chapter

14

Population
and Urbanization

The image still haunts me. There stood Celia, age 30, her distended stomach visible proof that her thirteenth child was on its way. Her oldest was only 14 years old! A mere boy by our standards, he had already gone as far in school as he ever would. Each morning, he joined the men to work in the fields. Each evening around twilight, I saw him return home, exhausted from hard labor in the subtropical sun.

> There stood Celia, age 30, her distended stomach visible proof that her thirteenth child was on its way.

I was living in Colima, Mexico, and Celia and Angel had invited me for dinner. Their home clearly reflected the family's poverty. A thatched hut consisting of only a single room served as home for all fourteen members of the family. At night, the parents and younger children crowded into a double bed, while the eldest boy slept in a hammock. As in many homes in the village, the other children slept on mats spread on the dirt floor—despite the crawling scorpions.

The home was meagerly furnished. It had only a gas stove, a table, and a cabinet where Celia stored her few cooking utensils and clay dishes. There were no closets; clothes hung on pegs in the walls. There also were no chairs, not even one. I was used to the poverty in the village, but this really startled me. The family was too poor to afford even a single chair.

Celia beamed as she told me how much she looked forward to the birth of her next child. Could she really mean it? It was hard to imagine that any woman would want to be in her situation.

Yet Celia meant every word. She was as full of delighted anticipation as she had been with her first child—and with all the others in between.

393

How could Celia have wanted so many children—especially when she lived in such poverty? That question bothered me. I couldn't let it go until I understood why.

This chapter helps to provide an answer.

POPULATION IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

Celia's story takes us into the heart of **demography,** the study of the size, composition, growth, and distribution of human populations. It brings us face to face with the question of whether we are doomed to live in a world so filled with people that there will be very little space for anybody. Will our planet be able to support its growing population? Or are chronic famine and mass starvation the sorry fate of most earthlings?

Let's look at how concern about population growth began.

A Planet with No Space for Enjoying Life?

The story begins with the lowly potato. When the Spanish *conquistadores* found that people in the Andes Mountains ate this vegetable, which was unknown in Europe, they brought some home to cultivate. At first, Europeans viewed the potato with suspicion, but gradually it became the main food of the lower classes. With a greater abundance of food, fertility increased, and the death rate dropped. Europe's population soared, almost doubling during the 1700s (McKeown 1977; McNeill 1999).

Thomas Malthus (1766–1834), an English economist, saw this surging growth as a sign of doom. In 1798, he wrote a book that became world famous, *An Essay on the Principle of Population* (1798). In it, Malthus proposed what became known as the **Malthus theorem.** He argued that although population grows geometrically (from 2 to 4 to 8 to 16 and so forth), the food supply increases only arithmetically (from 1 to 2 to 3 to 4 and so on). This meant, he claimed, that if births go unchecked, the population of a country, or even of the world, will outstrip its food supply.

The New Malthusians

Was Malthus right? This question has become a matter of heated debate among demographers. One group, which can be called the *New Malthusians,* is convinced that today's situation is at least as grim as—if not grimmer than—Malthus ever imagined. For example, *the world's population is growing so fast that in just the time it takes you to read this chapter, another 20,000 to 40,000 babies will be born!* By this time tomorrow, the earth will have over 200,000 more people to feed. This increase goes on hour after hour, day after day, without letup. For an illustration of this growth, see Figure 14.1.

The New Malthusians point out that the world's population is following an **exponential growth curve.** This means

In earlier generations, large farm families were common. Having many children was functional—there were many hands to help with crops, food production, and food preparation. As the country industrialized and urbanized, this changed to a dysfunction—children became expensive and nonproducing. Consequently, the size of families shrank as we entered Stage 3 of the demographic transition. In 1939, when this photo was taken in McIntosh County, Oklahoma, many farm families had more children than the number shown here.

FIGURE 14.1 How Fast Is the World's Population Growing?

The Results of a Single Day

Add	Births — 367,000
Minus	Deaths — 153,000
Equals	Population increase — 214,000

0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400

The Accumulating Increase

Each second 2.5	Each minute 150	Each hour 8,900	Each day 214,000

Each week 1,500,000	Each month 6,500,000	Each year 78,000,000

Source: By the author. Based on Haub 2002, 2005, 2006; McFalls 2007.

that if growth doubles during approximately equal intervals of time, it suddenly accelerates. To illustrate the far-reaching implications of exponential growth, sociologist William Faunce (1981) retold an old parable about a poor man who saved a rich man's life. The rich man was grateful and said that he wanted to reward the man for his heroic deed.

The man replied that he would like his reward to be spread out over a four-week period, with each day's amount being twice what he received on the preceding day. He also said he would be happy to receive only one penny on the first day. The rich man immediately handed over the penny and congratulated himself on how cheaply he had gotten by.

At the end of the first week, the rich man checked to see how much he owed and was pleased to find that the total was only $1.27. By the end of the second week he owed only $163.83. On the twenty-first day, however, the rich man was surprised to find that the total had grown to $20,971.51. When the twenty-eighth day arrived the rich man was shocked to discover that he owed $1,342,177.28 for that day alone and that the total reward had jumped to $2,684,354.56!

This is precisely what alarms the New Malthusians. They claim that humanity has just entered the "fourth week" of an exponential growth curve. Figure 14.2 shows why they think the day of reckoning is just around the corner. It took from the beginning of time until 1800 for the world's population to reach its first billion. It then took only 130 years (1930) to add the second billion. Just 30 years later (1960), the world population hit 3 billion. The time it took to reach the fourth billion was cut in half, to only 15 years (1975).

FIGURE 14.2 World Population Growth over 2,000 Years

Billions of People

11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3 Only 300 million people in the world?
2
1
0

The birth of Christ 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000 2200

Year

2100 →
2013? →
1999 →
1987 →
1975 →
1960 →
1930 →
1800

Projected

Source: Modified from Piotrow 1973; McFalls 2007.

Then just 12 years later (in 1987), the total reached 5 billion, and in another 12 years it hit 6 billion (in 1999).

On average, every minute of every day, 150 babies are born. As Figure 14.1 shows, at each sunset, the world has 214,000 more people than it did the day before. In a year, this comes to 78 million people. During the next four years, this increase will total more than the entire U.S. population. Think of it this way: *In just the next 12 years, the world will add as many people as it did during the entire time from when the first humans began to walk the earth until the year 1800.*

These totals terrify the New Malthusians. They are convinced that we are headed toward a showdown between population and food. In the year 2025, the population of just India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh is expected to be more than the entire world's population was 100 years ago (Haub 2006). It is obvious that we will run out of food if we don't curtail population growth. Soon we are going to see more pitiful, starving Pakistani and Bangladeshi children on television.

The Anti-Malthusians

All of this seems obvious, and no one wants to live shoulder-to-shoulder and fight for scraps. How, then, can anyone argue with the New Malthusians?

An optimistic group of demographers, whom we can call the *Anti-Malthusians,* paint a far different picture. They believe that Europe's **demographic transition** provides a more accurate glimpse into the future. This transition is diagrammed in Figure 14.3. During most of its history, Europe was in Stage 1. Its population remained about the same from year to year, for high death rates offset the high birth rates. Then came Stage 2, the "population explosion" that so upset Malthus. Europe's population surged because birth rates remained high while death rates went down. Finally, Europe made the transition to Stage 3: The population stabilized as people brought their birth rates into line with their lower death rates.

This, say the Anti-Malthusians, will also happen in the Least Industrialized Nations. Their current surge in population growth simply indicates that they have reached Stage 2 of the demographic transition. Hybrid seeds, medicine from the Most Industrialized Nations, and purer public drinking water have cut their death rates, but their birth rates remain high. When they move into Stage 3, as surely they will, we will wonder what all the fuss was about. In fact, their growth is already slowing.

Who Is Correct?

As you can see, both the New Malthusians and the Anti-Malthusians have looked at historical trends and projected them onto the future. The New Malthusians project continued world growth and are alarmed. The Anti-Malthusians project Stage 3 of the demographic transition onto the Least Industrialized Nations and are reassured.

FIGURE 14.3   The Demographic Transition

STAGE 1	STAGE 2	STAGE 3	STAGE 4
Stable population: Births and deaths are more or less balanced.	**Rapidly growing population:** Births far outnumber deaths.	**Stable population:** Births drop, and births and deaths become more or less balanced.	**Shrinking population:** Deaths outnumber births.

Note: The standard demographic transition is depicted by Stages 1–3. Stage 4 has been suggested by some Anti-Malthusians.

There is no question that the Least Industrialized Nations are in Stage 2 of the demographic transition. The question is, Will these nations enter Stage 3? After World War II, the West exported its hybrid seeds, herbicides, and techniques of public hygiene around the globe. Death rates plummeted in the Least Industrialized Nations as their food supply increased and health improved. Because their birth rates stayed high, their populations mushroomed. Just as Malthus had done 200 years earlier, demographers predicted worldwide catastrophe if something were not done immediately to halt the population explosion (Ehrlich and Ehrlich 1972, 1978).

We can use the conflict perspective to understand what happened when this message reached the leaders of the industrialized world. They saw the mushrooming populations of the Least Industrialized Nations as a threat to the global balance of power they had so carefully worked out. With swollen populations, the poorer countries might demand a larger share of the earth's resources. The leaders found the United Nations to be a willing tool, and they used it to spearhead efforts to reduce world population growth. The results have been remarkable. The annual growth of the Least Industrialized Nations has dropped 29 percent, from an average of 2.1 percent a year in the 1960s to 1.5 percent today (Haub and Yinger 1994; Haub 2006).

The New Malthusians and Anti-Malthusians have greeted this news with significantly different interpretations. For the Anti-Malthusians, this slowing of growth is the signal they had been waiting for: Stage 3 of the demographic transition has begun. First, the death rate in the Least Industrialized Nations fell—now, just as they predicted, birth rates are also falling. Did you notice, they would say, if they looked at Figure 14.2, that it took 12 years to add the fifth billion to the world's population—and also 12 years to add the sixth billion? Population momentum is slowing. The New Malthusians reply that a slower growth rate still spells catastrophe—it just will take longer for it to hit.

