in several countries, on a national or a regional level, it is – other circumstances being equal – more likely to be used internationally or to be studied as a foreign language for its greater communicative potential. The stature of the countries involved of course plays a role too, which is why mere numbers of countries have to be treated with caution. They are, nevertheless, of some importance, especially in light of the rule followed by some, though not all, international organisations: one country – one vote. As a consequence, languages with considerable strength as an official language of countries tend to achieve a privileged status in international organisations too, which can further enhance their international standing. Table 15.7 gives an overview of the languages with official status in four or more countries.

Table 15.7 *Languages with official status in four or more countries*

	National	Sub-national	Total
1 English	27	21	48
2 French	17	10	27
3 Arabic	4	19	23
4 Spanish	4	16	20
5 Portuguese	7	–	7
6 German	4	3	7
7 Italian	4	–	4

Source: Fischer Weltalmanach 1997, 1996

Table 15.8 *EU countries with official status of official EU languages*

	Languages	Countries with official status on national level	Countries with official status on sub-national level	Total number of countries with official status
1	German	3 (Germany, Austria, Luxemburg)	2 (Belgium, Italy)	5
2	French	3 (France, Belgium, Luxemburg)	1 (Italy)	4
3	Dutch/English	2 (Netherlands, Belgium / United Kingdom, Ireland)	–	2
4	Swedish	1 (Sweden)	1 (Finland)	2
5	Danish/Greek/Finnish/Italian/ Portuguese/Spanish	1 (Denmark/Greece/Finland/Italy/Portugal/Spain)	–	1

German has official status in Germany, Austria, Liechtenstein (sole official language on the national level), Switzerland, Luxembourg (co-official on the national level), Italy (South Tyrol) and Belgium (German-Speaking Community) (regional level). Again, English is way ahead of all competitors on this measure; yet French, Arabic and Spanish are very strong too. For French, its continuing function in diplomacy supports its position, as does its function in the political institutions of the EU; for Spanish, it was helpful in becoming an official language of the United Nations (UN) early on, and for Arabic in achieving this status in 1973. German with but seven countries, or Japanese with only a single one, have less support through this factor, which is probably one reason why both languages have not gained official status in the UN, in spite of the fact that their countries count among its biggest financial contributors. Another reason is the circumstances of the UN's foundation after the Second World War, with Germany and Japan as the main culprits of the late global catastrophe. German has only gained the limited status of a 'documentary language' of the UN (since 1974), all costs of which the German-speaking member countries have to pay for, while the costs for the official languages are paid for by the UN. Within the EU, the standing of German is again much stronger than on the global level (see Table 15.8). The figures for official status in international organisations as given by various sources are presented in Table 15.9. According to Banks *et al.* (1987), German ranks seventh, immediately behind the six official languages of the UN.

In spite of its strength in basic factors (numerical, economic, number of countries with official status) in the EU, German ranks only in third place as an actual working language of the EU institutions, considerably behind English and French, although before Spanish and Italian. Table 15.10 reveals, among

Table 15.9 *Strength as official and working language in international organisations (number of organisations)*

Banks (1987)				*Fischer Weltalmanach internationaler Organisationen* 1995	
Language	Working	Official	Total	Languages	Official and working
English	16	35	51	English	181
French	12	37	49	French	165
Spanish	9	19	28	Spanish	77
Russian	5	10	15	German	58
Arabic	2	5	7	Russian	35
Chinese	1	4	5	Arabic	30
German	1	3	4	Italian	15
Italian	1	2	3	Portuguese	14
Portuguese	–	3	3	Chinese	12

Table 15.10 *Oral use in EU institutions in the early 1990s (percentage individuals)*

	Officials				Members of Parliament	
	With EU institutions		With countries outside EU		With Parliament Administration	
	Mother tongue	Foreign language	Mother tongue	Foreign language	Mother tongue	Foreign language
1 French	100	98	94	79	100	66
2 English	97	80	98	97	100	67
3 German	62	15	54	12	100	15
4 Spanish	36	2	22	3	66	4
5 Italian	29	2	6	0.5	71	2
6 Dutch	42	1	26	0.5	84	0
7 Portuguese	21	–	10	0.5	75	0
8 Danish	16	–	21	–	57	0
9 Greek	–	–	–	–	75	1

Source: Schloßmacher 1996

other things, that German trails behind English and French especially with respect to its use as a foreign language. Some maintain that there are only two real working languages of the EU's institutions: English and French; others contend that German constitutes a third. The future fate of German as a working language of the EU institutions is hard to predict. French might lose the support from the side of the German-speaking countries, and this would leave English as the only working language if German were excluded. As the EU extends into eastern Europe, German will probably win more support. The number of official languages will then reach a height, at which a formal distinction between working languages and other official languages will become necessary. It may be considered the fairest solution to let the countries whose national languages are chosen as the EU working languages pay for the respective language services for the advantages they gain, including lower costs for language training of personnel (this approach would, incidentally, also be a fairer solution for the UN).

Cultural strength

What one could call cultural strength comprises such a diversity of indicators that it seems questionable whether one should subsume them under the same heading. With respect to language, one would perhaps first think of literature, especially fiction. If one wishes to make a distinction between 'high culture'

Table 15.11 *Languages of home pages on the internet (percentages)*

1	English	84.3
2	German	4.5
3	Japanese	3.1
4	French	1.8
5	Spanish	1.2
6	Swedish	1.1
7	Italian	1.0
8	Portuguese	0.7
9	Dutch	0.6
10	Norwegian	0.6

Source: Graddol 1997, p. 51

and 'popular culture', the number of Nobel Prizes won by writers of the various languages might come to mind as a possible indicator of achievement in 'high culture'. It is first of all an indicator of perceived literary achievement and as such perhaps also an indicator of the international standing of languages in the field of 'high literature'. German ranks fourth here (10 prizes up to 1999), with English again leading (21.5), followed by French (13.5), Spanish (12) and – after German – Italian (7). (N.B. 0.5 indicates that an author has published in another language as well.) Nobel Prizes for literature in German became scarcer in the course of the twentieth century, and in recent times English has become predominant.

Much more important for the international standing of languages than the literature in those lofty heights are mass production of literature, including world best sellers. Here, German clearly plays a very modest role, with English dominating worldwide, although comparative figures are not readily available. German also trails English and other languages in the international distribution of print media (newspapers, magazines), and perhaps even more in the oral or visual media: radio and TV broadcasting, movies and popular music. German composers of pop music often use English for their texts, since releases with German-language texts reach only a limited audience; English is preferred even within the German-speaking countries. As a consequence, German is far less associated with youth and its culture than English is.

German also appears to be a 'less modern' language than English as a consequence of the fact that the German-speaking countries are perceived as trailing the USA in the important sectors of modern science and technology, for instance genetics or computer technology. This impression is confirmed by the dominance of English use in the internet; figures show that other languages find themselves in a similar position to German vis-à-vis English (Table 15.11).

Graddol (1997, p. 51) points out, however, that 'languages other than English are now being used on the Internet and [that] this trend is likely to be of growing importance.' He also mentions a comprehensive study, by which 'it is predicted that English content on the Internet may fall to 40% of the total material' (Graddol 1997, p. 51; see also Crystal 1997, p. 109f.). The share of English has in fact already dropped recently (see Chapter 2 of this volume), and German is among the languages whose share has risen.

Risking overburdening a very complex concept of 'cultural strength of languages', here we subsume science and scholarship under culture; a more detailed study should disentangle the components. International scientific communication is a domain for which a wealth of comparative data have been collected (see, for example, Tsunoda 1983; Skudlik 1990; Ammon 1998). All of them indicate that German, and similarly French, stood on an equal footing with English before the First World War, but have since constantly lost ground. Their decline can, in part, be explained by the devastation of resources for scientific research in continental Europe during the First World War, and again during the Second World War, which in the case of Germany was aggravated by the murder and expulsion of the country's own scientists, especially Jews, under Nazi rule. In contrast, the USA – today's leading Anglophone country – remained unscathed. This certainly contributed to the shift of scientific leadership from Europe to North America, although this may have happened in any case, albeit to a lesser extent. One indicator of the modest role German plays today as an international language of science is its share in scientific publications. If we follow Anglo-Saxon bibliographical databases, which – though probably somewhat biased in favour of English – are the most representative worldwide, German and French had a share of 1.6% each in the sciences proper (biology, chemistry, physics, medicine and mathematics combined), English 87.2%, Russian 3.9% and Japanese 2.3%, with all languages but English heading towards a further decline (details are given in Ammon 1998, pp. 137–162). In the social sciences (sociology, history and philosophy combined), in 1995 the share of German was: 4.1% (1990: 5.7%), English 82.5% (71.7%), French 5.9% (5.9%) and Spanish 2.2% (3.8%) (Ammon 1998, pp. 162–170). Only for a few subjects in the humanities may we assume, judging from various pieces of evidence, that the share of German is still considerably higher, especially in archaeology, classical philology, music and Christian theology; however, representative data are missing (Ammon 1998, pp. 170–179).

Even the leading scientific journals of the German-speaking countries have recently shifted to English as their language of publication; they often no longer accept contributions in other languages. Sometimes their names have been anglicised too: *Archiv für Kreislaufforschung* became *Basic Research in Cardiology*, *Zeitschrift für Kinderheilkunde* – *European Journal of Pediatrics*,

Table 15.12 *The most influential books of the twentieth century in sociology*

Max Weber, Economy and Society (German)
C. Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination (English)
Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (English)
Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (German)
Peter Berger/Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality (English)
Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste (French)
Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process: Power and Civility (German)
Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action (German)
Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action (English)
Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (English)

Source: Findings of ISA in 1998

and *Psychologische Forschung – Psychological Research*. European databases also prefer English to German or French.

The dominance of English in scientific communication is a challenge, and at times a nuisance, particularly for scientists whose own languages have had a respectable standing in that domain up until recently. To adjust to this change has been easier for scientists of other language communities. Generally, communicating in a foreign language is more costly than communicating in one's own language; it needs intensive language studies and remains time-consuming. However, the problems for German scientists, and perhaps even more so French scientists, include not only those of costs but also of national pride. They experience their own language's decline in the prestigious domain of science as humiliating. Such misgivings sometimes result in refusals to communicate in the new lingua franca (for details and empirical data, see Ammon 1991, pp. 266–281). It also seems to be mainly from the side of frustrated intellectuals that the intrusion of English terminology into their own country's scientific discourse has been denounced as *Deutschlish*, *Franglais* and the like.

The former importance of German as a language of science and the humanities is still visible in numerous classical texts, which – one could argue – serious students of the history of their subject should be able to read in the original. An example is the findings of the International Sociological Association (ISA) which, in a questionnaire study among members, identified the ten most influential sociological books of the twentieth century: four of them were originally written in German, five in English and one in French (see Table 15.12; original languages in parentheses but all titles are given in English). These findings have been used as an argument for German to be made one of the ISA's official languages (alongside English, French and Spanish).

Study strength

On a worldwide scale, German ranks far behind English, and also behind French, as a foreign language in schools. Whether or not it ranks behind Spanish is not clear, although this seems likely, considering the figures for Spanish in North America (see Chapter 2 of this volume). German has lost ground recently as a foreign language in schools in numerous countries. Overall data are not available at the moment but are presently being processed at the Goethe Institute. There are, however, other figures that indicate more stability of German, and even expansion. Thus, the demand for German at private language schools seems stable or even rising. Figures do, however, indicate the contraction worldwide, with German being taught predominantly in European countries (compare the figures for 1989 and 1995 in Table 15.13 below).

Although German is studied less than French in western Europe and within the present EU (see Table 15.14), in eastern Europe it is the other way around (Table 15.15). This seems important in face of the future extension of the EU in eastern Europe.

Table 15.13 *Shares of languages in Berlitz schools (percentage of lessons)*

		Regional distribution								Total		
		Europe		North America		Latin America		Far East				
		1989	1995	1989	1995	1989	1995	1989	1995	early 1970s	1989	1995
1	English	37	35	12	14	21	27	30	24	42	63	65
2	Spanish	24	22	62	59	12	17	2	2	12	9	9
3	German	64	79	23	14	6	2	7	5	12	8	8
4	French	54	58	34	31	5	4	7	7	25	11	8
5	Italian	58	65	36	26	3	2	3	7	–	3	2
6	Chinese	–	5	–	23	–	–	–	73	–	–	1
7	Japanese	9	10	53	58	–	1	38	31	–	2	1
8	Dutch	96	90	4	10	–	–	–	–	–	1	1
9	Portuguese	28	29	36	47	30	18	6	7	–	1	1
10	Russian	–	53	–	43	–	–	–	4	–	–	1
	Others	25	52	36	27	25	1	14	21	9	2	2

Source: Director, Berlitz Schools, Frankfurt am Main, personal communication

Concluding remarks

Presently, German is studied as a foreign language around the world, as was the case throughout the twentieth century, though mostly only as a subject of choice and at the tertiary level. It is possible that the language will largely

Table 15.14 *Percentage of individuals in EU (a) having studied the language as a foreign tongue, and (b) able to communicate in the language (1994)*

(a) Having studied the language as a foreign tongue	
1 English	41
2 French	28
3 German	15
(b) Able to communicate in the language	
1 English	42
2 German	31
3 French	29

Source: Eurobarometer 1994

Table 15.15 *Languages' extent of being studied as a foreign tongue in eastern Europe, 1994*

	Number of countries in which ranking first in number of students	Number of countries in which ranking second in number of students	Number of countries in which ranking third in number of students	Total number of students
1 English	14.5	7	–	21.2 million
2 German	4.5	12	4	11.4 million
3 French	2.0	2	17	6.7 million

Note: 0.5 = ranking equal with another language

recede to Europe in the twenty-first century and become a regional international language only; this is what Graddol (1997, p. 13) predicts. However, Graddol also forecasts the growing strength of German vis-à-vis French, particularly in Europe (1997, p. 44). With all the uncertainties of predictions, it could also happen that German – being the strongest language in the EU numerically as well as economically – continues to play a noticeable role in foreign language studies outside Europe for contacts with the EU. The real weight of German in Europe is often underestimated because the millions of migrants or business people who have learned the language outside school or informally have never been counted. Tourists from German-speaking countries – who are, in fact, another factor of language spread that is unaccounted for – encounter these non-native speakers of German wherever they travel in Europe; they are also often encountered in overseas countries. One should also consider that Germany as the major German-speaking country in the world has not explored its possibilities of language promotion abroad with a similar energy as France has. This may change in the future as Nazi history becomes more distant.

The fate of German will, so it seems, most of all depend on the economic and technological development of the German-speaking countries. Will these countries be able to remain in third place with respect to GNP and second with respect to share in world trade? Only a prophet could know!

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16 Arabic and the new technologies

Foued Laroussi

Startling transformations in scientific and technical fields have an increasing impact on modern life. Language is central to these transformations in being the fundamental means for the acquisition of science and the spread of knowledge, and no progress can be made without reliance on it. Each country thereby finds itself constrained to shape its language in ways that adapt to and benefit from the demands of the modern era.

The challenge posed by technology for language impacts on all the countries of the world and in particular the Arab countries[1], which for the most part remain very far behind technologically. This is why numerous Arab countries assiduously pursue scientific and technological expertise, including bringing the Arabic language up to a comparable level with other modern languages. This is especially the case with respect to adaptability to advanced computer technologies and support for cutting-edge research.

In certain ways the computer revolution represents a great challenge to all languages because rational mastery of computer technology appears to be the only possible answer if every language is to prosper in a world shaped increasingly by scientific research and technology. What is referred to as the computer revolution constitutes a profound cultural and technological turning point for developed countries. The relationship of the Arabic language to new technologies is especially relevant for the internet, since the number of Arabic users continues to increase, thereby reinforcing the demand that their language adapt and integrate these new technologies and lift itself up to the rank of the major technological languages (see Table 2.3 in Chapter 2).

Reliance on new technologies is still at the early stages in Arab societies. Owing to the accelerated rate at which the transfer of knowledge and technologies takes place, major transformations in all sectors of social life (i.e. economy, education, teaching, technology, scientific research) are forecast.

[1] Members of the Arab League are: Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania, Oman, PLO, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen. Arabic is also spoken in the Comoro Islands (one of the official languages), in Israel (one of the official languages) and is an important immigrant language in several European countries.

The technological challenge that Arab culture and language must face is formidable. Witness in recent years the variety of congresses, colloquia and specialised publications putting emphasis on one or another aspect of the issue.

Arabic and computer technologies: Are there specific difficulties?

A certain number of queries, it seems to me, are a prerequisite for an accurate assessment about relations between the Arabic language and new technologies. Rather than an exhaustive discussion of all the issues relevant for this relationship, I limit myself to questions that can clarify the debate. How can Arabic integrate the new technologies? What are the difficulties? What is their origin? Are these difficulties specific to Arabic? If so, how can they be identified? How can and will Arabic evolve in a world where science and technology are developing very rapidly?

Answers to these questions must address the complexity of the issue. For example, the Arabic language – I understand here by Arabic the institutional or literary variety – is not the language of a single country, and is not 'managed' by a sole institution but rather by several often having diverging language policies. Any assessment about Arabic must be aware of problems posed by multiple, distinctive and often rival national sovereignties. While there exists a near consensus about the need to endow Arabic with tools and modern methods in order to raise it to the level of the major technological languages, there is no agreement about either the vision that diverse Arab countries have of the issue, their approaches, their strategies, or the means to achieve these.

Before reviewing the kinds of difficulties that Arabic must face in this area, an overview of the current linguistic reality of this language provides necessary background. In order to do this, I take as examples the spread of the language by satellite and the issue of the teaching of the language in France.

The spread of Arabic

Satellite broadcasting

For some years, Arabic (in its spoken local varieties) has experienced considerable spread in the world thanks especially to satellite dishes. This spread is directly linked to the evolution of television, which itself changes and spreads. Moreover, there is practically a cultural and technological revolution as new technologies spread and draw more people into managing their complexities.

Several satellites with C or KU bands currently offer television channels in the Arabic language. Without being comprehensive, one can cite the following names: ARABSAT 2B (30.5° East), ARABSAT 2A (6° East and 26° East), EUTELSAT 2F3 (16° East), EUTELSAT 2F1 and HOT BIRD (13° East). With these satellites, one can receive the majority of Arab television as well as radio stations. By way of example, the satellites EUTELSAT 2F3 and ARABSAT 2A (6° East) offer the majority of Arabic channels, with the first having channels of North African countries and the second the majority of television channels of the Middle East. In addition, in France, for example, providers such as CANALSATELLITE, cable or TPS offer several Arabic channels.

We are no longer in an era of media censorship and national protectionism. The media have become planetary and transcend national boundaries. No Arab country – including the most protectionist in audiovisual matters – can afford the luxury of prohibiting its people from receiving programmes from a foreign provider. The market for digital and analogue systems has experienced spectacular development with continuing growth of customers along with ongoing demand.

But how can these new transformations impact on language and for what reasons do Arabic speakers living outside Arab nations look for Arabic channels? With regard to the North African immigrant population in France, the majority of those who have installed a satellite dish belong to what is called the first generation. These immigrants, especially those from the Maghreb (north-west Africa, including Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia) came to France after national independence to provide foreign labour. These persons are bonded to the language and culture of their native countries, and the ability to receive television in Arabic from those countries puts them in permanent contact with their homelands. For others, the motivation is pedagogic with a cultural emphasis. Parents deem that watching Arabic channels benefits their children and helps them to learn about their heritage language. Moreover, numerous Arabic channels offer courses specially designed for children of immigrants.

One can thus say that Arabic has experienced a resurgence of interest as expatriates, thanks to new technologies, have been able to tap back into their original national cultures. Here is an added impetus for the language to develop in the sense that the viewers of Arabic programs living abroad do not have the same orientation or interests as the audience at home.

Arabic on the internet

In spite of the positive findings of a survey published February 2000 in *The Internet Arab World Magazine* that Middle East websites in Arabic are more visited by web browsers than sites in English, in numerous Arab countries as in the Maghreb foreign language sites especially in French and English are heavily used. Internet users who rely on French or English websites are more likely to find information that they are looking for, and moreover they avoid thereby all the problems of visiting an Arabic site. Users of Arabic sites face a series of problems whose resolution is very complex and costly. An adequate translator or navigator is necessary as well as a special configuration for the printer to print the page. Since the worldwide computer market is lucrative, competition among providers in this area is harsh. As a consequence of this providers of translators or navigators – such as that of Microsoft for viewing a text in Arabic on the internet – offer products that are not always compatible with each other.

