Class in America: An Encyclopedia, Volumes 1-3

Edited by Robert E. Weir

Greenwood Press

CLASS IN AMERICA

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CLASS IN AMERICA AN ENCYCLOPEDIA



Volume 1: A-G

EDITED BY ROBERT E. WEIR



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CONTENTS

Alphabetical List of Entries	
Topical List of Entries	XV
Volume 1	
Preface	xxv
Acknowledgments	xxvii
Introduction	xxix
Encyclopedia, A–G	1
Volume 2	
Encyclopedia, H–P	339
Volume 3	
Encyclopedia, Q–Z	673
Bibliographical Essay	967
About the Editors & Contributors	973
Index	979

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF ENTRIES

Abbott, Edith and Grace academia accents and language patterns achievement and ascription Adams family Addams, Jane advertising affirmative action: see institutional discrimination; quotas Affluent Society, The: see Galbraith, John Kenneth African Americans: see institutional discrimination; race, racism, and racial stratification agrarianism agribusiness: see agrarianism Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC): see welfare Alger, Horatio alienation Althusser, Louis American dream American Enterprise Institute: see think tanks American exceptionalism American Federation of Labor (AFL) American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial

Organizations (AFL-CIO) American Indians: see Native

Americans American Revolution anarchy
anglophilia: see Europhilia
anti-Semitism
antitrust laws
Appalachia
Appeal to Reason
armories
Aronowitz, Stanley
art
Ascription: see achievement and
ascription
Asian Americans
assimilation
Astor, John Jacob
Auchincloss, Louis
authority

Bacon's Rebellion
Baltzell, E. Digby
Beacon Hill
begging and busking
Bellamy, Edward
Berger, Victor
Bernstein, Jared
big game hunting: see sports
bilingualism
Bill of Rights
birth control
black conservatism
black power
Blau, Peter Michael
blue collar

blue-collar unions blues Bluestone, Barry boarding schools: see education; Ivy League boards of directors Bobos: see Neiman Marcus; status symbols; yuppies body image Boston Brahmins Bourdieu, Pierre bourgeoisie bowling Brace, Charles Loring Bracero Program Buchanan, Pat Bush family business aristocracy business cycle

campaign financing
capitalism
Carnegie, Andrew
casinos
caste
Catholics
Cattle Kingdom
CEO
Chamber of Commerce
charity balls
Chicago School of Economics
child labor

children and poverty Chomsky, Noam civil service Civil War

class consciousness

class definitions: see conflict theory; continuous/discontinuous views of class; corporate class; functional elite theory; gender stratification; inequality theory; lower class; managerial class; Marxism/Marxist; middle class; objective method; poverty; power elite; prestige; race, racism, and racial stratification; reputational method; status inconsistency;

subjective method; underclass; upper class; working class

class formation class struggle class subcultures classism

Cloward, Richard Andrew

Cold War
Coles, Robert
Commons, John R.
Communist Party
community colleges
company town
comparable worth
competitiveness
conflict theory

Congress of Industrial Organizations

(CIO)

conspicuous consumption

Consumer Price Index: see poverty

calculations consumerism

continuous/discontinuous views

of class

contradictory class location

corporate class corporate welfare country clubs country music creationism creative destruction

· ·

crime

deference

critical elite theory cultural capital cultural tourism culture of poverty culture wars

Dahrendorf, Ralf
Davis, Kingsley: see Davis-Moore
thesis
Davis-Moore thesis
Day, Dorothy
day trading
Debs, Eugene
debutantes

deindustrialization Delmonico's democracy department stores designer goods: see luxury goods discontinuous views of class: see continuous/discontinuous views of class disenfranchisement Domhoff, G. William, Jr. Dorr Rebellion dot-com bubble Dreiser, Theodore drug policy Drury, Victor Du Bois, W. E. B. Dye, Thomas

Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 (EOA) edge city education Ehrenreich, Barbara elitism: see classism entitlements environmentalism: see zoning **Episcopalians** equity pay ethnic enclaves ethnic stratification eugenics Europhilia evangelicalism: see creationism; culture wars; fundamentalism; sexuality;

Southern Baptists

factory system
faith-based charities
false consciousness
family trust
Farrell, James
fashion
Federalist Party: see Founding
Fathers
Federalist Society: see think tanks
feminization of poverty
Fifth Avenue
film

First Families of Virginia flat tax Floyd, Charles ("Pretty Boy"): see James, Jesse Flynn, Elizabeth Gurley food bank foreign policy establishment Fortune magazine foundations Founding Fathers fraternalism fraternities and sororities free trade Friedman, Milton: see Chicago School of Economics functional elite theory

fundamentalism Galbraith, John Kenneth gambling gangs gated communities Gates, Bill gender stratification general strike gentrification George, Henry ghetto Giddens, Anthony Gilded Age Gilman, Charlotte Perkins glass ceiling globalization gold Gold, Mike Goldman, Emma Goldthorpe, John Gompers, Samuel

Gramsci, Antonio: see Althusser,
Louis
Grant, Madison: see eugenics
Grapes of Wrath, The
Great Depression
Great Gatsby, The
Great Society
grunge and punk culture: see punk
and grunge culture

guaranteed annual income

Guthrie, Woody

Hamptons Harlem

Harrington, Michael Haywood, "Big Bill"

Head Start

health care: see medical care

Hearst family hegemony theory

Heritage Foundation: see think tanks

Hidden Injuries of Class, The

high culture higher education

Hispanics: see Latinos and Hispanics

home ownership homelessness

homosexuality: see sexuality

housing policy Howe, Irving Hutchinson, Anne

immigration

income and inheritance taxes

income and wealth indentured servitude individualism industrial reserve arm

industrial reserve army Industrial Revolution

Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) inequality measures: *see* poverty

calculations inequality theory

inheritance tax: see income and

inheritance taxes

inner cities

institutional discrimination

Invisible Man
Irish Americans
Ivy League

Jacksonian democracy

James, Henry James, Jesse

iazz

Jewish Americans

Job Corps job training *Jungle*, *The* Justice (civil)

Katrina

Kennedy family Kerbo, Harold

Keynes, John Maynard King, Martin Luther, Jr. Knights of Labor

Knights of Labo Kozol, Jonathan Ku Klux Klan

labor movement Lathrop, Julia

Latinos and Hispanics law of the jungle

law schools: see education; legacies

legacies
legitimation
Leninism
Lenski, Gerhard
Levittown
Lewis, John L.
Lewis, Sinclair
life chances

life expectancy Lipset, Seymour Martin

literacy literature living wage lobbyists London, Jack Long, Huey P.

lotteries: see casinos; gambling Lowell, Josephine Shaw

Lowell family
Lowell millworkers

lower class luxury goods

Lynd, Robert Staughton and Helen

magazines

maldistribution of wealth

Man in the Gray Flannel Suit, The

managerial class

Maoism

Marcantonio, Vito

marriage

Marxism/Marxists

mass media masses McCarthyism

McDonald's McMansion

men's clubs

means of production Meany, George medical care Mellon family

mergers and acquisitions

meritocracy middle class *Middletown* middling sorts migrant labor

military-industrial complex

military recruiting
Mill, John Stuart
Mills, C. Wright
minimum wage
Molly Maguires
Monday Night Football
monetary system: see gr

monetary system: see gold

monopoly

Moore, Wilbert: see Davis-Moore

thesis Morgan, J. P. Mormons movies: see film muckraking mudsill theory

multinational corporations:

see competitiveness; globalization

municipal socialism

museums Myers, Gustavus Myrdal, Gunnar

NAACP Nader, Ralph Native Americans natural aristocracy negative income tax: see guaranteed

annual income Neiman Marcus

new class: see managerial class

New Deal

New Deal coalition

New Left

new middle class new social history New York Yankees

Newport

newspaper mergers

Nob Hill nonprofits Norris, Frank nouveau riche

objective method O'Hare, Kate Richards

Okies

one-parent families organization man Other America, The outlaws: see James, Jesse

outsourcing ownership society

parochial schools: see Catholics Parsons, Albert R. and Lucy

Parsons, Talcott

patriotism: see McCarthyism

pawnbrokers

peonage: see Reconstruction

Pesotta, Rose

petite/petty bourgeoisie

philanthropy pink-collar workers Piven, Frances Fox Planned Parenthood

pluralism Polanyi, Karl

polo

Poor People's March

deindustrialization

populism pornography postindustrialism: *see*

reputational method

Poulantzas, Nicos Reuther, Walter P. poverty Rifkin, Jeremy poverty calculations Riis, Jacob poverty line Rise of Silas Lapham, The poverty theory: see inequality theory robber barons Powderly, Terence Robertson, Pat power rock 'n' roll Rockefeller family power elite Presley, Elvis Roosevelt, Eleanor Roosevelt, Franklin D. prestige primary (informal) work groups Roosevelt, Theodore prisons ruling class private schools: see education; Rustin, Bayard Ivy League privatization salary: see wages Progressive Era sales tax: see progressive/regressive taxation progressive/regressive taxation Prohibition saloons and bars proletarian literature Sanders, Bernard Sanger, Margaret proletarianization school tracking proletariat property rights school vouchers protectionism: see free trade Schor, Juliet Protestant work ethic: see work ethic Seeger, Pete public schools: see education segregation self-fulfilling prophecy punk and grunge culture Puritans self-reliance Pygmalion studies: see self-fulfilling Seneca Falls convention Sennett, Richard prophecy pyramid scheme servant class settlement houses Seven Sisters quotas sexuality race, racism, and racial stratification sharecroppers and tenant farmers Shays's rebellion Reagan, Ronald shopping Reagan Democrats Silicon Valley real income/real wages silver: see gold Reconstruction Simmel, Georg Red Diaper Babies Sinclair, Upton Red Scare single-parent families: see one-parent regionalism families religion single tax religious fundamentalism: see sit-down strikes/sit-ins fundamentalism Skull & Bones rent strikes slavery

slavocracy

slumming	strikes
slums	Students for a Democratic Society
small business/small farms	(SDS)
social climber	style: see lifestyle
social closure	subjective method
Social Darwinism	suburbia
Social Gospel	supply-side economics: see trickle-
social mobility	down theory
social networks	survival of the fittest: see Social
Social Register	Darwinism
social reproduction	symphony orchestras: see high
Social Security	culture
socialism	
Socialist Party	Tally's Corner
socialite	taxation: see progressive/regressive tax-
socioeconomic status (SES)	ation
Sombart, Werner	television
soup kitchens	Terkel, Studs
Southern Baptists	Thernstrom, Abigail and Stephan
Southern Tenant Farmers Union	think tanks
(STFU)	Thomas, Norman
special interests	Thurow, Lester
split labor market	tokenism: see institutional
sports	discrimination
Springsteen, Bruce	transportation
status	trickle-down theory
status attainment	trophy wives
status inconsistency	Trotskyists
status symbols	Trump, Donald
Steffens, Lincoln	Tuxedo Park
stereotypes	Two Americas
Stiffed	Two functions
stock market	underclass
Stokes, Rose Pastor	underemployment
Stone, I. F.	undeserving poor
stratification theory: see conflict theory;	unemployment
continuous/discontinuous views of	unskilled labor
class; corporate class; functional	upper class
elite theory; gender stratification;	urban renewal
inequality theory; lower class; man-	di bali Telle wal
agerial class; Marxism/Marxists;	vacations
middle class; objective method;	Vanderbilt family
poverty; power elite; prestige; race,	Veblen, Thorstein
racism, and racial stratification;	Victorianism: see Gilded Age
reputational method; status incon-	voluntarism
sistency; subjective method; under-	vo-tech schools
class; upper class; working class	voting rights
/ 11 / /	0 0

wage gap: see equity pay

wage slavery

wages

Wagner Act Wald, Lillian

Wall Street Journal, The Wallerstein, Immanuel

Wal-Mart War on Poverty Warner, W. Lloyd

WASP

wealth: see income and wealth Wealth against Commonwealth

Weber, Max welfare

westward expansion Wharton, Edith

Wharton School of Business

Whiskey Rebellion white backlash

white-collar work white trash

Wilson, William Julius

Winfrey, Oprah Winthrop, John women's clubs work ethic working class working poor

Wright, Eric Olin: see contradictory

class location Wright, Richard

yachting yuppies

Zinn, Howard zones of transition zoning

TOPICAL LIST OF ENTRIES

Books/Journals/Media

Appeal to Reason
Fortune magazine
The Grapes of Wrath
The Great Gatsby

The Hidden Injuries of Class

Invisible Man The Jungle literature

The Man in the Gray Flannel Suit

Middletown media

muckraking newspaper mergers The Other America proletarian literature

The Rise of Silas Lapham

Stiffed Tally's Corner

The Undeserving Poor

Wall Street Journal

Wealth against Commonwealth

Classes

business aristocracy bourgeoisie

caste

corporate class lower class managerial class

masses middling sorts middle class natural aristocracy petite/petty bourgeoisie

race, racism, and racial stratification

robber barons ruling class servant class underclass upper class working class

Cultural Practices/Debates/Values

accents

American dream anti-Semitism

art

begging and busking

bilingualism

birth control black conservatism

black power

blues

body image bowling casinos charity balls class subcultures comparable worth competitiveness

conspicuous consumption

corporate welfare country clubs country music creationism crime

culture of poverty culture wars day trading debutantes deference Delmonico's department stores designer goods disenfranchisement

drug policy and social class

elitism

ethnic stratification

eugenics
Europhilia
evangelicalism
fashion
Fifth Avenue

film

fundamentalism gambling gangs

gated communities gender stratification general strike gentrification ghetto

glass ceiling globalization

guaranteed annual income

high culture

individual is m

iazz

law of the jungle

legacies life chances life expectancy lifestyle literacy lotteries

luxury cars and goods
McCarthyism
McDonald's
McMansions
men's clubs
military recruiting
Monday Night Football

Minday Night Footi museums Neiman-Marcus nouveau riche one-parent families parochial schools pawnbrokers pink-collar workers

Planned Parenthood polo

pornography prisons

punk and grunge culture

quotas

race, racism, and racial stratification

rap
religion
rock 'n' roll
saloons and bars
school tracking
school vouchers
segregation
self-reliance
shopping
slumming
socialite
soup kitchens

sports status stereotypes

symphony orchestras

taxation television transportation trophy wives vacations wage labor Wal-Mart welfare Wharton School white backlash white trash work ethic working poor yachting yuppies

Economy

blue collar business cycle capitalism competitiveness day trading dot-com bubble

equity pay free trade

gender stratification globalization

gold

income and inheritance taxes industrial reserve army

marriage media

mergers and acquisitions

minimum wage outsourcing poverty line privatization

progressive/regressive taxation

philanthropy

pink-collar workers proletarianization real income/real wages

sales tax

sharecroppers and tenant

farmers single tax

small business/small farms

social climber Social Security stock market strikes taxation think tanks

trickle-down theory underemployment unemployment unskilled labor Wagner Act War on Poverty white-collar work working poor

Groups (Extant, Organized or Social)

AFL-CIO Asian Americans blue collar blue-collar unions

boards of directors

Catholics CEO

Chamber of Commerce

Chicago School of Economics

Communist Party
Episcopalians
Federalist Society
First Families of Virginia

fraternalism

fraternities and sororities

gangs immigration

Industrial Workers of the World (IWW)

Irish Americans
Ivy League
Jewish Americans
Ku Klux Klan
labor movement
Latinos and Hispanics
lobbyists

lobbyists men's clubs migrant labor Mormons NAACP

Native Americans New Deal coalition New Left new middle class New York Yankees

nonprofits

organization man pawnbrokers Reagan Democrats Skull & Bones Social Register Socialist Party socialite special interests

special interests women's clubs

Groups (Historical)

American Federation of Labor

American Revolution Bacon's Rebellion Boston Brahmins Bill of Rights Bracero Program cattle kingdom

Civil War Congress of Industrial Organizations

(CIO)
Dorr Rebellion
factory system
Federalist Party
founding fathers
Gilded Age
Great Depression

Great Depression Great Society immigration

indentured servitude Industrial Revolution Industrial Workers of the

World

Jacksonian democracy

Katrina

Knights of Labor Lowell millworkers McCarthyism Molly Maguires municipal socialism

New Deal

New Deal coalition

New Left

new social history

Okies populists

Poor People's March Progressive Era Prohibition Puritans Reconstruction Red Diaper Babies

Red Scare rent strikes robber barons

Seneca Falls convention settlement houses

sharecroppers and tenant

farmers Shays's rebellion single-tax

sit-down strikes/sit-ins

slavery slavocracy Social Darwinism Social Gospel Southern Baptists

Southern Tenant Farmers Union

(STFU)

Students for a Democratic

Society (SDS)

Victorianism Wagner Act War on Poverty westward expansion Whiskey Rebellion

People

Abbott, Edith and Grace

Adams family Addams, Jane Alger, Horatio Althusser, Louis Aronowitz, Stanley Astor, John Jacob Auchincloss, Louis Baltzell, E. Digby

Bernstein, Jared Blau, Peter Michael Bluestone, Barry Bourdieu, Pierre

Bellamy, Edward

Berger, Victor

Brace, Charles Loring Buchanan, Pat

Buchanan, Pat Bush family Carnegie, Andrew Chomsky, Noam

Cloward, Richard Andrew

Coles, Robert Commons, John R. Dahrendorf, Ralf

Day, Dorothy

Domhoff, G. William, Jr. Dreiser, Theodore Drury, Victor Du Bois, W. E. B. Dye, Thomas Ehrenreich, Barbara Farrell, James

Flynn, Elizabeth Gurley Galbraith, John Kenneth

Gates, Bill George, Henry Giddens, Anthony

Gilman, Charlotte Perkins

Gold, Mike Goldman, Emma Goldthorpe, John Gompers, Samuel Grant, Madison Guthrie, Woody Harrington, Michael Haywood, "Big" Bill Hearst family Howe, Irving Hutchinson, Anne

James, Henry James, Jesse Kennedy family Kerbo, Harold

Keynes, John Maynard King, Martin Luther, Jr.

Kozol, Jonathan Lathrop, Julia Lenski, Gerhard Lewis, John L. Lewis, Sinclair

Lipset, Seymour Martin

London, Jack Long, Huey P.

Lowell, Josephine Shaw

Lowell family

Lynd, Robert and Helen Marcantonio, Vito Meany, George Mellon family Mill, John Stuart Mills, C. Wright Moore, Wilbert Morgan, J. P. Myers, Gustavus Myrdal, Gunnar Nader, Ralph

O'Hare, Kate Richards Parsons, Albert R. and Lucy

Parsons, Talcott

Norris, Frank

Pesotta, Rose Piven, Frances Fox Polanyi, Karl Poulantzas, Nicos Powderly, Terence Presley, Elvis

Reagan, Ronald

Reuther, Walter Rifkin, Jeremy Riis, Jacob Robertson, Pat Rockefeller family Roosevelt, Eleanor Roosevelt, Franklin D.

Roosevelt, Theodore Rustin, Bayard Sanders, Bernard

Sanger, Margaret Schor, Juliet

Seeger, Pete Sennett, Richard Sinclair, Upton Simmel, Georg Sombart, Werner Springsteen, Bruce Steffens, Lincoln Stokes, Rose Pastor

Stone, I. F. Terkel, Studs

Thernstrom, Abigail and Stephan

Thomas, Norman Thurow, Lester Trump, Donald Vanderbilt family Veblen, Thorstein Wald, Lillian

Wallerstein, Immanuel Warner, W. Lloyd Weber, Max Wharton, Edith

Wilson, William Julius

Winfrey, Oprah Winthrop, John Wright, Richard Zinn, Howard

Places

Appalachia
Armories
Beacon Hill
community colleges
company town
country clubs
edge cities
ethnic enclaves
Fifth Avenue

gated communities

ghetto Hamptons Harlem inner cities Ivy League Levittown Newport Nob Hill

parochial schools regionalism Seven Sisters Silicon Valley slums suburbia

Tuxedo Park zones of transition

Political Ideologies

anarchism democracy legitimation Leninism Maoism Reagan Democrats socialism Trotskyists

Public Policy and Debate

antitrust laws bilingualism Bill of Rights campaign financing

casinos child labor

children and poverty comparable worth competitiveness

crime

deindustrialization disenfranchisement

drug policy

Economic Opportunity

Act of 1964 (EOA)

education entitlements environmentalism equity pay

ethnic stratification feminization of poverty

flat tax free trade

gender stratification gentrification

gold

guaranteed annual income

Head Start home ownership homelessness housing policies immigration inheritance taxes

institutionalized discrimination

Job Corps job training justice (civil) Katrina

law of the jungle legitimation

life expectancy living wage literacy lotteries medical care minimum wage monopoly

municipal socialism one-parent families

outsourcing ownership society

pluralism

poverty calculations

poverty line

progressive/regressive

taxation

race, racism, and racial stratification

school tracking school vouchers segregation slums

small business/farms Social Security special interests

strikes taxation think tanks

trickle-down theory
Two Americas
underclass
urban renewal
voluntarism
voting rights
Wagner Act
War on Poverty

wealth welfare

white-collar work working poor zoning

Social Institutions/Practices

academia advertising agrarianism capitalism civil service community colleges country clubs democracy education

faith-based charities

family trust

foreign policy establishment

foundations higher education Job Corps Planned Parenthood

Seven Sisters Social Security stock market suburbia vo-tech schools

welfare zoning

Theories and Concepts

achievement and ascription

alienation

American dream

American exceptionalism

anti-Semitism assimilation authority capitalism

class consciousness class formation class struggle class subcultures

classism

comparable worth competitiveness conflict theory

conspicuous consumption

consumerism

continuous/discontinuous views

of class

contradictory class location

creationism

creative destruction critical elite theory cultural capital cultural tourism culture of poverty Davis-Moore thesis deindustrialization

democracy

ethnic stratification false consciousness feminization of poverty

flat tax free trade

functional elite theory

glass ceiling globalization

guaranteed annual income

hegemony theory high culture income and wealth individualism inequality theory

institutional discrimination maldistribution of wealth

Marxism/Marxists means of production

meritocracy

military-industrial complex

mudsill theory new social history

objective method of determining

ownership society

patriotism

philanthropy pluralism poverty

poverty calculations

poverty line power power elite prestige

primary (informal) work groups

privatization

progressive/regressive taxation

proletarian literature proletarianization property rights protectionism pyramid schemes quota systems reputational method self-fulfilling prophecy

self-reliance

social climber social closure social mobility social networks social reproduction

socioeconomic status (SES)

split labor market status attainment status inconsistency status symbols stereotypes subjective method wage slavery WASP

white-collar work work ethic working poor yuppies

zones of transition

PRFFACE

Class in America: An Encyclopedia is both a general reference work and an invitation for dialogue. The 525 entries contained herein are aimed not at academic specialists or advanced researchers but rather at the larger reading public, students commencing projects, anyone seeking quick overviews of various subjects, and those who define themselves as curious but uniformed. The tone has been kept objective, and, to the degree possible, entries have been stripped of arcane references, specialist terms, the minutia of academic debate, and overly complex prose. Nor does this work intend to be comprehensive; the entries were chosen more for diversity than for blanket coverage of any single focus. We did not even choose the most "obvious" selections in some cases because we didn't want to get bogged down in conference-like debates over individuals and the "deeper significance" of their work. For example, there are entries on Marxism as an analytical category and on various Marxist organizations but none on Karl Marx himself. Marx has inspired encyclopedias devoted to his work, and there is little point in treading beaten paths. Moreover, we wanted to illumine how history and ideas have played out on American soil rather than engaging in philosophical and ideological debate. The goal, in short, is to paint in broad strokes rather than with a fine-point brush.

Many of the contributors to this volume are distinguished within their fields, and each is an admirable scholar. I thank each of them for sharing their expertise, hard work, and knowledge. The decision to adopt a less formal tone is laid out in more detail in the introduction that follows, but in essence it relates to a desire to have a discourse on social class in America. Many top-notch studies reveal that the United States is deeply stratified by social class, and some of the brightest minds available have wrestled with what that means and what—if anything—should be done about it. The *reality* of social stratification is, however, quite a different matter from *awareness* of class.

Even those who know about class are often quite confused about how to negotiate or discuss it. Is the gap between the rich and poor a social problem, or is it a confirmation that the promise of American opportunity actually works? Is materialism burying us under a mountain of debt, or is it responsible for accessorizing our homes with conveniences and luxuries that would have been the envy of the princes

and pashas of the past? Are rich elites robbing us blind, or are they paving the road to mass prosperity? And who, exactly, are those rich people? What do we mean when we toss out terms such as upper class, the power elite, or the business class? Does a corporate class exist and, if so, how does it differ from the managerial class?

Scholars debate the very terms of discourse, but the general public often opts for what I call the Great Denial; that is, it simply embraces the oft-repeated cliché that America is a middle-class society. Although there are some surveys that phrase questions in such a way that respondents will consider calling themselves "working class," that term is not in vogue with most Americans. For better or worse—mostly the latter—tens of millions of Americans are most comfortable labeling themselves middle class regardless of the myriad absurdities this causes. If some look at this work and find popular entries to be idiosyncratic, we can only reply that class is refracted through too many American lenses to allow us to ignore the widely recognized ones.

About This Encyclopedia

In the front matter are two lists to help readers find entries of interest right off: an Alphabetical List of Entries and a Topical List of Entries. The 525 signed entries each end with a Suggested Reading section, for those interested in further research. A Bibliographical Essay can be found at the end of Volume 3.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

As editor and principal writer of this work, I owe a great debt to many people and groups. To reiterate an earlier point, my heartfelt appreciation goes out to all who contributed articles. These volumes simply could not exist without them. Gratitude also goes to those tireless editors, proofreaders, photo researchers, accountants, and support staff at Greenwood whose names don't appear in this book but who are nonetheless the adhesive that gave it shape just as surely as the glue that binds the spine. I offer a special thank-you to my chief contact at Greenwood, Wendi Schnaufer, who served as equal part senior editor and chief cheerleader. Gratitude also goes out to Susie Yates and her crackerjack copyediting crew at Publication Services. Thanks also to the history and American studies departments at Smith College and to Commonwealth College at the University of Massachusetts-Amherst, all of whom took me on when I left a tenured job in order to pursue new challenges. Thanks for helping me pay the bills! Thanks also to my engaging colleagues at those schools and to my many undergraduate students who inspired me with their questions, comments, and observations. To those who despair of America's youth I offer some simple advice: you need to get out more! The young women and men I have had the honor of teaching give me great hope for America's future.

Gratitude goes out to Rick Fantasia of the sociology department at Smith College and Dan Czitrom from the history department at Mount Holyoke College, both of whom gave valuable feedback on choosing entry categories. Thanks also to Ron Story of the history department at the University of Massachusetts–Amherst, who early on considered tackling this project. I can only hope that the end result comes close to what Ron might have done.

Finally, love and hugs to my wife Emily, who has endured still another of the endless projects into which I am constantly immersing myself and who has to listen to my digressions, complaints, and questions. She is my touchstone and anchor.

Robert E. Weir, Northampton, MA

INTRODUCTION

Is the United States of America divided by social class? Ask academics and social reformers such a question and nearly all of them will reply, "of course." Ask the proverbial person on the street, though, and consensus melts. Unlike race and gender—the other two pillars of social history and social science analysis—class lacks many of the visible markers that seep into social awareness. The very title of SUNY economics professor Michael Zweig's *The Working Class Majority: America's Best Kept Secret* (2000) sums up one of the many problems associated with studying class in modern America. Zweig argues that the working class dwarfs the middle class, a revelation that would shock most Americans who presume they are middle class. He also cites a 1998 Roper Poll in which 53 percent of those polled self-identified as members of the working class. That figure raises eyebrows among those who study class, many of whom have not actually heard the term "working class" used in conversation outside of university and organized labor circles in decades!

There is an often-told story about the 2000 presidential election that—like so many accounts of that fiasco—might be apocryphal. It centers on West Virginia, a state where Vice President Al Gore spent little time campaigning. After all, except for Ronald Reagan's landslide in 1984, West Virginia had gone Democratic in every election since 1928, and the party's electoral roll was twice as large as that of the GOP. President Bill Clinton had carried the state easily in both 1992 and 1996, and Gore carried endorsements from powerful West Virginia Senator Harry Byrd and the American Federation of Labor–Congress of Industrial Organizations, which had a large presence in the state. In the end, though, George W. Bush carried West Virginia by 52 percent to 46 percent and thus claimed its five electoral votes. Those five votes were Bush's precise margin of victory in the Electoral College (271–266) after the legal dust settled from Florida's disputed results.

As the story goes, during one of Gore's rare appearances in West Virginia, he spoke of how Clinton-era prosperity was good for the country, but there were still challenges to overcome. In West Virginia he emphasized the need for a higher minimum wage, for government support programs aimed at the less fortunate, and for the need to help all Americans enjoy the American dream. When Gore spoke of helping the underprivileged, his audiences applauded. What they did *not* do was grasp the fact that Gore was talking about them.

The story may well be a latter-day folk tale, but it highlights one of the biggest problems in studying class in America: separating fact from perception. Objectively speaking, Al Gore should have rolled over Bush in such a historically blue-collar and unionized state. Where, one wonders, was class consciousness hiding in West Virginia? The dilemma facing all of us who contributed to this work is a thorny one: millions of Americans either ignore social class altogether or, from the scholar's point of view, horribly misinterpret it. Put directly, most social scientists agree that American society is deeply stratified, but most American citizens deny it. Few would refute the presence of the poor or the ultra-rich, but a key part of the modern American myth is that both poor and rich are small groups, and that most Americans belong to the middle class. From this perspective, the poor exist to warn of the dangers of idleness, substance abuse, and antisocial behavior, while the wealthy locate a place in the popular imagination not unlike the leprechaun's pot of gold. If one follows the rainbow path of hard work, perseverance, and rugged individualism, one will perhaps get lucky and gain fortune. Even many who profess to despise the rich as profligate, arrogant, and uncaring nonetheless aspire to join their ranks in the sincere belief that they would handle wealth better.

These reference groups—one negative, one positive—notwithstanding, most polls—including that of the National Center for Opinion research—disagree with Zweig's figures and reveal that vast sections of the American public believe they are middle class. They cling to such thinking irrespective of the jobs, salaries, and property they hold (or do not hold). More than one-third of those who make less than \$15,000 per year nonetheless think they are members of the middle class, but so too do many of those making more than \$200,000, according to a 2005 New York Times poll. From the standpoint of self-esteem it is understandable why few of those with low incomes would wish to identify with the lower class, but the reluctance of those in high-income brackets to claim their place in the upper class is more puzzling. It may well be that both groups are confused by the way views on class have been skewed across time. The poor are tainted by suspicions of laziness and low intelligence; the rich by frivolity, profligacy, and corruption. If historian Martin Burke is correct in *The Conundrum of Class* (1995), since the mid-nineteenth century the middle class has been assumed to be the repository of positive values such as hard work, concern for family, morality, civic virtue, charity, common sense, and thrift. Indeed, the middle class is often viewed as the very seedbed from which the American meritocracy is plucked.

But who does determine classes? How many are there? Is there a separate "managerial class"? Does it differ from the "business aristocracy"? Do we subdivide classes to account for obvious differences? Should a real estate developer who makes \$150,000 and moguls such as Bill Gates or Donald Trump all be lumped in the upper class? Are Gates and Trump even members of the upper class? (They wouldn't have been considered so in an earlier age; they lack the proper family credentials and breeding.) Does it make sense to assign values to inanimate categories such as class? Defining class has been elusive since the American Revolution. The founders of the new republic jettisoned British class distinctions as well as its government. In theory, the lack of a birth aristocracy or customary gentry made the United States a meritocracy in which all status was achieved rather than ascribed. In practice, however, powerful families have often acted in an imperious fashion

and have taken advantage of favorable taxation and inheritance laws. Families such as the Cabots, Lowells, Rockefellers, Kennedys, and Bushes have been de facto aristocracies. The failure (or refusal) of many Americans to recognize this frequently baffles foreign observers and frustrates scholars.

The traditional indicators of class are wealth, power, and prestige, but even these may be social science markers from an earlier era in which the discourse about class was considerably more informed than it is now. How does one classify, for example, police officers and firefighters? In many cities such individuals are now professionals with six-figure salaries. Are they members of the middle class? What about blue-collar auto workers in Michigan who make more than public school teachers? Even more problematic is the fact that many American families sustain material lifestyles consistent with middle-class status by assuming consumer credit debt. Do such examples and trends muddy the definition of the middle class to such a degree that it is meaningless as a social category?

Category dilemmas such as these have led many scholars to conclude that objective measures of class—wealth, power, and prestige—must take into account subjective and reputational factors that locate social class, at least to some extent, in the eyes of the beholder. After all, even Marxists agree that "class consciousness" is central to class formation. But how does one measure subjective factors, and what happens when objectivity is ignored? How can one hope to have a substantive discussion about class if we collapse distinctions and allow self-ranking? (Any teacher who has ever allowed students to grade themselves on an assignment knows the problems associated with self-evaluation.) Moreover, what happens when fashion dictates the terms of discourse? Fewer Americans now proclaim themselves "working class," a distinction that was once a source of pride for many and, according to Zweig, the objective reality of the majority of contemporary Americans. These days, if used at all, the term is often tinged with a note of tragedy. There were, for example, references to the neglected working class in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, but the term was used in such an imprecise manner that it was often a synonym for the poor.

The best one can say is that objective class measurements provide categories that millions of Americans reject, and subjective methods tell us more about perception than reality. There are, additionally, a host of other factors that mediate how class is constructed and perceived, such as age, ideology, race, gender, ethnicity, religion, regional identity, and politics. Some would argue that environmentalists, feminists, teens, suburbanites, the elderly, and others are distinct social classes. This assertion has merit, if one considers a class to be a community of shared interests, concerns, values, and challenges. But this classification too is fraught with analytical difficulty. Radical feminists, for example, blame sexism for the alarming poverty statistics on female-headed households and might posit an overthrow of patriarchy as its solution. Socialist feminists, by contrast, often subsume sexism within a Marxist framework that sees capitalism as the culprit. Which is it? And how does one even begin to negotiate the slippery terrain in which factors such as gender, race, and ethnicity are presumed to be more important than social class? Nor should anyone ignore the ideological constraints on class discourse. Liberals often complain that, the moment they raise issues of inequality, conservatives accuse them of promoting class warfare. Conservatives counter that liberals focus

on doom-and-gloom rather than progress. Political candidates, regardless of ideology, depend on the well-heeled to back their campaigns; media outlets, no matter their editorial preferences, depend upon advertisers to keep them afloat.

This encyclopedia will delight some and infuriate others, depending on how one thinks class ought to be approached (or avoided). Because the national dialogue on class is contentious, we have opted to look at class from a variety of traditional perspectives: economic, historical, and sociological. But we have also included references from popular culture and everyday conversations. Thus, we have entries on Pierre Bourdieu and Oprah Winfrey, Fifth Avenue and Wal-Mart, the stock market, and shopping, for example. Given the diversity of opinion, we tried to think of how a people unaccustomed to thinking about class at all might encounter the very concept, hence our decision to survey popular culture as well as academic tomes.

It is not easy to deal with collective amnesia, nor can one consistently rely upon the time-honored methods of studying class. Take education, for example. There used to be a discernible earnings gap between those with a college degree and those without, and the very possession of a degree often conferred middle-class status. There are still income differences, but there is considerably less consistency or predictability about the importance of education. In today's climate of contingency labor, a machine operator lacking a high-school degree earns far more than an adjunct college professor. Once there were predictable educational attainment voting differences; there was a positive correlation between education and liberalism. In the 2000 election, however, those without a high-school diploma preferred Gore by 59 to 39 percent and those with college degrees went for Bush by a 51 to 45 percent margin.

Election 2000 data reflect changes in American society that mediate class analysis. Take for instance, the Marxian notion that manual workers are likely to become alienated from their labor. That group was supposed to develop class consciousness when it realized that the owning classes were exploiting workers. In the 2000 election, however, roughly 55 percent of all blue-collar voters identified themselves as economic conservatives, a rate nearly identical to that of managers. Thus, the very constituency to which Gore pitched his message saw his economic populism as too radical. To put it glibly, the workers of the world were not disposed to unite.

The election also showed that class opinion makers were changing. Predictably, Gore won the organized labor union vote handily, 59 percent to Bush's 37. In past decades that would have carried West Virginia, but given that labor unions now represent just 13 percent of American workers, the bulk of wage earners are subject to other influences. Increasingly the views of conservative ideologues have come into play. In 2000, 56 percent of all blue-collar workers identified themselves as religious and moral conservatives. Bush won the Protestant vote by 56 to 42 percent and lost the Roman Catholic vote by just 50 to 47 percent. (In 2004 Bush won the Catholic vote even though his opponent, John Kerry, was a Catholic.)

Some political observers argue that the Gore campaign based its electoral strategy on antiquated notions of class and ideology. The Gore campaign spent a considerable amount of time addressing what was perceived to be a working-class agenda: jobs, wages, movable capital. By contrast, Bush spent nearly one-third of his time talking about values, and the Republican National Committee spent

35 percent of its budget on advertisements about character and virtue. Gore's campaign workers behaved as if unions were the dominant institution in West Virginia when, in fact, it was churches. They acted from the assumption that blue-collar workers would vote their economic self-interest; instead, many embraced the conservative economic brief that workers were best served by business incentives and tax cuts for the wealthy.

None of this is meant to pass judgment on West Virginia voters, but rather to remind us that social class is complex. It is easy to saddle blue-collar workers with hazy class awareness, but are self-styled intellectuals any more enlightened? In a trenchant 2005 review of authors such as Tom Wolfe and Curtis Sittenfeld, Professor Walter Benn Michaels marvels over the ways in which American writers construct stories set in elite schools and affluent neighborhoods as though these are the norm. But the professoriate has been little better. Social scientists and humanists assert that race, gender, and class are the big three of social analysis. At least, that is what they say. In practice, class is often the poor relative who occasionally comes to visit and must be tolerated.

Since the 1970s, identity politics has had an impact on the intellectual community as thoroughly as on society as a whole. Thus, while scholars *claim* that race, gender, and class are inextricably linked, they *write* as if race and gender matter more. It is exceedingly rare to find black scholars who, following the lead of W. E. B. Du Bois, overtly link economic exploitation to the construction of racism. One will, however, find African American scholars, such as Stephen J. Carter, who seek to decouple economics and race and argue that affirmative action programs and race-based initiatives are a *cause* of modern racism.

Similarly, although many gender studies are quick to point out the economic dislocation of women in American society, most take it as a given that sexism trumps class in explaining it. Only socialist feminists and a handful of popular writers such as Barbara Ehrenreich bother to follow the money trail to see who, exactly, benefits from keeping women in economic thralldom.

Our purpose is not to criticize other scholars, nor is it to topple racial and gender paradigms and reify class in its stead. Rather it is to suggest that, if we are to make sense of social class in modern America, we must look at the roots of how class has been discussed across the political and social spectrum in the past and acknowledge that present-day conceptions, constructions, and awareness of class are multilayered and maddeningly inconsistent.

If one looks to social scientists for help in understanding class, the results are often disappointing. As noted earlier, most agree that social class is important and that American society is stratified. Beyond this there is little agreement. What, for example, is the median income in America? It depends on whether you mean *individual* income, or *family* income, and it depends on which source you consult. Is the poverty rate 13 percent, the official level, or closer to 20 percent, as some researchers assert? There is no consensus on how many classes there are, what they are, how much they earn, what defines them, or how they matter.

In 1966 sociologist Gerhard Lenski outlined the debate over social class. He juxtaposed arguments for dismantling stratification—injustice, inequality, the tendency to elevate ascribed status over merit, the stifling of potential—against those that saw class as natural and positive. Defenders of the class system—a group that

includes many contemporary conservatives—often argue that inequality is necessary for innovation, that unequal rewards breed incentive, that stratification ensures that worthy individuals are entrusted with power, and that social stability is preferable to equality. Lenski's 1966 parameters continue to limit the debate—such as it is—over class.

To a great extent, the defenders of inequality have been more in vogue in recent times. Their point of view dovetails nicely with success tales (and myths) of achieving the American dream, especially the assertion that hard work yields rewards. The American dream has, in fact, proved so powerful that it has trumped notions of America as a haven of equality. History records that the United States never has been an equal society, but equality has nonetheless served as a touchstone value for the American republic. Lately, though, many Americans have jettisoned hopes of an equal society for more generalized support of equality of *opportunity*, and even this manifests itself more in rhetoric than in political activity. The same individuals who believe in equal opportunity often reject social programs, school-funding schemes, and progressive taxation reforms that would help level the playing field.

The entries in this encyclopedia are designed with several purposes in mind. First, they exist as historical overviews on the question, practice, and changing perceptions of class in America. As such, this is a reference work on social history. Second, they highlight the ways in which class is made manifest in contemporary society. In this regard, the work is part sociology and part cultural history. Finally, the encyclopedia seeks to provide information that is useful to conceptualize class in today's world. Call it political science with a touch of old-fashioned civics.

As stated in the preface, it is decidedly *not* the be-all and end-all, nor can it hope to be comprehensive. Writers have prepared entries with a general readership in mind, not academic specialists. Our purpose is to offer a reference tool that does what fewer and fewer Americans choose to do: look at social class. We hope to call attention to the very real existence of stratification even though many Americans prefer to think we live in a middle-class society with a few extraordinary poor and rich people on the fringes. It seeks only to be the first word on the subject, not the last.

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ABBOTT, EDITH (September 26, 1876–July 28, 1957) **AND GRACE** (November 17, 1878–June 19, 1939)

ROBERT E. WEIR

Edith and Grace Abbott were sisters who pioneered in social work and child advocacy and improved conditions for immigrants and the poor.

The Abbott sisters were born in Grand Island, Nebraska, during the **Gilded Age**, a time in which many members of the **middle class** adhered to the precepts of **Social Darwinism**. The concept of social problems was still murky, and conditions such as **poverty** were viewed as personal failings linked to inferior intellectual or moral development. The Abbotts, however, grew up in a household that rejected essentialist arguments about character, in part because their mother was an ardent suffragist and pacifist accustomed to challenging assumptions about human nature.

Edith attended Browning Hall, a boarding school in Omaha, and then took up teaching because the family could not afford to send her to college. However, despite these financial limitations, she began taking correspondence and summer school classes at the University of Nebraska, obtaining a bachelor's degree in 1901. She continued teaching until 1903, when she went to the University of Chicago, where she obtained a PhD in economics in 1905. Courtesy of a **Carnegie** fellowship, Abbott attended University College in London and the London School of Economics. At the latter she met Beatrice and Sidney Webb, Fabians whose belief that **socialism** could evolve peacefully was popular among the British middle class. Fabian socialists were committed to the idea that poverty was a social ill, an idea Edith retained when she returned to the United States.

Edith taught at Wellesley College during 1907, but left to join her sister at Chicago's Hull House, the famed **settlement house** experiment begun by **Jane Addams**. Abbott was also active in the suffrage movement and worked as an assistant to Sophonisba Breckinridge at the Chicago School of Civics and Philanthropy, where she learned about juvenile delinquency. In 1924, Abbott became the first female dean of a graduate program when she headed the School of the



Grace Abbott, Chief of the Children's Bureau of the Dept. of Labor, ca. 1929. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

Social Service Administration at the University of Chicago. The latter is considered the nation's first graduate program in social work.

Abbott held the deanship until 1942. During that time, she helped create the Cook County Bureau of Public Welfare, assisted in drafting the **Social Security** Act, and wrote voluminously to educate the public on topics such as poverty, prison reform, and the need for state and federal governments to take active roles in alleviating social problems. For many years she also edited the influential journal *Social Science Review*, which she and Breckinridge founded in 1927. She retired in 1953, returned to Grand Island, and died of pneumonia four years later.

Grace was equally passionate about helping members of the **lower class** and moved in many of the same circles as her older sister. She graduated from Grand Island Baptist College in 1898, taught high school for several years, and did graduate work at the University of Nebraska and the University of Chicago. In 1907, she moved to Chicago and moved into Hull House.

Two years later, she obtained a PhD in political science from the University of Chicago.

From 1908 to 1917, Grace worked with immigrants at Hull House and became the director of the Immigrants Protective League. Abbott also immersed herself in other Chicago reform movements of the **Progressive Era**, and her experiences exemplify both the promise and the limitations of government-directed social reform in the early twentieth century. She was particularly interested in the problem of **child labor** and left Hull House in 1917 to direct the Industrial Division of the Children's Bureau, where she worked closely with **Julia Lathrop** to enforce child labor laws passed by Congress in 1916. When the Keating-Owen Act, which had created those laws, was declared unconstitutional in 1918, Abbott left the Children's Bureau to direct the Illinois State Immigrants Commission, an experience she recounted in her 1917 book *The Immigrant and His Community*.

Abbott's concern for children brought her back to the Children's Bureau in 1921, when she replaced Lathrop as director. Her years of advocating federal aid for infant and maternity care seemed to bear success in 1921, when she published *Maternity and Infant Welfare*, and Congress passed the Sheppard-Towner Act. Alas, the latter was struck down as unconstitutional just one year later. Abbott nonetheless stayed in her post until 1934. During that time she advised the League of Nations on the exploitation of female and child laborers, and she threw herself

into the task of compiling solid social statistics to back her assertions. This culminated in numerous books, including the two-volume *The Child and the State*, a work sometimes cited as a model of rigorous collection and interpretation of social science data.

Grace left the Children's Bureau in 1934 to take up a professoriate in social work at the University of Chicago. Like her sister, she also edited the *Social Science Review* (1934–39), and she also joined Edith in helping draft the Social Security Act. Her career and passion were cut short when she died of cancer in 1939.

Both sisters greatly increased public awareness of how poverty and injustice can be embedded in social systems that operate independently of individual character or effort. They did much to legitimize the role of government in addressing social problems.

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ACADEMIA

MURNEY GERLACH

The concepts of the modern academy and university grew originally out of the Scholasticism movement of twelfth-century Europe, when scholars, students, and religious leaders mingled in places to study universal knowledge, philosophy, and science. By the thirteenth century, such places in Bologna, Paris, Oxford, Cambridge, and several locales in the German and Italian states had evolved into universities.

From the beginning, academia was associated with social **elites**. The church controlled the universities, and students were considered clerics. Under the primogeniture rules that dominated much of Europe, elder sons inherited land; the church was dominated by second and third sons of nobility. Moreover, it took a certain level of **wealth** for most students to indulge in long hours of discipline, study and analysis. Medieval students pored over complex theological texts, Latin and Greek classics, philosophy, and scientific treatises.

Universities and the academia thus became the fundamental living centers for basic research, learning, and the pursuit of knowledge, but they were also largely places of privilege and bastions for the aristocracy. They incorporated the idea that knowledge was its own reward, and also the idea that learning could improve society and improve humankind. After the Reformation, scholars and academics could more freely pursue their research, speculations, and conclusions about science and their age, but it was during the eighteenth-century Enlightenment that expansive views of the individual, reason, and philosophy led to scientific and humanistic revolutions in the academy. Writers and thinkers such as Voltaire, Rousseau, Diderot, and other *philosophes* provided new models that were beneficial for the pursuit of republican and **democratic** experiments that spread around the world in the period

between 1760 and 1800, especially in America, France, and Britain. In British North America, the founding of the American Philosophical Society and the philosophical writings of Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and Benjamin Franklin were instrumental in the decades leading up to the **American Revolution** and the eventual writing of the Constitution.

Even before then, transformational and revolutionary ideas infused the academic halls of Harvard, Yale, Brown, and the rest of the **Ivy League**. Scholars studied the writings of John Locke and Thomas Hobbes as well as Scottish and British philosophers and economists. It is important to note that Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations*, a book widely regarded as a founding document in the development of **capitalism**, was published in 1776, the same year Jefferson penned the Declaration of Independence.

Seminal to the emergence of academia in the mid-nineteenth century was Cardinal John Henry Newman's classic *The Idea of the University* (1852), a work that discussed learning, research, and the pursuit of knowledge in relationship to liberal education and research in science, technology, archaeology, and medicine. These ideas dovetailed with the reforming zeal of public education advocates such as George Henry Evans and Horace Mann. In 1818 Massachusetts opened the nation's first free public high school, and by the 1840s, it was an accepted idea that there was a responsibility to educate the general public, not just those of wealth and means. The University of North Carolina opened its doors in 1789 as the nation's first public university, but it was the Morrill Land-Grant College Act of 1862 that inspired the evolution of major American public universities.

Still, just 4 percent of the American population entered college in 1900, and most of them came from the **upper class** or upper **middle class**. Numbers increased steadily and, by World War II, about 18 percent of high school graduates attended college, but it was still unusual for children of the **working class** to pursue higher education. That changed with the passage of 1944 Servicemen's Readjustment Act, popularly known as the GI Bill. Also important was the postwar baby boom that led to a population explosion. By 1960 about 40 percent of all high school graduates entered higher education; by 1970 about 50 percent did so. Not all completed a four-year degree, but by 1990, 13.1 percent of Americans had obtained a bachelor's degree, and by 2000, 15.5 percent had done so.

Academia has been democratized to a great extent since World War II and has generally been a leader in advancing multiculturalism and **pluralism**. Mentoring, internships, practical experiences, and active and engaging learning in urban and world centers have made the once-narrow world of academia open to African Americans, **Asian Americans**, **Hispanics**, and the international community.

That said, the academy retains many of its medieval associations with wealth and privilege. Ivy League schools and other elite colleges and universities have made strides in diversifying, but the economic profiles of student families remain far above median income levels, and the schools obtain relatively few students from working-class backgrounds. Many argue that American academia is tiered, with the wealthy attending prestigious private schools, the middle class flagship state universities, and the working class **community colleges** and smaller state colleges. The **legacy** system, though it has eroded, still gives wealthier students a leg up in gaining admission to top schools and is seen as an important aspect of **social reproduction** in America.

Social reproduction patterns are also replicated in hiring practices. In 2003, for example, Ivy League schools hired 433 tenure-track professors. Of these, just 14 were African American, 8 were Hispanic, and 150 were women. Moreover, many of the new hires had degrees from Ivy League schools. There is a tendency across academia for institutions to hire professors who have been educated at similar institutions. Entry into the most prestigious law and medical schools also correlates with a high **socioeconomic status** (SES).

There remains a **wage** premium involved in obtaining a college education. In 2005, an individual with a bachelor's degree earned an average salary of \$51,206 per annum, whereas the average for those with just a high school degree was \$27,915. Although a college education remains a major contributor to upward **social mobility**, social class continues to set the parameters of how high one can climb.

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ACCENTS AND LANGUAGE PATTERNS

ROBERT E. WEIR

Accents and language patterns are regional, ethnic, and affected communication variations. Most language patterns are rooted in historical circumstances, and their sociolinguistic implications are of particular interest to social scientists.

There is no particular reason, other than custom, to favor one accent, set of grammatical expressions, or communication pattern over another. Scholarly studies of the history of English, for example, reveal that the language has evolved repeatedly since departing from original Germanic tribal tongues some time around the sixth century. Modern English derives from a particular set of preferences and practices that emerged in London in the fifteenth century, and the idea that there is a "standard" or "proper" form of English is largely the product of British imperialism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This so-called standard form did not displace regional variations in Britain or North America until free public education became widespread in the late nineteenth century. What came to be known as Standard English is thus a top-down imposition from the British upper classes, particularly the aristocracy and social climbers in the middle class. Even now, an affected upper-class dialect—sometimes called "BBC English" in reference to the fact that broadcasters for the British Broadcasting Corporation once had to master it—remains an external marker of good breeding.

In Colonial America, regional accents and speech patterns established themselves well in advance of standardization efforts and were further creolized by the numerous variations brought by millions of immigrants. In the mid-nineteenth century, however, some members of the upper and upper middle class began to cultivate faux British

accents and embrace Standard English to show their sophistication vis-à-vis the masses. Their grammatical and syntactical preferences came to dominate how English was taught in schools, and some educators envisioned a day in which uniform English would eliminate accents, colloquialisms, and alternative grammar usage.

That hope proved naïve, but language became an important class barrier. The American upper classes, motivated in part by **Europhilia**, integrated speech preferences into their class identity. Both **Theodore** and **Franklin D. Roosevelt**, for example, spoke English with hints of an affected British accent, as does contemporary conservative commentator William F. Buckley Jr. For much of the twentieth century, upper-class accents and slavish devotion to precisely defined grammar rules were commonplace in **Ivy League** colleges. The use of "poor" grammar or the use of certain regional dialects marked a person as socially and intellectually inferior.

Southern and Appalachian accents came to connote a lack of sophistication, even stupidity, whereas an accent common in the greater New York metropolitan area was associated with **working-class** bluntness and crudity. Although linguists assert there are at least three dozen distinct dialects spoken in the United States, it has become customary for Americans seeking middle-class **status** to flatten or deemphasize their accents. There are even classes and speech consultants that work with individuals interested in altering speech patterns. This is because multiculturalism has yet to make dominant inroads in matters of verbal communication. Studies indicate that listeners still negatively associate certain accents, particularly those deemed Southern, rural, or ethnic. There is also evidence that candidates who do not use Standard English also face uphill battles during job interviews.

The class distinctiveness of language impacts racial and ethnic minorities in particularly dramatic ways. Immigrants who learn English often find it difficult or impossible to speak it without an accent or to obliterate grammar and syntax patterns of their native languages. Attempts to address language-based discrimination often cause heated arguments within communities. Some **Latinos**, for instance, advocate replacing **bilingual** school programs with intensive English training, including speech therapy. African American leaders and educators arguing that a nonstandard form of English known as Ebonics should be recognized as a distinct language run afoul of black leaders who accuse them of further ghettoizing African American youth.

It remains to be seen whether linguistic class barriers will weaken in the future, but they remain strong at present. Thus far, the only class that has crossed language barriers to its advantage has been the upper class. In some cases, those in power find it advantageous to sound more "common." For example, politicians know that an upper-crust accent and an overly active vocabulary can make them seem aloof and snobbish. During his 1996 bid for the presidency, George H. **Bush**, who grew up on the East Coast, attended Yale, and spent many of his adult years in ambassadorial roles abroad, employed speech consultants to help him sound more Texan and broaden his populist appeal.

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ACHIEVEMENT AND ASCRIPTION

SHANNON J. TELENKO

The terms *achievement* and *ascription* are used by social scientists to describe the means through which someone attains class **status** as well as to describe how an institution or society creates hierarchical structure. Achievement is the attainment of socioeconomic or class status based on individual effort. Although achievement is most often associated with hard work, education, occupation, and motivation, it can be enhanced or reduced through ascribed or assigned class status.

Ascription is the attainment of class status based on who one is and into what social and economic situation one was born. Families who have descended from industrialists and other entrepreneurs enjoy **upper-class** status through ascription, despite their benefactors' achievement of that status. The **Rockefeller** and **Kennedy** families are, at this point, beneficiaries of ascribed status. The children of these families can live off the old money and the recognition that their ancestors established for them long ago.

It is argued that U.S. culture values achievement over ascription. However, some individuals and organizations have grown accustomed to building their personal and professional relationships on ascription. This is often what people mean when they mention "good old boy" clubs or **social networks**. This, in turn, affects how individuals acquire certain positions within society regardless of the official or ideological stances that the government takes on equal opportunity and **individualism**.

Institutions, governments, and organizations within the United Sates usually claim they select members on the basis of their "earned" status and achievements and not because of the status into which members were born. However, many people find their opportunities enhanced by who they are and whom they know. For example, presidents of the United States should be elected based on achievement. Nevertheless, presidential candidates must either have money or be able to raise money through reputation or recognition before they can hope to launch a bid for office. Therefore, some question the assumption that the United States is a **meritocracy**. Many high-level positions in government, business, and other institutions appear to result from ascription rather than achievement.

To cite a hypothetical scenario, a university admits a student because she graduated high school with a high grade-point average. This student then excels and graduates college with honors. Because of her superb study and leadership skills, she is hired shortly after commencement. Despite the fact that this hypothetical woman grew up with **working-class** or **working-poor** status, her dedication to higher education, traditionally a realm for only upper- and middle-income families, has elevated her to **middle-class** status. If her job paid enough, or she went on to receive more education, she could eventually rise to upper-class status. In this way, achievement is also a vehicle for **social mobility**.

Some, however, argue that such a scenario is rare because upper-class status is ascribed and exclusive. There is, moreover, a distinction between "old money" and the **nouveau riche** in the United States. Old-money families have historically looked down on individuals or families who have become newly wealthy through achievement.

Leaders in American society have historically been considered those with ascribed upper-class status. These leaders included government officials (including the **Founding Fathers**), professors, and scientists. Groups who have traditionally been ascribed lower-class status are minorities, **immigrants**, the working classes, single mothers, the mentally ill, and the disabled. Some argue that these assignments still plague American society, despite the increased opportunities for all groups as well as the higher positions to which those historically considered "lower class" have been appointed.

Under **capitalism**, people are taught to believe that hard work always pays off and that one can achieve almost anything regardless of socioeconomic background or family name. Some think that this is a myth and that the lower classes exist to permit the upper classes to have what they have. They believe that this idea of achievement serves as a false hope for the lower classes so that they will not complain about their position in society. If a few actually "make it" through individual efforts, this only serves to reinforce the myth of social mobility through achievement.

Therefore, although it is argued that there are two ways to attain status, through achievement and ascription, barriers to the attainment of higher class status still exist in the United States. Some individuals may never be able to enjoy the status that is ascribed to American society's very upper classes. Members of lower classes in American society may have to work even harder to overcome discrimination in achieving higher class status, which can be a difficult and tiresome obligation.

Suggested Reading

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ADAMS FAMILY


ROBERT E. WEIR

Adams is the family name of one of America's oldest **elite** families. Although many of the family members lived in nearby Quincy, the Adams clan is often numbered among the **Boston Brahmins**, in part because of family wealth and the tendency of prominent members to adopt imperious airs. A few of the more public Adams family members are profiled here.

John Adams (October 30, 1735–July 4, 1826) was the first Adams to immerse himself in public affairs. His father was a church deacon, farmer, and town official in Braintree, Massachusetts. John Adams attended Harvard College, became a lawyer, and gained a reputation for eloquence and a disputative nature. By the 1760s he routinely took cases defending colonists against royal power, though,

surprisingly, he successfully defended British troops accused of murder in the 1770 Boston Massacre. In the buildup to the **American Revolution**, however, Adams firmly identified with the Patriot cause. He attended both Continental Congresses, and it was he who nominated George Washington to be commander-inchief of the Continental Army. He also assisted Thomas Jefferson in writing the Declaration of Independence.

Adams spent most of the war in various diplomatic ventures and helped negotiate the 1783 Treaty of Paris that secured American independence. In 1785 he became the new nation's first ambassador to Great Britain, but was considered so haughty by American detractors that they called him the "Duke of Braintree." Like many of the **Founding Fathers**, Adams was distrustful of the common people and expressed the view that men of breeding and wealth were more worthy of public service. He even suggested the new nation create an upper legislative body analogous



John Adams, second president of the United States. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

to the British House of Lords. These views derailed any hopes that Adams would become the first president of the United States. Instead, he became Washington's vice president in 1789.

Within what came to be known as the **Federalist Party**, Adams and Alexander Hamilton led a conservative faction that was often criticized for imperial pretensions. Adams is credited with helping maneuver positive American foreign policy toward Britain and away from France; the French Revolution seemed to signal anarchy and the tyranny of the masses. This led to a political squabble between Adams and Jefferson, who at least publicly expressed more faith in democracy. Adams barely defeated Jefferson in 1796 and succeeded Washington as president.

His presidency was also marked by controversy. His open support for Britain in its war against France led to public battles with Jefferson, and Adams was lampooned severely in pro-Jefferson newspapers. The 1798 Alien and Sedition Acts clamped down on pro-French and anti-Adams utterances, but fueled criticisms that Adams was a closet aristocrat. In 1800 Adams lost his reelection bid to Jefferson. He retired to Quincy and, ironically, died the same day as Jefferson in 1826.

Abigail Adams (November 22, 1744–October 28, 1818) was the wife of John Adams and the mother of John Quincy Adams and three other children. She and John enjoyed an affectionate relationship, and the tone of their correspondence is remarkable for its frankness and emotionality. Abigail spent most of her marriage apart from her politically active husband and demonstrated great skill and courage

in managing both economic affairs and family safety during the American Revolution. Her admonition to John to "remember the ladies" as he helped draft the new government is often quoted, and some have viewed her as a proto-feminist. Although such an assessment is overly charitable, Abigail Adams was as headstrong and opinionated as her husband. She joined John in England while he was ambassador, but spent most of the twelve years he served in the new government shuttling back and forth between the family home in Quincy and Philadelphia, the temporary capital. In 1800 she became the first presidential spouse to live in the newly built White House.

John Quincy Adams (July 11, 1767–February 23, 1848) was the eldest son of John and Abigail and the sixth president of the United States. His childhood was consumed by war and politics. He accompanied his father to Europe several times before he was thirteen and went to Russia as a private secretary to Ambassador Francis Dana when he was fourteen. Like his father, he graduated from Harvard with a degree in law, though most of his early career was consumed by diplomacy rather than legal matters. He helped draft the Jay Treaty in 1794 that secured peace with Great Britain but angered Jeffersonians. He also secured a treaty with Prussia during his father's presidency.

He served in the Massachusetts legislature and in the U.S. Senate and did so first as a Federalist, but he angered some colleagues by supporting President Jefferson's purchase of Louisiana and his trade embargo of Britain and France. These acts led the Federalists to dump him as a senator in 1808, and J. Q. Adams responded by aligning himself with the Republican (today's Democratic) Party and supporting President James Madison and the War of 1812, which most Federalists opposed. Adams served as an envoy to Russia and then as secretary of state under President James Monroe. In that latter post, he was a key architect of the Monroe Doctrine, which asserted U.S. hegemony in the Western hemisphere, and he was furthermore an ardent booster of what was later dubbed Manifest Destiny, the idea that it was America's fate to expand westward to the Pacific coast. He also negotiated a treaty with Spain that transferred control of Florida to the United States and one with Britain in 1818 that averted war by establishing the border between the United States and Canada.

In 1824 John Quincy Adams, having lost the popular vote to Andrew Jackson, became president in an election decided by Congress. His presidency was marked by as much controversy as his father's, with Jackson as his chief antagonist. Battles over chartering a federal bank and over federal funding for internal improvements and a trade tariff marked his single term. The tariff sparked the Nullification Crisis in which South Carolina threatened secession, and it was a key issue in the 1828 election in which Jackson soundly defeated the incumbent J. Q. Adams.

In 1830 J. Q. Adams returned to national politics via election to the House of Representatives. He became one of the foremost opponents of **slavery** and introduced an unsuccessful amendment to gradually end it. Outraged Southerners accused him of being an aristocratic meddler, and Adams returned their contempt. Ironically, though, he used popular democracy as a pressure tactic by introducing citizen petitions calling for slavery's end. These prompted Jacksonians to institute a gag rule that prohibited antislavery discussions. Adams also

angered the South by securing freedom for African mutineers from the ship *Amistad* on the grounds that the ship violated slave-importation laws. He died after suffering a brain hemorrhage during an impassioned speech opposing the Mexican War.

Charles Francis Adams (August 18, 1807–November 21, 1886) was the son of John Quincy and Louisa (Johnson) Adams. His career path followed that of his progenitors: Harvard, a law degree, a well-connected marriage, politics, and diplomatic service. Like his father, he was an ardent opponent of slavery. After a short stint in the Free Soil Party, he joined the newly formed Republican Party and won election to Congress in 1858 to the Massachusetts seat his late father had once held. When Abraham Lincoln won the presidency in 1860, Charles became the latest Adams to serve as ambassador to Great Britain. He played a key role in the Civil War by dissuading the British from their early support for the Confederacy. Also a historian, he edited the memoirs of both his father and his grandfather. His son, Charles Francis Adams Jr. (1835–1915), later wrote Charles Sr.'s biography. Charles Francis Adams III (1866–1954) also went into politics and served as President Herbert Hoover's secretary of the navy.

Two of Charles Francis Adams Sr.'s other sons made their mark during the Gilded Age. Brooks Adams (June 24, 1848–February 13, 1927) parlayed his Harvard education into a career as a historian at a time in which said profession was often that of wealthy dilettantes. Like his eldest brother, Charles, one of his favorite subjects was his own family. In keeping with the views of so many Adamses before him, he expressed skepticism about the virtues of democracy. Brooks Adams authored several works of history, the most significant being *America's Economic Supremacy* (1900), in which he accurately predicted that the United States and Russia would become dominant world powers. In his later life, he questioned the Adams family maxim that wealth and worthiness to hold power went hand in hand. Seeing the social turmoil of the late Victorian period, he and others came to suspect that members of the upper class had grown soft and irresponsible. His nephew Charles Jr. embraced these same ideas and grew so disgusted with the "low instincts" of business that he abandoned his railroad career to write history.

Brooks Adams's reputation was surpassed by that of his brother Henry Brooks Adams (February 16, 1838–March 27, 1918), also a historian and writer. Henry Brooks Adams worked as a journalist and edited the influential *North American Review* from 1870 to 1876, by which time he was also a history professor at Harvard. He wrote a nine-volume history of the Jefferson and Madison administrations.

Henry Adams's life took a sharp turn in 1885, after his wife, Marian (Hooper) Adams, committed suicide. He began traveling extensively, writing two books that established his reputation. The first, *Mont-Saint-Michel and Chartres* (1904), is still considered a classic for the way in which the author combined philosophy, art history, and religion. He is even better known for his autobiography *The Education of Henry Adams* (1907), the companion piece to *Mont-Saint-Michel and Chartres*. In many ways, this book is a metaphor for the Adams family. He contrasted the unity of the Gothic Age and what he dubbed the "multiplicity" of his own age. With family history lurking in the background, Adams presented himself as a man adrift and one whose "education" left him ill-prepared for modern life.

The Adams family is certainly one of America's most distinguished clans, but decades of public service notwithstanding, many of its offspring struggled to reconcile wealth, *noblesse oblige*, and democracy. In many ways, the Adamses illustrate the limits of top-down leadership patterns.

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ADDAMS, JANE (September 6, 1860–May 21, 1935)

VICTORIA GRIEVE

Jane Addams was a famed reformer, social worker, peace activist, and champion of the **working class**. She is best known for cofounding Hull House, a **settlement house** in Chicago for poor and **immigrant** families. Addams also received the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1931 for her lifetime contributions to social work.

She was the youngest child born to a large, wealthy family in Cedarville, Illinois. After her mother died when Addams was two, Addams developed a close relationship with her father, who encouraged her to pursue her education. After graduating from Rockford Female Seminary in 1881, Addams announced to the dismay of her family that she would pursue a medical degree. However, her father died, and Addams was bedridden for more than a year with spinal problems. In 1883 she traveled to Europe for two years and then returned home to what was a traditional life for a well-off, unmarried woman: living with and caring for her family. In 1885, however, she again traveled to Europe, this time with her friend Ellen Gates Starr, and they visited London's Toynbee Hall, a settlement house.

Both Addams and Starr were greatly influenced by British social reform movements, and shortly after returning to the United States, they moved to Chicago, a center of industry and commerce that required cheap labor supported by massive migrations from Europe. The Halsted Street neighborhood on Chicago's West Side was a poor neighborhood dominated by immigrant slums where overcrowded tenements, crime, disease, inadequate schools, inferior hospitals, and insufficient sanitation were common. Mobilizing the generosity of wealthy donors, Addams and Starr opened Hull House in 1889 to employ the underutilized talents of educated, **middle-class** young people to serve the poor. In response to the need for child care, they opened a kindergarten, and soon they also offered medical care, legal aid, and classes in English, vocational skills, sewing, cooking, music, art, and drama.

Addams's involvement with the **working poor** transformed her from a philanthropist into an activist. Shocked by the poor housing, overcrowding, and **poverty** they witnessed, she and other Hull House workers gradually became more involved in their community and urban politics. Addams was appointed to the Chicago School Board in 1905 and additionally accepted the position as garbage

inspector for the Nineteenth Ward. She lobbied for child labor laws, a factory inspection system, and improvements in the juvenile justice system. She fought for legislation to limit the working hours of women, mandate schooling for children, recognize labor unions, and provide for industrial safety. Hull House attracted a variety of social reformers, including Florence Kelley, a member of the Socialist Labor Party, who introduced the middleclass Hull House residents to political and trade union activity. In 1903 several Hull House residents, including Addams, were involved in establishing the Women's Trade Union League.

Her increasing political activity convinced Addams of the need for women's suffrage. She joined the National American Woman Suffrage Association in 1906 and became its president in 1911. In 1909 Addams was a founding member of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). Hoping to see her work become part of a national political agenda, Addams actively campaigned for Progressive presidential candidate Theodore Roosevelt in 1912. Addams traveled and lectured widely; between



Jane Addams, ca. 1914. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

1907 and 1930, she wrote hundreds of articles and delivered countless speeches on topics ranging from settlement work to the **labor movement**, prostitution, and women's suffrage. She wrote seven books, including her 1910 autobiography, *Twenty Years at Hull House*.

The outbreak of the Spanish-American War in 1898 and the rising threat of American imperialism led Addams to oppose war. She joined the Anti-Imperialist League and in 1904 spoke at the Universal Peace Conference. In her 1907 *Newer Ideals of Peace*, she argued for a moral substitute for war, and she worked to keep the United States out of World War I. She served as chairman of the Woman's Peace Party and accompanied a delegation to the International Congress of Women to The Hague in 1915. Addams served as president of the Women's International League of Peace and Freedom (WILPF) from 1919 until she resigned in 1929, and she remained honorary president until her death.

Addams's involvement in labor, suffrage, and peace movements, and especially her opposition to American involvement in World War I, stirred public criticism. She was castigated in the press and expelled from the Daughters of the American Revolution, but in 1918 she worked for Herbert Hoover's Department of Food Administration to provide relief supplies to the women and children of enemy

nations. Many thought her a traitor for her pacifism, and in the 1920s, she was called the most dangerous woman in America for opposing the mass arrests and deportation of suspected radicals during the **Red Scare**. Shocked by such political persecution, Addams was among the founders of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) in 1920.

Addams's reputation revived with the onset of the **Great Depression**, and she was awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1931. She supported Franklin Roosevelt's **New Deal** and remained active in social issues, but her health steadily declined. She died of cancer on May 21, 1935, and her funeral service was held in the courtyard at Hull House.

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ADVERTISING

JANEAN MOLLET-VAN BECKUM

Advertising is the promotion of goods, services, or ideas through paid announcements to the public. Professional ad creators use different advertising techniques to sway the public's view on a product or issue. They have become adept at targeting certain segments of the population, making their ads very effective.

When targeting a particular group of people, advertisers rely on demographic statistics relating to the group, including the group members' age, gender, **income**, race, and education. This allows ads to be placed in areas of a city or during media programming where the promotional messages will most likely reach the target audience. For example, an advertiser selling a clothing line targeted at teenagers may advertise products during television programming popular with teens. Likewise, a company such as **Wal-Mart** is more likely to advertise in moderate- or low-income areas than in affluent areas.

Recent controversy regarding advertisements has centered on the promotion of alcohol and, particularly, tobacco products to children. For example, the mascot used to promote Camel cigarettes from 1987 to 1997 was a cartoon camel named "Joe Camel." Research showed that the cartoon image appealed to young children, and under pressure from activist groups and the government, R.J. Reynolds removed Joe Camel from its advertising campaigns. Anti-tobacco activists claim that Camel cigarettes were intentionally targeted at young children, causing them to smoke at a younger age as well as encouraging brand loyalty at a young age; the company denies these allegations. This is only one of several examples of companies allegedly marketing to children a product intended for use by adults. The idea was that if children were introduced to the cigarettes as children, they would be more likely to remember them when choosing cigarettes when they turned eighteen or to begin smoking at an even earlier age.

One of the advertising profession's strongest strategies is to create a desire for a product that may not really be needed. To create a need where there is none, advertisers often show an ideal standard of living when the product is used, suggesting social and economic upward mobility. This is one of the most common types of advertising, promising heightened social status by promising acceptance in the higher group. This type of advertising may also suggest the acquisition of everything that is perceived to go along with the higher status, such as wealth, beauty, and leisure, when a particular product is purchased. **Luxury** car ads are particularly adept at this type of persuasion. Drivers are portrayed as successful, wealthy, happy individuals with an abundance of leisure time to enjoy their car. The reality is that those in **lower classes** who buy these cars in an effort to attain a higher status often have less **wealth** and leisure and therefore less happiness because of the increased expense required to pay for the high-end car.