The Anti-Malthusians also argue that our future will be the opposite of what the New Malthusians worry about: There are going to be too few children in the world, not too many. The world's problem will not be a population explosion, but **population shrinkage**—populations getting smaller. They point out that births in sixty-five countries have already dropped so low that those countries no longer produce enough children to maintain their populations. *All* of the forty-two countries in Europe fill more coffins than cradles (Haub 2006).

Some Anti-Malthusians even predict a "demographic free fall" (Mosher 1997). As more nations enter Stage 4 of the demographic transition, the world's population will peak at about 8 or 9 billion, then begin to grow smaller. Two hundred years from now, they say, we will have a lot fewer people on earth.

Who is right? It simply is too early to tell. Like the proverbial pessimists who see the glass of water half empty, the New Malthusians interpret changes in world population growth negatively. And like the eternal optimists who see the same glass half full, the Anti-Malthusians view the figures positively. Sometime during our lifetime we should know the answer.

Why Are People Starving?

Pictures of starving children gnaw at our conscience. We live in such abundance, while these children and their parents starve before our very eyes. Why don't they have enough food? Is it because there are too many of them or simply because the abundant food produced around the world does not reach them?

Photos of starving people, such as this mother and her child, haunt Americans and other members of the Most Industrialized Nations. Many of us wonder why, when some are starving, we should live in the midst of such abundance, often overeating and even casually scraping excess food into the garbage. We even have eating contests to see who can eat the most food in the least time. The text discusses reasons for such disparities.

The Anti-Malthusians make a point that seems irrefutable. As Figure 14.4 below shows, *there is now more food for each person in the world than there was in 1950.* Although the world's population has more than doubled since 1950, improved seeds and fertilizers have made more food available for *each* person on earth. Even more food may be on the way, for bioengineers are making breakthroughs in agriculture. The United Nations estimates that even without agricultural gains through bioengineering, there will be ample food to keep up with the world's growing population for at least the next thirty years (United Nations 2000).

Then why do people die of hunger? From Figure 14.4, we can conclude that starvation occurs not because the earth produces too little food, but because particular places lack food. Droughts and wars are the main reasons. Just as droughts slow or stop food production, so does war. In nations ravaged by civil war, opposing sides either confiscate or burn crops, and farmers flee to the cities (Thurow 2005). While some countries have their food supply disrupted, others are producing more food than their people can consume. At the same time that countries of Africa are hit by drought and civil wars—and people are starving—the U.S. government pays farmers to *reduce* their output of crops. The United States' problem is too much food; West Africa's is too little.

The New Malthusians counter with the argument that the world's population is still growing and that we do not know how long the earth will continue to produce enough food. They add that the recent policy of turning food (such as corn and sugar cane) into biofuels (such as gasoline and diesel fuel) presents another serious threat to the world's food supply. They also remind us of the penny doubling each day. It is only a matter of time, they insist, until the earth no longer produces enough food—not "if," but "when."

Both the New Malthusians and the Anti-Malthusians have contributed significant ideas, but theories will not eliminate famines. Starving children are going to continue to peer out at us from our televisions and magazines, their tiny, shriveled bodies and bloated stomachs nagging at our conscience and imploring us to do something. Regardless of the underlying causes of this human misery, it has a simple solution: Food can be transferred from nations that have a surplus.

These pictures of starving Africans leave the impression that Africa is overpopulated. Why else would all those people be starving? The truth, however, is far different. Africa has 23 percent of the earth's land, but only 14 percent of the earth's population (Haub 2006). Africa even has vast areas of fertile land that have not yet been farmed. The reason for famines in Africa, then, *cannot* be too many people living on too little land.

FIGURE 14.4   How Much Food Does the World Produce per Person?

Note: Julian Simon provided the stimulus for producing this figure. I used to reproduce a figure that he had developed, but since his death in 1998 inconsistencies in data have made it difficult to update his work. Based on UN data, this figure overcomes that limitation. Production per person is the amount produced for each individual in the entire world.
Source: By the author. Based on Simon 1981; Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 2006.

Population Growth

Even if starvation is the result of a maldistribution of food rather than overpopulation, the fact remains that the Least Industrialized Nations are growing *fifteen times faster* than the Most Industrialized Nations—1.5 percent a year compared with 0.1 percent (Haub 2006). At these rates, it will take 1,000 years for the average Most Industrialized Nation to double its population, but just 48 years for the average Least Industrialized Nation to do so. Figure 14.5 puts the matter in stark perspective. So does the Down-to-Earth Sociology box on the next page. Why do the nations that can least afford it have so many children?

## Why the Least Industrialized Nations Have So Many Children

Why do people in the countries that can least afford it have so many children? To understand this, let's figure out why Celia is so happy about having her thirteenth child. Here, we need to apply the symbolic interactionist perspective. We must take the role of the other so that we can understand the world of Celia and Angel as *they* see it. As our culture does for us, their culture provides a perspective on life that guides their choices. Celia and Angel's culture tells them that twelve children are *not* enough, that they ought to have a thirteenth—as well as a fourteenth and fifteenth. How can this be? Let's consider three reasons why bearing many children plays a central role in their lives—and in the lives of millions upon millions of poor people around the world.

First is the status of parenthood. In the Least Industrialized Nations, motherhood is the most prized status a woman can achieve. The more children a woman bears, the more she is thought to have achieved the purpose for which she was born. Similarly, a man proves his manhood by fathering children. The more children he fathers, especially sons, the better—for through them his name lives on.

Second, the community supports this view. Celia and those like her live in *Gemeinschaft* communities, where people identify closely with one another and share similar views of life. To them, children are a sign of God's blessing. By producing children, people reflect the values of their community, achieve status, and are assured that they are blessed by God. It is the barren woman, not the woman with a dozen children, who is to be pitied.

These factors certainly provide strong motivations for bearing many children. Yet there is a third powerful

incentive: For poor people in the Least Industrialized Nations, children are economic assets. Like Celia and Angel's eldest son, children begin contributing to the family income at a young age. (See Figure 14.6 on page 401.) But even more important: Children are also the equivalent of our Social Security. In the Least Industrialized Nations, the government does not provide social security or medical and unemployment insurance. This motivates people to bear *more* children, for when parents become too old to work, or when no work is to be found, their children take care of them. The more children they have, the broader their base of support will be.

To those of us who live in the Most Industrialized Nations, it seems irrational to have many children. And *for us it would be.* Understanding life from the framework of people who are living it, however—the essence of the symbolic interactionist perspective—reveals how it makes perfect sense to have many children. Consider this report by a government worker in India:

> **Thaman Singh (a very poor man, a water carrier) . . . welcomed me inside his home, gave me a cup of tea (with milk and "market" sugar, as he proudly pointed out later), and said: "You were trying to convince me that I shouldn't have any more sons. Now, you see, I have six sons and two daughters and I sit at home in leisure. They are grown up and they bring me money. One even works outside the**

FIGURE 14.5 World Population Growth, 1750–2150

Source: "The World of the Child 6 Billion," 2000; Haub 2006.

Down-to-Earth Sociology

How the Tsunami Can Help Us to Understand Population Growth

This photo was snapped at Koh Raya in Thailand, just as the tsunami wave of December 26, 2004, landed.

On December 26, 2004, the world witnessed the worst tsunami in modern history. As the giant waves rolled over the shores of unsuspecting countries, they swept away people from all walks of life—from lowly sellers of fish to wealthy tourists visiting the fleshpots of Sri Lanka. Over the next several days, as the government reports came in, the media kept increasing the death toll. When those reports were tallied two months later, the total stood at 286,000 people.

In terms of lives lost, this was not the worst single disaster the world had seen. Several hundred thousand people had been killed in China's Tangshan earthquake in 1976. In terms of geography, however, this was the broadest. It involved more countries than any other disaster in modern history. And, unlike its predecessors, this tsunami occurred during a period of instantaneous, global reporting of events.

As news of the tsunami was transmitted around the globe, the response was almost immediate. Aid poured in—in unprecedented amounts. Governments gave over $3 billion. Citizens pitched in, too, from Little Leaguers and religious groups to the "regulars" at the local bars.

I want to use the tsunami disaster to illustrate the incredible population growth that is taking place in the Least Industrialized Nations. My intention is not to dismiss the tragedy of these deaths, for they were horrible—as were the maiming of so many, the sufferings of families, and the lost livelihoods.

Let's consider Indonesia first. With 233,000 deaths, this country was hit the hardest. Indonesia had an annual growth rate of 1.6 percent (its "rate of natural increase," as demographers call it). With a population of 220 million, Indonesia is growing by 3,300,000 people each year (Haub 2004). This increase, coming to 9,041 people each day, means that it took Indonesia less than four weeks (twenty-six days) to replace the huge number of people it lost to the tsunami.

The next greatest loss of lives took place in Sri Lanka. With its lower rate of natural increase of 1.3 and its smaller population of 19 million, it took Sri Lanka a little longer to replace the 31,000 people it lost: forty-six days.

India was the third hardest hit. With India's 1 billion people and its 1.7 rate of natural increase, India is adding 17 million people to its population each year. This comes to 46,575 people each day. At an increase of 1,940 people per hour, India took just eight or nine hours to replace the 16,000 people it lost to the tsunami.

The next hardest hit was Thailand. It took Thailand four or five days to replace the 5,000 people that it lost.

For the other countries, the losses were smaller: 298 for Somalia, 82 for the Maldives; 68 for Malaysia; 61 for Myanmar, 10 for Tanzania, 2 for Bangladesh, and 1 for Kenya ("Tsunami deaths . . ." 2005).

Again, I don't want to detract from the horrifying tragedy of the 2004 tsunami. But by using this event as a comparative backdrop, we can gain a better grasp of the unprecedented population growth that is taking place in the Least Industrialized Nations.