The challenge is not simply a linguistic one, but is also technological, scientific and political. The developed countries have an important lead over the rest of the world. They represent 30% of the world's population and possess nearly 90% of the total number of scientific investigators, engineers and technicians, while in the countries where 70% of the world's population lives, the number of these qualified personnel is about 10%. The Arabic language countries, being in the less favoured group, must intensify their efforts to attain this level of technical expertise.

Technical difficulties

In order to assess the variety and complexity of linguistic challenges adequately, reliance on technologies is necessary. In 1961, Professor Lakhdar-Ghazal organised the first colloquium on Arabisation to discuss the relationship of the Arabic language to new technologies. In 1974, on the occasion of a colloquium organised by the International Council of the French Language on relations between Arabic and French, he again raised a still unanswered question: How to make the Arabic language a technological language?

In 1976, Lakhdar-Ghazal founded the Institute for Study and Research on Arabisation (IERA) at the Mohamed V University (Rabat, Morocco). He was the first to have used the computer to assess the Arabic language. More broadly, he proposed application of new technologies to this language in order to address its future on a scientific basis.

The most important issue involving Arabic is its alphabet. This difficulty is pressing since there is no universally accepted standard for rendering texts in Arabic onto the computer. In the absence of a scientific consensus regarding Arabic writing, I limit myself to clarifying certain elements of the debate.

Problems of adapting computer technology to Arabic occur on two levels: first, transmission and storing of Arabic characters, and second their acquisition and representation on the computer.

The way of designing the Arabic letter presents a significant difficulty. On this point, there are two competing views. According to the first, traditional letters promote restitution of the calligraphic dimension of Arabic writing. The second favours a simplified letter, since this would reduce the number of Arabic characters thereby economising on energy and capital invested. Each approach is supported not just by scientific and economical reasons but also by political and even ideological ones.

Arabic writing, besides its lag with relation to the technology of knowledge, suffers from a handicap that seems decisive with regard to its future. No Arab country is a producer of communication technology. This implies that the printed Arabic letter will necessarily evolve in the shadow of the Latin letter. In order to integrate every new technology, Arabic must possess elements equivalent to those of the writing systems of the major technological languages. Yet, that is not possible without ongoing research emphasis on optimal standardisation for the writing of Arabic letters and technological applications.

Another major obstacle involves the coding of Arabic characters. Insofar as the set of codes expressing different characters generates disagreements, proposed solutions are not compatible. Moreover, issues of standardisation encompass both emission and reception of information. Further complicating the situation, Arabic includes twenty-nine characters with the representation of each differing according to its position in the word (there are four forms: independent, initial, medial and final). One can make the following calculation:

- 22 letters having 4 forms = 88 representations
- 6 letters having 2 forms = 12 representations
- 13 representations for the 'hamza' (this occlusive glottal can be written without support, i.e. on the line, or with support).

To this, one may add, it is necessary to add functional letters (having grammatical meaning): the 'ta marbuta' (two forms) and the 'alif masqûa' (also two forms).

To this total of 117 characters representing the consonants, it is necessary to add compound letters, which are used in manuscript writing but are also reproduced by publishers. Their number is variable and can reach 470 characters not including vowels. Difficulties increase further with the use of fourteen vowel signs that may be carried by each of the 117 characters.

Thus, even excluding compound letters, the total number of representations of Arabic characters is: $117 \times 14 = 1{,}638$ characters. To this number, one must add figures and signs of punctuation, all of them being read from right to left. As one can appreciate, this constitutes a heavy burden for anyone wishing to represent Arabic in computer terms. To be sure, the different projects of standardisation of Arabic writing propose to reduce this number considerably, but obstacles to standardisation remain.

Since Arabic writing is curvilinear, reliance on a large matrix is necessary to respect the curves and the aesthetics of the characters. Other constraints include problems relating to the formats of characters with certain ones rising above the line and others descending. Finally, there are technological limits in trying to represent vowels above and below consonants on screens.

IERA represents, in my view, the only approach whose task consists of adapting the Arabic language scientifically to modern technologies. Its objective from the beginning has been to create a contemporary Arabic dictionary that would be unified and automated for access throughout the Arab world, not only in the educational sphere but also in other technical, administrative and cultural sectors. In order to do this, IERA has proposed a unified Arabic codification (CODAR-U). At the time of the first meeting of the Committee on Arabisation for Computers (COARIN), which was held in 1977, representatives of the Arab countries had recommended CODAR-U. Without entering into technical details, it may be pointed out that the project respects the alphabetical order of Arabic letters, the representation of all of the hamzaed letters, and the use of vowel sets. But in spite of this, difficulties persist.

IERA, in continuing to apply technology to the Arabic language, has tried to improve CODAR-U by proposing the AVS-CODAR system (Standard Arabic Vowel Code) as a new effort for global reform of the written language. This project has led to diverse industrial achievements including adaptation of Arabic characters to all standard techniques developed for European characters, from typesetters to routine signal panels and on to teleprinters and input–output tools for computers. In spite of the support this project has received – including support from UNESCO, ALECSO (Arab Organisation for Teaching, Culture and Sciences), IBI (Intergovernmental Bureau for Computer Science) and ASMO (Arabic Organisation for Standardisation) – this has not had a major impact on the public at large. Even those most directly involved do not appear to appreciate the importance of such an enterprise for the scientific and technical development of the Arabic language.

Both science and technology are in rapid, constant evolution. This results in the creation of numerous new terms entering the market of global technology. It is thus necessary to transpose them into Arabic in order to be able to follow contemporary scientific events.

To this should be added the problem of teacher training. While it is possible to teach traditional disciplines in Arabic, Arabic-language courses in sciences or technology are rare. Teaching in technological areas is done in French or English depending on the particular Arab country. It is possible although difficult to translate a large number of materials into Arabic, but the problem with instructor training continues. The majority of instructors were taught in technological areas in a European language, so that it is difficult for them to speak about their speciality in Arabic. And why bother translating scientific or technological materials if there is no one to teach them?

There is also the issue of the lack of Arabic-language documentation, since it is not easy to obtain teaching handbooks or reference books in technological disciplines in Arabic. When such materials exist, they are usually in foreign languages. One could of course translate them, but this would not solve other problems.

Efforts in this field remain tentative without solving key problems. One could cite, for example, the University of Aleppo (Syria) which has made an effort to publish a series of books dealing with architecture, hydraulics, geology, etc., but with technical terms significantly different from those used in the Maghreb. To be sure, this does not detract from praise due to universities that have made such significant advances. Rather, there is a lack of coordination and cooperation between the various national entities for standardisation whose unstated objective is often to serve one or another political regime anxious to improve its image.

Which propositions?

It is necessary to propose solutions to some of the problems identified. According to some, for generally accepted technical words to be used it would be necessary to teach them at all levels, since otherwise technical Arabisation would never occur in daily practice. While subscribing in part to this opinion, I think that the solution has to be found elsewhere. The issue requires, in my view, a bold, realistic diagnosis from the perspective of a language policy. Inasmuch as the problem of diglossia between literary and mother-tongue speech is not resolved, major difficulties remain.[2] Mother tongues are often considered as dialects without interest or prestige, and ideological discourse continues to stigmatise these varieties because, it is claimed, they symbolise ignorance, fragmentation and decadence of the Arab world. This view blocks a solution to the problems the Arab world encounters, including problems of underdevelopment and scientific and technical lag. The world is evolving at an accelerating rate, and the developed countries have a long lead over the Arab world. The gap is thus sufficiently large that one cannot waste time in ideological discussions that offer no benefit for Arabic. Rather, it is necessary to adopt a pragmatic, realistic attitude that will lead to recognition of mother tongues as real languages even if that cannot be done without creating uncertainties about the personality of the Arab citizen, about his or her identity, indeed about his or her future. To recognise these mother tongues is not from my perspective a denial or rejection of their Arabic character.

In my view, the problem should not be oversimplified as a matter of promoting the will to Arabise technical matters, in the sense that it will be enough to sensitise people about the difficulties of technical Arabisation so that these can be overcome. Instead, the challenge goes beyond a strictly linguistic context. Language policy cannot benefit users of the language unless it is conceived and put into practice in a democratic context. At present, this is not the case for most of the Arab countries. No effective language management can be achieved

[2] In a situation of diglossia, a prestigious variety (H-variety for high variety) used for formal communications coexists with local forms of speech (L-variety or low variety); in such a situation, there is typically a distribution of functions between the H and L forms of speech (Beniamino 1997).

without eliciting the opinions of the users of the language. In the Arab world, users are excluded from any decision concerning their language.

Experiences with standardisation

Sadid (1993, p. 351) wrote:

> All political or methodological projects cannot be carried out without an adequate institution which oversees their implementation. The creation of a pan Arab research entity endowed with sufficient technical and policy means is a *sine qua non* condition for the success of any policy planning to make Arabic writing a writing fit for sciences and technology.

While I cannot but subscribe to the purpose of Sadid's final objective, I do diverge with regard to a certain number of points. In the Arab world, an independent pan-Arab institute, regardless of what its orientation (political, historical, scientific, linguistic) might be cannot escape from the influence of national governments. Cases in point involving linguistic issues include controversies over the adoption of one word or another or for the necessity or not of particular reforms of the language. For example, there is rarely consensus between the academies of Cairo, Damascus, Baghdad and the Arabisation bureaus of the Maghreb. Obstacles and even failures of some projects have frequently been the result of having been promoted as pan-Arab. Because of the political, historical, geographical and linguistic cleavages that exist between these countries, any search for a consensus is foreordained to failure. To this can be added the pressures that political regimes exert against such initiatives. To wit, the Arab League has rarely succeeded in imposing a linguistic decision on all its member countries. The divergence that underlies this international body does not allow it to impose controversial language decisions. Scientific institutions also work in a context of reciprocal misunderstanding. As for cooperative initiatives between universities, academies, schools and research centres, these are practically non-existent.

One could ask why no institution oriented towards such a task exists in the Arab world. Although considering their role as supranational in linguistic matters, the academies of Damascus, Cairo, Baghdad, Amman and Rabat all work for their own interest. Linguistic questions as all other matters always constitute an object of rivalry and never of consensus between Arab countries, whether this be the writing system, terminology or reform of Arabic grammar.

This being the case, I believe that everyone can agree on the following two ideas. First, for a language to be capable of gaining access to technology on which all economic and social development largely depends, it is necessary to support it with adequate tools. Second, linguistic development can no longer rely on a laissez faire or status quo approach. Rather, the social role of language should be reflected through overall direction from the relevant linguistic communities while relying on specialised competencies of linguistic sciences and technologies.

However, disagreements arise when diagnoses of difficulties are made and especially when solutions are proposed. I think that Sadid's solution of creating a pan-Arab organisation is not adequate. A pan-Arab linguistic organisation can never have decision-making power. The more competencies would be expanded, the more complicated and difficult decisions would become, especially in a context where democracy is not the norm. Arab countries that have played the pan-Arab card to varying degrees have not been able to unite the Arab world and, in fact, have often fed regional conflicts without promoting their own development. It is perhaps less difficult to imagine regional initiatives (Middle East, Maghreb) or, failing these, national initiatives.

Towards a conclusion

Can the future of Arabic be predicted? It is difficult to respond positively to such a question. Be that as it may, if Arabic is to rise to the rank of the major technological languages, the Arab countries must provide all necessary resources to achieve this. This objective will not be possible until mother-tongue linguistic varieties cease to be considered as deprecated dialects. This also calls into question a linguistic ideology which views language as a pure, homogeneous, and consequently unchangeable object.

For Arabic to become a technological language, audacious, efficient reforms will be needed. It will not be enough to endow Arabic with technical and scientific means to raise the language to the rank of the major technological languages. Besides, users of the language must be associated with this project and have access to technology in a language they use. Presently this is not the case, since existing technical terms continue for the most part to lie inert in dictionaries and specialised works. This is not surprising, since in the Arab countries most people write and study in one language while speaking in another.

The future of Arabic, in my view, will depend on the outcome of several interlocking trends of which the most important are political in nature. No attempt has been made to carry out a reform of the language beginning with local realities, the specific context of each country, or by embodying the reality of language practice.

No linguistic reform relying on broad agreement of users of the language is possible outside of a democratic process. Meanwhile, one can always look back to the past and long for 'the golden age of Arabic civilisation'. Why not if this can comfort some?

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17 Russian in the modern world

Vida Io. Mikhalchenko and Yulia V. Trushkova[1]

When speaking about any kind of space (economic, cultural, ecological, etc.), scholars often rely on the geographical location of phenomena distributed widely inside the borders of a country and adjoining territories, to include one large area according to some classifying (e.g. functional) feature or features. We therefore think it constructive to introduce the term 'language space' into sociolinguistic research, in order to define a complex phenomenon: the functional performance of a language. The notion of language space, therefore, includes both geographical and functional dimensions of language. Languages with restricted social functions (e.g. some minority languages) have narrower geographical space, since their functional space is usually more homogenous, and, at the same time, restricted to the territory where their native speakers are located. The geographical space of functionally developed languages, such as Russian, is heterogeneous.

The repertoire of the social functions of Russian can be described as follows:

- national language of the Russian Federation;
- ethnic language of Russians;
- mother tongue of some non-Russians within the Russian Federation and the CIS (Commonwealth of the Independent States, the association of countries that emerged after the disintegration of the USSR);
- mother tongue of Russian-speaking communities in different regions of the world;
- common means of interethnic communication in the Russian Federation;
- one of the languages of interethnic communication in the countries of the CIS;
- a means of international communication between the countries of the CIS;
- one of the international languages as acknowledged by the UN and UNESCO.

In contrast to a world language such as English, which is spoken mostly as a second and a foreign language, having the bulk of its speakers throughout the world (Graddol 1997), Russian has more of a fixed location, i.e. it continues

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to be largely the ethnic language of Russians and the national language of the Russian Federation, the first or second language of the bulk of the population of the Russian Federation and the language of interethnic communication of the CIS.

When considering the position of the Russian language in the modern world, the following aspects should be explored:

- its functional presence throughout different regions of the world (geographical location and functionality, or language space);
- its social basis, i.e. the number of its first-language and second-language speakers (the demographic strength of a language);
- the repertoire of its typical social functions, i.e. its functional domains in different geographical regions (the functional power of a language).

In this chapter, we discuss the following geopolitical areas of the functioning of the Russian language:

- the Russian Federation;
- the countries of the CIS;
- the Baltic states;
- other foreign countries.

Russian within the Russian Federation

In the Russian Federation, Russian performs the following functions; it is:

- the national language of the Russian Federation;
- the ethnic language of Russians;
- the mother tongue of some non-Russians within the Russian Federation and the CIS;
- the common means of interethnic communication in the Russian Federation.

Looking at the demographic strength of Russian in the Russian Federation, according to data of the last All-Union Census of 1989 (Ethnic structure of the population of the RSFSR 1989), the total population of the Russian Federation consists of 147,021,869 people, of which about 120 million (81.6%) identified themselves as ethnic Russians. The total number of Russian speakers was 143,732,573 (97% of the total population), of which 88% identified it as their mother tongue. Some 94% of the speakers of Russian as a first language were Russian by ethnic identity. Among members of other indigenous ethnic groups of Russia, some 7.5 million people also identified Russian as their mother tongue. This constituted 27.6% of the non-Russian ethnic groups.

Among ethnic Russians, the Russian language is the main and most often used means of communication. Most Russians are monolingual: they make up about 98% of all Russians living in the Russian Federation. Only 0.6% of ethnic Russians can speak languages of other peoples of the Russian Federation, either as a first or second language, and 0.03% of ethnic Russians living in the republics of the Russian Federation cannot speak their own ethnic language at all.

The tendency for Russians living in the Russian Federation to be monolingual is continuing and even strengthening. In 1994 a selective micro-census of the population of Russia was carried out; this census questioned individuals' command of languages. It involved 7.3 million people, which makes up 5% of the total population of Russia. According to this micro-census, out of 1,000 Russians, 100% identified Russian as their mother tongue, but only fifteen Russians out of 1,000 (1.5%) can speak any languages other than Russian (Distribution of the population of Russia by the command of languages 1995).

Bilingualism of the 'ethnic language to Russian' type is quite widespread in Russia. According to the 1989 Census, about 11% of the total population of Russia (16,425,996) can speak Russian as a second language. The vast majority of these – some 16 million – are from the indigenous non-Russian populations (this figure represents 61% of the total indigenous non-Russian population of Russia); the rest are Russians by ethnic identity, who speak their ethnic language as a second language.

Unfortunately, data on bilingual tendencies and on the command of other languages in Russia in the late 1990s are unavailable. We can only suppose that the new situation of the national languages of the republics of the Russian Federation has strengthened languages other than Russian in numbers of bilinguals, but that the overall ratio of bilinguals in Russia is very unlikely to have changed radically in such a short time.

So, Russian in the Russian Federation has an elevated demographic strength, among both the Russian and non-Russian populations. In spite of this, the profile of the demographic strength of Russian in the Russian Federation is not so auspicious as it would seem. The strength of the Russian-speaking population in this region was, in many respects, maintained largely at the expense of intensive emigration from the countries of the former USSR in the 1990s. Thus, from recent estimates, the resident population of the Russian Federation was 145.9 million people as of 1 August 1999 (Rimashevskaya 2000), compared with 147 million people in 1989. The demographic base of Russian in the 1990s was reduced, chiefly due to natural population losses: since 1992 mortality rates in Russia have constantly exceeded birth rates, and this can be explained by the serious economic difficulties in the Russian Federation.

The functional power of a language and its measurement is known to be the basis for the estimate of its vitality (McConnell 1991). Compared to other languages, Russian in Russia has the widest range of social functions, and it can be defined as the main means of communication in all spheres. For example, in the sphere of education, Russian, being the national language of the state, is a generally accepted subject and the prevalent teaching medium in primary (grades 1–4) and secondary (grades 5–11) schools of the Russian Federation. Teaching in higher education in Russia is in Russian, and in the republics and national regions of Russia, in Russian and partly in regional ethnic languages (see Table 17.1).

Russian is also predominant in the publishing of books and periodicals. Of the total production of books in 1994 (ca. 33,000 units), about 85% were published in Russian. Magazines and bulletins published in Russian in 1994 made up 91% of the total production (2,166 units out of 2,307), and newspapers published in Russian constitute 93% of all newspapers (4,197 units out of 4,526) (Periodicals and book publishing in Russia in 1994, 1995). Book publishing and development of periodicals in other languages of the Russian Federation is supported and promoted by the authorities of the regions and by the republics of the Russian Federation (although exact statistical data are unavailable). Statistics on scientific and scholarly publications in Russian show that about 96% of scientific literature is published in Russian.

In 1991, Russian officially became the national language of the Russian Federation. Along with this – and this was a significant change in the 1990s – was the acceptance of official status for national languages of other ethnic groups (the so-called titular nations) in the republics of the Russian Federation. Laws for other national languages have been adopted in twenty-one republics of the Russian Federation. In these republics a new language space with two-component or multi-component structures is being created, i.e. areas of national bilingualism. In most of the republics (e.g. in Yakutia and Tatarstan) teaching in pre-primary and primary schools is in the national language (while secondary and higher schooling is mostly taught in Russian, as before).

Language accommodation in the regions and republics of the Russian Federation, where there are two or several national languages, will depend on practical measures proposed by the regional authorities and on their ability to apply the language laws to the local situation for creative activity, i.e. to the development of languages, to the creation of scientific literature and teaching materials, etc. Still, there remains a danger of using language laws to incite political and economic rivalry among elites, e.g. with a view of ousting Russian-speaking monolinguals from important spheres of regional communication (and, hence, economic and political activity). These tendencies can be observed in Tuva, Yakutia, Mari El, Tatarstan and Bashkortostan.

In general, most of the population of Russia has a good command of Russian, and it is traditionally used as a means of interethnic communication. When compared with the Baltic states and other states of the former USSR, the language situation in the Russian Federation is far more stable and language conflicts are not so acute. Still, the desire of the titular nations of the republics of the Russian Federation is to speed up the further acquisition of their languages, now declared national. For the other language communities in these regions, this causes some anxiety.