These marketing tools work because material things are connected both to how a person perceives himself or herself and to how others perceive him or her in American society. Goods communicate what we think of ourselves and how we want others to think of us. Therefore, ads focusing on what people want to be, and how they want to be seen, are very successful. They create perceived increases in **status** that are often illusory. Scholars such as **Juliet Schor** argue that targeting luxury goods at various income groups is a new phenomenon in American culture that has led to social shifts. Whereas Americans of earlier generations compared themselves with those in their specific peer groups, modern advertising encourages them to measure their worth vis-à-vis the lifestyles of the affluent Americans.

Another good example of this is the wedding industry. Many couples do not want huge, expensive weddings but still end up with them because of the ideals portrayed in magazines, at bridal shows, and in the media. The fairytale wedding of the high class and popular entertainers becomes the ideal and is expected by guests. Couples want guests to remember their wedding as akin to glamorous media images, and they are therefore driven to buy the accessories and clothing advertised, even though they may not consciously want them or be able to afford them.

Ads also perpetuate or create stereotypes, most obviously in the case of gender roles. Just like fifty years ago, **middle-class** women are still portrayed as the caretakers and nurturers of the family, although their roles may have also expanded to work outside the home. This particular stereotype is rooted in the desire to be all things to all people. It says women can be good mothers and housekeepers, as well as breadwinners to keep their families at a middle or higher social class, as long as they have the proper products on hand.

Advertisers use the ideas and ideals already ingrained in American society to reinforce the desire for upward **social mobility** and attainment of the **American dream**. In the competitive commercial world of the modern day, consumers must be careful that they are buying a product for what it is, and not for what it purports to be.

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AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

See Institutional Discrimination; Quotas.

AFFLUENT SOCIETY, THE

See Galbraith, John Kenneth.

AFRICAN AMERICANS

See Institutional Discrimination; Race, Racism, and Racial Stratification. (Many entries also discuss African Americans within specific contexts.)

AGRARIANISM

ROBERT F. WEIR

Agrarianism is a set of ideals that posits virtue in agricultural production and rural life. For many years, it was also linked to notions of independence and self-reliance among North Americans of European descent.

When Europeans established their North American colonies, most common people made their living from the land. Landholding was closely connected to wealth and vocation, with many Europeans imposing their social and religious views about property and productive labor onto unsuspecting Native Americans. Seizures of Native lands were sometimes justified on the grounds that Natives had not made those lands "productive" and hence had abrogated claims to them. Natives likewise found deeded land transactions baffling and often ceded land to colonists under the mistaken impression that they had agreed to mutual use of the land rather than to colonists' exclusive ownership.

By the time of the **American Revolution**, farming and other rural pursuits such as hunting and trapping were the primary occupations of most whites residing in the English colonies. Even intellectuals such as Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson opined that farming was the best way for most people to gain "independence," a term they interpreted in both political and economic terms. Although **capitalism** had begun to develop, the prevailing view was that working for wages made a person dependent on others, and true mastery came only when one was self-sufficient. In many places, property ownership conferred the status of "freeman," and one could not vote unless one owned land. This pattern persisted in many places until after the War of 1812 and in Rhode Island until the 1841–42 **Dorr Rebellion**. Jefferson even offered the opinion that the United States should remain an agricultural nation and rely upon European imports only for what few manufactured goods Americans might need.

The Jeffersonian ideal of an independent yeomanry was challenged by the antebellum **factory system** and the post–Civil War **Industrial Revolution**, but one can easily exaggerate the overall impact of each. Most Americans were farmers on the eve of the Civil War, and as late as 1890, some 24,771,000 Americans worked on farms—over 42 percent of the nation's total population of 62,947,714. Moreover, not until 1920 did more than half of Americans reside in urban units larger than 5,000 people. As America industrialized, agrarianism remained the ideal for most Americans; even labor organizations such as the **Knights of Labor** called for comprehensive land reforms to make farm ownership easier.

But not all nineteenth-century farmers were Jeffersonian models of rural independence. The bulk of antebellum Southern agricultural workers were **slaves**, not independent yeomen. The failure of **Reconstruction** after the Civil War saw the bulk of African Americans become tenant farmers and sharecroppers rather than farm owners. Farmers and ranchers everywhere felt the sting of economic changes that transformed their products from goods for local consumption into commodities for regional and national markets. Banks, railroads, grain elevators, stockyards, and meatpackers increasingly came to dictate prices and production, often leaving farmers to struggle with high interest rates, exorbitant storage costs, and soaring freight rates. Farmers expressed collective anger by organizing into reform groups such as the Grange, the Farmers' Alliances, the Greenback and "free silver" movements, and the Populist Party.

These groups, especially the Populists in the 1890s and **Progressive Era** movements such as the **Industrial Workers of the World**, the Citizens Non-Partisan League, and Minnesota's Farmer-Labor Party, helped legions of farmers, but several economic trends began to erode agrarian ideals. First, expansion of the industrial and service sectors created a permanent wage-earning **working class** and shifted economic relations to money-based exchanges. Second, the scale of the economy favored large enterprises over small ones, with farming subject to the same consolidation practices as manufacturing. Ranching was the first to give way. By the 1880s much of the meatpacking trade relied on animals from large ranches that employed wage-earners, not the livestock of small ranches.

The decline of family farms is much discussed in contemporary America, but it has been accelerating since the late 1920s. During and after World War I, many farmers expanded production to meet military needs and to feed war-ravaged Europe. As Europe recovered, American farmers faced dropping prices because of overproduction. The **Great Depression** officially began in late 1929, but many rural areas were in decline several years earlier.

The Depression further ravaged rural America. Even **New Deal** programs such as the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA), which brought price subsidies for many commodities, favored large operations over small farms. Although the total amount of tilled acreage actually increased slightly between 1930 and 1940, the number of farms and farmers declined. As farms were foreclosed, corporations bought small farms and consolidated them. What came to be called agribusiness emerged in full force in the 1930s.

The post–World War II expansion of the economy was not marked by resurgence in family farming. In 1930 more than 30 million Americans worked in agriculture; by 1950 barely half that number worked in the agrarian sector. Small-scale

agriculture began an inexorable decline. In 1950 just 15.3 percent of Americans lived off the land; by 1970 that figure had slipped to 8.7 percent, and by 1990 a mere 1.9 percent made their livelihood by farming. This is because farming has become a corporate activity. The total amount of tilled acreage in 1990 was just slightly down from 1930 levels, but the average farm size was over 300 percent larger. Between 1982 and 1997 alone, some 339,000 small farms ended up in the hands of approximately 2,600 consolidated operations. Today, many producers, wholesalers, and retailers are the same corporate entity. Firms such as Tyson and Perdue operate their own chicken ranches; just four firms control nearly threequarters of U.S. beef production; and corporate giants such as ConAgra, Cargill/Monsanto, Archer Daniels Midland, and AgriMark own vast amounts of American farm and grazing lands. There are reputedly still about 100,000 familyrun dairy operations, but the price farmers get for milk is often dictated by creameries and distributors such as AgriMark, Dean Foods, Hood, and Hershey Foods. Recent changes in the AAA favor corporate enterprises even more. The reality is that agrarianism has given way to agribusiness in contemporary America.

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AGRIBUSINESS

See Agrarianism.

AID TO FAMILIES WITH DEPENDENT CHILDREN (AFDC)

See Welfare.

ALGER, HORATIO (January 13, 1832–July 18, 1899)

ROBERT E. WEIR

Horatio Alger Jr. was a **Gilded Age** novelist of more than 130 books; his very name is now synonymous with rags-to-riches stories of sudden upward **social mobility**. His books are seldom read today, and only a handful are still in print, though they provide useful documentation of nineteenth-century urban problems.

Alger's own youth was far from ideal, though he was raised in **middle-class** comfort. The senior Alger was an exacting Unitarian minister who tutored his son in math and reading and encouraged him to enter the ministry. But childhood

stuttering and his diminutive size—he was just five feet two inches when fully grown—isolated Alger socially. Still, he entered Harvard, graduated Phi Beta Kappa in 1857, and entered Harvard Divinity School. After his ordination in 1860, he left for a seven-month tour of Europe. When he returned, the **Civil War** had begun, but asthma disqualified him from military service; instead, he became a minister of a Unitarian congregation in Brewster, Massachusetts. He began writing during this time, perhaps to supplement his meager ministerial salary.

In 1866 Alger was abruptly fired by his church. It was later revealed that he was suspected of pedophilia with two teenaged boys. Alger fled to New York City, a metropolis being rapidly transformed by mass **immigration**, industry, and an ever-widening gap between **wealth** and **poverty**. Alger witnessed firsthand the crushing effects of life in the **slums**, **child labor**, **homelessness**, and nativism. He befriended numerous street



Horatio Alger. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

urchins, though the nature of his relationship with these children is unknown. Alger's legions of posthumous defenders claim that he was remorseful for his earlier actions and rescued street children as acts of penitence. This may be the case, but suspicion lingers because his sister destroyed his papers upon his death, perhaps in an attempt to conceal his homosexuality and physical attraction to boys.

Alger's interest in rescuing street children coincided with pioneering efforts such as those of **Charles Loring Brace** and the Children's Aid Society. As many as 34,000 children were homeless in New York City alone, and neighborhoods such as the infamous Five Points region were awash in prostitution, violence, political corruption, and despair. Alger made street boys the heroes of most of his novels. The first, *Ragged Dick; or Street Life in New York with the Bootblacks* was serialized in 1867 and appeared in book form the following year. The novel juxtaposes a virtuous but poor bootblack, Dick Hunter, and the wastrel Johnny Nolan. Although Nolan succumbs to vice, Hunter saves a businessman's son from drowning, wins the man's patronage, and begins his rise within the firm.

Achieving salvation through hard work, cheerfulness, luck, determination, and patronage forms the story arc of most of Alger's books. These "dime novels," as the pulp fiction of the day was called, were akin to modern-day romance novels in that they are formulaic and quickly penned, and they resolve positively for their protagonists. Alger's books are essentially **inner-city** fairy tales, with young boys assuming the roles that fairy tales often reserved for princesses-in-the-making. *Ragged Dick* became a series, as did several other Alger fictional franchises, including *Tattered Tom*, *Pluck and Luck*, and *Joe the Hotel Boy*. Alger's novels were famed for the manner in which central characters obtain the **American dream**. They were

widely consumed by **working-class** readers in the Gilded Age, a time in which **capitalism** was hotly contested, and they may have played a role in advancing **Social Darwinian** beliefs in **self-reliance**. Some historians dispute Alger's influence, arguing that such ex post facto interpretations of the importance of his work developed after the suppression of working-class radical movements in the early twentieth century. Nonetheless, some 20,000,000 copies of Alger's books were sold before they passed from fashion in the early 1920s. His works were so well-known that Mark Twain penned two Alger parodies in 1875.

Ironically, Alger was not himself a rags-to-riches story. His books sold well, but his various acts of **philanthropy**—the YMCA, the Children's Aid Society, the Newsboys Lodging House, and various missions—quickly depleted his funds, and some of the boys he tried to assist flimflammed him. He also gave money to various political reform causes, including efforts to end contract labor and to enact child labor law reform. In addition to writing, Alger also tutored children of rich New Yorkers; one of his charges was future Supreme Court justice Benjamin Cardozo. Shortly before he died from pneumonia in 1899, Alger left New York and moved in with his sister, Augusta, and her husband in Natick, Massachusetts.

The importance of Alger's writing is hotly contested. In his lifetime he was widely read, and **Theodore Roosevelt** and Ernest Hemingway were among his youthful devotees. His work inspired similar ventures, such as the Hardy Boys and Nancy Drew series, and in death, Alger himself became an icon. To his detractors, Horatio Alger was a spinner of mindless pap and platitudes. His very name is sometimes invoked to convey naivety, simplicity, and unexamined **individualism**. Some damn Alger for contributing to the myth that poverty is attitudinal rather than systemic.

Conservatives sometimes link Alger to American ideals of economic opportunity, the value of hard work, and the openness of the American system of social mobility. The Horatio Alger Association of Distinguished Americans, founded in 1947, awards annual scholarships to high school students who overcome adversity in an Alger-like fashion. The association's members have included an unusual assortment of former **sports** figures (Hank Aaron, Julius Erving, Wayne Gretzky); business leaders (Thomas Watson, T. Boone Pickens); celebrities (Joyce Carol Oates, **Oprah Winfrey**); and political figures. The latter category tends to draw from conservative ranks—**Ronald Reagan**, Clarence Thomas, Robert Dole, John Connally—but it has also included liberals, such as Mario Cuomo. There is a Horatio Alger Society devoted to his literary outpouring, and Alger's personal life also inspired the formation of the North American Man/Boy Love Association, a group that lobbies for the elimination of laws governing consensual homosexual relations between minors and adults.

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Horatio Alger, Ragged Dick, 2005 (1867); Alger, Bound to Rise, 2005 (1873); Jack Bales and Gary Scharnhorst, The Lost Life of Horatio Alger, 1985; The Horatio Alger Association of Distinguished Americans (http://www.horatioalger.com/index.cfm); Carol Nackenoff, The Fictional Republic: Horatio Alger and American Political Discourse, 1994.

ALIENATION

KAREN BETTEZ HALNON

Alienation is a term used in sociology, critical social theory, and more generally among **Marxists** to refer to an activity or a state in which a person, a group, an institution, or a society becomes estranged. For example, an individual might come to perceive himself as outside what he feels is a "natural" (or, for some theorists, "normative") relationship with the self, others, the community, or the world. For most Marxists, the concept of self-alienation is the essence of capitalist oppression, and in turn, de-alienation involves the potential for revolutionary social action. Revolutionary action then lies in political economic education, or in unmasking what some call **false consciousness**—the ideologies or inverted desires that distract from accurately perceiving and rejecting deficient and dehumanizing material realities.

Alienation can assume several different forms, but all are ultimately a form of self-alienation, or estrangement from the potentiality of the achievement and expression of the self. These forms include alienation from one's self; alienation from other human beings, from the humanity of others, and from our natural and interdependent state of community with others; alienation from nature or from the material world in which we are situated; and alienation from one's own life activities.

Religious alienation is one possible form of self-alienation because it subordinates individuals to a non-objective ideology. For Marx (following Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity), religious alienation attributes part of the self, the potential for humanity, and ultimately the perfection of the self and humanity to an objective existence as God, or as the cultural imagining of human perfection. Such beliefs are dominant and also oppressive. Marx famously proclaimed religion to be the "opiate of the masses." Similarly, economic activity in the forms of money, commodities, and capital remove and abstract one away from direct relation with one's life activities and their products. For example, the surplus value extracted in the labor process (i.e., profit), in particular, has the effect of intensifying economic, social, and cultural domination by the capitalist class (or those who own the means of production). In fact, Marx felt that capitalist production modes were alienating by nature because they divorced the working class from the fruits of their own labor and attempted to substitute money and goods. The state, the law, and social institutions further conspire to trick individuals into identifying themselves and their activities with separate and simplified objects. Such alienation renders the individual slavish, powerless, and dependent. At minimum, a de-alienated individual is an autonomous and creative self-producer of meaning and is in direct conscious relation with the products of her or his life.

Whereas traditional Marxist theory focused on production-related alienation, contemporary social theory focuses on alienation as the deliberate production of unreality. Many see **consumerism** and its attendant **advertising**-based dreams as a dominant, oppressive force colonizing contemporary social life. The focus of critics of consumerism is on the dehumanizing effects of living in a **globalized**

world of mass media and advertising, of spectacle and simulation, and of consumption of simulated experiences and homogenized (and branded) lifestyles and identities. A particular emphasis of such work is on the commoditization of dissent or how the modern capitalist state assimilates (and even markets) opposition to its **hegemony**.

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Erich Fromm, *Marx's Concept of Man*, 1961; Karen Bettez Halnon, "Alienation Incorporated: 'F*** the Mainstream Music' in the Mainstream," *Current Sociology*, 53.4 (May 2005), pp. 441–464; Georg Lukacs, *History & Class Consciousness*, 1920; Herbert Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 1968; Bertell Ollman, *Alienation: Marx's Conception of Man in Capitalist Society*, 1971.

ALTHUSSER, LOUIS (October 19, 1918–October 23, 1990)

ROBERT E. WEIR

Louis Althusser was an influential French **Marxist** thinker whose interpretations of Marx have influenced numerous social scientists, especially those with leftist political views.

Born in Algeria, Althusser had a troubled childhood but excelled in school. His education at the well-regarded École Normale Supériuere was interrupted by World War II, and he spent much of the war in a German prisoner-of-war camp. His public career began after the war, and he wrote numerous books and articles, many of which are intellectually dense and hard to penetrate, but which have greatly influenced Marxist theory. His later life was marred by tragedy. In 1980 he murdered his wife, was declared mentally incompetent, was treated for three years in a psychiatric hospital, and spent the remainder of his life as a recluse.

His work is important for the way in which he addressed seeming contradictions in Karl Marx's writings. He defended Marx from those who saw his work as a form of crude economic determinism that reduced all human decision-making and social change to one's relation to the **means of production** and to economic shifts. Althusser argued that Marx himself underwent an "epistemological break" that he did not completely understand, but that Marx nonetheless saw complexity in the ways in which the economic substructure of society interacted with social forces and institutions. In other words, people's social needs also condition their political actions, economic decision-making, and ideological development.

Much of Althusser's thought is of interest mainly to political theorists, but his emphasis on what he called "ideological state apparatuses" is an important reminder that **capitalists** often take advantage of their power over social institutions to reinforce values vital to maintaining their dominance as enshrined in the relationship to the means of production. Althusser saw two levels of control: repressive state power embodied in police, the legal system, and the military; and "professionals of ideology," such as schools, popular culture, religion, and the family, that manufacture consent for the capitalist state. Like Antonio Gramsci

(1891–1937), an Italian **communist** whose health was ruined in a fascist prison camp, Althusser understood that ideological consent was a more potent form of social control than coercion and, hence, less likely to induce revolutionary fervor. Although he agreed with Marx and others that this consent was a form of **false consciousness**, he also realized that ideas such as democracy, divine judgment, or patriotism can place individuals in what he dubbed "an imaginary relationship" with the world.

Althusser's explication of this "imaginary relationship" is quite complex, and many aspects of his work are problematic. However, one need not embrace his Marxism or immerse oneself in his writing to appreciate the distinction he makes between repressive and ideological agency or to realize the potency of his explanation for how individuals can come to embrace things that are not necessarily in their self-interest. Gramsci called the ability to make repressive systems appear as common sense "cultural hegemony." Both theorists help explain, for example, social phenomena such as the relative quiescence of those living in **poverty**, why some members of the **working class** refuse to join labor unions, or the ways in which many people admire members of the **upper class** even if they know that their wealth was gained dishonestly or exploitatively. Both also help one see how social-class relations can be reinforced subconsciously; Althusser was a student of psychology—especially Freud and Lacan—and Gramsci noted the power of popular culture to embed and encode ideas about social class.

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Louis Althusser, For Marx, 1969; Perry Anderson, Considerations on Western Marxism, 1979; Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 1971.

AMERICAN DREAM

ROBERT E. WEIR

American dream is a vague, but inspiring, term that refers to the belief of many Americans that they will be happy, materially well off, and economically secure. Embedded within it is the expectation that each generation will do better than their parents. Because the term is so unspecific, it has been subject to exploitation by all political persuasions.

The first known use of the term comes from *The Epic of America*, authored by historian James Truslow Adams in 1931. Adams, however, merely coined a phrase to describe an impulse that is as old as European settlement in North America. A key component of the American dream is freedom, loosely construed to embody ideas as diverse as land acquisition, ideals enshrined in the Bill of Rights, and a nonregulatory business environment. In essence, the American dream often corresponds to what groups or individuals believe the promise of America to be, although economic opportunity has often been central to its construction.

By the mid-nineteenth century, the American dream was increasingly linked to notions of acquiring personal wealth. The fortunes made by various entrepreneurs, robber barons, and industrialists offered hopes of upward social mobility to millions, and the conspicuous consumption patterns of the wealthy fueled the dream. So too did the rags-to-riches novels of Horatio Alger, propaganda from Social Darwinists, laissez-faire economic policies, and the aspirations of the millions of immigrants who poured into American society between 1870 and 1920. Although labor unions and radicals tried to convince the masses they were being exploited, the opulent wealth of enclaves such as Newport ameliorated potential anger; many looked upon the mansions, gilded carriages, and possessions of the wealthy with envy rather than desire to redesign society. By the turn of the twentieth century, many viewed individuals such as Andrew Carnegie, John Rockefeller, and Henry Ford as folk heroes, not robber barons.

During the 1930s and 1940s, the American dream was challenged by the Great Depression and World War II. By the 1950s, however, postwar prosperity had unleashed a wave of **consumerism** that fed the American dream. Key material components of the American dream included home ownership, access to consumer goods, and economic security. These were reinforced by core beliefs in the superiority of the American political, economic, and social system and the idea that hard work would result in material success. Television and film images also served to promote the American dream, and advertisers seized upon the idea to promote their products. Not coincidentally, there was a marked decline in the number of Americans who identified themselves as working class and an increase in those claiming middle-class identity. Although membership in labor unions remained high, militancy declined, and labor leaders such as George Meany opined that workers were indeed becoming middle class. On a less benign level, the American dream was often linked to enforced conformity. The Cold War brought not only a fear of and backlash against communism, but also the idea that there was a singular American "way of life" and that all who deviated from it were suspect. The political right labored to equate the American dream with unquestioning patriotism, anticommunism, and support for market capitalism.

In the 1960s, however, awareness rose that not everyone had access to the American dream. African Americans, ethnic minorities, and working women complained that systemic discrimination kept them in subordinate positions both socially and economically. Moreover, **poverty** studies revealed that economic data did not support the idea that America was predominately a middle-class society. Social activists such as Rev. **Martin Luther King Jr.** and **Michael Harrington** copted the American dream image to argue in favor of anti-poverty programs, racial justice, and redistribution of wealth. Radical groups such as the **Students for a Democratic Society** issued manifestos challenging the American dream.

Since the 1960s competing versions of the American dream have, to some degree, symbolically framed political debate within American society. In the 1980s, for example, President Ronald Reagan evoked the American dream to solicit support for tax cuts and conservative political views, a tactic renewed by Karl Rove and other conservative political consultants in the early twenty-first century. One of the most notable results of this has been declining public and government support for **welfare** programs, the prevailing critique being that welfare destroys **self-reliance** and works against the American dream. Conservatives have even formed

groups, such as the American Dream Coalition, to promote property ownership, low taxes, and the dismantling of business regulations.

By contrast, liberals often use images of a derailed American dream to drum up support for their own views. They point to **homelessness**, large numbers of **working poor**, and widespread discrimination as evidence that the American dream is as much mythic as real. For example, 80 percent of Americans state a goal of owning a single-family home with a stand-alone yard. Nearly three-quarters of all white families own property, but less than half of all African American and Latino families can make this claim. Moreover, liberals charge that conservatives misuse the American dream to draw attention away from racism, gender bias, regressive taxation, sinking wages, and other factors that give the rich unfair advantages.

Suggested Reading

Jeffrey Decker, Made in America: Self-Styled Success from Horatio Alger to Oprah Winfrey, 1997; Jason DeParle, American Dream: Three Women, Ten Kids, and a Nation's Drive to End Welfare, 2004; Richard Florida, "The New American Dream," Washington Monthly, March 2003.

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE

See Class; Think Tanks.

AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM

ROBERT E. WEIR

American exceptionalism is a postulate put forth by some scholars that American society and history departed from that of the Europeans who settled North America because of special advantages that existed in the United States after its revolution against Great Britain. In particular, scholars point to the relative openness of the American social system resulting from its lack of an aristocracy of birth, an abundance of available land for settlers, and a political system that granted many basic liberties and individual freedoms for which Europeans had to struggle for decades to attain. The theory is often evoked to explain the relative lack of class conflict in the United States.

The term originated with Alexis de Tocqueville and appeared in his four-volume *Democracy in America* (1835–40). Tocqueville cited liberty, equality of birth, individualism, popular democracy, and laissez-faire business practices as hallmarks of American exceptionalism. These, he felt, differentiated the United States from the feudalism-scarred past of Europe. Americans, he argued, felt loyalty to their families and to a vaguely constructed notion of their nation, but were not burdened by obligations to social class and hierarchy.

Tocqueville's musings were simply a restatement of ideas that many original settlers had brought with them to the American colonies even before the **American**

Revolution. The Puritan vision of constructing a "city upon a hill" is one expression of making the New World substantively different from Europe, and many other settlers consciously set forth to reject what they perceived to be Old World values.

As an intellectual construct for scholars, American exceptionalism has waxed and waned, the prevailing notion at the present being that it has been overstated. During the nineteenth century, many Americans belonging to the upper **middle class** revived American exceptionalism as a form of class identity masquerading as national pride. Conservatives often evoked some form of it to justify Manifest Destiny designs on the continent in the antebellum period as well as imperialist ventures at the turn of the century. Often, ideals of exceptionalism mingled with those of Americans as a chosen people of biblical proportion. The notion also shows up in Frederick Jackson Turner's famed "frontier thesis," in which he argued that the availability of free land operated as a "safety valve" that softened the development of radicalism in the United States. American exceptionalism also appeared in works from worried **Victorians** such as Charles **Adams**, who feared that immigrants and debased culture were weakening the American character.

Exceptionalism received a big boost from German scholar Werner Sombart, whose 1906 Why Is There No Socialism in the United States? touched off an academic debate that continues to roil. Sombart put forth a thesis that American workers were prosperous vis-à-vis those in other industrial nations and hence were less likely to embrace **socialism** or other radical notions. His views were often cited to explain why the United States never developed an independent labor party. Another strain of exceptionalist debate took the position that Sombart was overly optimistic, but socialism held little attraction because it was viewed as a foreign import and could not successfully compete with older, indigenous forms of American radicalism. In the 1920s, however, scholars working at the University of Wisconsin, such as John R. Commons and Selig Perlman, tended to echo Sombart and argue that American workers were more wage-conscious than Europeans and that they also had more outlets within the traditional political system.

American exceptionalism also proved palatable for the sort of nationalist history that dominated much of the twentieth century. Whether overtly or by implication, exceptionalism often emerged in histories that evoked themes such as the glory, genius, and power of the United States. Many of America's most eminent historians—including Charles Beard, Daniel Bell, Daniel Boorstin, Henry Steel Commager, Richard Hofstadter, Horace Kallen, **Seymour Lipset**, Vernon Parrington, Henry Nash Smith, and Arthur Schlesinger—have played off exceptionalist themes.

In the 1960s, however, scholars practicing what was dubbed the **new social history** began to call into question the underlying assumptions of American exceptionalism. First, they argued that exceptionalist scholars confused form and essence. Each nation has practices, laws, and events that are outwardly different, but often these are only surface manifestations of trends, problems, and issues that arise elsewhere; in other words, most things are not as unique as they might appear to be. Scholars also charged that exceptionalism was such a diffuse concept that it was used to explain everything when, in fact, it was too imprecise to explain much of anything. More significantly, critics charged that American exceptionalism assumed a social consensus on values and ignored the role of

power. It was not that American workers rejected radicalism so much as the fact that organized **capitalism**, court systems, and politicians crushed radical movements. Nor could one sustain a prosperity thesis if one looked at the social data pertaining to the **working class**. Whereas defenders of American exceptionalism tended to embrace consensus theory, most of its critics were **conflict theorists** who charged defenders with historical distortion, reductionism, amnesia, or a combination of these.

Despite attacks on exceptionalism from the 1960s on, the theory remains very much alive. More recent scholarship has tinkered with the thesis to locate exceptionalism in more recent history. In other words, America wasn't born exceptional; it became so after the defeat of radical movements that might have brought America's history more in line with Europe's. This scholarship stands as an attempt at finding middle ground between consensus and conflict schools.

American exceptionalism has remained very attractive to the political right, especially since the collapse of the Cold War. From their viewpoint, America's triumph is testament to the resiliency of its political, social, and cultural institutions, and America's status as the dominant superpower is proof of uniqueness. Quite often, the **Founding Fathers** are evoked in defense of such positions. Exceptionalism also meshes well with social views that celebrate the opportunities conservatives believe are inherent within American capitalism.

Among scholars, the prevailing view is that American exceptionalism has been overstated. Much of what once appeared to be exceptional has largely been a matter of the dearth of comparative studies. Many scholars do believe, however, that a belief in exceptionalism is useful in explaining the tendency of some Americans toward xenophobia and the nation's awkwardness in international relations. It also retains a devoted core of intellectuals who feel the concept retains merit.

Suggested Reading

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AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR (AFL)

SARAH CROSSLEY

The American Federation of Labor (AFL), a labor federation organized in 1886 by cigar maker **Samuel Gompers**, was a reorganization of a previous federation: the Federation of Organized Trades and Labor Unions. Initially, the AFL was organized as a response to dissatisfaction with the **Knights of Labor**, which developed a centralized structure and fostered a workers' culture under which anyone from the "producing classes" could be a member.

The AFL sought to distinguish itself from the inclusiveness of the Knights of Labor through various means. Rather than fighting what they saw as the inevitability



American Federation of Labor building, ca. 1920–50. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

of wage labor, the AFL was determined to work within the established **capitalist** system through two fundamental principles: (1) pure and simple unionism and (2) voluntarism. Pure and simple unionism simply referred to bread-and-butter issues such as wages, hours, and working conditions.

Voluntarism meant that constituent unions would rely only on themselves and their members. This was a far cry from the Knights of Labor's ideology, which insisted that "an injury to one is an injury to all." In fact, the only real similarity between the two organizations was the campaign for the eight-hour day. After that, the AFL promoted autonomy of the unions and limited its membership to workers only. Member unions were encouraged to set up high initiation fees and dues to support workers themselves if they went on **strike**.

Initially, the AFL promoted a platform of egalitarianism and industrial unionism. However, as craft unionism came to dominate the landscape of the AFL, both the principle of egalitarianism and the practice of industrial unionism were hard-pressed to find a place. The AFL did not actively exclude workers based on **race** or nationality, but many of its affiliates did, and the

skilled workers' craft unions in the AFL rarely included workers of color or **immi-grant** workers. Initiation fees and high dues made it impossible for unskilled workers, most of whom were women, immigrants, and people of color, to join an affiliate union.

By the mid-1890s, both egalitarianism and industrial unionism had become less of an issue as industries such as construction and railroads actively sought to exclude immigrant and African American workers. The AFL sought to work around the racist policies of affiliate unions by organizing segregated locals. By the early 1900s segregated locals had become the norm. The AFL followed the lead of its affiliate unions and soon began to support anti-immigration legislation, including the reaffirmation of the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act.

Although the AFL was formed by members of the **Socialist Party**, this leftist approach was almost immediately discarded for a more conservative approach to unionism. The experiences of the Knights of Labor had convinced AFL founders that such an all-encompassing union of workers with a political agenda was no way to create a stable **labor movement**. For AFL members, immediate issues pertaining to a skilled workforce of craft unionists offered more possibility for stability than working on a political agenda. Thus, from its inception, the AFL refused to align itself with any political party, including any labor party.

For AFL president Samuel Gompers, party affiliations did not dictate who may or may not be a friend to labor. Gompers's disillusionment with the political process in regard to labor led him to dismiss even legislation beneficial to workers because it would hurt collective bargaining processes that sought the same protections.

At the turn of the twentieth century, the AFL stayed with its method of pure and simple unionism while other organizations such as the Socialist Party and the **Industrial Workers of the World** took more radical stances regarding the transformation of the American labor movement. Collective bargaining remained the centerpiece for AFL organizing, and despite the influx of unskilled labor into the labor market, craft unions remained the focus of AFL organizing. When AFL leaders did try to organize unskilled workers, it was into "federal labor unions (FLU)." FLUs were separate unions that existed within the federation for unskilled laborers whose work did not fit into the structure of craft unions. The exclusivity of the federation prohibited large numbers of women, African Americans, and immigrants from unionizing within the AFL.

Despite its shortcomings, in the early twentieth century, the AFL proved a powerful and vital influence on the labor movement and the creation of an expanded **middle class**. Although union membership often followed the ebbs and flows of the larger political economy, it remained the **working classes**' most powerful ally, claiming anywhere from approximately 1.7 million members in 1904 to almost 4 million in 1920.

By 1935 the AFL was struggling with internal dissension over how to organize the industrial workforce. The AFL's tried-and-true method of organizing along craft lines was proving an inadequate way of organizing larger industries such as rubber and steel. Led by **John L. Lewis**, several union leaders formed the **Committee for Industrial Organization** (CIO) to promote the unionization of a rapidly growing unskilled workforce. Fearful that such large numbers of unskilled workers, many of whom spoke little or no English, would hurt the bargaining power of skilled workers, the AFL resisted. By 1937 the federation had expelled the ten member unions that made up the increasingly powerful CIO. The two groups remained rival federations, vying for new members until their merger in 1955 under then-president of the AFL **George Meany**.

Although the AFL and its successor, the **AFL–CIO**, have been plagued with many shortcomings in their history, the labor federation has also proved itself a resilient force in the American labor movement. Its focus on the creation and protection of a new middle class has successfully remained the heart of its motivation. Its failure to address adequately the concerns of women, minorities, and immigrants (the vast majority of the unskilled workforce) is an ongoing challenge for the modern labor movement as it struggles to remain vital in an increasingly diverse and rapidly changing workforce.

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American Federation of Labor–Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL–CIO)

SARAH CROSSLEY

The AFL–CIO is a voluntary federation of labor unions. Initially, the **American Federation of Labor** (AFL) and the **Congress of Industrial Organizations** (CIO) were two separate federations. Formed in 1886, the AFL originally opened itself up to skilled tradesmen within their particular trade. The CIO initially formed in 1935 within the AFL to organize previously ignored unskilled workers. Members of the CIO felt that with the onset of industrialization and mass production, all workers within a given sector should be organized, regardless of their skill level. Expelled from the AFL in 1937, the CIO remained a rival federation until the two merged in 1955, under the leadership of AFL president **George Meany**. Part of the impetus for merger was the passage of the anti-labor Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, which the AFL–CIO vowed to have repealed.

Under Meany's leadership, the AFL–CIO reached its apex as the **labor movement** readied itself to "organize the unorganized." In the 1950s, unions represented approximately one-third of all private enterprise workers. Historians credit a strong post–World War II economy, demobilization, and Meany's ambitious leadership with labor's rise in the 1950s. It did not, however, succeed in overturning Taft–Hartley, nor did it make major inroads in the South, where right-to-work laws and Red-baiting tactics sidetracked AFL–CIO efforts.

By the 1970s divisions over the Vietnam War were causing significant rifts within the federation. The AFL–CIO leadership, with Meany at the helm, was mostly prowar, supporting the corrupt anticommunist Vietnamese Confederation of Labor (VCL) through its Asian American Free Labor Institute. Unhappy with the VCL, with Meany's steadfast support for the war, and with the AFL–CIO's perceived slowness in embracing the Civil Rights Movement, several unions formed the Alliance for Labor Action, an alternative organization to the AFL–CIO spearheaded by Meany critic **Walter Reuther**. The alliance proved short-lived and unsuccessful.

When Meany retired in 1979, labor was in deep decline. Postwar unionism bolstered a new **middle class** that included well-paid **blue-collar** workers who gave labor temporary respectability but decreased its militancy. The changing face of labor hampered incoming AFL–CIO president Lane Kirkland. The administration of President **Ronald Reagan** in the 1980s continually challenged pro-labor legislation, while the growth of international corporations, increasing uses of outsourcing, **deindustrialization**, and a general decline in labor organizing all contributed to sinking union membership levels. Labor leaders were caught off guard by the creation of new jobs in the booming service sector and were ill-prepared for the aggressive anti-union environment of the late 1970s and beyond.

Conservatives—many of whom were angered by the AFL–CIO's electoral support for the Democratic Party—attacked labor unions as relics of a past era and obstacles to making American business competitive in a global economy. Many businesses overtly smashed unions, while others forced them to make significant concessions on wages, benefits, and workforce strength. Conservatives also turned Meany-era logic against labor and argued that because most Americans were now

members of the middle class, there was no need for labor unions. By the mid-1980s, labor unions were viewed as obstructionist and antiquated by a substantial number of Americans.

Traditional methods of organizing grew obsolete in this anti-labor climate, and large and virulently anti-union employers such as **Wal-Mart** became typical. Between 1979 and 1983, for instance, service jobs such as domestic or janitorial jobs increased by about 38 percent, while production jobs such as those in the automotive industry decreased by 12 percent. Many union activists accused the AFL–CIO of being overly bureaucratic, of caving in to concessionary demands, and of squandering federation resources in political campaigns. The AFL–CIO's relationship with the Democratic Party was particularly scrutinized, with some activists arguing that the federation had received poor return on its large campaign expenditures.

Pressure to reverse the downward trend in union membership resulted in the 1995 election of current president John Sweeney. Sweeney stressed the need for renewed militancy, but organizing in the new economy has proved a daunting task. Rhetoric of a "new" middle class aside, since the 1980s, the gap between **wealth** and **poverty** has widened. The AFL–CIO sought to make changes. It recognized that the number of women and minorities in the workforce has grown steadily and that **immigrants** continue to make up sizable percentages of the labor force, especially in the service sector. The Sweeney-led AFL–CIO attempted to revitalize union activism through programs designed to train new organizers—especially women and minorities—and to recruit younger members. The new tactics may have slowed union decline, but they have yet to stimulate resurgence.

As unionism has stagnated, detractors have turned against Sweeney. His supporters argue that labor must remain united in this time of crisis in order to secure strong union membership. They point to the success of the labor movement in mobilizing union voters during the 2004 election and the AFL–CIO's aggressive push to organize as symbols of strong leadership and signs that the movement is headed in the right direction.

Critics assert that a single federation fosters complacency among the AFL–CIO hierarchy and that a second rival federation would push labor leaders to act more aggressively in defense of their constituency. They cite the strength of labor in the pre–World War II era as an example of the efficacy of multiple federations. On July 25, 2005, five unions split from the AFL–CIO to form the Change to Win Coalition. By 2006, this coalition had grown to include seven constituent unions, but labor continued to struggle, with just 8 percent of private-sector workers belonging to unions.

Whether competing federations will aid or harm the labor movement remains an open question. What is clear is that as the face of labor continues to change, the labor movement must be willing change with it.

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AMERICAN INDIANS

See Native Americans.

AMERICAN REVOLUTION

ROBERT E. WEIR

Between 1775 and 1783, colonists in thirteen of England's fifteen North American colonies waged a war for independence that ultimately resulted in the formation of the United States of America. The American Revolution is so thoroughly engrained in the American psyche that it exists in popular memory as much as a myth as an actual event. This is especially true of the so-called **Founding Fathers**, such as George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and Benjamin Franklin. For many years, the story of the American Revolution was told mostly through the deeds and words of **elites**, with commoners mentioned mostly for their roles as soldiers and local militiamen.

This oversight went largely unaddressed until the emergence of the **new social history** during the 1960s, when historians began to pay more attention to pre-Revolutionary protest that established protest traditions. Long before the clash with Britain became apparent, commoners were expressing their discontent. Numerous **slave** rebellions took place, as did individual acts of rebellion ranging from running away from masters to resisting the lash. **Indentured servants** engaged in similar protests, a few of which became violent. In 1676, for instance, indentured servants and runaway slaves in the Chesapeake region joined backcountry farmers in **Bacon's Rebellion**, which briefly overthrew the royal government of Virginia.

Colonial artisans also resisted arbitrary authority, especially after 1720, when new waves of Scots-Irish and German immigrants altered the social landscape of the colonies. Many of these individuals came from humble backgrounds and were already distrustful of aristocrats and elites. In the cities, many of them joined journeymen's associations and friendly societies that became the basis for trade unions, with the 1724 Philadelphia Carpenter's Company often credited as the first to regulate prices, apprenticeship, and wages.

Likewise, there were periodic bread riots in the colonies during periods of shortage, several of which took on class dimensions when desperate artisans and wives directed their anger at wealthy merchants, tax collectors, or royal officials. In the countryside, rising land prices and taxes also led to upheaval. As social historians now note, much of the pietism and religious experimentation associated with the Great Awakening revivals from the 1720s on had as much to do with popular discontent as with religious fervor. In New England, the revivals often saw land-poor youths strike out against their elders, while in the Mid-Atlantic region and the South, new converts openly challenged existing elites.

By the 1740s Colonial society was under stress. Religious fervor split numerous communities into opposing camps of "New Lights" embracing revivalism and the "Old Lights" who opposed them, the latter group disproportionately representing elites. There was also an emergent land crisis in which most of the best land and

that closest to settled areas was already claimed. As settlers ventured deeper into the backcountry, they often encountered **Native Americans**, whom they saw as obstacles in need of removal, though colonial officials were often loath to do so. Religion, land, and Native policy often yielded anger toward established authority, which spilled out in events such as rent protests in New York during the 1740s, the Regulators' rebellion of South Carolina planters from 1767 to 1771, and the Paxton Boys' march on Philadelphia in 1763.

The aftermath of the French and Indian War (1754–63) further heightened tension, especially in Colonial cities. Although originally hailed as a great victory for "Mother England," the cost of conducting the war—which was part of a greater European struggle known as the Seven Years' War—bankrupted the English treasury and necessitated raising taxes. The colonial tax burden was actually light in comparison with rates within Britain, but new taxes coincided with a general dullness of trade, sinking wages, and increasing impoverishment of the urban poor. Colonial cities saw increases in debt imprisonment and almshouse applications, and it was exceedingly difficult for a man to support his family solely on his own wages. Many artisans, especially hard-hit shoemakers, braziers, coopers, and sailors, took note of the fact that in cities such as Philadelphia, the wealthiest 10 percent controlled two-thirds of the total wealth.

By the late 1760s an odd alliance had crystallized between merchants and intellectuals resisting British authority and the farmers and urban workers whose discontent was more generalized. Many commoners took part in protests against the Stamp Act, though they seldom needed to buy one; against the Townshend duties, though most of the taxed goods were luxury items they did not consume; and against the Tea Act, though many had never drunk a cup of tea. Popular protests such as hangings-in-effigy or attacks on royal officials broke out in the colonies, and commoners joined groups such as the Sons of Liberty and various corresponding societies. The 1770 Boston Massacre also stoked the flames of discontent because all five victims were laborers. Women began to weave homespun cloth as colonists boycotted English goods and also tended farms and shops once hostilities broke out in 1775.

It is difficult to determine how many colonists actually took part in the American Revolution; several estimates claim that only about 40 percent of males old enough to fight actually did so and that they were divided rather evenly between Patriots and Tories. Moreover, in an agrarian economy, few farmers could be away from their fields for long, and thus, they were more likely to be part of a temporary militia—such as the famed "Minutemen"—which saw only brief, local action. What is known is that the bulk of fighters came from the ranks of commoners, with artisans and sailors disproportionately represented. Soldiers in the Continental Army suffered an array of hardships ranging from lack of supplies, disease outbreaks, and inadequate housing to missed pay. Commoners made up the bulk of casualties.

Historians now believe that those commoners went to war for different reasons than their leaders. Men such as Jefferson, Franklin, and Patrick Henry were inflamed by new ideas of governance emanating from the Enlightenment, whereas merchants such as John Hancock favored the removal of British trade restraints. Although many commoners were idealists, most farmers and artisans probably cast their lot with colonial leaders in hopes of bettering their economic lot in a new

republic. Alas, this was not immediately in the offing. Inflation, a postwar recession, the devaluation of the Continental dollar, the contraction of available credit, and newly enacted taxes left some war veterans in worse shape than before the American Revolution, which precipitated such popular revolts as **Shays's Rebellion** and the **Whiskey Rebellion**. Whatever else the American Revolution accomplished, it did not address inequality, impoverishment, or social privilege.

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ANARCHY

DAVID V. HEALY

Anarchy is a political theory developed by numerous political philosophers since the mid-1800s. The word *anarchy* is derived from the Greek $\alpha\nu\alpha\rho\chi i\alpha$, which translates to "without rulers." Anarchy, a political theory also known as anarchism, proposes a system without hierarchy. In anarchist thought, class is not defined solely by social or economic class, but rather by the relationships of **power** present in society. Anarchists criticize any system where a person is subservient to or dependent on another because such constructions place individuals and groups in supposedly unnatural relationships. These unbalanced interactions, according to anarchists, are the root cause of most of society's ills, for the **elites**' exploitation of government, business, and religion is responsible for the destitution of the masses.

Important late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century anarchist theorists such as Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Mikhail Bakunin, and Emma Goldman helped shape the discourse of their times and the course of history. Early anarchists were major competition to communist revolutionaries and thinkers, Marx included. Perhaps the most notable institution of anarchist theory was Catalonia in the 1930s, before Franco's victory in the Spanish Civil War. Catalonian anarchy eventually collapsed, along with the 1871 Paris Commune and many other anarchist societies. Christiania, Denmark, is hailed as the current anarchist model society, though it is threatened by numerous actions on the part of the Danish national government. Once considered a major threat to the power structures of Western society—anarchists were even accused of involvement in the assassination of President William McKinley—anarchism since has waned in society at large.

Anarchist thought today is divided into several specialized fields, each tailored to the beliefs and priorities of various anarchists. Though "pure" anarchy still exists, anarcho-communism, anarcho-syndicalism, and anarcho-primitivism are all common "modified" anarchist theories. Anarcho-communism blends the theories of anarchism and communism, whereas anarcho-syndicalism takes a different course for workers' liberation, positing that workers' organizations (syndicates) hold the ideal for social organization. Anarcho-primitivists believe that the best world possible requires

a rejection of technology, on the assumption that it is technology that destroys the inherent humanity of social interaction and drives us to form hierarchies that inevitably exploit the weak. This strain of anarchism has surfaced in recent protests against **globalization**, particularly at meetings associated with the World Trade Organization. Anarcho-communists have also been active in these protests.

In the course of anarchist development, numerous actions have come to the fore. Perhaps most well-known of anarchist institutions in the United States is the **Industrial Workers of the World**, a union based on the principles of anarchosyndicalism. Also prevalent are Food Not Bombs, a charity supported by anarchists that provides free vegan meals for homeless people worldwide, and Earth First!, a radical environmental group loosely based on anarchist precepts. The Anarchist Black Cross, formed as the anarchist answer to the Red Cross, is involved with assisting prisoners trapped in jails worldwide as well as educating them. Domestically, many cities are home to Infoshops, which are essentially anarchist community centers; inside, gatherings, workshops, and other events take place, while the infoshops themselves also function as libraries, soup kitchens, and bicycle shops.

Today, the biggest challenge facing anarchists is their exclusion from mainstream social discourse. Whereas once their views were common and well-known, few modern North Americans are cognizant of anarchist political theory. Anarchists constantly struggle against a mass public misconception that anarchy is chaos and strife, all the while attempting to have their voice heard. Aside from **Noam Chomsky** and a few others, few anarchists are taken seriously at all, and in the mass media they are essentially voiceless. Some anarchists argue that globalization will re-energize movements, but merely being considered remains elusive at present.

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ANGLOPHILIA

See Europhilia.

ANTI-SEMITISM

MAXINE LEVAREN

Anti-Semitism, prejudice against Jews, has crossed all class lines, not only in the United States, but all over the world. However, the reasons have been different, depending on the times as well as on the economic and social class of the population. Historically, anti-Semitism among Christians was associated with the mistaken belief that the Jews were responsible for Jesus' crucifixion. However, the reasons

ranged from economic and religious to the desire for racial purity and national identity, as well as the need to find a scapegoat when times were perilous.

In medieval Europe, when the church prohibited money lending, Jews were the only ones who were able to lend money to the rulers and nobility. Therefore, they were often targets when debtors were unable to repay their loans. By expelling, terrorizing, or exterminating the Jews, debtors not only were "forgiven" their loans, but also had the opportunity to confiscate Jewish property. By appealing to the fears of the lower class, the nobility were often supported by the uneducated classes.

Because Jews had different customs and were kept in **ghettos** separate from the majority population (not always by their choice), they were often feared and therefore blamed for any catastrophe that occurred. One of the greatest incidents of this was during the Black Plague in the fourteenth century, when the Jews were systematically blamed for the outbreak and were exterminated from several communities as a result. There were also other events and periods of widespread anti-Semitism, such as the Crusades and the Spanish Inquisition, and as late as the mid-twentieth century, the Jews were blamed for the dire economic conditions in Germany, which gave rise to the Nazi Holocaust. These incidents of anti-Semitism also crossed class lines.

For the most part, American anti-Semitism has had less to do with religion than with the concept that Jews were not "white" or that they often supported the "wrong" end of the political spectrum. During Colonial times, the Jewish population, though very small, fully participated in the economic and social life of the community and fought on both sides during the American Revolutionary War. They populated all the colonies and also supported both North and South during the Civil War, which caused outbreaks of anti-Semitism when the Jews were blamed by each side for aiding the other side. In the early twentieth century, Henry Ford, one of the most famous American anti-Semites, was at least partially influenced by an anti-intellectual and politically conservative viewpoint; Jews, as a whole, tended to emphasize education and embrace liberal politics, such as support for organized labor, which certainly was against Ford's political and economic advantage.

Although American anti-Semitism has been less extreme than in many other countries, Jews were often persecuted and were not allowed to vote in some states until the late nineteenth century, and anti-immigration laws enacted in 1924 restricted the number of Jewish immigrants. These laws in the 1930s and 1940s prevented Jews fleeing the Holocaust from entering the United States.

More often, American anti-Semitism was subtle, taking the form of negative stereotypes and discrimination in housing and employment and exclusion from universities, professional organizations, and social clubs. This had the effect of keeping Jews out of the institutions that would allow them to rise to the highest rungs of the social and economic ladder.

The racist **Ku Klux Klan** was also anti-Semitic, based on the desire to maintain American racial purity, because they didn't consider the Jews as Caucasian (note that Roman Catholics were a close third in the groups that the Klan vilified). During the years between World War I and the end of World War II, American anti-Semitism underwent several changes. In the period between the two world wars, several Americans, including aviator Charles Lindbergh and radio demagogue Father Charles E. Coughlin, accused the Jews of pushing American entry into war against Germany. However, in the postwar years, as Americans learned more about

the Holocaust, most people adopted a more sympathetic attitude toward Jews. However, that did not prevent a white-supremacist minority from denying that the Holocaust even occurred.

This attitude was particularly emphasized during the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s, when young Jews openly and visibly supported the breakdown of racial barriers in the South and throughout the nation. Jews were also active in the movement against the Vietnam War and supported many liberal causes, which in some people's minds made them anti-American. Despite heavy Jewish involvement in the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s, some of the more militant black organizations claimed that Jews were responsible for exploiting blacks.

Some of the white and black racist attitudes toward Jews still remain. However, another dimension of this problem has emerged because of the conflicts in the Middle East. Jewish interest groups are sometimes accused of using their lobbying might to create a pro-Israel bias in U.S. foreign policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. For the first time, anti-Semitism has gained a foothold in the American liberal community and on university campuses. Many liberals counter that anti-Zionism (opposition to support of Israel), which is a political stand, should not be equated with anti-Semitism, which is more of a prejudice against a particular group, but their intellectual parsing does little to explain away the overtly anti-Semitic graffiti and hate speech that are on the rise on American campuses.

Modern anti-Semitism is not as closely linked to social class as the religious and economic anti-Semitism of the last two centuries, nor is it as thoroughly institutionalized. It remains, however, a distressing aspect of modern American society.

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ANTITRUST LAWS

ROBERT E. WEIR

Antitrust laws are regulations that, in theory, ensure business competition by setting guidelines about how much of the market any one manufacturer or service provider can control. Those guidelines are artificial standards determined by legislative and judicial action; hence, they tend to be controversial. Some entrepreneurs argue that economic forces, not politics, ought to govern business activity and that most antitrust laws are inefficient and unwarranted regulations that complicate rather than enhance business. The debate over antitrust laws thus overlaps with larger economic and social questions about how best to provide profits for investors and job opportunities for workers.

American antitrust laws developed out of the historical antipathy toward monopolies, which were viewed as aristocratic. Early presidents, especially Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson, saw monopolies as activities that government itself created. This was part of the reasoning behind Jackson's famed veto of the Second

Bank of the United States (B.U.S.). Jackson was anti-monopoly, not anti-bank, and he quickly dispersed government funds from the defunct B.U.S. among various state and private banks.

The **Founding Fathers** did not foresee the rise of large corporations, and thus, the control over enterprises emerging during the **Industrial Revolution** was left to legislators and the courts. According to critics of monopolies, ruinous and predatory competition threatened **capitalism**, though such arguments took some time to gain support, given that laissez-faire business attitudes were strong among the **upper** and **middle classes**. In 1886 the Supreme Court case of *Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad* granted legal corporations many of the same constitutional guarantees as citizens, though it stopped short of calling corporations "persons." Nonetheless, the horizontal integration of firms such as American Tobacco, the rise of vertical monopolies such as Standard Oil, and a rash of state laws led Congress to pass the 1890 Sherman Antitrust Act, which outlawed restraint of trade, backroom price-fixing, trade pools, sweetheart deals, and predatory pricing.

The vagueness of the Sherman Act created as many problems as it solved. The **labor movement** was victimized by it, with some courts ruling that labor unions were illegal restraints of trade. By the **Progressive Era**, many reformers were demanding changes to the Sherman Act on the grounds that it had accomplished little. **Muckraking** studies from writers such as Ida Tarbell, **Upton Sinclair**, **Lincoln Steffens**, and others primed public outrage over corporate abuses, and President **Theodore Roosevelt** led the government charge to break up trusts such as Standard Oil and the Northern Securities Company (contrary to myth, Roosevelt was not opposed to all trusts, only to those he felt abused the public).

Several court decisions affirmed Roosevelt's assault on "bad" trusts and gave greater leeway to applying the Sherman Act. This paved the way for the 1914 Clayton Act, which tightened definitions of illegal business practices and exempted labor unions from restraint of trade charges. That same year, Congress created the Federal Trade Commission and empowered it to define unfair business practices. (FTC powers were expanded by the 1938 Wheeler-Lea amendment.) The 1936 Robinson-Patman Act required sellers to offer the same price to all buyers, thus ending pricing practices that favored large retailers (some critics charge that **Wal-Mart** currently violates the act). In 1950 the Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act ended the practice of hidden monopolies by forbidding businesses from buying the assets of their competitors to create the illusion of competition.

Antitrust attitudes prevailed in Congress for much of the post–World War II era. In 1980, however, **Ronald Reagan** was elected president. Reagan took power in the midst of a recession, and he and his advisors argued that slashing taxes and unleashing American business were the best ways to stimulate economic growth. In cooperation with the business community, the Reagan administration attacked "needless" business regulations and argued that it was acceptable for large corporations and the upper classes to reap the bulk of tax cuts because they would reinvest their savings and create new jobs for the middle and **lower classes**. In truth, **trickle-down** economics created very few new jobs, and most of these were lowwage positions.

Reagan's defense of big business was given an unintentional boost when, in 1984, courts ruled that AT&T controlled too much of the nation's Bell System telephone

and communications network. The chaos that initially ensued when smaller "Baby Bells" were spun off from AT&T seemed to signal that some monopolies benefited the public. This is much the approach taken by Microsoft, which was deemed to have violated the Sherman Act in a 2002 ruling. In addition, Microsoft contends that misuse of antitrust laws stifles creativity and invention.

Since the 1980s Congress and the White House have been less likely to stop corporate mergers, though the Clinton administration introduced mild standards that required consideration of the impact on consumers and prices before approving mergers. The Clinton standards, though weak, were largely ignored after George W. **Bush** assumed the presidency in 2001. Moreover, **globalization** complicates the antitrust debate because international cooperation is needed to apply U.S. regulations outside the United States' borders.

Most antitrust debates hinge on business efficiency and profitability rather than class or social-justice implications. Although many theorists in the **Chicago School of Economics** and their conservative allies continue to tout the virtues of unregulated big business, the track record for job creation is poor when one looks at large corporations. In the 1990s small businesses of twenty or fewer employees accounted for about 75 percent of all new jobs. As late as 2003, about 60 percent of all American workers were employed by such firms.

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APPALACHIA

BRENDA K. BRETZ

Appalachia is defined as a geographic region within the United States that roughly matches the eponymous mountain range in the eastern United States. Over the years, the exact definition of which states are included has changed depending on federal definition and legislative need. Currently, the federal definition includes 410 mountainous counties in twelve states from New York to Mississippi. Appalachia has consistently appeared on various lists as an area of widespread rural **poverty**, with 15.4 percent of its 23 million people officially defined as impoverished. As federal legislation has been proposed to deal with the economic, environmental, and social problems of the region, the boundaries have shifted and expanded. Most attempts to create agencies or organizing entities focusing on the Appalachian region have failed because these require joint ventures that cross state borders and that often conflict or compete with legislative jurisdiction and power held only by the federal government.

The area was the first to be identified as a unique subculture within the United States that has its own folkways encompassing distinctive cultural, religious, and social practices. The region was "discovered" during the last third of the nineteenth century, when railroad companies, mining operations, and people who were not

born within the region began moving into the area to exploit natural resources such as minerals and timber. During this time, the United States was in the middle of an **Industrial Revolution**, and those who came in contact with the natives of this region were cognizant of the way in which the peoples in this area held firm to a slower pace and differing values, ideals, and lifestyles. The region as a separate entity within the United States was attractive to those who had a nostalgic viewpoint and who idealized a simplistic culture of the past, and it proved a trove for early folklorists. In the view of others, the region represented the dangers of isolationism and bred provincialism that fostered backwardness and poverty.

The region became known and defined in particular ways, many of which are romanticized myths. As the setting for novels such as *The Trial of the Lonesome Pine* and *The Little Shepherd of Kingdom Come* in the early twentieth century by Kentucky writer John Fox Jr., the region was described and popularized as different from the rest of the United States. These popular novels created the belief that the region was distinctive and beyond the American mainstream. Such stereotypes and the deliberate creation of Appalachian culture persisted throughout the twentieth century; some parts of this culture—such as handicrafts and "hillbilly" music—were aggressively displayed and marketed. It was also a destination for agents of the **New Deal** Federal Writers' Project seeking to record "fading" traditions.

Debate rages as to whether the Appalachian region is or ever was truly a distinct culture within the United States. Those from outside the region created images of Appalachia dwellers that vacillated between romanticism and primitivism, both of which were rooted in stereotype. The creation of culture by those from within the borders, such as John Fox at the beginning of the twentieth century and Harriet Arnow at the end, perpetuated and legitimized stereotypes of the folk crafts, music, and behaviors of the people who lived there. Numerous Appalachian musicians have traded on romantic stereotypes to sell records and concert tickets.

Detractors viewed the culture and the people living there as deviant and created images of them as savage, vicious, crude, and cruel. This belief became so successful that by the twentieth century, everyone "knew" that mountain folk carried on a tradition of feuding—in the vein of the Hatfield–McCoy clashes of the late nineteenth century—and that they engaged in illegal smuggling and moonshine brewing. Other deviant behaviors included backwoods religious practices and the brutal way in which the men treated each other, their wives, and their children. Comic strips such as *L'il Abner* carried these messages to the masses.

Ironically, when individuals from the Appalachian region migrated to northern U.S. cities to escape the poverty and high **unemployment** of the region, they had to be taught their own "culture." Many did not know how to make the crafts that were "known" to be native and ubiquitous to the region, calling into question whether such activities were really distinctive to Appalachian culture. Still, Appalachians migrating to cities such as Detroit to work in the auto industry found that their **accents** and carriage marked them as exotic.

By the 1950s romantic images of Appalachia had largely given way to deprivation and isolation theories. The region was the site of numerous bloody and vicious miner **strikes** in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and urban newspapers reporting these conflicts tended to emphasize the remoteness of coal-patch hamlets and the backwardness of residents. (The journalists also conveniently ignored

things such as the sophistication of United Mine Workers unionization campaigns or the stellar academic qualifications of instructors at institutions such as the Highlander Folklife Center.) To optimists caught up in the rampant consumerism and economic expansion of the post–World War II era, Appalachia represented a rare repository of American poverty that was quickly being eradicated elsewhere. Those illusions were shattered by writers such as **Michael Harrington**, but **Great Society** programs during the 1960s often treated Appalachia as if it was distinctive, and numerous programs were earmarked at alleviating its special brand of poverty.

There remains a tendency to consider Appalachia as a unique cultural and social region or as the poster child for rural poverty. The latter view has, perhaps, more merit than the first, given the area's persistent high unemployment levels.

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APPEAL TO REASON

JOHN A. GRONBECK-TEDESCO

Appeal to Reason was a weekly **socialist** periodical in publication from 1895 to 1922. Founded by J. A. Wayland, Appeal began in 1895 in Kansas City, Missouri, and in 1897 moved to Girard, Kansas. Wayland enlisted help from a journalist from Missouri, Fred Warren, who became the paper's managing editor. Appeal was the most successful radical serial in its day; by 1913 it had reached a peak circulation of 760,000 weekly subscriptions. Often a target for governmental censorship, Appeal solicited the help of thousands of men and women—the "salesmen army"—to distribute the publication around the nation.

As an organ of the Socialist Party of America, *Appeal* addressed issues related to industrialization, agriculture, the **labor movement**, and social activism from a left-wing perspective. It often advocated equal distribution of wealth, supported workers' rights, and opposed **capitalism**. The paper flourished in a rapidly changing culture in which the transition from an agricultural to industrial economy and the influx of millions of **immigrants** caused a new social awareness of economic inequality and poor working conditions. The ills of America were deemed the dire by-products of capitalism, with big business the leading scapegoat for social problems. Here the political woes of a new Midwestern radicalism morphed from populism to socialism, which produced an audience of agrarians and urbanites alike. Covered in *Appeal*'s pages were **muckraking** articles that discussed **strikes**, **poverty**, and urban unrest. These invectives took the form of cartoons, columns, poetry, and opinions. *Appeal* was also a venue for women's rights. With women making up a significant portion of its staff, *Appeal* formed a

"woman's department" that published news and editorials on suffrage, employment, and home life.

Appeal was an influential magnet for left-wing politics. It was central to campaigns for socialist candidates, including the five-time presidential contender on the Socialist ticket, **Eugene Debs**. The paper published a host of writers, well-known and anonymous, who shared their radical views on current political and social problems of the day. Contributors included **Jack London**, **Upton Sinclair**, and Helen Keller. Also appearing in the publication's pages were the works of **Edward Bellamy**, Karl **Marx**, and **Charlotte Perkins Gilman**.

The political climate surrounding World War I finally caused the paper's demise. Like many radical publications, *Appeal* was federally censored and lost credibility in the new postwar culture.

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ARMORIES

ROBERT E. WEIR

Armories are sites where military ordnance are stored and troops such as state and National Guard soldiers drill. They are common throughout the United States and evoke little comment today, though in the past, they were often symbols of class struggle.

Because weapons and ordnance were stored in armories, rebel groups sometimes targeted them. During the **Shays's Rebellion** of 1786–87, the attempt to capture the Springfield, Massachusetts, armory was the pivotal battle of the conflict. Likewise, John Brown's brief capture of the federal armory at Harpers Ferry, Virginia (now West Virginia), in 1859 is widely regarded as a precipitating event of the American Civil War.

The heyday of armory building occurred in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Most Americans are surprised to learn that many armories were built not to train troops protecting America from invasion, but to offer protection to the **upper** and **middle classes** from perceived threats of a **working-class** revolution. For example, wealthy families such as the **Astors** and **Vanderbilts** donated money to build some of New York City's twenty-nine armories because they were alarmed by the civic unrest of the Civil War anti-draft riots that convulsed the city in 1863.

The upper and middle classes also grew frightened by other events, both home and abroad. When French radicals seized control of the city of Paris and declared the Paris Commune in 1871, it engendered fear in the United States. So too did sensationalized press coverage of alleged **Molly Maguires** activity in northeast Pennsylvania. But it was the nationwide 1877 rail strikes that truly struck terror

into the hearts of many **elites**. Numerous state militias were turned against workers, and President Rutherford B. Hayes used federal troops to quash the strikes. The strikes were blamed on **anarchists**, **communists**, and immigrant radicals, though said groups played a very small role overall. In the wake of 1877, a spate of fortress-like red brick armories were built.

Joint state and federal control of a professional National Guard was not finalized until the Militia Act of 1903. Prior to this, the federal standing military was small, states usually raised their own militias, and governors could call out the Guard on their own initiative (although governors retain



Cranston Street Armory, Providence, Rhode Island. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

the right to do so today, the Guard can be activated by federal fiat as well). Armories were often the site of class conflict. Troops that were activated to quell labor disputes, such as the lockouts at Homestead Steel in 1892 and Pullman in 1894, were housed and drilled at local armories. Many workers came to associate armories with repression, an association that lingered into the twentieth century. Boston armories were used to train impromptu militias recruited from Harvard and the city's criminal element during the 1919 Boston police strike, just as Seattle armories were used by militias that crushed a citywide **general strike** that same year. Members of the radical **Industrial Workers of the World** regarded armories and American Legion halls as physical manifestations of worker repression. Well into the 1930s, many members of the working class held negative opinions of armories, having grown accustomed to viewing armories as the site at which anti-union forces gathered.

One can largely credit **New Deal** labor legislation and World War II with changing the way working-class Americans came to view armories. Today, most modern armories are patriotic symbols, and many of their nineteenth-century predecessors have been torn down or gentrified.

Suggested Reading

Jerry Cooper, The Rise of the National Guard: The Evolution of the American Militia, 1865–1920, 2002; Robert Fogelson, America's Armories: Architecture, Society, and Public Order, 1989; James Whisker, The Rise and Decline of the American Militia System, 1999.

ARONOWITZ, STANLEY (1933–)

MICHAEL A. VASTOLA

Stanley Aronowitz is professor of sociology and urban education at the City University of New York Graduate Center, where he has taught since 1983. He is the author of over twenty books on class, culture, sociology of science, and politics,

and he has published more than two hundred articles and reviews in publications such as *The Nation* and *The American Journal of Sociology*. Aronowitz earned a BA from the New School for Social Research in 1968 and a PhD from the Union Graduate School in 1975.

Aside from his influential academic contributions to the topic of labor history, institutional critiques of the university systems in the United States, and a pioneering analysis of the production of knowledge in the hard sciences—what is typically called "science studies"—Aronowitz has also worked in factories in New York and New Jersey and has organized for the clothing, oil, and chemical workers' unions. Additionally, he served as associate director of the group Mobilization for Youth on New York's Lower East Side and was director of the first experimental public high school in New York, the Park East High School in East Harlem. In 2002 he led the fight to maintain the official ballot status of the Green Party in New York State and ran for governor on that ticket the same year. He is also a member of the executive council of his university's union, the Professional Staff Congress.

Aronowitz's reasoned critiques of the **capitalist** political economy include influential works on labor history such as *False Promises* (1973) and *The Jobless Future* (1994). *Science as Power* (1988) is an examination and criticism of the relationship between ideology and the institutionalization of scientific practices, and *The Knowledge Factory* (2000) takes a similar approach to the general corporate university structure. His recent *Just Around the Corner: The Paradox of the Jobless Economy* (2005) is an analysis of the changing relationship between job creation and economic growth in the global economy. Though no single book can be called his magnum opus, and they cover an array of distinct topics, each contains a substantial critique of class domination and illegitimate hierarchies within the capitalist economy. Consequently, Aronowitz's greatest strength as an intellectual lies in the exemplary range of his ideas and in his ability to effectively link topics as seemingly disparate as pedagogy or institutional critique to broader issues of class inequality.

Unfortunately, Aronowitz's more recent fame has come at the expense of the reputation of *Social Text*, a journal he founded with Fredric Jameson and John Brenkman. *Social Text*, which took as its initial subtitle "Theory, Culture, Ideology," was intended to do the work of interrogating the critical intersections between those notions, but in a distinctly post-Marxist manner. For instance, the concept of culture was seen as central in its own right, rather than being determined by and subordinate to the economy. Ideology was also treated as something more complex than the orthodox **Marxist** conception of the term as simply **false consciousness**. Recuperating those concepts for new radical theories was something Aronowitz had been doing for some time in his own work. But the political focus of the journal was assailed by a remarkably successful hoax perpetuated by Alan Sokal, a physicist and self-described "Old Leftist" who doubted the political efficacy of such seemingly abstract theorizing.

Sokal's deep belief in scientific objectivity compelled him to write an article that elaborately caricatured what he perceived as the abuses of scholars like Aronowitz, who had pioneered the critique of how scientific knowledge is produced. In fact, after being published in a 1996 issue of the journal, Sokal revealed that his article was manufactured, obscure, jargon-filled nonsense, and he cited

Aronowitz's association with the journal as a main reason for his choosing to publish the article in *Social Text*. Aronowitz exposed Sokal's fallacies in the radical political journal *Dissent*, but despite his persuasive rebuttal, the hoax continues to unjustly tarnish the reputations of many of its targets.

Suggested Reading

Stanley Aronowitz, False Promises, 1973; Aronowitz, Science as Power, 1988; Aronowitz, Just Around the Corner: The Paradox of the Jobless Economy, 2005.

ART

ROBERT E. WEIR

Although few people give it much thought, social class often determines the content of art, the type of art consumed, and how art is valued.

Art made by common people has traditionally been labeled "folk art" rather than "fine art," especially if it is an object whose purpose is functional as well as decorative, such as a weather vane, animal decoy, cane, or quilt. Untrained painters are commonly dubbed "primitivists" and their efforts little appreciated until members of the **middle** and **upper classes** decide that the works of painters such as Erastus Salisbury Field (1805–1900) or Anna Mary Robertson "Grandma" Moses (1860–1961) or of a carver such as Wilhelm Schimmel (1817–90) are worthy of collection. Even when the products of common people show up in museums or fetch large prices at art auctions, they are usually viewed as whimsical rather than fine art or **high culture**.

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, farmers and laborers occasionally appeared as the subjects of professionally trained painters and sculptors, though their depictions were likely to be romanticized or allegorical. Winslow Homer's Morning Bell (1873) is typical of the way nineteenth-century painters set their work in idyllic rural settings. It stands in marked contrast to the way a handful of painters such as Thomas Anshultz, Robert Kohler, and John Ferguson Weir depicted labor as gritty and capital-labor relations as contested. In works such as Gun Foundry (1866) and Ironworkers-Noontime (1881), Weir and Anshultz showed industrial work as dirty and dangerous, and Kohler presented labor conflict in works such as The Strike (1886) and The Socialist (1885).

More notable than any of these images, however, is the relative absence of the **working classes** in art. Trained artists were more likely to render landscapes, portraits of the middle and upper classes, allegorical works, and high-society life. Industrial workers and farmers were most likely to be seen on items such as fraternal-order certificates, on trade-union posters, and in graphic images appearing in non-mainstream newspapers and journals.

The advent of practical photography in the late nineteenth century played a big role in diversifying the subjective gaze of artists. **Jacob Riis**'s photos in *How the Other Half Lives* (1890) depicted shocking views of New York City **poverty**, particularly in immigrant neighborhoods. His work paved the way for Lewis Hine

(1874–1930), whose photos of arriving immigrants, **child laborers**, and industrial laborers shocked many Americans, though they were rendered with great humanity.

In the early twentieth century, a small group of painters such as Stuart Davis, George Luks, William Glackens, Everett Shinn, and John Sloan also began to show tenement life, work, and capital—labor relations in a less-than-flattering light. Their work so unsettled some members of the pre—World War I middle class that the work was derisively deemed "ashcan" quality, a term the artists came to embrace in describing their approach. Some of them were members of the **Socialist Party**, the **Industrial Workers of the World**, and other radical organizations and found outlets for their artistic expression in journals such as *The Masses* and *The Industrial Worker*.