FIGURE 14.6
Why the Poor Need Children

Children are an economic asset in the Least Industrialized Nations. Based on a survey in Indonesia, this figure shows that boys and girls can be net income earners for their families by the age of 9 or 10.

Source: U.N. Fund for Population Activities.

village as a laborer. You told me I was a poor man and couldn't support a large family. Now, you see, because of my large family I am a rich man." (Mamdani 1973)

Conflict theorists offer a different view of why women in the Least Industrialized Nations bear so many children. Feminists argue that women like Celia have internalized values that support male dominance. In Latin America, *machismo*—an emphasis on male virility and dominance—is common. To father many children, especially sons, shows that a man is sexually potent, giving him higher status in the community. From a conflict perspective, then, the reason poor people have so many children is that men control women's reproductive choices.

Implications of Different Rates of Growth

The result of Celia and Angel's desire for many children—and of the millions of Celias and Angels like them—is that Mexico's population will double in thirty-five years. In contrast, women in the United States are having so few children that if it weren't for immigration, the U.S. population would begin to shrink. To illustrate population dynamics, demographers use **population pyramids.** These depict a country's population by age and sex. Look at Figure 14.7 on the next page, which shows the population pyramids of the United States, Mexico, and the world.

To see why population pyramids are important, I would like you to imagine a miracle. Imagine that, overnight, Mexico is transformed into a nation as industrialized as the United States. Imagine also that overnight the average number of children per woman drops to 2.0, the same as in the United States. If this happened, it would seem that Mexico's population would grow at the same rate as that of the United States, right?

But this isn't at all what would happen. Instead, the population of Mexico would continue to grow much faster. As you can see from these population pyramids, a much higher percentage of Mexican women are in their childbearing years. Even if Mexico and the United States had the same birth rate (2.0 children per woman), a larger percentage of women in Mexico would be giving birth, and Mexico's population would grow faster. As demographers like to phrase this, Mexico's *age structure* gives it greater *population momentum.*

Mexico's population momentum is so strong that, as we saw earlier, its population will double in thirty-five years.

FIGURE 14.7 Three Population Pyramids

Source: *Population Today, 26, 9,* September 1998:4, 5.

The implications of a doubling population are mind-boggling. *Just to stay even,* within thirty-five years Mexico must double the number of available jobs and housing facilities; its food production; its transportation and communication facilities; its water, gas, sewer, and electrical systems; and its schools, hospitals, churches, civic buildings, theaters, stores, and parks. If Mexico fails to double them, its already meager standard of living will drop even further.

Conflict theorists point out that a declining standard of living poses the threat of political instability—protests, riots, even revolution—and, in response, repression by the government. Political instability in one country can spill into others, threatening an entire region's balance of power. Fearing such disruptions, leaders of the Most Industrialized Nations are using the United Nations to direct a campaign of worldwide birth control. With one hand they give agricultural aid, IUDs, and condoms to the masses in the Least Industrialized Nations—while, with the other, they sell weapons to the elites in these countries. Both actions, say conflict theorists, serve the same purpose: that of promoting political stability in order to maintain the dominance of the Most Industrialized Nations in global stratification.

The Three Demographic Variables

How many people will live in the United States fifty years from now? What will the world's population be then? These are important questions. Educators want to know how many schools to build. Manufacturers want to anticipate changes in the market for their products. The government needs to know how many doctors, engineers, and executives to train. Politicians want to know how many people will be paying taxes—and how many young people will be available to fight a war.

To project the future of populations, demographers use three **demographic variables:** fertility, mortality, and migration. Let's look at each.

Fertility   The number of children that the average woman bears is called the **fertility rate.** The world's overall fertility rate is 2.7, which means that during her lifetime the average woman in the world bears 2.7 children. At 2.0, the fertility rate of U.S. women is considerably less (Haub 2006). A term that is sometimes confused with fertility is **fecundity,** the number of children that women are *capable* of bearing. This number is rather high, as some women have given birth to 30 children (McFalls 2007).

The region of the world that has the highest fertility rate is Middle Africa, where the average woman gives birth to 6.3 children; the lowest is Eastern Europe, where the average woman bears 1.3 children (Haub 2006). As you can see from Table 14.1, Macao has the world's lowest fertility rate. There, the average woman gives birth to only 0.9 children. Four of the lowest-birth countries are in Asia. The rest are located in Europe. The countries with the highest birth rate are also clustered. With the exception of Afghanistan, all of them are in Africa. Niger in West Africa holds the

TABLE 14.1   Extremes in Childbirth

| Where Do Women Give Birth to the Fewest Children? | | Where Do Women Give Birth to the Most Children? | |
Country	Number of Children	Country	Number of Children
Macao	0.9	Niger	7.9
Hong Kong	1.0	Guinea-Bissau	7.1
South Korea	1.1	Mali	7.1
Taiwan	1.1	Somalia	6.9
Poland	1.2	Uganda	6.9
Slovenia	1.2	Afghanistan	6.8
Ukraine	1.2	Angola	6.8
Germany	1.3	Burundi	6.8
Italy	1.3	Liberia	6.8
Russia	1.3	Chad	6.7

Note: Other countries with 1.2 children per woman are Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Moldova; others that average 1.3 children are Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, and Spain.

record for the world's highest birth rate. There, the average woman gives birth to 7.9 children, *nine* times as many children as the average woman in Macao.

To compute the fertility rate of a country, demographers analyze the government's records of births. From these, they figure the country's **crude birth rate,** the annual number of live births per 1,000 population. There may be considerable inaccuracies here, of course. The birth records in many of the Least Industrialized Nations are haphazard, at best.

Mortality   The second demographic variable is measured by the **crude death rate,** the annual number of deaths per 1,000 population. It, too, varies widely around the world. The highest death rate is 28, a record held by Botswana and Lesotho in southern Africa. At 1, the oil-rich country of Kuwait holds the world's record for the lowest death rate (Haub 2006).

Migration   The third demographic variable is the **net migration rate,** the difference between the number of *immigrants* (people moving into a country) and *emigrants* (people moving out of a country) per 1,000 population. Unlike fertility and mortality, migration does not affect the global population, for people are simply shifting their residence from one country or region to another.

As you know, immigrants are seeking a better life. They are willing to give up the security of their family and friends to move to a country with a strange language and unfamiliar customs. What motivates people to embark on such a venture? To understand migration, we need to look at both push and pull factors. The *push* factors are what

people want to escape: poverty or persecution for their religious and political ideas. The *pull* factors are the magnets that draw people to a new land, such as opportunities for education, higher wages, better jobs, the freedom to worship or to discuss political ideas, and a more promising future for their children.

Around the world, the flow of migration is from the Least Industrialized Nations to the industrialized countries. After "migrant paths" are established, immigration often accelerates as networks of kin and friends become additional magnets that attract more people from the same nation—and even from the same villages.

By far, the United States is the world's number one choice of immigrants. The United States admits more immigrants each year than all the other nations of the world combined. Thirty-six million residents—one of every eight Americans—were born in other countries (*Statistical Abstract* 2008:Table 44). Table 14.2 on the next page shows where recent U.S. immigrants were born. To escape grinding poverty, such as that which surrounds Celia and Angel, millions of people also enter the United States illegally. As surprising as it may seem, as Figure 14.8 on the next page shows, U.S. officials have sufficient information on these approximately 11 million people to estimate their country of origin.

Experts cannot agree about whether immigrants are a net contributor to the U.S. economy or a drain on it. Some economists claim that immigrants benefit the economy. After subtracting what immigrants collect in welfare, what they cost the medical and school systems, and then adding what they produce in jobs and taxes, they conclude that immigrants produce more than they cost (Simon 1986, 1993). Looking at the same data, other economists conclude that immigrants drain taxpayers of billions of dollars a year (Huddle 1993; Davis and Weinstein 2002). Evidence seems strong that immigrants lower the income of the native-born Americans with whom they compete (Borjas 2004, 2005, 2006). The fairest conclusion seems to be that the more educated immigrants produce more than they cost, while the less educated cost more than they produce.

Problems in Forecasting Population Growth

The total of the three demographic variables—fertility, mortality, and net migration—gives us a country's **growth rate,** the net change after people have been added to and subtracted from a population. What demographers call the **basic demographic equation** is quite simple:

$$\text{Growth rate} = \text{births} - \text{deaths} + \text{net migration}$$

If population increase depended only on biology, the demographer's job would be easy. But social factors—wars,

TABLE 14.2   Country of Birth of U.S. Immigrants

North America	2,161,000	Vietnam	186,000	Brazil	70,000
Mexico	1,051,000	Pakistan	84,000	Peru	82,000
Cuba	167,000	Iran	68,000	Ecuador	65,000
Dominican Republic	166,000			Venezuela	45,000
Canada	108,000	**Europe**	**922,000**	Guyana	50,000
El Salvador	173,000	Ukraine	108,000	Argentina	29,000
Haiti	111,000	United Kingdom	96,000		
Jamaica	101,000	Russia	104,000	**Africa**	**431,000**
Guatemala	104,000	Poland	82,000	Ethiopia	54,000
		Bosnia and Herzegovina	83,000	Nigeria	58,000
Asia	**2,089,000**	Germany	49,000	Egypt	37,000
India	407,000	Romania	34,000	Ghana	34,000
China	371,000			Somalia	29,000
Philippines	342,000	**South America**	**511,000**		
Korea	124,000	Colombia	138,000		

Note: Totals are for the top countries of origin for 2000–2006, the latest year available.
Source: By the author. Based on *Statistical Abstract* 2008: Table 49.

economic booms and busts, plagues, and famines—push rates of birth and death and migration up or down. As is shown in the Cultural Diversity box on the next page, even infanticide can affect population growth. Politicians also complicate projections. Sometimes governments try to persuade women to bear fewer—or more—children. When

FIGURE 14.8   Country of Origin of Unauthorized Immigrants in the United States

Mexico 5,970,000
Other countries 2,250,000
El Salvador 470,000
Guatemala 370,000
India 280,000
China 230,000
Korea 210,000
Philippines 210,000
Honduras 180,000
Brazil 170,000
Vietnam 160,000

Source: By the author. Based on *Statistical Abstract* 2008: Table 46.