So, in general, the most advantageous geographical space for Russian is the Russian Federation, since it is an area where Russian demonstrates the

Table 17.1 *Russian as a teaching medium in the Russian Federation (primary and secondary levels) (percentages show the proportion of schools and pupils with Russian as a teaching medium, to the total number of schools and pupils in Russia)*

			With Russian as the only teaching medium		With both Russian and other languages as teaching mediums	
Year	Total schools	Total pupils	Schools	Pupils	Schools	Pupils
1990–91	61,422 (95%)	19,087,185 (98%)	58,046 (89.9%)	18,504,711 (95%)	3,376 (5.2%)	789,837 (4%)
1994–95	61,682 (94.5%)	20,060,404 (98.9%)	58,459 (89.6%)	19,123,311 (94.3%)	3,223 (4.9%)	937,093 (4.6%)
1998–99	61,134 (94%)	20,104,370 (98.2%)	57,980 (89%)	19,481,685 (94%)	3,154 (4.8%)	950,605 (4.7%)

Source: Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation, 21 November 1999 widest range of social functions. It is also the area with the highest density of Russian-speakers and, finally, language policy of the Russian Federation is very supportive of the Russian language. Russian performs the roles of both an ethnic and inter-ethnic idiom and is an instrument of the linguistic integration of the country.

Russian in the countries of the CIS

In the countries of the CIS, Russian fulfils the following functions:

- ethnic language of Russians;
- mother tongue of some non-Russians (mostly of an older age) living in CIS countries;
- means of interethnic communication; and
- means of international communication in the countries of the CIS.

In the early 1990s (i.e. when the USSR collapsed) the position of Russian in most of the republics of the USSR was very strong. The ratio of the Russian ethnic communities in the total populations of the republics (except some republics of Central Asia and Transcaucasia[2]) was high, and most Russian ethnics were monolingual. A considerable part of the indigenous population of the Soviet republics could speak Russian, as either a first or second language. At the foundation of the CIS, Russian was then the mother tongue for Russians and some non-Russians living in the countries of the CIS. It also played a vital role in national interethnic communication (along with other local lingua francas), and it was the main means of interethnic communication among multiethnic populations in different republics (actually, it was a lingua franca of the region) (see Table 17.2).

The functional power of Russian in the republics of the former USSR was also very high. Although Russian did not have the official status of a national language of the USSR, it was a compulsory subject in the Soviet system of education, a leading language in the spheres of industry, trade, science, book and periodical publishing, TV and radio broadcasting, and culture. It was widely used in regional governments and their administrative bodies and in regional official record keeping. The absolute predominance of Russian in all essential spheres of communication was really unwarranted. It existed at the expense of the national languages, which, undoubtedly, could have had a more important role in the above spheres, for example, in regional mass media, periodicals, pre-primary, primary and secondary education, and more. Hence, the language rights of indigenous nations of the USSR were infringed, and this was what caused reactionary language policies by the national governments of the new states of the CIS.

[2] The republics of Central Asia being: Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Tadjikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenia. The Transcaucasian republics being Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Table 17.2 *Demographic strength of Russian in the republics of the former USSR at the time of the collapse of the USSR (command of Russian as a first and second language)*

		Russians (by ethnic identity)		Those who identify Russian as their mother tongue			Those who identify Russian as their second language		
Republic of the USSR*	Total population	Absolute number	Percentage of the total population	Russians	Members of other ethnic groups	Percentage of the total population of the republic	Russians	Members of other ethnic groups	Percentage of the total population of the republic
Ukraine	51,452,034	11,355,582	22.0	11,172,508	5,725,765	32.8	139,285	23,303,865	45.6
Moldavia	4,335,360	562,069	13.0	557,146	464,173	23.0	3,382	1,962,112	45.0
Byelorussia	10,151,806	1,342,099	13.0	1,311,043	1,932,136	32.0	23,870	5,132,752	50.8
Kazakhstan	16,464,464	6,227,549	38.0	6,224,252	1,573,026	47.0	666	2,974,867	18.0
Kirghizia	4,257,755	916,557	21.5	915,891	174,776	25.6	236	1,324,668	31.0
Tadjikistan	5,092,603	388,481	7.6	388,045	107,135	9.7	164	1,356,050	26.6
Uzbekistan	19,810,077	1,653,478	8.0	1,651,513	500,121	10.9	864	4,463,649	22.5
Turkmenia	3,522,117	333,892	9.5	333,575	87,440	12.0	149	937,540	26.6
Georgia	5,400,841	341,172	6.0	336,718	142,561	8.9	2,436	1,741,164	33.0
Armenia	3,304,776	51,555	1.6	50,736	15,964	2.0	549	1,398,121	42.0
Azerbaijan	7,021,178	392,304	5.6	391,343	137,419	7.5	458	2,165,437	30.8

*Note:** The names of the republics of the USSR are given as they were before 1991.
Source: Distribution of the population by ethnic identity, mother tongue and second language of the peoples of the USSR, 1989

It should, however, also be mentioned here that Russian was not exclusively the language of the totalitarian regime, government bureaucracy and forced assimilation, as was often portrayed in public discussions in the 1980s and 1990s. This is true if we bear in mind the idea that language, as an instrument of language policy, is a means of symbolic domination. Furthermore, for more than fifty years Russian, especially in the republics of Central Asia and Transcaucasia, was the medium for disseminating information about technology, industry, medicine, construction, transportation, science and higher education. This was conditioned not only by government policy, generally aimed at attaining Russian monolingualism throughout the country (especially since the 1950s), but also by the availability of specialised vocabulary (LSP) and the stylistic system of Russian, which allowed the language to provide professional terminology in the spheres mentioned above. The corresponding professional subsystems of many other languages of the USSR were not developed and unified enough, regardless of constant work during the Soviet period of elaborating terminological systems in the national languages. Application of the original terminological systems to professional communication was slow and not always effective enough. Everyday experience of professional communication showed 'divergence in the terminological norm and usage in the languages of the peoples of the USSR', i.e. international or Russian terms were given preference, instead of the recommended Arabic, Persian or Latin loanwords (Baskakov, 1988, pp. 6–12). In the USSR, Russian was a language that provided access to professional activity and success in the job market. This was one of the main reasons for the high level of command of Russian as a second language in some former republics of the USSR, where ethnic Russians were not numerous (see the data in Table 17.2 on Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan). Russian had the strongest position in cities (which were industrial and cultural centres of the republics), in industrial areas and in areas of field development.

At the start of the 1990s, as the USSR was collapsing, in all Soviet republics the laws that were adopted on languages confirmed their status as national languages of the titular nations. Only Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan adopted programmes of language development, because official status for their national languages had already been confirmed in their constitutions much earlier. Official status was aimed at ensuring that titular languages expand their functional spheres, together with their demographic base and beyond to speakers of other languages.

It might have been expected that Russian – as a language of a numerous language community, as a means of communication in many significant social spheres and as a traditional medium of interethnic and international communication – could have worked out some official status, for example, as the first or second official language or as the language of regional or local administration in the areas where the Russian-speaking populations were concentrated. In spite of this:

in some countries of the CIS the national state authorities took and are still taking rather strong measures to restrict the functioning of Russian, not only as a means of interethnic communication, but also as mother tongue of the Russian diaspora. The former promises (at least their first part) – i.e. to create conditions for the free functioning of all languages spoken in the republics, though keeping the priority of titular languages – have been forgotten long ago. (Belousov and Grigoryan 1996, pp. 6–7)

Russian did not attain official status in the republics of the CIS other than in Belarus, where it is a second national language. Quite recently, Russian was confirmed as an official language of Kirghizstan and can be used along with the national language (Kirghiz) in the spheres of public management, legislation and office work (Law on the Official Languages of Kirghizstan, 25 May 2001).

The development of policy concerning the revival of ethnic languages and cultures of the titular nations – which aspire to use the new national languages in all spheres of communication – began in the early 1990s. Because it is advantageous to use the titular languages, their use consequently weakened the position of Russian and other non-titular languages of these states. Among the issues most painful for the non-titular populations were the linguistic requirements for employees (including fluency in the titular language), a very rapid conversion of the whole system of education into the national language and the prompt introduction of the national language into all official spheres of communication, including mass media. Given the functional prevalence of Russian – which had been established in the Soviet period and which was a real albeit objectionable linguistic situation – one might have expected a less stringent language policy, e.g. a step-by-step policy of change and a longer period of transition towards a new national language. Rapid change in language reorientation and deliberate severity of the new national language policies made the Russian-speaking population feel that their civil and personal rights were being infringed. Russian speakers made strong protests regarding the restricted opportunity of being educated in Russian.

It should be mentioned that even in the middle of the 1990s Russian held a position as a medium of interethnic and international communication between multiethnic populations both within and among the states of the former USSR. Thus, data from a sociolinguistic survey – based on a questionnaire prepared by scholars at the Institute of Russian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 1990–95 – showed that at that time old identities and, hence, language preferences, together with language competence, were still vital, and Russian still preserved its functional power (Belousov and Grigoryan 1996).

In many respects language prospects are conditioned by the states' education policy. As can be seen from Tables 17.3 and 17.4, the role of titular-nation languages in pre-school and school education has steadily increased, while the role of Russian is steadily diminishing. This fact is the result not only of emigration of Russians from the CIS and Baltic countries, but also due to the

Table 17.3 *Distribution of pre-school educational institutions in the countries of the former USSR, by languages of education*

	1988				1990				1992			
	Number of institutions (percentage of total institutions in the country)		Number of children (percentage of total children in the country)		Number of institutions (percentage of total institutions in the country)		Number of children (percentage of total children in the country)		Number of institutions (percentage of total institutions in the country)		Number of children (percentage of total children in the country)	
	With the titular language as a teaching medium	With Russian as a teaching medium	With the titular language as a teaching medium	With Russian as a teaching medium	With the titular language as a teaching medium	With Russian as a teaching medium	With the titular language as a teaching medium	With Russian as a teaching medium	With the titular language as a teaching medium	With Russian as a teaching medium	With the titular language as a teaching medium	With Russian as a teaching medium
Russia	2.8	95.8	1.2	97.8	4.4	94.8	2.1	96.8	4.9	94.0	2.3	95.5
Ukraine	58.2	40.2	37.0	59.2	61.2	31.5	41.5	42.9	–	–	58.6	41.0
Kazakhstan	11.9	86.4	6.7	90.7	19.7	63.5	12.6	61.8	–	–	31.1	68.1
Uzbekistan	68.1	27.7	51.7	40.7	72.7	15.0	58.9	18.8	77.6	8.3	66.6	9.7
Belarus	19.3	72.7	6.0	88.6	35.5	50.6	14.4	59.9	60.9	11.5	35.8	14.1
Kirghizstan	36.5	61.3	18.7	77.4	46.0	41.1	27.1	49.7	–	–	–	–
Moldova	53.4	31.7	39.8	33.3	57.5	26.4	47.0	25.5	–	–	–	–
Azerbaijan	63.0	17.5	38.9	22.9	69.1	9.0	50.0	9.6	–	–	–	–
Tadjikistan	39.4	51.0	20.9	63.8	48.0	23.2	27.3	25.8	30.9	15.0	22.8	13.6
Georgia	81.6	8.8	72.4	7.5	91.2	5.1	94.2	3.4	–	–	–	–
Turkmenistan	59.0	39.7	31.7	67.0	62.9	30.9	41.2	48.0	–	–	54.6	45.1
Armenia	78.2	5.7	69.1	6.9	94.3	1.1	91.6	1.0	–	–	–	–

Notes: Missing numbers indicate that data are unavailable.
Source: Number and sociodemographic characteristics of the Russian population in the republics of the former USSR, 1994

Table 17.4 *Number of pupils in secondary schools in the countries of the former USSR with Russian as a teaching medium*

	1989		1994		1995	
	Absolute number of pupils (in thousands)	Percentage of total pupils in the country	Absolute number of pupils (in thousands)	Percentage of total pupils in the country	Absolute number of pupils (in thousands)	Percentage of total pupils in the country
Azerbaijan	240.6	18.8	137.3	9.8	127.4	8.9
Armenia	88.2	15.0	23.1	3.9	16.7	2.9
Belarus	1,139.0	79.2	987.9	65.9	900.8	59.4
Georgia	201.6	25.2	131.3	16.9	105.4	13.2
Kazakhstan	2,024.0	65.6	1,722.4	57.2	1,612.9	53.9
Kirghizstan	323.1	35.7	218.6	23.4	213.6	22.6
Moldova	280.0	39.8	171.2	28.5	160.1	25.5
Tadjikistan	116.1	9.7	47.8	3.9	42.4	3.3
Turkmenistan	124.9	15.5	116.7	13.4	113.4	12.7
Uzbekistan	657.2	14.8	459.8	9.7	427.5	8.7
Ukraine	3,517.7	51.7	3,097.5	44.9	2,945.9	42.7

Source: State Duma of Russia, 1997

closure of Russian schools in all these countries, including the reduction or complete elimination of Russian classes in the school curricula. For example, in the secondary schools of Kazakhstan, Russian literature has been completely withdrawn from curricula (State Duma of Russia, 1997). Now often defined as a foreign language and therefore placed on the same footing as English and German, Russian is more rarely chosen by pupils because it is judged to be a less socially advantageous language. Equating Russian with other foreign languages is observed, for example, in the schools of Ukraine and Kazakhstan. So, the real need for education in Russian for these Russian-speaking populations does not match the educational opportunities granted to the national group. A too rapid transition in education to the titular languages has caused many problems for the non-Russian populations as well: the 'Russian-oriented' educational systems of these countries were not ready for teaching in titular and other ethnic languages. They lacked new curricula, teaching techniques, teaching materials, a system of teacher training and, in some countries of the former USSR, even a functional language system suitable for teaching exact and natural sciences in one or more languages. In the early 1990s some researchers pointed out (Solntsev and Mikhalchenko 1992; Mikhalchenko 1994; State Duma of Russia 1997) that educational standards and even the grammatical competence of pupils decreased. In the late 1990s the situation for teaching languages became more stable.

The role of Russian has been considerably reduced in all the new states of the CIS, especially in the republics of Central Asia and Transcaucasia. For example, in Kirghizstan, Turkmenistan and Armenia the publishing of local newspapers in Russian has almost ceased, while the delivery of periodicals from Russia is sporadic. In Turkmenistan, Russian television broadcasting is reduced to one channel (ORT). From September 2000, following a decision of the Moldovan government, television broadcasting in Russian stopped completely in Moldova. Informational needs of the Russian-speaking population in Moldova were therefore left unsatisfied during the 1990s.

It is important to point out that the reduction of Russian in education was often a result not of a deliberate policy, but of the disintegration of the USSR. In these conditions, a policy of support for Russian speakers by the government of the Russian Federation could have lessened their losses and helped them to adapt to the new reality. A considerable part of the responsibility for cuts in education for Russian in these countries should be assumed by the federal government, which did not elaborate programmes of support for compatriots in the so-called 'new foreign lands' (State Duma of Russia, 1997). During the 1990s, Russian schools of Central Asia and Transcaucasia received much less teaching material than they needed. The situation improved only in the late 1990s. In 1997 the heads of governments of the CIS countries signed an agreement confirming the start of a single informational space for the CIS (18 October 1997) and also a single educational space (17 January 1997). (The latter agreement was not signed by the representatives of Georgia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.) Among the latest steps taken in forming a single educational space of the CIS, one could mention the coordination of educational programmes in the countries, and mutual acknowledgement of the validity or equivalence of certificates, diplomas, academic degrees and academic statuses in different CIS countries. (An agreement on this matter between Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kirghizstan was signed in 1998.) Another step was the creation of a single programme of remote language training based on modern information technology. In 2000, this programme was launched in nineteen educational institutions in CIS and Baltic countries, including Armenia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.

Since the federal policy for support of the Russian language in the countries of the former USSR is still insufficient, regional and local efforts in this area are especially important. Quite recently, several regional educational associations emerged, based on a direct relation between the schools and institutes of Russia and the neighbouring countries of the CIS. This initiative was supported by the regional and local authorities. Among them, there is an association of the educational institutions of Bryansk region (Russia), Chernigov region (Ukraine) and Gomel region (Belarus). More than ten agreements were signed between Omsk region (Russia) and eleven regions of Kazakhstan; they are aimed at cooperation in training teachers of Kazakh for Russian schools and teachers of Russian for Kazakh schools. Direct cooperation among the Russian institutes and colleges and their new subsidiaries in different countries of the former USSR (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Estonia, Georgia) has also been carried out recently.

It is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss and illustrate the situation and perspectives of Russian in each of the countries of the CIS: the conditions in each country are unique. We therefore give a short selective review of Russian in the Ukraine and Belarus (State Duma of Russia 2000) from the less advantageous in the Ukraine to the most advantageous in Belarus.

Ukraine

The status of the Russian language in Ukraine has generated one of the worst arguments among the former Soviet republics. In 1989, Ukrainians made up 72.3% of the total population, Russians (by ethnic identity) 22% and members of other ethnic groups 5.7%. In many cases Russians were and still are living in concentrated communities (for example, in eastern Ukraine and in the city of Odessa), which could be favourable for the functioning of Russian (Belousov and Grigoryan 1996). In 1989 the total Russian-speaking population was 78.4%, and Russian had considerable advantages in most spheres of communication, in many cases at the expense of Ukrainian. While in the middle of the 1990s Russians (by ethnic identity) made up 22% of the population, more than 40% of all children attending secondary schools were taught in Russian (Belousov and Grigoryan 1996). Such data show that Ukrainian should have had a larger share in social communication and especially in education. Since the early 1990s, the functional use of languages in Ukraine has been regulated by the Language Law (1991), which declared Ukrainian the only national language and established a directive for its promotion in all spheres of communication. Russian was defined as a language of interethnic communication. The Language Law of Ukraine includes stipulations that fully meet international democratic jurisprudence requirements: state officials should speak both Ukrainian and Russian (art. 6); state directives should be published in Ukrainian and Russian (art. 10); citizens of Ukraine may appeal to the organs of government and public institutions in Russian (art. 5); technical documentation should be printed in both Ukrainian and Russian (art. 13); and Ukrainian and Russian are compulsory subjects in public schools (art. 27). In spite of this, these directives are rarely followed in practice. The declared aim of the Language Law of Ukraine is the functional expansion of Ukrainian. In fact, it is carried out at the expense of Russian. As is pointed out in Russian periodicals in Ukraine, these restrictive measures are usually the initiative of local authorities (regional, municipal, etc.), but they are not challenged by the central state authorities.

In the late 1990s, the strength of the Russian-speaking population in different regions of Ukraine, and hence the need for Russian in education, did not correspond to the number of schools with Russian as a teaching medium (see Table 17.5). Thus, in 1995 in Ivano-Frankovsk there was one Russian school for 30,000 Russians living in the city (representing 15% of its population). In Zaporozhskaya region, where 46% of the population identify Russian as their mother tongue, the number of Russian schools was reduced to 31% of the total number of schools in the region. In the 1990s, in Ternopol region, Rovno region and Kiev region all schools with Russian as a teaching medium were closed; in eight other regions their number is insignificant (Alekseyev 1999). Russian is usually removed from the education curriculum by the orders of the local authorities, who simply discontinue enrolment of pupils at the primary grades of schools with Russian as a teaching medium, offering enrolment only into Ukrainian-medium classes. As a result, Russian or bilingual schools then become monolingual (Ukrainian) ones. So, most bilingual pupils are in the upper grades only; once these pupils leave, the classes are then replaced by Ukrainian-medium ones.

Regardless of the guarantees in the Language Law of Ukraine, Russian continues to be ousted from spheres of communication, including higher education and science. For example, results of scientific research should be translated into Ukrainian, according to the demand of the Higher Certifying Commission,

Table 17.5 *Trends in education in Russian in Ukraine (1999)*

Regions	Number of schools with Russian as a teaching medium		Number of pupils taught in Russian				Russians (not including Russian-speaking members of other ethnic groups)	
			Total number, including pupils of bilingual schools		Including pupils of Russian-only schools			
	Total number	percentage	Absolute number	percentage	Absolute number	percentage	Total numbers	percentage of total population
Vinnitsa	3	0.28	12,410	0.11	4,224	1.73	112,484	5.9
Volyn′	1	0.12	2,044	0.24	985	0.06	46,900	4.4
Zhitomir	3	0.32	17,842	0.57	2,441	1.17	121,443	7.9
Zakarpatye	3	0.42	5,254	2.52	1,809	0.87	49,458	4.0
Ivano-Frankovsk	1	0.14	2,444	1.12	753	0.35	57,005	4.0
Kiev	0	0	15,415	5.83	0	0	167,938	8.7
Lvov	5	0.35	9,636	2.49	3,885	1.00	195,116	7.2
Poltava	9	0.95	28,337	12.68	8,364	3.74	178,965	10.2
Rovno	0	0	1,204	0.63	0	0	53,634	4.6
Ternopol	0	0	1,028	0.61	0	0	26,610	2.3
Khmelnitskiy	1	0.09	10,325	4.83	130	0.06	88,018	5.8
Cherkassk	1	0.14	20,159	9.94	212	0.10	122,308	8.0
Chernovtsy	3	0.68	4,075	3.01	3,833	2.24	63,066	6.7
Chernigov	4	0.47	23,376	13.65	2,833	2.24	96,562	6.8
City of Kiev	16	4.26	59,322	17.79	13,827	4.15	536,707	20.9

Source: Alekseyev 1999

though, according to the Language Law, scientific research can be documented either in Ukrainian or in Russian according to the choice of the researcher.