The **Great Depression** was largely responsible for making common people the center of artistic expression to a far greater degree than ever before (or since). **New Deal** programs such as the Public Works of Art Program, the Works Progress Administration, and the Farm Security Administration subsidized muralists, photographers, painters, and sculptors, and the overall unsettledness of the 1930s stimulated scores of others to express themselves artistically. Many commentators say that a **proletarian** art ethos dominated the 1930s and that a documentary impulse held sway among photographers. Among the many artists whose work dealt with common people were muralists Thomas Hart Benton and Diego Rivera; photographers Margaret Bourke-White, Walker Evans, Dorothea Lange, Russell Lee, Arthur Rothstein, Ben Shahn, and John Vachon; and painters Philip Evergood, William Gropper, Alexandre Hogue, Rockwell Kent, Jacob Lawrence, Alice Neel, and Ben Shahn. Numerous sculptures, some of which were unsigned, appeared in public plazas and parks and in the details of skyscrapers.

As during the Civil War, the Spanish-American War, and World War I, photographers, graphic artists, and painters also depicted common people during World War II. Perhaps the most notable image to come from the 1940s was J. Howard Miller's "Rosie the Riveter" poster, which became iconic and led to spin-offs by many others, most notably Norman Rockwell. Photographers also captured some of the postwar strikes, and photo magazines such as *Life* and *Look* printed numerous images of everyday life. In addition, African American artists built upon traditions established during the Harlem Renaissance (ca. 1920–30) and portrayed the black experience in paintings and photographs.

To a large extent, however, American art of the 1950s was becoming less representational, more personal, and less likely to tackle social issues. Outside of documentary photography, common people were once again sentimentalized—as in the graphic works of Rockwell—or largely ignored. This became particularly obvious in the 1960s and 1970s, when photographers including Earl Dotter, John Kouns, Eliott Landy, Jerome Liebling, Charles Moore, and Milton Rogovin captured the Civil Rights Movement, antiwar protests, and debased labor conditions in ways almost entirely ignored by the painters who were favored by collectors, museums, and the avant-garde.

The current disconnect between art trends and the shared experiences of most Americans has, in the past several decades, exacerbated long-simmering tensions over defining art, portraying it in public, and allocating museum funds to purchase new art. Artist-patron relations date from ancient times, and collecting what is dubbed fine art is nearly always the pursuit of the rich. These private relations seldom trouble most people, but when artists and others who seek to dictate taste place their work before the public, class tensions can emerge.

There have been numerous community struggles over what some view as obscene content. From the 1980s on, the National Endowment of the Arts has been under conservative pressure to deny funding to artists whose work is deemed incendiary, pornographic, or unpatriotic. This reached fever pitch in 1987, when Andres Serrano displayed *Piss Christ*, a crucifix immersed in urine. In 1990 an exhibit that included several homoerotic photographs by Robert Mapplethorpe led to the arrest of Dennis Barrie, the director of Cincinnati's Museum of Contemporary Art. Such high-profile figures as former New York City mayor Rudolph Giuliani joined the chorus of those demanding more public accountability in funding and displaying controversial art.

Critics of unsettling art are often cavalierly dismissed as puritanical or unlettered by elites and the avant-garde, many of whom take refuge behind the Bill of Rights and assert the right to freedom of expression. One need not take a position on censorship, however, to realize that other issues are at stake. Many Americans simply dislike the art favored by elites. According to a well-publicized 1995 survey of tastes and preferences conducted by artists Vitaly Komar and Alex Melamid, a vast majority—64 percent—of Americans prefer "traditional" art, and just 25 percent preferred anything they deemed "modern." They were especially dismissive of abstract and nonrepresentational art. When pressed further, the American public expressed preference for content that included landscape, wild animals, historical figures, and the color blue.

Cutting-edge artists—including the French Impressionists, who now score high in public-preference polls—are often out of synch with mass society in their own lifetimes. Artists and art critics assert that artists must be free to express themselves independently of public taste. Again, such assertions become problematic when museums and curators cross the private–public boundaries. In recent years, the public reacted negatively to the New York Public Library's secret sale of Asher Durand's nineteenth-century masterpiece *Kindred Spirits*, and the Boston Museum of Fine Arts has taken heat for plans to sell Americans paintings and rent some of its Monets in order to buy more contemporary art. When many Bostonians voiced their dislike for pieces the museum planned to purchase, controversy grew so intense that directors were forced to seek a compromise that saved (some) works by Gilbert Stuart and other American genre painters.

Social class also expresses itself in purchases of art. Aside from high-ticket art auctions whose works are bought by foundations, museums, and wealthy collectors, the majority of the public (60 percent) tend to buy art they like rather than what they feel is collectable or important. In the Komar and Melamid poll, another 34 percent chose art that matched their decor. This, plus the penchant for indulging public preference, helps explain the popularity of Thomas Kinkade, whose production-line works are sold in nearly 300 retail outlets, mostly in malls. Again, critics may scoff, but in 1999, Kinkade sold over \$126 million worth of paintings, mostly to members of the lower middle class and upper **lower class**. Even members of the upper middle class, who often pride themselves on refined

taste, are more likely to purchase the works of regional and local artists whose works they enjoy than the works of those who are pushing art's boundaries. Across the nation, the word "art" is more often associated with graffiti, favored pieces of jewelry, mass-produced posters of works from established artists, bric-a-brac, porcelain collectables, or even bright paint on a velvet background than with work by those viewed as "serious" artists.

In summary, the link between wealth and so-called fine art is widespread and timeless, and art frequently mirrors the class dynamics of its society. Students of social class can thus look to art to gain insight into the consumption patterns, cultural battles, and political concerns of any given period.

Suggested Reading

Philip Foner and Reinhard Schultz, *The Other America: Art and the Labour Movement in the United States*, 1985; David Halle, *Inside Culture: Art and Class in the American Home*, 1993; Vitaly Komar and Alex Melamid, "The Most Wanted Paintings" (http://www.diacenter.org/index.html).

ASCRIPTION

See Achievement and ascription.

ASIAN AMERICANS

ROBERT E. WEIR

"Asian Americans" is an imprecise term applied largely to immigrants from southeastern Asia, especially those from China, Indochina, Japan, Korea, the Philippines, and Taiwan. It is generally not applied to those from the Indian subcontinent, as there were relatively few immigrants from India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh until the 1970s. Like many terms that treat ethnicity in a collective fashion, the label *Asian American* oversimplifies and makes specious assumptions. Asian Americans come from a variety of backgrounds, represent numerous cultural and religious traditions, and can be found across all lines of social **stratification**.

Americans originally viewed Asians as exotic when contact was limited largely to trade and cultural exchanges. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, thriving trade with China often led the **upper classes** to consume Chinese silk, porcelain, lacquerware, furniture, and artifacts. In 1854 Commodore Matthew Perry negotiated a treaty with Japan that had a similar impact for Japanese goods. Fascination soon gave way to revulsion when Chinese and Japanese immigrants began to arrive on American shores, lured by the post-1849 Gold Rush and opportunities to work on railroads. By the time of the Civil War, there was growing discrimination against Asians, especially the Chinese. This discrimination intensified in the 1870s with vicious verbal and physical attacks on Asian immigrants in ethnic

enclaves in cities such as Denver, San Francisco, and Seattle. Many white Americans began to demand an end to Asian immigration. The **working class** was especially susceptible to anti-Asian outbursts because it believed that Asian gang labor was undercutting wages. In 1882 Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act, which dramatically curtailed immigration. In 1908 the so-called Gentleman's Agreement with Japan placed similar restrictions on Japanese immigration. The animus against the groups lasted into the 1930s for Chinese and into the 1950s for Japanese. Thousands of the latter had their property seized and were placed in internment camps during World War II as a response to the bombing of Pearl Harbor. Japanese Americans were seen as potential spies, even though earlier immigration restrictions meant that most were second- or third-generation Americans who had little contact with Japan. (The Chinese fared better during these years because China was invaded by Japan and was a putative U.S. ally during the war.)

Filipinos make up the largest group of Americans of Asian descent. The United States acquired the Philippines as a result of the 1898 Spanish-American War. Attempts to assert direct imperialist control over the islands failed because of the opposition of nationalist groups who battled U.S. forces between 1901 and 1913. The United States granted the islands increasing degrees of autonomy until the Philippines obtained full independence in 1946, though it retains deep economic ties to the United States. This troubled history contributed to the discrimination that Filipino immigrants to the United States experienced, though its intensity did not match that directed toward the Chinese or Japanese, and intermarriage with Caucasians took place in greater numbers. Nonetheless, although many Filipinos assimilated, there were also large numbers clustered in low-wage agricultural work. They did not receive the attention given to **Hispanics**, but a large number of Filipino migrant workers were involved in Cesar Chavez's United Farm Workers union movement in the 1960s.

Koreans began arriving in the United States in large numbers because of the Korean War (1950–53), just as large numbers of Cambodians, Laotians, and Vietnamese immigrated to the United States during the Vietnam War, whose active phase for America was between 1965 and 1975. Victories by communist forces in all three places also led many to flee from the late 1970s on. The media dubbed many of these refugees "boat people" in reference to the makeshift vessels on which many ventured toward sanctuary (untold numbers died in such efforts). Smaller numbers of Thais and Burmese have come to the United States in the past three decades, the former mostly for economic and educational opportunity, the latter to escape a repressive military junta. Malaysians and Indonesians have also come, though in smaller numbers than those from the former French Indochina. Indonesian immigration tends to wax and wane according to cycles of political turmoil.

By the 1960s Asian Americans were often touted as "model minorities" because of their high levels of educational attainment, occupational successes, stable family patterns, and propensity for becoming U.S. citizens. By 1990 the average Asian American family income surpassed that of Caucasians, a situation often attributed to the high value Asian Americans place on education. According to 1997 data, 66 percent of all Asian American workers held **white-collar** jobs as opposed to 61 percent of all white workers. By 2000 half of all Asian Americans over the age of

twenty-five held at least a bachelor's degree, and about 19 percent had advanced degrees, versus 29 percent of whites with a four-year degree and just 9 percent with graduate degrees.

Figures such as these often obscure other issues. Although it is true that many Asian Americans have excelled, their **poverty** rate is two and a half times higher than that of whites. The data also harm certain groups by treating Asian Americans as a unified whole. Family income, for example, is skewed by the fact that those of Japanese, Taiwanese, and Filipino ancestry have, on the average, extraordinarily high incomes. By contrast, those of Chinese and Southeast Asian backgrounds have incomes roughly half of that of the average Caucasian family. Likewise, though about 58 percent of all Asian Americans will attend at least some college, high school dropout rates for Cambodians, Laotians, and Hmong are higher than that of the general population. In general, Asian Americans who came to America before 1980 have done much better than those arriving after. This improvement is due to pronounced differences in social class and occupation, with the pre-1980 group being better-educated, whereas post-1980 arrivals are more likely to come from a rural peasant background.

Treating Asian Americans as model minorities also serves to obscure nativist discrimination directed at them. Asian Americans tend to live in areas with high concentrations of others of Asian background, partly in response to the cultural distance many feel in their relationships with other ethnic groups. Even high achievement sometimes leads to discrimination. In California, for instance, the high number of Asian American college graduates has led some to call for graduate school quotas, especially for competitive medical and law schools whose slots have gone to high-achieving Asian Americans rather than whites. Some Asian Americans also charge that **Ivy League** schools discriminate against them. Whereas Asian Americans make up 41 percent of all University of California— Berkeley undergraduates and over 50 percent at other UCal universities, they average just 15 to 19 percent in most Ivy League schools because of in-place target quotas. Discrimination against Asian Americans often receives little public attention, in part because their diversity tends to mitigate against the formation of high-profile civil rights groups such as those formed by African Americans or Native Americans.

According to the 2000 census, there are about 13.5 million Asian Americans in the United States, about 4.2 percent of the total population. Western states have the highest concentrations of Asian Americans, with California leading the way. New York City, however, has more Asian Americans than any other metropolitan area. The overall future of Asian Americans looks promising. Recent figures reveal that an equal percentage of Asian Americans and Caucasians view themselves as **middle class**. Some Asian Americans, particularly those of Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Laotian ancestry, argue that the model minority stereotype is harmful because it blinds policymakers and other Americans to deep social problems within their ranks.

Suggested Reading

Stacey Lee, Unraveling the "Model Minority" Stereotype, 1996; Ronald Takaki, Strangers from a Distant Shore: A History of Asian Americans, 1998; Meyer Weinberg, Asian American Education, 1997.

Assimilation

MAXINE LEVAREN

Assimilation is the absorption of a minority group into a majority population. It has always been an important way for **immigrants** and other disenfranchised groups to improve their position and social class, but it does not come unencumbered.

New immigrants, with minor exceptions, have generally been on the bottom rungs of society for several reasons. Often, those immigrants who come to the United States to improve their economic position or to escape political or religious oppression in their native countries leave their homes with few material or economic resources. These economic hardships and the fact that their customs are incompatible with American culture make it difficult to integrate with the majority population and rise in society. Notable exceptions are cases in which highly educated or economically advantaged people have arrived. Often, these groups have been welcomed into society and have been able to maintain the social class that they had in their native countries. However, in immigrant groups that stay cohesive into subsequent generations, there is less assimilation, even when people rise economically.

Besides class, an important factor that influences assimilation is **race**. When people are racially distinguishable, as in the case of **Asian Americans**, African Americans, and **Hispanics**, assimilation is considerably more difficult. Even as people enter the professions, become entrepreneurs, and acquire wealth, prejudice from the majority population can inhibit assimilation. This consequently enforces the separatism of these groups once they leave the workplace, where they are forced to integrate into the majority population in order to be successful.

Many new European immigrants in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries did not easily assimilate into American culture. Adults who arrived often had difficulty learning a new language and adapting to a culture. In addition, the new culture was strange and sometimes viewed as immoral, especially regarding the relationship between parents and children. Therefore, these new arrivals tended to stay in **ethnic enclaves** with other immigrants from their original country, where they could speak their own language, follow their own customs, and establish their own houses of worship. Within these enclaves, they often formed their own social structures, where immigrants with more money or education rose to the top of the social structure. Since many did not have professions, they earned their living through manual labor. For example, in New York, many Italian immigrants were active in the construction trades, and Jewish immigrants gravitated toward the garment industry. Consequently, these immigrants were also active in labor unions, which further alienated them from the upper classes.

Assimilation and the consequent rise in class usually happen in later generations, as children of first-generation immigrants go to American schools, speak English without a foreign accent, and readily absorb American customs. This sometimes leads to conflicts between children and their parents, who don't understand each other. Unlike their parents, second- and third-generation Americans have friends and associates of many different backgrounds, live in mixed neighborhoods, and are open to marrying people of different national backgrounds, religions, and races. The cost, however, is that fully assimilated individuals often reject their cultures of

origin, a factor that intensifies intergenerational conflict and makes it difficult for subsequent generations to recover their heritages.

Despite generational conflicts, most immigrants take great pride in watching their children assimilate. By learning the language and becoming educated, they become qualified for **white-collar** jobs; civil service professions such as policing and firefighting; and professional vocations, such as law, medicine, and education. These children often act as interpreters for their parents, helping them navigate through the linguistic and cultural roadblocks they encounter.

Among second- and third-generation immigrants, assimilation is only sometimes a melting pot, where newcomers are completely absorbed in the prevailing culture and social structure. Often, it is more like a tossed salad, where individual ethnic groups maintain features of their own ethnic identities and social structures, such as food, festivals, and faith, while at the same time operating within the majority culture.

Suggested Reading

Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, Beyond the Melting Pot: The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians, and Irish of New York City, 1970; Tamar Jacoby, ed., Reinventing the Melting Pot: The New Immigrants and What It Means to Be American, 2004.

ASTOR, JOHN JACOB (July 17, 1763–March 29, 1848)

ROBERT E. WEIR

John Jacob Astor was an early American capitalist and the patriarch of one of the new nation's richest families. The Astors are a prime example of a family that some label an American patrician class.

Astor was born in Waldorf, Baden, Germany, the fourth son of a butcher. An elder brother, George, moved to London, where he manufactured musical instruments. John Jacob joined him in London and learned English there. In 1784, just one year after the Treaty of Paris ended the American Revolution, John Jacob Astor immigrated to New York City. Legend holds that he learned the fur trade that soon enriched him from a fellow German immigrant while in passage to New York, though this story may be apocryphal. Astor initially worked as the New York agent for his brother's musical instrument business before working for a Quaker furrier. Sometime around 1785, he opened his own shop. He also married the former Sarah Todd, who was said to possess equally sound business sense.

It was a propitious time to get into the fur trade. Not only was demand for beaver and other pelts high, but the 1794 Jay Treaty between the United States and Britain had eased tensions between the two nations and had opened sections of the Ohio Valley, Great Lakes region, and Canada to trappers. His major competitor was the Hudson Bay Company, but Astor entered into direct negotiations with Native tribes to supply pelts. Soon, Astor had a string of trading forts stretching from the upper Great Lakes to the Pacific. Historians studying Native Americans have demonstrated that Astor trading posts greatly disrupted traditional Native American life, often turning erstwhile allies into competitive enemies and creating exchange networks that reduced the tribes' self-sufficiency. Astor, however, prospered. By 1800

his net worth had surpassed \$250,000 (more than \$2.7 million in today's dollars), and he began shipping furs to China in exchange for tea, sandalwood, and luxury items that he sold to the fashionable set back in the United States. Between 1800 and 1817 he was able to trade in ports controlled by the British East India Company, despite mounting tensions between the United States and Britain.

Astor's American Fur Company suffered when President Thomas Jefferson enacted the Embargo Act of 1807, which curtailed trade between the two nations, and the War of 1812 placed further restraints on Astor's burgeoning fur monopoly. By then, however, he had begun to diversify, with holdings in real estate and securities purchases. The war's end in 1817 led to renewed trade when the government enacted protectionist policies that essentially granted Astor the monopoly he had long sought. He also realized a huge profit from his securities purchases and from real estate transactions. His second son, William Blackhouse Astor, built more than 700 stores and buildings in New York, greatly adding to a growing family fortune.

By the 1830s John Jacob Astor was a semiretired philanthropist who patronized libraries, cultural institutions, the scholarly pursuits of John James Audubon, and the literary endeavors of Edgar Allen Poe. Before his death in 1848, Astor's personal fortune of \$20,000,000 had made him the richest man in America.

Astor's offspring further enriched the family coffers, and the Astor family was as well-known in England as in America. Several Astor family members obtained aristocratic titles in England, including Baron Waldorf Astor (1879–1952), a member of Parliament; Viscountess Nancy Witcher Astor (1879–1964), the first woman to sit in Parliament; and Baron John Jacob Astor IV (1886–1971), who owned *The Times* of London. Like many rich Americans of the nineteenth century, the Americanborn Astors often adopted English mannerisms, cultivated an air of sophistication, and maintained an exclusive lifestyle isolated from fellow citizens. Scholars seeking to refute the notion that America escaped aristocratic trappings often point to families like the Astors to bolster their argument, although critics counter that inherited wealth and affected lifestyles make families such as the Astors de facto nobility. The Astors remain a rich and philanthropic family, though in 2006, allegations circulated that 104-year-old Brooke Astor, who once headed the Astor Foundation, has been reduced to living in squalor.

Suggested Reading

John D. Haeger, John Jacob Astor: Business and Finance in the Early Republic, 1991; Axel Madsen, John Jacob Astor: America's First Multimillionaire, 2001; Jack Weatherford, Native Roots: How the Indians Enriched America, 1991.

Louis Auchincloss (September 27, 1917–)

ROBERT E. WEIR

Louis Stanton Auchincloss is a novelist, short-story writer, essayist, and retired lawyer. His fiction is often compared with that of **Henry James** and **Edith Wharton** because of its emphasis on the urban patriciate, **WASP** families, and the manners and social conventions of **socialites**.

Auchincloss writes extensively about the world of which he has been a part. He was born into a wealthy family and received **private schooling** at Groton Academy and Yale University, before obtaining a law degree at the University of Virginia in 1941. He served in World War II and then settled in New York City, where he joined the prestigious law firm of Hawkins, Delafield, and Wood. He specialized in estate law until his retirement in 1986, but was deeply involved in **philanthropy**, support for cultural institutions, and writing even as he practiced law. His first novel, *The Indifferent Children*, was published in 1947, and his 1964 novel, *The Rector of Justin*, was a best seller. In all, Auchincloss has published more than sixty books.

Like James and Wharton, Auchincloss deals extensively with the inner life and tensions of the **upper classes**. Some of his works are set in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a time in which the lines between the lower upper class and the upper **middle class** had begun to blur. His books deal with what one might call the **ruling class**, rather than with sociological distinctions between groups; that is, his books deal with people who have access to upper-crust education, money, and **power**. The settings often parallel those of his own life: prep schools, the **Hamptons**, law firms, and **country clubs**. Auchincloss is sometimes labeled a novelist of manners. There is indeed a moralistic theme to many of his books, though he is often as critical of the stodginess and hollow conventions of the rich as he is of the declining morals of the masses.

Since the 1960s few serious novelists have situated their stories among the ruling class. Older Auchincloss books such as *Portrait in Brownstone* (1962) and *The Great World of Timothy Colt* (1956) are sometimes consulted for the glimpses of genteel life they provide, whereas newer works such as *The Atonement and Other Stories* (1997) and *Manhattan Monologues* (2002) are viewed as reflections on a passing way of life. Auchincloss disagrees with the latter assessment and asserts that the WASP ruling class simply has more competition in the modern world, but retains much of its social and political power.

His nonfiction also deals with the ruling classes, social convention, and wealth. Among his works are studies of the **Vanderbilts**, Queen Victoria, Woodrow Wilson, the **Gilded Age**, and canonical literary figures such as Proust, James, Wharton, and F. Scott Fitzgerald.

Suggested Reading

Louis Auchincloss, *The Rector of Justin*, 1964; Auchincloss, *A Writer's Capital*, 1974; Carol Gelderman, *Louis Auchincloss: A Writer's Life*, 1993.

AUTHORITY

ROBERT E. WEIR

In sociological terms, "authority" refers to the socially sanctioned and legitimate use of power. With authority comes the ability to make decisions that affect other people, as well as the possibility of shaping social, cultural, and economic institutions in

ways that benefit those who command authority. The amount of authority that groups possess tends to mirror the American class structure; that is, the **upper classes** shape decision-making processes to the greatest degree, the **middle classes** possess mid-level power, and the **working** and **lower classes** routinely adjust to conditions dictated by those above them.

Most modern sociological analyses of authority derive from classic work done by **Max Weber** in the early twentieth century. Weber noted that there were three types of authority: traditional, charismatic, and legal. Traditional authority is based in custom and precedent, charismatic in the dynamics of personality, and legal in powers that are rooted in rules and procedures. Weber also called legal authority "rational," to note the ways in which it served modern bureaucratic institutions. It should be noted that Weber did not see these categories as mutually exclusive; leaders often wield authority based on whichever justification best serves them.

Once authority is established, it can hold powerful sway over those compelled to obey it. In a famed 1964 experiment that, among other things, sought to explain why ordinary people succumbed to the lure of fascism, Stanley Milgram demonstrated that authority figures can sometimes compel individuals to act contrary to their moral codes. Some of Milgram's subjects carried out orders to administer an electric shock that appeared to harm other people (in fact, Milgram's "victims" were actors). Others have argued that authority figures can likewise convince people to act against their self-interest. Some have evoked Milgram as a partial explanation as to why many low-paid workers come to reject labor unions or vote for conservative office-seekers.

Authority usually shapes society in subtler ways than those suggested by Milgram. Gender studies indicate, for example, that because men dominate governmental and corporate ranks, an unstated male norm determines everything from agenda items to work-station designs. Organized religion also embodies male bias; male clerics outnumber women by about four to one and determine policy, even though women frequently make up the bulk of congregations.

In more specific class terms, decision making in most occupations filters downward. **CEO**s in distant offices make decisions that impact the jobs and livelihoods of thousands in far-off locations. On the local level, mid-level (and middle-class) managers dictate job routines, the pace of work, and the procedures by which tasks are accomplished, even if workers on the job possess greater knowledge and are capable of increased efficiency.

Authority, when exercised, is seldom cooperative or democratic. Thus, although the intent may be covert or even unconscious, the very use of authority tends to maintain the social status quo.

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Stanley Milgram, *Obedience to Authority*, 1974; George Ritzer and Douglas Goodman, *Sociological Theory*, 2003; Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, 1920.

B


BACON'S REBELLION

THOMAS A. WING

Bacon's Rebellion was an upheaval in the Chesapeake region in 1675–76. Class distinction and struggle permeated life during the Colonial period. Occurring 100 years before the Declaration of Independence, this event is described as the "first **American Revolution**" and is a case study in **class struggle**: years of distrust and animosity between Virginia **elites** and freemen erupted into violence and lawlessness.

At the center of the rebellion was the effort by wealthy elites to keep the colony's best lands and privileges out of the hands of the freemen. The freemen, formerly **indentured servants**, had worked a specified amount of time for the cost of travel to the colonies. Once released from servitude, the freemen sought land and a new start. Virginia elites felt threatened by the large numbers of freemen and feared grievances would spill over to servants and **slaves** and lead to open rebellion. The fear was somewhat unwarranted, however, as Indian relations on the frontier actually provided the main cause for the revolution. White settlers pushed into the western back country because most of the best coastal lands were in the hands of elites. Left unprotected by inadequate militia, these settlers, many of them freemen and their families, suffered raids by hostile Indian groups living in the same remote regions.

Declining tobacco prices due to England's war with the Dutch had forced many planters to seek favorable trade with friendly Indians, and officials were reluctant to upset relations because of isolated incidents on the frontier. Along the James River a group of freemen of humble means, led by disgruntled wealthy planter Nathaniel Bacon, Jr., took reprisal by carrying out a campaign that made little distinction between friendly and hostile Indian groups. Invited to Jamestown by Governor William Berkeley, Bacon demanded a militia commission. Berkeley, fearing Bacon more than hostile Indians, accused the freemen of treason and declared



Scene from Bacon's Rebellion. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

their leader a traitor. Bacon was arrested but later released. Bacon persisted in his quest for power, eventually winning a seat in the colonial legislature. Berkeley failed to prevent Bacon from taking his seat, and, faced with violence, he fled Virginia. With Berkeley gone, Bacon increased his forces and plundered the estates of pro-Berkeley elites. The class struggle escalated as Berkeley offered freedom to servants who joined his militia, while Bacon offered freedom to slaves and servants of Berkeley supporters. Troops from England were on the way to suppress the rebellion as Bacon descended into random plunder and theft. Bacon became ill—most sources credit dysentery—and died on October 26, 1676, leaving his men without a leader. The British troops arrived and arrested all but eighty of Bacon's followers in November.

On his return to Virginia, Berkeley carried out the hanging of about twenty-four wealthy men who had supported Bacon. Their estates were taken to compensate pro-Berkeley victims who were plundered by Bacon's forces. King Charles II of England was displeased with Berkeley's response and called him back to England, where he died in 1677. Subsequent legislation loosened Virginia's social system for whites, but made it even more difficult for slaves. Some scholars feel that slavery took a decidedly more cruel turn in the wake of Bacon's Rebellion, with officials there determined to draw rigid color lines to preclude future alliances among poor whites, indentures, and slaves.

Today, Nathaniel Bacon, Jr. is viewed by some as a champion of liberty who fought a cruel tyrant, hence a precursor of the American Revolution. Some scholars

think this assessment too charitable and that Bacon was a selfish, power-hungry criminal.

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Michael Oberg, ed., Samuel Wiseman's Book of Record: The Official Account of Bacon's Rebellion in Virginia, 1676–1677, 2005; Wilcomb E. Washburn, The Governor and the Rebel, 1957; Stephen S. Webb, 1676—The End of American Independence, 1984.

BALTZELL, E. DIGBY (November 14, 1915–August 17, 1996)

ROBERT E. WEIR

Edward Digby Baltzell was among the foremost sociologists and historians studying the inner workings of the **upper class**. He is widely credited with having popularized the term **WASP** to describe the privileged white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant elites who hold and exercise **authority** and **power** in America. Baltzell defended the upper class and



Nathaniel Bacon. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

viewed their might as proof of an American meritocracy.

Baltzell was born into an upper-**middle-class** home in Philadelphia, the city where he spent most of his life and which was the focal point for much of his social class research. He obtained his bachelor's degree from the University of Pennsylvania (Penn) in 1940, served in the Navy during World War II, then obtained a PhD from Columbia. He then returned to Penn, where he taught for his entire career. Baltzell's reputation was established upon publication of *Philadelphia Gentlemen: The Making of a National Upper Class* (1958) and *Protestant Establishment: Aristocracy and Caste in America* (1964). The latter book was particularly well received and did much to popularize the term WASP.

Baltzell, unlike many sociologists, distinguished between elites, whom he identified as those at the top of a functional hierarchy, and the **upper class**, which consisted of families several generations removed from their original elite status. A true upper class, he argued, topped a social hierarchy, not just a functional one. The upper class world revolved around preparatory schools, **Ivy League** education, family ties, endogamous marriage patterns, membership in exclusive (and private) social clubs, and adherence to a Protestant religion, especially **Episcopalianism**. Its members were listed in the **Social Register** and came from such

occupations as banking, architecture, law, medicine, and museum administration. Those who went into politics or other forms of public service did so out of a sense of *noblesse oblige*.

Baltzell also articulated upper class values, including a greater awareness of the past, a stress on character rather than occupation, and the formation of lineal relationships rather than emphasis on **individualism**. He also saw the upper class as performing valuable social functions, arguing that their control over national and cultural life brought stability, that it served as a hedge against totalitarianism, and that it created folkways and mores that guarded against social chaos. He even defended the exclusivity of private clubs, stating that privacy was necessary to build the **social networks** that made society more efficient and functional. Baltzell fretted over the potential extremism inherent in democracy and praised upper-class traditions as a social safeguard against excess. Like the novelist **Louis Auchincloss**, Baltzell lamented the declining power of the upper class.

Although not as often appreciated, Baltzell was also a fine historian. His work on Philadelphia traced the very construction and evolution of social class within the city, and his works on religion showed important distinctions within American religious practices, including views on business, morality, and war. Among other things, Baltzell argued that the Puritan pessimism toward individuals coincided with optimism toward human institutions, an uneasy compromise embodied in the **Protestant work ethic.**

Suggested Reading

E. Digby Baltzell, *Philadelphia Gentlemen: The Making of a National Upper Class*, 1958; Baltzell, *Protestant Establishment: Aristocracy and Caste in America*, 1964; Baltzell, *Puritan Boston and Quaker Philadelphia*, 1996.

BEACON HILL


RONALD DALE KARR

Located in Boston, Beacon Hill is the oldest, continuous, **upper-class**, residential district in the United States, as well as the site of the Massachusetts State House (state capitol).

In the Colonial period, the Trimountain (or Tremont) was on the northwest fringe of the town of Boston, with its three peaks—Mount Vernon, Beacon Hill, and Pemberton (or Cotton) Hill—looming over the settlement. Until it blew down in 1789, a beacon topped the center peak for over 150 years. Eighteen acres on the southern slope of Mount Vernon constituted the cow pasture of noted artist John Singleton Copley, who left his house here for England in 1774.

The remoteness and unsavory reputation of the area attracted little interest until the 1790s, when the State House was moved from the town center to John Hancock's pasture on Beacon Hill, just east of Copley's lands. In 1795 a group of wealthy Bostonians, the Mount Vernon Proprietors, made a deal with Copley's agent to

purchase his lands for \$18,450. (Copley vainly sought to nullify his agent's action.) The proprietors laid out streets, sold lots, and scraped away the top fifty to sixty feet of Mount Vernon. Construction began in 1799 with the help of one of the nation's earliest railroads. In 1800 Harrison Grav Otis became the first of many aristocrats to locate there. High demand for building sites prevented wide replication of Otis's detached mansion, and blocks of elegant townhouses became the norm. The most celebrated location on Beacon Hill (as the development soon became known) was Louisburg Square, which was planned in 1826 and constructed in the 1830s and 1840s. This private park soon became Boston's most prestigious address.



Old Boston: Beacon Hill from the site of the reservoir between Hancock and Temple Streets, ca. 1858. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

By 1850 the Copley lands had largely been developed, and to this day **Boston Brahmins** regard Beacon Hill proper as those original lands, running from the Common at Beacon Street north to Pickney Street, and from Joy Street on the east to the Charles River on the west. The expansion of the downtown commercial district into what had once been quiet streets drove most of the city's antebellum elite to Beacon Hill. After the **Civil War**, the construction of the Back Bay district on filled land provided an attractive alternative to Beacon Hill, and later the burgeoning suburbs of Chestnut Hill, Brookline, and elsewhere drew affluent residents; but the hill never lost its appeal to Brahmins and other well-heeled home-seekers. By the beginning of the twenty-first century, houses here fetched millions of dollars. U.S. senator and presidential nominee John Forbes Kerry maintains a home on Louisburg Square.

The northern half of Beacon Hill experienced a very different history. In fact, Bostonians have long regarded it as part of the West End, the sprawling neighborhood north of Beacon Hill across Cambridge Street. Known in the eighteenth century as "Mount Whoredom," early in the nineteenth it became the center of Boston's small black community and the site of four black churches. Hostile whites called it "Nigger Hill," although blacks never made up a majority of the residents. In 1900 less than a quarter of Boston's African Americans lived there, and by World War I, most inhabitants of the northern slope were Jewish **immigrants**. Today it is a **middle-class** apartment district, the only surviving remnant of the West End, which was destroyed by overzealous urban renewal in the 1950s.

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Cleveland Amory, *The Proper Bostonians*, 1947; Walter Firey, *Land Use in Central Boston*, 1947; James Oliver Horton and Lois E. Horton, *Black Bostonians: Family Life and Community Struggle in the Antebellum North*, 1999; Walter Muir Whitehill and Lawrence W. Kennedy, *Boston: A Topographic History*, 2000.

BEGGING AND BUSKING

ROBERT E. WEIR

Begging and busking are forms of soliciting money, food, shelter, or other favors from the public, generally by those living in **poverty**. Other terms include sponging, panhandling, hoboing, tramping, or spanging, the latter a slang term for "spare change." Busking is a more specialized form of begging in which the beggar engages in some sort of performance in order to attract donations. Musical performances are the most common form of busking; others include juggling, mime, recitations, and street theater. Busking is often viewed as a rite of passage for many performers. Even Bob Dylan once busked on street corners for spare change. Busking by student musicians and the later success of former buskers who are now professionals often obscures the fact that the vast majority of buskers do not become famous and that a significant number of them depend on donations in order to live.

Begging is an ancient human endeavor, though the number of beggars in an affluent society like that of the United States is so troubling that some Americans choose to view begging and busking as a lifestyle choice or as a con to avoid work and taxes. This may be true in some cases, but the vast majority of beggars live in **poverty**. The U.S. Census Bureau estimated there were nearly 36 million poor Americans in 2004. There are currently an estimated 750,000 **homeless** people in the United States, and as many as 12 million people in the United States have experienced homelessness in their lifetimes. Many homeless and poor people rely on begging for sustenance as well as indulgences. The forms of begging vary; beggars may make direct appeals to passersby, sit on sidewalks holding signs asking for handouts, or peddle goods for money. Some engage in more desperate acts, such as prostitution, running cons, or otherwise debasing themselves for money.

The exact number of beggars in the United States in unknown, and their numbers fluctuate according to the state of the economy, the season, local ordinances, and other external factors. Historians routinely link the viability and expansion of begging with the rise of urbanization. In agrarian-based economies, begging more often takes the form of casual labor, with those in need offering to work for handouts. Urban societies generally have more formal rules for employment, making it more difficult to barter labor for food or money, though a thriving unofficial employment network does exist in many cities, with illegal immigrants particularly susceptible to being recruited by temporary employment agents who pay them off the books and at substandard rates.

The number of beggars goes up during recessions and depressions. There was a huge rise in the number of beggars and hoboes during the Panic of 1893, for example. Their numbers were so large that the Ohio reformer Jacob S. Coxey led a march on Washington, D.C., consisting of beggars and unemployed workers. This protest, which included **Jack London**, is often cited as the prototype for future marches on the nation's capitol. The **Industrial Workers of the World** attempted to organize migrant workers during the early twentieth century, but for the most part, beggars, hoboes, and buskers have had little political clout. The measure of their desperation was evident during the **Great Depression**. With unemployment rates of over 20 percent for much of the 1930s, untold numbers of Americans survived by acts

such as peddling apples on street corners, bartering day labor for food, panhandling, and tramping. Many displaced **Okies** made their way to California, where the lack of sufficient employment opportunities reduced many to beggary.

The post–World War II economic recovery reduced the overall number of beggars, but 1970s stagflation and deep cuts to social programs beginning in the 1980s swelled their ranks once again. The latter point is crucial. The United States, vis-à-vis many other affluent nations, has fewer assistance programs for the poor. Welfare reforms since the 1990s weakened those programs available by severely limiting the time that one can draw public assistance benefits. Likewise, the deinstitutionalization of mental facilities beginning in the 1970s also left many marginally proficient individuals to their own devices. Begging is sometimes one of the few options available to those who cannot find steady employment at a rate that pays them enough to survive.

Beggars, street peddlers, and buskers are now a standard feature of American towns and cities. Those with year-round temperate climates, such as San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Miami often have large numbers of beggars, but there is no region that is immune. Even in the dead of winter, for example, one can find rows of tables on streets in Boston or New York City on which peddlers offer their wares or doorways in which huddled individuals beg for spare change. Many locales have responded to the social problem of begging by enacting tough ordinances against soliciting, busking, or living on the street. Some cities, like Denver, encourage citizens to contribute to social programs rather than give money to beggars. Indeed, one critique against beggars argues that many donations end up fueling drug and alcohol abuse rather than helping the needy. There is little disputing the fact that beggars often have health and addiction problems, but the notion that begging is self-induced or a lifestyle choice is simply not supported by social data.

Suggested Reading


Mitchell Duneier and Ovie Carter, Sidewalk, 2000; Jay MacLeod, Ain't No Makin' It: Aspirations of Attainment in a Low-Income Neighborhood, 2004; Peter Rossi, Down and Out in America: The Origins of Homelessness, 1991.

BELLAMY, EDWARD (March 26, 1850–May 22, 1898)

ROBERT E. WEIR

Edward Bellamy was a journalist and writer whose 1888 novel *Looking Backward* created a sensation and caused many readers to question some of the materialist assumptions of the late **Gilded Age**.

Bellamy was born in Chicopee Falls, Massachusetts, and spent most of his life there. He was the son of a Baptist minister, an upbringing that perhaps instilled in Bellamy the missionary zeal with which he later attacked social injustice. Although he could have observed inequality in Chicopee—a small industrial city crisscrossed with paper and textile mills—he credited study in Germany with awakening his awareness of poverty.



Edward Bellamy. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

Bellamy attended Union College, studied law, and passed the bar in 1871, but he was not satisfied with a legal career. Instead, he became a journalist for the New York Evening Post and continued to write for that paper even after returning to Chicopee Falls in 1872 to become editor for the Springfield Union, the metropolitan daily published in an adjoining city. Many of Bellamy's editorials dealt with social issues, but Bellamy also dabbled in fiction. He published his first short story in Scribner's in 1875 and his first novel, Six to One: A Nantucket *Idyll*, in 1878. In all, Bellamy published twenty-two short stories and six novels, though only *Looking Backward* was a huge success.

Looking Backward, however, ranks among the most influential books in American literary history; in the nineteenth century, only Uncle Tom's Cabin and Ben Hur outsold it. Bellamy had previously tried his hand at science fiction and utopian themes, both of which came into play in Looking Backward. The book's protagonist, Julian West, is a typical nineteenth-century social climber,

an upper-middle-class professional about to marry into a **Brahmin** family. Like many members of his class, he is troubled by the violent labor strikes, poverty, and class conflict of his day; in fact, a strike delays work on the very home West is building. Despite his economic and social prospects, West is an insomniac. He employs a hypnotist to help him fall asleep and builds a special subterranean chamber to dampen the constant construction and street noise of his Boston neighborhood. When a devastating fire breaks out and consumes West's home while he is under hypnosis, he is presumed lost in the fire.

In fact, the underground chamber protected West from the flames and smoke, but he remained asleep until he was unearthed during renovations of a house on the site 113 years later. West is gently awakened by Dr. Leete, the man who will become his mentor and guide for the twenty-first century world. The Boston of 2000 could not be more different than that of 1887; in short, Julian West awoke to a utopia.

Nearly all social ills had been corrected by a government-directed **socialist** program in which **individualism** had been supplanted by a collectivist society designed to achieve equality, rationalism, and efficiency. Class conflict has been overcome through the creation of an Industrial Army in which all citizens must serve from ages twenty-one through forty-five, the latter being the retirement age at which

one was free to pursue whatever activities he or she wished. Money had been eliminated in favor of a credit system in which all members received equal shares. The nation had also become the sole employer, producer, and supplier; one could redeem credits for goods and services at national stores, restaurants, laundries, and nurseries. Housework, childcare, and cooking were similarly provided by the state, and women were considered the equals of men (although they had a separate government and Industrial Army).

Leete explained to West that this state of domestic harmony prevailed as a result of peaceful evolution; in essence, the strife of West's own day so exhausted Americans that they decided to vote for an end to **capitalism**. By eliminating competition, private enterprise, hierarchy, and power, society was able to banish inequality, slums, labor conflict, slavery, crime, and most other social evils. Much of the book reads as an extended lecture from Leete on how nineteenth-century problems were solved.

Although Bellamy's fictive socialist utopia was fanciful and many readers responded more to the book's conventional **Victorian** romance than to its politics, *Looking Backward* spawned a reform movement. Much to Bellamy's own surprise, many readers came to view his imaginative novel as a literal blueprint from which society could be rebuilt. In 1889 Bostonians created a Bellamy Club devoted to advancing the novel's principles. From this emerged the Nationalist movement, so named because the nation in the form of a centralized bureaucracy directed all economic, social, and political activities. By the mid-1890s, there were about 165 Nationalist clubs in the United States. Clubs also emerged in Europe (especially in The Netherlands), Australia, and New Zealand. Bellamy's ideas also had profound influence on the **Populist** movement of the 1890s, and many scholars credit *Looking Backward* for reforms that emerged in the Progressive Era and under Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal.

The latter claims are given credence when one considers who read the book. Predictably, members of progressive groups like the **Knights of Labor** embraced the book, as did radicals and reformers like **Eugene Debs**, **Elizabeth Gurley Flynn**, Clarence Darrow, and **Upton Sinclair**. Yet it was members of the **middle class** who devoured the novel and joined Nationalist Clubs with the greatest gusto. Bellamy had indeed struck a responsive chord when describing the many problems of the Gilded Age; during what historians have dubbed the "crisis of the 1890s," a horrible four-year economic slump (1893–97), renewed outbreaks of labor violence, **anarchist** attacks, and other problems convinced many middle-class members that reform was needed. Many within the middle class were comforted by Bellamy's assertion that transition could take place rationally and peacefully. Neither Progressive Era (c. 1901–17) nor New Deal (1933–40) reforms went as far as Bellamy envisioned, but it is credible to attribute Bellamy with partially inspiring both movements.

Looking Backward is at once a hopeful and naïve book. It did not lack critics. For many conservatives, Bellamy was a dangerous anarchist bent on destroying individualism and the American republic; many on the political left saw him as a deluded dreamer with little understanding of the power of **robber barons**, corrupt governmental officials, and greedy stock traders. There are also gaping logical holes in the book. Bellamy himself became caught up in the Bellamy movement. His book was

intended to be a work of imagination, but he too came to see it as a blueprint; in 1897 he wrote a sequel titled *Equality*, which addressed some of the critics' charges. The book did not sell well, though Charles Kerr published one chapter as a standalone pamphlet titled *The Parable*.

Whatever one might think of Bellamy from a modern perspective, in his own day he stimulated healthy and productive discussions of the American class system.

Suggested Reading

Edward Bellamy, *Looking Backward:* 2000–1887, 1960; John Hope Franklin, "Edward Bellamy and the Nationalist Movement," *The New England Quarterly*, 11 (December 1938), pp. 739–772; Franklin Rosemont, *Apparitions of Things to Come*, 1990.

BERGER, VICTOR (February 28, 1860–August 7, 1929)

ROBERT E. WEIR

Victor Luitpol Berger was a prominent **socialist** politician of the early twentieth century, an antiwar activist, and a defender of the working class.

Berger was born in Nieder-Rehbach in the now-defunct Austro-Hungarian Empire. He attended universities in Budapest and Vienna before immigrating to Bridgeport, Connecticut, in 1878 with his parents, who were innkeepers. In 1880 he moved to Milwaukee and became a teacher, a newspaper editor, and an activist in the city's German-speaking community. The move to Milwaukee also focused Berger's attention on Midwestern agrarian radicalism, and he joined the **Populist** movement during the 1890s. Increasingly, however, Berger was attracted to ballot-box socialism. He helped organize the Social Democracy of America Party in 1897 and the Social Democratic Party (SDP) the following year. In 1901 the SDP became the Socialist Party (SP) after Berger, **Eugene Debs**, and Morris Hillquit reorganized it, in part to differentiate SP efforts from those of radical factions in Daniel DeLeon's Socialist Labor Party (SLP), which they viewed as disruptive, divisive, and nonpragmatic. Not coincidentally, Berger hoped the SP could bring unity to the fragmented socialist movement.

Rather than adhere to strict Marxist views like DeLeon, Berger sought influence in the political realm and felt that elected socialists could help the working class. Berger was defeated in his bid for Congress in 1904 but was successful in several city elections over the next six years. In 1910, Berger was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives on the SP ticket, becoming the first socialist to serve in Congress. Berger lost his reelection bid in 1912 but remained active in Milwaukee politics. He was returned to Congress in 1918, in part because of his outspoken opposition to U.S. involvement in World War I.

In that year, however, Berger was convicted of violating the Espionage Act, a bill passed during the war that made it a felony to impede the war effort. Like many socialists, Berger viewed the conflict as a capitalist war in which laborers had no stake and should not participate. In early 1919, Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis,

who became the commissioner of major league baseball after the 1919 Black Sox scandal, sentenced Berger to twenty years in jail despite his election to Congress.

Berger appealed his conviction, posted bail, and went to Washington. Congress, however, debated whether Berger's credentials should be accepted and, in November of 1919, declared Berger's seat vacant. In a December special election Berger won an even larger majority. Congress once again refused his credentials, and the seat remained unfilled until 1921. In that year the Supreme Court overturned Berger's conviction; Berger stood again for Congress and was again victorious. He was reelected in 1922, 1924, and 1926. Berger was finally defeated in 1928 and returned to Milwaukee to edit the *Milwaukee Leader*, a socialist paper sympathetic to the **labor movement**. In 1929 he died from injuries sustained in a street car accident.

Although Victor Berger is seldom accorded the acclaim of his colleague and contemporary Eugene Debs, he was a more successful political campaigner than Debs. Despite commitment to social programs and the labor movement, animus



Victor Berger. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

against socialism runs deep in the United States, in part because of negative associations with foreign radicalism and in part because the winner-take-all electoral policy of the United States favors the entrenched two-party system. Berger, Meyer London of New York (1915–21), and **Bernard Sanders** are three of just a handful of socialists who have ever won Congressional seats.

Suggested Reading

Victor Berger, Voice and Pen, 1929; Sally Miller, Victor Berger and the Promise of Constructive Socialism 1910–1920, 1973; David Shannon, The Socialist Party of America: A History, 1955.

Bernstein, Jared (December 26, 1955–)

ROBERT E. WEIR

Jared Bernstein is an economist whose work concentrates on the links between **poverty**, labor markets, and social policy.

He was born in Philadelphia, the son of Fabian and Evelyn Bernstein, a physician and a teacher, respectively. He attended Hunter College of City University of New York and obtained a masters of social work from Hunter in 1982. Subsequent work as a New York City social worker sharpened his interest in how the working class

fares in America. In 1992 he joined the Economic Policy Institute (EPI), a **think tank** that seeks to integrate sectors of the American economy. Bernstein is now a senior policy analyst for EPI and the director of the Living Standards program. He has also worked for the Department of Labor. In 1994 he obtained a PhD in economics from Columbia University. Bernstein is a prolific writer and commentator but is perhaps best known for his contributions to the biennial series *The State of Working America*, for which he began writing in 1992.

The State of Working America, which has appeared since 1988 and has been anchored by EPI director Lawrence Mishel, is an important analytical work that crunches data to separate economic reality from political rhetoric. Early editions of the work revealed 1980s prosperity to be illusory for most working class families and highlighted the growing gap between rich and poor. This has been a theme of subsequent editions as well.

Bernstein has focused much of his work on inequality in the American economy, and he points to ways in which American society has grown more unequal since 1979. He blames some of this on balance of trade deficits, some on deindustrialization, and some on technological changes, but he does not feel that these alone explain rising poverty rates. Bernstein places much of the blame on labor market imbalances. Put simply, wages have not kept pace with inflation. In 2004, for example, adjusted real income fell for 70 percent of female and 80 percent of male workers and was mostly flat even for highly educated workers. The problem is especially acute at the bottom of the social ladder; when adjusted for inflation, a janitor in 1965 earned far more than one in 2004. He also notes that in 1979 the top 5 percent of American wage earners made 11 times as much as the bottom 20 percent; by 2000, they made 19 times more. He argues that though cuts in the social safety net may be politically popular policy, they have exacerbated inequality. This is especially the case for minorities, who are disproportionately placed in low-wage positions, and anyone seeking to survive on the **minimum wage**.

Bernstein observes that many highly publicized economic trends—the introduction of new technology, the development of new products, up-ticks in the gross domestic product, expansions of payrolls—often have virtually no impact on closing the gap between rich and poor. Nor does he feel that the economy is producing new jobs fast enough. This is due in large part to weak labor markets; that is, there is very little pressure on employers to add jobs, raise wages significantly, or to provide more benefits for existing workers. The weakening of the **labor movement** is, hence, bad news for wage earners, especially those in low-paying service sector jobs. Ultimately, Bernstein feels that current trends are also bad for the overall economy as inequality, high **unemployment**, and stagnant wages are incompatible with sustained economic growth. He takes some solace in the burgeoning **living** wage movement.

Although Bernstein's views are dismissed by some as liberal bias, he is seldom shrill in his political remarks and generally garners respect for his statistical prowess and keen analytical skills. Some claim that the Economic Policy Institute generates better data than the Department of Labor, which has been politicized in recent decades. Bernstein also attracts notice as one of the few working economists to focus on the working class.

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Jared Bernstein, *The State of Working America*, 2004; Bernstein, "Crunching Numbers," *The American Prospect Online*, February 4, 2005; Bernstein, Heather Bousey, Chauna Brocht, and Bethney Gundersen, *The Real Story of Working Families*, 2001.

BIG GAME HUNTING

See Sports.

BILINGUALISM

CHERRY LEI HUNSAKER

Bilingualism refers to the ability to communicate in two languages. To assess language proficiency, several tests have been developed. These tests include rating scales, fluency, flexibility, and dominance. Critics assert that these tests are problematic, arguing that assessing bilingualism is very difficult since there are at least twenty elements of language to consider and many more ways of evaluating each element. Each of the four general language areas—reading, writing, speaking, and listening—include terms given to clusters of smaller, more specific language elements. For example, one's speaking proficiency is a culmination of vocabulary, grammar, and pronunciation.

Bilingualism can be broken down into three dichotomies. The first dichotomy is between receptive and productive bilingual competence. Receptive, or passive, bilingual competence refers to one who is able to understand a second language, spoken or written, but not able to reciprocate the giving of the information. On the other hand, with productive bilingual competence, information is both given and received two ways. This is also sometimes called active bilingual competence. Someone is considered to have productive bilingual competence if they are able to both give and receive information well in a second language.

The second dichotomy of bilingualism is between additive and subtractive. For bilingualism to be additive, the development of the new language must add to and expand one's linguistic repertoire. Subtractive bilingualism has the opposite effect. In this case, the new language being learned is actually replacing existing linguistic ability. Additive bilingualism usually occurs when both languages are useful and serve particular purposes. For example, business leaders often learn a second language to help them in their professional ventures. Additionally, children of **immigrant** families often speak their native language at home and English at school. In these situations both languages serve specific purposes. In contrast, subtractive bilingualism occurs when one language becomes used in all domains of life. For example, a small child adopted from China into an English-speaking family in America will quickly lose his or her ability to speak Chinese if this language is not reinforced.

The third dichotomy of bilingualism is between primary and secondary bilingualism. Primary bilingualism shows that the attainment of dual proficiency has

come about naturally, such as through a family context, or developed due to social-contextual demands. In America, for example, an immigrant child may speak his or her native tongue at home and English at school. In this manner, both languages are learned and developed naturally. Secondary bilingualism refers to a more conscientious way of learning language, such as through formal schooling. However cleverly these programs are structured, differences remain between primary bilinguals and secondary bilinguals. For example, if a person learns Korean at home through speaking to family members and English while out and about in the city and at school, he or she will have command over both languages, especially in social settings. However, they may not be able to write Korean well or will perhaps struggle with proper grammar usage. In contrast, if a person learned English at home and school and studies Korean for several hours a week as part of an intensive language program, he or she may know Korean grammar well, but in social contexts he or she may be unable to grasp informal language cues.

An area in which we see these three dichotomies play out is in the social debate around bilingual **education**. In the United States, there is an ongoing debate over the role, effectiveness, and future of bilingual education. The debate centers on the Bilingual Education Act (BEA) signed by President Lyndon B. Johnson in 1968. Education analysts argue whether this act was put into place as an antipoverty initiative, antidiscrimination measure, or an experiment in multicultural education. Since 1968 supporters and critics of the BEA have debated its effects.

Supporters claim that while some bilingual programs have been more successful than others, investing in a child's native language development is still valuable. Evidence supports the conclusion that cleverly structured bilingual programs can generate high levels of long-term academic success without losing English acquisition among minority language-speaking groups. Essentially, encouraging fluent bilingualism and cultivating educational merit is evidenced as complementary. In fact, approaches that stress native language instruction can help overcome other obstacles such as **poverty**, family illiteracy, and social stigmas that have been associated with minority **status**.

Critics, on the other hand, assert the BEA has failed to meet expectations. Despite positive intellectual outcomes, some research suggests bilingual education is counterproductive. Many policymakers have considered dismantling the program, an action that is endorsed by some within the Latino community who argue that continuing to use Spanish places Latino students at a competitive disadvantage. Still other critics oppose bilingualism programs because they privilege Spanish, even when it makes little sense to do so. In northern New England, for example, non-English speakers often use French rather than Spanish, and some California schools have become such a polyglot as to render native language instruction impractical. In 1998 the California electorate voted to end native language teaching programs. Furthermore, some Americans have reacted defensively against the diversity brought about by rising levels of immigration in the United States, generating a nation-wide campaign to protect the English language. As a result, several states have passed laws establishing English as the only official language used in the government. Additionally, bills have been proposed in various states, as well as Congress, to limit the amount of time a child can be enrolled in programs that address limited English proficiency.

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BILL OF RIGHTS

ROBERT E. WEIR

The Bill of Rights is the name given to the first ten amendments to the United States Constitution, which were enacted on December 15, 1791. Although most Americans cherish the individual freedoms enshrined in the Bill of Rights, fewer are aware of the battle that took place to secure them, the social class dimensions inherent in those debates, or the struggle that took place to convince many citizens of the very need for a Constitution.

The 1783 Treaty of Paris recognized the United States of America as independent of Great Britain, but it did not establish the structure by which the new nation would be governed. The Articles of Confederation provided for a structure, but they granted the central government few powers beyond those the thirteen former colonies had unanimously granted. Day-to-day life for most citizens was regulated by their individual state constitutions, with those states coining their own currency, defining extradition laws, and proscribing individual liberties. Events like **Shays's Rebellion** and Rhode Island's veto of a tariff bill agreed upon by twelve other states caused some of the same men who led the American Revolution to lobby for a revision of the Articles of Confederation in order to strengthen the federal government. Their efforts led to the calling of a constitutional convention.

Constitutional framers like James Madison and George Washington were motivated in part by what they perceived to be sound governmental theory, but there is little doubt that social class also shaped constitutional debate. A significant number of the Founding Fathers were distrustful of mass democracy, which they equated with chaos and anarchy. Embedded within the United States Constitution are numerous safeguards designed in part to protect minority elites. The decision to enact a representative (rather than direct) democracy was one measure of this; the decision to create a bicameral legislature and independent, non-elected judiciary are others. In addition, U.S. senators, who hold six-year terms, originally were appointed by state legislatures rather than by popular vote. Unlike many of the state constitutions, whose authority was superseded, the federal Constitution did not impose term limits on office holders, and many who gathered in Philadelphia to draft the document simply assumed that federal offices would and should be the provenance of "worthy" men such as themselves. Alexander Hamilton was among those who thought the masses excitable and prone to the lures of demagogues. The Electoral College was still another proviso that allowed popular will to be undone. It could, if necessary, allow Congress to determine the fate of an election. Hamilton



The original of the U.S. Bill of Rights, the first ten amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Courtesy of Eon Images.

spoke for many when he argued that a Bill of Rights could prove undesirable; he mused, for instance, that an unfettered press might be dangerous.

As the U.S. Constitution took shape, some ex-Revolutionary War patriots grew alarmed at the power invested in the federal government, the curtailment of states' rights, and absence of guarantees of individual liberty. Two factions emerged: Federalists, who supported the new document, and Anti-Federalists, who opposed it. Among the Anti-Federalists were many individuals who had been most active in supporting independence, including Samuel Adams, Elbridge Gerry, George Clinton, Patrick Henry, Richard Henry Lee, George Mason, and James Monroe. Opposition to the Constitution was particularly strong in Virginia, from whence the latter four hailed.

As noted, motives for opposing the Constitution varied, but the Anti-Federalist argu-

ment that the document lacked a Bill of Rights, and hence tended to foster oligarchy, resonated with many Americans. Federalists initially countered that there was no need for a separate Bill of Rights as such liberties were automatically granted to American citizens and/or stipulated in state constitutions, but the Anti-Federalist charges clearly placed Federalists on the defensive. In New York, opposition grew so large that Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison wrote a series of political tracts collectively known as *The Federalist Papers* to defend the need for the Constitution, and less famous tracts appeared elsewhere. Even then, several state legislatures initially rejected the Constitution, and its final passage was slim in Massachusetts (187 to 168), New York (30 to 27), and Virginia (89 to 79).

Ultimate passage of the Constitution was due not to the persuasiveness of pamphleteers, but rather to the decision to write and pass a Bill of Rights. Thomas Jefferson was among those who argued that a Constitution devoid of a Bill of Rights was defective, and he exerted influence on James Madison, the Constitution's chief writer, to include one. Seventeen amendments were proposed, which were whittled to twelve, then ten. Of these, the first eight can be viewed as compromises to popular democracy, including now-cherished rights such as freedom of religion, a free press, freedom of speech, the right to bear arms, and various legal protections.

The Bill of Rights ensured the passage of the Constitution and effectively quashed the Anti-Federalists as a political movement; only eight of its members were elected to Congress in 1789, and they soon aligned themselves with Jeffersonian Republicans. Nonetheless, the Anti-Federalists were more responsible than any other group in securing basic liberties that Americans now take for granted. Although the U.S. Constitution remained a document that favored elites, the

democratic impulses of the Anti-Federalists derailed the elitism of those who distrusted the masses.

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BIRTH CONTROL

STACEY INGRUM RANDALL

The struggle for women to control their own reproductive futures predates the founding of the American republic, though the organized movement for birth control rights first emerged in full force in the twentieth century.

Colonial women and those of the early republic engaged in a variety of strategies to delay or avoid unwanted pregnancies, including prolonging the periods they breastfed children, practicing coitus interruptus with their partners, and attempting to confine sexual intercourse to less-fertile times between menstrual cycles. There were also a host of folk practices of varying efficacy, including the use of douches, pessaries, and herbal abortifacients. Abortions, if conducted early in a pregnancy, were also an option well into the nineteenth century, as prevailing wisdom held that a fetus did not develop a soul until several months into development. Although **poverty** was a factor in those seeking to end pregnancies, women of all classes sought either chemical or surgical abortions as the dangers of child-birth far exceeded those of abortion well into the twentieth century. It is estimated that antebellum New York City had several hundred doctors who performed abortions. All manner of improvised prophylactics were in use long before condoms were brought to the United States in 1840.

Birth control restrictions were largely the product of **Gilded Age** moralists, though some states had outlawed abortion before the Civil War. In 1869 the Catholic Church first took the official position that abortion is murder, and Protestant ministers quickly followed suit. The condemnation of abortion led to generalized assaults on all forms of birth control, many of which were led by Victorian moralist Anthony Comstock, who in 1873 convinced Congress to outlaw the dissemination of birth control information on the grounds that it was obscene.

The Comstock laws precipitated a long battle for women to regain reproductive control, a battle that remained in doubt into the 1960s. In the interim, numerous birth control advocates suffered persecution. The list includes Victoria Woodhull, Tennessee Claflin, **Emma Goldman**, Benjamin Reitman, and **Margaret Sanger**. Sanger's birth control campaign, which began in 1912, is often credited with giving rise to the modern birth control movement. Sanger, though, was dogged by controversy. She was originally a **socialist** who saw birth control as a way for working-class

women to liberate themselves but later allied herself with the **eugenics** movement and **middle-class** groups.

During the twentieth century, discussions of birth control increased in all areas and among all social classes of the country, though attempts to overturn Comstock laws failed from 1912 on. Nonetheless, as more women began to move into the working world, particularly after World War II, many argued for the necessity of regulating pregnancy. However, mainstream opinion continued to urge women to reject birth control in favor of the natural process of pregnancy and childbirth. Sex surveys by Alfred Kinsey in 1943 and 1948 and several by William Masters and Virginia Johnson after 1957 revealed that American sexual practices were far different than the expectations of moralists. In 1960 the first birth control pills became available, and in 1961 a Connecticut couple set up a birth control clinic in New Haven, which was later raided by Connecticut state police. This led to the 1965 Supreme Court *Griswold v. Connecticut* decision that invalidated the Comstock laws. In 1971 the Boston Women's Health Book Collective published *Our Bodies, Ourselves: A Book By and For Women*, which encouraged women to learn about their bodies and the medical care necessary to maintain their reproductive health.

The authors challenged male-dominated culture and exhorted women to find their own sources of power, particularly with respect to controlling reproduction. This book detailed women's alternatives, including birth control and abortion. Linda Gordon, author of *Woman's Body, Woman's Right*, contends that the lengthy debate over birth control was based on politics rather than technology. Women knew how to terminate unwanted pregnancies and stop them from occurring for hundreds of years, yet these practices were forced out in the modern world. Once the medical profession specialized and moved medical treatment into the hospital setting, women's roles as healers, midwives, and herbalists were quashed by the medical profession, which encouraged women to embrace motherhood as their specific and valuable social role.

While *Our Bodies*, *Ourselves* revolutionized women's health and birth control awareness, it was lacking in several ways. The members of the Collective were all white, middle- and **upper-class**, educated women. While some of the stories within the book came from women of other backgrounds, the members of the collective had similar experiences that were very different from their readers. Women of different racial, ethnic, and economic backgrounds faced different problems and had different concerns when deciding about birth control.

In *Wake Up Little Susie*, Rickie Solinger discusses single pregnancy prior to the 1973 Supreme Court decision legalizing abortion. Solinger argues that the pressures of class and race radically altered both society's perception of single mothers as well as the choices those women could make with regard to birth control. The state and federal government had a vested interest in promoting conservative values about the family and women's roles rather than supporting women's right to have access to birth control.

Young, white women who became pregnant faced a social crisis both at home and within their community. Many people viewed women who asserted their sexual independence before marriage as "subverting" the idea of the strong family as well as the traditional image of the demure, passive female. A young, pregnant, white girl faced alienation from her family and her home. In most cases, the young girl went to live in

a maternity home for the duration of her pregnancy so that it could be hidden from the community. Then, the baby would be put up for adoption by a respectable family. Before World War II, women who had illegitimate children were considered "fallen" women and cast out of society, and their babies bore the same stigma. However, after the war, social workers decided that if the young women put their children up for adoption, they could be socially redeemed and later pursue traditional, acceptable paths of marriage and a family. In addition, their white babies would allow childless couples to gain access to the **American dream** of the nuclear family.

Young women of color, however, experienced a very different path. Young minority women, particularly African American and Latina women, were blamed not only for "getting themselves" pregnant, but also for abusing the federal **welfare** system. These young women's pregnancies were viewed as a product of uncontrollable biology. In effect, pregnancy was seen through the racist lens that nonwhite women could not control their sexuality. In addition to racial issues, many of these young women were also very poor and had to rely on the federal government to support them and their babies, a condition that bred resentment on the part of white tax-payers. Solinger argues that this racially constructed image gave birth to the stereotype of "welfare mothers" as social parasites whose promiscuity leads to unwanted children or who give birth for the purpose of living on the dole.

Unwed mothers, particularly those who are young, poor, and nonwhite, have always lived with racial, social, and class conflict. Single pregnancy threatened the protected status of the American family as well as the image of female sexuality that social reformers fought so hard to preserve. This problem of unmarried mothers allowed different classes and types of women to enter public debate for the first time throughout the twentieth century. Therefore, the women debating single motherhood were actually challenging their position in defining women's roles and sexuality as well as issues of race and class.

Birth control, however, remains contentious on many levels. The 1973 Supreme Court decision *Roe v. Wade*, which once again made medical abortion legal, has never been accepted by many within American society. Since 1973 numerous attempts have been made to limit the scope of *Roe* or overturn it altogether. As in the nineteenth century, abortion battles have also extended to matters of sexuality in general. This has been seen in numerous rancorous state, local, and federal battles on issues such as teaching sex education in public schools, distributing free condoms in schools and colleges, attempts to censor sexual content in the media, and the crusade to keep RU-486—popularly known as the "morning after pill"—unavailable in the United States. Contemporary moralists, like their Victorian counterparts, see birth control as a key component of stemming America's social and cultural decay, while their detractors condemn them as classist, racist, Puritanical, and unrealistic.

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BLACK CONSERVATISM

CARMELITA N. PICKETT

Black Conservatism is the term used to describe the political beliefs of African Americans who endorse modern Republican values such as **individualism**, materialism, and limited government intervention.

Historically, African Americans favored the Republican Party because of the party's role in abolishing **slavery**. During the 1850s, when the party was founded, it was known as an antislavery party. This was evident when the first Republican president, Abraham Lincoln, signed the Emancipation Proclamation on January 1, 1863, ending slavery in all areas under rebellion. During **Reconstruction**, African Americans registered to vote in large numbers, and most enrolled in the Republican Party. Many even obtained elected office.

The end of Reconstruction and the rise of Jim Crow **segregation** systems led to the wholesale disenfranchisement of African Americans. By the early twentieth century, few African Americans could vote, but for those who could, the Republican Party was the only option considering that the Democratic Party had established all-white primaries throughout the South. Democrats supported poll taxes, grandfather clauses, and other restrictive practices that prohibited African Americans from voting.

During the 1930s, however, African Americans began shifting their support toward the Democratic Party, primarily because of the **New Deal** created by President **Franklin Roosevelt**. The New Deal provided jobs and aid for American families during the **Great Depression**. In 1954 the U.S. Supreme Court's *Brown v. the Board of Education of Topeka* decision ended legal segregation in public schools. Many historians purport that the *Brown* decision gave birth to the modern Civil Rights Movement, which eventually dismantled all vestiges of the Jim Crow systems relegating African Americans to second-class citizenship. Most African Americans became loyal constituents of the Democratic Party after the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the **Voting Rights** Act of 1965, which were passed during Lyndon Johnson's administration. These were integral to **Great Society** initiatives designed to help underprivileged Americans.

Black conservatives strongly oppose programs like affirmative action (a legal policy designed to end discrimination based on race, national origin, sex, religion, or sexual orientation), minority scholarships, public education, and **minimum wage** laws. They insist that African American communities must embrace the self-help mantra "pulling oneself up by his or her bootstraps." This ideology supports individualism, which black conservatives believe will lead to **wealth** and economic security. Black conservatives receive criticism from many within the African American community because they seldom acknowledge the unique history of African Americans and the historical policies and practices that prohibited the advancement of African Americans in the United States. Black conservatism supports a **Protestant work ethic**, which asserts that a person's hard work, talents, and self-discipline will lead to wealth.

One early twentieth-century black conservative, Booker T. Washington, founder of Tuskegee Institute and author of *Up from Slavery* (1901), was well liked

by white Southerners because his belief in **self-reliance** seemed to support segregation. Washington became famous in 1895 after his opening speech at the Atlanta Cotton States and International Exposition held in Atlanta, Georgia. Another well-known black conservative, George Schuyler, wrote *Black and Conservative* (1966). He vehemently criticized the New Deal and the Civil Rights Movement. Other well-known black conservatives include Harlem Renaissance writer Zora Neale Hurston, Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas, political commentator Armstrong Williams, scholar Thomas Sowell, former congressman J. C. Watts, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, and former U.S. Secretary of State Colin L. Powell.

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
BLACK POWER

CARMELITA N. PICKETT

Black power is an ideology that gained prominence during the mid-1960s and supports the political, social, and economic empowerment of African American communities.

Black power embraced African Americans defending themselves against violence and intimidation and abandoned the nonviolent tactics practiced during the Civil Rights Movement. Black power was a response to the increasing race riots that erupted during the 1960s in Detroit, Newark, and Los Angeles (Watts). Many African Americans in these urban communities felt a sense of hopelessness with continued high **unemployment**, substandard housing conditions, and police brutality. In 1965 African Americans witnessed the assassination of Malcolm X, leader of the Organization of Afro-American Unity and former Black Muslim leader. Young African Americans soon became disillusioned with the nonviolent approach to opposing racism espoused by leaders such as the **Rev. Martin Luther King Jr.**, since it seemed as if no traditional civil rights organization spoke to the ills and frustration of young African Americans in urban **ghettoes**.

In 1966, when Stokely Carmichael became chairman of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), he began promoting self-identity, racial pride, and the establishment of African American economic and political power. Carmichael popularized the term "black power" by chanting publicly, "We want black power." Under his leadership, white members were driven out of the SNCC. The SNCC soon lost its white liberal financial base along with large numbers of African Americans who believed in the integration efforts of the SNCC. Ella J. Baker, a civil rights organizer, founded the SNCC in 1960 as a student organization committed to nonviolent protest as a means of ending discrimination. One of



Stokely Carmichael standing at rostrum, speaking at the University of California's Greek Theater. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

their most noted actions was a sit-in at a Woolworth's lunch counter in Greensboro, North Carolina. Nonviolent demonstrations by SNCC and other civil rights organizations were often met with brutal violence.

On July 20, 1967, the National Conference on Black Power legitimized the black power movement. Over 200 organizations and institutions participated, including the A. Philip Randolph Institute, Black Muslims, Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party, the NAACP (National Association for the Advancement of Colored People), the National Council of Negro Women, and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). During the workshops, delegates worked toward creating resolutions requiring specific action plans. The resolutions included establishing a black economic power fund, a black power lobby in Washington, D.C., and the National Black Education Board, and creating international employment services to serve and train the African diaspora. Black power called for the unification of African Americans and created a community that would address community needs through economics, politics, education and building an international black community.

The Black Panther Party (BPP), a black militant group founded by Huey P. Newton and Bobby Seale, gained prominence during the black power movement by promoting black nationalism, along with **communist** ideologies of Karl Marx and Vladimir Lenin. The BPP focused on creating better environments for urban African Americans by establishing social programs, such as kindergartens for African American children and free breakfast and health care programs. The Black Panther Party was the largest black organization during the mid-1960s that advocated for black power.

Black power faded after the 1970s because of the continued condemnation of the concept as an anti-white movement and the organized ruination of Black Panther members. Although the radical politics of black power was discredited, the quest for African American empowerment survived.

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BLAU, PETER MICHAEL (February 7, 1918–March 12, 2002)

ROBERT E. WEIR

Peter Michael Blau was a sociologist whose theories on **social mobility** and **status attainment** remain influential in social stratification studies.