Hitler decided that Germany needed more "Aryans," the German government outlawed abortion and offered cash bonuses to women who gave birth. The population increased. Today, European leaders are alarmed that their birth rates have dropped so low that their populations will shrink. With its population dropping, Russia's leaders are offering incentives to women to have children: cash grants for each child and subsidies for day care (Chivers 2006).

In China, we find the opposite situation. Many people know that China tries to limit population growth with its "One couple, one child" policy, but few know how ruthlessly officials enforce this policy. Steven Mosher (2006), an anthropologist who did fieldwork in China, revealed that—whether she wants it or not—after the birth of her first child, each woman is fitted with an IUD (intrauterine device). If a woman has a second child, she is sterilized. If a woman gets pregnant without government permission (yes, you read that right), the fetus is aborted. If she does not consent to an abortion, one is performed on her anyway—even if she is nine months pregnant. No unmarried women are allowed to give birth; any unmarried woman who gets pregnant is arrested and forced to have an abortion.

In the face of Western disapproval and in an effort to present a better image to accompany its new role on the world political stage, Chinese leaders have relented somewhat. They have kept their "One couple, one child" policy, but they have begun to make exceptions to it. In rural areas, authorities allow a woman to bear a second child—if the first child is a girl. This improves the couple's chances of getting a son (Baochang et al. 2007).

Cultural Diversity around the World

Killing Little Girls: An Ancient and Thriving Practice

"The Mysterious Case of the Missing Girls" could have been the title of this box. Around the globe, for every 100 girls born, about 105 boys are born. In China, however, for every 100 baby girls, there are 120 baby boys. Given China's huge population, this means that China has several million fewer baby girls than it should have. Why?

The answer is *female infanticide,* the killing of baby girls. When a Chinese woman goes into labor, the village midwife sometimes grabs a bucket of water. If the newborn is a girl, she is plunged into the water before she can draw her first breath.

At the root of China's sexist infanticide is economics. The people are poor, and they have no pensions. When parents can no longer work, sons support them. In contrast, a daughter must be married off, at great expense, and at that point, her obligations transfer to her husband and his family.

In the past few years, the percentage of boy babies has grown. The reason, again, is economics, but this time it has a new twist. As China opened the door to capitalism, travel and trade opened up—but primarily to men, for it is not thought appropriate for women to travel alone. With men finding themselves in a better position to bring profits home to the family, parents have one more reason to want male children.

These women in New Delhi, India, are protesting sex-selection abortion.

The gender ratio is so lopsided that for people in their 20s there are six bachelors for every five potential brides. Concerned about this gender imbalance, officials have begun a campaign to stop the drowning of girl babies. They are also trying to crack down on the abortions of girl fetuses.

It is likely that the preference for boys, and the resulting female infanticide, will not disappear until the social structures that perpetuate sexism are dismantled. This is unlikely to take place until women hold as much power as men, a development that, should it ever occur, apparently lies far in the future.

In the meantime, politicians have become concerned about a primary sociological implication of female infanticide—that large numbers of young men who cannot marry pose a political threat. These "bare branches," as they are referred to in China, disgruntled and lacking the stabilizing influences of marriage and children, could become a breeding ground for political dissent. This threat could motivate the national elites to take steps against female infanticide.

For Your Consideration
What do you think can be done to reduce female infanticide? Why do you think this issue receives so little publicity?

Sources: Jordan 2000; Dugger 2001; Eckholm 2002; French 2004; Hudson and den Boer 2004; Riley 2004; Wonacott 2007; Yardley 2007.

Government actions can change a country's growth rate, yet the main factor is not the government, but industrialization. *In every country that industrializes, the birth rate declines.* Not only does industrialization open up economic opportunities but it also makes rearing children more expensive. Children require more education and remain dependent longer. Significantly, the basis for conferring status also changes—from having many children to attaining education and displaying material wealth. People like Celia and Angel begin to see life differently, and their motivation to have many children drops sharply. Not knowing how rapidly industrialization will progress or how quickly changes in values and reproductive behavior will follow adds to the difficulty of making accurate projections.

Because of these many complications, demographers play it safe by making several projections of population

The Chinese government uses billboards to remind people of its "one couple, one child" policy. The fat on the child's face on this billboard in Chengdu carries an additional message—that curtailing childbirth brings prosperity, abundant food for all. The portrayal of a girl baby is part of the government's attempt to reduce infanticide.

growth. For example, what will the U.S. population be in the year 2050? Between now and then, will we have **zero population growth,** with every 1,000 women giving birth to 2,100 children? (The extra 100 children make up for those who do not survive or reproduce.) Will a larger proportion of women go to college? (The more education women have, the fewer children they bear [Sutton and Matthews 2004].) How will immigration change? Will some devastating disease appear? With such huge variables, it is easy to see why demographers make the three projections of the U.S. population shown in Figure 14.9.

Let's look at a different aspect of population, where people live. Because more and more people around the world are living in cities, we shall concentrate on urban trends and urban life.

FIGURE 14.9   Population Projections of the United States

Millions of People

High projection

Medium projection

Low projection

Year   2000   2020   2040   2060   2080   2100

Note: The projections are based on different assumptions of fertility, mortality, and, especially, immigration.
Source: By the author. Based on *Statistical Abstract* 2002:Table 3.

URBANIZATION

As I was climbing a steep hill in Medellin, Colombia, in a district called El Tiro, my informant, Jaro, said, "This used to be a garbage heap." I stopped to peer through the vegetation alongside the path we were on, and sure enough, I could see bits of refuse still sticking out of the dirt. The "town" had been built on top of garbage.

This was just the first of my many revelations that day. The second was that El Tiro was so dangerous that the Medellin police refused to enter it. I shuddered for a moment, but I had good reason to trust Jaro. He had been a pastor in El Tiro for several years, and he knew the people well. I knew that if I stayed close to him I would be safe.

Actually, El Tiro was safer now than it had been. A group of young men had banded together to make it so, Jaro told me. A sort of frontier justice prevailed. The vigilantes told the prostitutes and drug dealers that there would be no prostitution or drug dealing in El Tiro and to "take it elsewhere."

They killed anyone who robbed or killed someone. And they even made families safer—they would beat up any man who got drunk and beat "his" woman. With the threat of instant justice, the area had become much safer.

Jaro then added that each household had to pay the group a monthly fee, which turned out to be less than a dollar in U.S. money. Each business had to pay a little more. For this, they received security.

As we wandered the streets of El Tiro, it did look safe—but I still stayed close to Jaro. And I wondered about this group of men who had made the area safe. What kept them from turning on the residents? Jaro had no answer. When Jaro pointed to two young men, whom he said were part of the ruling group, I asked if I could take their picture. They refused. I did not try to snap one on the sly.

My final revelation was El Tiro itself. On the next two pages, you can see some of the things I saw that day.

In this second part of the chapter, I will try to lay the context for understanding urban life—and El Tiro. Let's begin by first finding out how the city itself came about.

The Development of Cities

Cities are not new to the world scene. Perhaps as early as 7,000 years ago, people built small cities with massive defensive walls, such as biblically famous Jericho (Homblin 1973). Cities on a larger scale appeared about 3500 B.C., around the time that writing was invented (Chandler and Fox 1974; Hawley 1981). At that time, cities emerged in several parts of the world—first in Mesopotamia (Iraq and Iran) and later in the Nile, Indus, and Yellow River valleys, in West Africa, along the shores of the Mediterranean, in Central America, and in the Andes (Fischer 1976; Flanagan 1990). In the Americas, the first city was Caral, in what is now Peru (Fountain 2001).

The key to the origin of cities is the development of more efficient agriculture (Lenski and Lenski 1987). Only when farming produces a surplus can some people stop producing food and gather in cities to spend time in other economic pursuits. A **city,** in fact, can be defined as a place in which a large number of people are permanently based and do not produce their own food. The invention of the plow about 5,000 years ago created widespread agricultural surpluses, stimulating the development of towns and cities.

Most early cities were tiny, merely a collection of a few thousand people in agricultural centers or on major trade routes. The most notable exceptions are two cities that reached 1 million residents for a brief period of time before they declined—Changan (now Xi'an) in China about A.D. 800 and Baghdad in Persia (Iraq) about A.D. 900 (Chandler and Fox 1974). Even Athens at the peak of its power in the fifth century B.C. had about 250,000 inhabitants. Rome, at

Early cities were small economic centers surrounded by walls to keep out enemies. These cities had to be fortresses, for they were constantly threatened by armed, roving tribesmen and by leaders of nearby city-states who raised armies to enlarge their domain and enrich their coffers by sacking neighboring cities. Pictured here is Cologne, Germany, as depicted in a 1545 manuscript.

A Walk Through El Tiro in
Medellin, Colombia

This is the "richer" area below El Tiro. As you can see, some of the residents own cars.

Kids are kids the world over. These children don't know they are poor. They are having a great time playing on a pile of dirt in the street.

Almost at the top of the garbage heap, I saw this boy in front of his house. His mother hung out the family's wash to dry.

This is one of my favorite photos. The woman is happy that she has a home—and proud of what she has done with it. What I find remarkable is the flower garden she so carefully tends, and has taken great effort to protect from children and dogs. I can see the care she would take of a little suburban home.

© James M. Henslin, all photos

It doesn't take much skill to build your own house in El Tiro. A hammer and saw, some nails, and used lumber will provide most of what you need. This man is building his house on top of another house.

The road to El Tiro. On the left, going up the hill, is a boardwalk. To the right is a meat market (*carnicería*). Note the structure above the meat market, where the family that runs the store lives.

El Tiro has home delivery.

An infrastructure has developed to serve El Tiro. This woman is waiting in line to use the only public telephone.