Data of the late 1990s show that Ukrainian continues to spread into all spheres of social communication. In August 1997, a new draft on the use and development of languages was presented to the Upper Rada by the Ministry of Education of the Ukraine. The draft confirms the main pronouncements of the existing Language Law and strengthens the promotion of Ukrainian. It states that all official mass media should use Ukrainian only, while for private TV and radio stations, the rate of 70% of broadcasting in Ukrainian is confirmed. Languages of ethnic minorities should be used only in cultural and educational activities. (Only in the Crimea is the use of minority languages, along with the national language, permitted.) The draft suggests that a special 'language police' will control the implementation of these measures (Alekseyev 1999).

On the whole, the tendencies of language policy in the Ukraine tend to remain unchanged, which was confirmed by President L.D. Kuchma before the presidential elections in 1999.

Belarus

Of all the countries of the former USSR, Belarus has preserved the closest economic, political and cultural connections with the Russian Federation. It is no wonder then that the most advantageous conditions for the Russian language are found in Belarus. The legislative basis of language policy is determined by two laws, namely: On Education in the Republic of Belarus and On the Languages in the Belorussian SSR (1990). Russian, together with Belorussian, are proclaimed the national languages. The official and actual bilingualism provides a relatively conflict-free language situation.

Russians living in Belarus constitute a very numerous ethnic group: they are 1,342,100 people, of which 1,164,400 live in cities and 177,700 in rural areas. Most Russians live in the city of Minsk (ca. 325,000), Minsk region (156,000), Vitebsk region (214,000), Gomel region (211,000), Mogilyov region (166,000) and Brest (146,000) region.

In the 1970s and 1980s, the language situation in Belarus was characterised as widespread Belorussian–Russian bilingualism; in the 1990s, about half of the population of Belarus could speak Russian as a second language (see Table 17.2). So, Russian, as a closely related cognate language of Belorussian, possessing a high functional power, quickly began to absorb Belorussian in many spheres of communication. At the beginning of the 1990s, major social functions were carried out in Russian, and bilingualism was giving way to Russian monolingualism. To protect Belorussian from being completely replaced by Russian, a Language Law was passed in 1990. In the law Belorussian was declared the national language and Russian the language of interethnic communication.

Table 17.6 *Distribution of state* schools of Belarus by languages of instruction (urban and rural schools)*

School year	Total number of schools	Schools by language of instruction				
		Belorussian	Russian	Belorussian and Russian	Polish	Lithuanian
1990–91	5,197	3,421	1,287	489		
1991–92	5,067	3,278	911	878		
1992–93	4,853	3,141	297	1,415		
1993–94	4,924	3,138	257	1,529		
1994–95	4,859	3,137	239	1,482	1	
1995–96	4,808	3,029	594	1,184	1	
1996–97	4,764	2,957	799	1,006	1	1
1997–98	4,709	2,915	952	839	2	1

Note: *Vocational and evening schools are not included.
Source: State Duma of Russia, 1997

Table 17.7 *Comparison of Russian and Belorussian in higher education (university level) in the republic of Belarus*

Year	Students taught in Russian	Students taught in Belorussian
1994	110,211	19,153
1995	123,271	16,855
1996	125,485	14,523

Source: State Duma of Russia, 1997

This law was applied mainly to the sphere of education. In 1993–94, teaching in primary schools was in Belorussian only; in the 1990s the number of schools with Russian as a teaching medium diminished, while the number of bilingual schools increased (see Table 17.6). In 1994, after a referendum, official status of national language was granted to both Belorussian and Russian.

In higher education Belorussian is less commonly used, while Russian dominates (see Table 17.7). In teacher training colleges Belorussian is usually used as a teaching medium only for those studying primary education, while students training to teach in the higher grades use Russian.

Since 1993 the governments of Russia and Belarus have been developing a plan for a single educational system, which aims to establish a unified standard of education in the two countries, including a unified list of school subjects and a unified basic school curriculum for regular and vocational schools. On the whole, the government of Belarus is trying to follow a language policy that is intended to be conflict free and to solve ethnic and language problems.

Russian in the Baltic states

By the 1990s, the functional characteristics of Russian in the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) were similar to other countries of the former USSR. By the beginning of the 1990s the demographic imbalance between the Russian and titular populations had emerged. In the Baltic states, Russians were concentrated in specific areas: they lived in the cities and in the industrial regions (e.g. in the cities of Narva, Sillamäe and Kohtla-Jarve in Estonia). Most of the members of other ethnic groups living in the Baltic states were also Russian-speaking, so the level of bilingualism was relatively high (see Table 17.8).

By the 1990s the language situation in the Baltic countries was unfavourable for the titular languages: the strength of their speakers did not amount to an absolute majority of the population of these countries. According to the 1989 Census, of the total population of Latvia (2,666,567), only 62% spoke Latvian either as a mother tongue or a second language. In Estonia, 67% of the total population of 1,565,662 could speak Estonian either as a mother tongue or as a second language. In Lithuania, the total number of Lithuanian speakers (either as a first or second language) made up 85.2% of the total population (3,674,802). The titular languages of the Baltic states (especially Latvian and Estonian) became languages with insufficient functional power in their own traditional territory, so their status was evaluated as endangered. The absolute predomination of Russian in secondary and higher education was considered as an intolerable situation for the speakers of the Baltic languages. For example, in Latvia about 10,000 Latvian pupils attended schools with Russian as a teaching medium, because of a lack of schools with teaching in Latvian (Mesz 1995; Blinkena 1996, pp. 84–85).

Immediately after the Baltic states had gained independence in 1991, their language policy was aimed at restoring the balance between the new national languages and the languages of the new ethnic minorities, which implied a change in the language hierarchy, i.e. a redistribution in the communicative space of the languages in these countries in favour of the national languages (Blinkena 1996, p. 85).

The language policy of the Baltic states is conditioned by the general trends of national politics, i.e. the consolidation of the titular nations and naturalisation of the ethnic minorities. Hence, the aim of this policy is the monolingual and monocultural state (Blinkena 1996; Burenina, in preparation). Legislative grounds for the restrictions or the prohibition of the use of Russian in spheres of regulated communication is provided for by the Language Laws of the Baltic states, passed from 1989 to 1995. The aim of the monolingual society is supported by the laws on citizenship and by rather strict linguistic qualifying requirements. In Latvia and Estonia, persons who cannot speak the national

Table 17.8 *Demographic power of Russian in the Baltic states*

		Ethnic Russians		Russian as mother tongue			Russian as second language		
Country	Total population	Absolute number	percentage of the total population	Russians (absolute number)	Members of other ethnic groups	percentage of the total population	Russians (absolute number)	Members of other ethnic groups	percentage of the total population
Lithuania	3,674,802	344,455	9.4	329,309	99,935	11.7	11,191	1,297,352	35.6
Latvia	2,666,567	905,515	34.0	894,293	227,783	42.0	9,548	1,043,849	39.5
Estonia	1,565,662	474,834	30.0	468,216	76,717	34.8	5,387	371,310	24.0

Source: Distribution of the population by ethnic identity, mother tongue and second language of the peoples of the USSR, 1989 languages are not granted citizenship (as a result, their civil rights are restricted). So, by 1998 only 300,000 'stateless'[3] living in Latvia had been granted Latvian citizenship. As a result of this policy, the functioning of Russian steadily decreased during the 1990s, especially in official communications.

In secondary and higher education, the use of Russian as a teaching medium has been considerably reduced, although in the middle of the 1990s the number of pupils at the secondary school level with Russian as language of instruction was still quite high (see Table 17.9). Russian was then practically removed from the national government, the municipal bodies and to a large degree from the domains of science and mass media. At the same time, Russian prevails in areas not controlled by state authorities, i.e. in the sphere of private enterprise (business and commerce). It is still widely used, together with the national languages, in primary and secondary education as well as in mass media (although the number of Russian schools is being gradually reduced).

A direct correspondence between the strictness of the national and language policy and the size of the titular nation as a percentage of the population of the country can be observed. For example, in Lithuania, where in the late 1980s the size of the titular nation is the highest (80%), linguistic policy is much more tolerant than in Estonia and Latvia, where the titular nation makes up only 66–69% of the total population.

In all Baltic states, the Russian-speaking communities, in spite of their wish to preserve their language, lack the social incentive to do so. The sociological surveys of Estonia and Latvia of the mid-1990s showed the high motivation of the non-titular residents to learn the national languages, and their increasing skills in these languages (Druviete 1997; pp. 118, 133–134; State Duma of Russia 1997). At the same time, the children's skills in Russian start to go down. For example, Russian teachers of Lithuania mention the growth of mixed forms of speech used by school children. Still, a significant increase in the number of Russian speakers that have completely shifted to the national languages has not yet been observed. In other words, the development of bilingualism among the Russian speakers of the Baltic states, though not the loss of mother tongue, is currently going on.

The main tendencies of language policies of the Baltic states did not change much in the late 1990s. In Estonia, since the year 2000 the entire secondary education system is in Estonian only, according to the law on colleges and public schools. What is more, a recommendation has been made to introduce qualifying language tests in the sphere of private business (Tomusk 2002, pp. 35–48), according to the amendment to the language law (1999). In Latvia, from 2005 all teaching in state schools is planned to be in Latvian only, and only Latvian will

[3] 'Stateless' is a term used by Latvian officials to describe permanent residents of Latvia who do not have official citizenship of that country.

Table 17.9 *Number of pupils in state schools of the Baltic States with Russian as a teaching medium (1989–95)*

	1989		1994		1995	
State	Pupils taught in Russian (thousands)	percentage of total pupils	Pupils taught in Russian (thousands)	percentage of total pupils	Pupils taught in Russian (thousands)	percentage of total pupils
Latvia	157.0	47.5	141.1	44.0	116.9	35.5
Lithuania	80.8	15.8	58.7	11.8	57.7	11.3
Estonia	79.1	36.5	68.9	32.7	68.5	33.5

Note: Technical and vocational schools are not included.
Source: Hearings of the Parliament of Russia, October 1997

be allowed in the workplace. The situation in Lithuania shows some peculiarity, in spite of the same tendencies in language policy. Russian has undergone the same functional shift: in the late 1990s it actually acquired the status of minor language (Burenina 2000, pp. 331–341). Still, Russian is more and more often chosen as a second foreign language in Lithuanian universities, the first being English (Merkene 2000, pp. 53–55).

Interim conclusions

To sum up the situation, we should mention again that the reduction in the role of Russian in the countries of the former USSR was quite legitimate and was to be expected. However, the language policy towards Russian – prompt and enforced language reorientation – carried out by forcible measures not only diminishes the rights of the Russian-speaking diaspora, which is too significant to be neglected, but is not advantageous for the education and economies of these countries. The status of Russian as an ethnic language in this region (except in Belarus) might be evaluated as ‘tolerated’ (in most of the countries of Central Asia and Transcaucasia) or ‘stigmatised’ (in Ukraine and in the Baltic countries). Yet, the actual language competence of people changes quite slowly. As observations of the situation through the 1990s show, Russian continues to maintain its high functional use and power. In future, Russian might become either a lingua franca or a widespread foreign language in the region of the former USSR. The future prospect of Russian in the CIS countries depends greatly on the future economic, political and cultural relations between Russia and the countries of the CIS. Even at the present time, all highs and lows in their relationships cause fluctuations in the position of the Russian language in this region. Federal policy aimed at promoting education, mass media and cultural activity in Russian might also contribute to supporting Russian in the states of the former USSR.

Russian in other foreign countries

In this section the focus is on evaluation of the status of Russian in a global context, from the viewpoint of its past and present functional power and its prospects for the future. Can Russian be defined as a world language or as a regional language? The main problem is that both notions include a wide set of parameters (demographic, functional, educational and cultural power; the level of standardisation, functioning through modern information technologies, etc.). The development of different functional characteristics for Russian is rather uneven. So, the real status of Russian is rather difficult to define.

It is beyond the scope of this chapter to describe all aspects of the functioning of Russian during different periods of time in the twentieth century and in different regions of the world. Moreover, information is often too sketchy to arrive at precise conclusions. Still, a brief outline might be given. Before the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russian was recognised as one of the world languages. It was, and currently is, an official language of the UN and UNESCO. After the Second World War, Russian became the international language of the countries of the socialist bloc. In these countries, the language was taught in schools as a compulsory subject. Economic progress of the USSR in the 1960s and 1970s, its achievements in science, and especially in space technology, aroused a tide of interest in Russian, and the language started to be taught as a foreign language in the countries of western Europe, in the USA and in other countries. At that time, the foreign policy of the USSR was aimed at supporting developing countries. Some of its main objectives included assistance in introducing modern technology, on-site exploration and mining operations, and developing industry, medical services and education in these countries. In many countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America a wide network of Russian language courses emerged; Russian was also taught in secondary schools and universities. Millions of technical workers of these countries received higher education in the Soviet Union. Statistical reports of the International Association of Teachers of the Russian language and literature show a growth for the study of Russian in all countries of the world from the late 1960s until the early 1980s (Lizunov 1977; Kostomarov 1979; Sokhin 1986). It should be mentioned that even during this period Russian could hardly be considered as a common lingua franca of the socialist bloc and other socialist oriented countries, and that the people of eastern Europe preferred to communicate in European languages other than Russian (see Chapter 7 of this volume).

In fact, sociolinguistic research in the communicative spheres of Russian in some countries of eastern Europe (East Germany, Bulgaria) showed that Russian (in its written form) was mostly used for reading scientific literature and technical documentation. In oral communication it was used much less: mostly at scientific conferences and at business meetings of Soviet and European technical workers and with public figures. The results of sociolinguistic research, like those mentioned above, allowed some Soviet scholars to state that Russian played a role of lingua franca in eastern Europe, although on a somewhat restricted basis (Grebenev 1983, 67–76; Karpenko and Buttke 1989, 20–22, 50–57).

From the late 1980s the use of Russian outside the USSR was steadily decreasing and this has continued since the break-up of the USSR. This was caused by the profound political and economic changes in the former socialist bloc. Attitudes towards Russian changed as well: it was no longer regarded as a language of modern technology and developed culture. The ideologically biased attitude to Russian as the language of a totalitarian regime, and the economically based attitude of Russian as a language with lesser informational value than, for example, English and German, led to a decrease in the use of Russian in the spheres of communication where it had been widely used before.

Presently, Russian is used:

- as a mother tongue of the Russian diaspora outside Russia; and
- restrictedly as a foreign language in higher education, book publishing, science, sales, services and mass media.

The new communicative sphere of Russian is in modern information technology, where it emerged a few years ago and where developments are significant.

The demographic power of Russian

The demographic power of a language could be most precisely estimated by the ratio of the number of L1 and L2 speakers to the total population of a region. But demographic power can be measured by absolute numbers as well, as in the total number of native speakers. Russian is ranked seventh in the world: the number of Russian native speakers is estimated to be 155 million according to the engco model (www.english.co.uk), or 288 million people according to the Ethnologue model (Graddol 1997, pp. 9–10, 27; Grimes 2000). The engco model forecasts a decrease in the demographic power of Russian: in the twenty-first century, it will decrease to 132 million native speakers and drop to eighth position against other languages.

It can be easily seen that Russian, by the territorial location of its speakers, is a regional language. About 127 million of its speakers (both L1 and L2) live in the Russian Federation, and some 33 million in the states of the former USSR (Census 1989). Outside this region, Russian native speakers are very few: estimates vary, but range between 1.5 and 4.5 million people. Exact calculations are almost impossible to make, because naturalised persons of Russian origin and L1 Russian speakers cannot be easily distinguished. The majority of Russian native speakers abroad reside in the USA (241,709 according to the USA Census of 1990), in Canada (59,630 according to the Canadian Census of 1996), in Israel (over one million) and in Germany (360,000 in 1995).

The late 1980s and the whole of the 1990s were periods of mass emigration of Russian speakers, both for temporary and permanent residence. In 1986–1989 over one million people left the USSR, and during the 1990s migration rates were continuously increasing (Kabuzan 1996). Correspondingly, the number of Russian speakers living outside Russia increased. For example, the Census of Canada documented 31,745 Russian native speakers in 1971, 38,030 in 1991 (17,165 spoke Russian in the family) and 59,630 native speakers in 1996 (37,745 spoke Russian in the family).

The rate of naturalisation of Russian-speaking immigrants is determined by different factors: by the functional power of a language, by the ability to keep regular contact with other Russian speakers, including those who live in the mother country, and by immigrants' attitudes to language. Outside the traditional territory of Russian speakers, the communicative space of Russian is limited mostly to family, to periodicals and to fiction, although the internet increasingly offers opportunities. The wish to adapt to new conditions almost invariably results in the growth of bilingualism in the second generation of emigrants, and then to a complete language shift in the following generations (Golubeva-Monatkina 1999). According to 1990 census data, most Russian speakers living in the USA are bilinguals: of 241,798 Russian speakers using Russian in the family, 110,386 can speak English very well, 66,126 well, 50,365 speak it badly and 14,939 cannot speak English at all (although note that these data represent a self-estimation). Yet, as Stocker (1996, p. 97) mentions, by their level of assimilation and competence in English, Russian-speaking immigrants are relegated to the fourth from final position in the list of ethnic groups (they are followed by Chinese, Koreans and Vietnamese).

It is difficult to forecast the possible speed of naturalisation of Russian speakers in modern conditions. The increased number of Russian-speaking communities, their concentration in certain locations in some countries, and modern technical facilities may promote the maintenance of Russian as a language of diaspora. A considerable proportion of Russian permanent and non-permanent residents throughout the world endeavours to maintain their mother tongue through local periodicals, primary and secondary education (as an optional subject), business and culture. From 2000, a Russian web community has emerged: informational resources of the Russian-speaking diasporas in over twenty countries, linked with Russian on-line resources, have been united into the 'Russian webring' information system (http://dvor.com/friends.html; www.russianseattle.com/russians_r.htm; both accessed 10/2002).

To sum up, Russian outside the traditional territories of its use (Russia and the former USSR) functions to satisfy the basic communicative needs of the multiethnic Russian-speaking diaspora, which has increased during the 1990s and has some chance of maintaining the mother tongue in the new countries of residence.

The economic power of Russian

As is known, the parameter of economic power of a language is one of the most important when considering its future prospects. 'It is clear that a language which is spoken by rich countries is more attractive to learners than one which provides no access to personal betterment or lucrative markets' (Graddol 1997). From this point of view, Russian, which has a high demographic strength, loses when compared to languages of economically developed countries. In the 1980s, the USSR was already falling behind the economically developed countries in the speed of its economic growth. In the 1990s, the share of Russian in world trade and production was decreasing. The crisis of 1998 practically stopped all foreign investments in the Russian economy, although the economic situation has started to improve at the start of the twenty-first century.

The estimation of economic power of a language is a debatable question. Research of the late 1980s (Ammon 1995) provides evidence of a comparatively high economic strength for Russian at that time: it ranked fourth among languages of the world. It is obvious that the economic strength of Russian might improve only in conditions of fast economic growth in Russia. At the same time, it could hardly be expected that, even if this happens, Russian could take on a noticeable international position in world business, finance and trade. This 'economic niche' is now firmly occupied by English. In Russia, English is widely used in private business for negotiations with foreign partners and for general office work. Knowledge of English is usually a requirement for being employed in private firms in Russia. Thus, for foreign business people working with Russian partners, knowledge of Russian is desirable, although not essential. This is true as far as big business is concerned. In the 1990s, Russian became widely used in small businesses and trade, first of all in trade with the countries of Southeast Asia (China, Vietnam, Korea), with Turkey and, to a lesser degree, with the countries of eastern Europe.

Russian in worldwide education

Russian was a compulsory subject in the socialist countries, and was also taught in many developing countries of Asia and Africa, which had intense economic, political and cultural relations with the Soviet Union. In the 1990s, Russian gave way to other foreign languages, although in different regions of the world the fate of Russian as a subject of study also varied.