Blau was born in Vienna, Austria, the son of secular Jews. He dabbled in radical Socialist Workers' Party politics as a youth and received a ten-year jail sentence for treason when he was only seventeen. Ironically, he was released from prison by the Nazis who, upon assuming power, rescinded the ban on political activity that sent Blau to jail. When Hitler invaded Austria in 1938, however, Blau attempted to escape to Czechoslovakia, but was captured, tortured, and confined to Prague. He made his way back to Austria, where a friend secured permission for him to immigrate to the United States. He entered France under a German passport, surrendered to Allied troops, and was briefly in a French labor camp before sailing to America in 1939.

Blau attended Elmhurst College as an undergraduate and, in 1942, learned that his family had been killed at Auschwitz. After World War II he entered graduate school at Columbia, where he studied under Robert K. Merton, rigorously examined theorists such as Karl Marx, **Robert Lynd**, and **Talcott Parsons**, and met other young scholars also destined to reshape sociology, including Lewis Coser and Martin Seymour Lipset. He obtained his PhD in 1952 and taught at Wayne State and Cornell before going to the University of Chicago in 1953. Blau stayed there until 1970, when he returned to Columbia, where he taught until retiring in 1988. He was also a visiting fellow at Cambridge University, served as the president of the American Sociological Association, and was elected to the National Academy of Sciences.

During his long career, Blau's work traversed many sociological fields, but he is best known for his research in organizational, occupational, and bureaucratic structures. In fact, Blau is often cited as a founder of organizational sociology. Studies of bureaucracy completed in 1955 and 1970 confirmed suspicions that the growing size of any bureaucracy increases its complexity, complicates coordination within it, and can actually decrease efficiency. Later studies anticipated the manner in which **globalization** and corporate **capitalism** would come to define social relations and capital/labor dynamics in the United States.

Blau is famed for a path-breaking study of social mobility that he conducted with Otis Dudley Duncan in 1967. Blau and Duncan looked at the Horatio Alger myth of rags-to-riches. Their study confirmed the reality of upward mobility in the United States, but on a much more modest scale than the Alger myth suggests. They used empirical data from the Census Bureau to confirm that upward mobility was generally slight rather than dramatic. Their way of verifying this was novel and compelling. By looking at **status** attainment, the process by which individuals secure a given social position, and situating it within the occupations that confer said status, Blau and Duncan showed that any individual's chosen occupation was only partly dependent on his or her own ability and education, though those factors were important. One also had to look closely at the occupations, educational levels, and status of parents, as well as simple luck. When broken down, rather than seeing a dramatic change in the occupation of children vis-à-vis their parents, one sees the greatest cross-flow between occupations closely related in **prestige** and status. Moreover, children of high-status parents were more likely to inherit that status and improve upon it than children of manual workers. Hence, there has been an historic trend of reproducing existing social stratification rather than a dramatic restructuring of power via upward social mobility from the bottom.

The status attainment model has become one of the standard ways through which scholars analyze class. Blau's subsequent work built off this model. He showed that there were other factors that could influence upward mobility, including the role of nonparental significant others. Another factor, often widely refuted by conservatives, is that government policy in forms such as the GI Bill of Rights, educational grants, and low-income initiatives often stimulated greater mobility than ability alone. Still another study confirmed the difficulties that African Americans have in attaining status and asserted that they are far less likely than white families to be able to pass an attained higher status to their children.

Blau also conducted important work on social inequality. He refuted assumptions on the psychology of **poverty** that axiomatically linked high crime rates with being poor. Instead, Blau found a higher correlation between inequality and crime than between poverty and crime. An offshoot of this research verified the existence of "homophily," the tendency of people to associate with others like themselves. In social terms this means that minority or religious out-groups benefit more from inclusion in dominant groups than vice versa, a potentially potent argument in favor of controversial social measures such as school busing, integrated housing projects, and **affirmative action**. Blau was so influential that some scholars use models of what sociologist Miller McPherson dubbed "Blau space" to map the relative status position of individuals within social networks.

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BLUE COLLAR

SUSAN CLEMENS-BRUDER

Blue collar is a term that came into general use after World War II and refers to manual labor, which is usually paid hourly wages, might require special uniforms or work clothes, and differs from that of white-collar workers, who are usually salaried, do mental labor, and wear clothes not designed to get dirty. The success of the American labor movement in the 1930s, accumulated savings from overtime wages and shortages of consumer goods during World War II, and the benefits offered returning veterans after the war encouraged the belief that it was possible to expand the middle class to include stable members of the U.S. working class population. Blue collar became useful as a designation in the post-war years that the wages of unionized workers in mass-production industries and building trades would increase to parity with the middle class. By dividing the American workforce into blue-collar and white-collar categories, the middle class could be more easily analyzed by the government, sociologists, economists, and historians.

During the **Cold War**, a policy for increased military capabilities increased government contracts for the research and development of products that could be produced by industry for armed defense. Blue-collar industries benefited unevenly from the policy, which often resulted in slow periods that kept the working class from achieving the hopes of a true middle-class life. In order to keep up with heightened material expectations, blue-collar families often supplemented their income through second jobs for men, or "moonlighting," and/or full- or part-time jobs for women in "pink-collar" clerical and sales positions or in light industry. Critics, including many blue-collar families, argue that their lives were not truly middle class since white-collar families, many of whom had blue-collar roots, raised their own material expectations beyond that of the working class and were more successful in attaining them.

Many blue-collar families found that they could participate in the post-war move to the suburbs, especially to the lower-middle-class tracts such as the Levittowns of Long Island, New York, and Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania. This was made possible in part by Federal Housing Authority Loans and Veterans Administration Loans in the post-war period. Some workers were able to buy a boat or vacation cabin and take **vacations** in places that pre-World War II working class families could not afford. Critics, however, question whether the material success stories of some can speak for an entire group.

Blue-collar families report that there were some good years in industry before 1980, but they hoped that their children would not choose manual, industrial labor since it was physically demanding and often dangerous. Blue-collar families aimed for enough savings to put their children through college with the hope that the next generation could achieve middle-class incomes and white-collar jobs. That dream has been achieved by many second- and third-generation families with blue-collar roots, especially because of Veterans Administration benefits, low-interest government insured loans, and discount rates offered by many colleges and universities.

The heyday of blue-collar life was short-lived. By the 1980s, the concessions won from employers by unions reversed. Concession bargaining of the last twenty years of the twentieth century slowly chipped away at the gains workers had achieved in wages and benefits, and the class bargain of the post-war war years began to fail. Blue-collar workers accused **CEO**s of extravagant spending on entertainment, **country club** memberships, and luxurious business trips. Executives often criticized blue-collar workers of being greedy, lazy, and protected by their unions. They pointed out gains made in benefit packages in health care and extensive paid vacations. Unions continued to make concessions to employers, and although class conflict erupted mostly at the bargaining table and in workplace grumbling, during the 1980s a number of **strikes** erupted, most of which ended in unsuccessful results for workers.

Blue-collar jobs declined as competition from overseas industries increased. American automobile production declined during the two gasoline crises of the 1970s. Consumer electronics products made in America also suffered in the 1970s and 1980s because of Japanese competition. New high-tech industrial jobs required sophisticated training that many older workers saw as unachievable. Job losses in other heavy industries, especially in steel production, helped to complete what has become known as American **deindustrialization**, which ended the so-called heyday of a lucrative blue-collar life.

People employed in the jobs that could be labeled under the original definition of blue collar criticize the current practices of employing illegal **immigrants**, sending jobs overseas, and new technologies such as robotics in production industries and in the building trades as breaking the back-bone of good blue-collar work. Blue-collar jobs from which workers can make a viable living continue to disappear in the United States. Working class jobs are more likely to be found in the service sector, out of temporary employment agencies, or part-time arrangements. **Globalization** has further blurred "collar designations" in the United States.

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Alfred Lubrano, Limbo: Blue-Collar Roots, White-Collar Dreams, 2004; Becky M. Nicolaides, My Blue Heaven: Life and Politics in the Working-Class Suburbs of Los Angeles, 1920–1965, 2002; Reg Theriault, The Unmaking of the American Working Class, 2003.

BLUE-COLLAR UNIONS

ROBERT E. WEIR

Blue-collar unions refer to craft and industrial unions that emerged during the mature phase of the American **Industrial Revolution**. These unions consist mainly of manual laborers and reached their apex of importance during the period between 1935 and 1965. The decline of American manufacturing has led to an erosion of **blue-collar** work in general and has been a severe blow to the labor union movement. Sources vary on exact percentages, but in the mid-1960s, roughly one-third

of all American workers belonged to labor unions; by 2005, union strength had slipped to under 15 percent.

Workers have long sought the right to bargain collectively with employers. The first associations were collections of journeymen trying to wrest concessions from master craftsmen who owned the shops. The first formal unions, often organized despite statutes that declared them illegal, were craft unions—that is, collections of skilled workers performing similar tasks. Scores of craft unions emerged by the 1820s. Only a handful managed to have national strength in the antebellum period, and attempts to organize a larger federation were largely still-born. Only a few industries, notably textiles, shoes, and iron, could be said to be giant industrial concerns; most American production was still done in small shops manned by skilled craft workers, most of whom were men and most of whom were unorganized.

In the 1880s, the **Knights of Labor** managed to bring hundreds of thousands of workers under its wing, though the Knights organized across skill lines as well as in craft unions. It also pioneered what was later dubbed industrial unionism—that is, organizing workers according to the product they produced or the industry they serviced, not according to the specific task they performed. The **American Federation of Labor** (AFL), organized in 1886, finally brought craft workers into a larger association. By the 1880s, the United States was a major economic power and American manufacturing had moved into a mature phase.

Nonetheless, in the absence of federal laws protecting collective bargaining rights, forming unions of any sort was fraught with difficulty. The 1914 Clayton Act was the first important legislation to give labor the right to organize, but it was not until the passage of the 1935 National Labor Relations Act that collective bargaining was backed by federal protections. After 1935, labor union strength increased. This was due, in part, to the successes of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), which brought industrial workers like automakers, steelworkers, rubber makers, and textile workers into a common federation. Both the AFL and CIO conducted numerous union recognition strikes in the 1930s and early 1940s. By then, blue-collar workers were a staple of American economic life. In 1930 the total U.S. population was under 123 million, of whom roughly onethird worked in blue-collar manufacturing jobs. Powerful blue-collar unions like the United Autoworkers of America, the United Steelworkers, and the United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers unions represented millions of laborers in collective bargaining sessions. Despite the lingering effects of the Great Depression, by 1940 about 27 percent of all workers were union members.

In the period following World War II, blue-collar unions flexed their collective muscle. When the AFL and CIO merged in 1955, there was hope that "Big Labor," as journalists dubbed it, would serve as a countervailing force to "Big Business" and that industrial and business decisions would need input and acceptance from unions in order to proceed. This did not turn out to be the case. Blue-collar unions were already weakening by the time of the merger, a victim of conservative political legislation, such as the 1948 Taft-Hartley Act, and a furious counter-assault by anti-union forces, which waylaid plans to organize the non-union South. Still, by 1960 labor unions represented over 31 percent of all workers, a figure that climbed as high as 35 percent by 1965.

This seeming rise, however, was due more to post-World War II economic expansion than to AFL–CIO efforts. After 1965 the Vietnam War strained the economy. It was dealt a more serious blow by an embargo launched by oil-producing nations in the 1970s and by recessionary and inflationary pressures. These occurred at an inopportune time; American industries were aging and in need of retooling at precisely the time during which Europe, Japan, and Korea had begun to recover from World War II and build state-of-the-art factories. As American corporations in industries such as electronics, steel, textiles, and rubber lost market share to global competition, their retrenching led millions of blue-collar union jobs to disappear.

Blue-collar unions declined even more in the 1980s as employers demanded wage, hour, and benefit concessions from workers in the name of global competitiveness. Though business won much of what it wanted in the anti-union political climate under **Ronald Reagan**, it did not stem the loss of jobs or the decline of unions. Mergers eliminated more jobs, as did technological changes. For example, hundreds of thousands of telephone operators lost their jobs because of automated answering services. Outsourcing and relocating production to low-wage nations eliminated still more jobs.

In 1995 the AFL–CIO elected John Sweeney as its new president. Sweeney pledged a renewed organizing drive to rebuild labor's strength, but these plans have yielded little, and some have criticized Sweeney for wasting resources trying to rebuild blue-collar unions that they believe are doomed. There are many observers who retain faith in the ability of blue-collar unions to revive, but most observers feel that unions will need to shift their focus to retail and service sector jobs if they are to do so. Traditional blue-collar work is endangered within the United States, and the working class as traditionally understood may need to be reconceptualized. At present, the future of blue-collar work and blue-collar unions is uncertain.

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Stanley Aronowitz, From the Ashes of the Old: American Labor and America's Future, 1998; Sue Doro, Blue Collar Goodbyes, 1992; Rick Fantasia and Kim Voss, Hard Work: Remaking American Labor, 2004.

BLUES

JAMES PETERSON

The blues are challenging to define because they can refer to a range of feelings or to a multifaceted form of music. The term originates from the phrase "blue devils," which can loosely be defined as a despondent mood. The music known as the blues derives from a rich musical tradition of folk songs, ragtime music, African American spirituals, pre-jazz music, field hollers, and work songs.

The blues must be heard first and only subsequently read about or defined. Blues music exists wholly in oral and aural forms, and most scholars and aficionados of the blues favor live performances over the recorded ones, which by various estimations have been contaminated by **racism** and corporate greed. The blues can be described

BLUES

in a variety of ways: guttural, primitive, primordial, haunting, sad, and lewd. They engender all of these descriptions, yet maintain their status as a complex subject of study for musicologists and historians alike because of their multivalent grass-roots origins. The blues were developing as local forms of musical entertainment and cultural expression in the late nineteenth century simultaneously across the South, including but not limited to Mississippi, Louisiana, Tennessee, and Texas. Most scholars acknowledge that W. C. Handy, sometimes incorrectly referred to as the Father of the Blues, was one of the earliest official blues composers. That is, his encounters with the earliest blues musicians convinced him of the significance and economic import of the blues itself, as well as its commercial potential. Handy encountered the blues as early as 1890, and during one of these encounters he came to terms with the **proletarian** force of this peculiar emerging, moody music. Blues scholar Giles Oakley recounts Handy's experience in Cleveland, where he composed, arranged, and performed conventional nineteenth-century music, which included folk songs, spirituals, and minstrel show tunes, but not the local blues music erupting across the country. In Cleveland, during one such performance, a note was passed to Handy asking him to direct his band in "our native music." He responded by playing "an old time Southern melody," in response to which he received a second note asking if the local band could usurp the stage. He acquiesced and quickly bore witness to the fact that this local band earned more in tips during this impromptu performance than he and his band were being paid for that entire night.

This anecdote about Handy is significant for several reasons. It underscores the economics already at play in any discussions or definitions about the blues and/or those musicians who played them. It also highlights the important tensions between the power of local, nuanced cultural products and the hegemonic force of mass-produced and mass-mediated cultural products. These are the two enduring tensions in the blues and the music industry that tended to exploit the blues and its artisans. Although we cannot pinpoint a single sui generis bluesman or birth-of-the-blues moment, scholars agree that the blues as both emotion and music attempt to capture and express the conditions of bondage in **slavery** and the extent to which these conditions persisted in disguised forms after the collapse of **Reconstruction** and well into the twentieth century.

Historians have documented the horrific conditions of American slavery, the brief respite during Reconstruction, and the awful racial and economic conditions of the Jim Crow era of violent **segregation**. The blues were born in the midst of these conditions. The development of the blues in Southern states in the late nineteenth century can be viewed as a deliberate and willful response to violent racism and severe economic oppression. Alan Lomax argued that for many black working-class individuals, Jim Crow created more bitter feelings than slavery, experiences captured by blues singers. Accordingly, the instruments of the first blues were the most rudimentary: pain-filled human vocals, hand-made banjos, washboards, and other creatively improvised modes of making music. The content of these folk blues was usually love lost and/or severe economic conditions, both of which can be traced directly to the work conditions of the day. Love was usually transitory because individuals had to be mobile in order to defy the stultifying rules of **sharecropping** and other intrinsically unfair labor practices. Well into the twentieth century, African Americans were on the move seeking better opportunities and escape from prejudice.

This constant movement spread the blues even as it contributed directly to both their multifaceted appeal and their ability to develop local potency wherever blues musicians projected their pain into authentic, vernacular art.

This widespread popularity among the folk was an integral component in the development of the record industry. A popular blues record in the first half of the twentieth century could sell hundreds of thousands of copies just among poor African Americans. This economic potential had an adverse affect on America's first popular folk music recorded and performed by African Americans. One of the most dedicated ethnographers of the blues and American folk culture in general, Alan Lomax, complained that record producers cared little for aesthetics and were interested only in what sold well. This, he felt, explained why so many recordings were "slavish and uncreative imitation of others." Notwithstanding this unfortunate damper on the creativity of blues recordings, blues music still thrives not only in its own right as a powerful folk form, but it also continues to influence nearly every other form of popular American music, including jazz, rhythm and blues (R&B), rock and roll, and rap music.

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Alan Lomax, *The Land Where the Blues Began*, 1994; Giles Oakley, *The Devil's Music: A History of the Blues*, 1997; Hazel Rowley, *Richard Wright: The Life and Times*, 2001; Steven Tracy, *Langston Hughes and the Blues*, 2001.

BLUESTONE, BARRY (1944-)

SHANNON J. TELENKO

Barry Bluestone is a political economist, writer, and policy advocate. He currently serves as the Stearns Trustee Professor of Political Economy and Director of the Center for Urban and Regional Policy at Northeastern University. In 1995 he was a member of the senior policy staff for Congressman Dick Gephardt, the Democratic leader of the U.S. House of Representatives and later a United States presidential candidate. Bluestone founded and directed the Public Policy PhD Program at the University of Massachusetts–Boston. From 1971 to 1986 he taught economics at Boston College, where he was also director of the Social Welfare Research Institute. Raised in Detroit, Michigan, a place that has likely influenced and enhanced his scholarship on deindustrialization, Bluestone received his PhD from the University of Michigan in 1974.

There are two main categories for economists in the United States: classical and **Keynesian**. Bluestone would fall more in the second category, making his research and policy work more applicable to Democratic goals for the U.S. economy and federal budget. Fiscal conservatives and corporate leaders often perceive Bluestone's arguments as biased and quasi-**socialist**. His work leans more towards liberal, demand-side economics and encourages public spending and the easing of income inequalities.

In 1982 Bluestone and Bennett Harrison's book *The Deindustrialization of America* was published. Alfred E. Kahn, a former adviser on inflation to President Carter, wrote for the *New York Times* on December 12, 1982, "Even though I found

[Bluestone and Harrison's] analysis distorted, their explanations simplistic and their remedies of dubious efficacy, I commend their message to anyone interested in where America is and where it is going." Bluestone and Harrison also worked together on *The Retail Revolution* (1981), *Corporate Flight* (1981), and *Growing Prosperity* (2000). Bluestone and Harrison's earlier work describes what was going on behind the scenes in the 1980s, when American teachers urged students to surpass their Japanese counterparts in math and science.

Bluestone's early career focused on the changes that American business and industry were undergoing due to increased technology, **globalization**, and the subsequent layoffs of skilled workers. *Deindustrialization in America* highlighted the idea that firms were disinvesting in the United States productive capacity and subsequently in American individuals and communities. Rather than simply focusing on the bottom line, as a political economist Bluestone highlights the political as well as the social aspects of the economy and economic decision making. In 2003, just twenty years after *Deindustrialization in America*, Bluestone noted in the foreword of *Beyond the Ruins* that despite the dismal predictions of economists and other experts in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the mid-1990s were a time of renewed prosperity for many Americans. However, he takes care to note that despite these gains, many workers and communities still bear the brunt of deindustrialization.

Bluestone's career choices continue to highlight his commitment to understanding changes in the economy due to political decision making as well as how those changes affect people's lives and the decisions they make. He has made a deep imprint on young scholars who hope to create a richer understanding of the interactions between government, economy, society, and culture.

Suggested Reading

Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison, *The Deindustrialization of America: Plant Closings, Community Abandonment, and the Dismantling of Basic Industry*, 1982; Bluestone, Harrison, and Lawrence Baker, *Corporate Flight: The Causes and Consequences of Economic Dislocation*, 1981; The Center for Urban and Regional Policy at Northeastern University (http://www.curp.neu.edu/).

BOARDING SCHOOLS

See Education; Ivy League.

BOARDS OF DIRECTORS

MURNEY GERLACH

Boards of directors are responsible for the overall fiduciary, policy development, and management review of nonprofit and corporate organizations in modern America. Individuals on a board of directors are either appointed or elected according to law and are authorized to manage and direct the affairs of a corporation,

company, or nonprofit entity. They hold powers to review decisions individually but also to form collective policies that are consistent with the overall mission, values, and traditions of the organization.

The duties and responsibilities of a board of directors are set out in either the articles of incorporation, articles of organization, bylaws, or charter agreements. Some agreements date to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and a few go back to Colonial times. Other documents and guidelines for boards of directors are developed in a trustee manual or by various officers, directors, and committees who set rules, regulations, and operating procedures for the board. These set out the basic operating framework and entrust the **CEO** with the responsibility of working with the board to carry out the visions, missions, and day-to-day management of the organization, nonprofit group, or corporation. In all cases, the very best boards value the concepts of "work, wisdom, and wealth," or "time, treasure, and talent," to provide a wide range of fiduciary, strategic planning, and financial and business leadership in what has been recently been called "generative leadership." This later concept, developed by the authors Richard Chait, William Ryan, and Barbara Taylor, places value, community involvement, and forward thinking as critical elements that good boards bring to the management of organizations.

Most board members are passionate about the entity on whose board they serve and are professionals, executives, or community leaders with an understanding of how organizations work. The powers of the board and the CEO are related, integrated, and focused on the ways that decisions may be reached. Duties and responsibilities of directors or trustees include determining the organization's mission and fundamental policies according to its governing documents; setting the organizations long-term and strategic plans; reviewing its yearly progress; establishing fiscal policy by developing budgets and financial controls; fund raising; choosing a chief executive officer and evaluating that person's performance; developing close links and involvements with the community; supporting the CEO; and promoting the work and agendas of the organization.

CEOs are frequently the individuals who receive the most public attention, but their boards act as their superiors and often have the power to dismiss a CEO. Those who serve on boards of large corporations, **Ivy League** and other prestigious universities, and of numerous cultural agencies generally come from the economic **elites**, though less wealthy members of the **middle class** often make up the boards of nonprofit groups and less prestigious entities. There is a remarkable degree of overlap on boards serving the top echelons of society, a reality that leads some scholars to look at the intersections between wealth, **power**, and **prestige** and postulate the existence of a **corporate class** possessing undue influence.

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John Carver and Miriam Mayhew Carver, Reinventing Your Board. A Step-by-Step Guide to Implementing Policy Governance, 1997; Richard P. Chait, William P. Ryan, and Barbara E. Taylor, Governance as Leadership. Reframing the Work of Nonprofit Boards, 2005; Lewis D. Solomon and Alan R. Palmiter, Corporations. Examples and Explanations: A Student's Guide to Understanding Corporations, 1990; Thomas Wolf, Managing a Nonprofit Organization in the Twenty-First Century, 1999

Вовоѕ

See Neiman Marcus; Status Symbols; Yuppies.

BODY IMAGE

MAXINE LEVAREN

Body image has often been a reflection of the ideals of society and therefore a reflection of social class as well. Throughout history, there have been prevailing body images that were especially favorable among a particular class or ethnic group. This desire to conform to society's concept of beauty is most prevalent among women but is also a concern of some men.

In much of Europe and the United States, the ideal body image has changed throughout history. Up until the twentieth century, when much of society was agrarian and abundance was dependent on good crops, thinness indicated poverty and hunger, and a plump body image indicated a degree of health, wealth, and comfort. In fact, being fat was sometimes cultivated as a way to demonstrate wealth and a higher position in society. This perception of beauty is still held as an indication of a higher social status in many parts of the world, particularly in countries where life, dependent on agriculture, is more precarious and a lean figure shows someone who does not have enough to eat. However, as American society became more industrialized and food became more universally available, a lean body indicated access to a more balanced diet rather than a diet that was dependent on more filling and less nutritious foods.

Social class is not the only factor that determines the most desirable or acceptable body image, since different ethnic groups embrace varying ideals of beauty. For example, the African American and **Hispanic** communities tend to value a more full-figured body image, as opposed to the white American and European ideal of leanness. In addition, the ideal body image is most often associated with feminine beauty. In the modern day, men have been relatively immune from these standards.

Until the 1920s, the ideal feminine body image was one that indicated an ability to bear children—full breasts and hips. Fashion reflected this image with corsets and padding designed to emphasize these attributes. In Western Europe and the United States, body image often followed fashion rather than vice versa. For example, the flapper era of the 1920s favored thin women, as did the preference for thinness that started with Twiggy and the fashions of the 1960s.

Films and movies also influenced the ideal body image. During the 1940s and 1950s, the curvaceous images of the screen goddesses such as Rita Hayworth, Marilyn Monroe, and Jayne Mansfield were the epitome of female beauty. In the twentieth century, the media often promoted the ideal body image rather than reflecting it.

Preoccupation with body image is most prevalent among **middle-** and **upper- class** white women, who want to fit in with the ideals of beauty promoted in the media. This has often led to eating disorders, such as anorexia and bulimia, in an effort to be as thin as the most famous models and actresses.

Suggested Reading

Kathy Peiss, Hope in a Jar: The Making of America's Beauty Culture, 1999; Teres Riordan, Inventing Beauty: A History of the Innovations That Have Made Us Beautiful, 2004; Peter Stearns, Fat History: Bodies and Beauty in the Modern West, 2002.

BOSTON BRAHMINS

RONALD DALE KARR

Boston Brahmins are **upper-class** residents of Boston, especially members of a handful of distinguished families. The term "Brahmin" derives from the top echelon of India's **caste** system. Like Indian Brahmins, Boston Brahmins have placed great importance on privilege inherent in being born into particular families.

In 1859 Oliver Wendell Holmes described "the Brahmin caste of New England... the harmless, inoffensive, untitled aristocracy" of scholars, nearly always the offspring of old and cultivated families of ministers and intellectuals. In time, however, the term became synonymous with that of the "Proper Bostonian," a man or woman of the city's best families, regardless of level of intellectual activity.

Most of Boston's most celebrated clans were descended from merchants and ship owners who came to prominence following the departure of much of the city's Loyalist mercantile **elite** during the **American Revolution**. Some were already men of means in secondary ports, such as Salem and Newburyport. After the decline of shipping following the Embargo of 1807 and the War of 1812, they invested much of their wealth into manufacturing, banking, and later, railroads, vastly enhancing their fortunes. As the Boston Associates, they owned and managed corporations that controlled a significant proportion of New England's commercial property. Brahmins dominated the cultural and charitable institutions of Boston, founding the Massachusetts General Hospital, the Boston **Symphony Orchestra**, and the Perkins School for the Blind, as well as taking control of existing bodies, such as Harvard College.

Brahmin families, among them surnames such as the **Lowell, Adams**, Cabot, Lawrence, Appleton, Coolidge, Forbes, Higginson, Lee, Lyman, Peabody, Sears, and Saltonstall, tended to marry either within their Brahmin circle, with scions of socially-prominent families from other regions—such as New York's Harvard-educated **Theodore Roosevelt**—or with worthy Harvard faculty, such as Henry Wadsworth Longfellow or Louis Agassiz. Throughout most of the nineteenth century Brahmins typically lived on **Beacon Hill** or in the new townhouses of the Back Bay. By the middle of the twentieth century, however, most had moved beyond the Boston city limits to Chestnut Hill, Brookline, Concord, Lincoln, Dover, Beverly Farms, and other elite suburbs, though they often remained employed in the city as business executives, professionals, and brokers.

Boston's Brahmins, unlike their counterparts in New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, and other large cities, managed to fend off challenges from newer **wealth** after the **Civil War** and retain their economic, social, and political power well into the twentieth century. Indeed, one of their own, Senator John Kerry, was the Democratic candidate for President of the United States in 2004. Other notable Brahmins

have included numerous members of the Lowell family, the two Senators Henry Cabot Lodge (grandfather and grandson), Senator Leverett Saltonstall, the writer Henry Adams, the two Oliver Wendell Holmes (father and son), historians William Hickling Prescott, Francis Parkman, and Samuel Eliot Morison, and Civil War hero Colonel Robert Gould Shaw.

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Cleveland Amory, The Proper Bostonians, 1947; Robert F. Dalzell Jr., Enterprising Elite: The Boston Associates and the World They Made, 1987; Betty G. Farrell, Elite Families: Class and Power in Nineteenth-Century Boston, 1993; Frederic Cople Jaher, The Urban Establishment: Upper Strata in Boston, New York, Charleston, Chicago, and Los Angeles, 1982.

Bourdieu, Pierre (August 1, 1930–January 23, 2002)

DIETER BÖGENHOLD

Pierre Bourdieu was an influential French sociologist whose book *Distinction* (French 1979, English 1984) is considered one of the ten most influential books of the twentieth century according to the International Sociological Association. Most contemporary scholars of social class reference Bourdieu.

Bourdieu was born in Denguin, France, to **sharecropper** parents. He was schooled in Paris and served in the French army during the Algerian War. In 1964 he became director of the School for Advanced Studies on the Social Sciences in Paris and in 1981 became head of the sociology school at the College of France, also in Paris. In 1968 Bourdieu founded the Center of European Sociology. Before his death in 2002, Bourdieu received numerous accolades, honors, and awards.

Bourdieu's sociology is all-encompassing in that he synthesized findings from consumption behavior, education sociology, socialization research, and social stratification in a specific form that serves as an interdisciplinary cultural sociology. Bourdieu departed from many of the assumptions of a materialistic class theory. He refined his analysis to highlight social inequalities that exist even within subtle human actions. Differing social class practices can be detected, for example, in the ways in which people furnish their houses, where and how they vacation, how they host guests at home, the patterns of their leisure spending, musical preferences, and how they consume food and drink. Bourdieu noted the variations in daily life practices—drinking beer or champagne, for example—and interpreted them as codes that can be translated into a societal practice of differentiation and homogenization. Many such inequalities in differentiated market societies are no longer primarily grounded in conflicts for material resources but rather in practices of symbolic "distinction." Bourdieu's approach combines analysis of social stratification with the analysis of cultural symbols. In essence, Bourdieu sought to analyze objectively those cultural symbols and interactions that were customarily viewed subjectively.

When Bourdieu looked at society, he often employed the metaphor of a multidimensional "social space." Contrary to narrow materialistic interpretations, Bourdieu argued in favor of relative autonomous "social fields" covering divergent principles of differences and distributions, which give sources of **power** and **prestige** to individual actors. Individual actors or social groups are defined by their *relative* positions within these fields. One's place within society is, hence, not necessarily defined by social class alone; rather it depends in large part on the amount of social, cultural, and symbolic capital one possesses.

Following the lead of Max Weber, Bourdieu analyzed, theoretically and empirically, the relationship between "classes" and "status groups." By doing so he explored the meaning of social inequality relations in advanced consumption societies. Beside the inner workings of social fields, two further analytical pillars of reading Bourdieu's work involve individual capital and habit (Latin, habitus). The category of the field acts as location for the existence of social action and behavior including subfields such as the arts, the economy, law, policy, literature. Social fields are structured by a variety of social figurations and poles with concentrations of different capital. Bourdieu extended an interpretation of capital derived from Marxism. He saw it in economic terms and access to material resources, but also as a resource composition that included **social networks**, **education**, and the qualifications of social actors. Bourdieu discussed the financial, social, and cultural capital that human beings have at different levels and in different compositions. Cultural capital exists in three different forms; it is incorporated as permanent disposition, it exists objectively, and it becomes institutionalized. Society confers forms such as degrees and titles to express institutional cultural capital.

Social capital is treated within the context of actual and potential resources, all of which are connected to a network of stronger or weaker social contacts. Social capital can be converted to improved **life chances** and/or access to resources. For example, an individual possessing strong social capital has an advantage when seeking credit in financial markets or might land a job to which better qualified individuals simply have no access. In such a fashion, social networks are built and maintained. In this way, habitus becomes a form of cultural and **social reproduction**. The incorporated behavior of human actors and groups is acquired individually over time, but it also serves as permanent dispositions for those with access to those who model and teach those cultural symbols that perpetuate social inequality, including such seemingly insignificant markers of distinction such as **accents**, etiquette, and the carriage of one's body. His work suggests that most Western societies, including the United States, must be viewed through the lens of power relationships, popular rhetoric on **meritocracy** notwithstanding.

Bourdieu's cultural sociology of inequality has become very popular in academic discourse through the last two decades. It serves as a new starting point for research on divergent lifestyle research and mentalities. Apart from the sociological side of Bourdieu's career, he acted as an engaged political citizen and gave many interviews and talks through which he signaled his sympathy for critics of **globalization**.

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Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste, 1987; Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, 1997; Bourdieu, Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action, 1998; Bridget Fowler, Pierre Bourdieu and Cultural Theory: Critical Investigations, 1998.

Bourgeoisie

DAVID V. HEALY

Bourgeoisie is a French word literally referring to a title of nobility, although, ironically, it is most often applied to refer to the **middle class**. It is directly related to the English word *burgess*, which has similar usage.

Historically, the word is derived from the class of artisans and craftsmen that emerged in the Middle Ages. It was the bourgeoisie, using the wealth of their new class independence, who found the time to develop much of early European thought on philosophy. Their writings influenced thought for many years, establishing many trends, including those of the Enlightenment and later ages. Most importantly, bourgeoisie thought established concepts of natural and property rights, two elements that would serve as the foundation of Western civilization after the decline of the aristocracy and rise of the middle class that the bourgeoisie became.

In more modern times, the word *bourgeoisie* has become tied to **Marxist** philosophy. In many of Karl Marx's works he criticized the middle class as the enemies of the working class, the **proletariat** he endorses in his theories. The reasoning behind this critique cites the relationship between workers and their managers. According to Marx and other **communist** thinkers, the bourgeoisie exploits the labor of the proletariat, expropriating profit at the expense of workers who are beholden to the bourgeoisie for their jobs and livelihood. This is to the detriment of the workers, who are provided less than the worth of their labor on the part of their employers in the bourgeoisie.

Today, as Marxist thought has fallen aside, the word *bourgeoisie* is used less frequently. Though understood in academic circles, bourgeoisie is rarely heard in common discussion, although the adjective *bourgeois* is sometimes invoked in a negative way as shorthand for **social climbing**, pretense, excessive conformity, or a lack of imagination. However, while the word is out of fashion, the class consciousness that it initially represented and later engendered in common culture remains, as the middle class continues to be a prevalent and influential component of modern society throughout much of the world.

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Karl Marx, *The Communist Manifesto*, 1998; Michael Mollat and Phillipe Wolff, *The Popular Revolutions of the Late Middle Ages*, 1973; David K. Shipler, *The Working Poor: Invisible in America*, 2004.

BOWLING

ADAM R. HORNBUCKLE

In the United States, bowling usually refers to a game in which a ball is rolled in an attempt to knock down pins. This differentiates American bowling from European games such as lawn bowling or bocce. Ten-pin bowling is the most common form, but thin candle pins and short "duck" pin bowling also enjoy popularity.

The origins of modern bowling are found in the medieval German game of *kegels*, in which participants rolled a wooden ball into a group of wooden pins. Although the Dutch introduced bowling to the American colonies in New York, bowling became increasing widespread as German immigration to the United States intensified in the late 1840s. From the outset of its introduction to America, bowling was closely tied to gambling and the consumption of alcohol, which tarnished its reputation and led to prohibitions against the sport in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. In 1840, for instance, most of the 200 bowling alleys in New York City were associated with saloons, taverns, and gaming establishments. As such, bowling was mostly associated with the **lower classes** and the lower strata of the working class.

For much of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, urban, **immigrant**, working class males constituted the majority of bowlers in the United States. Nearly one-third of the bowling alley proprietors in turn-of-the-century Chicago were German immigrants, who catered to an ethnic, working class clientele. For many German, Italian, Czech, and Polish neighborhoods, the bowling alley was an important nexus of street-corner life, as young working class males would congregate at the establishments, socialize, and demonstrate their skills in an environment considered more respectable than the billiard parlor. For many first-generation Americans, bowling provided cheap entertainment, a source of self-display, and sociability in an environment favorable to sustaining their ethnic identity. In contrast, the cost of bowling was out of reach of most African Americans, few neighborhoods had bowling alleys, and those that did lost them during the **Great Depression**.

In 1895 the American Bowling Congress (ABC) formed to reform the character of the sport, to broaden its appeal beyond the working class, to standardize rules and equipment, and to sanction competition. Reflecting the success of the ABC in reforming bowling, bowling teams representing local businesses and professional organizations formed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. National prohibition, from 1919 to 1936, had more influence on reforming the character of bowling than the ABC, as many saloon and tavern owners, who maintained bowling alleys, became solely bowling alley proprietors after closing their bars. During the 1920s and 1930s, bowling lost many of its low-life associations and was transformed into an activity for good clean fun, in which both men and women could participate and socialize. In the 1930s, Chicago alone boasted over 500,000 bowlers, who made up nearly 900 leagues, representing various businesses, churches, civic groups, and ethnic societies.

The number of Americans participating in bowling stood at about 12 million after the Depression and increased to about 20 million after World War II. During the postwar era, bowling establishments became increasingly common in suburban shopping malls. Although the sport began to attract a **middle class** clientele after World War II, bowling remained for the most part a working class pastime, in which its participants enjoyed a relatively inexpensive source of entertainment and recreation, besides finding a place for camaraderie, socialization, and cultural identity.

The period between the end of World War II and into the early 1970s is generally held to be the heyday of organized bowling, with industrial leagues flourishing and professional bowlers such as Donna Adamek, Don Carter, Earl Athony, Betty Morris, and Don Weber acquiring sports hero status among the working class.

Some scholars see the popularity of bowling as consumed leisure as a confirmation of the newfound affluence of the working class in the postwar period.

As traditional **blue-collar** work declined during the 1970s and many of the industries that once supported bowling teams began to close, the ABC and other bowling associations made efforts to alter the sport's strong association with the working class. Upscale bowling alleys opened, while special events such as disco bowling nights encouraged cross-class participation. Some observers claim, however, that since the 1980s bowling has lost much of its community association altogether and is now primarily a solitary activity. Such assessments may be overly gloomy in some respects; each year more than 50 million Americans go bowling, about one-third of whom are under the age of twenty-four and bowl in peer groups.

There is little doubt, though, that bowling has never lost its association as a plebeian, low-culture activity. This can be seen in images that appear in such popular TV shows as *The Simpsons* and in films such as *Kingpin* and *The Big Lebowski*. It is also reflected in how professional bowling prize money fares vis-à-vis other sports. In 2005, for example, top-rated professional bowler Mike Scroggins earned over \$136,000, a lucrative sum, but one that is just over one-third of the *minimum* salary for professional baseball players. In the same year, American tennis star Andy Roddick made nearly \$1.8 million for a sport that attracts more well-heeled followers but in which only 17 million people participate.

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BRACE, CHARLES LORING (June 19, 1826-August 11, 1890)

ROBERT E. WEIR

Charles Loring Brace was a pioneering social worker and the founder of the Children's Aid Society, which he directed for thirty-seven years.

Brace was born in Litchfield, Connecticut, and grew up amid upper-middle-class comfort in nearby Hartford. He graduated from Yale in 1846 and from Union Theological Seminary three years later. Ordained as a Methodist cleric, Brace ascended the pulpit. Firsthand observance of New York City poverty caused Brace to change his focus. By the mid-1850s, New York City teemed with as many as 34,000 homeless children and even greater numbers of children living in dysfunctional and/or impoverished families. Some members of Brace's class came to embrace Social Darwinism, arguing that the fate of the poor was a product of their own character flaws. Although Brace never entirely shed paternalistic attitudes, he saw the problem of "street Arabs," as bands of street children were often dubbed, as potentially dangerous to social order and argued that the children needed assistance. He also felt that orphanages, soup kitchens, and other benevolent

agencies erred in merely offering basic creature comforts; Brace advocated programs that mixed aid with teaching **self-reliance**. In 1853 he founded the Children's Aid Society to provide sustenance, job training, educational opportunities, moral instruction, shelter, and other services for children.

Brace was also an advocate of foster care for troubled or endangered youths. To posterity he is best known for his controversial "Orphan Train" concept that relocated New York City youths and placed them with rural families, many of whom were located in remote Western states and territories. Critics and some later historians charged that many of the children became virtual serfs to farm families looking for free labor, though Brace and his supporters claimed that nearly 90 percent of their placements thrived. Hard data are sparse, however, with even the number of placements in dispute; in the seventy-five years of the program's existence, estimates vary from a low of about 100,000 relocated children to more than 400,000.

Brace was motivated by what he saw as his Christian duty and, hence, is often cited as an early shaper of the **Social Gospel** movement. When he died in 1890, his son, Charles Loring Brace Jr. (1855–1938), assumed control of the Children's Aid Society of New York. This agency continues to deliver services to needy children, and some of its young clients enjoy spectacular success later in life. Brace's life and career serve as a reminder of the complicated face of class relations in the nineteenth century. They illustrate that not all members of the middle class embraced Social Darwinism, but that those who rejected it did not entirely free themselves of its paternalistic, pietistic, and moralistic underpinnings.

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Bracero Program

ROBERT E. WEIR

The Bracero Program was an arrangement between the governments of the United States and Mexico in effect between 1942 and 1964 that allowed about 4.5 million Mexicans to cross into the United States and secure temporary employment, especially in agriculture. In many sections of the United States, especially the Southwest and California, controversy rages over the entry of illegal Hispanic immigrants into the country. Stemming the tide of illegal border crossings is often a cause celebre for conservatives. The merits (or lack thereof) of such efforts notwithstanding, contemporary discussions of Mexican immigration often neglect the reality that border crossings have been a long-term historical trend and, on occasion, the United States encourages it, either by official action or benign neglect.

Borders between the new United States and Spanish Latin America were fluid in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Although Mexico obtained independence from Spain in 1810, its northern borders and those of the Louisiana Purchase lands obtained by the United States from France in 1803 were both sparsely populated and imprecisely surveyed. Attempts by Mexico to define her borders and keep Southern slaveholders from illegally settling in the Téjas province were among the tensions that led to the Mexican War. When this conflict was settled by the 1847 Treaty of Guadalupe, Mexico ceded nearly half its territory to the United States, and over 100,000 Mexicans found themselves to be "Americans."

The border between the United States and Mexico remained porous throughout the nineteenth century, but little attention was paid as the United States was under-



Mexican braceros being examined at reception center before being put to work, California, 1959. © Michael Rougier/Time Life Pictures/Getty Images.

populated, Mexicans seldom competed with Anglo wage earners, and the specialized skills of the vaqueros were valued by **cattle kingdom** barons. They were also viewed as preferable alternatives to the Chinese, who were excluded altogether after 1882. To be sure, Mexicans were treated poorly, subject to nativist attacks, disproportionately poor, and viewed by many **Victorians** as subhuman, but only isolationists and **eugenicists** advocating closing the Mexican border.

During the cataclysmic Mexican Revolution of 1910, nearly two million peasants died and others suffered economic deprivation. This led many to cross the U.S. border in search of safety or opportunity. This coincided, however, with heightened rhetoric about Anglo-Saxon racial superiority, which led to a general curtailment of immigration, and a larger number of American officials calling for tightening of border controls. Oddly enough, Mexicans were excluded from a restrictive 1924 immigration act, but the Border Patrol was established in that year.

Sentiment ran for exclusion during the **Great Depression**, but this changed during World War II, when the United States experienced a manpower shortage in agriculture. Under the 1942 bill "For the Temporary Migration of Mexican Agricultural Workers to the United States," Mexican workers were recruited to cross the border to cut sugar beets and harvest crops such as cotton, cucumbers, and tomatoes. This program was popularly called the Bracero Program, for the Spanish slang term meaning, roughly, "strong-arm worker." Before this program ended in 1964, as many as four million Mexican workers came to the United States.

Under the Bracero Treaty signed with Mexico, immigrants were supposed to be over the age of fourteen, have their transportation and living costs paid, and were to receive at least thirty cents an hour in wages. In practice, the thirty-cent guideline became the default wage, living quarters were routinely substandard, and birth certificates were easily falsified to facilitate hiring children. The bill also provided for repatriation of workers once harvests were completed, but it was quite easy for many to avoid return. Public pressure to end the program did not sit well with agribusiness, whose corporate farm structure came to depend on cheap Mexican

labor. Lost in the contemporary hue and cry over illegal Mexican immigration is agribusiness's role in perpetuating that immigration and its disingenuous claim that checking green cards and official identification is too difficult a task.

In effect, the Bracero Program never really ended; it simply shifted from official sanction to customary practice. Many **Hispanics** and **Latinos** have been incorporated into business patterns in which they are viewed as a cheap and readily available labor supply. The general exploitation of immigrant and migrant labor led to the formation of the United Farm Workers of America union in 1966, and there have been gains made in wages and working conditions, but the overall status of Hispanic and Latino farm workers is still debased, and many social scientists would use them as negative examples of **ethnic stratification** in the contemporary class system. The future implications of this are profound given that President George **Bush** and Mexican President Vicente Fox have discussed the creation of a new Bracero program. To its defenders, such a program is a realistic way to reduce illegal immigration and provide Mexicans with economic opportunity. To its critics, the Bush-Fox plan simply debases wages and ensures a supply of cheap farm labor for agribusiness, underpaid clerks in urban service sectors, and domestic servants for self-indulgent **yuppies**.

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BUCHANAN, PAT (November 1, 1938–)

ROBERT E. WEIR

Patrick Joseph Buchanan is a controversial and enigmatic ultra-conservative. He has served three presidents, has run for the presidency thrice, and is a prolific writer and a ubiquitous commentator on television, radio, and in print.

Buchanan was born in Washington, D.C., one of nine children to William Baldwin and Catherine Elizabeth (Crum) Buchanan. He graduated from Georgetown University in 1961 and obtained a master's degree in journalism from Columbia in 1962. That same year he began writing for the *St. Louis Globe Democrat*. His political activities began when he helped Richard Nixon mastermind a political comeback. When Nixon assumed the presidency in 1969, Buchanan came aboard as a researcher and a speechwriter for Nixon's vitriolic vice president, Spiro Agnew. Some sources credit Buchanan with playing a role in normalizing relations with China and for encouraging Nixon to seek détente with the Soviet Union. He also pressed Nixon to resist allying himself with the civil rights movement and made numerous controversial statements about the slain **Rev. Martin Luther King Jr.**

Buchanan was also involved in some of the activities associated with Watergate, which brought down the Nixon presidency, but he was never indicted.

Buchanan briefly advised Gerald Ford but resigned in 1974 to take up political commentary. Buchanan served as the White House communications director

during **Ronald Reagan**'s second term and once again engendered controversy. Buchanan has been a long-time critic of Israel, has asserted that the extent of the Holocaust has been exaggerated, once praised Spanish dictator Francisco Franco, and was the chief architect of an embarrassing scenario in which President Reagan laid a wreath at a German cemetery in Bitburg, where ex-Nazis are interred.

Buchanan again left government in 1987 and resumed his commentator role. He was highly critical of Reagan's successor, George H. W. **Bush**, and fought him for the Republican nomination when Bush sought reelection in 1992. He garnered over three million votes by evoking **culture war** themes, ridiculing Bush's tax increases, and staking out populist turf. When Bill Clinton defeated Bush in the general election, Buchanan turned his ire on the Clinton administration. He tried again in 1996 to secure the Republican presidential nomination; although he did not win, he won the New Hampshire primary.

Buchanan's 1996 campaign highlights why he is such a puzzling figure. Although he was far and away the most conservative figure in the race, he was the only one to address directly the plight of the American working class. Buchanan has been an outspoken opponent of the North American Free Trade Agreement and is a protectionist who feels that high import tariffs are needed to protect American jobs from the pressures of **globalization**. His America-first themes resonate with many American workers, and he enjoys considerable support among imperiled **blue-collar** voters. Although **Ralph Nader** is usually credited with being the "spoiler" in the disputed 2000 election in which the Supreme Court determined that George W. Bush had defeated Al Gore, Buchanan himself played a significant part. He was on the ballot as a Reform Party candidate. In Florida, whose vote determined the final outcome, some voters claimed they accidentally punched Buchanan's name on confusing ballots, thinking they were voting for Gore. This probably did occur in some cases, but in others the populist-sounding Buchanan probably wooed workers who would have otherwise voted for Gore.

Buchanan remains a controversial commentator, whose views can be found in *The American Conservative* and in many other media outlets. His detractors call him racist, sexist, elitist, nativist, homophobic, and bigoted because he has made statements that have outraged abortion rights supporters, immigrants, Jews, African Americans, gays, and women. That said, he remains steadfast in his support for American workers, the need to rebuild American industry, and in his attacks on American economic policy. He also strikes populist chords in his opposition to American interventionism. He opposed both Iraq wars and called upon President George W. Bush to remove American troops from Iraq.

In many ways Buchanan challenges traditional political notions of liberals and conservatives. Although many debate his positions and view him a fringe player, Buchanan has paid more attention to the plight of the working class than most mainstream politicians.

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BUSH FAMILY

RICHARD JENSEN

As one of the premier political families in America from the 1950s onward, the Bush family has wrestled with social class. Their **upper-class**, high society, highincome background was obvious to everyone, but has not always been a handicap. In the 1950s, when Prescott Bush (1895–1972) served as Republican senator from Connecticut, men of comparable background held office in the nearby states, including Governor Averill Harriman of New York and Senator John Kennedy of Massachusetts. Like the **Rockefeller** and Kennedy families, the Bushes have moved around in search of a geographical base, but always with family support. Prescott Bush's father, Samuel P. Bush (1863–1948), was a manufacturing executive from Ohio, but Prescott moved to Connecticut in 1925 and commuted to a senior position with Brown Brothers Harriman & Co., a Wall Street firm headed by his fatherin-law. During the Great Depression he maintained a pleasant but not ostentatious home, well staffed with three full-time maids and a chauffeur-bodyguard for the children. Bush became active in local Greenwich town affairs, then in the statewide Republican Party as a moderate similar in views to his friend Dwight Eisenhower. He strongly supported civil rights. His positions also resembled those of Nelson Rockefeller, but the two were estranged. Bush was elected to the Senate in 1952 after defeating celebrity Clare Boothe Luce in the primary. His son, war hero George H. W. Bush (1924-), graduated from Yale in 1948 and went to Texas to start a career in the oil industry, with family encouragement. George's son George W. Bush (1946–) also settled in Texas, while the younger son, Jeb Bush (1953–), relocated to Florida to build a new base. Jeb was defeated for governor in 1994, but won in 1998 and 2002. All the Bushes showed very high levels of commitment to civic duty and activism.

American class tensions in politics peaked around 1948, as the **labor movement** reached its maximum strength. The Bushes avoided this problem in the South, where unions were weak and class conflict did not separate the parties. On the petroleum frontier in West Texas, fortunes were quickly gained and lost. During the 1950s and 1960s the Bushes lived in twenty-eight homes in seventeen different Texas cities. George H. W. Bush realized the state lacked a grassroots Republican Party, and he helped build it from scratch. (Bush even worked with a speech therapist to sound more Texan.) He lost his 1964 Senate race, then was elected to Congress, and subsequently served as ambassador to the United Nations and to China. He also became national chairman of the GOP and Central Intelligence Agency director. In 1980 he challenged **Ronald Reagan** for the party's presidential nomination and lost, but Reagan made him vice president. Bush was elected president in 1988, directed the first Gulf War, and presided over the final collapse of **communism**. He avoided claiming victory in the **Cold War** so as not to destabilize Russia, a new American ally.

Class, however, was an issue in 1992, when Bush lost the presidency to Bill Clinton, a genuine Southerner whose appeal to common people was sharper. Clinton also promised tax relief to the **middle class**. A recession began in July 1990, and **unemployment** surged from 5.3 percent in 1989 to 7.4 percent in 1992. The recession officially ended before Election Day, but voters focused less on economic indicators and more on subtle indicators of character. Once Bush reneged on his pledge never to raise taxes, his moral credibility was shaken. He was also hurt by the populist class- and morals-based challenge of **Patrick Buchanan** in the primaries. That attack was followed immediately by Ross Perot's third party crusade against budget deficits, which he portrayed as a moral failure. Bush also was betrayed by his family's patrician roots at times, most famously during a debate with Clinton in which he was clearly unaware of American **shopping** habits.

For a time, George W. Bush appeared to be a ne'er-do-well, rejecting high society for the bottle and marrying a local librarian, Laura Bush (1946–). She proved a steadying influence, however, and helped Bush reform his character and reemerge as a chastened, born-again Christian. He also polished his public image, evoking a working-class back-to-the land ethic by chopping underbrush and stringing barbed wire on his ranch in Crawford, Texas. Inheriting his father's base and guided by campaign strategist Karl Rove, George W. Bush was elected governor of Texas in 1994 and was reelected in 1998. Republicans rallied around him in the 2000 presidential campaign, though he had to defeat the maverick John McCain to win the nomination. His election as the 43rd president in 2000 turned on 500 ballots in Florida, where Governor Jeb Bush operated a recount strategy that defeated the floundering Al Gore. The defining moments for President Bush were the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States and the war in Iraq. In both cases the heroic exemplars of duty and sacrifice were working class Americans: the firemen and police who died saving lives and the volunteer soldiers in Iraq.

That said, both presidents have been more comfortable with business interests than with **blue-collar** America. For example, George W. Bush relied on business and family **social networks** to fund his oil investments and his partial ownership of a major league baseball franchise. He is strongly committed to the idea that federal **income taxes** dampen entrepreneurship and slow long-term economic growth and that high rates are a punitive leftover from the days of **New Deal**-style class conflict politics. An important episode came in 2006, when Bush linked a 40 percent raise in the **minimum wage** to the repeal of the estate tax. To date, Senate Democrats have scuttled the plan because it would be too generous to the rich.

Karl Rove has also helped George W. Bush reframe class as cultural and lifestyle issues. In 2000, Bush appealed to rural working class Democrats in the border states, including opponent Al Gore's Tennessee. Bush made a special appeal to coal miners, truckers, steel workers, and factory workers, many of whom were identified as **Reagan Democrats**. Bush warned that their cultural values were under attack by Hollywood **elites** and that even hunting privileges were threatened by East and West Coast liberals. He swept the South in 2000 and again in 2004 with an anti-elitist appeal that neutralized **income** differences. Indeed, since the 1980s income has not been major determinant of voting behavior. George W. Bush won 41 percent of the poorest fifth of voters in 2004, 55 percent of the richest twenty percent, and 53 percent of those in between. The biggest remaining cleavages break

down along **racial** and **educational** lines. Since 1980 African Americans have voted Democratic about 85 percent of the time, regardless of income. In 1988 George H. W. Bush won 52 percent of the total vote, about what his son would win in 2004. But the elder Bush won 62 percent of voters with bachelor's degrees (but no higher), and in 2004 the younger Bush got only 52 percent. Among voters with a master's degree or higher, George H. Bush won 50 percent of their vote in 1988, while in 2004, his son received just 42 percent. Of course, George W. Bush made up the difference by gaining among college dropouts.

The education differential has expressed itself in the Bush family's positions on "culture war" issues dividing Americans. The elder Bush attacked the National Endowment for the Arts as unworthy of funding, as interest in the arts correlated with education, but not with income. His son expanded federal spending on science and education, but made a point in attacking projects like stem cell research, which was morally upsetting to the poorly educated, anti-science, religious fundamentalists in his base. (In 2004, 70–80 percent of white evangelicals voted for Bush.) In terms of education, Bush's "No Child Left Behind" program reoriented American public schools, demanding that they guarantee basic skills to working class students, while diverting class time away from enrichment programs favored by the well educated. Other fronts on the culture wars included limitations on gay rights, which won support from both fundamentalists and African Americans.

After 2004 much of George W. Bush's support eroded. He was widely criticized for clumsy handling of relief efforts after Hurricane Katrina. (In sharp contrast his brother Jeb has dealt better with Florida hurricanes, and his father effectively raised funds for Asian tsunami victims in 2005.) There have also been questions over his handling of the second Gulf War. Immigration has also been a hot-button issue, with many Republicans lobbying for a crackdown on illegal aliens. The Bushes, however, have been outspoken supporters of Latinos. Jeb Bush married a Mexican woman, became a Catholic, and his son, George P. Bush (1976–), is bilingual and calls himself Hispanic. George W. Bush's push for more open borders has won backing from the small business owners, such as restaurateurs, hoteliers, farm contractors, and construction company executives, who depend on immigrant labor. It has been criticized by others as coddling illegal activity.

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BUSINESS ARISTOCRACY

KEVIN S. REILLY

Business aristocracy is a frequently pejorative description of business elites that often accompanies debates about class privilege and democracy. In the early nineteenth century, this phrase referred to the potential for politically influential businessmen

to act together as a corrupt caste. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, it evolved to become a rhetorical disparagement for the wealthiest and most entrenched business leaders. In the post World War II period, sociologists further developed the idea in analyses of the American **upper class**.

In the early republic, American lawmakers were coming to terms with the economic and legal difficulties of democratic **capitalism**. At issue was the development of a legal institution: the corporation. Charters for incorporation granted special rights to the owners. For the generation following the **American Revolution**, such special protections seemed fundamentally at odds with the political philosophy of republicanism. If the government began to endow small groups of investors with privileges, what chance could the typical American individualist have? Writers such as James Fennimore Cooper and others criticized the rising numbers of wealthy "business aristocrats," who seemed to rekindle the decadent corruption of British colonial administrators.

Similar critics emerged in the late nineteenth century when new industrialists, sometimes referred to as "**robber barons**," developed an American aristocratic style—lavish parties, ostentatious mansions, and enormous art collections—to display their vast wealth. Their tendency to build monopolistic businesses and their support of high tariffs to protect domestic industries from competition looked alarmingly like a new kind of feudalism.

The notion of a business aristocracy has been more poetic than descriptive, but in the 1950s, sociologists set about trying to explore the upper class in the United States and give some precision to the term "business aristocracy." Foremost among these scholars was **E. Digby Baltzell**, who argued that the upper class was two groups: one fluid, created by new business wealth, and one less dependent upon wealth than upon family lineages. For Baltzell, the establishment of a European style aristocracy—an exclusive group educated in a few elite schools, practicing **Episcopalian**ism, and exhibiting common Anglo-Saxon backgrounds—was actually a phenomenon that restrained the abuse of power in American society. Unlike **C. Wright Mills**'s self-serving "power elite" of business and institutional leaders, Baltzell's aristocracy policed itself against individuals who might violate the group's values and undermine its claims to social authority and privilege.

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BUSINESS CYCLE

GERALD FRIEDMAN

The business cycle refers to the periods of rapid expansion of output and strong employment followed by periods of relative stagnation that are common in capital-ist economies. Over the past 100 years, there have been nineteen business cycle

downturns in the United States, or about one every five years. Rising output and employment during business cycle expansions are associated with rising wages, especially for low-wage workers; on the other side, declining output and employment are associated with falling wages, rising **unemployment**, and widening inequality.

Economists have long debated whether business cycles are accidents due to unforeseeable natural disasters or bad government policy or whether they are intrinsic to the nature of capitalism. The latter was the position of the early nineteenth century English economist Thomas Malthus, who argued that downturns were caused by a "general glut" in which more was produced than could be consumed. He recommended wasteful spending by rich landlords and others to ameliorate the business cycle. Malthus's friend David Ricardo responded by enunciating what has come to be known as "Say's Law" after the French economist Jean-Baptiste Say. Recognizing that individual products may be in excess supply, he denied that there could be a general glut. Producers, he argued, never produce except to consume, hence the total volume of production must necessarily be the same as the amount demanded. There can be general business downturns, Ricardo acknowledged, but he attributed them to temporary shocks such as demobilization after wars or else mistakes in governmental or monetary policies. Because they are not due to intrinsic conditions, they are temporary anomalies and should never be the source of general economic policies.

Since the early nineteenth century, most economists have accepted Say's Law and view business cycles as accidents rather than normal parts of capitalist society. One exception was Karl Marx, who argued that capitalist economies are inherently unstable because capitalist production is for profit rather than consumption. Capitalists, he argues, hire workers hoping to use their labor to produce goods of greater value than the wages they receive. But once most of the unemployed have been hired, continued expansion drives up wages and squeezes profits. Lower profits then reduce investment until the economy enters a recession or depression in which falling employment restores profits and revitalizes conditions for renewed expansion by driving down wages.

Few orthodox economists have openly embraced Marx, but others agreed that capitalist economies were inherently unstable. In the midst of the **Great Depression** of the 1930s, **John Maynard Keynes** argued that output is unstable because it depends on private investment, which fluctuates with investor confidence. Associating capitalist investment with a gambling casino, Keynes argued that private investment fluctuated with little regard for real need or economic circumstances because investors speculated on how other investors would value these projects in the future, not on the current or future value of their projects. Because private investment is driven by "animal spirits," Keynes argued that society cannot expect that the actions of private capitalists will necessarily produce full employment. Instead, he urged that governments should take an active role in guiding the economy to ensure a high level of output and employment. Only such intervention can limit the prevalence or virulence of business cycles.

Since Keynes, most governments have conducted "countercyclical" policies to increase spending during business recessions and reduce output during inflationary periods. While economists who believe in Say's Law reject such policies, there

is evidence that they have lessened the frequency and severity of business cycle downturns.

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C

CAMPAIGN FINANCING

ROBERT E. WEIR

Many reformers argue that the high cost of political campaigns in America is a class issue. In essence, the capital resources needed to secure election make candidates beholden to either wealthy interests or their overt representatives. Some argue that the connection between money and **power** is so thoroughly entrenched that it imperils the very essence of **democracy**.

Political office has always been more the domain of the wealthy than of those with reduced means. The prevailing ideal among the **Founding Fathers** was that government should be controlled by men of substance; in fact, ideally one engaged in public service only after having retired from a profitable enterprise. Although most Founders felt no one should spend one's entire career in politics, this was precisely the norm that came into being. Regardless, there has been remarkable continuity in the connection between the possession of wealth and the holding of political power. In theory, the United States is a representative democracy; in practice, most that hold high political office come from the upper **middle class** or the **upper class**. This is true even when candidates package themselves as men of "modest" means. Andrew **Jackson**, for example, had substantial land holdings; Abraham Lincoln was a successful railroad lawyer; and William Henry Harrison grew up in middle-class comfort, not the log cabin he used as a campaign symbol. Not a single man holding the presidency in the twentieth or twenty-first century could, in any way, be considered a person of modest means.

U.S. senators were not chosen by the electorate until the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913; prior to this, they were chosen by state legislatures and were often part of the "spoils system," wherein a winning party doled out rewards to longtime supporters and financial backers.

Mass media have exacerbated the tendency for elections to hinge more on money than on issues. Since the 1960s, television has played a large role in shaping voter behavior. Put simply, name recognition, image, and public perception are as important, if not more so, than issues. Television advertisements are expensive, as are the services of pollsters, public relations firms, and political consultants who craft the images of candidates, help them package their voter appeal, and plot their election strategies. By 1996 it cost an average of \$4.7 million to run a campaign for the U.S. Senate, an amount that required winning candidates to spend much of their time in office raising funds for reelection rather than attending to duties. Broken down, a senator needed to raise more than \$12,500 each week for an entire six-year term. Races for the House of Representatives soared to an average of over \$670,000 for the privilege of serving a two-year term. These numbers have continued to skyrocket. During presidential elections, the amount of money spent is staggering. In 1984 little more than \$200 million was spent; just twenty years later it was over \$2 billion. Even local and state races feel the impact of money. In 2004 Connecticut studies revealed that winning state senators had spent more than \$71,000 on their races.

The amount of money one must raise to get elected means that few candidates can be true "populists" representing "average" people. Corporate interests, labor unions, and political action committees (PACs) are among the few social groups that can command resources of the magnitude needed. Weak campaign finance laws ensure that these interests remain strong. In 1925 Congress passed the toothless Corrupt Practices Act, which failed to curtail influence. Equally ineffective was the 1939 Hatch Act. The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1972 (amended in 1974) set up the Federal Election Commission to oversee elections, partially fund presidential elections, require candidates to disclose the source of contributions, and set limits on the amount that could be given. Under federal law, an individual can contribute \$2,000 per candidate and PACs \$5,000 per candidate; total contributions are limited to \$25,000. These provisos proved wholly inadequate. There were no restrictions on "soft money"—contributions given directly to a political party and then channeled to the candidate indirectly. Nor did laws restrict "issues" advertising, in which advocacy groups run ads that support or attack a candidate's position on specific concerns. Moreover, candidates who come from wealth find very few restrictions placed on how deeply they can tap their own resources. The McCain-Feingold bill of 2002, officially the Bipartisan Reform Act, supposedly banned soft money, restricted "issues" advertising to sixty days before a general election, clamped down on how unions allocated member contributions, and closed several other loopholes.

Evidence suggests that, thus far, the ability to raise money continues to control election results. According to the Center for Responsive Politics, the candidate who raises the most money wins more than 90 percent of the time. Given that incumbents have greater access to potential donors, the current system perpetuates the link between entrenched political power and financial might. As of 2004, 123 of the 435 members of the House of Representatives had personal fortunes of over \$1 million; in the Senate, 35 of 100 are millionaires. It should also be noted that Congressional salaries put all members in the top 10 percent of wage earners. A 2003 study also revealed that nearly all members also had assets well above the national average.

Critics of the wealth/elections nexus charge that the high cost of political campaigns makes it difficult for third parties to challenge the Republicans and Democrats.

More serious still is the tendency for ideology and self-interest to drive political giving. Individual donations average just \$200. By contrast, in the 2004 election business interests channeled 55 percent of their more than \$1.5 billion in donations to Republicans, while organized labor gave 87 percent of its \$66.1 million to Democrats. In 2002 Wal-Mart gave eight times more money to Republicans than to Democrats, especially those with conservative leanings. Studies reveal that money is a deciding factor in close races and that it often alters voter perceptions in such a way that many come to support candidates whose positions are antithetical to their own. From the perspective of social class, an obvious problem is that very few groups who advocate for the poor have the resources to buy the sort of influence that corporate interests underwrite. Influence, in fact, is so expensive that even some business groups have called for serious campaign reform. To date, however, substantive reforms, such as setting hard spending caps, limiting the length of the campaign season, banning PACs, and providing free media access, have made little progress.

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CAPITALISM

CHUCK BARONE

Capitalism is an economic system in which commodities and services are produced for profit using privately owned goods and wage labor. The owners of capital goods hire wage labor to produce commodities with the goal of making a personal profit. The owners (or their designated managers) make most of the economic decisions and receive profit and other property income, including rent, interest, and dividends. Capitalism generally produces substantial economic growth and inequality.

Capitalism's founding manifesto is often considered to be Adam Smith's 1776 book *Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, though Smith based his work on many older ideas. It has in fact been the dominant economic system in parts of Europe since 1600. An inherently expansionary system from its earliest beginnings, capitalism has spread to most places in the world. It has developed very unevenly; in some places it has been a powerful engine of growth and industrialization—as in most of Europe, the United States, and Japan—but has left other parts of the world poor and underdeveloped.

Wherever capitalism has taken root, it has been and continues to be a powerful force for both positive and negative changes. **Globalization**, the result of the accelerated movement of capital around the world, provides opportunities for greatly expanded profits and low-cost consumer goods. Although some businesses and consumers may benefit, **outsourcing** has negative impacts for employees who lose their jobs or must accept lower pay to keep them. The costs and benefits of the

changes wrought by capitalism are usually very unequally shared, and those who bear a disproportionate share of the costs are rarely compensated for such losses.

Capitalism features generalized commodity production. Its other distinctive characteristics include private ownership of the **means of production** (capital goods), wage labor, and production for profit. Capitalism is historically the first economic system in which commodity production is generalized and most products are produced for exchange. Exceptions include the household sphere, where the products and services of household labor (performed mostly by women) are not exchanged directly for money in a market. The market is the basic mechanism through which exchanges are facilitated in capitalism. Markets regulate and coordinate commodity exchanges through price movements caused by competitive supply-and-demand conditions in markets for means of production, labor power, and final goods and services.

Although markets are the primary exchange-regulating mechanism, other regulating mechanisms exist in capitalism, such as government regulation and planning. The extent of government intervention is as hotly contested today as it was when Adam Smith argued that markets were self-regulating and needed minimal government regulation. **John Maynard Keynes**, a twentieth-century British economist and financier, was one of the first to make a compelling case for government intervention to stave off depressions and other market failures. Today few question the need for government regulation, yet in practice government intervention varies across countries and depends upon the political balance of power among those who may benefit from regulation and those who do not. Although capitalists may generally favor a loosely or unregulated business environment, this will depend upon whether corporate interests are advanced by government intervention.

Private ownership of the means of production places most of the land, raw materials, tools, equipment, factories, farms, and offices in the hands of privately owned businesses and corporations. Public or government ownership has a very limited place in capitalism, especially in the United States, where private business interests are quite powerful politically. Most production in capitalism takes the form of dependent commodity production, where one group (a distinct minority) owns the means of production and another group (the majority) provides the labor in the form of wage or salaried labor. Those who do not own the means of production must sell their labor power to those who do. Thus wage labor and private ownership of capital goods are closely related in capitalism.

Profits alone determine what will be produced and how it will be produced in a classic capitalist system. Capitalists hire workers to produce output. Out of the total revenue obtained from the sale of the output produced by labor, capitalists pay wages, raw materials, operating costs, and wear and tear on capital goods. The remaining revenue is the capitalist's profit. Capitalists are driven by competition to maximize rates of profits, a goal that is often in conflict with the interests of employees, whose goals are higher wages and salaries and better working conditions.

The hierarchal and authoritative dimension of capitalism is based on an unequal class structure. Capitalists and workers thus constitute separate classes in capitalism, and their competing interests have given rise to conflict and **class struggle**. The working class consists of those who must perform wage labor. Workers pro-

duce the total product, but they have little control over the labor of others or the labor process. This internal tension within capitalism has given rise to the **labor movement**, **unions**, and competing socialist movements, the latter rooted in a collective rather than a private ethos.

Karl Marx argued that, although capitalism was a powerful force for industrialization, it was a contradictory system that would at some point limit human progress. Marx predicted that antithetical class interests between the capitalist bourgeoisie and the wage-earning proletariat would precipitate socialist revolution. Advanced capitalism, however, is more complex than Marx envisioned. The middle classes, for example, contain many small business owners and those who are self-employed. They own their own means of production but do not rely substantially on the labor of others. Managers and other business professionals are also part of the middle class. They do not own capital goods but often have authority over workers. The growth of these middle classes have tempered to some degree class conflict and struggle.

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
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CARNEGIE, ANDREW (November 25, 1835–August 11, 1919)

VICTORIA GRIEVE

A business mogul and **philanthropist**, Carnegie is often viewed as the embodiment of the American "rags to riches" dream. He was born in Dunfermline, Scotland, to a working-class weaving family. When steam-powered looms destroyed craft production in Dunfermline, his father, Will Carnegie, was thrown out of work, and in 1848 the family immigrated to the United States. Settling in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, the Carnegies relied on an established community of Scottish immigrants for assistance. A fellow Scot offered Andrew his first job as a bobbin boy in a textile mill; he earned \$1.20 per week and enrolled in night school to learn bookkeeping.

Carnegie climbed steadily from bobbin boy to clerk to messenger to telegrapher to superintendent of Pennsylvania Railroad's Western Division. In his twelve years with the railroad, Carnegie learned modern systems of management and principles of capital investment that shaped his career. In 1856 Carnegie invested \$217.50 in the Woodruff Sleeping Car Company, which provided returns of about \$5,000 annually after just two years. His next major investment, in the Columbia Oil Company, produced a profit of more than \$6,000 in one year. Carnegie foresaw the need for iron bridges to replace wooden ones and formed the Keystone Bridge Company to make them. By the time he was thirty-three, Carnegie's investment income topped \$50,000 per year.