"What does an El Tiro home look like inside?," I kept wondering. Then Jaro, my guide at the left, took me inside the home of one of his parishioners. Amelia keeps a neat house with everything highly organized.

What do the people do to make a living in El Tiro? Anything they can. This man is sharpening a saw in front of his home.

its peak, may have had a million people or more, but as it declined, its population fell to just 35,000 (Palen 2005).

Even 200 years ago, the only city in the world that had a population of more than a million was Peking (now Beijing), China (Chandler and Fox 1974). Then in just 100 years, by 1900, the number of such cities jumped to sixteen. The reason was the Industrial Revolution, which drew people to cities by providing work. The Industrial Revolution also stimulated rapid transportation and communication and allowed people, resources, and products to be moved efficiently—all essential factors (called *infrastructure*) on which large cities depend. Figure 14.10 shows the global growth in the number of cities that have a million or more people.

The Process of Urbanization

Although cities are not new to the world scene, urbanization is. **Urbanization** refers to masses of people moving to cities and these cities having a growing influence on society. Urbanization is taking place all over the world. In 1800, only 3 percent of the world's population lived in cities (Hauser and Schnore 1965). Then in 2007, for the first time in history, more people lived in cities than in rural areas. Urbanization is uneven across the globe. For the in-

dustrialized world, it is 77 percent, and for the Least Industrialized Nations, it is 41 percent (Haub 2006; Robb 2007). Without the Industrial Revolution this remarkable growth could not have taken place, for an extensive infrastructure is needed to support hundreds of thousands and even millions of people in a relatively small area.

To understand the city's attraction, we need to consider the "pulls" of urban life. Because of its exquisite division of labor, the city offers incredible variety—music ranging from rap and salsa to death metal and classical, shops that feature imported delicacies from around the world and those that sell special foods for vegetarians and diabetics. Cities also offer anonymity, which so many find refreshing in light of the tighter controls of village and small-town life. And, of course, the city offers work.

Some cities have grown so large and have so much influence over a region that the term *city* is no longer adequate to describe them. The term **metropolis** is used instead. This term refers to a central city surrounded by smaller cities and their suburbs. They are linked by transportation and communication and connected economically, and sometimes politically, through county boards and regional governing bodies. St. Louis is an example.

> Although this name, St. Louis, properly refers to a city of 350,000 people in Missouri, it also refers to another 3 million people who live in more than a hundred separate towns in both Missouri and Illinois. Altogether, the region is known as the "St. Louis or Bi-State Area." Although these towns are independent politically, they form an economic unit. They are linked by work (many people in the smaller towns work in St. Louis or are served by industries from St. Louis), by communications (they share the same area newspaper and radio and television stations), and by transportation (they use the same interstate highways, the Bi-State Bus system, and international airport). As symbolic interactionists would note, shared symbols (the Arch, the Mississippi River, Busch Brewery, the Cardinals, the Rams, the Blues—both the hockey team and the music) provide the residents a common identity.
>
> Most of the towns run into one another, and if you were to drive through this metropolis, you would not know that you were leaving one town and entering another—unless you had lived there for some time and were aware of the fierce small-town identifications and rivalries that coexist within this overarching identity.

Some metropolises have grown so large and influential that the term **megalopolis** is used to describe them. This term refers to an overlapping area consisting of at least two metropolises and their many suburbs. Of the twenty

FIGURE 14.10   The Global Growth of Cities over One Million Residents

Sources: By the author. Based on Chandler and Fox 1974; Brockerhoff 2000.

or so megalopolises in the United States, the three largest are the Eastern seaboard running from Maine to Virginia, the area in Florida between Miami, Orlando, and Tampa, and California's coastal area between San Francisco and San Diego. The California megalopolis extends into Mexico and includes Tijuana and its suburbs.

This process of urban areas turning into a metropolis, and a metropolis developing into a megalopolis, occurs worldwide. When a city's population hits 10 million, it is called a **megacity.** In 1950, New York City was the only megacity in the world. Today there are nineteen. Figure 14.11 shows the world's ten largest megacities. Note that most megacities are located in the Least Industrialized Nations.

U.S. Urban Patterns

From Country to City   In its early years, the United States was almost exclusively rural. In 1790, only about 5 percent of Americans lived in cities. By 1920, this figure had jumped to 50 percent. Urbanization has continued without letup, and today 79 percent of Americans live in cities.

The U.S. Census Bureau divides the country into 274 **metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs).** Each MSA consists of a central city of at least 50,000 people and the urbanized areas linked to it. About three of five Ameri-

cans live in just fifty or so MSAs. As you can see from the Social Map on the next page, like our other social patterns, urbanization is uneven across the United States.

From City to City   As Americans migrate in search of work and better lifestyles, some cities increase in population while others shrink. Table 14.3 on the next page compares the fastest-growing U.S. cities with those that are losing people. This table reflects a major shift of people, resources, and power that is occurring between regions of the United States. As you can see, six of the ten fastest-growing cities are in the West, and four are in the South. Of the ten declining cities, eight are in the Northeast and two are in a state that borders the Northeast and the South.

Between Cities   As Americans migrate, **edge cities** have developed to meet their needs. This term refers to clusters of buildings and services near the intersection of major highways. These areas of shopping malls, hotels, office parks, and apartment complexes are not cities in the traditional sense. Rather than being political units with their own mayor or city manager, they overlap political boundaries and include parts of several cities or towns. Yet, edge cities—such as Tysons Corner in Washington and those clustering along the LBJ Freeway in Dallas, Texas—provide a sense of place to those who live or work there.

FIGURE 14.11   How Many Millions of People Live in the World's Largest Megacities?

Tokyo	
2015	26
2000	26
1975	19

New York	
2015	17
2000	17
1975	16

Los Angeles	
2015	14
2000	13
1975	9

Lagos	
2015	23
2000	13
1975	3

Shanghai	
2015	15
2000	13
1975	11

Bombay	
2015	26
2000	18
1975	7

Mexico City	
2015	19
2000	18
1975	11

Sao Paulo	
2015	20
2000	18
1975	10

Buenos Aires	
2015	14
2000	13
1975	9

Calcutta	
2015	17
2000	13
1975	8

Source: United Nations 2000.

FIGURE 14.12   How Urban Is Your State?
The Rural–Urban Makeup of the United States

The most rural states: 38% to 63% urban
Average states: 65% to 78% urban
The most urban states: 80% to 94% urban

Note: The most rural state is Vermont (38% urban). The most urban states are California and New Jersey (94% urban).
Source: By the author. Based on *Statistical Abstract* 2007: Table 33.

Within the City   Another U.S. urban pattern is **gentrification,** the movement of middle-class people into rundown areas of a city. They are attracted by the low prices for large houses that, although deteriorated, can be restored. A positive consequence is an improvement in the appearance of some urban neighborhoods—freshly painted buildings, well-groomed lawns, and the absence of boarded-up windows. A negative

TABLE 14.3   The Shrinking and the Fastest-Growing Cities

The Shrinking Cities		The Fastest-Growing Cities	
1. −1.9%	Buffalo–Niagara Falls, NY	1. +24.3%	Las Vegas, NV
2. −1.9%	Pittsburgh, PA	2. +23.6%	Cape Coral–Ft. Myers, FL
3. −1.8%	Scranton, PA	3. +22.2%	Naples, FL.
4. −1.6%	Youngstown, OH	4. +20.2%	Provo, UT
5. −1.0%	Cleveland, OH	5. +20.1%	Riverside, CA
6. −1.0%	Charleston, WV	6. +19.3%	Port St. Lucie, FL
7. −0.9%	Huntington, WV	7. +19.2%	Raleigh, NC
8. −0.7%	Utica–Rome, NY	8. +19.1%	McAllen, TX
9. −0.5%	Dayton, OH	9. +18.9%	Phoenix, AZ
10. −0.4%	Toledo, OH	10. +17.8%	Stockton, CA

Note: Population change from 2000 to 2005.
Source: By the author. Based on *Statistical Abstract* 2007: Table 25.

consequence is that the poor residents are displaced by the more well-to-do newcomers. Tension between the gentrifiers and those being displaced is common (Anderson 1990, 2006).

The usual pattern is for the gentrifiers to be whites and the displaced to be minorities. As is discussed in the Down-to-Earth Sociology box on the next page, in the Harlem neighborhood of New York City, both the gentrifiers and the displaced are African Americans. As middle-class and professional African Americans reclaim this area, an infrastructure—which includes everything from Starbucks coffee shops to dentists—follows. So do soaring real estate prices.

From City to Suburb   The term **suburbanization** refers to people moving from cities to **suburbs,** the communities located just outside a city. Suburbanization is not new. Archaeologists recently found that the Mayan city of Caracol (in what is now Belize) had suburbs, perhaps even with specialized subcenters, the equivalent of today's strip malls (Wilford 2000). The extent to which people have left U.S. cities in search of their dreams is remarkable. Fifty years ago, about 20 percent of Americans lived in the suburbs (Karp et al. 1991). Today, over half of all Americans live in them (Palen 2005).

The automobile was a major impetus for suburbanization. Beginning about one hundred years ago, whites began to move to small towns near the cities where they worked. After the racial integration of U.S. schools in the 1950s and 1960s, suburbanization picked up pace as whites fled the cities. Minorities began to move to the suburbs about 1970. In some of today's suburbs, minorities are the majority.

Smaller Centers   The most recent urban trend is the development of *micropolitan areas.* A *micropolis* is a city of 10,000 to 50,000 residents that is not a suburb (McCarthy 2004), such as Gallup, New Mexico, or Carbondale, Illinois. Most micropolises are located "next to nowhere." They are fairly self-contained in terms of providing work, housing, and entertainment, and few of their residents commute to urban centers for work. Micropolises are growing, as residents of both rural and urban areas find their cultural attractions and conveniences appealing, especially in the absence of the city's crime and pollution.