In the countries of eastern Europe, Russian has all but ceased to be taught. This has not influenced the language competence of older people to a great extent, but younger people of these countries now choose English, German or French as school subjects (see Chapter 7 of this volume). In Southeast Asia (China, Vietnam and Korea), Russian is still popular as a foreign language, although there is a preference for English. In these countries, Soviet and Russian mechanical facilities and technical documentation are still being used, so this explains the practical interest in Russian in this area.

In western Europe and the USA, studying Russian as a foreign language has never been a mass phenomenon. There were two periods of popularity for Russian: in the late 1960s and the 1970s and, more recently, from the late 1980s and into the early 1990s. The most recent popularity of Russian was generated, first, by a general interest in the political changes of this period and, second, by an expectation of fast development in the Russian market. But in the second half of the 1990s, especially after the crisis of 1998, it became clear that the hopes for a rapid involvement of Russia in the world economy were not justified and the interest in studying Russian began to fall.

It is obvious that the main reason for the decline in the study of Russian is mostly economic, although this tendency was also further accentuated by the ideologically biased negative image of Russia in the late 1990s. At the same time, an opposite more positive process is still possible, depending on an economic revival in Russia:

> although the world population of speakers of Russian as a first language will decline in the next few decades, Russian may regain popularity as a foreign language, when the Russian Federation emerges as a major regional economy, which, unlike any other world region, spans two of the three global 'business time zones' (*Global English Newsletter*, 1).

Russian in the information technologies

Regular radio broadcasting appeared in the early 1920s. Radio then became a major mass medium in the USSR. In 1975 there were five radio channels, including one for Soviet citizens working abroad. From the beginning of the 1990s, the system of radio broadcasting underwent crucial changes. Currently, there are five major federal radio stations, including the radio station 'Golos Rossii' ('The Voice of Russia'), which broadcasts in Russian and in thirty-two foreign languages covering all regions of the world. By 1997, several dozen specialised radio stations, both public and private, had been established; some of them broadcast to the countries of the former USSR.

Russian TV was created in 1934. In the Soviet period, of four TV channels, only one used satellite technology and broadcast in all regions of the USSR. The early 1990s saw the start of commercial TV in Russian, including cable TV. In 1997, the total audience of cable TV broadcasting in Russian was estimated at forty-five to fifty million people, or a quarter of the population of Russia. By 1997, the number of commercial TV channels rose to 900. From 1996, some TV linking systems, combining satellite communication with other television broadcasting technologies, started functioning. In 1999, the broadcaster ORT began satellite broadcasting, covering an area from Britain to Turkey, aimed mostly at Russian speakers living in Europe. In 2000, there were 1,500 different broadcasting organisations, of which 1,100 were private.

Russian began to be used in the internet from about 1990 and its use is developing very rapidly. The history of the Russian internet began with a highly specialised computer network, Relcom, which was linked up to the EUNet in 1990.

Estimates made by the Russian Centre for Information Technologies (ROCIT; http://www.rocit.ru) show that in 1998 about 250,000 private users had personal access to the internet, about 500,000 people used corporate networks and over 600,000 people used educational and academic networks. So, the total number of permanent users in 1998 was about 1.5 million people. ROCIT forecasted an increase in their user numbers by the end of 1998 to 1.8 million people, and by 2004, to as many as 2.5 to 3 million people. But internet statistics in 2000 show that the actual increase in internet users in Russia exceeded all expectations. According to the report 'Russian Internet Monitoring III-2000', weekly internet online usage in Russia is about 2.5 million people and the growth of internet users increases by 2% every month.

A search on the worldwide web can be done by means of search engines such as Aport, Yandex, Rambler and others. The search engines are designed to deal with Russian morphology. The Russian part of the web is not isolated from its English part. Some Russian search engines provide the possibility of a search in two languages, usually in Russian and English (Aport, Rambler). The meta-search engine 'Sledopyt' ensures the translation of queries from Russian into English and vice versa, and the processing of queries by international search engines such as Alta Vista and Euroseek. On the other hand, some non-Russian search engines used on the web can work in Russian (e.g. Alta Vista, Infoseek).

In conclusion, the internet turns out to be a very promising, though young, sphere of functioning for Russian. It contributes to the communication of Russian speakers not only in Russia, but also in other countries where they live.

Conclusions

In discussing the status of Russian and its future prospects at the start of the twenty-first century, we should consider all factors influencing the functioning of a language. As far as Russian is concerned, its main indices are rather unequal. Some are high and others low; some are rising, others are falling. For example, Russian possesses a high demographic power (although it will tend to decrease in the near future), but the relatively weak economic power of Russian prevents it from taking a higher rank among the biggest languages of the world. Russian enjoys the status of one of the working languages of the UN and UNESCO, but its share in international trade and finances is very small. Cable and satellite TV in Russian is rather limited, but Russian participation in the internet is growing rapidly. However, all prognoses run the possibility of being inaccurate.

The following conclusions concerning the current position of Russian in the world and its possible prospects can be offered:

- Russian remains strong and is becoming stronger as a universal means of communication in all regions of the Russian Federation.
- In the states of the former USSR (other than Belarus) Russian has lost its dominant position in most spheres of communication controlled by the national authorities. At the same time, it holds its position in some spheres (particularly

in private business) and currently in secondary education. Russian is maintained by the Russian-speaking communities of these states, which, under the pressures of the national language policies, switch to bilingualism; however, at the same time, they keep a full command of Russian. In contacts between the people living in Russia and in the states of the former USSR, Russian continues to be used as a means of interethnic communication. So, in this region there is the opportunity for Russian to partly retain its functional power, as a regional medium and as a mother tongue of the numerous Russian-speaking diaspora of these countries.

- Russian is starting to be used in modern information technologies. Timetables for the commencement of satellite and digital TV, etc., could be limited by financial factors, but Russian has all the necessary resources to enter these communicative spheres. Russian, as a language of the new information technologies, is in demand within Russia and in the CIS states and by the Russian-speaking diaspora in foreign countries.
- Russian is used more restrictedly as a foreign language outside the former USSR. In the near future it is not expected to be an actively studied language.
- Because of its restricted use outside the former USSR, Russian is not expected to acquire a leading position in international education. It might be supposed that a knowledge of Russian will be demanded by certain occupational groups or individuals, but its study outside Russia will be limited. It is likely that Russian will remain a widely studied foreign language in the Asian region, which preserves close economic relations with Russia.
- Russian has a chance to be maintained within the Russian-speaking communities, provided they have the opportunity to keep regular contacts with other Russian speakers in Russia.
- In general, we agree with the prognosis that Russian has real opportunities of being an important regional language if Russia can create strong regional economies, using its advantageous geographical location across global economic zones.

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18 Geolinguistics, geopolitics, geostrategy: The case of French

Robert Chaudenson

For over a decade, I have been the Cassandra of the Francophonie (French-speaking world) in the sense that I have tried in vain to alert those responsible for French language policy about the risks facing the future of French in the world. The occasional contributions that I have sent to French daily newspapers that deal with these questions have hardly ever been published. This has not bothered me too much since I have been able to place them in the journal Languages and Development (*Langues et développement*) or elsewhere. This personal observation seems significant, since the French press is unanimous and vocal in espousing what might be called Francophonie rhetoric, that is, that the position of French in the world is strong and likely to improve still more. The discourse in *Le Monde* when the journalist Mr Peroncelle-Hugoz was in charge was the same as that in *Le Figaro* with the exception that articles in the latter French daily were generally more substantive and better informed. For the benefit of readers unfamiliar with French political life, nationalism is a value shared by both the Communist Party and the French far right, a fact at once strange if explicable.

Emphasis on the dangers that French faces in the world need not produce anguish inasmuch as languages live and die like everything in this transient world, whatever claims of incivility or alienation are made against this view. A study published by the British Council (Graddol 1997) on the future of English expresses views close to mine about the future of French.

The most illustrative example of Francophonie rhetoric involves determining the number of French speakers. At the beginning of the 1980s, Philippe Rossillon – who had not only been a militant activist for the Francophonie but also Director of Cultural and Technical Cooperation in the Ministry of Foreign Development – told me of his plan to create a research institute about the Francophonie. One of the aims would have been to count the number of French speakers and assess their evolution. I remember with great clarity our conversation in Louisiana in the home of Senator James Domengeaux. From the outset, Rossillon had been the 'father' of the Council for the Development of French in Louisiana (CODOFIL), which has emphasised maintenance of French language and culture in Louisiana and for which Domengeaux had played a major role. I had responded to Rossillon that the idea was excellent, but that beforehand one would have to define what is a French speaker, that is, what would be the specified level of competence to ‘qualify’? Lacking such an evaluation, I viewed this initiative with concern. Rossillon, who was not a man to stop pursuing one of his ideas in mid-stream (his militancy was accompanied by a remarkable mixture of intelligence, power of decision and generosity), set up an Institute for Research on the Future of French (IRAF). IRAF publications essentially became a conduit for a ‘demographic linguist’, Claude Couvert. For years, Couvert prepared and published a series of modest monographs dealing with the prospects of French in various Third World countries.

The reader will have noted that I put the term ‘demographic linguist’ in quotation marks. This stylistic precaution reflects a reserve on my part which does not refer to the discipline as such, which is as legitimate as sociolinguistics, ethnolinguistics or psycholinguistics. Rather, for me demographic linguistics can be like the yeti or the Loch Ness monster, a being I have never found and whose existence remains problematical until proven otherwise. The demographic linguist, to judge by C. Couvert, is a two-sided entity of which one can only see one side at a time. For linguists the demographic linguist is a demographer, while he or she is a linguist with respect to demographers. In the name of an interdisciplinary approach, traditional standards of each discipline have been neglected.

This is the context in which IRAF began to furnish demographic linguistic data about Third World countries. These data have been widely circulated. I will not dwell on the criticisms I have made at length of the methods used. Suffice it to say here that they rely essentially on calculations based on education statistics and demography without questioning their reliability. At the same time, they rely little on study of linguistic competencies and situations. Even after IRAF disappeared, these data have been used and Couvert, who is moreover one of the co-authors of the *Atlas of the Francophonie* published in 1993, created a consulting firm to advise on issues in the area.

Serious methods would require the evaluation of levels of linguistic competence in French and this should be the basis on which the number of individuals possessing the ‘French-speaking minimum’ should be determined (this would be what I have called the French-speaking SMIC, that is to say, the linguistic equivalent of the minimum wage in France; Chaudenson *et al.*, 1995, 1996, 1997). Rather, ways have been looked for to up the number of French speakers through subterfuges that emphasise rhetoric and sophistry instead of demographic linguistics. Over the years, categories were thereby developed of ‘real French speakers’ (the others wouldn’t be?), ‘Frenchified speakers’, ‘occasional French speakers’ and ‘potential French speakers’ (the latter being the only effective category in distinguishing the real from the potential). I cannot take up here in detail the critique of these terms, which I have made elsewhere. Most of these terms (in any event the 'occasional' and the 'Frenchified' speakers) qualify not only as fictitious categories but moreover assail the French language itself since the meaning given them in no way corresponds to that in the most authoritative dictionaries. The objective is clear: one wishes, cost what it may, to up the number of French speakers in the world. In my personal notebook of silly estimates of French speakers in the twentieth century, the record was 500 million (M. Druon, *Le Point*, 7 August 1987), but the contest remains open in this new century.

Determination of a reliable quantitative and qualitative estimate of French speakers would have nothing to do with linguistic chauvinism or masochism. This is for me the primordial condition for the definition of a policy of effective, adaptive French language spread, be it national, bilateral or multilateral. One speaks readily today of cultural and language industries. What serious industry can ignore, or worse yet, falsify the state and potential of the market for its products? In the private sector, the sanction would be immediate and fatal. Only rich countries can afford to waste public money with impunity.

Accordingly, the categories and evaluations listed below are preferred. In 1989 I proposed distinguishing three principal species of Franco-fauna (Chaudenson 1989):

- French speakers who whether native speakers or not possess in French a linguistic competency that permits them to handle all communication situations in that language.
- Limited French speakers ('Francophonoïdes') who possess limited or partial competency in French but who can communicate quickly if incompletely in that language.
- Very limited French speakers ('Franco-aphones') who possess very limited or no competency in French but who being citizens of French-speaking countries are often classified in statistics as French speakers.

These classifications can be given greater rigour through, for example, application of an evaluation test such as the Abidjan test (Chaudenson *et al.* 1997). For an approximate application of this test, one may consider that French speakers obtain results greater than 350, limited French speakers between 350 and 150, and very limited French speakers a total less than 150 (these guidelines should be adapted if dealing with illiterate speakers).

Naturally, there is not much enthusiasm to proceed with this type of evaluation, which would call into question certain exaggerated counts of French speakers even though the tendency in serious inventories is to approximate linguistic realities. National surveys based on rigorous estimates would doubtless lead to re-evaluation of educational policies in particular. If pupils at the primary level, for example, do not have a sufficient level of French to permit them to assimilate lessons which are taught in that language, one must question the relevancy of educational policies into which countries frequently pour a third of their national budget.

Action by French-speaking countries as well as the policy of France with regard to the spread of French abroad must therefore take into consideration the real facts of the market. It is clear that the key stake has to do with the masses of limited French speakers and very limited French speakers in the Third World; these without doubt will determine the future of French in the world. Africa is thus the crucial stake, and recent evolution of the situation calls for attention.

Three events stood out in the 1990s:

- The fall of the Soviet empire: In Africa, this event made irrelevant the unconditional support by France (and more generally by the West) of autocratic African regimes, which had been viewed as bastions against popular democracies supported by the East bloc. The Berlin Wall had scarcely fallen when President Mitterand of France, at the La Baule Summit between France and French-speaking African countries (1990), suddenly discovered the virtues of democracy in Africa!
- The economic rise of Asia: European attention has focused on this continent. With regard to the Francophonie, expectations of Asian wealth unleashed a frenetic French commercial drive towards Vietnam. This policy has been unrealistic considering the geographical, political and economic realities, and has led to the worst rebuffs. For example, several months before the Hanoi Summit, the Vietnamese government banned any application in French for licences for industrial development (these being only permitted in Vietnamese and English!). Moreover, representatives of Vietnam express themselves in English in international meetings in contravention with the rules established for the admission of new countries into the Francophonie.
- The end of apartheid in South Africa: This event allowed the return of the Republic of South Africa on the international stage, which initiated an African policy worthy of the status the country has. These circumstances are full of consequences for French-speaking Africa, which is a colossus with 'feet of clay'. As a case in point, the French-speaking African minorities in these countries (elites and urban bourgeoisie) might easily tilt towards the English-speaking world. To take as an example French scholarship holders from Africa, the selection system is not objective and, in fact, lends itself easily to nepotism. As a result, the best African students set out for American universities or, increasingly, for South Africa. For African masses, the choice between English and French does not obtain, since they lack knowledge of both English and French. Other illustrative examples are that Rwanda has made English the third official language of the country and on several occasions I.D. Kabila of the Congo made similar gestures favourable to English.

In my role as Cassandra, I shall simply reiterate what I wrote in June 1991 as a conclusion to the book *The Francophonie: representations, realities and perspectives* (Chaudenson *et al*. 1991, pp. 196–197):

> The end of apartheid in South Africa has every possibility of having, on the African continent and in the Indian Ocean, geopolitical repercussions many of which cannot be measured . . . It is evident that the strategic impact of South Africa poses an immense danger for French in Africa.

One could analyse in greater detail events in central Africa in recent years and observe a domino effect where impacts, both direct and indirect, are felt up to Gabon.

If the effects of the third event listed above (the end of apartheid) are relatively limited at present to central Africa and the Indian Ocean, the other two events have more extensive repercussions throughout the continent. In Africa, it is widely believed that France and more generally Europe have turned away from Africa and towards central and eastern Europe and Asia. Germany, for example, has made an important revision in its aid policy. As for French policy, this impression has been reinforced by the debates about restructuring French foreign policy relating to cultural and technical aid. The reunification of the French ministries of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Assistance has crystallised this anguish. On this point, the views of Alain Juppé (as Minister of Foreign Affairs) and Lionel Jospin (as Prime Minister) were identical on the need for such a reform. At the Contonou Summit (1995), the African heads of state extracted the promise from President Jacques Chirac (then at the beginning of his administration) that during his presidential mandate this reform would not be implemented. Since then this commitment has been honoured only in part: the Ministry of Development may still exist but the creation of the Directorate of International Assistance and Development (DGCID) in January 1999 represented a major reunification of the technical services of the two ministries. This change in structure fortunately ends a bothersome dichotomy in the aid policy of France. Through another equally fortunate initiative, a sectoral organisation has global authority thereby substituting for geographical divisions (for more detail, see Chaudenson 1999).

The image of France has also been damaged, justifiably or not, by a necessary economic reform (reform of the CFA currency, i.e. the franc in Africa) and by some questionable policy choices (Rwanda, Zaire, Congo, etc.). Given this situation, two strategic choices remain possible.

One, which could be labelled humanist (but not 'third worldist'), is to take seriously the present political reality that French remains the official language (alone or with others) of the majority of the so-called French-speaking African countries. This situation – however strange this may seem – results from a free choice of African states supported almost unanimously by great African revolutionary leaders from Patrice Lumumba to Samora Machel. I find it personally a little tiring to hear still, nearly forty years after independence, repetition of the thesis of a neo-colonial plot. Nothing prevents African states from immediately changing this state of affairs.

In the present state of affairs, the citizens of these countries where French is the official language have a right to French, while human rights are scoffed at. The limited French speakers and the very limited French speakers, who constitute the immense majority of the populations, are deprived of the right to education, to information, to health, to work, etc. The UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 to which these countries are signatories formally guarantees these rights. But the fact that one permits these citizens occasionally to exercise a right to vote (when one does not do this for them!) scarcely has any importance in light of the deprivations they suffer elsewhere. There is thus in Africa a strong demand for French while supply is largely limited to the educational system that is supposed to spread this language to everyone. One quickly sees the limits of such a policy when the state of crisis or even failure of schools is recognised. Schools do not include or quickly exclude 60–70% of the school-age population, which moreover is going to double by 2020!

In this matter, the French-language demand of African populations, the interests of French-speaking countries, and those of France's policy of French-language spread are complementary. For France, the challenge is to rationalise the balance of French-language supply and demand abroad. It is necessary to balance situations where there is a heavy demand for which the supply is very insufficient (Africa and more generally the Third World), with contrasting situations where there is a much larger or inappropriate supply with respect to demand (certain traditional areas where French is studied abroad). All this indicates that a rational strategy can come about only through reliance on a global system for audio-visual spread of the French language (for details, see Chaudenson 1999).

The other strategic option is different in orientation and could be labelled as realist or even cynical. As is done in part at present, this consists in emphasising elites while the masses would be neglected. One observes in this regard a significant change, worthy of examination, in the African policy of the USA. Similarly, financial groups express great interest in Africa.

These diverse choices reinforce the view of some economic experts that Africa will be the continent of the twenty-first century inasmuch as its human and material resources are immense and almost unexploited. In fact, these two options lead to the same conclusion. People like myself who have expressed concerns about the future of French (but not about the future of Africa) have been labelled as Afro-pessimists, even though we rely on simple observation of facts. As I said in Rabat in September 1998 at the Second Scientific Meeting of the AUPELF-UREF, to the dismay of some of my colleagues especially French ones, the possibility that French may disappear in Africa in a century does not particularly disturb me. Rather, this should be a source of permanent anguish for official agencies responsible for French-speaking countries, for those responsible for French cultural and technical assistance, and for those African leaders who think that their national development cannot be viable without an international language.

It seems obvious to me, as I have been repeating over the past ten years, that the future of French in the world will be determined in Africa and not in Poland nor in Vietnam. It is indeed only there that there are masses of potential French speakers and a social demand favouring that language. Save exceptions which are well known, the linguistic demand of eastern and central European countries arises from a strategy to accelerate their integration into the European community. This orientation is legitimate, but transient language preference should not be confused with the underlying strategy of integration with Europe. It follows that the fate of French in Europe itself will be determined not in that space but precisely outside that space. No one in Europe is fooled by fiery declarations in favour of multilingualism, which is nothing but a smoke screen for the spread of English. Those favouring the spread of the French language should at once become more realistic and efficient regarding the determination of key stakes and places as well as strategies and methods for language spread.