Andrew Carnegie, ca. 1913. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

Carnegie played a crucial role in shaping the American system of manufacturing in the nineteenth century. Dissatisfaction with iron rails and visits to the Bessemer steel plants in England convinced him that steel would replace iron in manufacturing. Prior to opening his first steel mill, he integrated his Keystone Bridge and Union Iron Mills to reduce costs and streamline production. Carnegie opened the Edgar Thomson Works in 1873 at Braddock, Pennsylvania, twelve miles south of Pittsburgh. In addition to steel rails, Carnegie supplied steel for the Brooklyn Bridge and the new skyscrapers rising in America's cities.

Carnegie's modern manufacturing methods, his relentless drive to reduce costs, his use of the latest equipment, and his emphasis on efficiency allowed him to undersell his competition. His vast Pennsylvania steel mills at Braddock, Duquesne, and Homestead were the most productive in the world and provided thousands of jobs. But steelworkers struggled against falling wages and job security, unsafe conditions, and the end of creative labor. One

of the most infamous strikes in American history took place at Carnegie's Homestead plant in 1892. Refusing Carnegie's proposed pay cut, unionized workers were locked out of the factory, and Henry Frick, Carnegie's partner and manager, known for his strident anti-unionism, hired 300 Pinkerton Agency strikebreakers to replace them. Violence throughout the day on July 6 resulted in the deaths of seven workers and three strikebreakers. Henry Frick suffered knife and bullet wounds. Carnegie and Frick won the battle in November, when some workers voted to return to work as non-union employees. The mills remained unorganized for another forty years.

Between 1872 and 1889, Carnegie made his fortune in the steel industry, controlling the most extensively integrated iron and steel operations ever owned by an individual in the United States. In 1900 he sold Carnegie Company to **J. P. Morgan** for \$480 million, the largest commercial transaction to that date and one that made Carnegie the richest man in the world. And then, unlike any industrialist of his time, he began to give away his fortune.

Carnegie believed that great wealth conferred social responsibility, a principle he explained in his 1900 essay, *The Gospel of Wealth*. Throughout his life he donated funds for almost 3,000 libraries, hospitals, and universities. By the time he died, Carnegie had given away more than \$380 million, almost 90 percent of his fortune. He established the Carnegie Institution in 1902 to provide research for American

colleges and universities, endowed his Teachers Pension Fund with \$10 million in 1905, and created the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in 1910. In 1911 Carnegie endowed the Carnegie Corporation with \$125 million to aid colleges, universities, technical schools, and scientific research.

Carnegie died at Shadowbrook, his Massachusetts estate, on August 11, 1919.

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CASINOS

ROBERT E. WEIR

Casinos are establishments where legalized **gambling** takes place. They have become a large industry in the United States, with an estimated \$68.7 billion having been wagered in casinos and on legal lottery tickets in 2002 alone. Casinos are at the center of intense public debate. Many see casinos as economic incubators that bring jobs and revenue, especially to distressed locales. Critics counter that the social problems associated with casinos far outweigh the advantages.

Although saloon gambling was a staple of nineteenth-century Western lore and large cities have always had a "sporting crowd" that wagered on events and games of chance, the modern casino industry dates from 1931, when the state of Nevada legalized gambling. Las Vegas and Reno became casino centers, with Nevada retaining monopolistic control on legal casinos until 1978, when Atlantic City, New Jersey, banked on casinos to restore its dilapidated Boardwalk and energize an impoverished city. Native American tribes, which had operated gaming houses on reservations, also got into the act. In 1979 the Seminoles opened their highstakes bingo parlor to the public. This prompted legal challenges, but in 1988 Congress passed the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, which sanctioned Native casinos. In 1992 the Mashantucket Pequot tribe opened its Foxwoods, Connecticut, casino, the first legal casino in New England. There, as elsewhere, other groups petitioned to be granted the same privileges as Natives. Although casinos are often associated with Native Americans, in 2004 just 21 percent of all casino revenue came from Native establishments. There are currently more than 700 casinos operating in thirty-six states, though some are cruise boats that operate outside of state jurisdictions. Massachusetts, for example, currently does not license casinos, but several ships sail three miles off its coast into international waters and run gaming tables.

Many people object to gambling on moral grounds, but another line of criticism argues that casinos exacerbate social problems. The temptation for economically challenged regions to place hope in casinos is great, and it has helped revitalize some regions. Atlantic City's pattern, however, is more typical. There a series of high-rise casinos added glitz and glamour to the oceanfront but failed to generate

wealth for the entire city. In essence, the casinos were classic "strip" development—a shiny veneer that extends no more than a few blocks deep. There is also substantial evidence that the same sort of organized crime influence that bedeviled Las Vegas gaming is present in Atlantic City. Racketeering allegations have also surfaced around gaming parlors in California, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, South Carolina, and elsewhere.

The human impact is also controversial. Just as some cities see casinos as a panacea, so do some individuals hope to escape **poverty** through gambling. There are an estimated 15 million gambling addicts in the United States, about one-third of whom are poor. Casino advertising usually features well-dressed patrons gathered around roulette wheels, but casinos are also magnets for those with limited resources who play slot machines or try their luck at blackjack. A 2004 study in Connecticut revealed that the average problem gambler loses \$21,542 per year, a staggering sum for most, but not one that would necessarily bankrupt a member of the upper **middle class**. Problem gambling cuts across social classes, but its greatest impact is on those of lower **socioeconomic status (SES)**. Perhaps as many as 6 percent of all bankruptcies within the **working class** result from gambling debt. Other studies reveal high rates of mental health problems and suicides among gambling addicts; these again disproportionately impact lower-income gamers.

Supporters argue that it is unfair to blame casino operators for any individual's lack of self-control and that fewer than 5 percent (some say just 1 percent) of gamblers ever suffer crippling losses. Critics counter that casinos and lotteries thrive on the desperation of poor Americans and are a de facto form of **regressive taxation**. Some casinos in the South even cash welfare checks. The current debate over casinos is complicated by moral and ideological debate, but one can safely assert that the promised economic benefits of gambling have yet to materialize in more than a few cases. Some places, notably Las Vegas itself, have recently begun to deemphasize gambling, with some investors arguing that there is now an overabundance of casinos in America.

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CASTE

ROBERT E. WEIR

The term *caste* generally refers to a closed stratification system in which one's **status** is determined by birth and social custom. In traditional caste systems, hierarchy is so rigidly defined as to restrict marriage outside of the caste, either

by law or powerful social conventions. In such a system, upward **social mobility** is rare.

Most Americans equate the caste system with Hindu societies, particularly India. In India, caste evolved from Vedic religious practices that predate the articulation of Hinduism and were in place at least as early as 1400 BCE. Indian caste—known as *varna*—was reinforced by religious ideals linked to karma and reincarnation, which dictated that one's social rank was fixed at birth for the course of one's life, though it might change in the next life. There were four main castes in India, plus a group known as "Untouchables," who constituted the majority of Indians but had very low status. In theory, the caste system was abolished after India became independent in 1947; in practice, caste is still very much a part of Indian life, especially in rural areas. It is still exceedingly rare (and socially difficult) for a person from the upper **Brahmin** class to marry an Untouchable.

India's caste system is the most famous, but some African tribes have historically constructed similar systems. Western societies generally frown upon such rigid and closed systems and like to pride themselves on their relative openness. **Max Weber**, for instance, ranked social systems by their relative mobility; he placed caste at the extreme end of the closed scale and market-driven economic systems at the other, open end.

Scholars have come to challenge Weber's optimistic assumptions, as well as the conventional wisdom that American society has no castes. Both W. Lloyd Warner and Gunnar Myrdal argued that the United States operates a caste system based on race. Warner wrote in 1936 and Myrdal in 1944, but other researchers have expanded upon the idea of racial castes. Some have argued that African Americans are akin to modern-day Untouchables in India. In each case, most legal barriers to mobility have fallen, but custom and social taboos remain in place. For example, black/white interracial marriages are still exceedingly rare. About 4 percent of American marriages are considered interracial, but many of these are between Latinos or Asian Americans and non-Caucasians; fewer than 2 percent of African Americans marry outside their race.

More significant than marriage patterns are ongoing patterns of discrimination in the justice system, hiring and promotion considerations, housing preferences, and a host of other social indicators. Despite decades of affirmative action programs, access to **power**, **prestige**, and status remains elusive for black Americans. In this regard, it makes sense to speak of an American caste system. Some feminist scholars argue that women of all races suffer fates similar to that of African American males. They too find that social mobility is more illusory than real as they bump into the **glass ceiling** and find the overall social system skewed in favor of white males. Moreover, women and African Americans both find themselves the victims of stereotypes that call into question their abilities, intelligence, and emotional stability.

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CATHOLICS

MARK NOON

Roman Catholicism has a reputation as a working-class faith, but from the Colonial era to the present American Catholics have demonstrated considerable upward social mobility.

In the colonies of the New World through the early Republic, Catholics were largely a minority sect who endured discrimination and harassment, a relic of the religious zeal of the Protestant Reformation. Still, the Catholic faithful remained steadfast, and the church even prospered in some states, particularly Maryland and Pennsylvania. In fact, some Catholic families were wealthy planters active in the gentry class. As late as 1820, however, membership in the American Catholic Church was still low, outside of Maryland, in comparison with other denominations. This would change dramatically over the next few decades. Because Roman Catholicism is a world religion, the Catholic population in the United States ballooned from the thousands to the millions when mass **immigration** ensued in the nineteenth century. Groups such as the **Irish** often suffered discrimination at the hands of nativists and other anti-Catholic zealots.

In the 1850s the recently arrived Catholic immigrants were largely unskilled laborers. They composed the bottom level of Catholic society and were the most numerous. Fewer in number were middle-class Catholics—sometimes dubbed the Lace Curtain Irish—who were often native-born Americans who held white-collar jobs such as clerks or small businessmen. An even smaller number—usually Americanborn professionals of German or Irish descent—made it into the upper class. As the Industrial Revolution moved through the Gilded Age and into the Progressive Era, an anti-Catholic mindset was still part of American culture, and members of the church were viewed as outsiders. In the 1920s the revived **Ku Klux Klan** added Catholics to their list of undesirables. Still, social mobility moved more and more second- and third-generation Irish and German Catholics into the middle class. Catholics continued to close the gap with the rest of the American population in terms of income as the twentieth century progressed. By the time John F. Kennedy entered the White House in 1961, the immigrant church had faded, replaced by **suburban** Catholics who achieved economic parity with other Americans. By the close of the twentieth century their representation in the upper class even improved. In a reversal of historical trends, a 1970 survey revealed that Catholics were attending college at a higher rate than Protestants.

Initially, the population of Roman Catholics in the United States was centered in the industrial cities and towns of the Northeast. Working-class Catholics were particularly susceptible to the **poverty** and **unemployment** wrought by economic panics and depressions. The Catholic response to social problems was generally conservative, a reflection of the commitment to private property in the Catholic tradition. Catholic clergy placed a high emphasis on charity and the development of philanthropic institutions as the main method of addressing problems in working-class neighborhoods. Many Catholic lay men and women felt other steps were necessary, and, not surprisingly, they were attracted to the developing **labor movement**.

Immigrant Catholic workers joined early labor unions in very large numbers, a development that greatly concerned priests and bishops. They were troubled by the level of violence in many labor struggles, but more problematic was the secret nature of early unions. A key example is found in the clerical response to the **Knights of Labor**. Despite efforts by the Knights' national leader, **Terence V. Powderly**, to remove suspicion, some clergy remained so troubled by the oath-swearing and initiation rituals of the Knights that they denied the sacraments to known members. Eventually, as Catholic participation in the labor movement continued to grow, clerical opposition waned. A major reason for the shift was the publication of Pope Leo XIII's papal encyclical *Rerum Novarum* in 1891. The pontiff decried the excesses of **capitalism** and defended the right of workers to organize, and the social encyclical was initially well received in the United States.

While *Rerum Novarum* failed to ignite a widespread campaign for social justice among American Catholics, the pope's endorsement of labor marked the emergence of the tradition of the labor-priest. There are several examples of priests acting aggressively on behalf of their working-class parishioners, particularly during strikes. The proximity of the priest to the grievances of the workers placed them in a strong position to champion the cause of labor. They often spoke and wrote in support of strikers, planned strike strategy, helped raise strike funds, and worked to negotiate settlements. A significant example is John J. Curren of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, who provided important assistance to John Mitchell and the United Mine Workers of America during the anthracite coal **strike** of 1902.

On a wider scale, one priest worked particularly hard to blend Catholic social thought with the progressive reform movement in the early twentieth century. John Ryan studied moral theology at Catholic University after his ordination to the priesthood in 1898. His doctoral dissertation, titled "A Living Wage," called for wages for laborers that would allow them "to live in a manner consistent with the dignity of a human being." Later, Ryan wrote another significant book, *Distributive Justice: The Right and Wrong of Our Present Distribution of Wealth*. In his effort to link ethics and economics, Ryan called for a **minimum wage** and helped develop a more public Catholicism.

The Catholic laity was also drawn into social reform movements, particularly by the economic challenges of the **Great Depression**. The major example is the Catholic Worker. This effort to make Catholicism a greater social force began on May Day 1933, when journalist and Catholic convert Dorothy Day began selling a newspaper, *The Catholic Worker*, in New York. The Catholic Worker was a radical movement that put the views expressed in the newspaper into action. Followers across the country established hospitality houses to provide the poor and homeless with food and a place to sleep. Similar reform organizations include Friendship House, established by Catherine de Hueck in **Harlem** in 1938. Friendship House, and such lay reform movements as the Grail and Catholic Action, placed particular emphasis on the role of Catholics in the fight for interracial justice and civil rights.

As noted, by the mid-twentieth century Catholics had largely been assimilated into the American religious mainstream, and most of the discriminatory patterns against Catholics had faded. Today Catholics are distributed across the social class spectrum, a reality that softens potential backlash against church positions on controversial issues such as reproductive rights.

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CATTLE KINGDOM

ROBERT E. WEIR

The term Cattle Kingdom comes from a period in the late nineteenth century that has wended its way into American culture as romance and myth. The cattle kingdom fostered the cowboy, a figure often evoked as the epitome of American **individualism** and **self-reliance**. Relatively few Americans realize that this image is largely false.

The age of cowboy cattle drives was relatively brief, roughly 1875 to 1890, and a substantial number of cowboys were African Americans or Mexican *vaqueros*, not the brooding white men of Hollywood films. The Great Plains were home to the buffalo, millions of which white hunters killed for hides, meat, and sport, and to deny **Native Americans** sustenance. The southern plains were also a grazing ground for sinewy longhorn cattle, which the Spanish introduced in the eighteenth century. Longhorns had little value until the eve of the Civil War, when growing urban areas necessitated expanding the American food supply. This meant that large herds of unclaimed free-range cattle were available for any enterprising person to exploit. The problem was that railroad lines to bring cattle to slaughterhouses and urban markets were located far from grazing grounds. This gave rise to the famed cattle drives, most of which were about 1500 miles in length. Trails such as the Sedalia, the Chisholm, the Western, and the Goodnight-Loving led cattle to railheads in Missouri, Kansas, Colorado, and Wyoming, but only after an arduous journey marked by danger, backbreaking work, and economic risks.

What one received at the end of a drive was determined by the number and weight of the animals delivered and prevailing market prices, minus supplies and wages paid for the crew necessary to keep the herd together. Contrary to popular belief, most cowboys were wage-earning members of the working class, not self-employed entrepreneurs. In fact, it often took large amounts of capital merely to launch a cattle drive; hence a substantial number of cowboys worked for corporate investors, some of whom cheated and exploited cowboys.

The economics of what came to be called the "Long Drive" made little sense, and collapsing beef prices in the 1880s dealt a severe blow to cowboy culture. Moreover, the invention of barbed wire and cross-breeding techniques between longhorns and meatier Hereford and Angus stock led to the cultivation of northern herds on grasslands closer to the railroads. The drives inexorably gave way to ranching, an enterprise fraught with difficulties of its own, such as unpredictable weather in the northern plains, disputed grazing titles, range wars with sheep herders, and fierce competition. The latter was winnowed by the record-cold winter of 1886–87, which largely eliminated small-operation ranchers and left large

enterprises and conglomerate cattle associations in its wake. By 1890 corporate interests controlled the beef industry just as surely as they controlled steel and oil.

Given the short duration of the Cattle Kingdom, why did it become such a potent American myth? First, in some cases it was possible for individuals to experience dramatic **social mobility** through cattle, especially in the early days. Several Civil War veterans were able to parlay a few head of cattle into large herds and enrich themselves, though the vast majority of cowboys earned \$25 to \$40 per month. For the most part, though, the cowboy image was crafted by Hollywood and television. In the 1930s and 1940s, cowboy films were produced mostly for their entertainment value, but in the 1950s and 1960s, the cowboy also had ideological undertones. Cowboys were used as potent symbols of American freedom, self-reliance, and individualism that, during the Cold War, implied a marked contrast to the totalitarian and collectivist image of the Soviet Union. Ironically, only a small number of actual Cattle Kingdom cowboys enjoyed the levels of independence and self-sufficiency embedded in popular culture imagery.

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CEO

ROBERT E. WEIR

CEO is the abbreviation for chief executive officer, the top-ranked official in a corporation or other business enterprise. In recent years CEOs have come under scrutiny for their high salaries, business practices, and relations with employees. To their defenders, CEOs are creative individuals whose business savvy has helped the United States reverse the economic decline of the 1970s. To their detractors, some CEOs are viewed as latter-day pirates who plunder companies for the benefit of a stockholder oligarchy, who have ravaged the American working class, and whose cozy relations with politicians constitute a **power elite** that undermines American **democracy**. Well-publicized financial scandals involving a small number of firms and their CEOs have fueled some of the criticism.

Few would deny that modern business bureaucracy demands strong and active leadership. CEOs generally chair corporate boards. In small firms the CEO is usually also the company president, though these roles tend to be separate in large enterprises. CEOs are charged with working with teams that develop a firm's comprehensive business plan. In consultation with the chief financial officer, a CEO must weigh decisions such as how much to spend on infrastructure, how the company manages its investment portfolios, how to market the firm's products, and a host of issues relating to workers: wages, benefits, pensions, and the like. The various constituencies within a firm often have contradictory demands. For example, long-term growth schemes often run afoul of the demands of some stockholders for immediate return.

Controversy and business procedures are hardly strangers. During the late nineteenth century critics claimed that much American business was dominated by robber barons. During the Progressive Era and subsequent to it, many regulations were placed on American businesses, some of which curtailed the power of corporate heads. Modern complaints of CEO power date largely from the 1980s, when President Ronald Reagan supported the removal of regulations he felt hampered the **competitiveness** of American firms in the global market. Among other things, a wave of mergers and acquisitions drew attention to arbitrageurs, investors, and CEOs. The compensation packages of CEOs skyrocketed to levels that struck many as egregious forms of **conspicuous consumption**. According to *Business*-Week, the CEOs of America's top 365 companies in 1980 averaged \$1.4 million in compensation (adjusted for 2004 dollars); by 2003, they made \$8.1 million. By contrast, workers in the same firms saw their average compensation increase from \$31,769 to just \$31,928. On average, CEOs made 44 times more than their workers in 1980, but by 2003 they made 254 times more. In top corporations, one estimate claims that CEOs make 431 times the average American salary, meaning that they make more each day than their workers do in a year.

The logic of **trickle-down theory** justifies this inequality by arguing that top-notch CEOs create wealth. Statistics do not bear this out, however. Even the successful companies that underwrote the 480 percent increase in CEO compensation saw profits grow by just over one-quarter that rate. In many cases, CEOs commanded fabulous sums though their firms foundered. Apple's Steven Jobs received over \$78 million in 2002, though stock returns sank nearly 35 percent; Jeff Barbakow of Tenet Healthcare took in \$34.3 million though shares dropped over 58 percent; and Pat Russo of Lucent Technologies saw stocks plummet over 75 percent yet collected \$38.2 million. Michael Eisner of Disney averaged over \$120 million a year during his six-year tenure though Disney stocks averaged a negative 5 percent return. Compensation packages become especially controversial for CEOs who oversee downsizing campaigns, shift corporate work overseas, slash employee benefits, decertify labor unions, or reduce payroll.

Scandals involving firms such as Enron, Tyco, WorldCom, Adelphia, and other firms that resulted in billions of dollars in lost investment have led many to see the current CEO climate as marked more by arrogance, greed, and corruption than by profit or efficiency. Such a view is unfair to the hundreds of CEOs who do their jobs honestly and well, but there is nonetheless gathering concern that a veritable business aristocracy has emerged that exerts undue influence on American politics. In the administration of George W. Bush, for example, more than a dozen officials, including Bush himself, Vice President Dick Cheney, and presidential advisor Karl Rove, had deep ties to Halliburton Corporation, a firm often accused of corruption. Many members of Congress from both parties also have ties to lobbyists, maintain friendly relations with CEOs, and have lucrative investments. Critics also question why American CEOs make so much more than their counterparts abroad. British CEOs, for instance, receive about twenty-eight times more in compensation than their employees. They also question why firms spend so much money on such perquisites as CEO apartments, private aircraft, and trips when these individuals are already so handsomely compensated. Some advocates call for nothing less than the re-regulation of American business, an unlikely scenario given the current close links between business and politics. At present, many CEOs stand out as symbols of class inequity.

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Arianna Huffington, *Pigs at the Trough*, 2003; Greg Palast, *The Best Democracy Money Can Buy*, 2003; Dan Sewell Ward, "CEOs" (http://www.halexandria.org/dward668.htm).

CHAMBER OF COMMERCE

ROBERT E. WEIR

The Chamber of Commerce (C of C) represents the interests of non–government-related business on the local level. The Chamber has a national office in Washington, D.C., that maintains a staff of lobbyists, lawyers, and policy analysts who lobby for policies that benefit business across the nation and abroad. Local and state chambers are loosely affiliated with the national C of C.

Local chambers of commerce have existed at least since 1825, with Daniel Webster often given credit for inspiring the first body in Boston. The national organization came into being in 1912 and was part of the **Progressive Era** impulse to rationalize society, place planning in the hands of supposed experts, and create large associations to coordinate policy. The C of C was one of numerous professional, academic, and business associations formed in the early twentieth century. By 2005 the national body claimed to represent more than 3 million businesses, scattered across more than 2,800 local chambers, 830 separate business associations, and 102 American chambers of commerce operating overseas. The national Chamber of Commerce attempts to create a favorable climate for business. Although much of its activity is mundane, the C of C has been immersed in controversial battles over such things as business tax cuts, deregulation plans, and attempts to blunt the authority of bodies felt to hamper business, such as the Environmental Protection Agency and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. Many Chamber members have also historically been antithetical to the **labor movement**.

Most Americans encounter the Chamber of Commerce on the local level, where groups are active in promoting economic growth, attracting new business investments, and pressuring local and state government to enact pro-business policies. Many chamber members are also tireless boosters of their municipalities and regions. In many towns, Chamber of Commerce members are major employers and hence enjoy great **prestige**. Most businesses in local chambers are usually small in scale, and their owners, **CEO**s, and managers are likely to be solid members of the **middle class**.

Controversy arises in those areas in which C of C members exert undue influence on local and state politics. Chamber members tend to be active in local affairs and form **social networks** that give them easy access to local officials. Most municipalities have to manage their budgets carefully; hence a decision to allocate funds to improve an access road to a business park might entail cuts to a local school

budget or deferring maintenance of residential streets. In some places local citizens charge that the business community receives preferential treatment, while schools, **poverty** programs, and municipal services are shortchanged. There is probably merit to many of these charges. Because municipalities depend heavily on the business community to generate employment and tax revenues, cozy relations between politicians and the local chamber of commerce is commonplace in America. Chamber members are likely to have a greater voice on local issues ranging from issuing bonds to liquor licensing.

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CHARITY BALLS

LAURA TUENNERMAN-KAPLAN

Charity balls are formal dinner dances held by nonprofit organizations to raise money. As such they fall into a larger category of fundraisers or charity benefits that mix giving, through the purchase of event tickets or the sponsoring of a table, with opportunities to socialize. Those who attend such events are often part of **social networks** composed of social elites, while others may be **social climbers**. This is especially true of the **nouveau riche**, which hopes to make important social and professional connections. In addition, charity balls are often featured in the society pages of newspapers, thus providing participants with publicity and **prestige**. Reciprocity is also often involved, as members of one organization invite friends to an event and are expected to return the favor by attending their friends' charity events.

Charity balls are usually formal events in which men don evening wear and tuxedos, and women attend in **designer** gowns. As such, they can appear to outsiders to be as much about **conspicuous consumption** as about **philanthropy**. This makes them subject to criticism. Some people question the cost of these lavish events, pointing out that charities could net a larger profit from outright gifts than from hosting events with high overhead. In some cases, charity balls have been replaced by more modest "opening receptions" or "donor dinners," partly to keep down costs and partly to blunt criticism. Other complaints include the charge that charity balls that raise money for the poor smack of paternalism, or conversely that events disproportionately benefit institutions that cater primarily to the **upper class** and upper **middle class**, such as art museums, opera companies, and symphony orchestras.

Charity balls have long been a staple of the privileged classes and, in some ways, are a holdover of aristocratic cultural forms inherited from England. The American form of charity balls, however, also owes much to self-conscious efforts on the part

of wealthy **Gilded Age** individuals to cultivate style and taste. Some Gilded Age balls were snapshots of upper class arrogance, excess, and snobbery. Although twentieth-century charity balls retained lavish and sumptuous airs, an overall decline in Victorian social mores muted some of their more exclusive aspects. Moreover, a general loosening of class distinctions that shifted the emphasis more toward wealth and less toward breeding gradually transformed the atmosphere of charity balls. Though most are still formal, they are far less so than those of the late nineteenth century.

In contemporary society, public fundraisers that cut across class lines have usurped many of the functions once filled by charity balls. That said, many organizations continue to rely on charity benefits to raise money. In recent years the Internal Revenue Service has further clarified the rules related to tax deductions taken for these charitable events so that the actual costs of the event are classified as non-deductible.

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Susan Ostrander, Women of the Upper Class, 1984; Francie Ostrower, Why the Wealthy Give: The Culture of Elite Philanthropy, 1995.

CHICAGO SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS

JESSICA LIVINGSTON

The Chicago School of Economics is named for the University of Chicago, famed for its free-market economic theorists.

It began to gain attention by the end of the 1950s in large part because of Milton Friedman, who served as a professor of economics at the University of Chicago from 1946 to 1976. Friedman is credited with being the leading proponent of the monetarist school of economic thought, which stresses the importance of money supply on inflation. Chicago School theorists often favored free markets rather than government intervention, a departure from the conventional wisdom of the postwar era. Keynesian economics, based on the ideas of **John Maynard Keynes**, was the dominant economic theory at the time. Keynesianism, which was a response to the **Great Depression**, argues for government-directed policies to fight high **unemployment** and deflation. The inability of Keynesianism in the 1970s to combat stagflation, the combination of high unemployment and inflation, played a significant role in the rising popularity of monetarism.

Friedman had been challenging Keynesianism for several decades preceding the 1970s. In 1947 Friedman and thirty-six other scholars were invited by Friedrich Hayek to form the Mont Pelerin Society. Hayek exerted great influence on the Chicago School. In *The Road to Serfdom* (1944) Hayek argued that **socialism** requires central planning, which leads to totalitarianism. He further claimed that economic freedom is necessary to guarantee political freedom; hence he emphasized the importance of laissez-faire, or free markets, and competition. This economic philosophy is now called neoliberalism for its mixing of neoclassical

economics and commitment to personal freedom ideals. Hayek realized that his ideas were not popular at the time, and thus he encouraged those economists who shared them to battle for their acceptance. Friedman, as well as his many loyal students, played a significant role in this mission. Friedman directed his classic *Capitalism and Freedom* (1962) to the general public as well as to economists. In it he argues that the primary role of the government is to foster competitive markets, enforce private contracts, and preserve law and order. The limited role he assigned to government is a defining characteristic of neoliberal doctrine.

The first experiment with implementing neoliberal theory at the national level took place in Chile in 1973, after General Augusto Pinochet's coup against the democratically elected president Salvador Allende. Chilean business elites felt threatened by Allende's move toward socialism, so they—along with U.S. corporations, the Central Intelligence Agency, and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger—backed Pinochet's coup. Pinochet hired the "Chicago boys," a group of economists from the University of Chicago, to reconstruct the Chilean economy along the lines of neoliberal theory. These economists worked with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to make Chile's economy more hospitable to trade and foreign investment. They reversed the policy of nationalizing assets, and they subjected both natural resources and pension systems to unregulated privatization. The **minimum wage** was abolished, and taxes on **wealth** and profits were lowered.

While Friedman referred to these changes as "The Miracle of Chile," the revival of the economy did not last. Unemployment rose and real wages declined. By the early 1980s Chile was in a recession, and during the 1982 Latin American debt crisis the privatized pensions were lost when the **stock market** collapsed. In addition to challenging the claim that these economic reforms were successful, critics have also pointed to how these reforms were achieved. While the dictatorship in Chile implemented economic reforms, it also tortured and murdered political dissidents. Economic freedom did not lead to political freedom as Friedman had claimed.

While critics of the Chicago School have called it dogmatic and reductionist, by the 1970s it had gained credibility with the award of the Nobel Prize to Hayek in 1974, and to Friedman in 1976. The department also received seven other Nobel Prizes between 1976 and 1995. By the 1990s the ideas of the Chicago School had become mainstream. These ideas were solidified with the articulation of the Washington Consensus, the implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement, and the formation of the World Trade Organization. Neoliberal policies such as deregulation and privatization have increased income polarization and corporate power while weakening labor unions. The overall effect has been a restoration of elitist class power and increased economic inequality both nationally and internationally.

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Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, 1962; David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, 2005; Juan Gabriel Valdes, Pinochet's Economists: The Chicago School of Economics in Chile, 1995.

CHILD LABOR

ROBERT E. WEIR


Technically, all employment of individuals under the age of eighteen is child labor, although current federal law places few restrictions on workers over the age of sixteen beyond prohibitions on handling hazardous materials or operating heavy machinery. As of 2005 there were over 5.5 million children between the ages of twelve and seventeen who work for wages. Child labor is often viewed as a rite of passage, with estimates running as high as 80 percent of high school students who have worked while still in school. The forms of child labor that are considered social problems involve illegal employment of children, violations of labor laws, and exposure of children to dangerous conditions.

The definition of child labor has changed through American history as the very concept of childhood evolved. In preindustrial times the period between childhood and adulthood was relatively short. Boys and girls alike were expected to engage in domestic and farm chores as soon as they were able to do so, and the onset of puberty marked entry into adulthood with all its incumbent work expectations. Some religious traditions, especially those of Separatists and **Puritans**, even viewed work as a safeguard against bedeviling idleness.

The development of factory work and the subsequent **Industrial Revolution** altered perceptions of child labor and helped redefine childhood itself. As the American economy expanded in the early nineteenth century, wage labor became a permanent social feature. Urbanization and advances in communications and transportation also transformed the nature of work. Although agriculture remained the dominant production mode throughout the nineteenth century, social reformers saw mining, factory work, and urban manual labor as inherently more dangerous for children than rural labor. By the 1870s the **labor movement** also railed against child labor, in part because unions found it unjust and in part because child labor was often used by unscrupulous employers to undercut adult wages. The call to curb child labor often went hand-in-glove with calls for compulsory public education, which promised the ancillary effects of extending childhood and delaying entry into the labor market.

The lure of wages proved hard to resist for those living in **poverty**, which was the plight of many immigrant families. Even well-established working-class families often needed the supplementary wages of children to survive. By the late nineteenth century child labor was a large social problem, with legions of children employed in sweatshops, mines, textile mills, and elsewhere. Untold numbers hawked newspapers, carried bundles in garment districts, toiled on docks, or engaged in peddling.

Newspaper exposés and photographers such as **Jacob Riis** and Lewis Hine focused attention on abusive child labor to such a degree that it became a source of national shame. In 1904 the National Child Labor Committee began to document the full extent of child labor. States began enacting legislation to curtail child labor in the late nineteenth century, and the federal government followed suit during the **Progressive Era**. Despite heavy opposition from the business community, Congress enacted the Keating-Owen Act in 1916, which set limits on child



Child laborers at a glass works, Indiana, 1908. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

labor. The law was, however, struck down as unconstitutional in 1918, and a subsequent act, passed in 1919, suffered the same fate in 1922. A proposed constitutional amendment to ban child labor failed in Congress.

It was not until the passage of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) of 1938 that federal laws finally regulated the age at which children could work and the number of hours they could hold employment. Even then, Congress was forced to enact special exemptions for agricultural work before passage could be secured. An amended FSLA is still the primary federal law governing child labor, although com-

pulsory school attendance laws also play a major role. (In most states one cannot legally leave school until age sixteen.)

Under the current FLSA no child under the age of fourteen can be legally employed, except in agriculture, where the minimum age is ten if the child is employed on a family-owned farm. In theory one has to be twelve to work on any other farm. The FLSA also holds that, until age sixteen, children cannot work during school hours and cannot work more than eighteen hours during a school week or more than three hours on a day school is in session. (During summer vacations they can work up to eight hours daily, not to exceed forty hours per week.) Again, most of these provisions are waived for farm labor. The FLSA also allows employers to pay a sub-minimum wage of \$4.25 per hour for under-twenty workers for a ninety-day period, at which time it rises to the federal minimum of \$5.15. (Farm labor is not subject to these limits.)

In the popular mind abusive child labor is a relic of the American past and a contemporary problem only in developing nations, but that perception is very far from the truth. As in the nineteenth century, modern child labor is strongly correlated with poverty and **immigration**. Harsh conditions are widespread in agriculture, where an estimated 800,000 children work in the fields. More than half of these come from immigrant or imported migrant labor families, many of the latter from families of undocumented illegal aliens. The United Farm Workers of America union has documented cases of children as young as five toiling up to ten hours per day. Abuses also abound among documented aliens and children of citizens, with migrant farm worker children having a school dropout rate of around 45 percent, more than double the national average. Moreover, pesticide exposure and hard labor reduces farm laborer life expectancy to just forty-nine years, twenty-six fewer than the national rate.

Child labor improprieties extend beyond the fields, however. Despite FLSA restrictions on hours, one of six child laborers works more than twenty-five hours per week while school is in session. Each week as many as 148,000 children are illegally employed in the United States, many of whom are under the age of fourteen. In 2003 states collected more than \$1.8 million in fines from employers violating

federal and state child labor laws. Certain enterprises have been singled out for their cavalier enforcement of the FLSA. The magazine and candy industries, for example, are often accused of exploiting child solicitors to the tune of about \$1 billion in yearly revenues, and another 50,000 children routinely work as street peddlers in American cities. In 2005 **Wal-Mart** paid a fine of over \$135,000 for allowing youthful employees to operate forklifts and handle hazardous materials. (The size of this fine was denounced by many reformers as a "sweetheart deal" between the government and Wal-Mart.)

Child labor remains a serious problem in America. Studies reveal that whether a child works out of necessity or because of



Two girls wearing banners with slogan "ABOLISH CHILD SLAVERY!!" in English and Yiddish. Probably taken during May 1, 1909, labor parade in New York City. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

the lure of **consumerism**, the consequences can be costly. Each year approximately sixty-seven workers under eighteen die, and one is injured every thirty seconds (more than 230,000 per year). Students working more than twenty hours also suffer declining academic achievement and higher rates of alcoholism and drug abuse than those who work less.

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Child Labor Coalition (http://www.stopchildlabor.org/); Sandy Hobbs, Jim Mc-Kechnie, and Michael Lavalette, *Child Labor: A World History Companion*, 1999; Laurence Steinberg, Sanford M. Dornbusch, and B. Bradford Brown, *Beyond the Classroom*, 1997.

CHILDREN AND POVERTY

GERALD FRIEDMAN

Entering the twenty-first century, the poorest groups in the United States are children and their caregivers. Children account for over a third of America's poor, and their parents account for another third. One child in six lives in a household with an income below the **poverty line**, a poverty rate nearly twice the rate of **poverty** among the elderly and over twice that of adults between thirty-five and sixty years of age.

Childhood poverty is inevitable in a society that relies on the free-market distribution of income. Following the advice of Adam Smith, **capitalist** societies rely on personal self-interest to produce desired goods and services: "It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker," Smith remarked, "that we can expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest." Self-interest does ensure Americans an adequate supply of meat, beer, and bread, but it cannot

provide for children who enter the world with great and pressing needs but without access to property or resources. If children are to survive, they must be supported by others—parents, kind strangers, or public agencies.

Because children are a society's future, the entire community wants them to be raised well. Nevertheless, the United States relies on biological and adoptive parents to care for children, often with little community support. For parents, this makes having children an expensive and time-consuming activity. The average American **middle-class** household directly spends over \$10,000 per year housing, clothing, feeding, and otherwise caring for each child in addition to opportunity costs, because children require parents' time and attention that could otherwise be devoted to paid work. Altogether, the direct expenses plus lost work time come to over \$300,000 per child for the average middle-class American two-parent family. This cost has risen sharply over time because of rising prices for labor-intensive activities, such as child care, and the greater cost of lost work time for mothers now that more women are working for pay outside the home.

For this expenditure, parents can expect virtually no financial return. To use Adam Smith's language, instead of self-interest, we rely on the "benevolence" of parents to provide for the next generation. The financial burden on parents has probably contributed to a declining fertility rate over the past century; the total fertility rate in the United States, the number of births per woman, has fallen sharply since the nineteenth century and is now barely 2.0, below the level needed to maintain the population. More men, especially, have chosen not to raise children. The proportion of children born to two-parent households has fallen sharply in the late twentieth century, down to only 66 percent in 2003. This means that a third of children are born without a father present; because of death, divorce, and parental separation, a majority of children will live in a one-parent household at some point in their youth. The poverty rate is especially high for children living with only one parent, because many single parents cannot earn enough to support their children. (This is especially true of single mothers, because women's earnings are significantly less than men's.) Some single mothers (and some single fathers) receive financial support from absentee parents, but 60 percent of all single mothers (and 75 percent of single fathers) manage entirely on their own. The average child support payment received in 2003, only \$4,274, was well under the cost of caring for a child. The poverty rate is especially high among single parents; among those receiving child support payments, 22 percent are living below the poverty line, as are 27 percent of those not receiving payments.

By lessening their dependence on often over-tasked parents, community support could reduce poverty among children to ensure care for the next generation of Americans. To ensure that the next generation is educated, for example, the United States spends over \$600 billion on public schools. To reduce childhood poverty, a patchwork of social **welfare** programs is in place to provide financial assistance to some categories of children. Those living in very poor households may receive health insurance, either through Medicaid or various state Children's Health Insurance Programs (CHIPs). Others may receive help with food budgets through Food Stamps or, for the very young, Women, Infants, and Children (WIC). The children of disabled workers receive Social Security Disability, and some very poor receive Transitional Assistance to Needy Families (TANF). Children in low-income

households may also benefit from the Earned Income Tax Credit provided by the federal government as a supplement to their parent's wages. Compared with more comprehensive programs in other countries, this patchwork approach to poverty amelioration in the United States is relatively ineffective at reducing childhood poverty. Antipoverty programs in the United States raise the income of fewer than half of the non-elderly poor above the poverty line. By contrast, government programs lifted over 80 percent of the poor out of poverty in France and other European countries, and Social Security does the same for over 80 percent of the elderly poor in the United States. One reason that antipoverty programs are relatively ineffective in the United States is that there is such a strong stigma attached to participation that fewer than 60 percent of poor families receive any government assistance.

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CHOMSKY, NOAM (1928-)

DAVID V. HEALY

A renowned academic and critic of hierarchical systems of government and economics, Chomsky was born on December 7, 1928, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. His primary academic background is in philosophy and linguistics, and his first PhD was in linguistics, issued by the University of Pennsylvania in 1955. Starting in the 1960s, Chomsky became heavily involved in politics, using theoretical structures derived from his academic work. Politically, he identifies himself as an anarchosyndicalist, a type of **anarchist** who subscribes to the theories of Mikhail Bakunin, among others. Though perhaps best known for his linguistic theories, most notably that of generative grammar, Chomsky is also notable for his political activism. He has published dozens of articles and books in several academic fields.

Chomsky has participated in protests for various causes, including anti-Vietnam War protests (as well as both Gulf wars). He has been an outspoken critic of many U.S. foreign policy decisions in the past four decades. However, his most notable contributions to numerous causes are his published works and his many lectures. Many of Chomsky's books are outside his "official" field of linguistics, and they present numerous critiques of political and economic systems.

In line with many of anarchism's tenets, Chomsky considers class and **class struggle** in terms of **power** versus the powerless. This paradigm defines a **power elite** that includes the political, economic, media, and even intellectual leaders. With this structure, Chomsky has repeatedly laid forth arguments against government and **capitalism**, utilizing obscure but public sources to debunk many of the myths and propagandistic structures propagated by the same elites he sets out to



Noam Chomsky (right) during the presentation of his new book at the Book Institute of Havana in October 2003. At left, Cuba's parliamentary president Ricardo Alarcón de Quesada listens to him. © Alejandro Ernesto.

criticize. The common target of Chomsky's critique is America's power elite, though he has dealt with others, including NATO and the global capitalist elite.

Current major targets of Chomsky's critiques include the American War on Terror, **globalization**, and corporations. It is Chomsky's usual method to point out the hypocrisy and falsehoods in elite propaganda systems, and he has done so in dealing with the War on Terror. Though decried for being "anti-American," one of Chomsky's most noted recent theses clearly presents the United States as the largest funder and supporter of terrorism in the world. Highly controversial, this argument has had little coverage in American media, contributing to ongoing criticisms that Chomsky's

theories are ignored by the mass media.

Chomsky's supporters, many of them anarchists like him, claim that the leadership class, the elite, conspires to keep Chomsky's ideas out of the common view so that it cannot challenge the status quo. However, Chomsky is well-known on the lecture circuit, especially at universities, where he also confronts the intellectual elite targeted by his criticisms. Chomsky's lectures are as notable as his writings, and many of his lectures have been recorded in published texts or on audio and videotape.

The construction that Chomsky uses—that the elites are all those who rule over society while those beneath have been either fooled or coerced into complying—is more expansive than the definition of class commonly found in discussions on the topic. For Chomsky and other anarchists, there is little difference among those who control vast portions of society and its resources, whether they are found in the fields of government, media, or corporations. This divergence has separated Chomsky from the mainstream class debate in many ways, yet he remains popular for those same divergent positions.

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CIVIL SERVICE

ROBERT E. WEIR

Civil service jobs are those in which employees perform the various tasks related to carrying out government and public functions. "Civil service" is often synonymous with bureaucracy, but there are many civil service jobs that are not traditional office

jobs, including much of the work of the U.S. Postal Service and the diplomatic corps. Since 1883 civil service jobs have been avenues of **social mobility** for many Americans.

Senator William Learned Marcy is often credited with the phrase "to the victor belong the spoils," a phrase he uttered in 1832 to defend President Andrew Jackson's office appointments from attacks by Congressman John Quincy Adams. Long before Marcy uttered that phrase, however, the "spoils system" defined the way in which most civil service appointments were made. Adams's own father, President John Adams, made a series of controversial "midnight appointments" the night before he turned over the presidency to Thomas Jefferson. The Supreme Court's validation of those appointments in *Marbury v. Madison* (1803) entrenched the federal spoils system for the next eighty years. This meant that many government posts were filled by cronyism, nepotism, and social class connections. Old New England families came to see the civil service as something of a class perquisite; overall, the civil service was disproportionately staffed by lawyers, professors, and children of wealthy merchants.

The federal civil service remained small until after the **Civil War**, but its expansion thereafter exacerbated the problems of the spoils system and led reformers to equate civil service **meritocracy** with social **democracy**. Cries for reform also came from members of the **middle class**, who had joined the abolitionist cause and had been Republican Party stalwarts but felt locked out of the civil service. Attempted reforms in the Grant, Hayes, and Garfield administrations withered, but when President Garfield was assassinated by a frustrated office seeker, Congress was pressed to act. In 1883 the Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act made approximately half of all appointments subject to merit hiring. This bill, though flawed, led to dramatic changes in the civil service, including the infusion of employees from lower on the socioeconomic scale and an overall professionalizing of many offices.

Changes on the federal level were (and are) slow to filter to the state and municipal level, where the spoils system was often (and still is) viewed as an extension of party politics. The Tweed Ring in New York City was simply the most infamous of dozens of patronage systems controlled by powerful political machines, and the city's Democratic Party continued to dole out patronage long after Tweed himself fell in 1871. Moreover, the Republican Party political machine that dominated much of the rest of New York State also doled out civil service jobs. Attacks on municipal and state manipulation of civil service jobs did not enjoy widespread success until the **Progressive Era**, and even today a large number of local and state jobs across the United States are routinely filled via practices that would not pass muster on the federal level.

During the **New Deal**, President **Franklin Roosevelt** expanded merit-based civil service jobs to include roughly 90 percent of placements, but these restrictions were largely gutted after World War II. Two other significant attempts to reform the civil service came in the Hatch Act of 1939, which restricted federal employees from engaging in political activities, and the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. The latter dismantled the Civil Service Administration, which had overseen the civil service since the Pendleton Act, and distributed its powers among the Office of Personnel Management, the Labor Relations Authority, and the Merit System Protection

Board. The idea behind this act was to decentralize control to reduce abuses, but it had the opposite effect under President **Ronald Reagan**, who staffed the upper echelons of federal offices with loyalists who often acted on ideological predilections that undermined merit.

All civil service reforms have allowed the possibility of abuse in that most of the highest offices are exempt from merit considerations. Ambassadorships, for example, remain political appointments for which candidates need no special qualifications so long as they can win Congressional approval. One need not even have legal training to be appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court, nor does one need to have specialized expertise to serve on a presidential cabinet or advisory board. **C. Wright Mills** was among the many scholars who argued that the upper levels of the civil service remain the preserve of the **power elite**.

Weaknesses of the civil service aside, entry into it remains a way in which individuals can attain upward mobility. Most administrative, service, and bureaucratic positions have guidelines, exams, and rules on how to advance. It is still possible, for instance, for a police officer to rise through the ranks from a patrol position to a top administrative post, and hence move from the working class to the middle class. Most civil service jobs also reward long service, and it is not unusual for long-time federal employees to draw salaries that would qualify them for upper middle-class **status**. The lure of the civil service is such that there is a thriving market for manuals on how to prepare for civil service examinations.

Suggested Reading

Cindy Aron, Ladies and Gentlemen of the Civil Service: Middle Class Workers in Victorian America, 1987; John Donahue and Joseph Nye, eds., For the People? Can We Fix Civil Service? 2003; Ari Hoogenbottom, Outlawing the Spoils: A History of the Civil Service Reform Movement, 1865–1883, 1961.

CIVIL WAR

THOMAS A. WING

Social class played an important role in the American Civil War (1861–65). Both sides experienced difficulties in raising and maintaining armies, as well as in enforcing discipline in the ranks. In some cases, keeping order on the home front was affected by **class struggle**.

In the North, class inequality had been rising in the years prior to the war. While Northern industrialists wholeheartedly supported war as a means of restoring the Union, the working class was indifferent. The bombardment of Fort Sumter by Confederate forces inspired a wave of nationalism and benefited Northern recruiters, but a string of early war defeats quickly squelched enlistment efforts. The Emancipation Proclamation increased tensions, as white workers feared mass migrations of former slaves to the North. Perceived competition for jobs and lower wages created panic among the working class. The Conscription Act of 1863 pushed the classes further apart as draft riots erupted

in New York and other disturbances occurred across the North. The act required that all able-bodied males between the ages of 20 and 45 be subject to military service, but a drafted man who provided an acceptable substitute or paid the government \$300 was excused. The \$300 exemption resulted in the cry "rich man's war, poor man's fight," alluding to the fact that many in the upper class bought their way out of the war. Democratic leaders added to the tension by calling the Conscription Act unconstitutional. Significant numbers of workingclass Irish and German immigrants were conscripted into the Union Army with no ability to avoid service. Harsh treatment of lower class enlisted men by upper-class officers added to the tension. The New York draft riots pitted large numbers of Irish immigrant workers against abolitionists and blacks. Widespread looting, property destruction, and violence characterized the riots. A black orphanage was burned, leaving children homeless. Police, militia, and Naval and Army forces as well as West Point cadets were called in to restore order. The New York riots cost between \$1 and \$2 million and approximately 1.000 lives.

Class struggle in the South during the war was equally destructive. Like the North, the white working class in the South was not completely supportive of a war many saw as a vindication of the aristocratic, slave-owning class. Poor, Southern, white workers had long felt the effects of **slavery** and had little chance for economic advancement. Confederate officials feared a Southern abolitionist party might emerge. Like the Conscription Act in the North, the Confederate draft of 1862 had similar repercussions. In the South, not only could a man avoid the draft by paying an exemption fee, but slave owners with twenty or more slaves were automatically free from obligation. "Rich man's war and poor man's fight" was heard in the South as well.

The rift between the aristocracy and the working class intensified during the war as the North's blockade and invading troops disrupted food production and distribution. The women and children of the South faced starvation, as most available food was reserved for Confederate troops. The continual reliance on cash generated from cotton sales kept farmland from being converted to food crops. The overproduction of cotton led to food shortages that had drastic effects on poor working-class women, left at home by men in the military. Speculators increased the tension by inflating prices on the few food items available. Faced with starvation, many women embraced violence and theft to survive. Richmond, Mobile, and every major city in Georgia experienced food riots as desperate women descended on army depots and took food reserved for soldiers. With mothers, wives, and children at home facing such conditions, many Confederate soldiers deserted for family preservation. With the fall of Vicksburg and the defeat at Gettysburg in July 1863, desertion rates rose for the duration of the war. The draft and food shortage, combined with deep class-related animosities, sowed the seeds of destruction for the Confederacy as a better fed and equipped, numerically superior opponent wore down the will of the South.

Although class conflict was not the single cause of the war, class struggle and long-standing disputes between the working class and the elites created problems for both the North and the South. Class conflict influenced the final outcome of the war, and it shaped **Reconstruction** in the years that followed.

Suggested Reading

Lorien Foote, "Rich Man's War, Poor Man's Fight: Class, Ideology, and Discipline in the Union Army," *Civil War History* 51.3 (2005) 269–287; Barnet Schecter, *The Devil's Own Work: The Civil War Draft Riots and the Fight to Reconstruct America*, 2005; David Williams, Teresa Crisp Williams, and R. David Carlson, *Plain Folk in a Rich Man's War: Class and Dissent in Confederate Georgia*, 2002.

CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS

Frank A. Salamone

In **Marxist** terms, a social class consists of a group of people who share the same position in the social hierarchy regarding the **means of production**. Class consciousness refers to the awareness members of that group or class have of their membership in that group. Moreover, included in consciousness is the ability of the class to act in furthering its self-interests. The extent to which individuals are aware of their own class and their allegiance to that class is also important in the definition.

Unfortunately, Marx never completed his work on class consciousness, leaving its precise definition to be contested. Many Marxists contrast class consciousness with **false consciousness** even though Marx never specifically used the latter term. Marxists do agree that true consciousness is a rational acceptance of one's class, a desire to work with the fellow-members of one's class, and an awareness of its history and purpose.

Interestingly, while the concept of social class goes back to ancient societies that had complex economic distinctions, the term itself entered the English language only in the 1770s. Basically, social classes at the top of the hierarchical scale are elites. Classes with greater power subordinate those with less power. Identification with members of one's own class coupled with an understanding of its relationship with other classes is the core of the concept of class consciousness.

There are, then, two major elements of class consciousness. The first is recognition of membership in a group, which has a position in society. The second is a commitment to changing that position through political activity.

Many observers argue that American workers have seldom developed class consciousness, whereas European workers have often exhibited it. Historians have put forward a number of reasons for this phenomenon. Foremost among them is the divide-and-conquer effect of the racial and ethnic divisions within the workforce and labor movement. Moreover, until recently at least, there has been the promise of movement into the middle class because of higher wages and open social mobility. Some scholars also point to the importance of the idea of political democracy in the United States traceable to the American Revolution. Many scholars, however, are dubious of explanations that posit American exceptionalism as an explanation for weak class consciousness.

Although labor unions in the United States provided some political power to the working class, labor membership has seldom been as high as 25 percent of eligible members. Since the 1970s, that percentage has dropped steadily. Thus, even membership in unions as a means for providing and fostering class consciousness has not proved strong in the United States. There is a strong aversion to the very concept of class in America. Beyond the reasons given above, there is resistance to anything remotely connected with Marxism or **socialism** in the United States. There is also a strong cultural value placed on the belief in upward social mobility and the possibility of a **Horatio Alger**–like rags-to-riches shift in material comfort. The rarity of actual mobility does little to dampen the dream.

Suggested Reading

Peter Blau and Otis D. Duncan, *The American Occupational Structure*, 1967; Anthony Giddens, "Class Structuration and Class Consciousness," in Giddens and David Held, eds., *Classes, Power, and Conflict*, 1982; Erik O. Wright, *The Comparative Project on Class Structure and Class Consciousness: An Overview*, 1989.

CLASS DEFINITIONS

See Conflict Theory; Continuous/Discontinuous Views of Class; Corporate Class; Functional Elite Theory; Gender Stratification; Inequality Theory; Lower Class; Managerial Class; Marxism/Marxist; Middle Class; Objective Method; Poverty; Power Elite; Prestige; Race, Racism, and Racial Stratification; Reputational Method; Status Inconsistency; Subjective Method; Underclass; Upper Class; Working Class.

CLASS FORMATION

JOHN F. LYONS

Class formation is the term used by **Marxists** to describe the process whereby individuals in the social relations of production start to attain and articulate a common outlook. Karl Marx believed that class was objectively determined by one's relationship to the **means of production** but that class formation also entailed subjective consciousness of class interests and the translation of these interests into collective action. Marx, who lived in Europe in the nineteenth century, believed that two new classes, the **bourgeoisie** and the **proletariat**, had formed in Western Europe and that similar classes would soon form in the rest of the world, especially other advanced capitalist nations such as the United States.

For Marx, the European bourgeoisie went through a period of class formation under feudalism and monarchism. The bourgeoisie were small property owners such as traders and master craftsmen who opposed the economic and political restrictions of feudalism and monarchism. They grew in number and influence and became conscious of themselves as a class. Starting with the English Revolution of the 1640s and continuing with the French Revolution of 1789, the bourgeoisie overthrew the monarchy, abolished feudalism, and created a capitalist society. Subsequently the bourgeoisie, according to Marx, became a powerful class of owners of **wealth** who controlled the economic and political system.

Marx believed that as **capitalism** matured a new class, the proletariat, or working class, would also go through a period of class formation. The proletariat owned no wealth and made a living by working in the factories and mills owned by the bourgeoisie. The proletariat would endure low wages and increasingly poor working conditions while the bourgeoisie increased their wealth. According to Marx, workers would become conscious of their common plight and the need to organize to overthrow capitalism and to establish a communist society. Eventually, the workers would expropriate the capital and take control of the means of production themselves.

Followers of Marx differed on how workers would gain revolutionary communist **class consciousness.** Some—such as the **Communist Party** of the U.S.A., which championed the ideas of the Russian revolutionary V. I. Lenin—believed that workers were incapable of gaining revolutionary consciousness unaided. A party of full-time revolutionaries must educate the workers, organize revolution, and control the state in the post-revolutionary years. Others—such as the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), formed in 1905—held that the proletariat would gain class consciousness through trade union struggles at work and would seize control of the workplace and run society without the aid of outside intellectuals.

Marx's theory of class formation has proved particularly difficult to transplant to the United States. European-style feudalism and monarchism were never replicated in the United States. The widespread ownership of private property and company shares, and the growth of white-collar occupations, has made it difficult to clearly distinguish between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Indeed, opponents of Marx have questioned the degree of working-class consciousness in the United States and believe that divisions based on ethnicity, gender, and race have hindered class solidarity. Others argue that American workers are conditioned by individualism and consumerism and thus view themselves not as exploited workers but as middle-class citizens. Whatever the reason, U.S. workers have not chosen to follow the revolutionary path prescribed to them by Marx.

Suggested Reading

Rick Halpern and Jonathan Morris, eds., American Exceptionalism: US Working-Class Formation in an International Context, 1997; Ira Katznelson and Aristide R. Zolberg, eds., Working-Class Formation: Nineteenth Century Patterns in Western Europe and the United States, 1986; Karl Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy, 1847.

CLASS STRUGGLE

JOHN F. LYONS

Class struggle, as defined by **Marxists**, is conflict generated by economic inequality and exploitation. Karl Marx believed that there had been an original primitive society in which equality and cooperation had prevailed, but that conflict between classes emerged with the development of private property. Classes, as defined by one's relationship to the **means of production**, were divided into exploiters and exploited, or between those who controlled the **wealth** and those who created the wealth. According to Marx, this class conflict eventually leads to major historical changes and different ways of producing wealth. In the ancient world, the major classes were master and slave, and in the feudalistic Middle Ages the lord and the serf. Feudalism eventually gave way to modern industrial **capitalism** and the emergence of two new major classes: the **bourgeoisie** and the **proletariat**.

As in previous societies, the conflict between the bourgeoisie and proletariat lay in economic exploitation. The bourgeoisie consisted of the capitalists, who owned the means of production such as mines and factories, while the proletariat comprised those who were propertyless and were forced to earn a living by working for the bourgeoisie. Yet the worker would not receive the full fruits of his or her labor. Instead, the bourgeoisie would compensate the workers for only a portion of their work and keep for themselves as profit what Marx called the "surplus value." Moreover, the employer seeks to increase his profit by lowering wages, by increasing the pace or hours of work, or by introducing new machinery. In contrast, the worker wants higher wages, to spend less time and expend less effort at work, and to enjoy better working conditions. These irreconcilable differences between the demands of the bourgeoisie and those of the proletariat produce class struggle. Workers indulge in sabotage and slowdowns to restrain the pace of work, and they form labor unions and take strike action to achieve higher pay and better working conditions. In contrast, employers fine and fire uncooperative workers and use any means to defeat **strikes** and break unions.

According to Marx, class conflict between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat would intensify because of polarization between classes, a growing deprivation and wretchedness of the proletariat, and declining rates of profit. Unable to compete with large-scale capitalist production, farmers and craft workers would be pushed into the ranks of the proletariat and the ownership of capital would be concentrated among ever fewer. The capitalist economy also produced cycles of boom and slump as capitalists tended to produce more goods than they could sell. This would lead to periods of economic depression, lowering of wages, plant closings, and **unemployment**. Marx, however, argued that these periods of depressions would become increasingly frequent and severe as capitalists spent more income on expensive machinery and their rate of profit declined.

Marx believed that eventually the workers would become aware of their exploitation and the need for collective ownership of property. Workers would join together across industries, confront the army and the police, overthrow capitalism, and take over the means of production. For a time, what Marx termed a "dictatorship of the proletariat," where the workers would rule society, would ensue. With the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, class struggle would continue against remnants of the bourgeoisie until all classes were finally abolished and a classless communist society established. Private property would no longer exist and society would function on the principle "From each according to his ability, to each according to his need."

Conflict between workers and employers, whether in the form of boycotts, strikes, or riots, has been a constant feature of U.S. history. Violence between employers and workers characterized nineteenth-century labor relations, and workers formed labor unions to further their interests. In the nineteenth century, workers formed local labor unions and national unions such as the **Knights of**

Labor and the **American Federation of Labor** to seek higher wages and better working conditions. In the twentieth century, the **Congress of Industrial Organizations** organized across lines of skill and race.

Even though class conflict has existed in the United States, fewer American workers joined the organized **labor movement** than did their European counterparts, nor did they forge large **socialist** or **communist** parties. Many factors have ameliorated class conflict in the United States. Many workers have sought and gained reforms through the political process. **Middle-class** occupations have grown, and public education has given many workers access to these jobs. Class friction has lessened because of the growing affluence and **consumerism** of American workers. Many see race or gender identity as more important than class in igniting conflict in U.S. history.

Whatever the validity of Marxist revolutionary philosophy, many sociologists suggest that class conflict remains a feature of American society. A 2006 survey, for instance, revealed that only 18 percent of Americans making \$100,000–\$150,000 per year felt there was "a lot" of tension between the rich and poor, yet 41 percent of those making under \$30,000 said there was "a lot." Disparities in wealth, unequal access to health and education, and poor working conditions continue to plague American society, and workers seek redress of their grievances through the political process and in unions and strikes.

Suggested Reading

Herbert G. Gutman, *Power and Culture: Essays on the American Working Class*, 1987; Karl Marx, *The Communist Manifesto*, 1848; Robert H. Zieger, *American Workers*, *American Unions*. 1920–1985, 1994.

CLASS SUBCULTURES

JACQUI SHINE

A subculture is any group with modes of appearance, style, behavior, and beliefs that contrast with mainstream and dominant forms of expression; those whose appearances and behaviors are common across a particular social class are called class subcultures. Usually based around issues or identifiers such as **ethnicity**, sexual expression, political affiliation, or class, the presence of subcultures usually reflects tension within and without the dominant culture. Such identifiers can be either self-selected or imposed onto the members of the subculture by the dominant culture; hence subcultural deviance can be read as either a response to the pressures of cultural conformity, or a response to ostracism and rejection by the dominant culture. Subcultures enact, express, and respond to social rejection through a set of behaviors, aesthetics, and beliefs that make up a separate style.

Class subcultures often reference those subcultures arising from social class identifications, particularly the experiences of **working-class** and **lower-class** young people. Additionally, class subcultures are often heavily shaped by **race** and ethnicity. A recent example of a class subculture is the **punk movement** of the late

1970s, which arose first among working-class white youth in postindustrial, suburban Great Britain. National **unemployment** and inflation collided with a critical mass of young people, many of them undereducated, and produced national disaffection and restlessness that was neither acknowledged nor remedied by the dominant culture—politically, musically, or socially. Punk bands such as The Clash debuted, formed by young musicians with little formal training or native talent. Loud, spontaneous, and fervent, The Clash offered lyrics that addressed the circumstances of working-class teenagers, who formed their fan base. Adorned in deconstructed, ripped clothing, the band developed a style, aesthetic, and message around which their fans could organize. Mainstream society was suitably shocked by this visceral expression of white working-class anger.

The vitality of a subcultural group's style and message is usually fairly short-lived, and the punk movement was no exception, though it did spread to the United States, where it spawned the grunge movement. As a subcultural movement's visibility grows, other groups, usually with mainstream social affiliations, adopt the movement's styles and behaviors, often as a way of managing its threat and mediating its influence. Shortly after its birth, the punk movement attracted the attention of **middle-class** young people, who detached the attitudes, anger, and **alienation** from punk culture and reworked punk's do-it-yourself aesthetic as a ready-made-for-sale-in-stores fashion statement. Once adopted by the mainstream culture it seeks to reject, the subculture's threat is managed and its resistance assimilated. Punk may have allowed working-class people to challenge a mainstream culture that limited their options for success, but only until the dominant culture began to imitate and reenact the styles that had expressed resistance.

The punk rock movement is but one example of a class subculture. Virtually any group operating outside the mainstream that evolves a distinctive set of values and practices could be considered a class subculture. Among the working class, those deeply involved in the **labor movement** could, in some situations, be considered a subculture. Urban **gangs** often exhibit antisocial, subcultural behaviors. But virtually any sort of behavior, positive or negative, operating outside accepted norms could become the basis for a class subculture. As the example of punk shows, however, it is generally easier for the mainstream to co-opt subcultures than for the latter to overthrow the mainstream.

Suggested Reading

Ken Gelder, ed. *The Subcultures Reader*, 1997; Dick Hebdige, *Subculture: The Meaning of Style*, 1979; David Muggleton, *Inside Subculture: The Postmodern Meaning of Style (Dress, Body, Culture)*, 2002.

CLASSISM

CHUCK BARONE

Classism can be defined as the systematic mistreatment of one socioeconomic group by another. It operates on personal, social, cultural, and institutional levels.

Classism, both as an ideology justifying economic and social inequality and as a system of oppression, has largely been ignored in spite of the historical and contemporary existence of class-based societies. Classism is a form of oppression analogous to other forms such as racism or sexism, and it is often intertwined with these. Depending upon the level, oppression manifests itself differently as aware and unaware prejudice (attitudes, stereotypes, and behavior); discrimination (power); and institutional discrimination (control and social reproduction). Classism is rooted in economic distinctions that include one's position within the system of production and distribution, income, the material conditions of life, levels of education, life chances, and sociocultural differences. Class oppression ultimately rests upon a structure of rules and social customs embodied in institutions, linguistic conventions, unwritten customs, and legal practices. It often embodies aspects of snobbery.

Classism includes prejudice and stereotypes projected toward working class and/or the **lower classes**. The actual content of classism is elitist; in other words, class oppression and class privileges are defended on the basis of one person or group claiming to be more important, smarter, better, more deserving, or more qualified than another. These attitudes frame class behavior and thus govern interclass social relations. The oppressed person/group—usually the lower class and poor—is viewed as less worthy intellectually, socially, and economically. Such views can be unintentionally patronizing or they can be vicious. Classism is usually linked to **power** and hierarchy, though bottom-up prejudices often exist. Members of the working class, for example, often presume that members of the upper and middle class are snobs, or that they are exploitative.

Classist patterns and attitudes are the source of much prejudice and have been used to denigrate and discriminate against working and lower-class people, and to rationalize current and past oppression of these groups the world over. Failure to address the economic needs of working families for adequate incomes, housing, and health care; attacks on welfare and the poor; widespread anti-union sentiments; and negative media stereotypes of working-class people are examples of classism in action.

The primary institutional basis of contemporary classism is economic, especially within systems in which one social class has power and authority over others. In **capitalism** the dominant class includes those who own and manage corporations. This unequal dynamic often results in the exploitation and mistreatment of workers. Classism manifests itself when some are treated as expendable or with less than complete human dignity. It includes being compelled to work long and hard under difficult and often dangerous conditions for compensation that is far less than the value of one's contribution. Classism also often includes being denied due process at work and the democratic right to control one's own production/distribution process.

Suggested Reading

Margaret Anderson and Patricia Collins, eds. Race, Class, and Gender: An Anthology, 5th ed., 2004; Chuck Barone, "Extending Our Analysis of Class Oppression: Bringing Classism More Fully into the Race & Gender Picture," Race, Gender, and Class, 6.3 (1999), pp. 5-32; Class Action: Building Bridges across the Classes (http://www.classism.org/index.php); Janet Zandy, ed., Liberating Memory, 1994.

CLOWARD, RICHARD ANDREW (December 25, 1926–August 23, 2001)

ROBERT E. WEIR

A social activist and sociologist, Cloward's work on **poverty** remains influential decades after its initial conception.

He was born in Rochester, New York, the son of Donald Cloward, a radical Baptist minister, and Esther Fleming, an artist. Cloward spent his entire academic career at Columbia, where he obtained his bachelor's degree, his master's, and his doctorate. He joined the School for Social Work faculty in 1954, shortly after completing his PhD.

Cloward's first notable work was *Delinquency and Opportunity*, a 1960 work coauthored with Lloyd Ohlin. Cloward and Ohlin put forth a contentious "opportunity theory," which argued that juvenile delinquency was a rational response for poor, inner-city youths whose access to legitimate economic opportunity was limited. Although many decried this work as condoning lawlessness, Cloward put his theory into action by creating the Mobilization for Youth program in New York City. He rejected the prevailing paternalism of social work and brought gang members into active leadership roles. This program inspired several **Great Society** initiatives in the mid-1960s. On a personal note, Cloward met **Frances Fox Piven** through the Mobilization program. The two married and were collaborators for the rest of Cloward's life.

During the mid and late 1960s, Cloward and Piven stirred controversy by organizing the poor for militant action. In particular, they actively recruited poor people to swell the welfare rolls and hence spur social reform. Their actions included picketing, occupying welfare offices, and other acts of civil disobedience. These ideas and activities ripened into the path-breaking 1971 book Regulating the Poor. Coming on the heels of cataclysmic urban riots, Cloward and Piven embraced class struggle as a legitimate response for poor Americans. Welfare, they argued, has two primary functions. In stable times it suppresses wages by stigmatizing recipients so that the near-poor will work harder, stay off welfare rolls, and make few financial demands. During times of social unrest, however, welfare's function is to restore order. This is done via a carrot-and-stick strategy in which the government provides basic needs, but only if the poor behave themselves. Both functions, they argued, are insidious blame-the-victim strategies designed to keep the poor in their place. For some recipients, welfare becomes a **self-fulfilling prophecy** in which they internalize their status and lose hope. Because the poor lack political clout, their only access to **power** is to be disruptive, especially during times of social upheaval when politicians wish to restore order. (Note: Social movement history reveals that groups that use a limited amount of violence routinely obtain more concessions than those that eschew it or those that engage in wholesale violence. This was true, Cloward and Piven noted, even of New Deal programs, which resulted from social upheaval rather than government benevolence.) Evidence suggests there was merit to their arguments; during the quiescent 1950s welfare spending increased just 17 percent, but in the 1960s it increased by around 225 percent.

Cloward and Piven cofounded the National Welfare Rights Organization to advocate for welfare rights, arguing that ongoing militancy was necessary to retain welfare benefits. As they warned, decreased protest paved the way for the **Reagan** and **Bush** administrations of the 1980s to slash benefits. Cloward and Piven were outspoken critics of presidents Reagan and George H.W. Bush. Conservative claims that rises in crime, single-parent families, gang violence, and addiction were due to moral breakdown, they argued, were based on ignorance and cruelty. They pointed especially to draconian cuts to Medicaid and Aid to Families with Dependent Children to argue that welfare cuts were attacks on the **working poor** that served to widen the wealth gap.

In Why Americans Don't Vote (1988, 2000), Cloward and Piven opined that the American economic and political systems had effectively closed the door on the **lower classes**. Although many of the institutional aspects of their work—including their assertion that multiparty systems are superior to U.S. two-party dominance—were ignored, their point that registration difficulties served to disenfranchise the poor factored in to the passage of the 1993 National Voter Registration Act—sometimes nicknamed the "Motor Voter Act"—which allows one to register to vote at welfare offices and when renewing drivers' licenses.

Cloward remained to his death a steadfast apologist for political activism. *Regulating the Poor* is still assigned reading in many university sociology and social work classes.

Suggested Reading

Francis Fox Piven and Richard Cloward, Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare, 1971; Piven and Cloward, Poor People's Movements: Why They Succeed, Why They Fail, 1977; Piven and Cloward, Why Americans Don't Vote, 1988 (updated 2000).

COLD WAR

FRANK A. SALAMONE

The Cold War was a time of heightened East-West tensions in the years between 1946 and 1991. It resulted from the clashing economic and geopolitical interests between **communism** and **capitalism** as embodied by the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR or Soviet Union) and the United States. It is generally dubbed a "cold" war to denote the ideological nature of the conflict, as opposed to armed "hot" war clashes. Both sides, however, also engaged in military action.

The seeds of the Cold War were sown in the midst of World War II. The allies consisting of the Western democracies plus the USSR discussed postwar potential settlements at major conferences in Tehran (1943), Yalta (1945), and Potsdam (1945). Problems between the democracies and the Soviet Union began to develop even before the war ended.

Soviet control of Eastern European states led British leader Winston Churchill to warn in 1946 that an "iron curtain" was descending through the middle of Europe. The USSR's Josef Stalin responded that, because World War II was the

logical outcome of Western "capitalist imperialism," future wars were possible. In the meantime, military blocs emerged on both sides. An arms race resulted, and each side sought to exert its influence in the Third World. At times, armed conflict erupted but never between the Soviet Union and the United States. After Stalin's death there were alternating periods of calm and tension that finally ended in 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed after many Eastern European nations had already cast off communism. Many parts of the former USSR became independent nations.

The Cold War and the ensuing competition had consequences for classes in the United States. After a brief postwar recession, a period of prolonged U.S. prosperity drove out vestiges of the **Great Depression**. The **military-industrial complex** that provided arms during World War II continued during the Cold War, and many American firms also profited from the rebuilding of Western Europe and Japan. Plentiful jobs resulted in great **social mobility** in postwar America. **Incomes** increased greatly; the median family income, for example, nearly doubled between 1945 and 1960. Likewise, the percentage of Americans in the **middle class** increased dramatically, from one-third during the Depression to two-thirds after the war by one reckoning, though other analysts place the figure at closer to 40 percent.