The Rural Rebound

The desire to retreat to a safe haven has led to a migration to rural areas that is without precedent in the history of the United States. Some small farming towns are making a comeback, their boarded-up stores and schools once again open for business and learning.

The "push" factors for this fundamental shift are fears of urban crime and violence. The "pull" factors are safety, lower cost of living, and more living space. Interstate highways have made airports—and the city itself—accessible from longer distances. With satellite communications, cell phones, fax machines, and the Internet, people can be "plugged in"—connected with others around the world—even though they live in what just a short time ago were remote areas.

Listen to the wife of one of my former students as she explains why she and her husband moved to a rural area, three hours from the international airport that they fly out of each week:

I work for a Canadian company. Paul works for a French company, with headquarters in Paris. He flies around the country doing computer consulting. I give motivational seminars to businesses. When we can, we drive to the airport together, but we often leave on different days. I try to go with my husband to Paris once a year.

We almost always are home together on the weekends. We often arrange three- and four-day weekends, because I can plan seminars at home, and Paul does some of his consulting from here.

Sometimes shopping is inconvenient, but we don't have to lock our car doors when we drive, and the new Wal-Mart superstore has most of what we need. E-commerce is a big part of it. I just type in www—whatever, and they ship it right to my door. I get make-up and books online. I even bought a part for my stove.

Why do we live here? Look at the lake. It's beautiful. We enjoy boating and swimming. We love to walk in this park-like setting. We see deer and wild turkeys. We love the sunsets over the lake. (author's files)

Models of Urban Growth

In the 1920s, Chicago was a vivid mosaic of immigrants, gangsters, prostitutes, the homeless, the rich, and the poor—much as it is today. Sociologists at the University of Chicago studied these contrasting ways of life. One of these sociologists, Robert Park, coined the term **human ecology** to describe how people adapt to their environment (Park and Burgess 1921; Park 1936). (This concept is also known as *urban ecology.*) The process of urban growth is of special interest to sociologists. Let's look at four models they developed.

The Concentric Zone Model   To explain how cities expand, sociologist Ernest Burgess (1925) proposed a

Down-to-Earth Sociology

Reclaiming Harlem: "It Feeds My Soul"

The story is well known. The inner city is filled with crack, crime, and corruption. It stinks from foul, festering filth strewn on the streets and piled up around burned-out buildings. Only those who have no choice live in this desolate, despairing environment where danger lurks around every corner.

What is not so well known is that affluent African Americans are reclaiming some of these areas.

Howard Sanders was living the American Dream. After earning a degree from Harvard Business School, he took a position with a Manhattan investment firm. He lived in an exclusive apartment on Central Park West, but he missed Harlem, where he had grown up. He moved back, along with his wife and daughter.

African American lawyers, doctors, professors, and bankers are doing the same.

What's the attraction? The first is nostalgia, a cultural identification with the Harlem of legend and folklore. It was here that black writers and artists lived in the 1920s, here that the blues and jazz attracted young and accomplished musicians.

The second reason is a more practical one. Harlem offers housing value. Five-bedroom homes with 6,000 square feet are available. Some feature Honduran mahogany. Some brownstones are only shells and have to be renovated; others are in perfect condition.

What is happening is the rebuilding of a community. Some people who "made" it want to be role models. They want children in the community to see them going to and returning from work.

When the middle class moved out of Harlem, so did its amenities. Now that young professionals are moving back in, the amenities are returning, too. There were no coffee shops, restaurants, jazz clubs, florists, copy centers, dentist and optometrist offices, or art galleries—the types of things urbanites take for granted. Now there are.

The police have also returned, changing the character of Harlem. Their more visible presence and enforcement of laws have shut down the open-air drug markets. With residents running a high risk of arrest if they carry guns, the shootouts that used to plague this area have become

West 125th Street in Harlem

a thing of the past. With the enforcement of laws against public urination and vagrancy, the area has become much safer, further attracting the middle class.

The same thing is happening on Chicago's West Side and in other U.S. cities.

The drive to find community—to connect with others and with one's roots—is strong. As an investment banker who migrated to Harlem said, "It feeds my soul."

"But at what cost?" ask others. This change might be fine for investment bankers and professionals who want to move back and try to rediscover their roots, but what about the people who are displaced? Gentrification always has a cost: residents of an area being pushed out as the area becomes middle class and more expensive. Tenant associations have sprung up to protest the increase in rents and the displacement of residents. And homeowners' associations have emerged to fight to keep renters out of their rehabilitated areas. All are African Americans. The issue is not race, but social class antagonisms.

The "invasion–succession cycle," as sociologists call it, is continuing, but this time with a twist—a flight back in.

For Your Consideration

One of the costs of gentrification is the displacement of the poor as people with higher incomes move into the area. What can be done to prevent this? Would you be willing to move into an area of high crime in order to get a good housing bargain?

Sources: Based on Cose 1999; McCormick 1999a; Scott 2001; Taylor 2002; Leland 2003; Hampson 2005; Hyra 2006.

HENS.7052.CH14p392–423.qxd 8/26/08 11:06 AM Page 415

The Development of Cities   415

concentric-zone model. As shown in part A of Figure 14.13 below, Burgess noted that a city expands outward from its center. Zone 1 is the central business district. Zone 2, which encircles the downtown area, is in transition. It contains rooming houses and deteriorating housing, which, Burgess said, breed poverty, disease, and vice. Zone 3 is the area to which thrifty workers have moved in order to escape the zone in transition and yet maintain easy access to their work. Zone 4 contains more expensive apartments, residential hotels, single-family homes, and exclusive areas where the wealthy live. Commuters live in Zone 5, which consists of suburbs or satellite cities that have grown up around transportation routes.

Burgess intended this model to represent "the tendencies of any town or city to expand radially from its central business district." He noted, however, that no "city fits

perfectly this ideal scheme." Some cities have physical obstacles such as a lake, river, or railroad that cause their expansion to depart from the model. Burgess also noted that businesses had begun to deviate from the model by locating in outlying zones (see Zone 10). That was in 1925. Burgess didn't know it, but he was seeing the beginning of a major shift that led businesses away from downtown areas to suburban shopping malls. Today, these malls account for most of the country's retail sales.

The Sector Model   Sociologist Homer Hoyt (1939, 1971) noted that a city's concentric zones do not form a complete circle, and he modified Burgess' model of urban growth. As shown in part B of Figure 14.13, a concentric zone can contain several sectors—one of working-class housing, another of expensive homes, a

FIGURE 14.13   How Cities Develop: Models of Urban Growth

Concentric zones (A)

Sectors (B)

Multiple nuclei (C)

Districts (for Parts A, B, C)
1. Central business district
2. Wholesale and light manufacturing
3. Low-class residential
4. Medium-class residential
5. High-class residential
6. Heavy manufacturing
7. Outlying business district
8. Residential suburb
9. Industrial suburb
10. Commuters' zone

Peripheral model (D)

Districts (for Part D)
1. Central city
2. Suburban residential areas
3. Circumferential highway
4. Radial highway
5. Shopping mall
6. Industrial district
7. Office park
8. Service center
9. Airport complex
10. Combined employment and shopping center

Source: Cousins and Nagpaul 1970; Harris 1997.

third of businesses, and so on—all competing for the same land.

An example of this dynamic competition is what sociologists call an **invasion–succession cycle.** Poor immigrants and rural migrants settle in low-rent areas. As their numbers swell, they spill over into adjacent areas. Upset by their presence, the middle class moves out, which expands the sector of low-cost housing. The invasion–succession cycle is never complete, for later another group will replace this earlier one. As discussed in the Down-to-Earth Sociology box on page 414, in Harlem there has been a switch in the sequence: the "invaders" are the middle class.

The Multiple-Nuclei Model   Geographers Chauncey Harris and Edward Ullman noted that some cities have several centers, or nuclei (Harris and Ullman 1945; Ullman and Harris 1970). As shown in part C of Figure 14.13 on the previous page, each nucleus contains some specialized activity. A familiar example is the clustering of fast-food restaurants in one area and automobile dealers in another. Sometimes similar activities are grouped together because they profit from cohesion; retail districts, for example, draw more customers if there are more stores. Other clustering occurs because some types of land use, such as factories and expensive homes, are incompatible with one another. One result is that services are not spread evenly throughout the city.

The Peripheral Model   Chauncey Harris (1997) also developed the peripheral model shown in part D of Figure 14.13. This model portrays the impact of radial highways on the movement of people and services away from the central city to the city's periphery, or outskirts. It also shows the development of industrial and office parks.

Critique of the Models   These models tell only part of the story. They are time bound, for medieval cities didn't follow these patterns (see the photo on page 407). In addition, they do not account for urban planning policies. England, for example, has planning laws that preserve green belts (trees and farmlands) around the city. This prevents urban sprawl: Wal-Mart cannot buy land outside the city and put up a store; instead, it must locate in the downtown area with the other stores. Norwich has 250,000 people—yet the city ends abruptly, and on its green belt pheasants skitter across plowed fields while sheep graze in verdant meadows (Milbank 1995).

If you were to depend on these models, you would be surprised when you visited the cities of the Least Industrialized Nations. There, the wealthy often claim the inner city, where fine restaurants and other services are readily accessible. Tucked behind walls and protected from public scrutiny, they enjoy luxurious homes and gardens. The poor, in contrast, especially rural migrants, settle in areas outside the city—or, as in the case of El Tiro, featured in the photo essay on pages 408–409, on top of piles of garbage in what used to be the outskirts of a city.

City Life

Life in cities is filled with contrasts. Let's look at two of those contrasts, alienation and community.