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19 Towards a scientific geostrategy for English

Grant D. McConnell

Geostrategy via a future language observatory

Given the dearth of substantive language data, including 'language interpretable and language-relatable figures' (Kloss and McConnell 1974–98, vol. 1, pp. 23–25), it would seem somewhat presumptuous to discuss the future 'geostrategy' of languages, and especially those languages that are found on most continents and in a large number of countries. It seems doubly presumptuous to discuss in a few short pages the future of English, it being manifestly the most widespread and complex network of any language in the world. 'Geostrategy' is here defined in terms of an empirical research model, that should allow for a widespread monitoring and analysing of changes in the numbers of language users and language uses. Although most of my comments apply to English, the model could also be applied to what have been called the 'big' languages, or even to all the languages of the world. The editors of this volume have wisely advised against 'long-term projections and predictions', but have rather recommended including 'factors of equilibrium and disequilibrium among "big" languages at the start of the twenty-first century'.

The problem here is that few of the 'big' languages have a centralised international agency to collate, analyse, monitor, evaluate, generate and distribute normative macro data on a global scale. It is true that institutes such as the British Council do promote the teaching of English and tend to its worldwide visibility on the cultural plane. But even the British Council was never meant to be a language observatory, monitoring and researching the presence and evolution of English in societies and their institutions across the globe (see the comments below by Graddol 1997). Such a language observatory would require some sort of international organisation with regional centres to gather and analyse data on the use and spread of English. But such an institution would also have the normative task of deciding what types of language data would be most valuable in a given context and of defining the objectives, the terminology and the questions used in the data gathering process.

Such an observatory, which could be set up for English and other languages, is badly needed for monitoring the changing macro patterns of language use. Here, three general types of language configurations would need to be generated:

- languages undergoing expansion, i.e. those enjoying an increase in the number of users and in the number of uses;
- languages undergoing loss in the numbers of users and uses; and
- languages showing maintenance in the number of users and of uses.

Before classifying languages according to these three categories, detailed geolinguistic surveys of types of language environments need to be made. It is only then that we could conclude that 'the majority of the world's languages – found at present only at the base [some 6,000 or more at the base of Graddol's language pyramid in Figure 8] – are likely to become extinct' (Graddol 1997, p.13). This conclusion appears to have been based on apparently safe but piecemeal evidence. The surveys required would involve not just enumerations of the number of speakers, readers, etc. of languages (Kloss and McConnell 1974–98), but also surveys relating to usage patterns and an account of language products (McConnell *et al.*, 1978–98) across a number of social domains. Along with calculations of their vitality rates based on the degree of usage, this approach would provide a sufficiently structured database for carrying out the types of contextual analyses required for a proper macro analysis of language trends. It is only then that 'factors in equilibrium and disequilibrium' could be properly tested (Mackey 1973; McConnell 1997).

Sources of international data

Sources giving international data on languages are extremely limited in number. In reviewing language statistics worldwide one could first point to such international bodies as the United Nations (UN) and its Demographic Yearbook, but this annual publication simply collates and reprints periodically ethnolinguistic data, which it obtains from other national statistical organisations. In fact, there is a wide gulf between simply collating statistics produced elsewhere by various methods and generating new statistics based on a broadly based research programme applying specific normative objectives. Once such a programme is in place, the work could be decentralised by region and undertaken by nationals in their own countries. This was the strategy that has been carried out within an international research programme on the written languages of the world at the International Centre for Research on Language Planning at Laval University, Quebec City. International funding was obtained for publishing the results of the research and for nationals doing out-of-country exchanges, but the brunt of the funding for field research was financed by national institutions in China, India and elsewhere; these were institutions that were already working on various ethnolinguistic problems of their area.

For international languages, this type of global research needs to be carried out by an internationally recognised body, particularly if we want to analyse at the level of 'factors in equilibrium or disequilibrium' according to the three general types of language configurations mentioned above. This, in fact, implies the marshalling in a systematic way of countless key facts and figures over a very vast territory.

Another statistical source of long standing is the widely known publication *Ethnologue* (Grimes 2000), now in its fourteenth edition. Yet it too has some built-in biases, oriented to local minority (autochthonous) languages, used in the Bible translating activities of the Wycliffe Institute. However, *Ethnologue* covers an important language category, especially because such local languages are often summarily ignored or are simply clubbed together under a generic name in official government publications, thus often giving the appearance of being a single language. So giving specific statistics for these languages can be useful, but it can also be a delicate operation given that the criteria by which such an itemisation is carried out are often vague or simply not known. Hence, the change in classification from a single broad language name to a number of more specific 'languages' goes frequently unexplained.

For the past thirty years *Ethnologue* has been publishing language data, which can now add a diachronic dimension to our language statistics. Since many minority languages are on uncertain terrain regarding their linguistic demarcation, inherent difficulties show up in the data over the long run. While certain languages appear in *Ethnologue* from one decade to the next, many others undergo a change of name; still others seem to disappear entirely or disappear as a language, only to reappear as a dialect of another language. Newly 'discovered' languages also appear, while group names disappear. In spite of all the difficulties regarding minority language identification, the portrait of the linguistic composition of the countries of the world is much better known than it was a few decades ago, and this is due in quite some measure to the pioneering fieldwork of the Summer Institute of Linguistics.

Something that *Ethnologue* does not do is to cover adequately other types of languages, such as immigrant languages or colonial-cum-international languages. For these languages, treatment is sporadic and incomplete. So, for example, if our interest is in English or French, the language either does not appear at the country level (especially if it is not a former British, American or French dependency), or it appears as a global world figure from another outside source. This also shows up as a weakness in most other documented sources, so that we have little solid data on the number of speakers, readers, learners, etc. of most international languages. If we are to collect data on international languages seriously – English or any other – we must obtain data on the number of speakers, readers, learners, etc. who, for the greater part, speak these languages not as mother tongues, but as second or third languages. Hard data of these types are usually lacking at the country level or are only available here and there and from time to time. Hence, there is the ever present discontinuity between analysing statistically the *ad hoc* situation on the ground and proposing a geostrategy based on a much more complete statistical base. With the present state of the art, it is easier to describe the situation in very general descriptive terms, and then to propose approximate, global figures that are usually based on very sketchy facts rather than on detailed field data. This is all that most publications can offer in answer to a request for international language figures.

Global approaches to the gathering of language figures

In spite of these difficulties, a number of attempts have been made to make aggregate international counts of language speakers. One such set of figures was calculated at the start of the 1990s (McConnell 1991). A tripartite division of types of speakers of a language was proposed according to the role of the language in a country. The roles were defined as basic role, subsidiary role and restricted formal role. The definition of these three categories was not unlike the concentric circle image (mother tongue, second language, foreign language) proposed by Crystal (1997). In turn, Crystal's typology harks back to an earlier classification by an Indian linguist, Kachru (1985), who had proposed three concentric circles also representing three types of English speakers.

The 'inner' circle is reserved for countries of mother tongue or first language (L1) speakers. Crystal refers to this circle as the 'primary language' circle, in which he includes the following countries for English (in alphabetical order): Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, UK and USA.

The second circle is the 'outer' or 'extended' circle and covers those countries where English has played an important public role as a speaker's second language (L2). These countries are for the large part within an historical Anglophone sphere of influence. In these cases, English was not generally spoken in the home (although today this is becoming more the case for a younger generation in the upper socioeconomic strata), but would rather be spoken in a number of domains in the public sphere, notably in those domains dominated or controlled by governments (McConnell and Gendron *et al.* 1993). Examples of countries in this outer circle for English are: India, Philippines and Singapore, amongst many more. Crystal lists seventy-five countries in the above two circles, with a preponderant number in the second circle.

The third or 'expanding' circle are neither English mother tongue countries nor Anglophone sphere countries, but are rather non-Anglophone sphere countries where English is learned not as a second language, but as a foreign language. Examples of countries in this category are: China, Greece, Japan and Russia, amongst many others.

As Crystal rightly points out, the distinction between the second and third circles is less relevant sociolinguistically than it is historically, i.e. many countries today in the expanding or third circle have just as many or more relative numbers of users and hence usually speakers of English than do countries in the second circle. In the past, people in the countries of the second circle had a certain learning advantage, due to the physical proximity of English in the society, since contact with English was more frequent, and it could be seen to be socially present, useful and accepted. With the revolution in communications this is less the case in that physical proximity alone is no longer an all-compelling factor. Today, English can be useful and used everywhere in cyberspace and in all types of communication, no matter from what circle (country type) one is communicating. It seems certain that more and more non-mother-tongue speakers of English are coming 'online', not just from second circle countries but from most countries of the world. Earlier it was certain that a higher percentage of second (extended) circle speakers had greater fluency and therefore a distinct advantage over third (expanding) circle speakers, but the world language pool as a clearing house is now open to all who want or need to communicate internationally. Clearly, the distinction between second and third circle speakers, i.e. between second language and EFL (English as a foreign language) speakers, is diminishing and both are simply becoming communicators/users of English. This trend should not eliminate other smaller regional language basins of communication, but it is difficult to imagine that tapping into that larger pool of information/communication through English, can be anything but highly attractive for those wanting to hear and be heard by the largest numbers.

This same typology of the three concentric circles is also used in a recent publication by Graddol (1997, p.10). He states: 'Native speakers may feel that the language 'belongs' to them, but it will be those who speak English as a second or foreign language who will determine its world future.' This, I would say, states the case well. At the present (especially with the slower rates of population growth in inner circle countries), growth of L1 (inner circle) speakers for English and French is slow. Also, as mentioned in McConnell's count (McConnell 1991, Appendix J), the number of countries using English and French in a basic role capacity is restricted: ten countries for English (with a base role population of L1 speakers of 300 million) and five countries for French (with a base role population of L1 speakers of sixty million). Other languages such as Spanish and Arabic have a much larger number of base role countries: Spanish twenty-one (with a base role population of 250 million L1 speakers) and Arabic twenty-one (with a base role population of 135 million L1 speakers). But the rate of population growth in the Arabic-speaking and Spanish-speaking countries is much greater than in the base role English and French speaking countries. For L1 countries, it is usually a case of an increase in numbers over generations, either of original stock or of the assimilation of other ethnic stocks over time. In spite of the fact that English is demographically in the slow growth group of languages for L1, in absolute numbers it is still in a favoured position when compared to the other languages. This may not be the case in fifty years' time.

In second (extended) circle countries (mainly ex-colonial countries), the speed at which English has grown has been moderate, especially if one excludes creole versions of the language. This is partly because of a lack of a widespread and solid teaching infrastructure for the language in such countries, but also because of a weak public education infrastructure, which is also reflected in the generally high illiteracy rates for school-age populations and a lack of access to modern communication tools. There are, of course other reasons for the slow growth in speaker figures for some of these countries, such as strong local indigenous languages (language pools) with equally strong literary traditions. India is a case in point. English with a colonial tradition has been established for some 300 years. It was long the official language of the country and is presently the associate official language after Hindi. It is also a co-official language at the state (sub-regional) level in some states. In spite of its semi-indigenous status, given its long exposure and visible presence in India, English remains largely a language of the educated urban classes and is all but a foreign language for the vast illiterate population. The educated classes are usually also literate in their various mother tongues, and after independence strong movements for strengthening the 'big' mother tongues – as full-fledged constitutional (Schedule VIII) languages (there are sixteen) – have continued to exist. This is particularly the case for Hindi, which is both the first official language (the second being English) and the largest mother tongue of the country. Since independence, Hindi/Urdu has spread much more naturally through the mass media (films, radio and TV) than English and has become more widely understood and used as an L2, especially by the illiterate masses. Between these two extremes of population types, there is a middle group who are educated in one or more of the Indian languages, but whose use of English is either passive or less than fully functional. Under these circumstances there appears to be little room for a rapid and widespread growth for English in India.

Contrastively, China is a good country with which to compare India, first because both countries are about the same size demographically (together they comprise two-thirds of the world's population), but do not belong to the same circle in the above typology: India is in the second (extended) and China is in the third (expanding) circles. India is obviously 'inside' while China is 'outside' the Anglophone sphere. Because of the semi-indigenous situation of English in India, we would naturally expect a larger number of pupils in English-medium schools than in China. This is the case. On the other hand, as for those studying the language as a school subject, there is a larger pool of children being educated in China (less illiteracy), and *ipso facto* a greater long-term potential for the growth of English. Figures we gathered in the late 1980s (McConnell and Roberge 1994) indicated a secondary school population of about forty-three million studying English in the state schools of India (admittedly there are many in private schools). However, at the same date some forty million were also studying the language in secondary schools in China. In the mid 1980s China's 'open door' policy had only just begun, so the above figure has now probably become larger for China than for India. This is a clear demonstration that the three circle typology is less relevant from a sociolinguistic point of view now that the internet is available throughout much of the world, that a strong educational infrastructure promotes access of a population to a world language and that the size of the 'pool' in turn stimulates the demand and over time creates a vested interest.

Presently and in the future, it will be the third or expanding circle countries that are likely to register the largest gains for English. To evaluate this third group of EFL countries fairly in terms of new English users, we would have to examine the size of the school population and the percentage of pupils at each scholastic level who are studying English or studying through English. We have recently done this (McConnell 2001) for eighteen polities of Asia, in which both the linguistic configuration of the countries, their historical linguistic backgrounds and their school age populations by levels were analysed. This also demonstrates both the utility and the need to undertake such contextual analyses if we are to monitor the gains in speakers for English or for any other world language.

In a recent report to the British Council on the question of the present position and the future of English in the world, Graddol (1997) presents a useful overview of the problem. Three general conclusions can be drawn from this report: namely:

- that we are hindered by a 'scarcity of data' and a lack of a 'central international authority';
- that the whole question of tracing the future path of any language, and particularly English, is fraught with uncertainty due to the large number of unpredictables involved, for it is not just a question of demographics but also one of attitudes, tastes and political agendas;
- when compared to other languages, English is successfully spreading, but the present model of success, whatever that may be, is no guarantee for success in the future.

The Graddol report is innovative in that it proposes a number of scenario models and accumulative indexes such as the 'engco' model (developed in 1995 by the English Company UK Ltd), which calculates an index of 'global influence' based on other indexes such as Traded Gross Language Product and Human Development Index. In this approach we are to presume that various social and economic indicators (groups of groups of indicators) have a more or less direct linkage with language use and usage. However, such statistics, however useful, should be no replacement for a hands-on research effort in the field that can measure usage (language vitality) and at the same time count various types of language users. The latter contextual approach would provide no quick solution, since it would present major logistical problems on a global scale given the present lack of an overall infrastructure. Thus, the Graddol report gives us a number of language indexes, but no tables giving the number of total speakers, readers or writers by language, and little data on actual language usage (McConnell 1978–98; McConnell and Roberge 1994). These fundamentals would in turn permit researchers to generate new indexes that would be more connected to the ever-changing linguistic reality of the societies and economies of the world.

A model for future analysis

If a scientific approach to the tracking of changing language patterns is sought, what is required is to build the research plan empirically over time, beginning with field work. This requires gathering standardised data on users and uses. In order to determine 'factors of equilibrium and disequilibrium at the start of the twenty-first century', spatial boundaries are also required and types of scenarios of language contact can then eventually be delineated and defined. One approach could be to use and continue to amplify the database of *The Linguistic Composition of the Nations of the World* (Kloss and McConnell 1974–98) with its delineation of country types (see Tables 19.1–19.3 below) according to various demographic-linguistic attributes (total speakers, mother tongue, etc.). By examining trends diachronically, we can then see on what attributes there is equilibrium or not. For example, if the mother tongue levels for all languages in a country are stable but the use of an L2 is increasing in relative and absolute terms for only one language, one can conclude that that language is numerically on the increase. As speakers are not learning and using a language in a vacuum, the next question is to determine where and how the new speakers are using their L2. On a statistical level this can be determined only after a social investigation of language use. We have carried out such surveys in a number of countries, leading not only to a demarcation of the oral and written usage patterns of a language in public, institutional domains (McConnell *et al.* 1978–98), but also to a measure of the vitality of the language, based on this usage (McConnell and Gendron *et al.* 1993).

For languages such as English in the third (expanding) circle countries (many of which have low literacy rates), the success of the spread of English, especially for the written language, is determined in part by the school system. Therefore, the extent of the presence of a language in the school system of a country not only reflects an evaluation of its sociopolitical status, but also points to a potential or eventual number of users.

The McConnell and Roberge school survey (1994) was recently matched with database statistics from eighteen countries of East and Southeast Asia (McConnell 1998) in order to determine in what types of countries (dominant

A / dominant B / mixed), in what functions (learning English / learning through English) and on what educational level (primary, secondary, post-secondary) English was most used. As expected, the results showed that in all three country types, English in the Anglophone-sphere countries did well with respect to percentage share for both functions and at all levels. In the non-Anglophone-sphere countries, English did well in all three country types for the function 'learning English' and did better in mixed type countries for the function 'learning through English'. The conclusion is that the function 'learning English' was strong in nearly all East and Southeast Asian countries at both the primary and secondary levels, regardless of the demographic-linguistic composition or historical orientation of the country. Table 19.1 gives a demographic-linguistic profile of the countries of the region. The typology presents three types of countries based on their demographic-linguistic composition according to total speaker figures.

The above analysis covers only one region of the world (East and Southeast Asia) and compares only a few variables. In this sense it is only a start to any sort of empirical analysis. A broader analysis would include more countries, other world regions and more functions in order to determine what kinds of continental and intercontinental patterns emerge in the expansion, loss and maintenance of language users and uses. To conclude these comments I discuss two other world regions from our databases, namely: (1) Europe and the former USSR region and (2) Central and South America.

With the break-up of the Soviet Union and the momentous changes in the whole of eastern Europe the trend in this part of Europe is towards more dominant A or single-language dominant states. The dominant B countries are only two in number: Moldova and Tajikistan. The mixed countries are: Andorra, Belgium, Gibraltar, Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Latvia and Luxemburg. Table 19.2 gives a similar demographic-linguistic profile of this world region according to linguistic typology.

As in the earlier study covering Asia, Anglophone-sphere countries in Europe rated strongly on both functions, which was not surprising given the fact that these countries (in Europe) are also English mother-tongue countries. On the other hand, the non-Anglophone-sphere countries of Europe rated strongly in the 'learning English' function. In thirteen of the twenty-five countries listed, English was taught as a subject at the elementary level in the 1980s. For the same period all twenty-five countries included English in their secondary level curriculum. This covered from 50% to 100% of the secondary level school population, depending on the country. This amounted to over ten million learners of English at the elementary level and twenty million studying English at the secondary level, for a grand total of thirty-three million pupils for the EFL countries. If this survey were conducted again at the present time, the totals could well be in the fifty-million range.

Table 19.1 *Three types of language country profiles using an adaptation of the historical (FCL[a]) Model: East and Southeast Asia*

	Type[b]		
Countries/Dependencies	Dominant-A	Dominant-B	Mixed
Brunei	×		
Cambodia	×		
China	×		
Hong Kong		×	
Indonesia		×	
Irian Jaya	×		
Java–Madura–Bali			×
Kalimantan			×
Maluku	×		
Nusa Tenggara	×		
Sulawesi		×	
Sumatra	×		
Japan	×		
Korea, North	×		
Korea, South	×		
Laos	×		
Macau	×		
Malaysia			×
Malaysia, peninsular	×		
Sabah-Labuan			×
Sarawak			×
Mongolia	×		
Myanmar (Burma)	×		
Philippines			×
Singapore			×
Taiwan			×
Thailand	×		
Vietnam	×		

Notes: [a]The FLC historical model used here for defining language country profiles in terms of language dominance/non-dominance is basically the same model used earlier by Ladefoged and Criper, and then Fishman, except that we use total language speakers rather than mother-tongue speakers in the calculations/classifications. For a further explanation of the model refer to volume 6 of Kloss and McConnell (1974–98, pp. xi–xix).

[b]The country types are defined as follows:

- Dominant-A countries: The numerically strongest language has twice (or more than twice) the number of speakers as the second largest language, and all other languages represent 10% or less of the total population.
- Dominant-B countries: The numerically strongest language has twice (or more than twice) the number of speakers as the second largest language, but at least one other language represents more than 10% of the total population.
- Mixed countries: All countries not included in the first two categories. These are mostly countries with no single numerically strong language.