Many things contributed to this growth. Low **unemployment**, new opportunities, and federal spending, based on the exigencies of the Cold War, spurred on prosperity. The G.I. Bill of Rights, officially the Servicemen's Readjustment Act, the building of new factories, low-interest government loans for housing, and other initiatives hastened the expansion of **suburbia**. Indeed, 85 percent of all new homes built in the 1950s were suburban homes.

Between 1946 and 1966, the country underwent a "baby boom." At its peak, 1957, a new baby was born every seven seconds in the United States, and nearly 76 million Americans were born before the boom ended in 1966. These new Americans sparked economic growth. Suburbanites needed new cars to commute, since there was little public transportation in the suburbs. Sales of new cars fueled the economy, as did easy credit to buy houses, appliances, and other important consumer goods. Women entered the job market in large numbers, further pushing the economy upward. President Eisenhower promoted the creation of the interstate highway system, which made car travel and truck deliveries easier. Between 1940 and 1950, the number of cars in the United States jumped from 40 to 60 million.

The government, as part of its defense measures during the Cold War, promoted college education. The new middle class followed the **upper class** in sending its children to college. The 1958 National Defense Education Act provided low-cost loans to college students and money for teacher training and material for instruction. The government aided research, especially in scientific and engineering pursuits. Fully one-third of all university scientific and engineering personnel in universities worked on government projects.

The fear of the "red menace" of communism worked to help workers attain greater benefits. The **Red Scare** put limits on the arbitrary power of business over their workers as the United States sought to win the hearts and minds of people under communist rule through example. This worked to ensure unprecedented

gains for American workers in wages and benefits. The ruling class sought to win the Cold War by convincing workers at home and abroad that American capitalism created a higher standard of living than was possible under communism. Statistics were quoted to prove that American workers had to work less to buy cars, houses, and household appliances. Western leaders and businessmen conveniently ignored the cost of things such as medical care, rent, housing, education, transportation, and other subsidized services that were cheaper in the socialist world.

Many of the advances American workers made must be understood in light of the Cold War and the global competition between capitalism and communism. This competition also helped African Americans during the Civil Rights struggle. After all, it was difficult to seek to capture the hearts and minds of Africans, Asians, and Latin Americans while allowing Jim Crow laws, lynching, and attacks on civil rights demonstrators to run rampant. Some American leaders, in fact, put their arguments for equality in precisely such image-conscious terms. Often, social justice mattered less than promoting American-style capitalism.

During the Cold War Americans began to perceive themselves as a middleclass nation. Unprecedented gains were made in working conditions, benefits, and public services. For many, **consumerism** supplanted **class consciousness**. The **labor movement** saw a marked decline in militancy, in part because workers felt more content and in part because its own leaders bought into middleclass ideals. The 1955 merger between the **American Federation of Labor** and the **Congress of Industrial Organizations** buried the hatchet between the two former rivals, but plans to use their mutual might to reverse antilabor bills such as the Taft-Hartley Act foundered. The head of the AFL–CIO, **George Meany**, was an ardent supporter of postwar economic planning and of American policy objectives. He too was infused with notions of the United States as a middleclass society and took a dim view of radicalism among the rank and file. Meany's views played badly among younger workers when the Vietnam War became unpopular.

The upper classes prospered financially during the Cold War, and especially benefited from the decline in working-class consciousness and militancy. The illogic of organized labor's quiescence with Cold War policies came to bear in the 1980s, as the Cold War was winding down and the anti-union administration of **Ronald Reagan** came to power. Since the 1980s labor union membership has fallen precipitously, and it has become harder for unions to convince American workers converted to middle-class ideology that they possess interests antithetical to those of the business community.

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Coles, Robert (12 October 1929–)

FRANK A. SALAMONE

Martin Robert Coles is a psychiatrist whose work has had far-reaching consequences. In addition to psychiatry, Coles has been a social philosopher who has critically examined not only what psychiatry is doing but also why practitioners are doing it. Coles was born in Boston, Massachusetts. His father, Philip, an engineer, was English and his mother, Sandra Young Coles, hailed from Sioux City, Iowa. Coles attributes his concern for social justice to their example, stating that one of his early memories was that of his mother reading **Dorothy Day**'s *Catholic Worker* with delight.

Coles attended Boston Latin prior to Harvard College, where he majored in English, studying with Perry Miller. His senior thesis was on a work of William Carlos Williams. The thesis so impressed Williams that he analyzed it for Coles, who had sent it to him. Eventually the two became close friends and Williams became a strong influence.

It was Williams, a physician as well as a poet, who helped Coles enter the Columbia University College of Physicians and Surgeons. Coles first studied pediatrics but switched to child psychiatry. He served in the Air Force as chief of neuropsychiatry in Biloxi, Mississippi. In 1965 he worked as a teaching fellow for Erik H. Erikson at Harvard. The following year he became a lecturer in general education. Coles was in steady contact with Anna Freud, with whom he conducted a regular correspondence. In the midst of all this activity, he managed to become a prolific writer, receiving the Pulitzer Prize in 1973 for volumes two and three of *Children of Crisis*.

Coles has based himself at Harvard, where he has taught and conducted research. He became a professor of psychiatry and medical humanities at Harvard Medical School in 1977, continuing to combine his scientific and humanistic interests. In 1981 he received a MacArthur Fellowship, being in the first group of honorees. He has received numerous other honors in his career, including being visiting professor at Dartmouth and being instrumental in establishing the Center for Documentary Studies at Duke University.

Coles is the founding editor of *Double-Take* magazine, combining photography and writing in an effort, he says, to help people change the way they view the world. It fits in with the general tenor of his work, examining the lives of Americans, especially the disadvantaged. Coles finds a dignity in the lives of the oppressed who display a remarkable resiliency.

Coles has chronicled the lives of children from many backgrounds. His books narrate the lives of children from many regions of the United States as well as those from other countries of the world. These studies display his deep commitment to ethics as well as child psychiatry. Indeed, he has taught social ethics in a number of academic settings, including medical schools, business schools, law schools, and schools of education.

Coles has been a prolific writer. His opus includes 1300 articles and sixty books, including *Children of Crisis* (in five volumes); *The Moral Life of Children*; *The Political Life of Children*; *Dorothy Day: A Radical Devotion*; *The Call of Stories: Teaching and the*

Moral Imagination; and Doing Documentary Work. Many of his works deal with young children living in extreme **poverty**. Indeed, his five-volume Children of Crisis series is considered by many to rank among the classic works of the effects of poverty on children and their families. His books survey the ways children from a variety of ethnic and **socioeconomic statuses** negotiate moral and social dilemmas. Among the children Coles studied were African Americans, Latinos, Native Americans, Inuits, and the offspring of **sharecroppers** and **migrant workers**. He has even looked at the ways in which **upper-class** children confront their own privilege.

Coles demonstrates the manner in which poverty affects both the physical and the intellectual well-being of children. The social implications of poverty carry on throughout their lives though, like **Jonathan Kozol**, Coles expressed admiration for the perseverance demonstrated by children in difficult straits. Coles is a fervent opponent of **segregation**, though he maintains that merely busing school children within the city limits is not enough. The rich white **suburbs** need to be included in any comprehensive goal of integration. Not doing so, Coles maintains, ignores the class dimensions of economic status.

"The ultimate reality is the reality of class," Coles proclaims. Working-class whites and blacks, he said, "are both competing for a very limited piece of pie, the limits of which are being set by the larger limits of class, which allow them damn little, if anything." Coles has argued for a class-based affirmative action policy, one that would not pit black against white but would face the reality of class in America.

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Commons, John R. (October 13, 1862–May 11, 1944)

ROBERT PAUL "GABE" GABRIELSKY

John Rogers Commons was an economist, a political scientist, and the father of the modern discipline of American labor history. His perspective was explicitly non-Marxist, and he endeavored to explain and justify the American exceptionalism embedded in the U.S. labor movement, in particular the lack of a mass social democratic or labor-based party in the United States. The pragmatism of American labor unions, another aspect of their exceptionalism, is often labeled "business unionism" and is, in comparison to its European counterparts, extremely conservative and essentially nonideological in its approach to political and economic objectives. This business unionism typically has an exclusive orientation toward a narrow "bread and butter" concern for better hours, wages, and working conditions for the members of each individual union to the exclusion of workers outside the unions, any broader political course of action, or any theory or conception of the working class as a whole.

Commons was born in Hollandsburg, Ohio, attended Oberlin College, and did graduate work at Johns Hopkins University under Richard T. Ely. He never received a doctorate, but he went on to teach at Wesleyan University, Oberlin, Indiana University, and Syracuse University. He also worked for several nonacademic groups before going to the University of Wisconsin in 1904, where he was to spend the balance of his academic career until his retirement in 1932.

The historian Fredrick Jackson Turner had been Commons's classmate at Johns Hopkins, and Turner's notion of the disappearance of the frontier as a primary influence on American economic development greatly influenced Commons's first published book, *The Distribution of Wealth* (1894). Commons's next book, *Proportional Representation* (1896), reflected his belief in a democratic, voluntary society in a system balanced by conflicting pressures.

Commons established his scholarly reputation while at Wisconsin with the publication of *A Documentary History of American Industry* (10 vols., 1910–11). His work culminated in two important books: *Trade Unions and Labor Unions* (1905) and his best-known work, *History of Labor in the United States* (4 vols., 1918–35), written in collaboration with his students.

Commons's institutional approach to labor history and his theory of the labor movement were generally accepted, and they became the basis for the "Wisconsin school" of labor analysis and political economy. Indeed, the perspective that he developed went largely unchallenged until the 1960s, when a new generation of younger labor historians, influenced by the British **New Left** and particularly by the work of E. P. Thompson, began to emerge.

Commons was very much a part of the Progressive tradition and drafted much of the social legislation that made Wisconsin an example for other states and a model for later federal legislation under the **New Deal** in areas of **civil service**, public utilities, workers' compensation, and **unemployment** insurance. His later works include *Legal Foundations of Capitalism* (1924) and *Institutional Economics* (1934). Among those most directly and greatly influenced by him were Selig Perlman, Harry Millis, David Saposs, Ira Cross, Philip Taft, and Wayne Morse.

Suggested Reading

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COMMUNIST PARTY

ROBERT E. WEIR

A **Marxist**-based political party devoted to **class struggle**, the Communist Party in the United States (CPUSA) is a legally registered political organization.

The CPUSA was founded in 1919 by American delegates who attended the Communist Third International. It formed just two years after the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, and many of its early U.S. leaders were former **Socialist Party**

members inspired by the potential for revolutionary upheaval in America, an outcome Karl Marx himself had predicted in his writings. Marx noted that the advanced industrial development of the United States had created an impoverished working class that would soon suffer alienation because it was divorced from control over the means of production. He also saw the growing labor movement as evidence that potential revolutionary networks were forming. In the latter spirit, many members of the CPUSA hoped to convert labor unions into communist cells.

The Bolshevik Revolution represented hope to many dispirited American leftists. By 1919 the **Industrial Workers of the World** had been rendered ineffective by repeated government raids, indictments, and repression. Ballot-box socialism had also proved disappointing as a national movement, and, on the local level, municipal socialism had proved more pragmatic than socially transformative. Moreover, in the conservative backlash following World War I, socialists faltered badly at the polls. Early on the CPUSA argued for a "boring within" relationship with trade unions, whereby communists would seek to gain control over affiliates of the American Federation of Labor (AFL) through a front group known as the Trade Union Educational League TUEL). The TUEL also served to insulate communists from the **Red Scare** backlash following World War I. TUEL members worked to convince unions to convert from craft unionism to industrial unionism in the belief that organizing workers according to what they produced rather than by specific skills would build class consciousness. Communists were emboldened by a series of general strikes in 1919, but ultimately the AFL proved too conservative. In 1929 the CPUSA set up the independent Trade Union Unity League (TUUL).

The creation of the TUUL also marked a change in relations with the Soviet Union. Early on, the CPUSA maintained a great degree of autonomy, with delegates to the various Communist Internationals arguing that local conditions dictated local strategies. By the mid-1920s, however, Moscow began to direct CPUSA policies, which had the unintended effect of dragging American communists into ideological debates, such as the decision to denounce **Trotskyists**. For the next several decades American leadership ranks were occasionally disrupted by ideological infighting.

The CPUSA experienced its greatest growth period during the **Great Depression** of the 1930s and the oncoming struggle against fascism. Most scholars peg its peak membership at around 75,000 in 1940–41. Its overall influence was far greater, though. Communists proved able organizers, especially in depressed urban areas, where they operated **soup kitchens**, organized rent strikes to protect the **working poor**, ran language classes for immigrants, and galvanized protests against decaying economic conditions. They also rose to prominent leadership positions in numerous unions, including those of autoworkers, furriers, longshoremen, maritime workers, meatpackers, and steelworkers. Many of these unions affiliated with the **Congress of Industrial Organizations** (CIO), which split from the AFL in 1935 and embraced the industrial unionism model favored by the CPUSA. Although only a handful of unions contained substantial numbers of communists, CPUSA leaders did much to help build unions in the 1930s.

Communism's major political appeal lay in its alternative, collectivist economic vision. The severity of the Great Depression led some Americans, especially

intellectuals, to question the long-term sustainability of **capitalism**. Communists were further aided by Moscow's shifting tactics in the mid-1930s. As the fascist threat grew, the CPUSA was given permission to cooperate with capitalists to overcome the greater threat. Between 1935 and 1939, a coalition of the left known as the Popular Front united many communists, socialists, labor activists, and radicals.

The CPUSA suffered a blow to its prestige in 1939, when the Soviet Union signed a non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany in a cynical move to annex parts of Poland. Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 led the CPUSA to reestablish its support for **Franklin Roosevelt**, whom it officially endorsed for the presidency in 1944. Communists also proved loyal defense workers, signing nostrike pledges during the war and cooperating with efforts to streamline factory production. Some communists openly asserted that "communism is twentieth-century Americanism," and they were cheered by the U.S./USSR alliance that defeated fascism. For a brief moment the CPUSA was dissolved as a political party and reorganized as a political association.

The postwar period saw alliances unravel quickly and dramatically. With Soviet armies occupying much of southern and eastern Europe, wartime cooperation gave way to adversarial relations known as the **Cold War**, which exacerbated the ideological differences, contrasting territorial designs, and divergent economic visions of the United States and the Soviet Union. American communists were placed in the untenable position of being called upon to subvert their own government and of surviving a postwar Red Scare aimed at destroying them. The 1947 Taft-Hartley Act outlawed many of the militant tactics favored by communist labor activists and required all labor leaders to sign affidavits that they were not members of the CPUSA or any other communist group. The support many communists gave to Henry Wallace's quixotic 1948 campaign for the presidency further isolated them from the American political mainstream.

The Red Scare reached fever pitch between 1949 and 1956. In 1950 the CIO, once a bastion of communist strength, expelled eleven unions and nearly a million members because of supposed ties to the CPUSA. The House Un-American Activities Committee and several Senate Select Committees held near-constant hearings on alleged communist subversion, and numerous prominent CPUSA leaders were jailed. The American public was fed a steady diet of fear and propaganda, which was intensified by the arms race, dramatic spy trials, the Chinese Revolution of 1949, the outbreak of the Korean War, and the ravings of such demagogues as Senator Joseph McCarthy. More than 15,000 federal employees lost their jobs because of security concerns, as did untold others in the private sector. The entertainment industry was under constant scrutiny, and many within it found themselves blacklisted. Nationwide, one in five Americans had to sign loyalty oaths as a condition of employment, while employers found red-baiting an expedient way to derail unionization drives. The CPUSA was forced to go underground merely to survive.

Anticommunist hysteria held sway into the 1960s, often abetted by actions of the Soviet Union, such as its 1956 invasion of Hungary, the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961, its attempt to erect missile sites in Cuba in 1962, its 1968 suppression of a freedom movement in Czechoslovakia, and its support for North Vietnam during the Vietnam conflict. For Americans growing up during the Cold War,

communism was synonymous with treason, suppression of freedom, and the threat of nuclear warfare, not the **class struggle**. Revelations of the excesses of former Soviet leader Josef Stalin and allegations—some of which were later substantiated—that Moscow was funding domestic spying within the United States served further to discredit the CPUSA. Unlike the 1930s, the CPUSA was unable to capitalize on 1960s militancy, even though it again surfaced as an open political party and took steps to gain independence from Moscow. For the most part, the CPUSA was eclipsed by the **New Left**.

CPUSA supporters claimed a membership of around 25,000 in the early 1970s, but that figure is surely inflated. Its support weakened as the Soviet Union itself declined, first during Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms in the 1980s, then with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. It was also weakened by its continuing penchant for internecine battles. Today the CPUSA still runs candidates for office, and copies of the *Daily Worker* are still hawked by activists (many of whom are idealistic college students). Most observers claim it has about 2,500 official members and that its current impact on American politics and economic policy is minimal.

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COMMUNITY COLLEGES

WILLIAM DEGENARO

Community colleges are institutions of post-secondary higher education that usually provide two years of instruction for students. Virtually all community colleges are open admissions, which means those with high school diplomas or the equivalent qualify for admission. Community colleges offer lower tuition costs and tend to attract more working-class college students than four-year schools. Although some community colleges are beginning to build residence halls, most remain exclusively commuter schools and provide access to higher education both to traditional and to older, nontraditional students who live in the surrounding communities. Because they have the reputation for attracting students with weak high school records, community colleges are sometimes dubbed "second-chance" schools, or "thirteenth grade."

Community colleges were originally called "junior colleges," because they were envisioned as institutions that would eventually allow four-year (or "senior") colleges to stop teaching the first two years of coursework. Early college planners imagined that the new two-year campuses could help universities weed out less-prepared students who weren't "college material." The first such institution, Joliet Junior College, opened in 1901 in Illinois. By the 1960s, a decade of boom for two-year colleges, the new brand of college had morphed into a multipurpose learning center whose mission and scope, which now included vocational and certification

programs as well as academic transfer programs, transcended service to universities. "Community college," a name that reflected this broader mission, became the preferred designation for two-year colleges.

Currently over 6 million students—39 percent of all college students in the United States—matriculate at community college campuses. All fifty states have community colleges, but California has a particularly extensive system. Programs at community colleges include associate degree programs in the arts and sciences, pursued in large part by students wishing to transfer to four-year schools. Community colleges also offer vocational programs and certification in technical or careeroriented areas ranging from medical assistance to nursing to broadcasting to computer repair to heating/cooling repair to welding. Community colleges frequently create partnerships with local businesses to provide job training and other forms of instructional support. The colleges also regularly partner with local high schools for dual enrollment programs wherein high school students receive college credit for courses taken during their eleventh- or twelfth-grade years.

Critics such as sociologist Burton Clark claim community colleges serve a "cooling out" function, managing and decreasing the aspirations of working-class and racial minority students. Further, the critics maintain, public community colleges provide the state a further opportunity to discipline working-class malcontents who might otherwise disrupt the workings of the corporate state. By giving first-generation college students both a trade (via a two-year vocational degree) and a sense of **democracy**, taste, and decorum (via liberal arts requirements), community colleges construct citizens who can contribute to economic and civic life. Indeed, empirical data suggest that students become less prone to high aspirations during their tenure at community colleges and more amenable to a "practical," more realistic set of objectives. Finally, the critics point out that community college students miss out on the opportunities for socializing and the aesthetic qualities that four-year institutions offer.

In contrast to the critics, community college boosters praise community colleges for opening the doors of higher education to a broader cross section of the U.S. population. Many students who could not otherwise afford to attend college take advantage of low costs at community colleges and the fact that close proximity to home allows students to continue working jobs to support families or augment family incomes. Some research also suggests that working-class students—like students who grow up in ethnic enclaves—are more likely to have ties with their home communities that would be broken by "going away" to school. Finally, community colleges boast accessible faculty and student support networks such as tutoring centers that help students learn the culture of higher education; this kind of support is particularly important to first-generation college students, most of whom come from the working class.

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COMPANY TOWN

ROBERT E. WEIR

Company town is the term applied to a municipality where a single industry or employer supplies the bulk of employment, owns significant amounts of real estate, and (often) exercises undue political power over local decision making. Historically the term referred to places that were often literally owned by an employer, including housing and utilities. More recently it has come to designate any town and city whose economy relies disproportionately on a single employer.

Company towns owe their origins to the early days of American **capitalism** and were tied to ideas such as individual entrepreneurship and paternalism. Many observers see Samuel Slater's textile operation in Pawtucket, Rhode Island, as the prototype for company towns. Slater owned the mill, required workers to live in the company boarding house, controlled water rights on the Blackstone River, and even paid some workers in scrip redeemable only at the company store. Slater expanded his operation northward along the Blackstone River, often creating new company towns whenever a new mill was constructed.

Textiles and coal mining made up the bulk of pre-Civil War company towns. Lowell, Massachusetts, was one of the more famous company towns; by the mid-1830s its several dozen mills employed more than 20,000 workers, most of whom were employees of the Boston Associates business conglomerate. The Boston Associates represented a departure from the local, paternal model of Slater. As corporations grew larger, absentee ownership became more common, with towns and factories being administered by an imported managerial class. The Boston Associates, for example, also developed mills in such places as Chicopee, Holyoke, and Lawrence, Massachusetts; Dover, Manchester, and Nashua, New Hampshire; and Biddeford and Saco, Maine. In each place the mill became the dominant (or sole) employer and the towns either overt or de facto company towns.

Other industries followed suit. Lynn, Massachusetts, applied company town principles to the shoe industry, Troy, New York, to iron manufacturing, and Lynchburg, Virginia, to tobacco processing. Both before and after the Civil War, company town principles proved easiest to apply in remote areas. Coal-mining hamlets in Pennsylvania, Colorado, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Ohio, and West Virginia were often company towns, as were silver- and gold-mining operations in California and the Great Basin, timber outposts in the Pacific Northwest and Upper Great Lakes, and copper mines in Arizona. Perhaps the two most famous examples of company towns in the late nineteenth century were the privately owned sleeping car manufactory of Pullman, Illinois, and the greater Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, region, many of whose towns were solely dependent on steel mills.

The Pittsburgh suburb of Homestead and Pullman suffered cataclysmic strikes in 1892 and 1894, respectively, but the company town ideal outlasted such upheaval. In fact, in the early twentieth century it even expanded. Tobacco- and textiles-dominated company towns crisscrossed much of the South, many New England towns remained under the sway of textile manufacturers, and mining operators continued to operate according to nineteenth-century models. Moreover, the rise of new industries created new de facto company towns—the wave of the future.

Many industrial capitalists preferred to exercise indirect economic power rather than direct social control over towns and property. Detroit, for example, was not a traditional company town per se, but the economy was so dependent upon auto manufacturing that, for all intents and purposes, Ford and General Motors controlled it. The same could be said of the steel industry in Gary, Indiana, and Birmingham, Alabama; the rubber-making industry of Akron, Ohio; machine tool production in Springfield, Massachusetts; and meatpacking in Kansas City, Missouri, and Des Moines, Iowa. The twentieth century even retained old-style paternalist company towns, such as the chocolate domain of Milton S. Hershey, who until the 1950s owned most of the housing stock, charitable organizations, and cultural institutions of Hershey, Pennsylvania.

In the later twentieth century, though, the trend was for towns and cities to diversify their economies. This does not mean, however, that the company town concept disappeared. Ironically, trends such as **deindustrialization** and **globalism** actually revitalized it. Those municipalities that did not diversify became even more dependent upon single employers and often granted tax abatements, funded infrastructure improvements, and offered various economic enticements aimed at preventing corporations from closing or relocating. Even more ominously, communities often ended up competing against each other in bids to lure industries seeking cost containment. (This phenomenon was not new; many New England towns had seen textile mills flee to the low-wage, non-union South before World War II.)

In terms of social class, company towns past and present have had profound implications for those on the lower end of the **socioeconomic status** scale. By exercising economic leverage, powerful business elites tend to exercise undue social and political **power**. Labor unions, for example, find it quite difficult to organize in de facto company towns; corporate critics experience obstacles in publicizing their grievances, and oppositional cultures of all sorts struggle against prevailing norms that are often stamped with the values of corporate leadership. Even town spending tends to tilt toward the interests of the upper **middle class**. This is true even in towns dominated by universities and colleges, which tend to be more liberal politically. That said, many academic enclaves operate as intellectual company towns where local budgets and referenda often disproportionately cater to the middle class.

There are many examples of company town influence in contemporary society. Boeing Corporation and Microsoft exercise tremendous influence in the greater Seattle area, as does the U.S. Marine Corps near Parris Island, South Carolina. Much of central Florida is either owned or controlled by the Walt Disney Company, and many communities in the Northwest continue to bow to timber interests.

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COMPARABLE WORTH

PAT REEVE

Comparable worth is the concept that workers are entitled to equal pay for work of comparable value. In 2006 members of the nonpartisan National Council of Women's Organizations (NCWO) endorsed policies aimed at increasing women's economic security. Among these was comparable worth, a notion closely related to equity pay. Central to both is the idea that gender and racial bias have contributed to the systematic undervaluing and segregation of work performed by women and people of color.

NCWO and other women's organizations contend that the Equal Pay Act of 1963 does not protect workers in gender and racially segregated occupations. For this reason, comparable worth supporters call for legislative and contractual remedies that institute wage parity across occupations and labor markets.

Current demands for pay equity build on a century of campaigning for equal pay for equal work. Over time **wages** have been a lightning rod for what historian Alice Kessler-Harris calls "a contest over visions of fairness and justice." Classical economic liberals explain wage setting as a neutral function of supply and demand. Their critics, notably those in the **labor movement**, argue that wage determination reflects prevailing gender and racial biases. At stake in these debates is a worker's right to self-sufficiency.

In 1963 civil rights activists and feminists successfully campaigned for the Equal Pay Act, which amended the Fair Labor Standards Act (1938), and Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Thereafter it was illegal to pay lower wages to female rather than male employees for "equal work" or jobs. The judiciary extended protection to greater numbers of female workers in *Schultz v. Wheaton Glass Co.* (1970), U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, and *Corning Glass Works v. Brennan* (1974), U.S. Supreme Court.

Still, women earn substantially less than male workers. In 2002 women earned 77 cents for every dollar earned by a man. In April 2004 the Institute for Women's Policy Research (IWPR) reported the earnings of white men and women of different races, concluding that the highest-paid women earned 25 percent less than white men in comparable positions.

Beginning with the 1945 federal Women's Bureau, comparable worth supporters have advocated for data collection to document the causes and effects of job segregation. Recommended are comparative appraisals of job content, qualifications, and working conditions across occupations.

In 1974 Governor Daniel Evans (R) of Washington ordered the nation's first pay equity wage study in response to pressure by the Washington Federation of State Employees (WFSE), American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 28. The ensuing study of 121 job classifications revealed that women in state service earned 20 percent less than male public employees in comparable jobs.

Lawmakers failed to act on pay inequalities documented by the state-commissioned study, causing the WFSE to file suit in U.S. District Court in 1982. In 1983 U.S. District Judge Jack E. Tanner found for WFSE. Plaintiff Helen Castrilli recollected her reaction: "I thought, Oh my God. This is big. This is going to impact hundreds of thousands of people." The state appealed the decision and won. Nonetheless, the

union maintained public pressure for a remedy. In 1985 Washington settled with the union and approved \$101 million in pay increases for female employees.

Litigation for comparable worth, previously unsuccessful, now promises to narrow the wage gap between men and women. In June 2004 a U.S. district judge in northern California allowed the class action suit *Dukes, et al. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.* to go forth. Plaintiffs, 1.6 million past and present female employees, allege that **Wal-Mart** systematically pays women less than men in comparable positions. *Dukes* is the largest sex discrimination case ever brought against a private employer, and Wal-Mart is the world's largest private employer. The retail giant has appealed the decision.

The climate for Congressional action on pay equity has also improved since 2000. That year the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions heard testimony on gender-based wage discrimination. In succeeding sessions, sponsors of the Fair Pay Act have introduced a bill to mandate "equal pay for equivalent jobs." In 2005 Tom Harkin (D, IA) introduced that year's bill, asserting, "In nearly 10 million American households, the mother is the only breadwinner. These families struggle to pay the rent or make mortgage payments, buy the groceries, cover the medical bills and save for a child's education." Echoing earlier generations of advocates for pay equity, Harkin concluded, "We simply must do something about the longtime pattern of wage discrimination. We can start closing the pay gap right now by simply paying women what they're worth."

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COMPETITIVENESS

ROBERT E. WEIR

Competition is a central tenet of **capitalism**. Proponents from Adam Smith on have argued that competition is the best way to mediate supply and demand. In theory, competition produces efficiency and economic growth. Consumers can expect to benefit from this, with competitors providing goods and services either at lower prices or with higher quality in order to keep up with their rivals. More recently competitiveness has become a shorthand way to express the economic pressures of **globalization** as they impact American business interests.

There can be little doubt that the United States no longer dominates world economic markets to the degree that it did immediately following World War II. It now faces global competition, not just from Europe and Japan, but also from low-wage competitors in developing nations in Southeast Asia, the Indian subcontinent, and Latin America. Often lost in the discussion of making American business

more competitive is the domestic impact of such policies. Most American politicians, economists, and business lobbyists favor **free trade** policies that treat much of the planet as a single market for the movement of goods, services, and labor. Free trade capitalist enterprises can become more competitive through innovation or improved efficiency, but one of the primary ways is to reduce labor costs. Such reductions have profound implications for the American class system.

One way that American business cuts labor costs is by relocating operations to low-wage areas, whether they are non-unionized sections of the United States or abroad. Still another way is to wrest concessions from the workforce. This is frequently done when companies face bankruptcy; Chrysler Corporation got \$673 million in employee wage cuts, pension reductions, and fringe benefit givebacks in 1979. Similarly United Airlines demanded more than \$5 billion in concessions from its employees under a 2002 reorganization plan.

Since the 1980s, however, even profitable businesses have insisted upon wage, pension, and benefits concessions from employees, often in the name of global competitiveness. In numerous cases employers simply closed U.S. plants and located outside U.S. borders in order to cut labor costs. Critics have charged, with considerable merit, that many of these moves use the rubric of being more competitive to disguise the true motive of greater profit taking for stockholders and other investors. The impact of this on the working class is profound. Studies of the impact of the North American Free Trade Act (NAFTA), enacted in 1994, show that more than 200,000 American jobs were lost in the first five years of its passage, 70 percent of which were formerly high-paying manufacturing jobs. NAFTA has also had a negative effect on environmental standards and on U.S. trade deficits.

Competitiveness has, to date, served to widen the **income and wealth** gap in America. When adjusted for inflation, the average hourly wage has declined steadily since 1975. By 1995 the average hourly wage had declined to just \$4 of real buying power, down from more than \$13 just twenty years earlier. The gap is even more acute for workers under the age of twenty-four. Ironically, the productivity of American workers has soared since 1975. Nonetheless, wages fell in real terms from 1970 to 1990, and they rose less than 0.05 percent in the next decade. The statistics become even more alarming when one factors in lost benefits. In 2005 Delphi Corporation put forth a plan that would slash wages and benefits by two-thirds for its employees. Labor unions also charge that employers further undercut wages by hiring illegal immigrants; one 2004 study reveals that as many as 20 percent of all construction jobs now go to illegal aliens being paid in cash off the books.

Competitiveness is an attractive buzz phrase, but whether the **American dream** can be realized by workers receiving drastically reduced compensation is, at best, problematic. Early signs are not encouraging; nearly all studies reveal a widening gap between rich and poor.

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CONFLICT THEORY

ROBERT E. WEIR

Conflict theory is a major school of social science analysis that posits the inevitability of fundamental clashes of economic interest in most societies, especially those in which capitalism is the dominant exchange mode. Conflict theory derives largely from a Marxist critique of power, though not all modern conflict theorists are Marxists. Lewis Coser is one example of a non-Marxian conflict theorist. During the 1960s and 1970s, Coser argued that conflict—both among and within groups—is often an important factor in shaping in-group identity. Likewise it can serve to reinforce groups and institutions by revitalizing them and preventing social calcification. Another non-Marxist conflict theorist is Ralf Dahrendorf.

Most conflict theorists, however, see much of society as marked by competing interests rooted in social, political, racial, gender, and economic inequality. Marx and others argued that **class struggle** was inevitable, though they held out hope that positive social change would come from it. Marx famously argued that class conflict would ultimately yield a one-class society in which future clashes would vanish along with private property, private wealth, and inequality. **C. Wright Mills** later argued that the dominance of the **power elite** muted the voices of the masses in decision making. Although he too believed that class conflict was probable, Mills also imagined a pessimistic premise in which class issues would be subsumed in geopolitical conflicts whereby militarization led to World War III.

The predictions of such theorists as Marx and Mills notwithstanding, conflict theory's greatest contribution to date has come from its analysis of power and clashing interests. Some academic fields—labor history, black studies, and feminist studies, for instance—are dominated by conflict theorists. In a vaguely Darwinian way, most conflict theorists see society as a struggle to control finite and scarce resources. In such a scenario, powerful interests can become more so only by claiming resources from the less powerful. Hence, competition, conflict, and change are inexorably linked. Clashes can occur along any of society's social divisions, as well as between ideological systems and nation-states, but conflict theory is most often employed by scholars to critique social class.

Conflict theorists insist that social stratification is inherently dysfunctional and destabilizing. It limits opportunities for those with less social power, degrades the **life chances** of the non-wealthy, and supports the social status quo, even when it is based on nonrational, nonscientific, and socially inefficient criteria such as family origin, **ethnicity**, **race**, **gender**, and class. Ultimately it fosters discontent, resentment, and social upheaval. Dahrendorf went so far as to suggest that conflict within stratified societies was inherent in their design. Marx noted that capitalism was particularly vulnerable to conflict because it rested on a set of social problems that were not in the best interests of capitalists to resolve. Low wages, for instance, can be addressed only by reducing profits to investors. Likewise, a permanent and replenishable reserve of unemployed workers was necessary for capitalist enterprises to expand; otherwise businesses would have to compete with each other to secure workforces.

Conflict theorists have also been at the fore of studies on the causation of **poverty**. In sharp contrast to conservative critiques that shift much of the explanation

onto individuals, conflict theorists point to the built-in structural impediments that prevent poor people from enacting the **self-reliance** nostrums favored by conservatives. In contemporary society, for example, conflict theorists point to systematic campaigns to cut labor costs, cripple the **labor movement**, slash social services for the poor, prevent the equalization of educational spending, and work on other factors whose net effect is to deny opportunity to those most in need.

Suggested Reading

Joseph Healey, Race, Ethnicity, Gender, and Class: The Sociology of Group Conflict and Change, 2005; Harold Kerbo, Social Stratification and Inequality: Class Conflict in Historical and Comparative Perspective, 2005; Rhonda Levine, ed., Social Class and Stratification: Classic Statements and Theoretical Debates, 1998.

CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS (CIO)

SARAH CROSSLEY

Originally the Committee for Industrial Organization, the CIO was founded within the **American Federation of Labor** (AFL) in 1935 by **John L. Lewis** of the United Mine Workers and several other union leaders. After 1937, when it was expelled, the CIO was an independent labor federation and a rival to the AFL. It remained so until 1955, when the two groups reunited.

Its purpose was to organize the unskilled workers on an industrial basis instead of having them placed into various craft unions. Founders of the CIO felt that, with the onset of industrialization and mass production, most workers were part of integrated production processes, so that all workers within a given sector should be organized regardless of their skill level. Historians note that grassroots uprisings among unorganized industrial laborers had already shown their mettle and potential strength by pressuring politicians to enact significant legislative gains such as the **Wagner Act**.

Contrary to the goals of the fledgling CIO, the AFL was content to organize skilled tradesmen within their particular trade. They believed that skilled workers could maintain more control over a given industry through craft unions because their particular skills gave them leverage over production. AFL leaders argued that bargaining power would be diminished if craft unions organized across an industry rather than by specific skills. Many also argued that unskilled pools of labor dominated by poor **immigrants** were difficult, if not impossible, to organize given language and culture barriers. One AFL leader contemptuously referred to such workers as "the garbage of the **labor movement**."

Lewis and other industrial union advocates saw more opportunities than obstacles. The CIO in 1935 began mobilizing exactly those workers deemed unorganizable. Initially, it consisted of eight unions with about a million members. Within two years, it nearly quadrupled its membership, with thirty-two unions, more than 6000 locals, and about 3.7 million members. The CIO's initial successes occurred in 1937. A sit-down strike by the United Auto Workers (UAW) against General Motors (GM) exhibited the power of grassroots activism on the shop floor. In addition

to workers taking over GM plants, a UAW women's auxiliary was formed, the Socialist Party formed the Women's Emergency Brigade, and even Eleanor Roosevelt made a monetary donation in support of the strike. The UAW's victory catapulted the CIO into the public consciousness, and its focus on workplace democracy and working-class solidarity was pivotal to its initial success. By the late 1930s the CIO had succeeded in unionizing numerous industries that hitherto had weak unions or none at all: automobiles, electronics, rubber, steel, and textiles, for example. It also enjoyed a reputation as being the most socially progressive mainstream federation since the Knights of Labor in the late nineteenth century.

The grassroots militancy of CIO unions existed in part because of the nature of their organizing. The AFL sought to turn highly skilled tradesmen into a part of the **middle class**. By virtue of their skills, the task was difficult but not impossible. By contrast, CIO industrial unions embraced working-class identity. The CIO wanted similar economic stability for unskilled workers but recognized that unity against big business was the only way to secure that goal. Hence, CIO unions tended to be more confrontational than AFL unions. CIO unions also had an opendoor policy in regard to **race**, **gender**, nationality, and religious affiliation. Constitutions were adopted among affiliate unions forbidding any form of discrimination, exclusion, or segregation, and members were often required to take a pledge promising never to do so.

The culture of solidarity that spread through CIO unions was part and parcel of the leftist perspective that made up much of the CIO, including **communists**. Some scholars credit radical leaders with advancing **class consciousness** and class solidarity over racial, gendered, or political barriers. Their presence did, however, make the CIO vulnerable to Red-baiting. In May 1938 the U.S. House of Representatives established the Committee to Investigate Un-American Activities. John Frey, representing the AFL Executive Council, appeared before Congress and offered the names of hundreds of CIO leaders affiliated with the Communist Party.

Although the CIO's first head, John L. Lewis, had previously attacked communism, he welcomed Communist Party members into the CIO, as he understood how the Communist Party's emphasis on working-class solidarity often resonated among rank-and-file industrial workers. He also admired the skills of Communist Party organizers, which he hoped to use for his own purposes. Lewis resigned as CIO head in 1940, and his successor, Philip Murray, initially maintained friendly relations with communists. Over the next eight years, however, infighting and political divisions caused an irreparable rift between CIO leaders and the Communist Party. The 1947 Taft-Hartley Act forbade communists from holding union leadership positions, and it was another factor in the CIO's decision to expel numerous unions and nearly a million workers from the federation in 1948.

By the 1940s, cracks also appeared in the CIO's progressive mission. Not all CIO unionists agreed on how to create worker solidarity or, more importantly, which workers belonged in the union. For instance, some United Auto Workers locals called spontaneous "wildcat" strikes to protest the promotion of African American workers from service jobs to production jobs. The CIO took limited actions against racism, but failed to deal sufficiently with high levels of racism within the rank and file. Sexual discrimination also often took a backseat to other issues. Prior to World War II, even unions whose membership was predominately

female—such as the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union—had no female leaders. Even after the war, when women entered the industrial workforce in droves, the situation was slow to change.

By the late 1940s the CIO was on the defensive. New antilabor bills robbed the CIO of cherished weapons such as the sit-down strike and led to an overall drop in the militant spirit that had led to its rapid rise. This, plus leadership's squabbles and a purge of communist unions, greatly reduced the CIO's strength. When the CIO and the AFL finally agreed to merge in 1955, CIO president **Walter Reuther** made a number of demands for racial and gender equity that reflected the spirit of the early CIO, and he extracted promises to promote industrial unionism. Unfortunately, his weak bargaining position in relation to the stronger AFL meant that the new organization failed to implement many of these concessions.

Despite the CIO's official demise as a federation separate from the AFL, its early spirit remains an inspiration to current labor activists. Grassroots organizing campaigns in service industries often evoke the CIO, including movements such as the Service Employees International Union's Justice for Janitors campaign, or Domestic Workers United (not affiliated with the AFL—CIO). Additionally, in the summer of 2005 several unions bolted from the AFL—CIO to form the Change to Win Coalition, the latter likening itself to the renegade CIO and making analogies between 1930s industrial workers and twenty-first-century service industry workers.

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CONSPICUOUS CONSUMPTION

VICKY HILL

Coined by the economist and social critic **Thorstein Veblen** in his 1899 classic, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, the term *conspicuous consumption* refers to the acquisition and display of expensive luxury items for the purpose of demonstrating one's social status and wealth.

Veblen argued that American society was ruled by a "leisure class," a wealthy elite that maintained its position and **status** through demonstrations of conspicuous leisure and conspicuous consumption, since its members enjoyed the privilege of not having to work for a living. His observations of the **Gilded Age** elite were among the first to articulate the now-commonsensical connection between consumption and groups' attempts to solidify and demonstrate their place in the social hierarchy. At the time Veblen wrote, however, this idea was a departure from mainstream economic thought, which insisted that human economic activity was governed by a rational individual desire to accumulate wealth for utilitarian purposes. Veblen was the first analyst to suggest that impressing other people was an important economic motivation for many individuals. He was also the first to articulate

the importance of the cultural meanings attributed to goods, clearly linking consumption and class for the cultural theorists who followed.

Taking an anthropological perspective on economics, Veblen pointed out that in early societies, high status was awarded to excellent hunters or warriors. These talented individuals could also command more physical resources than other members of the society—the hunters could catch more food, for example. But the relatively greater wealth of the individual was a result of his status, not the cause of it. However, over time, wealth itself came to be viewed as a reason to hold its owner in high esteem. Once that shift occurred, those who had wealth wanted to be sure that others knew about it. They learned to display visible symbols of their wealth, not only to illustrate their own standing, but to aggressively compare that standing with others'. This competitive aspect of conspicuous consumption was key for Veblen; he insisted that the main motive for consuming conspicuously was to outdo others and to widen the status distance between oneself and one's rivals. Conspicuous consumption also had to be wasteful; if it merely served a utilitarian function, it couldn't display and solidify its user's status.

As culture developed, elite individuals could no longer consume enough by themselves to display their wealth properly. They resorted to giving lavish feasts and gifts and maintaining servants, wives, and children to consume vicariously for them. Veblen was the first to describe how the ruling class used women to display their husbands' status via idleness, expensive leisure activities, and the ostentatious display of expensive clothing, decoration, and housing.

Modern theorists argue that conspicuous consumption is no longer the sole province of the leisured elite; in fact, some scholars claim that a form of conspicuous consumption—or displaying one's financial resources, taste, and identity through commodities—is a primary social function in modern mass consumer culture.

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Stephen Edgell, Veblen in Perspective: His Life and Thought, 2001; Roger Mason, The Economics of Conspicuous Consumption: Theory and Thought Since 1700, 1998; Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class, 1899.

CONSUMER PRICE INDEX

See Poverty Calculations

CONSUMERISM

ROBERT E. WEIR

Consumerism is the practice of accumulating/using goods and services that are generally purchased rather than produced by individuals. It can be used generally to refer simply to the purchasing patterns of Americans, but is more commonly

referenced as a debatable economic pattern that defenders claim celebrates the prosperity and choices created by American **capitalism**, and which critics argue induces an unhealthy materialism that is harmful to individual livelihoods, community welfare, and social stability.

Although consumerism is not necessarily synonymous with capitalism, within the United States the two have developed in tandem. Prior to the **Industrial Revolution** most American families produced most of what they consumed, bartered for goods and services they did not produce, or engaged in highly selective and infrequent monetary transactions to secure necessities. The articulation of regional and national markets occasioned by the development of the factory system in the early nineteenth century shifted economic transactions to an emphasis on money that hastened the separation of production and consumption, led to the rise of the wage system, and changed the way Americans defined necessity and desire. Some, including labor movement activists and Marxists, viewed these changes with alarm. Labor reformers feared that, if the wage system became permanent, it would undermine self-reliance and foster dependency in ways that agrarianism and proprietorship did not, while Karl Marx and others argued that a consumer society bred alienation by cheapening the value of labor. Marx predicted that the marketplace rather than work would set the value of goods and services. Marx and many neo-Marxists such as Louis Althusser, Theodor Adorno, and Herbert Marcuse also argued that consumerism leads to commodity "fetishization" in which objects assume an artificial value that creates its own (often irrational) desire.

Gilded Age society saw the creation of new objects and fabulous fortunes, but also widening gaps between rich and poor. As wealth became increasingly measured in material terms rather than older measures such as land and social deference, critics such as Thorstein Veblen argued that conspicuous consumption was supplanting things of true value. Veblen's *The Theory of the Leisure Class* (1899) remains a relevant work for those studying contemporary consumerism. Although consumerism has waxed and waned according to economic cycles, by the early twentieth century mass production of goods, efficiency, market- and money-based economic exchange, and created desires came to define American economic activity. Advertisers and merchants linked their wares to comfort, leisure, and novelty. The constant flow of new goods, new models, and changing trends dovetailed nicely with the ideology of individualism; consumers were encouraged to seek self-expression through their purchases.

Historian Gary Cross notes that products such as the assembly-line–manufactured Model-T Ford and new venues such as **department stores**, amusement parks, and movie theaters strengthened consumerism to the degree that it could withstand challenges such as the **Great Depression**. The post–World War II economic boom democratized consumption by making objects such as television, electronics, and household appliances affordable to the **masses**. Americans were steadily told that the United States had become a **middle-class** society, with consumption standing as a marker of said **status**. In fact, social critic Dwight Macdonald argued that consumerism converted Americans into passive and uneducated shoppers who accepted the enticements of advertisers, retailers, and marketers without reflection. American consumer patterns were also exported. As Victoria De Grazia shows, by the 1950s

much of Europe and parts of Asia had come to embrace American-style market consumerism.

The triumph of consumer ideals meant that even the anti-consumerist ideologies found among the **New Left**, the counterculture, and ecology groups sometimes had the ironic effect of reinforcing materialism. Capitalists often view **class subcultures** as good business, as they encourage new styles that can be packaged and marketed, just as environmental awareness spawns the production of T-shirts, bumper stickers, and other salable movement paraphernalia. By the 1980s groups such as **Yuppies**, though a much-exaggerated social phenomenon, openly celebrated shopping and spending.

Consumerism has not gone unchallenged, and economic factors perhaps threaten to erode it. As observers such as Cross, **Ralph Nader**, and **Juliet Schor** have argued, recent patterns of American consumerism differ from those of the past in that the reference group for consumers has changed. Americans no longer compete with their economic peers or even aspire to achieve a hypothetical middle-class standard; rather they are encouraged to compare themselves to the affluent and spend their way to **prestige**. Although these critics may err in assuming this is a new development—working-class women of the nineteenth century often copied the fashions of the middle class, for example—they do correctly point out that modern consumerism often rests upon accumulating debt. More than half of Americans feel they are too deeply in debt, and economists generally agree that family debt is too high and savings rates too low to sustain current consumer patterns.

There is also evidence that many Americans are uncomfortable with consumerism as currently constituted. A 2004 poll of Americans older than twenty-four conducted by the Center for a New American Dream confirms this: 88 percent of Americans feel that society has become too materialistic and 95 percent feel that youths have been bombarded with advertising that has made them "too focused" on consumerism. The poll also surprisingly revealed that 91 percent think American **lifestyles** are wasteful, that 83 percent think we consume too many resources, and that 57 percent feel that greedy consumerism harms U.S. foreign relations. Such opinions do not necessarily translate into behavioral changes, but several trends suggest that there may be changes on the horizon. Sixty-four percent of those polled believe that it is harder to obtain the **American dream** now than ten years ago, and 48 percent have made lifestyle changes through which they have opted to work less, earn less, and buy fewer things in order to create more leisure and family time.

Academics such as Craig Thompson and James Twitchell counter that such data are alarmist and that consumerism is a positive thing that authenticates American prosperity and provides outlets for expressiveness. They even suggest that consumerism critics are latter-day **Puritans** trying to impose their values onto the American mainstream. Whether American consumer capitalism can continue to be pervasive and malleable is an open question that engenders intense debate.

Suggested Reading

Gary Cross, An All-Consuming Century: Why Commercialism Won in Modern America, 2000; Victoria De Grazia, Irresistible Empire: America's Advance through

Twentieth-Century Europe, 2005; Sarah Roberts, "Survey Confirms That Americans Overworked, Overspent and Rethinking the American Dream" (http://www.newdream.org/newsletter/survey.php); Juliet Schor, Do Americans Shop Too Much? 2000.

CONTINUOUS / DISCONTINUOUS VIEWS OF CLASS

ROBERT E. WEIR

Class may be viewed as being continuous or discontinuous. In brief, those who hold that social class ranks are continuous argue that class can be ranked from low to high on a spectrum. As such, there are various ranks and sub-ranks, all of which exist within a coherent social system. By contrast, supporters of discontinuous rankings see sharp divisions between classes, the differences being so magnified as to enhance the possibility of **class struggle**.

Functionalist sociologists are often among those who favor continuous class ranking, and this continuity undergirds theories such as the **Davis-Moore thesis**. Class is viewed as analogous to a scale whose boundaries are fuzzy and indistinct because the individual classes naturally blend into one another. What, for example, distinguishes the upper **lower class** from the lower **middle class**? Ultimately such delineations rest on **subjective methods** that are imprecise, but nonetheless real. Subjectivity is also socially useful in that it promotes consensus and social stability.

Those functionalists who argue for continuous class rankings do not deny that social classes exist; rather they see a very broad social distribution of **income**, **status**, and wealth that precludes creating hard, fast, and **objective methods** of measuring class. Because criteria for establishing class are so murky, the development of **class consciousness** in a **Marxist** sense is improbable. Some advocates of the continuous perspective go so far as to suggest that many Americans cannot conceive of, let alone perceive, the reality of social class.

Those holding discontinuous views of class rankings see the continuous position as a convenient myth that attempts to hide the very real, objective realities of social class in America. They see opposition and breaks, not consensus and flow. In their view the social system has very sharp divisions of income, status, **prestige**, and wealth, all of which can be measured. Moreover, these divisions are so dramatic as to cast doubt on the variegated class continuum postulated by those holding a continuous view of class. Karl Marx felt that society consisted primarily of the **bourgeoisie** and the **proletariat**, and that the division and inequalities that existed between them rendered class conflict inevitable.

Many modern scholars see Marx's dichotomous view of class as too sharply drawn, but **conflict theorists** nonetheless argue that very real and very obvious class differences exist. Far from building consensus, class stratification is dysfunctional, unjust, and unstable. Rather than focus on subjective (some would say delusional) constructions of class, scholars of the discontinuous school measure **life chances** and other objective factors.

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John Creswell, Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches, 2002; David Rose and David Pevalin, Researcher's Guide to the National Statistics Socio-Economic Classification, 2003; Alex Thio, Sociology: A Brief Introduction, 2000.

CONTRADICTORY CLASS LOCATION

VICKY HILL

Sociologist Erik Olin Wright developed the concept of *contradictory class location* to describe, within a generally **Marxist** framework, the class position of some contemporary members of the **middle class**.

Karl Marx's foundational analysis of class was based on his perception that two main classes existed, the **bourgeoisie** and the **proletariat**, and that the two were engaged in an epic struggle because the bourgeoisie necessarily exploited the proletariat to maintain their own class position. However, Marx wrote in the late nineteenth century, before the dramatic expansion of the middle class. Further, he had assumed that as capitalism progressed, the middling classes that had existed would eventually diminish as a few members ascended into the bourgeoisie and the rest were forced into the proletariat. Subsequent scholars found it difficult to incorporate the increasingly widespread and influential middle class into Marx's broader framework.

In response to this theoretical problem, a handful of theorists, most notably Wright, recognized in the late 1970s and early 1980s that many people in the wageearning middle classes experience characteristics of both traditional class positions. For example, many middle-class workers have supervisory jobs and thus exploit the workers who report to them, but they are also exploited by their own supervisors. Similarly, many executives who do not directly supervise employees do have control over a company's money or its physical means of production, which would indicate a bourgeois position, but they are still subject to the control of their own supervisors, the possibility of being fired, and exclusion from ownership of capital assets. Wright described this situation as a "contradictory class location" because the two traditional classes have inherently contradictory class interests and to embody them both is necessarily to have contradictory class interests within oneself. Though Wright has since moved away from the idea that these intermediate class locations must, in every case, have contradictory interests, the concept of contradictory class position remains a useful one for class theorists in describing some middle-class situations.

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Erik Olin Wright, Class Boundaries and Contradictory Class Location, 1978; Wright, Classes, 1985; Wright, Class Counts: Comparative Studies in Class Analysis, 1997.

CORPORATE CLASS

ROBERT E. WEIR

The term *corporate class* refers to individuals in government and business whose high rank and far-reaching influence gives them extraordinary social, economic, and political **power**. Some scholars postulate that this group has largely supplanted the **upper class** in influence in contemporary America; others argue it *is* the modern upper class; and some doubt its very existence. If there is a corporate class, many traditional class definitions and stratification theories are outmoded.

Debates over the influence of financiers and manufacturers have circulated since the implications of the **Industrial Revolution** became apparent during the **Gilded Age**. To some degree, however, the rising industrial elite often found itself at odds with the top stratum of the upper class, which viewed this group as gauche parvenus and sought to block their social and political ambitions. Under advanced **capitalism**, however, the economic ground shifted from under the property-endowed upper classes by making money-based **income and wealth** more important than property ownership. The **Great Depression** may have forestalled the rise of the corporate class, but by the 1950s many social commentators began to argue that this group was in ascendancy and the upper class in decline. **C. Wright Mills** presaged contemporary thinking in his **power elite** studies, and in 1961 President Dwight Eisenhower famously warned of an emergent **military-industrial complex** whose sway over economic and political decision making was ominous.

The corporate class is now said to consist of a select group of **CEOs**, presidents, vice-presidents, and board members from powerful corporations. It may also include politicians with close ties to those corporations. Many members of the administration of George W. **Bush**, for example, have had extensive ties with Halliburton, a Texas-based oil and chemical company that also routinely wins large government contracts. Members of the corporate class tend to move capital, advance government policy, and command bureaucracies rather than hold extensive amounts of property as the traditional upper class does. This has implications for **Marxist** views of class, which usually link class to ownership of the **means of production**: the corporate class controls rather than owns the means of production.

The corporate class is closely linked to what is often called "economies of scale": that is, its members come from very large (often international) corporations; hold vast amounts of stock, securities, and other investments; and are often linked through **social networks** and various interlocking boards, charity organizations, fraternal organizations, and decision-making bodies. Their overall clout gives them great leverage over political fundraising; hence the corporate class exercises political influence disproportionate to its size.

It is clear that there is tremendous overlap among top firms. A handful of banks such as BankAmerica, Citibank, and Chase Manhattan, for example, are also major stockholders of global corporations and seat their representatives on the boards of those enterprises. What is less clear is what this economic reality means in social terms. **Conflict theorists** and **critical elite theorists** often view the corporate class as a cabal whose power imperils **democracy**, perpetuates the exploitation of the working **masses**, and manipulates society to serve its own interests. By contrast,

functional elite theorists see corporate elites as a necessary force to negotiate the complex global economy. They see the corporate class as efficient, technically proficient guardians of the public interest.

Still others altogether discredit the existence of a corporate class. Pluralist social theorists argue that modern society is too complex, that interests (including ideology) are widely divergent, and that countervailing groups and structures (such as laws and regulations) blunt the potential of a corporate class. Still others argue that common economic interests are not enough upon which to base social class. This group finds no evidence of **class consciousness**, which is seen as crucial to class formation. These critiques are minority views in the academic community, the bulk of which assumes the existence of a corporate class, though it hotly debates the importance, need for, and influence of it.

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CORPORATE WELFARE

FRANK A. SALAMONE

Corporate welfare is a term applied to government programs and policies that benefit business and industries. There are two major types of government programs that benefit this sector: subsidies and tax breaks. Those in favor of these programs argue that they aid American business in gaining a competitive edge. However, many others argue that these aids are nothing more than handouts to corporations with great political influence. Moreover, they argue, these handouts stifle rather than increase competition.

Newly enacted corporate benefits cost taxpayers an additional \$570 billion over a five-year span. Much of this money comes from **middle-class** and **working-class** wage earners, who can least afford subsidizing wealthy corporations. The growing government deficit is also fueled by these subsidies. Often subsidies go to wealthy, established corporations such as oil companies. The Strategic Petroleum Reserve, for example, supposedly guards against depleting supplies during a war. This is no longer the case, yet the subsidies continue, and they serve to raise the cost of oil by creating an artificial demand for the product.

There are many similar examples of corporate welfare unnecessarily funding programs that no longer need them. Thus, although the family farmer has been largely supplanted by **agribusiness**, the farm subsidy program continues, aiding the farm corporations that drove family farms from the landscape. The biggest example of government favoritism to private interests, however, is that to corporations exploiting natural resources.

What many term the "Granddaddy of All Giveaways" is that given to the mining industry. The 1872 Mining Act allows the mining industry to take and excavate hard-rock minerals on land belonging to the public. It does so at bargain-basement prices and without paying any royalties. Moreover, it purchases the land for between \$2.50 and \$5.00 per acre. Thus, Congress has given away billions of dollars in public lands and resources. The taxpayers, additionally, pay for the cleanup of the lands and the rivers, which industry leaves polluted.

Subsidies and tax breaks to corporations have many deleterious effects. Certainly, they decrease government revenues. They shift the tax burden to those who can least afford it while allowing the wealthiest corporations to avoid taxes. Additionally, programs to aid those most in need of help are often cut for lack of funds.

Stephen Moore and Dean Stansel have compiled a list of ten targets they would like to eliminate from the corporate welfare list. These targets include the 1872 Mining Act, the Forest Service's building of timber roads, the Clean Coal program, the National Ignition Facility, the GT-MHR Gas Reactor, the National Parks concession contracts, the I-69 highway extension plan, and the USDA Marketing Promotion program. Consumer advocate **Ralph Nader** is among the most vocal opponents to corporate welfare; Senator **Bernard Sanders** is another.

Corporate welfare hurts government, the consumer, and **capitalism** itself. It ties business and government too closely together, but tends to favor interests that in many ways are antithetical to the interests of the consumer. It also hinders free competition, favoring wealthy businesses, especially those involved in resource exploitation, over others. The majority of taxpayers are hurt for the benefit of a few. Members of the **lower class** and the **working poor** are especially impacted, as money spent on corporate welfare is unavailable for programs aiding the socially and financially disadvantaged.

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COUNTRY CLUBS

ADAM R. HORNBUCKLE

Country clubs are venues to recreate, play golf and tennis, swim, and socialize, especially for high-income Americans of the **upper** and **middle classes**. Originating in the late nineteenth century, the country club is essentially an imitation of the country estates of English aristocracy or moneyed gentry. In England the upper classes often lived in the country and belonged to urban social clubs, but in America the privileged classes tended to live in the cities and seek an approximation of the

English country manor in rural areas. One mark of social distinction was to approximate European aristocratic privileges by keeping servants and maintaining private preserves in which to indulge outdoor activities such as hunting, fishing, horseback riding, and other activities.

Established in 1882, the first country club in the United States was in Brookline, Massachusetts. The official history of the Brookline Country Club unabashedly states that the club was established to cultivate, promote, and preserve the exclusiveness of Boston's Brahmin elites. The Brookline group zealously guarded social borders and constructed a realm in which social reproduction of privilege was the order of the day. The Country Club became a venue in which social networks, including socially endogamous marriages, were arranged. With the Brookline Country Club as an example, the American country club stood in stark contrast to the English country estate as a buffer placed between the upper and middling classes. In comparing the English athletic club to the American country club, Englishman George Birmingham observed that the members of the English clubs became acquainted through their common pursuits, whereas those in American country clubs drew upon preexisting sociability to encourage mutual participation in sports. Citing New York's Tuxedo country club as an ideal, Birmingham noted that "it not only fosters, it regulates and governs the social life of the place."

During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, country clubs spread throughout the nation as a result of the growing interest in golf. Joseph M. Fox, a successful Pennsylvania businessman, and John Reid, a Scottish immigrant and executive of a Yonkers, New York, iron works, introduced golf into the United States in 1887. Reid organized the first golf club in the nation, the St. Andrews Club, named after the famed Scottish golf course. The first professionally designed golf course came in 1891, at the Shinnecock Hills Golf Club in Southampton, New York, where many wealthy New Yorkers had summer homes. By the end of the century, golf had become the favorite pastime of the upper crust in New York, Boston, Philadelphia, and Chicago, and they built their own golf courses based on the Shinnecock Hills model. During the early twentieth century, golf had spread into the South, where the nation's elite built lavish golfing resorts for their winter pleasure. Throughout the twentieth century, golf became the favored sport of business and professional men, who stood a rung or two down from the wealthy elite on the nation's social ladder. Golf provided this social niche not only a symbol of conspicuous status, but also an escape from the confines of the urban office to the open countryside. For many businessmen, however, the golf course became an outdoor boardroom, where final touches could be made on business deals or the foundations laid for future deals.

The majority of contemporary country clubs center on golf, with once-central pursuits such as hunting, fishing, horsemanship, and swimming relegated to secondary roles. Nearly all country clubs charge membership fees, the cost of which mirrors the clientele to which they cater. Clubs designed for the **working class** are few, but some middle-class clubs charge day rates and greens fees for those using their facilities, thus democraticizing country clubs to some degree. For the most part, however, country clubs remain what they have always been: zones of social exclusivity.

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COUNTRY MUSIC

MICHAEL T. BERTRAND

Commencing in the mid-1920s, country music has reflected the tensions related to the adaptation of tradition to modernity. Its underlying themes of individual alienation and vulnerability have possessed universal appeal, and have helped country music attain a large global audience. Indeed, by the turn of the twenty-first century, country music enjoyed unprecedented popularity and represented a multibillion dollar corporate enterprise recognized around the world.

Yet commercial country music has not always enjoyed widespread acclaim. For most of its history, a problematic pedigree circumscribed its allure. It did appeal to a Southern rural white **working class** lacking in political power, status, and material affluence. Like other aspects of Southern culture, country music allowed natives to create a space for themselves, a virtual autonomy that indulged self-expression, psychological release, creative sustenance, and personal satisfaction. Because country artists generally emerged from the audiences they entertained, their articulated hopes, fears, dreams, doubts, desires, and anxieties necessarily corresponded to those enjoyed and endured by the larger community. On the surface, country music conveyed an authenticity not usually associated with commercial culture.

The origins of country music can be indirectly traced to one of the founding fathers of American modernity and commercial culture: Henry Ford. Ford, who despised the modern sounds and rhythms of 1920s jazz, sought to counter the syncopated rage by popularizing old-time music. Ford dealerships across the country sponsored fiddling contests. Extremely popular with audiences composed of recent migrants from the South, these fiddling competitions soon found their way to radio. Hoping to translate rather random and informal affairs into a permanently profitable enterprise, radio executives created an efficient formula that endured for much of the twentieth century: rustic costumes and personas; sentimental and nostalgic song repertoires; homespun group names such as the "Gully Jumpers," "Skillet Lickers," "Fruit Jar Drinkers," and "Possum Hunters"; and, most important, the sense that country performances were unstructured and spontaneous.

The appeal of the "hillbilly formula" diminished during the **Great Depression**. Its affected images of **poverty**, personified by performers wearing overalls and other rural regalia, often reminded audiences of conditions they were anxious to forget. Soon wool hats, galluses, and dobro guitars gave way to Stetsons, chaps, and singing cowboys. The West, with its wide-open spaces and romanticized past, provided a complementary motif that country music promoters, performers, and

audiences were very willing to adopt. No doubt driven by commercial considerations, the "Country and Western" character of country music nevertheless suited artists and listeners searching for signs of their own material and social progress. While the "formula" may often have been concocted, the symbols it referenced certainly seemed familiar to large numbers of people.

Saturday night radio barn dance programs—such as the WLS National Barn Dance, The Grand Ole Opry, and WSB Barn Dance—contributed greatly to the informality and down-home familiarity associated with country music. They also launched the stars who dominated the field prior to World War II, including Bradley Kincaid, Uncle Dave Macon, DeFord Bailey, the Delmore Brothers, Roy Acuff, and Red Foley. The post–World War II era witnessed the birth of other significant wireless barn dance programs, including the Louisiana Hayride, the Big D Jamboree, and the Ozark Jubilee.

No single phenomenon helped popularize country music more than World War II, as migratory patterns allowed the displaced of Dixie to disseminate their music to a wider audience. Transferred Southern-born soldiers brought their musical tastes with them, and country music package tours performed for military units on a regular basis. The jukebox, a mechanical record-playing machine found in many establishments catering to the working class, also popularized the music beyond its original borders. War-related industries in the South likewise exposed new listeners to the sounds of country music. Anecdote holds that Japanese attacks on American troops in the Pacific were accompanied by shouts of "To Hell with Roy Acuff!"—a testament to the unexpected ubiquity of country music.

Country music continued to gain popularity after World War II, although songs rather than artists generally crossed into the popular music mainstream. Indeed, pop stars regularly mined the repertoires of "hillbilly" vocalists for hit records. The song-writing talents of Hank Williams, for instance, brought him national fame, yet as a performer, his provincial singing style and mannerisms did not resonate far beyond regional working-class audiences. The same could be said for most of the artists who attained prominence during this period, including Ernest Tubb, Lefty Frizzell, Hank Snow, and Webb Pierce.

The next generation of performers, led by Merle Haggard, Buck Owens, Conway Twitty, George Jones, Charley Pride, and Willie Nelson, arguably enjoyed country music's golden age. The success of episodic rural-based television shows such as *The Beverly Hillbillies* contributed to this upsurge, as it suggested that country music fans watched television. A large number of country music—themed shows were regularly aired in syndication, and major networks briefly featured programming that included *Hee Haw* and the *Glen Campbell Goodtime Hour*. From 1969 to 1971, ABC-TV produced the *Johnny Cash Show*, an innovative program that effectively linked country music's past and present to contemporary popular music.

In the years between 1960 and 1980, the country music industry fashioned a product that creatively reflected the various upheavals disrupting American and Southern life. As a result, country music penetrated further into the national consciousness than ever before. The music's popularity fluctuated for the remainder of the twentieth century, however, with much of its appeal seemingly tied to its association with often lightweight motion pictures, opportunistic politicians, and the cyclical whims of the market. Acts such as Ricky Skaggs, Randy Travis, Alabama,

George Strait, and Dwight Yoakam consciously worked to reconcile innovation with convention and newer listeners with older traditions.

Although bound in imagery that exaggerates the exclusivity of its rural white male working-class attributes, country music has an inclusive folk history. Never, for instance, has it operated as a separate male preserve; countless women, from the Carter Family, Coon Creek Girls, Patsy Montana, Minnie Pearl, and Kitty Wells to Patsy Cline, Loretta Lynn, Tammy Wynette, Dolly Parton, and Reba McIntire have found their voice in country music. Although country songs often appear to endorse a world of **gender stratification** in which women are systematically subjugated, they also reveal glimpses into the lives of women who have endured and overcome such oppression. Country music has expressed self-assertion and strength as well as dependence and vulnerability.

Country music has been dynamic and adaptive. Jimmie Rodgers, the "Father of Country Music," for instance, was an eclectic entertainer who transcended categories and served to remind listeners of country music's deep connections to African American **blues**. Country music fostered such racial boundary–bending performers as Rodgers, Jimmie Davis, and the young Gene Autry, who established precedents that eventually gave rise to rockabilly. Elvis Presley and other Southern **rock 'n' roll** artists were infatuated with rhythm and blues (R&B) and emerged from a country-blues tradition embraced by earlier performers such as Bob Wills, Bill Monroe, and Hank Williams.

Soul music also reflected the influence of country music. Many recording studios in the South brought together black and white musicians schooled in both R&B and country, a common musical heritage that defied a segregated past. At the height of his career in the early 1960s, Ray Charles, the lead architect of soul, ventured to Nashville to produce a country music album, *Modern Sounds in Country and Western Music*. Although the album did not single-handedly break down racial barriers erected by marketing and record executives in the 1920s, its tremendous popularity demonstrated that country music's appeal was not and never had been as racially restricted as conventional wisdom suggested.

Much of country music's storyline has been linked to a subplot involving the South's long-delayed entry into (and alienation from) the national mainstream. Southerners have long attempted to reconcile modernity with tradition, **middle-class** ethics with working-class realities. And contrary to Henry Ford's dictates, country music has also responded to the interests of a more affluent yet socially apprehensive audience. Even bluegrass, often considered a safe haven for "old time music," is an innovative subgenre derived from sources both old and new. Although built around acoustic instrumentation, its hard-driving, jazz-influenced improvisations diverged from pre-commercial techniques. With its reliance on blues, jazz, black and white gospel, vocal harmonies, and rural repertoires, bluegrass represents a "modern" form of expression. It is, as one writer put it using language more appropriate to the automobile age, "folk music in overdrive."

Country music has evolved to address issues and experiences common to ordinary people. At times nostalgic, comical, quixotic, and escapist, it is a music generally couched in personal rather than political terms. Country songs express the innermost desires and frustrations of alienated individuals coping with the uncertainties of everyday life. Played at an assortment of venues and through multiple

media, country music (or any one of its other contemporary appellations and subgenres, such as "old familiar tunes," "country folk," "Country and Western," "Western swing," "bluegrass," "honky tonk," "rockabilly," or "country pop") provided more than a soundtrack to the lives of its disaffected adherents.

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CREATIONISM

ROBERT E. WEIR

Creationism, a religious view associated primarily with Western Christianity, holds that God created the universe. It is at odds with scientific teachings on evolutionary development. There is no one Creationist movement per se; Biblical literalists, taking their lead from the book of Genesis, hold that creation took place in six days, and some ultraconservatives use Old Testament genealogies to assert—as did the sixteenth-century Irish Bishop James Usher—that the world was created in 4004 BC. More recent manifestations of the creationist debate have surfaced among supporters of Intelligent Design. Proponents of Intelligent Design insist that the universe is so complex as to demand the existence of a higher power that made order from chaos. Some hold that Intelligent Design is compatible with science, with the latter being an explanation of how life emerged, and the former a rationale for why it occurred. This view is held by some scientists who are also religious. However, the bulk of Intelligent Design supporters reject scientific explanations altogether and call evolution merely a theory for which there is little credible evidence.

The creationism debate has implications for **class consciousness**, class identification, and a host of other social issues. It is not a new debate in American society. Charles Darwin's publication of *On the Origin of the Species by Means of Natural Selection* (1859) caused a hailstorm of controversy within American churches. By the end of the nineteenth century, many liberal Protestant denominations had reconciled themselves with Darwin's assertion that present-day life evolved from lower forms, but fundamentalists and conservative Christians largely rejected evolution. Educated Americans, concentrated disproportionately in the **upper** and **middle classes**, were also more comfortable with evolution, a principle that soon became well established in the curricula of American universities. In the famed Scopes Trial of 1925, a Tennessee public school teacher was tried for teaching evolution to high school biology students in violation of state law. This case was seen as a cause celebre that pitted superstitious, rural, **lower-class** Americans

against modern, scientific, urban sophisticates. Although John Scopes was found guilty, creationists were discredited and their efforts lost steam.

The teaching of evolution slowly became the norm in public schools, but the centrality of religion in American public life guaranteed that it would not go unchallenged. Religious supporters were angered by a host of court decisions during the 1960s and beyond that placed restrictions on public religious expression, struck down school prayer as unconstitutional, and affirmed secular school curricula. When conservatives began to reassert political power in the 1980s, especially during the administration of **Ronald Reagan**, creationists were among those seeking to revisit domestic policy. Since then the Republican Party has courted creationists and other religious conservatives, using morals as a wedge issue to attract groups such as the **working class**, **Catholics**, white Southerners, and others who had for decades preferred Democrats.