Alienation in the City

Impersonality and Self-Interest   If you know urban life, you know that impersonality and self-interest are ordinary characteristics of the city. As you traverse city streets, you can expect people to avoid needless interaction with others and to be absorbed in their own affairs. These are adjustments that people have made to deal with the crowds of strangers with whom they temporarily share the same urban space. Sometimes, however, these characteristics of urban life are carried to extremes. Here is an event that made national headlines when it occurred:

> **In crowded traffic on a bridge going into Detroit, Deletha Word bumped the car ahead of her. The damage was minor, but the driver, Martell Welch, jumped out. Cursing, he pulled Deletha from her car, pushed her onto the hood, and began beating her. Martell's friends got out to watch. One of them held Deletha down while Martell took a car jack and smashed Deletha's car. Scared for her life, Deletha broke away, fleeing to the bridge's railing. Martell and his friends taunted her, shouting, "Jump, bitch, jump!" Deletha plunged to her death. Whether she jumped or fell is unknown. (**_Newsweek,_** September 4, 1995)**

Anyone who lives in a large city knows that it is prudent to be alert to danger. You never know who that stranger near you really is. Even traffic accidents hold the danger of angry people whose wrath is ready to explode.

Community in the City

The city is not inevitably alienating, however. The drivers who witnessed the attack on Deletha Word did nothing. But after Deletha went over the railing, two of them jumped in after her, risking injury and their own lives in a futile attempt to save her. Some urbanites, then, are far from alienated.

The Gans Research   The city also has enclaves of community. Sociologist Herbert Gans, a symbolic interactionist, did participant observation in the West End of Boston.

He was so impressed with the sense of community that he titled his book *The Urban Villagers* (1962). In this book, which has become a classic in sociology, Gans said:

> After a few weeks of living in the West End, my observations—and my perceptions of the area—changed drastically. The search for an apartment quickly indicated that the individual units were usually in much better condition than the outside or the hallways of the buildings. Subsequently, in wandering through the West End, and in using it as a resident, I developed a kind of selective perception, in which my eye focused only on those parts of the area that were actually being used by people. Vacant buildings and boarded-up stores were no longer so visible, and the totally deserted alleys or streets were outside the set of paths normally traversed, either by myself or by the West Enders. The dirt and spilled-over garbage remained, but, since they were concentrated in street gutters and empty lots, they were not really harmful to anyone and thus were not as noticeable as during my initial observations.
>
> Since much of the area's life took place on the street, faces became familiar very quickly. I met my neighbors on the stairs and in front of my building. And, once a shopping pattern developed, I saw the same storekeepers frequently, as well as the area's "characters" who wandered through the streets every day on a fairly regular route and schedule. In short, the exotic quality of the stores and the residents also wore off as I became used to seeing them.

In short, Gans found a *community,* people who identified with the area and with one another. Its residents enjoyed networks of friends and acquaintances. Despite the area's substandard buildings, most West Enders had chosen to live here. *To them, this was a low-rent district, not a slum.*

Most West Enders had low-paying, insecure jobs. Other residents were elderly, living on small pensions. Unlike the middle class, these people didn't care about their "address." The area's inconveniences were something they put up with in exchange for cheap housing. In general, they were content with their neighborhood.

Who Lives in the City?

Whether people find alienation or community in the city, then, depends on whom you are talking about. Here are five types of urban dwellers that Gans (1962, 1968, 1991) identified. They certainly have vastly different experiences in the city. The first three live in the city by choice and are not alienated; the latter two are outcasts of industrial society who live in the city despairingly, without choice or hope.

The Cosmopolites   These are the intellectuals, professionals, artists, and entertainers who have been attracted to the city. They value its conveniences and cultural benefits.

The Singles   Usually in their early 20s to early 30s, the singles have settled in the city temporarily. For them, urban life is a stage in their life course. Businesses and services, such as singles bars and apartment complexes, cater to their needs and desires. After they marry, many move to the suburbs.

The Ethnic Villagers   Feeling a sense of identity, working-class members of the same ethnic group band together. They form tightly knit neighborhoods that resemble villages and small towns. Family- and peer-oriented, they try to isolate themselves from the dangers and problems of urban life.

The Deprived   Destitute, emotionally disturbed, and having little income, education, or work skills, the deprived live in neighborhoods that are more like urban jungles than urban villages. Some of them stalk those jungles in search of prey. Neither predator nor prey has much hope for anything better in life—for themselves or for their children.

The city dwellers whom Gans identified as ethnic villagers find community in the city. Living in tightly knit neighborhoods, they know many other residents. Some first-generation immigrants have even come from the same village in the "old country." This photo was taken in New York City.

The Trapped   These people don't live in the area by choice, either. Some were trapped when an ethnic group "invaded" their neighborhood and they could not afford to move. Others found themselves trapped in a downward spiral. They started life in a higher social class, but because of personal problems—mental or physical illness or addiction to alcohol or other drugs—they drifted downward. There also are the elderly who are trapped by poverty and not wanted elsewhere. Like the deprived, the trapped suffer from high rates of assault, mugging, and rape.

In Sum: Gans' typology illustrates the complexity of urban life. With the city a mosaic of social diversity, not all urban dwellers experience the city in the same way. Each group has its own lifestyle, and each has distinct experiences. Some people welcome the city's cultural diversity and mix with several groups. Others find community by retreating into the security of ethnic enclaves. Still others feel trapped and deprived. To them, the city is an urban jungle. It poses threats to their health and safety, and their lives are full of despair.

The Norm of Noninvolvement and the Diffusion of Responsibility

Urban dwellers try to avoid intrusions from strangers. As they go about their everyday lives in the city, they follow a *norm of noninvolvement.*

> **To do this, we sometimes use props such as newspapers to shield ourselves from others and to indicate our inaccessibility for interaction. In effect, we learn to "tune others out." In this regard, we might see the Walkman [or iPod] as the quintessential urban prop in that it allows us to be tuned in and tuned out at the same time. It is a device that allows us to enter our own private world and thereby effectively to close off encounters with others. The use of such devices protects our "personal space," along with our body demeanor and facial expression (the passive "mask" or even scowl that persons adopt on subways). (Karp et al. 1991)**

Social psychologists John Darley and Bibb Latané (1968) ran the series of experiments featured in Chapter 5, page 132. In their experiments, Darley and Latané uncovered the *diffusion of responsibility*—the more bystanders there are, the less likely people are to help. As a group grows, people's sense of responsibility becomes diffused, with each person assuming that *another* will do the responsible thing. "With these other people here, it is not *my* responsibility," they reason.

The diffusion of responsibility, along with the norm of noninvolvement, helps to explain why people can ignore the plight of others. Those who did nothing to intervene in the attack on Deletha Ward were *not* uncaring people. With the diffusion of responsibility, each felt that others might do something. Then, too, there was the norm of noninvolvement—helpful for getting people through everyday city life but, unfortunately, dysfunctional in some crucial situations.

To this dispassionate analysis of diffusion of responsibility and norm of noninvolvement, we can add this: These people were scared. They didn't want to get hurt. The fears nurtured by events like the sudden attack on a motorist, as well as the city's many rapes and muggings, make many people want to retreat to a safe haven. This topic is discussed in the Down-to-Earth Sociology box on the next page.

Urban Problems and Social Policy

To close this chapter, let's look at the primary reasons that U.S. cities have declined and then consider the potential of urban revitalization.

Suburbanization

The U.S. city has been the loser in the transition to the suburbs. As people moved out of the city, businesses and jobs followed. White-collar corporations, such as insurance companies, were the first to move their offices to the suburbs. They were soon followed by manufacturers. This process has continued so relentlessly that today twice as many manufacturing jobs are located in the suburbs as in the city (Palen 2005). As the city's tax base shrank, it left a budget squeeze that affected not only parks, zoos, libraries, and museums, but also the city's basic services—its schools, streets, sewer and water systems, and police and fire departments.

This shift in population and resources left behind people who had no choice but to stay in the city. As we reviewed in Chapter 9, sociologist William Julius Wilson (1987) says that this exodus transformed the inner city into a ghetto. Left behind were families and individuals who, lacking training and skills, were trapped by poverty, unemployment, and welfare dependency. Also left behind were those who prey on others through street crime. The term *ghetto,* says Wilson, "suggests that a fundamental social transformation has taken place . . . that groups represented by this term are collectively different from and much more socially isolated from those that lived in these communities in earlier years" (quoted in Karp et al. 1991).

City Versus Suburb   Having made the move out of the city—or having been born in a suburb and preferring to stay

Down-to-Earth Sociology
Urban Fear and the Gated Fortress

Gated neighborhoods—where gates open and close to allow or prevent access to a neighborhood—are not new. They always have been available to the rich. What is new is the rush of the upper middle class to towns where they pay high taxes to keep all of the town's facilities private. Even the city's streets are private.

Towns cannot discriminate on the basis of religion or race–ethnicity, but they can—and do—discriminate on the basis of social class. Klahanie, Washington, is an excellent example. Begun in 1985, it was supposed to take twenty years to develop. With its winding streets, pavilions, gardens, swimming pools, parks, private libraries, infant–toddler playcourt, and 25 miles of hiking-bicycling-running trails on 300 acres of open space, demand for the $300,000 to $500,000 homes nestled by a lake in this private community exceeded supply (Egan 1995; Klahanie Association Web site 2007).

As the upper middle class flees urban areas and tries to build a bucolic dream, we will see many more private towns. A strong sign of the future is Celebration, a town of 20,000 people planned and built by the Walt Disney Company just five minutes from Disney World. Celebration boasts the usual school, hospital, and restaurants. In addition, Celebration offers a Robert Trent Jones golf course, walking and bicycling paths, a hotel with a lighthouse tower and bird sanctuary, a health and fitness center with a rock-climbing wall, and its own cable TV channel. With fiber-optic technology, the residents of private communities can remain locked

The U.S. economic system has proven highly beneficial to most citizens, but it also has left many in poverty. To protect themselves, primarily from the poor, the upper middle class increasingly seeks sanctuary behind gated communities. Some seek even more safety and privacy by living behind gates within a gated community, as shown here in Miami Beach, Florida.

within their sanctuaries and still be connected to the outside world.