Table 19.2 *Three types of language country profiles using an adaptation of the historical (FCL*) Model: Europe and the former USSR*

Countries/Dependencies	Type: Dominant-A	Type: Dominant-B	Type: Mixed	Countries/Dependencies	Type: Dominant-A	Type: Dominant-B	Type: Mixed
Albania	×			Kirghizstan			×
Andorra			×	Latvia			×
Armenia	×			Liechtenstein	×		
Austria	×			Lithuania	×		
Azerbaijan	×			Luxembourg			×
Belgium			×	Malta	×		
Belarus	×			Moldavia		×	
Bulgaria	×			Monaco	×		
Channel Islands			×	Northern Ireland	×		
Czechoslovakia	×			Norway	×		
Denmark	×			Poland	×		
Estonia	×			Portugal	×		
Faeroe	×			Romania	×		
Islands				Russia	×		
Finland	×			San Marino	×		
France	×			Scotland	×		
Georgia	×			Spain	×		
Germany	×			Sweden	×		
Gibraltar			×	Switzerland	×		
Greece	×			Tajikistan		×	
Holland	×			Turkmenistan	×		
Hungary	×			USSR	×		
Ireland (Eire)	×			Ukraine	×		
Iceland	×			United Kingdom	×		
Isle of Man	×			Uzbekistan	×		
Italy	×			Vatican City	×		
Kazakhstan			×	Yugoslavia			×

Note: See note at Table 19.1

For these same twenty-five countries, no English was used as a medium of instruction at any school level. However, again the picture has changed vastly in the past decade so that a survey in Europe would be required particularly for the post-secondary or university level, where English has become much more present as a language of science and learning (Ammon 1998; Ammon and McConnell 2002). If the presently developing situation in schools is later replicated in society as a whole, this could eventually generate a diglossic situation in which national languages are used alongside English for certain public functions and particularly in certain domains of science and global communication. This is the trend for a number of countries in Europe.

Turning to the second case study, for the countries of Central and South America, the vast majority are dominant-A type countries, six are mixed type countries and none are dominant-B type countries. The mixed type countries are Bolivia, Surinam and dependencies or former dependencies in the Antilles, namely: Netherland Antilles, Guadeloupe and Martinique, and St Lucia. As expected, Anglophone-sphere countries of this region are completely dominated by English in the schools in both functions and at all levels. As for the non-Anglophone-sphere countries, teaching through English is infrequent; but it does exist on all levels in the Netherland Antilles and in post-secondary education in Brazil, Colombia and Surinam. Learning English is, however, widespread in all countries at the secondary level (for Haiti and Peru there were no data) and occasionally at the primary level: Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Netherland Antilles. Some 16.5 million pupils study English in this region. By repeating this survey today one could determine the change in the use of English. In South America, English has traditionally been in competition with French as the foreign language and also with Spanish, as a lingua franca of the region. Due to strong demographic growth, Spanish stands to make major gains in South America in the coming decades (if and when the economies of the region become further integrated) not only as a lingua franca, but also as a mother tongue. Due to the potential of Spanish, particularly as a continental lingua franca, the degree to which English strengthens its position as an L2 in this region could be a test of its powers of expansion elsewhere in the world as the international language. Table 19.3 presents a summary of the situation of English for the 1980s in the schools of Central and South American countries both within and outside the Anglophone-sphere of influence.

If further developed and amplified, the above research model might realistically serve as a basis for an overall scientific geostrategy for English, or for any of the other major lingua francas of the world. It could lay the groundwork for empirical research based on quantified and verifiable data, revealing the trends and patterns of language equilibrium and disequilibrium in the twenty-first century.

Table 19.3 *Summary of learning through and of English in Central and South America in the 1980s*

	Those learning through English[a]			Those learning English[b]	
Countries	Primary	Secondary	Post-secondary	Primary	Secondary
(1) Countries historically outside the Anglophone sphere:					
Argentina	–	–	–	–	964,785
Bolivia	–	–	–	84,318	158,038
Brazil	–	–	17,075	–	3,339,090
Chile	–	–	–	–	401,692
Colombia	–	–	6,041	–	955,884
Costa Rica	–	–	–	–	143,064
Cuba	–	–	–	–	1,143,137
Dominican Republic	–	–	–	324,092	361,384
Ecuador	–	–	–	–	744,373
El Salvador	–	–	–	–	45,483
French Guiana	–	–	–	–	4,789
Guadeloupe and Dependencies	–	–	–	–	47,148
Guatemala	–	–	–	–	120,526
Haiti	–	–	–	–	–
Honduras	–	–	–	–	238,635
Martinique	–	–	–	–	40,722
Mexico	–	–	–	–	6,164,827
Netherland Antilles	2,201	827	62	2,201	4,625
Nicaragua	–	–	–	–	172,108
Panama	–	–	–	–	199,564
Paraguay	–	–	–	–	34,458
Peru	–	–	–	–	–
Surinam	–	–	1,240	–	–
Uruguay	–	–	–	–	95,197
Venezuela	–	–	–	–	634,834
TOTAL	2,201	827	24,418	410,611	16,014,363
(2) Countries historically inside the Anglophone Sphere:					
Anguilla	1,483	634	–	1,483	634
Antigua (Barbuda and Redonda)	9,097	5,044	–	9,097	5,044
Bahamas	36,003	23,280	4,932	36,003	23,280
Barbados	28,845	22,181	3,828	28,845	22,181
Belize	39,779	7,326	–	39,779	7,326
Bermuda	5,334	4,510	561	5,334	4,510
British Virgin Islands	1,921	1,113	–	1,921	1,113
Cayman Islands	2,223	1,315	267	2,223	1,315
Dominica	16,105	3,523	–	16,105	3,523
Falkland Islands	245	130	–	245	130
Grenada	19,963	6,437	850	19,963	6,437

Table 19.3 (*cont.*)

Countries	Those learning through English[a]			Those learning English[b]	
	Primary	Secondary	Post-secondary	Primary	Secondary
Guyana	134,679	47,870	2,200	134,679	47,870
Jamaica	332,636	235,066	17,791	332,636	235,066
Montserrat	1,403	1,056	–	1,403	1,056
St Christopher	6,564	4,153	221	6,564	4,153
St Lucia	32,650	6,280	1,097	32,650	6,280
St Vincent	24,541	6,448	736	24,541	6,448
Trinidad and Tobago	182,764	98,911	4,939	182,764	98,911
Turks and Caicos Islands	1,546	872	–	1,546	872
Total	877,781	476,149	37,422	877,781	476,149
Total for (1) and (2)	879,982	476,976	61,840	1,288,392	16,490,512

Notes: [a]refers to the school population by country that has English as a medium of instruction; [b]refers to the school population by country that has English as a school subject.
Source: McConnell and Roberge 1994

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20 On Brazilian Portuguese in Latin American integration

Maria da Graça Krieger

It is estimated that the Portuguese language is spoken by about 200 million people. In quantitative terms, it ranks as the sixth most widely spoken language in the world, having spread from Portugal to various other countries. Such wide expansion and distribution originate in the Portuguese history of maritime explorations that led to the discovery of new lands and important commercial routes to the East. That is why today this language is present not only in various ex-Portuguese colonies but also in those regions where communication in Portuguese was common, as is the case of India and Southeast Asia.

Today, Portuguese is the national language of Brazil as well as the official tongue of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Also, Macao in Asia keeps Portuguese as its official language, while near Australia the east part of Timor Island is trying to re-establish this language, forbidden during the occupation by Indonesia. As happens to every language spoken in different regions, Portuguese has a great number of variants. However, its linguistic unity is preserved due to the reiteration of the morphological and syntactic systems, in spite of the lexical diversity that affects its various linguistic strata in different territories.

The expansion of Portuguese as one of the most widely spoken languages of the world confirms that the history of languages – with respect to territorial reach and acceptability as a communication means – can be explained with reference to interests and needs related to economic, scientific and cultural exchanges. This reaffirms the strong connection between language migration movements and socioeconomic and cultural factors.

Brazil, with nearly 170 million inhabitants, has the greatest number of Portuguese-speaking people. Influenced by Indian and African languages, alongside other natural factors of language evolution, Brazilian Portuguese has lexical units and some syntactic and phonological features that represent significant differences from those used in Portugal. Despite these distinctions that characterise so-called Brazilian Portuguese, Brazil is a country that plays an important role in the process of making the Portuguese language an important component in the globalised world of today. This role is strongly related to Brazilian membership in Mercosur (the South American Common Market or *Mercado del Sur*), which has established both Portuguese and Spanish as official tongues.

Brazil is the only Portuguese-speaking country in Latin America, being a kind of island in a sea of Spanish-speaking countries. Portuguese does not have a history of expansion in America, while Spanish, which is spoken in about twenty countries, has always had greater prestige in the international arena. Nevertheless, economic interests peculiar to globalisation are responsible for the increasing space Portuguese has been acquiring at the end of the twentieth century.

Strong economic and technological development characterises Brazil as one of the nations where gross domestic product grows relatively fast despite its evident social disparities. This reality and the potential derived from the country's continental dimension and population density explain the new situation of Brazilian Portuguese as the second foreign language after English in the context of Latin America. This is an important change, as historically there has never been any interest by Spanish-speaking countries for acquiring the language of Brazil.

It is not possible to analyse the situation of Brazilian Portuguese in Latin America without recognising the relationship between Portuguese and Spanish in the communicative process of the region. Such a process has been traditionally marked by the rejection of the neighbour's language as a foreign tongue to be learned or spoken properly. This can be easily explained by the fact that speakers of both languages understand that their common origin, phonological similarities and equivalent syntactic structures facilitate mutual understanding of their respective tongues. And apart from this, these similarities stimulate and encourage a type of communication where Brazilian Portuguese and Southern Cone Spanish systems mingle in a type of mixed language conventionally known as *Portunhol* (Portunish).

Notwithstanding, Mercosur tries to reverse the situation of longstanding disregard for the neighbour's language. In fact, Mercosur represents today a supranational undertaking that is not limited to commercial interchanges, but that is also active in scientific, technological and cultural interchanges. Such a change of attitude has been achieved by having strengthened the belief that the common knowledge of both languages is an important integration component and also a necessary condition for the harmonious consolidation of supranational blocs. International agreements assigning the same rank as official languages to both languages spoken in the countries of the new regional venture are also considered as mechanisms for integration (Krieger 1998).

For this reason, there has been a series of official actions aimed at promoting the development of effective bilingual competence from Portuguese to Spanish and vice versa. Although these agreements have been formally made by the signatories to the Asunción Treaty (December 1994), the teaching of Spanish and

Portuguese as foreign languages within the formal teaching system is limited. Many reasons can explain this fact, one of them being the lack of well trained teachers.

As a counterpart, a number of private enterprises offer language courses. The commercial world regards a greater linguistic competence as a *sine qua non* condition. Thus, the effects of this endeavour can be statistically measured as an increase of Portuguese use, mainly in the Spanish-speaking countries in the most diverse commercial and business environments. The economic, population and cultural potential of Brazil acquires relevance here.

Despite the growth of the language of Brazil as a foreign language, the movement towards the acquisition of another tongue is not unidirectional in the present process of economic integration of South America. On the contrary, there is a bidirectionality encouraged by a linguistic policy of Mercosur of equal status of Portuguese and Spanish. It is a policy fully accepted due to economic interests, but also because it exists in a linguistic competition-free area. Without a polemical legacy, Portuguese and Spanish do not usually dispute spaces or prestige. Therefore, the panorama of one language aiming at hegemony over the other is not foreseen.

On the other hand, this peaceful conviviality favours and reaffirms the use of *Portunhol* in informal communications. No doubt, it is a question of a spontaneous manifestation, a common attempt to speak the language of the other by means of a linguistic blend. Thus, each speaker uses the syntactic semantic structures of his or her own mother tongue, introducing, though, some lexical and phonological elements from the language intended to be spoken.

However, such a phenomenon does not represent the creation of a ‘new’ language. On the contrary, such spontaneous manifestations simply testify to a communicative paradigm rather than a linguistic one, in that it is not characterised by utterance regularities identifying the presence of a new language. In short, it is considered a droll modality of which the communicative efficiency is questionable. It should be added that, despite this communicative mingling, neither Portuguese nor Spanish has incorporated lexical units from each other. The foreign interferences and neological processes are not permanent nor consubstantial, as happens with English influences over these languages.

Thus, the leading polemical aspect of linguistic policy in the Southern Cone is not the dispute between two languages of border countries, but rather the great English interference into their lexical stock. This comment does not mean to overlook the importance of English. On the contrary, the development of internal and external economy in Latin America, especially in Mercosur, needs English as an indispensable tool for commercial advance and consequent affirmation in the international market.

It is not likely that *Portunhol* will become the spoken language in Latin America to the detriment of the other current national languages. At least in the short run, a transforming force able to give linguistic supremacy to this spontaneous form of communication cannot be foreseen. Nevertheless, it must be also understood that the advance or not of *Portunhol* in the Southern Cone will depend on the concrete achievement of governmental purposes of making the region competent in both major national languages: Portuguese and Spanish.

If making a linguistic policy of expanding bilingualism in the Southern Cone is linked to 'the necessary growing of our Latin American conscience' (Antunes 2000), then it becomes simultaneously a form of promoting the productive economic, scientific and cultural potential of South America. As a result, both the internal integration of this supranational area and its affirmation in the international arena would be strengthened.

In this context, Portuguese expansion does not reflect a dispute or a drive for supremacy, but rather a readjustment towards greater balance in correlating linguistic forces in South America. As a consequence, the advance of Brazilian Portuguese shows the power of economies in shaping societies at the same time as respect for cultural identities of each country, both of which are fundamental components of the history of languages.

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Conclusion

21 The search for a global linguistic strategy

Humphrey Tonkin

The era that ended with the collapse of communism has given way to an era of globalisation, the term of choice to describe the changes observed in the world over the past ten or a dozen years. Broadly speaking, there are two ways of looking at the phenomenon of globalisation: as interconnectedness or as expansion. The first tends to be sympathetic to the USA, the second opposed. According to the former model, the various independent economies across the world, aided by technological advances and resulting improvements in communication, have come together to form economic and financial networks, allowing for greater flow of capital (including human capital) across national boundaries, greater integration of markets and the emergence of extra-governmental transnational structures in the form of global corporations. Such structures, the argument goes, promote dense communication networks and financial interdependencies that not only improve the standard of living in many countries, but also serve to promote peace by creating shared interests. Thomas Friedman, author of *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (1999), has pointed out that countries endowed with McDonalds franchises do not go to war with one another. By-products of this new world order and major contributors to the growth of a world polity are non-governmental organisations whose reach goes beyond the parochial interests of individual states (Boli and Thomas 1999), worldwide concern for human rights that is much less inhibited by national boundaries than it once was, ease of international travel as restrictions on the free movement of persons are reduced, and a growing integration of both scientific research and advanced education.

This era of interconnectedness has opened up new opportunities for vast numbers of people and brought prosperity to many. It is an era of what Friedman calls 'the democratisation of technology'. No longer must dependent countries in the Third World ship their raw materials to industrialised countries to be processed into finished goods by their expensive and ponderous machinery: now it is increasingly easy to process the raw materials in the producing countries themselves, or indeed anywhere else where adequately trained labour is available. Furthermore, Friedman points out, it is also an era of 'the democratisation of finance': with worldwide financial markets readily accessible from all corners of the globe, and with many forms of financial products available to the public, anyone with a little capital to invest can buy a stake in this worldwide system. In short, globalisation promises rising standards of living for many, and increased opportunity for all.

Interconnectedness, while it may have brought new opportunities, has, however, also brought uncertainty. Bauman (1998, p. 3) singles out as 'globalising processes' the phenomena of 'progressive spatial segregation, separation and exclusion'. The rapid strides made by technology – particularly communications technology – have had the effect of wiping out whole industries, forcing whole communities to re-tool and re-educate themselves, and inventing new industries to take the place of the old. Uncertainty brings with it a yearning for stability and for enduring values, even as they are threatened by economic and cultural change. It also brings with it the desire for rootedness, and a certain resistance to the homogenisation and anonymity of modern living. The new technology can deliver at least a form of planned variety, by producing specialty goods and by setting up forms of feedback between producer and consumer, and it can serve to cement the common interests of those who seek to preserve old ways of life: it is interactive, it allows for the creation of self-selected networks, and it permits responsive planning even by scattered interest groups. So there is a certain tension between the forces of change unleashed by the new technology and the potential for resistance to that change offered by access to democratised communication systems such as the internet.

US citizens, sentimentally wedded to a view of the world in which the values expressed by the US Constitution are supposedly shared by all, and in which people around the world are all very much the same beneath the skin, are apt to see in globalisation the realisation of a dream of democracy: if globalisation brings with it some negatives, for the most part it is a positive development, in which all people can share. Furthermore, it is not so much a US – or American – phenomenon as a phenomenon born of the simultaneous and reciprocally reinforcing discovery of a community of interest and of the technological, economic and political means of embodying shared values. It is significant that American interest in human rights tends to focus less on the rights embodied in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, than on those contained in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. These two international agreements, which entered into force in 1976, are expansions of the principles contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, one dealing with such matters as rights to employment, the right to an adequate standard of living and so on, and the other addressing such questions as freedom of thought, freedom of speech and freedom of religion. In the American view, the latter would seem to be more important than the former. Thus, a vision of a workplace free from governmental control is coupled with a vision of a political environment free of governmental constraint.

If this view of globalisation is the view commonly espoused by Americans, and others who are part of the American consensus, it is emphatically not the view of many others. What is one person's vision of global capital flows is another person's nightmare of 'McDonaldisation', or what Benjamin Barber (1996) calls 'McWorld'. To such people's way of thinking, globalisation is essentially expansion: the spread of American business practices, American cultural assumptions and American knowledge to other parts of the world. According to this view, globalisation is an attempt to make the world safe for American values and American capital. To quote Mackey (Chapter 6 of this volume) quoting Lacordaire, 'Entre le fort et le faible, c'est la liberté qui opprime' ('Between the strong and the weak, it is liberty that oppresses') Ignacio Ramonet (2000, p. 5), perhaps indulging a certain licence for selective accusation, but expressing a sentiment widely held by those outside the USA, writes:

> Formerly perpetrators of genocide (against the Indians), agents of slavery (against the Blacks of Africa), expansionists (against the Mexicans) and colonialists (against the inhabitants of Puerto Rico), the USA, no doubt worn out by their excessive brutality, aspire, from here on, to install themselves peacefully in the heads of all non-Americans, and to seduce their hearts. (translation)

Ramonet points out that the most effective colonialism is the colonialism in which the colonised are happy with their lot, a view made popular forty years ago in the writings of Herbert Marcuse and his notion of 'commodities of satisfaction' doled out to the poor as a consumerist opiate by controlling capitalists (Marcuse 1964, Chapter 1). Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth (2000) suggest, writing in the same issue of *Le Monde Diplomatique*, that the spirit that lies behind such expansionism rests on a particular kind of political ambiguity, in which freedom to exploit is coupled with an obligation to philanthropy, and in which freedom to acquire wealth is linked with other more morally acceptable forms of personal freedom. They call this tension 'the imperialism of virtue'. It is one manifestation of what Eduardo Galeano describes in a recent highly polemical exposé of American capitalist values (Galeano 2000, p. 25) as a 'looking-glass world':

> This world, which puts on a banquet for all, then slams the door in the noses of so many, is simultaneously equalizing and unequal: *equalizing* in the ideas and habits it imposes and *unequal* in the opportunities it offers.

But there is a more immediately ugly side to globalisation as well: the exploitation of cheap labour, the concentration of extreme wealth in a small number of hands, and the growing gap between those who have access to technology and those who do not. For many people, among them those in the old Soviet Union, the global triumph of capitalism has led to a lowering of the quality of life and a drop in real income. Such deprivation in the presence of wealth, when coupled with the alienation to which I have already referred, produces counter-currents almost as strong as the movement to globalisation itself.

If the advent of globalisation has highlighted a tension between expansion, on the one hand, and interconnectedness, on the other, this tension is clearly manifest in the linguistic relations of the world's peoples. English, aided by its abundant and widely marketed cultural products, has emerged not only as a worldwide symbol of the consumer society and of personal prosperity but also of personal and political rights; it was precisely this combination that made English and the USA so powerful an inspiration to the rebels and reformers of eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s and the demonstrators in Tiananmen Square in 1989. Global English offers its users access to the new globalised networks and institutions, and the fortunate few who speak the language (becoming, little by little, the fortunate many) are in a position to parlay that knowledge – when coupled with other elements of education – into personal wealth and success. Language is, of course, in the context of politics a metaphenomenon: the adoption of English is, as always with languages, primarily a manifestation of a set of non-linguistic factors having to do with global economic integration and with significant changes in the way of life of a highly influential and increasingly numerous global elite, but the fact that this elite uses English gives the English-speaking countries, and particularly the USA, a certain competitive edge, born, some would say, of the natural tendency of states to accumulate power (Morgenthau 1948, quoted by Ruggie 1998). English is the operating system on which the global economic network is based, and the owners of the system have a market advantage.