The composition of the revitalized creationist movement differs significantly from its predecessors. It cuts across social class boundaries, but some of its greatest strength is among the white suburban middle class; in a 2005 poll, 52 percent of this group supported the teaching of Intelligent Design in public schools. Many modern-day creationists are also profoundly antiscience in their perspective. In a recent National Science Foundation survey, 80 percent of creationists rejected the notion that Earth is 4 billion years old, and 40 percent of them feel that scientists are "dangerous"; indeed, 25 percent of them blame science for what they see as America's spiritual decline.

Creationism has spawned several very high-profile public battles. The state of Kansas mandated teaching creationism along with evolution in 1999. The Kansas Board of Education reversed this mandate in 2001, after suffering great ridicule, but reinstated the policy in 2005. In 2004 the Dover, Pennsylvania, school board also mandated that the biblical view of creation be taught alongside Darwin's evolutionary studies. This too caused great controversy, and in 2005 most of the school board was replaced by candidates vowing to remove creationism from the curriculum.

Because creationism is not class specific, it further muddies the study of class in America. Some critics argue that social class no longer corresponds to values, breeding, education, **prestige**, or any other traditional class definitions. To such individuals, class is strictly defined by purchasing power. One need not agree with that assessment to see how wedge issues such as creationism, abortion rights, and others associated with the **culture wars** challenge constructions of class that give the greatest weight to economic determiners. Indeed, some analysts assert that cultural issues are cynically manipulated by elites to divert attention from the existence of economic inequality. More prosaically, issues such as creationism suggest that social theorists need to pay more attention to **subjective** factors when discussing **class formation**.

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CREATIVE DESTRUCTION

DIETER BÖGENHOLD

Creative destruction is an ambivalent term originated by Joseph A. Schumpeter (1883–1950), an Austrian economist who held professorships in Austria and Germany before joining the faculty at Harvard University in the early 1930s, where he spent the rest of his career. It refers to the economic processes by which old systems, technology, innovation, and thinking are destroyed by the new. Examples of creative destruction in the music industry include the evolution from wax cylinders to vinyl records to compact discs and MP3 files. Schumpeter saw creative destruction as a logical byproduct of **capitalism**, but not necessarily as a good thing.

From a contemporary perspective Schumpeter was truly interdisciplinary, and his many works span fields such as sociology, finance economics, and politics. Over a time span of nearly fifty years, Schumpeter published numerous articles and books. *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* (1942) contained the expression "creative destruction." The book's chapter entitled "Creative Destruction" deals with the modus operandi of competition. Schumpeter argues against some predominant economic thought of his time, which characterized economies as being static. In opposition to that, Schumpeter conceptualized economy as being in a constant flux of economic and social change. Schumpeter frequently discussed the parallels and divergences of his thought and **Marxism**: "The essential point to grasp is that in dealing with capitalism we are dealing with an evolutionary process. It may seem strange that anyone can fail to see so obvious a fact which moreover was long ago emphasized by Karl Marx."

Schumpeter is regarded as one of the pioneers of "evolutionary economics." He viewed capitalism as a "form or method of economic change." Creative destruction is a contradictory expression that seeks to highlight the fact that competition and inherent processes leading toward monopolistic and oligopolistic competition are only one part of the overall economic game. Too often neglected are simultaneous processes of the creation of new firms, new ideas, and even new business leaders elsewhere in an economy. Deaths and births—of business enterprises and of individuals—are two sides of the same coin, and Schumpeter dubbed creative destruction an essential fact about capitalism.

Creative destruction has to be seen in a wider context of innovation and entrepreneurship for which Schumpeter is well-known. Entrepreneurs are treated as agents to introduce new inputs into the economy. He defined an entrepreneur as a person who comes up with "new combinations" (new goods, new methods of production, new markets, new sources of supply, new organizations of any industry, or combinations of these items), which are commonly called *innovation*. Entrepreneurs are driven by a set of diverse motivations, and their activity is fundamental for economic development. Innovation is the infusion of "fresh blood" through new ideas and people who keep the "capitalist machine" vital. However, creativity is always combined with destruction elsewhere. When new products appear, consumer demands change, and existing production and related markets are rendered obsolete. In some cases entire communities are negatively impacted when the production of new products locates elsewhere. Labor historians and economists have

long studied the fallout from **deindustrialization**. There are, for example, cities and towns throughout the Northeast and Midwest that have yet to recover from the economic decline associated with the closure of textile and steel mills.

Capitalism always exists as a development with a fragile balance of "coming" and "going" of firms, entrepreneurs, goods, ideas, mentalities, and ideologies. Although Schumpeter is often regarded as the academic hero of entrepreneurship and innovation, he was highly skeptical about the endogenous ability of capitalism to achieve a balance between creativity and destruction. In one chapter he posed the question "Can capitalism survive?" and did not hesitate to answer "No, in my opinion not." He actually felt that **socialism** would eventually supplant capitalism. So far, Schumpeter can be said to have underestimated the potential innovation sources of capitalism. Nevertheless, Schumpeter's ideas remain in vogue, and an international Joseph A. Schumpeter Society was founded in the 1980s. Schumpeter has found a firm place as one of the most important economists of the twentieth century.

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CRIME

CHUCK BARONE

Studies show a strong connection between **socioeconomic status (SES)** and crime. Those from the lowest SES groups are over-represented among the more than 2 million prisoners in the United States, a country with one of the highest incarceration rates in the world.

Criminal behavior is sometimes believed to be the result of flawed individuals, which in this case means that such individuals are disproportionately from lower SES groups. Others believe that a social environment of **poverty** and **unemployment** creates economic pressures that can result in criminal behavior. Evidence in support of this contention includes statistical studies that show a strong correlation between the rate of unemployment and the rate of crime. Furthermore, social psychologists have found a high correlation between socioeconomic inequality and violence.

Whatever the individual cause, the existence of these "dangerous classes" has been historically associated with the development of industrial **capitalism**, which created specialized social (penal) institutions to contain, punish, and rehabilitate criminals.

Some view the criminal justice system (CJS) itself as reflecting and serving the dominant class interests of the larger society. The very purpose of the CJS is in this view questioned, as a system that not only contains and makes the public safe from the "dangerous classes," but also as a system of social control—a way of regulating

the poor and **working classes**. In a highly stratified class-based society, such as the United States, where class divides are great and growing wider, dominant class interests are often reflected in the nature of the CJS.

The extent that the CJS reflects such interests depends upon the ability of **upper-class** groups to influence the decisions of legislators who decide which behaviors/acts are to be criminalized; the decisions of police and prosecutors who arrest and charge; and the decisions of judges and juries who convict and sentence. For example, the economic cost to society of **white-collar** crime far exceeds the cost of street crimes, yet far fewer resources are devoted to enforcing and prosecuting white-collar crimes, and punishment is usually much less severe. Another example is the criminalization of drug use in the United States and the way such laws have been selectively enforced and prosecuted so as to disproportionately affect those from lower SES groups, especially but not only racial minorities.

The rapid growth in the prison population in the United States has resulted in a corresponding growth of the prison system to house, guard, supervise, feed, and clothe prisoners. This has become a rapidly growing and profitable billion dollar industry that some call the "prison industrial complex," an intricate web of corporate and local interest groups that benefit financially from its expansion. The rapid growth of government expenditures on the CJS has been offset by less growth in other areas of government, including education, **welfare**, and other programs that are targeted for lower-income families. The growing use of cheap prison labor by some of our largest corporations raises interesting questions about exploitation, a captive labor force, and the impact of this particular kind of internal "outsourcing" on domestic labor markets.

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CRITICAL ELITE THEORY

MAURO STAMPACCHIA

Critical elite theory is based on the assumption that in every society only a minority retains power, whether it be political, economical, or cultural, while the vast majority is deprived of it. This assumption can be purely descriptive; however, most elite theory focuses mainly on the retention and exercise of *political* power.

Ancient, medieval, and modern history show us many examples of aristocratic or oligarchic power, where the two words indicate respectively "the rule of the best," or "the rule of the few." But elite theory was formalized at the end of the nineteenth century, when the idea of **democracy** coincided with notions of the sovereignty of

the people. Many elites were critical of government by the people, for the people, and of the people, including many of America's **Founding Fathers**. Elites often described mass democratic processes as mere appearance and ritual, while the very substance of political processes operated at the highest levels and filtered down to the masses. Critical elite theorists thus look at the ways political elites acquire legitimacy and consent. The political elite does not perfectly coincide with the **ruling class**, or the **bourgeoisie**, as it was defined by **Marxists**. It is, rather, a professional, specialized group, and its behavior could be described, according to some, as appropriate and beneficial.

Gaetano Mosca, a professor of political thought, pointed out the unique role of what he named the "political class." Likewise, Vilfredo Pareto, an economist and a sociologist, wrote about the "circulation of the elites," the political conflict that leads one elite to overcome other elites. Robert Michels, a student of **Max Weber**, used critical elite theory to analyze political parties and organizations, with a focus on the European **socialist** parties. He argued that elites were originally skeptical of democratic processes and social reform. The emerging elite used social conflict language and adopted socialist ideas only to chase the established elite from power, and were thus not part of the **working class**. But the elite theory proved to be open also to a democratic and progressive interpretation.

In the United States, critical elite theory had a renewed fortune during the **Great Depression** of the 1930s. Harold Lasswell wrote about the presence of not just a single elite, but also of middle strata of intermediate elites. He stressed that democracies needed elites who could manipulate propaganda in such a way as to ensure that the **masses** accept what is in their best interest. In this regard, the social structure does not depend on the absence or presence of a political elite, but on the quality of the relations between elites and masses, and elites are judged by how they exercise political power. Lasswell's thinking was, in some ways, a marriage between **functional elite** and **power elite** theory.

Not surprisingly, apologists for critical elite theory inspired critics (hardly surprising, considering that Michels was a fascist). In his influential 1941 work, *The Managerial Revolution*, the **Trotskyist** James Burnham argued that **capitalism** and democracy were imperiled, but doubted a socialist future. Instead, he foresaw political dominance by a new class of managers, technocrats, bureaucrats, and the military, whose power relied not on owning the **means of production**, but rather on controlling them through social knowledge and managing functions. His views anticipated theories of the **military-industrial complex** and those of **C. Wright Mills**. Mills provocatively raised doubts about the role of the "common man" in America, and argued that a selective and exclusive power elite controlled positions that offered strategic control over political **power**, wealth, celebrity, and high **status**. The stable positions held by the "power elite" in politics, the economy, and the military are instrumental to the unchallenged control elites exercise on the society as a whole.

Wright's ideas were themselves subject to dispute. Robert Dahl criticized the idea of a monolithic ruling elite and argued that the **pluralism** of American society meant that different elites shared power and/or competed in every major aspect of society. From the political left, Paul Marlor Sweezy argued that Mills overstressed the influence of military and political elites over corporate capitalism. He and other

theorists of a **corporate class** returned critiques of critical elite theory to the economic base of classical Marxism. Most modern theorists suggest that any construction of elites needs to be nuanced.

Joseph Schumpeter noted that elites competing for power through the popular vote were the very essence of a "democratic elitism," and the concept of a divided elite runs through thinkers such as Raymond Aron, as does the idea that elites are continuously influenced by political and social needs from below. **Ralf Dahrendorf** proposed a model of society in which social inequalities are determined not by the economic structure, but by **authority** relations that shift and are constantly renegotiated.

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CULTURAL CAPITAL

SHANNON J. TELENKO

Cultural capital is **Pierre Bourdieu**'s (1930–2002) sociological concept for the abstract cultural gains that someone can make because of social background, upbringing, education, and other experiences. Similar to financial capital, such as money and material things, one can also accumulate cultural capital. In addition, like financial capital, the more cultural capital one has, the more cultural capital that person can obtain. The effect is exponential. In addition, in order to obtain it at all, one must know how to go about doing so and know that cultural capital even exists. Most people do not know the term cultural capital, but all are familiar with what it represents.

Examples of cultural capital include anything of cultural significance that is of value to some segment of society. Categories of cultural capital include **literature**, **film**, music, **art**, language, **fashion**, food and drink, and general cultural knowledge. Middle- and **upper-class** segments of society have some common tastes and goals when it comes to accumulating cultural capital. Thus the **middle class** is commonly accused of trying to emulate the upper class. **Lower-** and **working-class** segments of society might have a different ideal when it comes to accumulating cultural capital and may use their values as a form of resistance against the more elite members of society. A good illustration of such resistance is the relationship between teenagers and parents. Younger Americans will come up with ways to keep out the older generations, through music, dance, language, and clothing. This is both a protest of adults' control over them and a way to form identity with peers.

Cultural capital can be both symbolic of what a segment of society finds important for understanding life, and a means for **social mobility**. Although everyone accumulates cultural capital regardless of age, **income**, or **socioeconomic status**,

certain types of cultural capital will allow entrance into certain segments of society. If one is trying to gain admission into something that is traditionally and institutionally set up to accept those from middle- and upper-class backgrounds, it will be much easier if one is born into a family that is in the upper classes of society and knows how to go about accumulating the proper type of cultural capital for the situation.

What is most vital in understanding cultural capital, in the way Bourdieu originally intended, is that certain kinds of cultural capital are more valuable for attaining higher class status. The higher status one tries to attain, the more difficult and expensive it becomes to accumulate cultural capital. In this way cultural capital also works as a barrier to entry into certain social circles. It can be a tool for sustaining racist, classist, and sexist practices.

Cultural capital gives the message to others that one belongs or could belong to a certain segment of society. Since cultural capital is accumulated by already having cultural capital or the knowledge of its existence, Bourdieu argues that it serves to secure power for select members of society.

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CULTURAL TOURISM

LISA L. HEUVEL

Cultural tourism identifies the motivation for people who travel to destinations with cultural institutions, historic sites, and cultural events. Along with heritage tourism or cultural heritage tourism, it describes the activities, travel-related industries, and worldwide economies impacted by tourists interested in learning more about their own culture or other cultures. Although camping, boating, and other recreational activities may be part of vacationers' overall plans, cultural tourism involves experiencing unique regional or cultural lifestyles for pleasure and education.

Culture entails the overall beliefs, customs, arts, and institutions of a given society at a particular time, and cultural tourism destinations are as varied as the restored eighteenth-century capital of Williamsburg, Virginia, France's Louvre Museum, and Gila Cliff Dwellings National Monument in southwestern New Mexico.

Whether it involves museum going, sight seeing, dining, or other pursuits, the essence of cultural tourism is experiencing another culture in meaningful and personally enjoyable ways. A significant market niche has been created by the growing adult baby boomer generation of the United States: both the travel and tourism industries concentrate research and marketing on people with the affluence and leisure to plan vacations around such experiences. According to Travel Industry of America statistics for 1997, 25 percent of U.S. adults (53.6 million) took at least

one trip that included a historic place or museum, and 17 percent of U.S. adults (33 million) took at least one trip that included a cultural event or festival. In 1990 tourism constituted an estimated 5.5 percent of the world gross national product, according to the World Travel & Tourism Council. However, it should be pointed out that cultural tourism is not necessarily limited to places and events customarily considered **high culture**. A case can be made that any vacationer's travel, whether to Disney World or the Taj Mahal, can be considered cultural tourism because it presents a different perspective than the tourist's familiar, everyday world.

Among the issues cultural tourism raises is the potent attraction of unique or real-life environments, lifestyles, and cultures. The consequences of marketing these features successfully may be increased social, economic, and political gain for related tourist industries and the destination sites. However, they may also include negative impact from environmental damage and other tourist-related overuse.

A further cause for concern is the impact on populations who on one hand welcome tourism for economic gain, but on the other hand fear exploitation of the unique characteristics that set them apart. In some cases, indigenous communities worldwide may be impacted through this interface with tourism, speeding acculturation that otherwise might have been delayed to some degree.

Another aspect of cultural tourism is driven by supply and demand. Entrepreneurs often package experiences for marketing value, moving them away from a "way of life" authenticity for broader appeal to potential consumers. When this happens, underlying cultural realities, historical narratives, and social concepts may be sublimated because of other determining factors: length of stay, competing area attractions, and budget may all affect the cultural tourism equation.

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CULTURE OF POVERTY

ROBERT E. WEIR

The *culture of poverty* is a controversial concept popular among some interactionist sociologists and conservative political theorists. They postulate that poverty can become self-perpetuating and that many programs designed to assist the poor actually do more harm than good. To proponents of a culture of poverty theory, poverty is part of the socialization process, with those raised in poverty more likely to see their lifestyles as normative, even when they engage in antisocial behavior. The term is often credited to Oscar Lewis (1914–71), an anthropologist whose work with Mexican and Puerto Rican families in the 1960s led him to see poverty as pathology.

From a culture of poverty vantage point, the everyday interactions of the poor make them prone to fatalism, feelings of inferiority, and antisocial behaviors and values. Among the latter are a desire for instant gratification (including sexual), a rejection of long-term planning, pessimism, and a generalized disregard for social conventions and laws. The longer any individual lingers in poverty, the more likely it is that he or she will pass on these values to other family members, with children being especially vulnerable to having their value systems distorted. A child growing up amid single-parent families, drug dealing, and violence may come to see these things as normal. That child might even overtly reject mainstream values such as work and embrace hustling or crime as the means to material gratification.

Few sociologists would deny the baleful effects of poverty, but culture of poverty theory becomes especially controversial when blended with social policy, as controversial conservative policy analyst Charles Murray has done. Some argue, for instance, that **welfare** programs are partly responsible for creating a culture of poverty and should be curtailed, reduced, or eliminated. Some conservatives even advocate strains of **individualism** and **self-help** that hark back to the **Gilded Age**, when social problems were largely viewed as individual failings.

Culture of poverty theory has many critics. Some see it as little more than blaming the victim, perhaps little more than disguised racism and nativism. Other critics excoriate proponents for refusing to address the structural causes of poverty, and a small number of scholars even view antisocial values as a top-down imposition on the **lower class**. The most substantive attacks have come from scholars who say that the concept is just too simplistic. The desire for material gratification, for example, seems to indicate that the value systems of the poor do not depart very much from the American mainstream. Herbert Gans and **William Julius Wilson** are among the critics who view culture of poverty as a stereotype that assumes all poor are alike when, in fact, communities of poor people are as heterogeneous as any other social group. Wilson and others have even argued that much of what passes for antisocial behavior is, in fact, a coping mechanism employed by individuals who currently have little access to mainstream lifestyles. Thus poor people might engage in what Richard Della Fave and others dub a "value-stretch approach." Stretched values, however, are not necessarily permanent or preferred.

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CULTURE WARS

RICHARD JENSEN

These "wars" have been part of European and American history for over a thousand years. European culture wars historically pitted **Catholics** against Protestants, from the extraordinarily violent Thirty Years War of the seventeenth century

to the nonviolent *Kulturkampf* in Germany in the late nineteenth century, when Bismarck's German Protestant government sought to suppress Catholicism and failed. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the great battles were over cultural and ethnic nationalism, in addition to political contests between clerical and secular forces, especially in France from 1789 to the early twentieth century. Just as violent were the occasional conflicts between Christianity and Islam that led to dramatic battles such as those at Tours (732), Kosovo (1389), Constantinople (1453), and Lepanto (1571). Similar outbursts occurred in Chechnya during the 1990s, and in Britain, France, the Netherlands, Spain, and elsewhere after 2001.

In the Western hemisphere, great violence accompanied culture wars in Mexico from 1810 to the 1930s that saw clerical/conservative alliances battle anticlerical, modernizing forces. In Canada mostly nonviolent cultural tension between English and French ethnic groups has simmered from 1760 onward. Finally, in the 1990s Canadians opted for a multicultural compromise that downgraded British heritage and Canadian nationalism in general. There remain, nonetheless, active separatist groups among Francophones and some native peoples.

Since 1789 there has been a persistent global cultural war between the forces of modernization, secularization, and globalization on the one hand, and traditionalists on the other. The latter expressed itself among Roman Catholics in the nineteenth century, and Islamists, Hindu nationalists, and Christian evangelicals in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. In class terms, the upper middle class has typically been the proactive modernizing force, with the peasants and working classes (often joined by the aristocracy) acting in reaction.

In American history, culture wars have seldom escalated into violence. In general, the groups at sword's point in other lands coexist in America. The rare exceptions were tensions between Catholic and Protestant Irish in the nineteenth century that erupted in riots in New York (1871), Philadelphia (1844) and elsewhere, though these were quickly quelled. More violence and hatred has surrounded racial tensions between blacks and whites (and between whites and Chinese in the late nineteenth century, and blacks and Koreans in the late twentieth century).

The most important culture wars in America have involved questions of morality. The abolitionist movement was one such expression. Before the 1830s many national leaders, North and South, considered slavery a social evil that should be gradually abolished. During the Second Great Awakening, religious evangelicals in the North began preaching that slavery was a personal sin that slave owners must immediately repent. The novel (later a play) by Harriet Beecher Stowe, Uncle Tom's Cabin (1851), became a best seller in America and Britain, driving home the horrors of slavery. Across the South those suspected of harboring abolitionist thoughts were driven out. More generally, the South feared various Yankee "isms" (abolitionism, feminism, and reformism) that threatened to destroy the traditional lifestyle of both subsistence yeoman farmers and slave plantations. The North meanwhile was modernizing rapidly and building an educational system that provided the intellectual and interpersonal skills needed for an upwardly mobile middle class to flourish. The South was nearly as rich as the North in 1860, but its wealth depended less on intellectual skills than on the luck of land speculation, gambling, European demand for cotton, and weather. After slavery ended in 1865

and cotton prices plunged, the South fell behind economically and intellectually until it finally broke with cotton and began urbanizing in the 1940s and abandoned **segregation** in the 1960s.

The Second Great Awakening created a series of reform movements that generated culture wars. In addition to abolition was the **Prohibition** movement, which moved liquor from a social nuisance to a personal sin in the minds of many pietistic, low-church, revivalist Protestants and motivated their efforts to destroy the liquor trade and **saloons**. The robust resistance provided by Catholics and liturgical, high-church Protestants such as **Episcopalians** and German Lutherans turned liquor into an ethno-religious issue that polarized the political parties along parallel lines.

Still another spin-off of the Second Great Awakening was Mormonism, whose doctrines of polygamy and theocracy profoundly alienated Americans. Persecuted relentlessly in culture wars in Ohio and Illinois, the **Mormons** journeyed to Utah. There the Mormon subculture grew rapidly because of high birth rates and successful missions to Europe. The anti-Mormon culture wars largely ceased around 1905, when Mormons finally abandoned polygamy and theocracy. A peculiar feature of the Mormon case was the remarkable combination of a high commitment to technological, organizational, and educational modernity among Mormons, who simultaneously clung to traditional religious and ethical views.

The post–World War I South developed a culture based on **fundamentalism** and related antimodernist tendencies. It rallied to its favorite political hero, William Jennings Bryan, already a leader in the prohibitionist cultural wars, when he declared war on ungodly Darwinism in the 1920s. The result was the fiasco of the Scopes Trial in 1925. It took decades to recover, but Southern antimodernism resurged in the 1980s, assisted by a new political mobilization behind the conservatism of Ronald Reagan. It was sponsored by the Christian Coalition and other ad hoc alignments led by the ministers of **Southern Baptist** mega-churches. Northern Catholics had long opposed abortion and began mobilizing their own culture war against secularism in the 1970s. In the name of "family values," Southern Baptists, Missouri Lutherans, Mormons, and fundamentalists joined in the new culture war, attacking abortion, feminism, homosexuality, obscenity, and government support for the arts and humanities. African Americans joined the ad hoc coalition to oppose gay rights. After 2000, stem cell research also became a culture war target. To reach their antiabortion and anti-stem cell position, the culture warriors had to reinterpret 2000 years of Christian teaching on the centrality of the birth experience and argue that life begins upon fertilization. Southern Baptists, who expanded nationwide after 1945, reignited their crusade against Darwinism as taught in the public schools and lobbied for the teaching of various forms of creationism as an alternative.

By the 1980s educational levels, more so than social class, aligned culture war partisans and spilled over into presidential elections. Republicans increasingly attacked public schools, higher education, and the arts, as they became a party of college dropouts and lost their historic support among the better educated. The injection of **immigration** issues into politics after 2005 opened a new front in the culture wars by reinvigorating nativist themes that had been dormant since the 1920s. Immigration, however, has proved problematic for Republicans, as Republican

nativists often denounce the Republican business interests that attracted illegal **Latino** immigrants in the first place with irresistible job opportunities.

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DAHRENDORF, RALF (May 1, 1929–)

ROBERT E. WEIR

Ralf Gustav Dahrendorf is a European sociologist whose work on **conflict theory** continues to influence the way social class is debated among scholars.

Dahrendorf was born in Hamburg, Germany, earned his PhD from the University of Hamburg in 1952, and did advanced studies at the London School of Economics (LSE) in 1954. He has taught at various German universities and served in the government of the former West Germany, and he was an official with the European Economic Community from 1970 to 1974, the director of the LSE from 1974 to 1984, and warden of Anthony's College, Oxford, from 1987 to 1997. In 1988 Dahrendorf became a British citizen and in 1993 was knighted by the Crown. He has been honored by numerous other governments and is a member of many prestigious societies, including the American Philosophical Society.

Many observers credit Dahrendorf with reshaping the way sociologists deal with social class. His view is a bold synthesis of **Marxist** views of class and those of functionalists, especially **Max Weber**. Dahrendorf observes that social change is inevitable, ubiquitous, and contentious. Moreover, since most social change is rooted in some form of coercion, class conflict is also a common feature of society. Like Marx, he sees class conflict as a clash between two competing groups, which he calls the "superordinate" and "subordinate" classes. Class conflict results because the former wishes to maintain the status quo at the expense of the latter, which resents its inferior status and wishes to alter existing social relations.

Dahrendorf departs from both Marx and Weber in how he defines class. Whereas Marx located it in the relationship to the **means of production** and Weber in market relations, Dahrendorf sees class as deriving from **authority** relations. In advanced societies it is simplistic to define class in purely economic terms, he argues, as individuals and groups often seek nonmonetary and nonmaterial rewards, such as freedom, **status**, or leisure. Possession of authority, defined as the likelihood that one's desires will be carried out, is the key to accessing resources in

complex societies. He agrees with Weber that shared **life chances** are a better indicator of social class, though he feels that status groups also influence these, not just market relations.

Overall, authority and **power** are more complex than Marx's dichotomous **bourgeoisie/proletariat** construct would suggest. What sociologists call the "managerial revolution" complicates matters because authority and private property are no longer necessarily linked. Marx's view was based in a family-centered **capitalism** that is now outmoded. Owners frequently cede power and authority to managers, boards of directors, and others who work hand-in-hand with government.

The expansion of and changing nature of the **middle class** and its ambiguous position within the social system also complicates matters. In essence, Dahrendorf sees social class as embedded within the social system. He uses the cumbersome term "imperatively coordinated associations" (derived from Weber) to describe social organizations with built-in authority relations. These establish the norms that define which social roles are most valued and structure how both individual and group interests are granted or denied. Unlike the functionalists, he does not believe that the norms are necessarily rational or benign. Conflict is inevitable because those in superordinate positions seek to maintain their position at the expense of those below them. Conflict also occurs because individuals (and, to a lesser extent, groups) are part of numerous associations, each of which may entail a different relationship to authority. The intensity of conflict, he argues, is dependent upon factors such as the amount of mobility an individual has, whether the conflict results from social pluralism or an autocratic act, careful calculations of cost and probability of success, and the degree to which the conflict seems a permanent fixture of the imperatively coordinated association.

Dahrendorf's theories have been extended to industrial and political conflict to show how interest groups form, how conflict is mediated, and how change occurs or is resisted. He is consistent, however, in seeing society as coercive by nature, though he sees conflict as potentially creative as well as destructive. He has been instrumental in forcing scholars to see the degree to which power-based class conflict is structural, not the result of economic crisis or the dawning of class consciousness. Because it is normative, other traditional theoretical constructs—such as attributing false consciousness to members of the working class who seemingly buy into capitalism, or the Marxist assertion that revolution would end class conflict—are open to critique.

Dahrendorf's work is also open to criticism. **Critical elite theorists** continue to ascribe essential and rational social roles to those who hold power, not the self-serving motives Dahrendorf postulates. Some functionalists charge that his view of inevitable and constant conflict is absurd, as it would preclude the existence of any meaningful social life; others assert that social change results more from social consensus than from conflict. Dahrendorf has also been criticized for his uneasy mix of complexity and reductionism. If individuals in society belong to as many overlapping associations as Dahrendorf claims, why continue to assert that one either has or does not have authority? Where does one draw the line between the superordinate and the subordinate classes? Given the possibility that some might be members of both classes, depending upon which associational role is in question, how does one determine which class identifies

an individual given the murkiness of Dahrendorf's view of class consciousness? Indeed, why assume a correlation between occupation, authority, and class? Some scholars feel that Dahrendorf should have repudiated Marx's dualistic construction of social class altogether.

The criticisms of Dahrendorf's work should rightly be viewed as confirmation of their enduring importance. Most serious work on social class in America wrestles with the implications of his theories.

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DAVIS, KINGSLEY

See Davis-Moore Thesis.

DAVIS-MOORE THESIS

ROBERT E. WEIR

Among the better known postulates in **functional elite theory** is the Davis-Moore thesis. It is named for Kingsley Davis (1908–97) and Wilbert Moore (1914–87), two sociologists who worked on questions of stratification. In the 1940s Davis and Moore attempted to explain the primary function of stratification and concluded that it was to guarantee that society's most important roles and positions were occupied by those most qualified to fill them. This is particularly the case in the economic, political, religious, and technological sectors of society.

Like all functionalists, Davis and Moore concentrated on those consensus-producing roles and norms they felt were necessary for society to survive and thrive. In a 1953 analysis of their work Melvyn Tumin delineated seven key components of the Davis-Moore thesis. First, some social roles are more important than others and require specific abilities to fill. Second, these roles are so specialized that only a few are capable of mastering them. Third, those roles require special training, and fourth, said training is difficult to obtain and hence must be rewarded. Fifth, those rewards can come in the form of special privileges that are harder for others to obtain. Sixth, those in the elite receive **prestige**, **power**, and other perquisites that tend to institutionalize inequality. Finally and most controversially, this level of inequality is desirable, positive, and functional. In essence, talent is scarce and ought to be rewarded.

The Davis-Moore thesis has been and remains contested. Some critics accused the two of constructing an illogical tautology that could not be tested; others charged **classism** and ideological biases. **Conflict theorists** question functionalist

assumptions at their core, and several note that Davis and Moore treated society as if it always operated as an ideal **meritocracy**, when in truth elite status often derives from factors other than merit, such as **social networks**, **Ivy League** education, inheritance, and in some cases exploitation of the **lower classes**. Their model also assumes competency and benevolence on the part of elites, a thesis often at odds with reality. **Harold Kerbo** further challenged the Davis-Moore thesis on the grounds that, even if they were correct, their postulates do not justify the degree of inequality that pervades American society.

The Davis-Moore thesis is no longer in vogue, but it nonetheless retains value. It remains a good explanation concerning the process by which some forms of elite **status** is attained, and, protestations of ideals notwithstanding, their argument that stratification in an advanced **capitalist** society is inevitable has yet to be refuted. Moreover, although it is seldom evoked by name, variants of the Davis-Moore thesis underpin many of the arguments made by economic and political conservatives.

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Leonard Beeghley, *The Structure of Social Stratification in the United States*, 2000; Kingsley Davis and Wilbert Moore, "Some Principles of Stratification," *American Sociological Review* 7 (1945), pp. 242–249; Harold Kerbo, "Marxist and Functionalist Theories in the Study of Social Stratification," *Social Forces* 55 (1976), pp. 191–192.

DAY, DOROTHY (November 8, 1897–November 29, 1980)

MATTHEW PEHL


An important **Catholic** activist, Day has influenced the thinking of many socially conscious church members through her work among the **working class** and the poor. She came of age in a left-wing, militantly secular milieu, but by the time of her death she was recognized as the most influential Roman Catholic laywoman of the twentieth century and a pioneer of Catholic radicalism.

Born to a **middle-class** family, Day embraced **socialism** during her student days at the University of Illinois and moved to New York where she lived in the years surrounding World War I. While in New York, she worked as a radical journalist for such magazines as the *Call* and *Masses*, and she also became familiar with staples of the bohemian art scene such as Floyd Dell and Eugene O'Neill. Day's personal life during these years was tempestuous, characterized by rocky romances and what she later termed a "long loneliness."

After the birth of her daughter, Tamar, in 1927, Day decided to baptize her child in the Catholic Church. Following the baptism, Day endured her own crisis of faith; ultimately, she abandoned Tamar's atheist father and converted to Catholicism herself in 1927. The turning point in Day's life came in the early 1930s when she met an eccentric French peasant and philosopher, Peter Maurin. Maurin urged Day to channel her Catholic spirituality and left-wing politics into a newspaper, *The Catholic Worker*. Sold for a penny outside radical meetings

and along the picket lines at major strikes, the paper gradually became a movement infused with Day's religious sensibilities.

Practically, the Catholic Worker movement spread with the success of the newspaper (which reached a circulation of 100,000 in the 1930s) and with the rise of "houses of hospitality." These houses offered a refuge for the poor and unemployed, and they provided Catholic Workers an intellectually stimulating environment in which they could enact and, to some extent, reinvent-their faith. Catholic Workers distrusted the modern state, and instead proclaimed a kind of neo-medieval belief in organic society and human brotherhood. Day's own voluntary poverty reflected her belief in the spiritually exalted status of the poor, and served as an inspiration for a new generation of Catholic activists. Likewise, Day's insistence on what she termed "personalism"—the personal responsibility of all people to each other—offered her many admirers a way to practice the corporal works of mercy so central to Catholic Worker theology. Finally, Day remained an unwavering pacifist, even as America entered and fought World War II. Day's commitment to nonviolence cost the Catholic Worker movement a great many members and



Dorothy Day, ca. 1934. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

dramatically reduced the number of houses of hospitality during the 1940s.

In time, however, Day's pacifism laid the groundwork for the major peace movements of the 1950s and 1960s. Other aspects of Catholic Worker thought continued to reverberate throughout the religious left; the movement's most famous influence, perhaps, was on the young Catholic Worker **Michael Harrington**, who went on the write *The Other America* in 1962 and helped prompt President Lyndon Johnson's **War on Poverty**. Slowed by age in the 1970s, Dorothy Day died in 1980.

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DAY TRADING

ROBERT E. WEIR

Day trading is the legal, but controversial, practice of purchasing and selling stocks and securities for quick profit. To its defenders, day trading has democratized the stock market and afforded small-scale investors opportunities once reserved for the **upper class** and corporations. To its detractors, day trading is more akin to **gambling** than wise investing, and it is more likely to incur debt than attainment of the **American dream**.

Day trading in the United States is a by-product of loosened regulations of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), competition, and technological change. The price of securities fluctuates according to daily trading on the NYSE and other exchanges. Investors make purchases and sales through brokerages licensed to transact exchanges. Very few investors pay face value up front for stocks or securities they purchase; rather they put down a percentage of the price, which is called the "margin." Investors also pay fees to the brokerage firms. Making money on stocks is done two ways: one can hold them for a long period and collect dividends paid to investors (generally on a quarterly basis), or one can sell the stock for a higher price than one purchased it.

Day traders nearly always pursue the second option. Some critics compare modern day trading to market conditions of the 1920s. Stock prices rose spectacularly in the 1920s, and some investors made fortunes. (A rising market is known as a "bull market"; a declining one is called a "bear market.") The supercharged market of the 1920s lured numerous small investors, especially members of the middle and lower ranks of the **middle class**. Margins were very low in the 1920s, a condition that led to speculation based mostly on confidence. Purchases were made for which little money actually changed hands; hence, when the market crashed in 1929, billions of dollars of debt accrued for which no assets existed to secure them.

In 1934 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was established to regulate stock exchanges. Much higher margins were required for purchasing stocks and securities (generally from 25 to 50 percent). Brokerage commissions were also regulated.

Great Depression—era reforms stabilized market transactions for several decades, but technological change made certain SEC and NYSE practices outmoded. By the 1970s it was possible to conduct exchanges electronically, an advantage over the slower procedure of making personal contact with a broker. In 1971 NASDAQ (National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations) formed to compete with the NYSE and to facilitate electronic purchases. Brokers subsequently began listing securities electronically and could even conduct business when exchanges were closed. NASDAQ also inspired day traders. By the mid-1970s numerous brokerages could list their products on NASDAQ's Electronic Communication Networks (ECNs), which operate much the way that real estate multilisting services operate. Anyone with computer access can search various ECNs to see what is available for purchase. In the 1970s personal computing was still in its infancy, but by the 1980s it became widespread. The introduction of

high-speed Internet connections in the 1990s made day trading even easier. In 1994 NASDAQ exchanges surpassed those on the NYSE. In 1998 NSADAQ merged with the American Stock Exchange to form an even more powerful challenge to the NYSE.

Also influential for day traders was a 1975 SEC ruling that banned fixed brokerage fees. Most had been based on a percentage of the sale price, usually 1 percent. Brokerage fees dropped dramatically, with most charging low flat rates per transaction—often as low as \$10—regardless of the value of stocks being traded. This benefited ECNs, who take in profits through "spreads," rather than by processing transactions. (NASDAQ's inventory is offered at prices that are slightly higher than their actual value, the difference being the "spread").

In 1997 an SEC ruling forced NASDAQ to offer the same spreads to small investors that had previously been available only to large-scale investors. This was fortuitous for both NASDAQ and the NYSE, as it coincided with a bull market in technology stocks. NASDAQ was heavily invested in technology stocks; hence its value more than quadrupled from 1997 to 2000, the same period that saw feverish day-trading activity. Some technology stocks were sold several times in the same day, and a handful of day traders made big profits.

Stories of day-trading fortunes made their way into popular culture and led to an explosion of day trading, especially among members of the middle class. The technology stock boom coincided with retrenchment in many **white-collar** businesses, encouraging some displaced professionals to take up day trading. In some cases, day traders borrowed money and speculated wildly. Most inexperienced day traders based purchase decisions on news trends and sought quick profit, not long-term investment plans. The 1920s analogy proved prophetic when, in March of 2000, technology stocks tumbled (the **dot-com bubble**) and NASDAQ's value returned to its pre-1997 levels. This led to huge losses on the part of many day traders, some of whom had taken out second mortgages or had invested student loans

In 2001 the SEC set new rules to govern day trading. It distinguished between "occasional" traders and "pattern" traders, the latter being those who trade four or more days out of five. Occasional traders are required to have at least \$5,000 in equity, pattern traders at least \$25,000. Automatic triggers suspend trading activity if daily purchases exceed the buying power of those securities. Margins must be paid within five trading days. The SEC also publishes guidelines warning investors of the risks involved in day trading. Estimates suggest that just 20 percent of day traders realize profits.

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DEBS, EUGENE (November 5, 1855–October 20, 1926)

BILL BARRY

Eugene Debs was a labor leader, **socialist** agitator, and five-time candidate for president of the United States.

Born in Terre Haute, Indiana, Eugene Victor Debs (named by his father for French novelists Victor Hugo and Eugene Sue) followed the course of American industry and the **labor movement** from low-capital enterprises marked by personal relations between owners and skilled workers, to bitter confrontations between thousands of organized workers and national **robber barons**—the latter supported by military force, the legal system, and other arms of the federal government.

Debs began working in the railroad yards of Terre Haute when he was fifteen. In 1871 he became a fireman on the Terre Haute and Indianapolis Railroad. After five years of sporadic employment, Debs took a position as organizer and recording secretary for a lodge of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen (BLF). Craft unionists of the time believed that a combination of high skills and responsible, sober attitudes would lead employers to recognize labor unions as partners in the emerging industrial landscape. Debs dreamed of eliminating conflict between workers and employers, and he believed that social harmony required that workers and bosses meet as equals. Debs was so convinced that railroads were the fulcrum of progress that he distanced himself from the 1877 railroad **strike**, even though his BLF lodge was technically on strike and federal troops secured the Terre Haute depot.

Debs served as secretary-treasurer of the BLF and editor of the BLF Magazine until 1892, by which time he had grown critical of craft unionism and its conciliatory attitude toward railroad owners, who were growing more powerful and more hostile to their workers. He was also becoming more interested in politics. In 1879 Deb was elected Terre Haute's city clerk as a Democrat; he also served one term (1884 to 1886) in the Indiana General Assembly.


By early 1893 Debs had grown suspicious of the possibility of a peaceful capital/labor accord. In June he cofounded one of the country's first industrial unions, the American Railway Union (ARU). The ARU found itself in immediate conflict with the craft "aristocracy": engineers and conductors. Still, the ARU grew rapidly, especially on the western rail lines of the Union Pacific, the Southern Pacific, and the Santa Fe. Shortly after winning a dramatic strike in April 1894, against James J. Hill's Great Northern Railroad, the ARU was drawn into one of labor history's most famous episodes: the Pullman Strike of 1894.

Rising against the oppressive paternalism of the Pullman Corporation (maker of railroad cars and operator of an infamous **company town**), workers from the Pullman Palace Car shops walked out in May 1894 and came to the ARU's first convention in Chicago for support. Over Debs's objections, the ARU agreed to support the strike, but the determined Pullman management, bolstered by court injunctions and the intervention of federal troops authorized by President Grover Cleveland, broke the strike and devastated the ARU. At one point in the strike, an ARU delegation asked **American Federation of Labor** (AFL) president

Samuel Gompers for support, but Gompers refused. Debs never forgave Gompers's betrayal.

Part of the U.S. mail was transported in Pullman cars. As part of its intervention, the federal government had used the mails as pretext to obtain injunctions against ARU leaders. Debs continued his strike activities but was arrested and in June 1895 was sent to prison in Woodstock, Illinois, for six months. While in jail, Debs claimed to have experienced a near-apocalyptic conversion to socialism. He read widely, claiming that "in the gleam of every bayonet and the flash of every rifle, the class struggle was revealed." In January 1897, after campaigning in 1896 for William Jennings Bryan, Debs announced his belief that socialism was labor's ultimate salvation.

Debs ran for president five times—in 1900, 1904, 1908, 1912, and 1920—as a **Socialist Party** (SP) candidate. The 1908 campaign featured "The Red Special," a train that toured the country in true whistle-stop fashion, and in 1912 Debs amassed almost 1 million votes, nearly



Eugene Debs, ca. 1912. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

6 percent of the total, in the four-way race for the presidency ultimately won by Democrat Woodrow Wilson.

In addition to socialist politics, Debs continued to support industrial unionism. In June 1905 Debs appeared at the founding convention of the **Industrial Workers of the World** (IWW), a new organization rooted in principles of revolutionary industrial unionism. As the IWW struggled against bitter opposition from the bosses, the majority of its members—many of them transient workers—rejected the political action that Debs so forcefully advocated. This prompted Debs to quit the IWW. He spent the rest of his life speaking across the country in support of socialism.

As World War I began, Debs and other prominent radicals voiced opposition to what they saw as a capitalist war. In a June 16, 1918, speech in Canton, Ohio, Debs urged workers to hold fast to the principles of international socialism. Debs insisted that wars were made by the "master class" and fought by the "subject class"; hence the master class "had all to gain and nothing to lose, while the subject class has had nothing to gain and all to lose—especially their lives."

Debs placed his opposition to the war within the protection of the U.S. Constitution, but his speech became the basis for a ten-count indictment for violation of the Espionage Law of 1917. In his defense, he claimed to be part of a tradition that began with "Washington, Paine, [and] **Adams**," but he was nonetheless convicted

and sentenced to ten years in federal prison. In court, Debs delivered one the most dramatic courtroom speeches in American history, proclaiming that "while there is a lower class, I am in it; while there is a criminal element, I am of it; while there is a soul in prison, I am not free."

While serving his sentence in a federal prison in Atlanta, Debs was once again a candidate of the Socialist Party for president. In the 1920 election Debs drew nearly 1 million votes (3 percent of the total). Yet even as Debs ran his unique campaign, his Socialist supporters fragmented in the wake of the Russian Revolution. Many SP members quit and joined with **communist** groups that they hoped would hasten revolution in the United States.

On December 23, 1921, President Warren Harding commuted the sentences of Debs and twenty-three other political prisoners. He returned to Terre Haute in frail health to confront the various factions of the left and to resume friendships with Midwestern colleagues such as **Sinclair Lewis** and Carl Sandburg. In 1923 he became the national chairman of the Socialist Party, but conceded that a working-class party had no chance in the 1924 elections. Instead Debs supported Robert M. LaFollette's fledgling Progressive Party, a decision denounced by the new Communist Party.

Debs never fully recovered his health after his release from the penitentiary. He spent time in a sanitarium near Chicago and witnessed the virtual collapse of the Socialist Party after 1925 amid the reactionary politics of the 1920s. Debs died on October 20, 1926, the same day he received a cheerful letter from anarchist Nicola Sacco, himself standing in the shadow of the gallows.

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DEBUTANTES

NEDA MAGHBOULEH

Debutantes, or "debs," are young women formally introduced to society at the age of eighteen. The selection and presentation of debutantes was first observed in the **Gilded Age** of the late 1800s and practiced by the most wealthy, aristocratic segments of U.S. society. In their earliest form, debutantes were presented as both girls on the cusp of womanhood and as eligible bachelorettes. In fact, some scholars contend that "debbing" surfaced at the same time that historically entrenched **upper-class** families were losing economic traction to the rising **bourgeoisie**. The debutante as commodity fulfilled a basic economic function by infusing her cash-strapped noble family with "new money." And in welcoming a deb to the family, the wealthy but hopelessly bourgeois family could hope for some social cache to rub off and legitimate their claims to social elitism.

During the **Great Depression**, debutantes highlighted the anxieties and injustices of class in a supposedly classless America. The debutante cotillions and

"coming out" parties were extravagant spectacles of privilege, bringing into sharp relief the ever-widening gap between the haves and have-nots. And it was during this same period that public thirst for debutantes reached fever pitch, fueling many American girls' fantasies of wealth and **social mobility**. Newspapers printed breathless accounts of the New York social season, and party sponsors enjoyed seeing their names alongside genuine newsmakers, politicians, and entertainers of the time. A new trope of the "poor little rich girl" arose as journalists detailed various dysfunctions of wealthy families—with adulterous, suicidal, or neglectful parents, a debutante was sufficiently humanized for public consumption. The rise and fall of Brenda Frazier, a deb who became a nightclub darling and—in a first for the era—commercial spokesperson, perhaps provides a prototype for celebrity culture today. The suffering masses no longer saw the deb as a tea-pouring, virginal "bud," but rather as everything glamorous, aspirational, and unattainable about the 1930s.

Although our cultural expectations of debutante-like behavior may have shifted, modern-day debutantes still dress as they always have—in long gloves, pearl neck-laces, and formal gowns, usually in white or a muted pastel. They are often linked with upstanding young men as "escorts," performing elaborate dances at cotillion. And yet the cotillion, like the deb, has changed over time. Now framed as a charity event in which cash contributions are donated to an arts or civics organization, the modern cotillion somewhat obscures the fact that wealth and class still determine whose daughters are transformed into debs.

"Coming out" has retained a formality of dance and dress, but debutantes now come out as college students, prospective interns or employees, and of course, potential daughters-in-law within the privileged classes. It is noteworthy that debutantes and cotillions enjoy particular importance within varied ethnic and racial communities across the United States and that "coming out" is both an expression and an event more closely associated with today's gay community. But perhaps the most significant change to the debutante tradition is in the cotillion's democratization and reinvention as "prom" in our nation's public and private high schools, making the average American girl a deb for a day.

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DEFERENCE

ROBERT E. WEIR

Deference refers to the respect one is expected to give to an elder, social superior, or person of a higher rank, position, or class. Although concepts of courtesy and civility are embedded within an act of giving deference, it also usually involves an implied **power** relationship; that is, the person receiving deference is seen as a superior whose bidding should be done by the social inferior.

Insofar as it can be determined, the first use of the verb *defer* specifically relating to class dates to the late fifteenth century; by the seventeenth century it was an integral feature of the British social system. Long before the term actually came into use, the practice of deference was long established in Western society. By the Middle Ages society was rigidly hierarchical, with those of noble and aristocratic birth commanding deference from serfs, independent yeoman, merchants, and others of non-aristocratic lineage. It was not only expected; it was customarily and legally proscribed. Even the ranks of nobility were highly stratified, and one was always expected to defer to those higher on the social scale. In England a separate class of prosperous landowners known as the gentry emerged; although many in the gentry were **nouveau riche** and lacked noble title, their great **wealth** placed them in a position to command deference from all other than the aristocratic classes.

British models of deference were imported to the American colonies as settlements developed. Some historians even claim that an excess of nobles demanding deference but lacking practical skills retarded the early development of colonies in the Chesapeake region. Attempts were made to replicate British government and class systems in America, but distance and differing conditions were not always ideal for this reproduction. Class tension emerged early in the British colonial experience and can be seen in such events as the **Anne Hutchinson** trial in Massachusetts and **Bacon's Rebellion** in Virginia. Deference was, however, an integral part of the relationship between masters and their **indentured servants** and **slaves**. It was also a customary, if contested, practice throughout Colonial society, with an elite group of wealthy landowners exercising political and social power in most places. Some church officials were also among society's top ranks.

Recent studies suggest that deference was breaking down on the eve of the American Revolution, and examples abound of commoners refusing to behave in a deferential manner. It would be naïve, however, to say that the American Revolution swept away systems of deference along with British political authority. Although aristocratic titles were abolished, such founders as John Adams and Thomas Jefferson believed fervently that "worthy" men should rule and that the masses should defer and follow.

The **masses** often proved intractable. By the early 1800s commoners complained bitterly of property requirements for voting, imprisonment for debt, and other "special privileges" that accrued to the rich. After the War of 1812, most states abolished many of the more blatant class-based laws, but enough remained for the Workingmen's parties of the late 1820s and early 1830s to make "equal rights" a centerpiece of their activities.

By mid-century, however, deference was alive and well; it had simply assumed other forms. The antebellum Southern social code was laden with faux chivalric ideals that were rooted in deference; likewise, **slaves** who failed to defer faced beatings and other sanctions. (Many slaves evolved complex subterfuges to disguise acts of defiance as acts of deference.) In the North, a new industrial capitalist class was emerging that demanded that wage earners submit to long hours, low pay, and substandard working, housing, and sanitary conditions. Many industrialists even demanded that their workforces accept the moral codes of their employers.

In the post–Civil War period, the rising **middle class** accelerated its embrace of the set of social norms often deemed **Victorianism**. Many aped English practices, including codes of deference. Civility, refinement, manners, and social interactions came to be defined by elite and middle-class norms, with those lower on the social scale expected to recognize the superior breeding of their alleged betters.

In the twentieth century deference took more subtle forms. The advent of mass, popular culture had a leveling effect insofar as one saw more convergence between the middle classes and **working classes**. One response of the **upper classes** and the **social climbers** seeking to join their ranks was to isolate themselves in educational, cultural, and social circles that positioned them to exercise power and hence command deference through the positions they held. **Ivy League** and other elite colleges, for example, remained exclusive bastions for the wealthy until the 1960s, and many remain less diverse than society at large. Elites also formed **social networks** designed to perpetuate class power and maintain control over such cultural institutions as the **opera** and **museums** that are designed, in part, to cultivate a sense of refinement that (they hope) sets them apart.

Deference has also taken on a less-savory connotation: the expectation that underlings owe unflinching deference to corporate executives. Although much has been made recently of imperious **CEO**s, overbearing executives such as **Donald Trump**, and bullying bosses, the phenomenon is not new. In the 1950s, for example, William Whyte warned of the dangers of the "organization man" who did not question his superiors and blindly carried out assigned tasks. Indeed, one could easily assert that both past and deference are conditions endemic to **capitalism**, which is, at its heart, a power dynamic; thus the line between due respect and abuse of position is easily transgressed.

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DEINDUSTRIALIZATION

ROBERT E. WEIR

The decline of the factory system in terms of its overall importance within the American economy is often called *deindustrialization*. As such it is a relative term; there are still more factories in contemporary America than there were during the nineteenth-century **Industrial Revolution**, but they are of declining rather than expanding importance within the overall economy.

By the end of World War I, the United States was the world's leading industrial power, and in the 1920s about 30 percent of all American jobs were in manufacturing. The United States retained its manufacturing might despite the **Great Depression** and emerged from World War II as even more dominant. This was

especially the case of "smokestack" industries such as steel and iron production, automobiles, rubber, glass, electronics, consumer appliances, apparel, and textiles. Many of these factories were the backbone of **blue-collar** employment and provided livelihoods for members of the **working class**. In 1950 about one-third of all American jobs were in the manufacturing sector, a figure that remained little changed until the 1970s. By 1984, however, just 18.5 percent of American workers were employed in blue-collar factory jobs and by the early twenty-first century just over 10 percent.

In April 2006 roughly 13.2 million Americans worked in manufacturing, a figure that represented a loss of over 2 million jobs since 1970. Some of the decline was due to the pressures of **globalism**. By the 1960s the war-ravaged economies of Western Europe and Japan had recovered and begun to contest U.S. dominance in global markets. Although conservatives often cite overly high wages forced upon employers by the **labor movement** as a reason why American firms did not respond well to global competition, other observers cite U.S. Cold War policy as a central factor. According to the latter critique, the military-industrial complex siphoned research and development money and talent from the consumer sector and plowed it into weapons production. Many firms found military contracts more lucrative and neglected other manufacturing lines. This conspired to leave the nation with aging factories to compete against the state-of-the-art technology of economic rivals. Inefficient factories were hard hit by surges in energy costs that first took effect in the 1970s. The hyper-inflation that ensued meant that capital improvements were often neglected, the costs of American products soared, and cheaper imports undercut U.S. goods. Even the automobile industry—often considered the bellwether of American manufacturing health—lost market shares to companies such as Volkswagen, Toyota, and Nissan (originally imported as Datsun).

Deindustrialization also occurred because of changes in tax and trade laws. Tax cuts enacted by presidents Jimmy Carter and **Ronald Reagan** were partly aimed at lowering the corporate tax burden to encourage reinvestment. The cuts—especially those under Reagan—were lauded by fiscal conservatives, but they served far better as **corporate welfare** than as a **trickle-down** stimulus. This was especially true of large firms. U.S. Steel, for example, saved over \$450 million in taxes, but rather than reinvest in steel production it gave large bonuses to shareholders and deemphasized manufacturing. From 1991 to 2001 it even operated as USX Corporation to signal that much of its revenue came from non–steel-related ventures: shopping malls, real estate transactions, engineering consultation, financial services, and so on. The 100 largest American firms pocketed huge profits in the 1980s, yet created less than 0.5 percent of all new jobs for the decade.

The effects of deindustrialization have been devastating for many communities, especially in the Northeast and Midwest, areas unflatteringly dubbed the "Rust Belt." Particularly hard hit were cities whose economic base was heavily tied to manufacturing, such as Akron, Buffalo, Detroit, Erie, Flint, Pittsburgh, and Youngstown. Youngstown, immortalized in song by **Bruce Springsteen**, has become an emblem of ongoing problems associated with deindustrialization. In addition to higher rates of **unemployment**, areas impacted by deindustrialization report above-average rates for social problems such as alcoholism, crime, divorce, domestic violence, drug addiction, and chronic illnesses. Studies also reveal that

very few workers displaced by deindustrialization obtain new jobs that pay as well as those they have lost.

Deindustrialization has also been fueled by deregulation and changes in trade policy. Deregulation took away many of the safeguards from dangerous work conditions, how worker pensions were invested, how jobs were assigned, and how grievances were settled. Some firms seized the initiative to raid pension funds and smash labor unions, but the biggest impact has been the freeing of capital for use in other investments. The net result is that many firms decided to sell off assets, downsize operations, and eliminate jobs. Changes in trade laws made it easier for "American" firms to close plants in the United States and open them in low-wage nations. In some cases entire lines of work are outsourced. Even before the signing of the 1993 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), many firms had set up shops in Mexico, but an additional 880,000 U.S. jobs were lost in the next nine years. In the early twenty-first century more than 700,000 jobs were outsourced to India. Such vaunted American firms as Levi Strauss and Maytag now produce all their products abroad, and firms such as American Motors, Bethlehem Steel, TRW, and Youngstown Sheet and Tube have gone out of business. By 1987 only Zenith still offered American-made television sets, and by 1993 it merely assembled sets in two U.S. plants; the nation that perfected television now imports all of its receivers. Deindustrialization touches even American children; no mass-produced Americanmade bicycles have been manufactured since 1999, and 80 percent of all toys are manufactured in China and Southeast Asia.

Some commentators claim that deindustrialization is exaggerated and that the history of **capitalism** is that some enterprises falter while others rise. They point out that American cultural exports remain strong, that the United States is a pioneer in medical technology, that capital goods remain 49 percent of all U.S. exports, and that information services are in demand. This rosy assessment is not shared by all economists, many of whom wonder how the United States can sustain a high standard of living within an economy in which just 20.7 percent of the gross national product comes from durable goods and a whopping 78.3 percent is tied to the service sector. Of even greater concern is that America now imports much more than it exports and hence suffers from massive balance-of-trade deficits. In 2005 alone, the United States imported over \$1.7 trillion worth of goods while exporting just \$927.5 billion worth of goods and services.

Current trends suggest that deindustrialization has not peaked. In 2005 General Motors—once the world's largest corporation—announced plans to close nine U.S. and Canadian plants and eliminate 30,000 jobs in the process. Ford Motor announced similar plans. The overall decline of manufacturing as a percentage of the total economy is evident. In 1965 it made up 53 percent of the total; by 1988 that had sunk to 39 percent and by 2004 it was just 9 percent. Although the analysts who see these trends as cyclical readjustments may prove to be right, the social and economic impact on the working and **middle classes** could be quite traumatic.

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DELMONICO'S

ROBERT E. WEIR

One of several New York City restaurants famed in the **Gilded Age** as social and dining destinations for the well-heeled, Delmonico's is often evoked as a metaphor for both the opulence of the late nineteenth century and its tendency toward excess. Dining at Delmonico's was surely a marker of social class, as only members of the **upper** and upper **middle class** could afford it. In the 1880s millionaire banker August Belmont was reputed to have a monthly wine tab of around \$20,000. Delmonico's is sometimes credited with being the first formal public restaurant in the United States, the first to offer an à la carte menu rather than fixed meals, and the first to introduce European-style fine dining. Such culinary delights as Lobster Newberg, Baked Alaska, avocados, terrapin soup, and chicken à la king were said to have debuted at Delmonico's, as well as its namesake steak and a potato dish.

Delmonico's began rather humbly when Swiss émigrés Giovanni and Pietro Del-Monico opened a pastry shop and café on South William Street in 1827. Two years later they opened a restaurant that quickly became known for innovative cooking at a time in which American fare could charitably be called basic. In 1831 nephew Lorenzo Delmonico arrived from Switzerland, got involved with the restaurant, and began to cater to a more upscale clientele. He parlayed the **Europhilia** of New York's social elites into a profitable enterprise by modeling various New York establishments on Parisian restaurants. By 1838 the Delmonico's menu was 100 pages long and featured 370 separate items.

The Delmonicos moved their enterprises numerous times, often following population shifts uptown, but a centerpiece was its 2 South William Street restaurant, nicknamed "The Citadel" because of its grandeur. Another branch opened on Chambers Street near City Hall in 1856, catering to bankers, stockbrokers, and high society. By then, Delmonico's was associated almost entirely with wealthy patrons. An 1876 restaurant opened at 26th and Fifth Avenue surpassed even The Citadel in opulence, featuring chandeliers, mirrors, fountains, frescos, and a ballroom. In the 1870s, the Delmonicos operated four separate upscale restaurants.

Delmonico's contracted upon Lorenzo's death in 1882, and by 1888 operated only two establishments. In 1891, however, a new eight-story restaurant opened on William Street, and five years later another debuted at 44th and Fifth that was renowned for its Palm Garden and which was reputedly the first restaurant to feature an orchestra playing as patrons dined. By the end of the nineteenth century, however, Delmonico's began to lose its grip on New York society, which had gravitated to its many imitators. It closed its 26th Street restaurant in 1899, was embroiled in propriety law suits from 1904 to 1907, and began to hemorrhage money. The flagship William Street establishment closed in 1917, and the firm

filed for bankruptcy in 1919. It was sold to Edward L.C. Robins, who had the misfortune to take over the business just as Prohibition put a damper on the high-end liquor trade once enjoyed by posh patrons. It was raided for liquor violations in 1921 and closed in 1923. Since then several other hotels and restaurants have used the Delmonico's name, but they bear little relationship to the original, despite efforts to associate themselves with its eminence.

During its heyday, Delmonico's clientele formed a compendium of Gilded Age wealth and fame from both America and abroad. Its diners included James Blaine, Diamond Jim Brady, Charles Dana, Charles Dickens, Jenny Lind, **Theodore Roosevelt**, Lillian Russell, Sir Walter



Delmonico's Restaurant, New York, ca. 1890–1910. © Photo Collection Alexander Alland, Sr./Corbis.

Scott, Mark Twain, Stanford White, Queen Victoria, and numerous governors, presidents, lawyers, merchants, and politicians. It was also the site of lavish banquets that some critics viewed as sybaritic displays of wretched excess. Infamous dinner parties featured acts of **conspicuous consumption** such as \$100 bills rolled into cigarettes, the presentation of a \$15,000 dog collar, and pearls embedded in dinner oysters.

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DEMOCRACY

ARTHUR HOLST

By definition, democracy is a form of government in which policies and laws are for the most part defined by the preference of the majority, usually through the process of election or referenda. More recently, the rise of nations and changing governments have been closely linked with the specific ideals of American democracy. According to a freelance research group, approximately 117 of the 192 countries in the world are democratic in nature. The rise of more constitutional forms of government has been closely associated with a reduction in global tension, rapid socioeconomic development, and social stability. Democratic governments are

generally viewed as more peaceful while dealing with neighbors and better at educating their citizens, igniting human initiative, fostering productive ambition, and unleashing energy for constructive purposes, wealth origination, and economic growth.

In the contemporary age, democratic descriptions are used to denote situations and lifestyles—not just an ethics system or personality type. In essence, the basic principles behind democratic notions are to incorporate the differences and personal identities of an entire group and give each a fair share of input toward government actions, whether on a local or national level. In a pure democracy all opinions would be valued equally, and minority groups, as such, would not exist. It is clear, however, that most democracies deem some viewpoints as more valuable, especially those emanating from individuals with wealth.

For democratic systems to be effective, more is required of a country than voting equality for its citizens. The success of democracies is based largely on the premise of political **legitimation**, that is, a generalized acceptance of a political system. American democracy is conceptually thought of as a liberal democracy, a form of representative democracy in which the political power of the government body is regulated by a constitution that protects the liberties and freedoms of individuals and minorities. However, in the United States less than 2 percent of the population controls over 95 percent of the country's wealth and monetary **power**. American **capitalism** is controlled primarily by those who have the means to do so, meaning that it is easier for the more advantaged to make their opinions known and heard. So one may wonder how the United States is able to run a legitimate and functional democratic system.

For a democracy to function correctly, a population must first be divided into hypothetical "winners" and "losers," as not every citizen is going to be happy with the election of a particular official who received the majority of a vote. Even though these "losers" might be unhappy with an election, they know that the premises of democracy ensure that any rules or laws enforced will not be completely abhorrent; a democracy must take into account its minorities or it will lack legitimacy. Yet when such a small percentage controls the nation's wealth, the "minority" can potentially make up most of the American public. With the obvious presence of a wealthy **upper class**, there conversely must be a lower, **poverty**-ridden class. Thus, the presence of a **middle class** is often thought to be a determinate factor of democracy.

One of the most important ideologies of democracy is the notion that all citizens are able to participate in political decision making. It is often explicitly stated or at least implied that the government's power in a democratic state belongs to the people. However, more than 20 million people are living within U.S. borders as **immigrants**; unless they obtain citizenship, these people are not given the opportunity to participate in government. It is not a coincidence that many of these immigrants are part of the lower classes.

The middle class and **working class** make up the largest segment of the American population. Hypothetically, a large portion of the laws should be passed in the favor of these groups, but this is not always the case. Even though the middle strata represent the majority, the upper classes retain much of the power needed to control the country's laws. The upper classes, because of their class power, have the ability

to influence outcomes and decisions to benefit their interests relative to those of other classes. This can be seen in the ways in which those with wealth assert political capital to secure the passage of **corporate welfare** benefits. Another example of class stratification is in the education system. Those in lower classes are usually forced to attend schools with fewer resources, which in turn leads to long-term negative results and retards upward **social mobility** for those at the bottom.

Democracy is often criticized for the possibility of a "tyranny of the majority," an idea first suggested by **John Stuart Mill**. This term implies that a government reflecting majority opinion will oppress minorities. This can be accomplished by dictating which social classes get certain benefits. Ironically, though, modern democracy is often more prone to tyranny by the (numerical) minority: the upper classes.

Overall, the existence of a democracy in the United States creates and keeps many of our social classes separate, without much individual hope of climbing or establishing oneself in a different class. Democracy in practice often limits human ambition and inhibits the redistribution of the wealth. In essence, democracy keeps the rich and the poor poor.

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DEPARTMENT STORES

JANEAN MOLLET-VAN BECKUM

Large retail establishments that sell a wide variety of products, department stores grew out of the **lower**- and **middle-class**-owned peddler carts and specialized shops. The first true department store was founded in Paris in 1838 by L.A. Boileau; it was named Le Bon Marché (the good market). The first American department store is usually considered to be Alexander Stewart's New York City establishment, which opened in 1846, but department stores developed in earnest after the **Civil War**, many created by talented entrepreneurs such as Rowland Macy, Marshall Field, and Richard Sears and Alvah C. Roebuck.

These early stores employed mainly **working-class** women but catered to the upper middle and **upper-class** consumer. The store owners' policy of hiring cheap labor while serving high-class clientele created conflict. Workers often dressed above their perceived station in life to attract desirable customers to the store. In turn, they began to see themselves as equal to those they served, a notion of which the upper class disapproved.

Department stores were one of the driving forces toward a more egalitarian society, especially for women. Jobs created by the stores gave the women who held them a respectable alternative to other work outside the home. Although department

store jobs often entailed long hours and low pay, many women preferred them to factory work, which generally involved even longer hours, lower wages, and more dangerous conditions. They also allowed the female consumer to meet her shopping needs on her own in one location. Although catering to the upper classes, cheaper prices of the mass-produced goods sold meant that the lower classes could afford some of the cheaper items.

Department stores were also essential in the distribution of mass-produced goods of the **Industrial Revolution** as well as the dissemination of new technologies and innovations. They were often the first to offer new goods to the public. Being able to buy in quantity helped to keep prices low, and this in turn democratized consumption and influenced both urban and rural values and lifestyles.

Along with the department store came mail order catalogs, the remedy for the rural customer. For many rural consumers the U.S. Mail was the only way to purchase uncommon items not stocked by the local general store. As nearly 70 percent of the country's population lived in rural areas until the 1920s, there was a huge market for the mail order service. The most widely known mail order catalog was Montgomery Ward's, created by former shopkeeper Aaron Montgomery Ward in 1872. With mass production in full swing, and transportation and mail service across the United States improving, Ward built a company that by 1882 did more than \$1 million in sales. The availability of nearly everything large-city dwellers could buy created more equality between the urban and rural communities. Today, the Internet has taken over many of the services mail order catalogues of the past served, allowing consumers to purchase from retailers worldwide.

Catalog sales notwithstanding, department stores would not have been possible without the dramatic expansion of urbanization and industrialization during the **Gilded Age**. Mass migrations of workers from rural areas to cities created a need for more and less-expensive goods. Department stores also spawned innovation and employment in areas other than retail. Because of the sheer size of the stores, architectural advancements were needed to make them run smoothly. New and different building materials and designs, as well as improved heating, cooling, and lighting technology, were driven by the needs of department stores.

Department stores inspired discount stores, which offered a wide array of goods at even cheaper prices. Discounters such as F.W. Woolworth, J. J. Newberry, and W.T. Grant began their enterprises in the early twentieth century and by the 1950s provided stiff competition for department stores. By the 1970s discounters such as K-Mart routinely outperformed department stores, which were badly hurt by stagflation and high overhead. Moreover, the flagships of many department store chains were located in **inner cities** rocked by urban riots and social problems. Although department stores opened branches in suburban shopping malls, many venerable names had perished or merged by the early twenty-first century: Hudson's, Steiger's, Wannamaker's, Jordan Marsh, Filene's, Field's. Even Sears and Roebuck recently merged with K-Mart. Some analysts consider old-style department stores a sunset enterprise that will soon be eclipsed by specialty stores and discounters such as Target and Wal-Mart. Wal-Mart in particular has been demonized as destructive of small stores and department stores alike. It provides goods at lower costs, in part, because of high-volume wholesale purchases, but also because it pays low wages and provides very few benefits to its employees. If the Wal-Mart model prevails, links may be severed in the historical associations between department stores, community pride, **status** mobility for clerks, and opportunities for women.

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DESIGNER GOODS

See Luxury Goods

DISCONTINUOUS VIEWS OF CLASS

See Continuous/Discontinuous Views of Class

DISENFRANCHISEMENT

CARMELITA N. PICKETT

Disenfranchisement is the deliberate act of depriving a group of people or a person of civil or electoral privileges.

When America was founded in 1789, **voting rights** were granted only to white male property owners, thus disenfranchising African Americans, white women, poor white men, and ethnic minorities. During **slavery** African Americans were considered three-fifths of a person for tax purposes. The issue of slavery ripped the country apart, finally coming to a head when Abraham Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation on January 1, 1863. After the **Civil War** ended in 1865, Congress passed the Thirteenth Amendment abolishing slavery; in 1868 the Fourteenth was passed, granting African American citizenship rights. This amendment was followed by the Fifteenth Amendment, granting voting rights to African American males but still excluding all women.

During the Reconstruction era (1865–77) blacks began to gain political power, but after the election of Rutherford B. Hayes, progress halted. Southern whites, who resented African Americans running for office, used intimidation and violence to maintain white supremacy. Supreme Court decisions such as *The United States v. Cruikshank* (1875) and *Plessy v. Ferguson* (1896) undermined the Fifteenth Amendment and upheld "separate but equal" principles that were thinly veiled disenfranchisement mechanisms. By the early twentieth century most Southern states had adopted legal policies, such as grandfather clauses, literacy tests, and poll taxes, that denied African Americans the right to vote.

Women gained voting rights in 1920 with the enactment of the Nineteenth Amendment to the Constitution. Although this was a celebrated accomplishment, its full impact was felt mostly by white women; African American women and men still faced obstacles if they attempted to vote.

There were occasional small victories for African American political empowerment. In 1928 a black Republican, Oscar De Priest, was elected to Congress from Chicago. But it took another seventeen years before another African American, Adam Clayton Powell, was elected to Congress, representing **Harlem**, New York. After African Americans returned from World War II, many realized they had been fighting for freedom abroad but were denied freedom in their own country. Many became committed to gaining true citizenship in the United States. The 1954 Supreme Court decision Brown vs. the Board of Education of Topeka struck down many of the assumptions of "separate but equal" clauses. This led many African Americans to realize that their quest for full citizenship in America was progressing and that **segregation** would soon be outlawed. Congress followed the Supreme Court decision with the Civil Rights Act of 1964. This act outlawed segregation in all public areas in America, meaning that African Americans could drink from the same water fountains as whites, ride the bus without giving up their seats to whites, and dine in restaurants without going to the back door. These changes were definitely significant, but without political representation in the South, African Americans could still be deprived of their civil rights. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 abolished discriminatory practices that were practiced by Southern states. This act gave not only African Americans the right to vote but also other ethnic groups such as **Latinos** and **Asian Americans**.

During the 2000 presidential election many Americans watched George W. Bush claim the presidency while losing the popular vote. Al Gore, the Democratic candidate, finally conceded after thirty-seven days, while many Americans watched in disbelief. Political analysts speculated about voter irregularities in Florida. Many Americans asserted there was something wrong with the electoral process. The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights investigated the voting irregularities that occurred on Election Day in Florida and reported that polling locations were relocated without proper notification, defective machines were used, African Americans were prohibited from voting because of inadequate resources at polling sites, non-felons were removed from voter registration lists based on unreliable information, and persons with disabilities had limited access to certain polling sites. All of this suggested that disenfranchisement was still a feature of American society. Congress finally agreed to the Election Reform Bill. It required states to develop nondiscriminatory and uniform voter registration lists, and created provisional paper ballots to replace Florida's punch-card voting machines until the latter are replaced. Americans were finally faced with the reality of disenfranchisement: when votes are not honored, **democracy** is dishonored.