For Your Consideration
Community involves a sense of togetherness, a sense of identity with one another. Can you explain how this concept also contains the idea of separateness from others (not just in the example of gated communities)? What will our future be if we become a nation of gated communities, where middle-class homeowners withdraw into private domains, separating themselves from the rest of the nation?

there—suburbanites want the city to keep its problems to itself. They reject proposals to share suburbia's revenues with the city and oppose measures that would allow urban and suburban governments joint control over what has become a contiguous mass of people and businesses. Suburban leaders generally believe that it is in their best interests to remain politically, economically, and socially separate from their nearby city. They do not mind going to the city to work or venturing there on weekends for the diversions it offers, but they do not want to help pay the city's expenses.

It is likely that the mounting bill ultimately will come due, however, and that suburbanites will have to pay for their uncaring attitude toward the urban disadvantaged. Karp et al. (1991) put it this way:

It may be that suburbs can insulate themselves from the problems of central cities, at least for the time being. In the long run, though, there will be a steep price to pay for the failure of those better off to care compassionately for those at the bottom of society.

Our occasional urban riots may be part of that bill—perhaps just the down payment.

Suburban Flight   In some places, the bill is coming due quickly. As they age, some suburbs are becoming mirror images of the city that their residents so despise. Suburban crime, the flight of the middle class, a shrinking tax base, and eroding services create a spiraling sense of insecurity, stimulating more middle-class flight (Herrick 2007). Figure 14.14 on the next page illustrates this process, which is new to the urban-suburban scene.

Disinvestment and Deindustrialization

As the cities' tax base shrank and their services declined, neighborhoods deteriorated, and banks began **redlining:** Afraid of loans going bad, bankers would draw a line around a problem area on a map and refuse to make loans for housing or businesses there. This **disinvestment** (withdrawal of investment) pushed these areas into further decline. Youth gangs, muggings, and murders are common in these areas, but good jobs are not. All are woven into this process of disinvestment.

The globalization of capitalism has also left a heavy mark on U.S. cities. As we reviewed in Chapter 11, to compete in the global market, many U.S. industries abandoned local communities and moved their factories to countries where labor costs are lower. This process, called **deindustrialization,** made U.S. industries more competitive, but it eliminated millions of U.S. manufacturing jobs. Lacking training in the new information technologies,

many poor people are locked out of the benefits of the postindustrial economy that is engulfing the United States. Left behind in the inner cities, many live in despair.

The Potential of Urban Revitalization

Social policy usually takes one of two forms. The first is to tear down and rebuild—something that is fancifully termed **urban renewal.** The result is the renewal of an area—but *not* for the benefit of its inhabitants. Stadiums, high-rise condos, luxury hotels, and boutiques replace run-down, cheap housing. Outpriced, the area's inhabitants are displaced into adjacent areas.

The second is some sort of **enterprise zone,** a designated area of the city that offers economic incentives, such as reduced taxes, to businesses that move into it. Although the intention is good, the usual result is failure. Most businesses refuse to locate in high-crime areas. Those that do relocate pay a high price for security and losses from crime, which can eat up the tax savings. If workers are hired from within the problem area and the jobs pay a decent wage, which most do not, the workers move to better neighborhoods—which doesn't help the area (Lemann 1994). After all, who chooses to live with the fear of violence?

A form of the enterprise zone, called *Federal Empowerment Zones,* has brought some success. In addition to tax breaks, this program offers low-interest loans targeted for redeveloping an area. It is, in effect, the opposite of disinvestment, which devastates areas. The Down-to-Earth Sociology box on page 414 featured the renaissance of

As cities evolve, so does architecture. This is the design of the headquarters for China's flagship television network to be built in Beijing. As a sign of changing times and of China's evolving partnership with the West, the architect is a Westerner, Rem Koolhaas of Holland.

FIGURE 14.14   Urban Growth and Urban Flight

50 years ago	25 years ago	Now

At first, the city and surrounding villages grew independently.

As city dwellers fled urban decay, they created a ring of suburbs.

As middle-class flight continues outward, urban problems are arriving in the outer rings.

Harlem. Stimulating this change was the designation of Harlem as a Federal Empowerment Zone. The economic incentives lured grocery stores, dry cleaners, and video stores, attracting urbanites who expect such services. As middle-class people moved back in, the demand for more specialty shops followed. A self-feeding cycle of investment and hope began, replacing the self-feeding cycle of despair, crime, and drug use that accompanies disinvestment.

U.S. cities can be revitalized and made into safe and decent places to live. There is nothing in the nature of cities that turns them into dangerous slums. Most European cities, for example, are both safe and pleasant. If U.S. cities are to change, they need to become top agenda items

of the U.S. government. Adequate resources in terms of money and human talents must be focused on overcoming urban woes. That we are beginning to see success in Harlem, Chicago's North Town, and even in formerly riot-torn East Los Angeles indicates that the transformation can be brought about.

Replacing old buildings with new ones, however, is not the answer. Instead, sociological principles of building community need to be followed. Here are three guiding principles suggested by sociologist William Flanagan (1990):

Scale. Regional and national planning is necessary. Local jurisdictions, with their many rivalries,

U.S. suburbs were once unplanned, rambling affairs that took irregular shapes as people moved away from the city. Today's suburbs tend to be planned to precise details even before the first resident moves in. This photo is of a suburb outside of Venice, California.

competing goals, and limited resources, end up with a hodgepodge of mostly unworkable solutions.

Livability. Cities must be appealing and meet human needs, especially the need of community. This will attract the middle classes into the city, which will increase its tax base. In turn, this will help finance the services that make the city more livable.

Social justice. In the final analysis, social policy must be evaluated by how it affects people. "Urban renewal" programs that displace the poor for the benefit of the middle class and wealthy do not pass

this standard. The same would apply to solutions that create "livability" for select groups but neglect the poor and the homeless.

Most actions taken to solve urban problems are window dressings for politicians who want to *appear* as though they are doing something constructive. The solution is to avoid Band-Aids that cover up the problems that hurt our quality of life and to address their *root* causes— poverty, poor schools, crimes of violence, lack of jobs, and an inadequate tax base to provide the amenities that enhance our quality of life and attract people to the city.

SUMMARY *and* REVIEW

A Planet with No Space for Enjoying Life?

What debate did Thomas Malthus initiate?
In 1798, Thomas Malthus analyzed the surge in Europe's population. He concluded that the world's population will outstrip its food supply. The debate between today's New Malthusians and those who disagree, the Anti-Malthusians, continues. Pp. 394–397.

Why are people starving?
Starvation is not due to a lack of food in the world, for there is now *more* food for each person in the entire world than there was fifty years ago. Rather, starvation is the result of a maldistribution of food, which is primarily due to drought and civil war. Pp. 397–399.

Population Growth

Why do people in the poor nations have so many children?
In the Least Industrialized Nations, children are often viewed as gifts from God. In addition, they cost little to rear, contribute to the family income at an early age, and provide the parents' social security. These are powerful motivations to have large families. Pp. 399–402.

What are the three demographic variables?
To compute population growth, demographers use *fertility, mortality,* and *migration.* The **basic demographic equation** is births minus deaths plus net migration equals the growth rate. Pp. 402–403.

Why is forecasting population difficult?
A nation's growth rate is affected by unanticipated variables—from economic cycles, wars, and famines to industrialization and government policies. Pp. 403–406.

The Development of Cities

How are cities to related to the Industrial Revolution?
Cities can develop only if there is a large agricultural surplus, which frees people from food production. The primary impetus to the development of cities was the invention of the plow. After the Industrial Revolution stimulated rapid transportation and communication, cities grew quickly and became much larger. Today **urbanization** is so extensive that some cities have become **metropolises,** dominating the area adjacent to them. The areas of influence of some metropolises have merged, forming a **megalopolis.** Pp. 406–413.

What models of urban growth have been proposed?
The primary models are concentric zone, sector, multiple-nuclei, and peripheral. These models fail to account for ancient and medieval cities, many European cities, cities in the Least Industrialized Nations, and urban planning. Pp. 413–416.

City Life

Who lives in the city?
Some people experience **alienation** in the city; others find **community** in it. What people find depends largely on their background and urban networks. Five types of people who live in cities are cosmopolites, singles, ethnic villagers, the deprived, and the trapped. Pp. 414–416.

Urban Problems and Social Policy

Why have U.S. cities declined?

Three primary reasons for the decline of U.S. cities are **suburbanization** (as people moved to the suburbs, the tax base of cities eroded and services deteriorated), **disinvestment** (banks withdrawing their financing), and **deindustrialization** (which caused a loss of jobs). Pp. 418–420.

What social policy can salvage U.S. cities?

Three guiding principles for developing urban social policy are scale, livability, and social justice. Pp. 420–422.

THINKING CRITICALLY *about* Chapter 14

1. Do you think that the world is threatened by a population explosion? Use data from this chapter to support your position.

2. Why do people find alienation or community in the city?

3. What are the causes of urban problems, and what can we do to solve those problems?

BY THE NUMBERS: Changes Over Time

- World population at the birth of Christ: **About 300 million**
- World population today: **Closing in on 7 billion**

- Per capita food production in 1970: **80**
- Per capita food production today: **105**

- Number of years it will take for the Most Industrialized Nations to double in population: **1,000**
- Number of years it will take for the Least Industrialized Nations to double in population: **48**

- Annual population increase of the Least Industrialized Nations in the 1960s: **2.1%**
- Annual population increase of the Least Industrialized Nations today: **1.5%**

- Number of cities in the world with over 1 million residents in 1975: **195**
- Projected number of cities in the world with over 1 million residents in 2015: **564**

- Number of cities in the world with over 10 million residents in 1950: **1**
- Number of cities in the world with over 10 million residents today: **19**

ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

What can you find in MySocLab?   mysoclab   www.mysoclab.com

- **Complete Ebook**
- **Practice Tests and Video and Audio activities**
- **Mapping and Data Analysis exercises**

- **Sociology in the News**
- **Classic Readings in Sociology**
- **Research and Writing advice**

Where Can I Read More on This Topic?

Suggested readings for this chapter are listed at the back of this book.