David Graddol (1997; and see also Chapter 19 of this volume) has pointed out that English is increasingly slipping away from the control of its native speakers. A worldwide English is emerging – what Ulrich Ammon in Chapter 15 of this volume calls 'globalese' – and, with it, a worldwide culture. While this culture depends on a mass-market base that in turn supports English-language operatives and personnel, its manifestations are similar to those of individual states or communities: an elite culture is reinforced by television programming, high-quality films, and common educational practices and goals. A kind of translingual literature is increasingly emerging in which some of the most creative and original of its practitioners use English as a second language (Kellman 2000) or operate in a largely translingual environment (one thinks of the rise of the Anglo-Indian novel in this connection, or of increasing numbers of Japanese novelists writing in English). The rapid expansion of speakers of English as a second language means that this group will play an increasingly significant role in the evolution of the language, or so Graddol (1997) suggests. The language may evolve in directions that accommodate this new international elite at the expense of its traditional geographic centres.

Graddol's observation, interesting as it is, prompts the reminder that statistics on language knowledge, or, indeed, on languages in general, are famously inaccurate and imprecise. Graddol himself says as much, and McConnell repeats these caveats in Chapter 19 of this volume. In his recent book on language death, Crystal (2000) demonstrates at length how hard it is to distinguish one language from another, let alone compile meaningful statistics. Several contributors to this volume, notably McConnell in Chapter 19, make the same point. The massive compilation of the languages of the world by *Ethnologue* (Grimes 2000) is probably the best guide that we have, but the editors of *Ethnologue* must inevitably make sense of conflicting and inadequate data and highly complex glossonymic practices in areas of the world that have been little explored by linguists. The fact that languages come and go from its lists shows how problematic is the multiplicity of names for the linguistic practice of a given community (or even for the community itself). And where does one language end and another begin? This simple question may prove baffling when the subject under consideration is, say, a West African dialect continuum. Nettle, in his admirable inquiry into linguistic diversity (1999), demonstrates how difficult it is to count languages. Yet we like to have numbers: Crystal, after declaring that it is essentially impossible to establish the number of languages in the world, none the less plumps for a particular number (5,000–7,000: see Crystal 2000, p. 11) and then continues to use it throughout his book. He is not alone: many linguists, and many popular writers on linguistics, seem perfectly content to quote figures they know are, at best, imprecise.

Statistics on numbers of native speakers are equally hard to arrive at, and figures on numbers of non-native speakers run up against not only the difficulty of identifying likely statistical candidates in the first place, but also deciding how much language is enough to establish bilingualism (on the problems of defining bilingualism, see Edwards 1995, pp. 55–60). 'How do you define a Francophone?' asks Robert Chaudenson in the course of his discussion of French in Africa in Chapter 18 of this volume. In the present instance, namely Graddol's assertion that non-native speakers of English are set to outnumber native speakers by a considerable margin in the next few years, the implications of this assertion are perhaps less clear than Graddol implies. The mere fact that non-native speakers of English outnumber, or will soon outnumber, native speakers tells us relatively little about the quantity, intensity or complexity of linguistic interactions that take place in English during a given time period. The fact that someone is capable of using English does not mean that he or she does so with any frequency, nor that he or she does so in face-to-face interaction with others – or, indeed, in an active, participatory way at all. As Mackey points out in Chapter 6 of this volume, 'The trouble with most appropriated models of language change is that they fail to reflect the multidimensional and multifunctional nature of language dynamics.' Of course, the relationship between language change and the question of the quantity, intensity and complexity of interactions is also less than clearly established: agents of change, as Graddol seems to be suggesting, may be relatively tangentially connected to the language in which changes are effected. Regardless of our views on these rather complex matters, we are likely to agree on one thing: languages that dominate in a limited number of domains for economic or political reasons are apt to decline extremely rapidly when the reasons for their domination are removed. The traces of Dutch in Indonesia or of Portuguese in Goa are barely discernible because they no longer perform an economic or social function.

It also seems clear that, in situations where English competes with small languages, we are likely to see erosion of the economic power of the smaller languages. This will occur as English begins to occupy domains previously occupied by the smaller languages and as texts and other cultural products backed by significant capital and produced in quantity so as to lower their unit price flood the market in what might be regarded as a form of linguistic dumping, driving out the smaller languages and devaluing their cultural capital. Of course, such changes are hardly new: language shift has been going on for as long as languages have competed, which is surely as long as the phenomenon of language has existed. Minority languages have also always been frozen out by politically dominant languages, and frequently 'linguicide' – the deliberate choking off of languages (Skutnabb-Kangas 2000) – has contributed to the roll-call of language deaths. This last fact is significant: there is a tendency to assume that language shift is a 'natural' phenomenon, and hence to eschew intervention. While it is true that language shift, like language change, is everywhere observable, and in this sense naturally occurring, it does not follow that a given instance of language shift is somehow ineluctable: a particular manifestation of language shift always has its social, economic or political causes, and is thus always caused by human intervention. One might therefore say that, while language shift is natural, each of its manifestations is the product of artifice. As Fishman (1991) has shown, language shift is under certain circumstances reversible.

What makes the present and the future different from the past is that the ebb and flow of languages, accompanying shifting economic, political and military relationships, once a local and regional phenomenon, has now become more visibly (or audibly) global. Seismic shifts in the political and economic organisation of the world are producing seismic shifts in language use. Problems long recognised by epidemiologists of language decline as afflicting small languages are now increasingly besetting major languages like French, German and Russian as the cultural force of English erodes their position. This is documented in the present volume by Kibbee (Chapter 4) and Laponce (Chapter 5) for French, Ammon (Chapter 15) for German, and Mikhalchenko and Trushkova (Chapter 17), Fodor and Peluau (Chapter 7), and Schlyter (Chapter 11) for

Russian. Thus, the world language system described by de Swaan (1998a; 1998b) is undergoing significant change at the macro level. Sudden political shifts are producing linguistic dislocation on a major scale. Schlyter describes some of this dislocation in her discussion of Kazakhstan (Chapter 11). In an article on the Caucasus, Robert Kaplan (2000) interviews the Georgian archaeologist Zaal Kikodze:

> On this street where I have lived since 1958 . . . there used to be Kurds, Armenians, Jews, Russians, and others. It was a golden age. We had no idea what nationalism was. Then it destroyed us. The Jews left for Israel, the Armenians for Armenia, the Russians for Russia, and so on. The Russian language is barely being taught, which is a disaster for us. English is still only for a rarefied elite, while the loss of Russian cuts the average Georgian off from the outside world. All our books of learning, our encyclopaedias on art, literature, history, science, are in Russian, not Georgian. Young Georgians can no longer communicate with Armenians and Ossetians. This illiteracy is promoting ethnic separation.

It will take years for the young nations of Central Asia to overcome such language deficits, which will require the mobilisation of what are often weak educational systems, and the planning of the linguistic means for integration into the global economy.

De Swaan's conception of a world language system is helpful in understanding the globalisation of English and the roles of other major languages, particularly as a new world polity emerges (I borrow the term from Ruggie 1998). Inevitably – and despite de Swaan's sensible disclaimers ('Languages are not produced by anyone in particular: they simply exist, available for conversation') – it tends to reify languages as actors, perhaps attributing to what are essentially shifting and imprecise communities of language users more unity than they in fact possess, and perhaps underestimating the force of overlapping language loyalties springing from the widespread practice of bilingualism. Despite all our efforts to the contrary, our conceptual models are apt to enshrine the European notion of language: a primary language (often a state language) to which one owes a strong, overriding loyalty, supplemented by demotic varieties, on the one hand, and elite, formally learned 'foreign' languages, on the other. If languages are simply modes of behaviour, there are many people who use several such modes as the occasion arises, and with no very clear sense of hierarchy: functional multilingualism is widespread in many parts of the world. De Swaan's model does help reinforce one important consideration: languages are elective. Accordingly they tend to expand and contract in accordance with their relative utility. At issue in the international arena, then, is language choice. This is an issue not necessarily of choice of one language over another, but choice of a language environment that may involve the coexistence of several languages (see, for example, Mühlhäusler 1997). And in the formulation of a geostrategy of languages, the fundamental question is whether such a choice can be influenced through policy and planning and, if it can, whether there is any basis for preferring one outcome over another.

In considering the issue of geostrategy, then, inevitably the question of what we want out of a world language regime will arise. Given the sheer pressure exerted on cultural diversity by a single world language such as English, and given the rather widespread feeling that cultural diversity is worth preserving, it seems inevitable that planning for some kind of linguistic diversity is called for. Such diversity may be social or individual. Globalisation has essentially eliminated the possibility of planning for social bilingualism alone, i.e. planning for a situation in which the world might be divided into a number of linguistic spheres of influence, each dominated by a regional language (not necessarily English), with relatively little contact among them. Simple economic and technological realities would seem to require the cultivation of a global lingua franca, for which role English is at present the sole major contender. If the regional language in question is not also English, all those wishing to operate at a global and a regional level must be individually bilingual, able to operate in both languages. They may need a third or fourth level of linguistic competence to operate at a national or local level as well. Rational planning would suggest that English speakers should gain command of an additional language, if only to hold the advance of English in check and to inhibit its expansion into domains where it is inappropriate. In short, individual bilingualism and multilingualism, the creation of a language ecology that allows an individual to move in and out of overlapping linguistic codes with relative freedom, seems the only option. If the international community were to set such a goal, massive realignment of educational systems would be required, as well as the development of incentives for language learning. Indeed, learning and teaching are not the same thing: most languages are learned rather than taught (they are acquired out of necessity by people who use them to survive or to succeed). Accordingly, we must develop means of providing incentives for their acquisition.

The problem, however, with any model that seeks to hold English in check while developing other alternatives, is that popular culture has already caused English to gain something of a foothold in all domains, and that the ‘owners’ of English have little incentive to accede to the wishes of others to limit their linguistic reach (see, for example, Morris’s article in Chapter 10 of this volume, which examines language issues in North America). Furthermore, even if we wished to limit the linguistic domains of English, literature and other forms of cultural production address the whole individual, not some specialised aspect of the individual: keeping English out of particular domains on a selective basis would surely never succeed.

On the last occasion when the international community sought to intervene in the patterns of world communication – namely the debate in UNESCO on a New World Information and Communication Order – the West succeeded in redefining the debate as a debate over free expression. While the issue of free expression may in part have been a stalking horse for western capitalism, it none the less carried the day, aided by the popular press, which naturally vented its outrage at any restriction on its freedom. There is no reason to suppose that a debate on the merits of multilingualism over monolingualism would fare any better.

Accordingly, maintaining stable multilingualism will prove, in such an environment, extremely difficult. The literature of language planning gives us relatively little guidance on how to frame linguistic issues to take into consideration their social dimensions: Haugen's classic definition of the planning process (1966) assumes that language planning is essentially linguistic, and that it requires little clarification. If language planners are uncertain how to organise debate at the national level, a worldwide debate on language policy would seem to lie beyond our collective grasp at present.

However, we are not without examples from other spheres. There are numerous other issues – the law of the sea or the environment, to mention just two – that have worked their way on to the international agenda over the years. At the regional level, in Europe at least, a veritable revolution with respect to languages has gone on in recent years, with the emergence of broad consensus on the preservation and maintenance of local languages and the establishment of a European Charter on Regional or Minority Languages (the texts of this and various other international instruments can be found in Skutnabb-Kangas and Phillipson 1995).

The literature of language policy and planning at the international level is scanty at best. The alternative strategies of interlingualism laid out by Fettes in Chapter 3 of this volume have precious few antecedents, and there has been little attention given to language use in international organisations or in other international transactions; language use in supranational and transnational entities remains largely unstudied. A few studies of the language situation in international and regional organisations, including work on the European Union (EU) (e.g. Labrie 1993; Schlossmacher 1994) and a couple of articles on the United Nations (UN), have been published (see, for example, Pearl 1996). Furthermore, some intraorganisational language planning has also been conducted by these organisations (often in an atmosphere in which boldness has been replaced by a desire to rock as few political boats as possible), but these organisations – havens for second-language users – are of little interest to linguists preoccupied with first-language use or to sociolinguists more concerned with micro issues closer to home. Language planners over the years, often financed by governments, have been largely content to focus on particular countries and particular situations. Furthermore, the sheer political defensiveness of both the UN and the EU makes the gathering of reliable information extremely difficult. Although the journal *Language Problems and Language Planning* came into being thirty years ago, precisely to encourage such study (Tonkin 1997), it has attracted few contributions that can be regarded as truly international or global in scope.

The EU, of course, is a more complex case than the UN: the UN is an intergovernmental organisation pure and simple, and its language policy should (or so one might assume) balance equity and efficiency; but, as Claude Truchot points out in Chapter 8 of this volume, language policy in the EU depends on what kind of union its members want: a free trade zone or an integrated community. And even if agreement could be reached on goals, the means of implementing those goals are, at the very least, elusive. What is clear, however, is that, the more resistant to change the language regime in a given organisation becomes, the more subversive will become the actual conduct of its participants. Thus, the gap between formal language use and informal language use at the UN or in the EU grows ever wider, and formal language policies become increasingly irrelevant to a system based on the relative power of individual actors. As every language planner knows, informal behaviours, once established, are hard to change. There is an urgent need to change a language regime at the UN still based on the balance of power prevailing half a century ago, not least because realigning ingrained patterns of informal language use to take into account new realities grows increasingly difficult.

By one definition, the EU is not just a grouping of governments, but also a grouping of countries: its social policies and planning embrace entire societies. As we contemplate a geostrategy of languages, we cannot stop at international organisations, but must consider the entire global linguistic economy. From the vantage point of the profession, this means improvement of data collection (the establishment of a global observatory perhaps of the kind proposed by McConnell in Chapter 19 of this volume), efforts to frame the issue of language in policy circles (an area in which Skutnabb-Kangas and others are making notable strides), and a general sensitisation of the larger public to linguistic concerns.

Nor is the question of a global language policy a matter limited to governments. The UN, the EU, and other organisations such as the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), NATO or the Organisation of African Unity, are communities of states brought together around common purposes defined by governments. Much of the present volume is based on what is essentially an international relations approach to the world: the world consists of sovereign states, each with its language policy, each subject to pressure from other states. The volume highlights the changes taking place in geographical and political regions of the world: the decline of Russian in eastern Europe, the role of German, the pressures of nationalism and competing spheres of influence in Central Asia, and so on. Clearly a key element in all of these areas is educational policy, perhaps the most important policy area controlled by governments. National educational policies determine what languages will be used to gain access to an international pool of knowledge, how languages will be used to enfranchise or disfranchise particular sections of the population, and how social and cultural continuity will be preserved or interrupted. Directly related to educational policy is economic policy (how those who pass through the educational system will be prepared to function in the local and global economy with maximum effectiveness) and cultural policy (how new generations will develop patterns of loyalty to particular cultural traditions). The two meet in the realm of cultural production: the deployment of human and financial capital to produce particular cultural outcomes. In education, choices must be made, some languages favoured over others, some languages promoted and some languages discouraged.

Inevitable casualties of such policies are the languages and the language practices that are left out; in many parts of the world this, in practice, means most languages. The current European and North American concern about language decline and language death may be nurtured by an interest on the part of linguists in preserving languages for their own sake, but it is driven and inspired by counter-currents of local autonomy generated by accelerating homogenisation, increased human mobility and rising educational levels. The uncertainty that such mobility produces leads both to a desire for new modes of self-identity and to an undermining of the means to effectuate the goals of such desire. Thus, efforts to preserve and revive local languages (what Fettes in Chapter 3 of this volume describes as elite plurilingualism) are flourishing: aided by the internet and inexpensive publishing techniques, entire extraterritorial, diasporic language communities are emerging. However, maintaining a stable base on which to build the required cultural and economic structures is altogether harder, not least because most such European minority languages are spoken only by bilinguals, and the domestic transmission of language competence from one generation to the next is uncertain and unstable. As for other parts of the world, predictions of language death are dire, ranging as high as 90% of all languages in the twenty-first century. Precisely in those parts of the world where multilingualism is most prevalent (folk plurilingualism, in Baldauf and Djité's Chapter 14, a variant on Fettes's terms) – for example the continent of Africa – even the simplest of efforts to develop and amplify even major regional languages are failing for lack of resources, as Roland Breton makes clear in Chapter 13 ('Any language planning policy requires a budget . . .'). Here, the concern is not preservation for its own sake: such a goal has long since been abandoned, if it was ever present. But even efforts at institution building and democratic inclusion through the greater economic and educational use of major African languages are foundering. As for minor languages, the gradual dissolution of local communities in the face of economic development and economic necessity, including migration to the cities, has in many cases removed their reason for being and made their future accordingly clouded.

Although governments are key players in language use and language choice, languages are not always respecters of boundaries: there is a difference between an international and a global geostrategy of languages. In many parts of the world, where boundaries were drawn between states only in the past century and a half, or where traditional ways of life have only recently begun to give way to modern, state-based ways, political boundaries have little to do with language. Furthermore, modern transportation – which has made it easier for people to move, and also easier to move people (one reason for the world's refugee problem is the fact that today it is easier than it used to be simply to drive people out than it is to massacre or subjugate them) – has turned cities into veritable Towers of Babel, so that simple language management (i.e. to educate young people adequately, to integrate people into civic institutions, and to develop a functioning work force) has become a burning issue even at the local level.

So, a global geostrategy will have to go beyond governments to embrace all forms of linguistic interaction and all manner of linguistic actors. With globalisation continuing apace, with technology redefining interconnectedness and with the steady emergence of a global culture, no language policy that simply seeks to halt these processes is either desirable or likely to succeed. The question before us is how to use the processes of globalisation to redefine the global purpose of languages. A first step is to acknowledge the desirability of linguistic diversity. One need not accept the Sapir–Whorf hypothesis in all its far-reaching details to acknowledge that diversity of language encourages diversity of thought, nor need one accept the complete parallelism of biodiversity and linguistic diversity to agree with the assertion that diversity of thought is as important to our collective future as diversity of species.

At the same time, as inhabitants of a world that technology is making smaller and population growth is making more crowded, we must acknowledge the need for direct communication. Linguistic unity is essential if global integration is to continue under circumstances in which its participants control the outcomes. So, we need a common language. That language, for the foreseeable future, is likely to be English, unless we are willing to search for some other more equitable alternative, such as Esperanto, and deal with the short-term upheaval that such a decision would cause.

But if English is to be our lingua franca, we must develop ways of preventing it from encroaching on the domains of other languages. It is hard to imagine doing so through some form of legislative fiat. As with such international questions as the development of a code of human rights, or the elimination of apartheid, such a provision can only come about by raising the ethical stakes so high that those with vested interests in the status quo cannot find any political high ground on which to fight. It is here that realism and liberalism meet.

Even getting such an approach on to the international and global agenda will require an intense and systematic effort, but, as Jacques Maurais suggests in Chapter 2 of this volume, it is high time that such an effort be made. I have already suggested that data-gathering is the place to begin, but such data-gathering and the advocacy that it might produce requires the creation of mechanisms to bring linguists and other experts together around a common dialogue, a common research agenda and a coordinated publication programme. These efforts should include the study of alternative scenarios for change, such as those laid out by Fettes in Chapter 3. At the same time, a global effort is needed to expand the number and quality of linguistic facilitators, i.e. those who can move messages from language to language through translation and interpretation and through fluency in several languages, and those who can teach these skills to others. Equally important is the continued development of technological means of overcoming linguistic barriers, particularly if they can be deployed to preserve the smaller languages by linking their speakers easily with the speakers of other languages, and if they can overcome such obstacles as differing writing systems (see, for example, Kaiser's contribution in Chapter 12 of this volume). Special attention needs to be given to expanding the reach of the technology, in order to engage those populations currently cut off from it by poverty or politics or both. Long overdue is an expanded international effort to provide resources for corpus development in those languages that aspire to greater autonomy. Of course, none of these efforts will solve, as if by miracle, the huge ethical and political dilemmas that language presents, such as those brought about by power shifts in the former Soviet Union, or those that African countries confront because of limited financial resources, or those faced on a daily basis in the great metropolises of the world because of migration or the displacement of populations. Nor will these efforts give us much guidance on the debate between free trade and cultural protectionism. However, in these as in other matters, a greater understanding of the issues involved – and a greater awareness that these issues have been faced before – may help ultimately to move our collective strategy towards a linguistic order that is fairer, more equitable and more effective.

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