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Domhoff, G. William, Jr. (August 6, 1936–)

ROBERT E. WEIR

George William Domhoff Jr. is a prominent psychologist and sociologist whose work in **conflict theory** is often invoked by scholars. He authenticates many of the suppositions of **C. Wright Mills**, illumines the inner workings of the **upper class**, and challenges the supposed openness of American **social mobility**.

Domhoff was born in Youngstown, Ohio, the son of George W. and Helen S. (Cornet) Domhoff. He obtained a BA in psychology from Duke in 1958, an MA in psychology from Kent State in 1959, and a PhD in psychology from the University of Miami in 1962. He taught at Los Angeles State College from 1962 to 1965, at which time he joined the faculty at the University of California–Santa Cruz, where he has taught psychology and sociology since. His work in the latter field is what most pertains to the study of social class.

Domhoff has studied the myriad ways in which upper-class **power** penetrates American society. Much like Mills's famed **power elite** studies, but in a more analytical and less ideological fashion, Domhoff posits the existence of an elite whose far-reaching agenda shapes everything from textbook content to the way the media present free enterprise. The elite also dominate political life, foreign policy decisions, university policies, and the construction of ideology. His work is a direct challenge to **pluralists**, who argue that the complexity of American society tends to diffuse power among numerous groups.

Domhoff takes his cue from **E. Digby Baltzell** in defining the American upper class. To be a member of the upper class, one is usually listed in the *Social Register*, attends the proper prep schools and colleges, belongs to exclusive private clubs, and is either born or marries into wealth. Education is of utmost importance; like Baltzell, he argues that the proper schools act as "surrogate families" whose job it is to acculturate rich children into an upper-class subculture. This means that children attend prestigious prep schools, such as Andover, Groton, Hotchkiss, or Saint Mark's, and go on to elite colleges, the top four preferences being Harvard, Yale, Princeton, and Stanford, followed by remaining **Ivy League** schools and select private schools.

Domhoff also treats club activities, **debutante** balls, lavish parties, jet-set vacations, **yachting**, and upper-class retreats more seriously than many. Far from being exercises in frivolity or **conspicuous consumption**, he argues, this lifestyle solidifies group identity and facilitates the creation of networks that give the upper class its power. For example, members of the upper class often belong to social clubs in various cities, a practice that makes policy coordination or business deals easier to execute. This point is crucial; Domhoff dismisses the popular notion of the upper class as a leisure class. The upper class *does* work; business and finance are the favored professions, followed by law, then medicine and other pursuits such as architecture and museum administration. There is a tendency toward patriarchy among the upper class, with men engaging in professions and women in volunteer and **philanthropic** ventures.

Domhoff views this group as a true power elite. His 1983 study of top industrial, financial, communications, and utility firms revealed that more than half of their directors came from the upper class. Among the trustees of leading universities and colleges, 45 percent are found on the *Social Register*. Even more surprising is their presence on boards at state colleges and universities. Domhoff and others have also noted the prevalence of upper-class members in presidential cabinets, in the diplomatic corps, in **think tanks**, and in various government positions. Domhoff's work also suggests that political affiliation is of little consequence; Democrats and Republicans alike are equally beholden to powerful and wealthy patrons.

The consequences of upper-class penetration of American institutions are farreaching. First, it poses an obstacle to upward mobility. Rather than a **meritocracy**, Domhoff sees "sponsored mobility" systems that favor members of the upper class. His work closely parallels others that show occupations are inherited far more often than the conventional myth of self-made individuals holds. Class is often the determiner of who gets recruited for certain careers or tasks. This is decidedly the case in politics, where the candidates selected to run are seldom those emerging from the grass roots.

Second, the upper class possesses extraordinary resources that ensure its values and beliefs are put forth favorably. For example, the media put forth a relentlessly pro-business spin on the news, seldom bothering to point out the way in which the American economy is controlled by interlocking networks or the ways in which business decisions negatively impact workers. In a like manner, few Americans are told that foreign policy initiatives are often driven by think tanks and policy boards dominated by corporate leaders. The upper class even exerts control over how Americans are socialized through the pressure it exerts on school curricula, teacher training, and textbook content.

Of particular concern is the ability of the upper class (through public officials) to plant disinformation. In the 1960s and 1970s, for example, campaigns were launched against several protest groups based on misleading or false information. It was found, for instance, that many anti-Vietnam War groups were riddled with FBI informers and that some acts of violence blamed on such groups were actually the work of government agents provocateurs. Likewise, through upper-class control over the media the American public can be led astray on an array of government initiatives, ranging from economic plans to military decisions.

Although few would deny that the upper class exerts disproportionate influence in American society, Domhoff's suggestion that a **business aristocracy** rules America with scant regard for **democracy** or the **masses** is highly controversial.

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DORR REBELLION

ARTHUR HOLST

The Dorr Rebellion took place in Rhode Island in 1841-42; it was named for its leader, Thomas Wilson Dorr, and was a struggle for change in Rhode Island's electoral system. Rhode Island had historically experienced problems within its system of voting. Originally established as a colony by King Charles II of England in 1663, Rhode Island retained property requirements for voting long after such provisos were abolished elsewhere. Originally only white landowners had the right to vote. Later changes excluded even some of them and stipulated that one had to have property valued at \$134 or more (over \$2,300 in 2005 dollars) to vote. After the American Revolution, Rhode Island saw a pop-



A polemic applauding Democratic support of the Dorrite cause in Rhode Island. "Tyrants Prostrate" is a pro-Dorr statement, praising the support of the movement by Democratic candidates Polk and Dallas while portraying Whigs Henry Clay, Theodore Frelinghuy, and Daniel Webster as enemies of the freedom of religion. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

ulation increase, as it was one of the earliest states to experience the **Industrial Revolution**. By 1840 nearly 60 percent of white males were ineligible to vote because the state was still operating under its charter of 1663. By then Rhode Island was the only state without a universal suffrage system for white males.

The initial 1841 rebellion lacked support, but in October 1842 Dorr and his supporters held an extralegal People's Convention, which declared all white males eligible to vote after a period of one year's residency. Dorr wrote a lengthy convention report, which he sent to the official legislature. This set off a tit-for-tat chain of events that exacerbated tension. The Rhode Island legislature formed a Freemen's Constitution that went against Dorr and the People's Convention. The latter promptly voted on and defeated the Freemen's Constitution.

The Chepachet Free Will Baptist Church played a big role in the Dorr Rebellion. The founder of the Chepachet Free Will Baptist Church Society, Job Armstrong, was against Dorr's rebellion. Nonetheless, three leading Dorrites came from the Society—Samuel Young Atwell, Amasa Eddy, Jr., and General Jedediah Sprague—and it provided more supporters among its members than any other organization in the state. About 300 of the Chepachet supporters were armed. In early 1842 both Dorr and the "Charterites," who supported Governor Samuel Ward King, held competing elections.

Predictably, rival polls only increased tension. On May 18 Dorr and his followers tried to seize a state **armory** but were forced to retreat to Chepachet, where they tried to reconvene the People's Convention. Governor King issued an arrest warrant for Dorr on June 8, along with a reward that increased over time from \$1,000 to \$5,000. Dorr fled the state but returned later in 1842. Faced with the potential for expanded armed conflict, the Rhode Island General Assembly (legislature) met at **Newport** and created a new constitution that greatly

liberalized the requirements for voting. It opened voting to any white man who could pay a \$1 poll tax.

Dorr was not destined for hero status. He was found guilty of treason against the state of Rhode Island and was sentenced to life imprisonment and hard labor. His harsh sentence was widely condemned, and one year later Dorr was released for health issues. Dorr suffered mental disability for the rest of his life, though his civil rights were restored in 1851 and the court's judgment against him overturned three years later. He died in 1854.

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DOT-COM BUBBLE

JESSICA LIVINGSTON

The term *dot-com bubble* refers to the period of speculative frenzy surrounding Internet and technology companies in the late 1990s. A stock market bubble is a self-perpetuating boom in the price of stocks in a particular industry. Speculators notice a stock rising rapidly in value and buy it in hopes of further increases rather than because the company itself is undervalued. Companies can become overvalued, as were many dot-coms in the 1990s. When the bubble burst in 2000, stock prices plummeted and many companies went out of business.

During the boom, venture capitalists and entrepreneurs were often more focused on using companies to create stocks and increase shareholder value than on building a company. Because the number of stocks in Internet companies was limited, the prices of stock skyrocketed. Stocks rose even for nonprofitable companies. For example, Webvan, a company that sold groceries online and delivered them, was valued at \$8 billion in its initial public offering (IPO) in November 1999. The company, which had been in existence for less than a year, was operating on a deficit and was expected to lose more than a half a billion dollars in its first three years of operation. Even the stock values of successful companies such as America Online, Yahoo!, and Amazon.com exceeded the companies' value. During 1998 America Online's stock rose by 593 percent, Yahoo!'s by 584 percent, and Amazon.com's by 970 percent.

The media contributed to the bubble. Rather than engaging in investigative reporting, the media offered tip-sheet journalism. They celebrated successful businessmen such as Steve Case of America Online and Jeff Bezos of Amazon.com. The press was not interested in exposing the unsound business practices of Webvan and other failing companies. A number of new magazines, such as *Wired* and *Fast Company*, devoted themselves to information technology and Internet businesses. Journalists and media companies had a vested interest in *not* reporting that the

economy was in the midst of a bubble because they themselves were benefiting from this bubble. Overall, they helped to popularize investing in the stock market.

The Federal Reserve, which was created after the **stock market** crash of 1929 to prevent speculative excess, failed to stop this speculative frenzy. While a rising trade deficit, a dropping savings rate, and increasing indebtedness indicated that the economy was in an increasingly precarious position, the Federal Reserve did nothing. Chairman of the Federal Reserve Alan Greenspan, a committed free-market conservative, resisted pressure from colleagues to raise interest rates.

A belief in the "New Economy"—that the Internet was transforming the American economy—buoyed the dot-com bubble. This idea appealed to many, and Wall Street analysts and Internet investors frequently touted the virtues of the "New Economy" and the economic benefits of technology. This New Economy argument, however, exaggerated the role that information technology plays in the economy. From a historical perspective, the New Economy arguments about a "new era without depressions" were similar to those made in the 1920s about the "new economics." In retrospect, most bubbles are mass deceptions.

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
Dreiser, Theodore (August 17, 1871–December 28, 1945)

JACQUI SHINE

Dreiser was an American novelist, journalist, and social critic whose fiction explored American class differences through the lens of urban life. Best known as a novelist, though prolific in multiple genres, Dreiser published eight novels among his twenty-seven books. He also had a long career of prominent social and ideological activism. He enjoyed associations with such prominent radicals as **Emma Goldman**, and a visit to the Soviet Union in the late 1920s cemented his interest in the **Communist Party** as an alternative to the American economic system. A writer and activist until late in his life, Dreiser died of heart failure in California, where he had made his home for several years prior.

Born into a large family headed by a German immigrant whose declining fortunes in the wool industry coincided with Dreiser's childhood years, Dreiser left home in Indiana at 16 to work as a reporter in Chicago, a move that would become central to some of his most famous fiction. He attended, but did not graduate from, Indiana University.

His first novel, *Sister Carrie*, was published in 1900. *Sister Carrie* was an early example of American literary naturalism, which sought to portray life—particularly urban life—with careful attention to detail and attention to the causative factors, such as heredity and circumstance, that influence behavior. The novel's titular heroine, seduced by city life, leaves her family's home in rural Wisconsin to go to



Theodore Dreiser, 1943. Courtesy of Eon Images.

Chicago, where she begins her urban life in a crowded apartment that she pays for with her sweatshop wages. By the end of the story, however, Carrie's fortunes have risen considerably, though not through the usual "pluck and luck" of earlier fictional heroes. Carrie, by contrast to Horatio Alger's hard-working young boys whose courage and fortitude brings them success, instead becomes a happily kept woman and adulteress; when her second husband's fortune fails, she leaves him and becomes a successful actress. Her disgraced husband eventually ends his life in a transient hotel.

In presenting the story of Carrie's life without judgment and with the clinical detachment that is a hallmark of naturalism, the novel emphasizes that class distinctions have less to do with character, ambition, and moral turpitude than with

sheer luck—less with what one deserves than what one stumbles into. Dispensing with the moralistic and proto-religious tone of earlier American fiction that equated economic poverty with ideological or moral **poverty**, Dreiser's *Sister Carrie* marked a significant shift in literary portrayals of class.

Following the novel's publication, Dreiser, suffering from writer's block, worked several years as a reporter and magazine editor, bringing his interest in social reform to his work with the women's magazine *The Delineator*. His second novel, *Jennie Gerhardt*, was published in 1911; much in the vein of *Sister Carrie*, the eponymous heroine has an affair with a senator and gives birth to his illegitimate child.

Dreiser then began exploring social class from the perspective of American business and economic institutions with 1912's *The Financier*. The first in his "Trilogy of Desire," also known as the "Cowperwood Trilogy" after the series' fictional analogue for Chicago transportation magnate Charles Yerkes, *The Financier* follows Frank Cowperwood's ambitious ascent to **power** and wealth. His acquisitive greed shapes his career in the railroad industry and includes aggressive and illegal investment practices. Yet even after Cowperwood is arrested and jailed, he is not reformed; the character and the characterization are amoral. There is no redemptive experience for Cowperwood or for the reader, because the novel's conceit is dispassionate observation, not moral judgment.

Dreiser's work was suppressed and censored by publishers and editors over the course of his career; *Sister Carrie* was met with deep resistance from the literary community and even from Frank Doubleday, his publisher, who considered it sordid and immoral. Support from public literary figures such as H.L. Mencken and the publication of 1925's *An American Tragedy*, based on a 1906 murder, as well as a growing international reputation, began bringing Dreiser greater acclaim.

Now known more for his pioneering naturalism than for his sometimes overburdened writing style, Dreiser is recognized as a major literary force whose work helped to change attitudes about **social mobility** and character.

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DRUG POLICY

ROBERT E. WEIR

The use of physical and mind-altering substances in the United States is wide-spread. How society responds, however, is inconsistent and controversial. In the public mind, the term *drug* usually implies an illegal substance. Medically speaking, though, a drug is any introduced agent that changes the way the human body or psyche responds on its own accord.

Public policy on drugs is and has been incongruous. Now-banned substances such as marijuana, cocaine, and LSD were once legal; in essence, the use of certain drugs is viewed as a social problem only when the legal system has so defined it. Many drugs are considered the purview of the legal system rather than the medical profession; hence possession and use of some categories of drugs are sometimes prosecuted out of proportion to the actual social danger they represent, and serious conditions such as addiction often incur legal sanctions rather than medical treatment.

Drug policy within the United States is rife with instability, injustice, and intolerance. The very definition of an "illicit" drug is an example. From a medical and sociological standpoint the most-abused drugs in the United States are alcohol and tobacco, both of which are regulated only for minors. Mortality studies for the 1980s show that more than 5 million Americans died of tobaccorelated problems during the decade, 1 million more from alcohol abuse, and just 350,000 from all other addictions combined. Alcohol is, by far, the most serious drug in terms of its link to social problems. Throughout the 1990s, approximately half of all fatal auto accidents and homicides were alcohol related. Alcohol abuse also correlates highly with rape, domestic violence, and a host of illnesses including heart disease and cirrhosis. Alcoholics are seven times more likely to divorce and twice as likely to miss work as nonabusers. One estimate from 1990 claimed that alcohol-related problems cost Americans \$86 billion per year, whereas those associated with illegal drugs cost only \$58 billion. By 1999 National Institutes of Health statistics pegged alcohol abuse-related problems at \$184.6 billion annually, greater than the \$151.4 dollar loss associated with drug abuse in a Letwin Group study. (The latter figure is deceptive as a raw number because it also includes abuse of prescription drugs, a figure that has soared in the wake of rising HIV rates.)

Nonetheless, by the 1990s 36 percent of all federal arrests were for possession, sale, or distribution of illegal drugs, a figure that had doubled since 1980. Those percentages have continued to rise. As the much-ballyhooed "war on drugs" intensifies, class and race inequities have become more obvious. Members of the **lower class**, African Americans, and **Latinos** are disproportionately prosecuted for drug offenses, even though studies reveal that members of the **middle** and **upper classes** use certain types of drugs with greater frequency. This is especially the case for powder cocaine, an expensive drug whose use is more common among affluent users. In pure form, powder cocaine is more addictive and dangerous than "crack" cocaine, which is smoked. Crack is more common among less-affluent users, and those arrested for crack offenses routinely receive much harsher sentences than are meted out for powder cocaine arrestees. **Conflict theorists** link this disparity to **racism** and **classism**.

In fact, contemporary drug abuse is often presented as synonymous with ghettos, poverty, and minority groups, much as drug abuse was associated with hippie subculture in the 1960s. Upper- and middle-class drug use is often ignored altogether, or is considered a medical problem when abuse occurs. In the nineteenth century, for example, many middle-class women used an opium-based substance known as laudanum; likewise, some scholars believe that the largest group of drug abusers in American history was suburban women of the 1950s whose abuse of legally prescribed tranquilizers dwarfed that of ghetto heroin addicts. Conservatives often associate drug use with permissive liberal values, but the link between political ideology and drug use is weak. In fact, cocaine use was highest in the 1980s, when conservative Republican Ronald Reagan was in office, and many who snorted cocaine were wealthy. When conservatives abuse drugs, however, as in the much-publicized revelation in 2003 that right-wing radio host Rush Limbaugh was addicted to painkillers, the focus tends to shift from enforcement to treatment.

After tobacco and alcohol, the next most used drug in the United States is marijuana (pot). Pot use cuts across social class and ethnic barriers and is so widespread that many consider it a recreational drug like alcohol, though alcohol consumption is far greater than pot smoking and the use of marijuana has declined steadily since 1980. Medical and social problems associated with smoking pot are few; nonetheless, an average of about 500,000 people are arrested annually for possession of marijuana. Some police and urban politicians argue that the cost of prosecuting such trivial offenses robs resources from more serious crime-fighting initiatives. Calls for legalization of marijuana have run into ideological barriers, but in some locales simple possession is now akin to public-order offenses that result in minor citations.

This is decidedly *not* the case for sale and distribution, however, and this is another area in which social class and ethnicity become visible. Dealers are often members of socially or economically disadvantaged groups; as the middle link between users and suppliers, they are more visible and far more likely to get arrested. Suppliers are frequently quite affluent, and some have ties to organized crime; most are many levels removed from individual drug transactions and are therefore seldom caught. Suspicions run high that a sizable percentage of money deposited in Florida banks comes from high-stakes drug supplying, but it takes

careful and time-consuming investigation to crack drug rings. Instead, officials touting progress in the war on drugs often elevate the arrest of low-level dealers as evidence of "getting tough on crime."

Amphetamine and barbiturate abuse largely cut across social class lines, though there is a slight tendency for middle-class addicts to be dependent on painkillers such as OxyContin rather than illegally manufactured compounds. Members of the lower class are also more likely to support drug habits through crime; amphetamine use is particularly associated with incidents of violent crime in poor neighborhoods. According to the Drug Enforcement Agency nearly 20 million Americans have at some point used painkillers illegally.

In addition to crack there are several drugs that are more commonly abused by members of the lower and **working class**. Among these is the hallucinogen PCP (phencyclidine), often known as Angel Dust. It is now the fourth most consumed drug in America. Heroin addiction is also higher among those of lower socioeconomic and educational levels. The high cost of heroin nearly guarantees that its users will commit other crimes; heroin use correlates highly with prostitution, burglary, theft, robbery, and drug dealing. Data suggest that as high as 75 percent of serious crime in urban areas is associated with drug addiction. Heroin use is also correlated with hepatitis and AIDS, as injection needles are often shared.

Why an individual uses or abuses drugs varies, but there are several class markers. Researchers assert that availability is the single greatest predictor of drug use. This is why drug use is high among doctors, for example, and it also explains why ghettos contain large numbers of addicts. Peer groups also exert great influence, which is why teens, young adults, and **gang** members are more likely to use drugs. Poverty is also a factor; those with reduced **life chances** sometimes use drugs to ameliorate despair. There are also data that link drug use with prolonged periods of **unemployment**. The poor are also more prone to be in **one-parent families**, another associated factor for addiction.

Addiction is a serious social problem, but critics of current drug policy argue that little progress can be made until the social focus shifts from law enforcement to social justice and medical treatment. They also point to the hypocrisy of how society views drug users. Athletes use a variety of drugs to enhance their performance, some of them illegal—as in the case of major league baseball stars Jose Canseco and Mark McGwire and football's Lyle Alzado, who used steroids, and those such as basketball's Len Bias, who died from drug use. The scandals notwith-standing, advertising saturates the airwaves and newspapers with appeals to use legal drugs, perhaps creating a pill-popping culture. Although it is true that those from the lower classes have higher addiction rates than those of the upper and middle classes, those with resources are *more* likely to experiment with drugs.

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Drury, Victor (February 24, 1825–January 21, 1918)

ROBERT E. WEIR

Victor S. Drury was a French-born radical active in the **Knights of Labor** in the 1880s. Although Drury is little known today, a series of articles he wrote for *The Socialist* in 1876 and gathered into book form as *The Polity of the Labor Movement* (1885) was exceedingly influential among **working-class** radicals in the late nineteenth century. Indeed, *The Polity of Labor* ranked with the writings of Karl Marx and **Henry George** among American **anarchists**, **socialists**, and other radicals.

During his long life Drury himself dabbled in numerous oppositional political forms, always from the perspective that work ennobled individuals and that non-producers were social parasites. As a young man he participated in an attempted over-throw of the French government of Louis Philippe in 1848. He was present at the first International Working Men's Association (IWMA) meeting in London in 1864, where he witnessed the debate between anarchist followers of Mikhail Bakunin and those adhering to the path laid out by Marx and Engels in *The Communist Manifesto*.

At first Drury sided with Marx and emigrated to New York City in 1867 to establish French-speaking chapters of the IWMA. He was in New York when the IWMA met there in 1872, just one year after the collapse of the Paris Commune, which had given hope to **communists** worldwide. By this time, however, Drury was beginning to question orthodox Marxism, especially Marx's assertion that the **labor movement** and trade unions would be the vanguard of a revolutionary movement. Drury was particularly influenced by the **utopianism** of Charles Fourier and Albert Brisbane, as well as Ferdinand Lassalle's insistence that Marx undervalued the role of the state.

When Drury wrote *The Polity* in 1876, he brought all his influences together. Like Fourier and Brisbane, he rejected the possibility of finding justice within **capitalism** and insisted that worker-owned cooperatives were integral to overthrowing the profit system. Like the Lassalleans, he grew distrustful of trade unions, which he privately viewed as parochial self-interest groups, although he generally spoke positively of them in public. He also envisioned that the state itself would be the vehicle for reforming society and urged workers to seize control through the ballot box. He was prepared, as many orthodox Marxists were not, to be patient as the working class consolidated its power.

Like most nineteenth-century reformers, Drury was also an advocate of land for settlers. His attacks on landlords, speculators, and absentee owners were quite popular among readers. He was respectful of the Grange and Greenback movements, but he chided each for placing too much hope that the monetary or banking systems could be reformed. In his view, only government ownership of things in the public interest—transportation, communications, property, exchange systems—would benefit laborers, and it was necessary that these things not be subject to economic forces of supply and demand.

Drury's views on labor won him many friends. As long as labor was viewed as a commodity, he argued, it would fall prey to what David Ricardo called the "iron law of wages"; that is, employers would drive wages down to subsistence level and workers would be denied upward **social mobility**. Drury argued there were only two social classes: producers and non-producers. The latter group commanded

80 percent of all society's resources, and Drury argued that society's "golden age" would emerge only when that percentage shifted to producers.

Drury also attacked nationalism and warfare, wrote about land redistribution in ways that anticipated (and perhaps influenced) **Edward Bellamy**, and put forth tax schemes consonant with Henry George and the **single tax**. Overall, though, it was his passionate defense of the labor theory of value—that it is the amount of labor imbued in any product or endeavor that sets its worth—that made *The Polity* so popular among workers. Many embraced Drury's thesis that they were being exploited by greedy and dishonest **robber barons**.

Drury moved sharply to the left, even as workers devoured his writings. By the early 1880s he had become an anarchist and no longer advocated the patience about which he wrote in *The Polity*. In 1883 he sponsored Johann Most's lecture tour of North America, and he coauthored the Pittsburgh Manifesto, a fiery document that espoused violence. During this time Drury was also active with the Knights of Labor (KOL) in New York City and became the center of an internecine struggle within the organization. Many New York Knights were Lassalleans who felt that KOL leader **Terence Powderly** was too cautious and that he kowtowed to trade unionists. Drury led an internal sect called the Home Club and used his own *Polity of the Labor Movement* as a proselytizing tool to gain support for an attempted takeover of the KOL.

The Home Club occupied much of the KOL's energies between 1882 and 1890, and it probably controlled the organization from late 1885 through 1887. Eventually both the Home Club and Drury were brought down, ironically with help of orthodox Marxists led by Daniel DeLeon. Drury began to modify his views in the 1890s and spent his remaining years as a mystic Christian socialist. Many of his late writings reflect a return to Fourier and Brisbane. By the time of his death in 1918, he was largely forgotten.

Nonetheless, Drury's obscurity—heightened in no small part by his mania for secrecy—should not blind scholars to his importance in articulating social class for nineteenth-century workers. His simple bifurcation of producers and non-producers was a typical viewpoint and serves as a reminder that capitalism was contested, that many workers rejected the idea that they held common interests with employers, and that late nineteenth-century laborers held more **class consciousness** than do most contemporary workers. They may also have been more politically educated and astute.


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Du Bois, W. E. B. (February 23, 1868–August 27, 1963)

VERONICA C. HENDRICK

Du Bois was an important African American civil rights advocate, prominent radical, and crusader for social justice.



W. E. B. Du Bois. Courtesy of Eon Images.

Du Bois was born five years after President Abraham Lincoln signed the Emancipation Proclamation (1863) and two years after the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment (1865), which constitutionally abolished slavery in the United States. He was raised in Great Barrington, Massachusetts, a free state since 1780, and graduated from its public high school. While just a teenager, he began to write a newspaper column for The New York *Globe*, which catered to a black readership. In 1884 he received a scholarship to attend Fisk University in Nashville, Tennessee. After graduating, he transferred to Harvard, where he received both a bachelor's and master's degree. Still hungry for knowledge, Du Bois pursued two years of doctoral study at the University of Berlin before returning to the United States as a teacher and completing his PhD at Harvard.

Despite enjoying the privilege to pursue his education and attend one of the nation's top schools, Du Bois focused his attention of the overall situation of black

Americans. He was very concerned with the lack of social progress made by freed slaves and their descendants. To receive his PhD from Harvard, Du Bois wrote a dissertation titled "The Suppression of the African Slave Trade to the United States of America, 1638–1870." This project, along with his other writings, demonstrates the seriousness of his attention to the struggling **lower class** of black Americans.

Du Bois was a leading civil rights figure during the late 1890s and into the first half of the twentieth century. He focused upon improving the social, economic, and political conditions of black Americans. Du Bois is most famous for creating the Niagara Movement (1905), which demanded full civil rights for blacks. He was also involved in the creation of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). Various civil rights leaders developed the NAACP, but Du Bois became one of its most famous members. He was responsible for editing the NAACP's magazine, *Crisis*, from 1910 to 1934.

The works presented in *Crisis* and Du Bois's other lectures and writings discussed civil rights and equality for black Americans. He believed political and legal action could force the United States to recognize these civil rights. Unlike his colleague Booker T. Washington, Du Bois felt it was a mistake to accept the small concessions offered to American blacks, especially in relationship to voting rights and education. Also unlike Washington, Du Bois stressed the need for intellectual and cultural advancement of blacks. He believed that a percentage of the black race should strive to excel in **education** and industry, thereby paving the way for future

generations. In his 1903 article titled "The Talented Tenth," Du Bois argued that African American liberation would be led by its "exceptional men." Ultimately, Du Bois fell away from the NAACP. He did not like the organization's push to have black culture blend completely into white culture. Du Bois wanted to highlight the strength and beauty of African American society.

Politically, Du Bois was concerned with issues of **segregation** and education, although he also had a deep appreciation for the cultural and artistic experiences of African Americans. Du Bois's interest in the welfare of people of color extended beyond America's borders. He asserted that the treatment of blacks worldwide was an issue of class. Du Bois organized a series of Pan-African conferences to unify blacks throughout the world in order to combat global racism. These conferences inspired him to dig into African history and write several books. Later in life, Du Bois became unhappy with the progress that black Americans had made in terms of equality and social status. He also moved politically to the left, becoming a member of the **Communist Party** when he was 93. He became increasingly involved with Pan-Africanism and, in 1961, moved to Ghana. Disgusted with the lack of progress in America, Du Bois gave up his U.S. citizenship to become a citizen of Ghana, where he died in 1963.

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DYE, THOMAS (December 16, 1935-)

ROBERT E. WEIR

Thomas Roy Dye is a political scientist whose work on the entrenched **power** of the **upper class** parallels that of sociological **conflict theorists** such as Randall Collins and **G. William Domhoff**.

Dye was born in Pittsburgh and was educated at Pennsylvania State University, where he obtained his BA in 1957, his MA in 1959, and his PhD in 1961. He taught at numerous colleges and universities before joining the government department of Florida State University (FSU) in 1968. He has been a visiting professor at Bar Ilan University, the University of Arizona, and the Brookings Institute. He also directed the FSU Policy Sciences Center from 1978 to 1991 and remains affiliated with it. Professor Dye has won numerous awards and research grants.

Much of Dye's research has looked at the relationships between power, wealth, and decision making. He is among those scholars who posit the existence of a **corporate class** that operates as a de facto **power elite**. Americans like to view their society as open and tell stories of upward **social mobility** and institutional leadership based on **meritocracy**, but Dye is dubious of these cherished myths. He has argued that who gets what, when, and how is often more a function of social standing than merit, and his meticulous analyses of political and social institutions back his assertions. He notes that access to and use of bureaucratic structures is one

way that power is obtained and retained among elites. In studies of the corporate class from the 1970s on, Dye has shown that, within top corporations, roughly 90 percent of the top officials come from either the upper class or the upper **middle class**. The **Horatio Alger** saga of rising from **blue-collar** labor to the upper class is, in truth, quite rare.

Like Domhoff, with whom he has collaborated, Dye argues that the corporate class has influence that stretches far beyond company boardrooms. Because of interlocking directorships and **social networks**, the corporate class also dominates college and university trustee boards, **think tanks**, foreign policy committees, lobby groups, and decisions on research and grant funding. It also has greater access to politicians. Dye's *Who's Running America?* series has focused on the corporate class's influence on presidencies from Jimmy Carter to George W. **Bush** and shown the consistency with which the economic interests of American elites are given priority.

Dye argues that decision making in America is mostly a top-down process that often disregards the wishes and best interests of average Americans. A study of the roughly 7,000 elites associated with the George W. Bush administration shows that decisions are hammered out by law firms, interest groups, think tanks, and foundations, not in accordance with public opinion or social need. In fact, earlier Dye studies reveal the degree to which the media are used to sell and reinforce elite points of view. By 1995, for instance, just fifteen newspaper chains controlled more than 50 percent of the papers sold in the United States. Likewise, television networks are owned by corporate interests that make certain that pro-business stories are reported and which (can) operate as censors. NBC, for example, is owned by RCA, while ABC is owned by Disney; Viacom owns CBS, and the Fox network is part of the media empire formed by the controversial Rupert Murdoch, whom some have regarded as a right-wing ideologue.

Dye's work suggests that American **democracy** often takes a back seat to class and economic interests.

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E

ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1964 (EOA)

ARTHUR HOLST

The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 (EOA) was an important antipoverty measure passed during the administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson.

After the assassination of John F. **Kennedy** in 1963, Vice President Johnson took the reins of the presidency with an internal agenda to improve the general welfare of the United States. With the nation knee-deep in the **Cold War** and after seeing the hardships of broken populations in poor countries, President Johnson spoke of a **Great Society** in his first inaugural address in 1964. Johnson declared an overall **War on Poverty** to improve the lives of the most vulnerable Americans.

The centerpiece of Johnson's antipoverty measures was the implementation of the EOA in the legislative arena. The EOA was passed in August 1964 after having been drafted in the previous February. Johnson stated that the EOA's primary focus was to "mobilize the human and financial resources of the Nation to combat poverty in the United States," so as to "not make the poor more secure in their **poverty** but to reach down and help them lift themselves out of the ruts of poverty and more." The EOA was originally coordinated by the Office of Economic Opportunity, but presently many of its original sections have been rescinded and the remaining functions transferred to other federal agencies.

President Johnson believed that, through the "Great Society" and the EOA, all American citizens would be able to achieve their full economic and societal potential, as would the United States as a nation. This could only happen if each person contributed to the development of society, whether through the workforce or in some other manner. To that end, educational and vocational training were central to the EOA's mission.

Johnson recognized that in most cases it is best to start education or useful work experience at a young age; therefore, he set up the **Job Corps**. The Job Corps was (and is) available to those between the ages of sixteen and twenty-one, and it provided for both rural and urban residential centers for education, vocational training,

and basic work experience. Education was also provided for adults, and the Economic Employment Act of 1964 also provided loans to **small businesses** attempting to establish roots. Other programs set up by the EOA included **Head Start**, VISTA (Volunteers in Service to America, a domestic version of Peace Corps), and the Neighborhood Youth Corps, which created projects and jobs for high-risk inner city children. There were also programs devoted to family planning, adult education, community health, expanded legal services, summer youth programs, senior centers, work study programs, and meal preparation for seniors and the poor.

The EOA also set up community action agencies (CAAs) to deliver direct help, which currently reaches about 96 percent of the nation's poor. Since 1964 the EOA has established more than 1,600 CAAs at the local level to assist in the implementation of the standards set on the federal level. Since then community action agencies have helped more than 13 million people nationwide. Each CAA is conducted and supervised by residents of the local area only. They deliver assistance in forms ranging from immediate emergency food and housing needs to long-term educational, nutritional, and health programs.

The EOA has been the target of conservatives and advocates of **self-reliance**, who see its programs as fostering dependency. Some of its critics have correctly identified waste within some programs. Nonetheless, the EOA has played a vital part in improving the quality of life for disadvantaged Americans.

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EDGE CITY

ROBERT E. WEIR

Edge city is a commonplace term among urban planners and urban sociologists that refers to commercial, retail, and technology centers and other enterprise clusters that emerge on the fringes of municipalities. Quite often these appear at the intersections of interstate highways or along the "beltline" feeder roads to them. Some see edge cities as an extension of **white flight** to the suburbs and as entities that further erode the vitality of nearby cities. The fact that many of them lie in unincorporated lands outside the control of any elected government adds to the controversy.

The term was coined in 1991 by *Washington Post* journalist Joel Garreau, whose prototype is Tysons Corner, Virginia, a collection of shopping malls, hotels, and business offices that arose at the junction of Interstates 495 and 66 outside of Washington, D.C., and close to Dulles International Airport. Tysons Corner sports several hundred retail stores, more than 3,000 hotel rooms, and over 100,000 jobs. Garreau set five criteria for edge city status: more than 5 million square feet of

office space, over 600,000 square feet of retail space (often in the form of malls), more jobs than homes, an attempt to provide for basic human commercial and recreational needs in a single environment, and the emergence of said activity in an area that had recently been undeveloped.

Garreau identified 123 edge cities in 1991 and another 83 that were in the process of becoming so. The bulk were located along the crowded urban corridors of the East and western California, but the phenomenon appears across the United States; new edge cities have emerged since Garreau's original study.

A definitional complication has arisen in that some edge cities have begun to spawn construction of new homes. If this trend continues, Garreau's criterion that edge cities tend to be commuter areas whose populations decline after work hours will lose its validity. This has led some critics to question the legitimacy of the concept and to view edge cities as simply another manifestation of urban sprawl: in essence, an extension of the **suburbs**. The greater Los Angeles area, for example, now encompasses an area that surpasses the state of Rhode Island in size.

Still another point of view disputes Garreau's criticism that edge cities tend to erode further already declining urban centers. Some view edge cities as economic engines that create new opportunities and serve as magnets to draw new residents seeking economic opportunity, visitors, and regional investors who would otherwise avoid nearby cities. A recent study of Chicago-area edge cities such as Rolling Meadows, Deerfield, Oak Brook, Des Plaines, and Rosemont suggests that edge cities provide a higher quality of life and greater stability than either urban Chicago or its closest suburbs.

The future of edge cities is uncertain, but their immediate impact on urban areas and social class is clearer. Edge cities may indeed serve as economic generators in some areas, but for the most part they drain more jobs from cities than they replace. Retail and commercial activities that once formed the backbone of **inner city** economic life have tended to shift further away from the urban core. Urban shoppers often have fewer options and often pay more for consumer goods, groceries, and entertainment than more prosperous suburbanites or upwardly mobile families that have easy access to edge cities. Moreover, edge cities entail longer commutes for those in nearby cities who often hold the bulk of service sector jobs. In essence, edge cities serve to exacerbate **stratification** rather than act as levelers.

The vast majority of those who hold high-paying jobs in edge cities go there to shop or be entertained, and live near or in them, are white, upwardly mobile, and members of the upper levels of the **middle class**. As economic activity gets further from the urban core, inner cities have become repositories for people of color, immigrants, and the poor. The population of Washington, D.C., for example, is 60 percent African-American and its economic profile is significantly lower from the population residing near Tysons Corner. Data from a 2002 Chicago study showed that the median income for the city was around \$36,000, while those in edge cities enjoyed incomes of \$57,500. Atlanta, another city ringed with edge cities, is over 61 percent black; Detroit's population is almost 82 percent African-American, and Birmingham, Alabama's, is over 73 percent. The same pattern of minority inner cities surrounded by white edge cities prevails where large **Latino**

populations cluster, such as East Los Angeles, El Paso, and Miami, whose inner city Latinos make up 97, 77, and 66 percent of the populations, respectively.

The lack of political accountability in edge cities is also troubling. Because many are not part of any municipal body or regional authority, residents of these areas get to vote on matters that affect nearby cities without having to deal with the consequences of their decisions. In the Chicago study, 31 percent of edge city residents called for cuts to welfare programs, as opposed to just 17 percent of Chicago residents. Similarly, just 44 percent of edge city dwellers supported subsidized housing for low-income workers, an idea favored by 60 percent of Chicagoans; 72 percent of the city's residents identified unfairness in school funding schemes, but just 48 percent of edge city residents agreed.

Some observers predict that it is inevitable that edge cities will be absorbed by metropolitan or regional governments and authority boards. If edge cities do indeed evolve into new suburbs—already dubbed technoburbs, suburban cores, and perimeter cities by those who project this process—it does not necessarily bode well for regional cooperation, if examples from existing suburbs can be taken as a measure. If that pattern is replicated, edge cities will simply replicate existing racial and economic stratification trends.

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EDUCATION

ROBERT E. WEIR

Education has traditionally been (and remains) a key factor in upward **social mobility**. Nonetheless, the quantity and quality of education that individuals receive often depend on class, ethnicity, **race**, and **gender**. This is true on all levels of the educational system, but it is acutely the case for primary and secondary education. The United States, unlike many democracies, does not have a national curriculum, nor does it fund schools equitably. Local school districts must raise part of their operating expenses from taxes; this practice tilts the balance heavily in favor of wealthier communities. **Upper-** and **middle-class** families also have **private education** options that are generally unavailable to poor families.

Quality education historically corresponds with **wealth**. In Colonial society, many individuals had rudimentary reading skills and men might have had some background in mathematics and accounting, but a college education was a **status** marker for a small number of upper-class individuals. Early universities such as Harvard (1636), Yale (1701), and William and Mary (1693) trained mostly ministers and dilettante scholars. By the end of the eighteenth century, most of the **Ivy League** colleges had been established, and nearly all of their students came from wealthy families. Benjamin Franklin is generally credited with advancing the idea

of practical education aimed at training professionals, but this was not widespread practice until the nineteenth century.

The concept of free public education was bolstered by the American Revolution, initially as a way of advancing ideals of republicanism and patriotism. In 1789 Massachusetts became the first state to require towns to provide tax-funded public elementary education. Because of the advocacy of women such as Judith Sargent Murray and Abigail Adams, girls were also educated in Massachusetts. Upper-class women, however, were generally sent to private academies, and it remained the custom elsewhere for females to receive little (if any) formal education. In 1800 there were no public schools outside of New England. Southern states also enacted laws that forbade teaching slaves to read or write, and even in the North very few African Americans obtained formal education.

By 1860, however, all states had enacted some form of public education. Federal land sales stipulated that money be set aside for that purpose, and urbanization led to renewed emphasis on the need for practical education. Horace Mann championed free universal education and formal teacher training, as did reformer George Henry Evans, who saw education as necessary for members of the **working class** to advance. Education was also bolstered by government legislation such as the 1862 Morrill Land Grant Act, which set aside land for agricultural colleges. Many state colleges and universities began as land grant colleges. During **Reconstruction** African Americans of all ages flocked to schools. Some **Native Americans** also received education, although much of it came in the form of forced assimilation programs aimed at "civilizing" Indians.

Educational opportunities expanded for white men and women during the Gilded Age but contracted for African Americans. Educational opportunity went hand-in-hand with industrialization, and scholars generally agree that a latent function was to delay the entry of males into the job market. By the late nineteenth century, more students were entering high schools, and the number of colleges nearly doubled between 1870 and 1900. Single women made up the bulk of all teachers outside of colleges, and the profession was poorly paid. Segregation laws also meant that black students were educated separately from whites, a principle enshrined in the 1896 Plessy v. Ferguson Supreme Court decision. In practical terms it meant that, in many places, African Americans received inferior education—and many got none whatsoever beyond elementary school. By 1911 just sixty-four high schools in the entire South accepted black students, and no state universities did so. It was not until the 1960s that public colleges in the South were forced to lower racial barriers.

Reforms during the **Progressive Era**, spearheaded by individuals such as John Dewey, finally shifted American education toward a pragmatic curriculum for all. By 1920 there were nearly 600,000 students enrolled in colleges, almost half of them women. Female teachers, however, remained poorly paid, and most states fired women educators who married, a trend that accelerated during the **Great Depression**.

The post–World War II period shaped many of the parameters of contemporary education. The federal government did much to promote education, in part because it linked an educated citizenry with **Cold War** objectives of touting American values and of developing scientific knowledge that might be of military value. The

structure of the **military-industrial complex** began to emerge in the 1950s. The GI Bill sent thousands of veterans to college after World War II, stimulating an overall growth of the university system, especially among public institutions. Overall, college enrollments soared from 2.3 million in 1940 to 7.4 million in 1970.

Public education expanded greatly during the 1950s, with the population surge resulting from the baby boom leading the way. The 1954 Supreme Court decision *Brown v. the Board of Education of Topeka* paved the way for black students to expand their educational horizons, though a bitter civil rights struggle was needed to make *Brown* operational. *Brown* also presaged ways in which American education became inextricably entangled with politics and social tension. The upheaval of the 1960s, fueled in part by a rising tide of baby boomers attending college, raised questions about many assumptions of education and society. Demands for black studies, women's studies, and critical social theory convulsed college campuses, and an influx of non-European immigrants touched off debates over **bilingualism** in public schools.

Tensions associated with the increasing diversity of American society have often leached into American schools, where they have mixed with social class to create a toxic brew. Liberals and conservatives routinely spar over **culture war** agendas such as sex education, **creationism**, funding girls' sports on par with those of boys, negotiating with teachers' unions, and a host of other values-based issues. Even more serious are disputes over who gets what sort of education.

Although strides have been made in some areas of gender equity, and nearly all colleges and universities now admit women, female students continue to complain that they are treated differently from males on all levels. In 1972 Title IX linked federal funding to equal spending for females, but the 1984 Supreme Court decision *Grove City v. Bell* limited the scope of this equality to specific programs, not entire institutions. Early in the twenty-first century the percentage of women attending college surpassed that of males, but sexism has yet to be vanquished.

Inequality is more obvious when applied to race and **socioeconomic status**. In 1944 **Gunnar Myrdal** noted problems associated with segregated school systems. Yet studies done fourteen years after the *Brown* decision showed that 77 percent of black students still attended segregated schools. That figure had dropped to 64 percent by 1984, but **Reagan**-era attacks on affirmative action caused the numbers to climb again, and by the twenty-first century, American schools were more segregated than they had been at the time of *Brown*.

This increased segregation has been due largely to white flight from urban areas, including in the North and Midwest, which had abandoned legal segregation well in advance of *Brown*. Rising crime rates in **inner cities**, resistance to court-ordered busing mandates, and racism coupled with school problems such as assault, vandalism, and falling achievement scores have led many whites to move from the city or to enroll their children in private schools. Currently schools are segregated by de facto population shifts rather than statute, but suburban parents also exert their political will to resist efforts to alter the racial profiles of their schools.

Given that most schools rely on local funding, many black students, as well as poor whites and **Latinos** who cannot move to other districts, receive inferior educations. In his numerous studies of urban schools, **Jonathan Kozol** reveals a "savage inequality" in how children are educated. Detroit, for example, has a student

body that is 90 percent black, but per-pupil expenditure is just 60 percent of what nearby affluent white suburbs such as Grosse Pointe or Bloomfield Hills spend. Kozol also reports on **Harlem** schools where students lack basic resources such as textbooks, paper, and sanitary facilities.

Minority students also complain that low expectations become **self-fulfilling prophecies**, a charge backed by evidence showing that African Americans, Latinos, and the poor are more likely to be placed in special education programs, business tracks, or **vocational** programs. **Conflict theorists** charge that one of the functions schools perform is to weed out students so that prime opportunities are reserved for children of the middle and upper classes. By 2003 nearly 90 percent of all Caucasians over the age of twenty-five had a high school diploma, but just 80 percent of all African Americans and only 57 percent of Latinos. Moreover, inner city schools often do a poor job of preparing minority students for college. According to a 2004 Education Trust report, 57 percent of all Caucasian students who enter college graduate, but just 44 percent of all Hispanic and but 39 percent of all African American students obtain their bachelor degrees.

Minorities and the poor have also fought rearguard actions against attacks on compensatory education programs such as **Head Start**. In 1969 Arthur Jensen advanced a **eugenics**-like assault on compensatory education by arguing that African Americans were intellectually inferior, as evidenced by IQ tests. Subsequent studies have verified that the tests have built-in white biases and that compensatory education works to raise IQ scores, but this has not prevented conservatives such as Charles Murray from resurrecting inferiority claims in less overtly racist terms.

Wealth plays an enormous role in how children are educated. About 29 percent of Americans aged twenty-five to thirty-four had a college degree in 2000. According to the Department of Education, students from upper-income brackets are twice as likely to enroll in college as those from low-income families, and far more likely to graduate. Nearly two-thirds of qualified black students claim that they lack the financial resources to attend. Deep cuts in federal grant and loan programs have further eroded access for poorer students. In recent years critics have warned of an emerging two-tier higher educational system. Although Ivy League and other prestigious schools are more diverse today than in the 1950s, the trend is for elite schools to revert to pre–World War II patterns, with smaller state schools and community colleges becoming bastions of lower-income students. At Yale, for example, just 15 percent of the 2006 student body came from families earning less than \$60,000 per year. There is a decided correlation between attending prep schools, being a legacy, or having college-educated parents and acceptance to top-rated schools.

Public education is currently under attack from political conservatives. The 1993 A Nation at Risk study from the National Commission on Excellence in Education painted a bleak picture of falling SAT scores, high drop-out rates, "dumbed-down" curricula, and ill-prepared teachers within American classrooms. The tone was alarmist, and some of the "evidence" was simply wrong: SAT scores, for example, dropped initially because many more students were taking them, but they have been remarkably stable since 1975. Nonetheless, there have been calls to "return to the basics," and many states have enacted teacher and student tests before granting

certification or diplomas. Conservatives have also touted merit pay based on student achievement as a condition for teacher raises—a move critics charge would penalize teachers in poor districts. Some have also called for **school vouchers** to allow parents to send children to any school of their choice, but these remain problematic, as vouchers would divert tax dollars into private education. Other controversial ideas include scrapping **school tracking**, increasing the length of the school day, mandating homework, and making students wear uniforms. What remains off the table in most places is equalizing school spending, standardizing curricula, or making college education affordable for all. Indeed, states such as California and Vermont, which have enacted laws to try to reduce spending gaps, have faced stiff challenges to overturn such legislation. Education can be a great equalizer, but it is not and never has been a portrait of equality.

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
EHRENREICH, BARBARA (August 26, 1941–)

STACEY INGRUM RANDALL

Barbara Ehrenreich is the author of fourteen books that focus on women's issues related to health, welfare, and economics, including the *New York Times* bestseller *Nickel and Dimed*. Ehrenreich is a prolific author and activist who believes that women have been controlled by the status quo in the United States. Recent works examine the lives of American women who are working **blue-collar** jobs, trying to survive and take care of their families. She is a frequent contributor to the *New York Times*, *Harpers*, and the *Progressive* as well as a contributing writer to *Time* magazine. *Bait and Switch: The (Futile) Pursuit of the American Dream*, was published in 2005, expounds on the problems of low-wage workers.

Ehrenreich was born Barbara Alexander in Butte, Montana, in 1941. Her father made his living as a copper miner and attended night classes in order to attend Carnegie Mellon. Though Ehrenreich's father was lucky enough to escape the mines of Montana, neither he nor his daughter ever abandoned concern for the working class. The image of the struggles of wage-earning families was deeply ingrained in Ehrenreich's mind and spurred her later work on the poor. Ehrenreich attended Reed College, where she studied chemistry and physics. She went on to graduate school at Rockefeller University, where she earned a doctorate in cell biology in 1968 at the age of twenty-seven. A self-described nerd and reader of Dostoevsky and Conrad, Ehrenreich became involved in the antiwar activism of New York, and it was there that she met her first husband, John Ehrenreich.

This focus on activism led Ehrenreich to the first of several books that focused on women's issues and gender stratification. She wrote two booklets on women's health along with Deirdre English: Witches, Midwives, and Nurses: A History of Women Healers and Complaints and Disorders: The Sexual Politics of Sickness. These two works were extremely influential to the women's health movement of the 1970s and continue to be read today. Ehrenreich and English questioned the social control that existed over women, particularly the **power** exerted by male physicians and the medical community. They argued that the swift transition from an agrarian to an industrial society had left American women at loose ends as to their place in society. In older, preindustrial societies women were subordinate, but their work was necessary and indispensable for the family's survival. Women were also skilled healers and midwives who were respected for their knowledge as they held a valuable place in society. Modern capitalism had shattered the world into two spheres—public



Author Barbara Ehrenreich promotes her book *Bait and Switch* at Book Expo 2005 NYC. © Nancy Kaszerman/ZUMA/Corbis.

and private—which stand in opposition to one another. In this new world, men worked in the public realm and women stayed at home, which meant that traditionally feminine roles such as that of midwives became increasingly taken over by men. Women's health care was moved from the home into the hospital and became increasingly standardized and sterilized, excluding most women from being anything other than a patient. Ehrenreich's works with English were among the founding documents of the women's health movement and are seen as pathbreaking.

Ehrenreich's *Fear of Falling* is often cited by scholars of the American **middle class**. This work is controversial in that she does not see the middle class as the bedrock of American society. Instead she views the middle class as fragile, endangered, and frightened. Its tenuous hold on **status** and prosperity has led to an internalized "fear of falling" that has made it insular, self-absorbed, and intolerant. She traces its slow abandonment of liberal social values and its retreat into mean-spiritedness and self-aggrandizement. She calls on the middle class, which she argues is imperiled, to join forces with the equally endangered working class.

Ehrenreich has been the recipient of numerous grants and awards, including a Ford Foundation Award for Humanistic Perspectives on Contemporary Society (1982), a Guggenheim Fellowship (1987–88), and a grant for Research and Writing from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation (1995). She shared

the National Magazine Award for Excellence in Reporting (1980) and has received honorary degrees from numerous universities, including Reed College, the State University of New York at Old Westbury, the College of Wooster in Ohio, John Jay College, and La Trobe University in Melbourne, Australia. Her work has been and remains controversial. Her critics view her as a polemicist and decry political views they interpret as sentimental **socialism**. Ehrenreich's many fans hail her as a champion of the downtrodden and a woman who is not afraid to take on entrenched power.

Suggested Reading

Barbara Ehrenreich, Fear of Falling: The Inner Life of the Middle Class, 1990; Ehrenreich, Nickel and Dimed: On Not Getting By in America, 2001; Ehrenreich, Bait and Switch: The (Futile) Pursuit of the American Dream, 2005; Ehrenreich, For Her Own Good: Two Centuries of the Experts' Advice to Women, 2005.

ELITISM

See Classism.

ENTITLEMENTS

GERALD FRIEDMAN

Entitlements are benefits, money, goods, or services that individuals receive automatically if they meet fixed criteria. These are bestowed without any discretion on the part of the granting agency. Some entitlement benefits are universal; among these are the rights to practice religion, to receive due process of law, or to move freely in society. Other entitlements depend on one's previous work record, such as **Social Security** retirement income, unemployment insurance, Medicare benefits, or the tax deduction received for employer-provided health insurance. Finally, there are means-tested entitlements, which are dependent on one's income, such as food stamps, Medicaid, or Transitional Assistance to Needy Families (TANF). Individuals receive these only if their income is below a certain threshold level. Different categories of entitlements have different distributional consequences because they generally go to different people.

Because it depends on the population that meets prescribed rules, entitlement spending does not rely upon the annual appropriation process in which Congress or state legislatures vote particular sums for particular programs. Entitlements, therefore, can grow without being subject to annual review. Perhaps for this reason, entitlement spending has grown faster than discretionary spending. Including both direct expenditures and "tax expenditures," where individuals who meet certain criteria are able to lower their income taxes, federal entitlement spending was over \$1.6 trillion in 2005. As half of total federal direct expenditures of \$2.6 trillion

and tax expenditures of over \$700 billion, entitlements are 14 percent of the entire United States economy. Most entitlement spending is in the areas of health care and elderly assistance; because spending in these areas is expected to grow rapidly with the aging of the population, one can anticipate that entitlements will also grow as a share of the federal budget.

Most entitlement benefits in the United States are linked to past work experience. The \$125 billion tax benefit for employer-provided health insurance, for example, is exclusively for workers with relatively good jobs; the 45 million workers without employer-provided health insurance get nothing from this entitlement, and low-wage workers gain less than do better-paid workers and managers who pay taxes at a higher rate. Other entitlements also favor the relatively well-to-do. Originally available for only a third of the workforce, Social Security retirement is still not available for workers in agriculture and some service occupations. Retirement benefits are tied to past earnings, so workers who earn more in their working years receive larger pensions. **Unemployment** insurance also favors the relatively well off: benefits are available only for workers with a stable work history, and benefits are tied to past earnings.

In all, about 80 percent of entitlement benefits are associated with past work. This American accent on work-reinforcing entitlement benefits makes a contrast with countries where there are more universal benefits provided to all citizens. By associating entitlement benefits with work experience, the American approach rewards those who have done well in the labor market. This may reflect an attempt to encourage more productive market work; and Americans do work more than workers in other advanced **capitalist** countries, devoting 170 more hours per year to market work than do the British, 300 more hours than the French, 400 hours more than the Germans, and 500 hours more than the Norwegians.

By linking entitlements with work and by giving entitlements to those who are already doing well in the labor market, the United States limits the redistributive effect of entitlements. This approach also limits the impact of entitlement spending on **poverty** rates; American government programs have dramatically less effect on poverty rates than do programs in other countries. This approach is a conscious political decision. In many other countries, universal entitlement programs have been sponsored by radical and **socialist** political movements as part of a broader program to reduce inequality and to limit the scope of the labor market. Without a strong socialist political movement, there has been little support for universal programs and fewer challenges to market hegemony in the United States. Those who advocate government entitlement programs, therefore, have had to make their arguments consistent with the dominant market ideology by showing how their programs mimic market outcomes and even reinforce the market. Politically, they have had to attract supporters among political groups not inclined to favor socialist programs for universal entitlements. The Social Security Act of 1935, for example, was carefully structured to mimic insurance programs provided by capitalist firms, and to attract the support of well-paid workers without challenging existing capitalist retirement or other insurance programs. Sponsors of the act wanted to steer benefits to the poor, but in a hostile political and ideological climate they knew that they had to bring such entitlements in through the back door without distracting from the main attraction of a retirement program for those who were already relatively well-off.

American patterns of linking entitlements to work have bred a curious ideology. The vast majority of those receiving entitlements do not view them as such. They see entitlements as "rights" that emanate from and accrue because of hard work, as if they were **self-reliance** savings accounts. By contrast, needs-tested entitlements such as many of the **welfare** programs serving the **lower class** are seen as "give-aways" and are often resented by members of the **upper** and **middle classes**, and even some members of the **working class**.

Suggested Reading

Michael K. Brown, *Race, Money, and the American Welfare State*, 1999; Gosta Esping-Andersen, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, 1990.

ENVIRONMENTALISM

See Zoning.

EPISCOPALIANS

HOWELL WILLIAMS

Episcopalians are members of a Protestant denomination called the Episcopal Church, which was established as an American branch of the Church of England, or Anglican Church, in 1789. Traditionally, Episcopalians have occupied a prominent place in the nation's aristocracy, as they represented one of the wealthiest and best-educated denominations. However, historians are careful to point out that such generalizations exclude the diversity of Episcopalians and those who were not representative of America's ruling class. Although no religious group is class exclusive, one might notice a homogeneous social class at local levels and in church governance. Today the Episcopal Church of America has over 2 million members and comprises 1 percent of the U.S. population, but the denomination has been responsible for eleven U.S. presidents. Why have Episcopalians been historically so influential?

In Colonial America, Anglicanism was the dominant religion of the English colonies. Anglicans held the first service in America in Jamestown, Virginia, in 1607, and Anglicanism became the established state church in the southern colonies and several New York counties. Prominent southern families and wealthy planters were leaders in the church, as the aristocracy identified with the powerful and wealthy English government. According to historian Henry May, Anglicans in America considered themselves to be modern, rational, moderate, and enlightened, or in other words, English. They built elaborate church structures as evidence of their **power** and **prestige**. However, not all Colonial Anglicans appreciated the established church's connection with the upper echelon of society.

For example, in the eighteenth century Anglicans divided their loyalties. Some clergy remained loyal to the English crown while other colonists associated Anglicanism with British oppression and dominance by the elite. In fact, two-thirds of the people who signed the *Declaration of Independence* were Anglican, as was the first president, George Washington. Soon after independence, Anglicans in America established their own branch of the church, thereafter known as the Episcopal denomination.

In the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Episcopalians did not join in efforts with the **Baptists**, Methodists, and Presbyterians to evangelize the frontier, and many clergy returned to England. However, there were concentrations of Episcopalians called "low church," such as those in Virginia, who expressed more of an evangelical tradition, emphasizing preaching and salvific personal conversion. Other Episcopalian churches, in New York and Tennessee, developed a more sacramental, or "high church," tradition. These worship styles were not determined by geography, or necessarily by social class, but rather a preference for worship style and reactions to revivalism and emotionalism.

American religious history scholars have long been familiar with the popular stereotype: "The Baptists came on foot, the Methodists on horseback, and the Episcopalians in parlor cars." This trope contains some truth, in that Baptists and Methodists experienced rapid growth on the southern and western frontiers through Methodist itinerant preachers and Baptist farmer-preachers. The sheer magnitude of Baptist and Methodist growth, as well as the emergence of Presbyterians as a competitor for elite church members and patrons, challenged the powerful position of the Episcopal Church as a church of the **upper classes**.

Nonetheless, in the Victorian era the Episcopalians, Congregationalists, and Presbyterians formed the "establishment," or what were considered the most prestigious and influential denominations. For example, Episcopalians founded the University of the South in Sewanee, Tennessee, shortly before the Civil War as a university for the elite. The powerful men of the Confederacy, Robert E. Lee and Jefferson Davis, were also Episcopalian. On the slavery issue, northern and southern Episcopalians agreed to disagree, never officially dividing over the issue as other Protestant denominations did. Episcopalians never took an official stance, but the church in the South was generally supportive of slavery and segregation. Episcopal bishops Leonidas Polk of Louisiana and Stephen Elliot of Georgia were two of the largest slaveholders in the country.

The Episcopalian Church reached its apex during the **Gilded Age**, and many urban churches contained well-heeled industrialists who supported **Social Darwinism**. Yet the Episcopalians' liberal theology also fostered numerous individuals at the fore of the **Social Gospel** movement. Episcopalians rarely experienced schism, but in the late twentieth century, debates over women's ordination, a revised *Book of Common Prayer*, and sexuality caused more conservative, traditionalist groups to leave the Episcopal Church.

Today one can find Episcopal churches all over the United States, but the membership is not as nationally vast and encompassing as in the late nineteenth century. Its traditional geographic presence has been in urban areas, the Northeast, the Midwest, and the Tidewater South near concentrations of wealth and influence. Thus, in a contemporary age, one can continue to recognize some denominations not only by their religious ideas but also by their social **status**.

Suggested Reading

David Hein and Gardiner H. Shattuck Jr., *The Episcopalians*, 2004; John K. Nelson, *A Blessed Company: Parishes, Parsons, and Parishioners in Anglican Virginia*, 1690–1776, 2001; Peter W. Williams, *America's Religions: From Their Origins to the Twenty-First Century*, 2002.

EQUITY PAY

ROBERT E. WEIR

The term *equity pay* refers to plans that would close the wage gap that currently exists for many workers. Women, ethnic groups, and people of color tend to collect lower wages on average than white, male workers. In 2002, for example, white female workers made 72 cents to every dollar earned by male workers, African-American women 64 cents, and Latinas just 52 cents.

The wage gap has been a long-standing feature of the wage labor system and has served to drive down wage structures for all workers. In the mid-nineteenth century, for example, Irish and Chinese railroad crews worked for lower wages than native-born Caucasians, but the latter found their own struggle for higher pay frustrated by the presence of low-paid workers. As new immigrants poured into the United States between 1870 and 1920, the problem intensified. Employers frequently sought to replace disgruntled native workers with immigrants, women, and African Americans. Some within the labor movement, notably the Knights of Labor (KOL) and the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), sought to include most workers within their fold, but the reaction of the American Federation of Labor was more defensive; many of its constituent unions made it difficult for marginalized workers to join. The decline of the KOL and IWW meant that many workers were excluded from the labor movement until the rise of the more inclusive Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) in the mid-1930s, although even the CIO was often slow to consider women. Several pieces of New **Deal** legislation even went so far as to justify a male/female wage gap, and a 1942 plan by the War Labor Board to equalize pay was not put in place by the time World War II ended. African Americans and ethnic minorities gained some protection under the 1941 Fair Employment Practices Act, but the scope of the law was too narrow and enforcement too spotty to make significant impact.

The 1963 Equal Pay Act finally mandated that men and women must receive equal pay for the same work, and the 1964 Civil Rights Act banned employment discrimination of women and people of color. Also in 1964, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission was established to hasten hiring of minorities and protect them on the job. This was the beginning of modern affirmative action programs. Both law and intent have proved easy to circumvent, however, through devices such as creating classifications within jobs, writing job qualifications in ways designed to exclude certain groups, not revealing company wage structures, and devising deceptive job categories. Moreover, Supreme Court decisions in the 1970s and 1980s ended most mandated **quota systems** and weakened many affirmative action plans. Pay equity and "comparable worth" campaigns have become grassroots political

causes for women and minorities, but thus far a proposed Paycheck Fairness Act designed to close wage gaps across the nation has not been passed.

The wage gap remains quite significant, and critics charge its major purpose is to create a secondary labor force whose debased economic status suppresses wages across the board. Labor union officials point to the large numbers of workers willing to cross strike picket lines as a measure of how employers conspire to keep wages low. They also point out that the richest 1 percent of Americans control over one-third of the nation's total wealth, and the bottom 80 percent command just 16 percent of the wealth. The wage gap is acute for racial and ethnic minorities. Overall, the median income for white families in 2002 was \$55,885 but just \$34,293 for African Americans and \$34,968 for Latinos. These data render problematic the conservative view that equal opportunity exists in modern America and gives weight to the charge that pay inequity reinforces the existing class structure and institutionalizes inequality.

Suggested Reading

Jeanne Gregory, Ariane Hegewisch, and Rosemary Sales, eds., Women, Work and Inequality: The Challenge of Equal Pay in a Deregulated Labour Market, 1999; Michael McCann, Rights at Work: Pay Equity Reform and the Politics of Legal Mobilization, 1994.

ETHNIC ENCLAVES

ROBERT E. WEIR

Ethnic enclaves are areas dominated by individuals of a particular cultural heritage. They are frequently the neighborhood of choice for first-generation **immigrants**, though many evolve into established centers for people of a specific background. African Americans have also tended to cluster, by forced **segregation** or by choice.

Ethnic enclaves are a logical outgrowth of the desire of newly arrived immigrants who have not yet acculturated to American society to be among those with whom they share language, culture, and lifestyles. Although cities like Philadelphia sported a section called Germantown and New York City had districts dominated by Dutch descendants, ethnic enclaves were not very visible until the spread of urbanization in the mid-nineteenth century. In many respects, the **Irish** were the first to draw attention to ethnic enclaves. Unlike earlier immigrants, the Irish were viewed in negative terms by many of those who fancied themselves to be natives. Some Irish were forced to live in defined sections, located on the outskirts of town, while others located among other Irish out of cultural solidarity. The Irish tended to settle in towns and cities touched by the **Industrial Revolution**, as these provided employment opportunities. Many towns and cities had enclaves unflatteringly given nicknames such as Shanty Town and Hungry Hill, the latter a reference to the "Famine Irish" who had fled the potato blight. Conditions were debased in many of these enclaves as many of the Irish lived in **poverty**. They were, however, vibrant culturally and supported such institutions as the Catholic church, fraternal organizations, and music clubs. In essence, Irish enclaves were **ghettos**, with all the negative and positive attributes such a designation entails.

Prior to the **Civil War**, the only other group to cluster to the degree of the Irish was the Chinese. "Chinatowns" were likewise areas in which Chinese immigrants could find familiar cultural practices, understand each other, and feel more secure. The latter became of the utmost importance after the Civil War, as anti-Chinese sentiment prevailed in American society and culminated in the passage of various laws to stop Chinese immigration. Chinatowns became self-contained centers that met the needs of residents, as well as providing services such as commercial laundries, which were not widely provided outside Chinatown.

The waves of massive immigration between 1870 and 1920 led other groups to set up ethnic enclaves. Soon American cities were dotted with Little Italys, Greektowns, Hunkyvilles (Slavs), and Jewtowns. As the names suggest, outsiders viewed these centers and their residents with suspicion, if not contempt. This was exacerbated by customs that struck long-time residents as odd, by the high population density of many of the enclaves, and by the high rates of poverty among recent immigrants. Like most centers of high poverty, ethnic enclaves had higher rates of crime, disease, and other social problems—though the reality of these seldom matched the sensational rumors that spread.

Ethnic enclaves have played an important role in assimilating immigrants. Many groups saw a three-generation model in which original immigrants clung to their culture to such a degree as was possible, while their children sought to Americanize. The second generation, however, was often caught between two worlds, and it was therefore the third generation that succeeded in assimilation. Assimilation, however, often entailed spatial mobility. Ethnic enclaves often fluctuate in their makeup, with groups such as the Irish moving up the social ladder and out of the enclave, while others supplant them both socially and spatially. A section that was originally Irish might become Polish, and later give way to Puerto Ricans or Cubans. Today that neighborhood might be inhabited by Eritreans or Haitians.

When **Jacob Riis** photographed New York City ethnic neighborhoods in the late nineteenth century, he noted the myriad social problems associated with them. Although some of his language bristles contemporary sensibilities, many of his observations remain relevant. Today's ethnic neighborhoods remain centers where groups seek to integrate into the American mainstream, yet maintain cherished cultural traditions. For a time the model enclave was **Harlem**, which spawned black-owned businesses, black organizations, and one of the most creative cultural flowerings in American history. Harlem, like areas such as Roxbury in Boston and the Sweet Auburn section of Atlanta, was a place where African Americans felt secure and which fostered racial pride. It began to fade in the 1940s and by the 1960s had become a ghetto, but its traditions were such that it is currently undergoing a revival.

Whether they are **Latino** barrios, Little Saigons (Vietnamese), Little Havanas (Cubans), or Russians living in the Brighton Beach section of Brooklyn, contemporary ethnic enclaves conform to many of the same patterns of those of the past. In each case, newer immigrants seek to survive and older ones seek to find their niche. All struggle to overcome nativism, nourish their culture, and seek physical and financial security.

Suggested Reading

Jacob Riis, How the Other Half Lives, 1997 [1890]; David Varady, Desegregating the City: Ghettos, Enclaves, and Inequality, 2005; Min Zhou, Chinatown: The Socioeconomic Potential of an Urban Enclave, 1994.

ETHNIC STRATIFICATION

NEDA MAGHBOULEH

Ethnic stratification is a form of social ranking that describes enduring relationships of inequality between different ethnic or racial groups. Ethnic stratification specifically pinpoints the existence of a hierarchical social system that positions ethnic groups relative to one another based on the political exigency, economic wealth, and class status members may or may not enjoy. In addition, ethnic stratification indicates patterns of institutional discrimination and injustice that determines a particular ethnic group's quality of life, or "life chances," as described by Max Weber.

In order to consider ethnic stratification in the United States fully, it is first necessary to interrogate the terms *ethnicity* and *race*, as the terms are often (incorrectly) used as synonyms for one another. One of the better definitions of ethnicity comes from the British sociologists Ellis Cashmore and Barry Troyna, who define it as "a subjective feeling of oneness or unity that a racial group may feel in certain contexts." In an American context, Cashmore and Troyna's definition falls short, eliding as it does the complex interactions between race and ethnicity, between (fallacious) sociobiology and culture. *Race*, which implies genetic ancestry, has been a powerful organizing principle in the United States, permeating every aspect of history, from Jim Crow to civil rights legislation. *Ethnicity* has served as a more politically neutral catch-all term, taken to mean a population's supposed genetic traits as well as its cultural qualities. Perhaps it is for that exact reason that the term *ethnic stratification* has held far more traction in American social thought than *racial stratification* has.

Therefore, given these definitions, ethnic stratification occurs as a result of unequal interactions between two or more populations deemed culturally or physically different from one another. And for this particular form of stratification to take place, ethnic groups once isolated from one another must come into contact. From antiquity to the present day, urbanization, colonization, territorial expansion, and human migration have contributed to the ethnically heterogeneous societies we see today. Stanley Lieberman, in his seminal 1970 article *Stratification and Ethnic Groups*, parses out historically "superordinate migrations" (conquest or annexation) from comparatively "subordinate migrations" (compelled by political refuge, **slavery**, or labor), signaling the potential for future societal inequality. Followed to its logical end, it is apparent that the nature by which diverse ethnic groups initially meet is a critical factor in explaining ethnic stratification. The distinction between voluntary and involuntary migration is consequently an important one.

Around the same time that Lieberman was exploring the historical origins of ethnic migration, sociologists such as Donald Noel proposed a theory of ethnic

stratification, delineating the specific social conditions necessary to advance a patterned system of social inequality such as this. Noel and others argued that four factors, particular to an interethnic social environment, ultimately led to ethnic stratification: universal needs and wants (all groups seeking similar resources and life goals), competition (typified by scarce means or mutually exclusive goals such as political domination), ethnocentrism (the belief that one's own group or culture is superior to all other groups or cultures), and unequal power (the ability of one group to dominate or otherwise compel other groups to acquiesce). That these four factors are quite common to multiethnic environments suggests that ethnic stratification is not surprising and perhaps even to be expected.

Once a multiethnic society has come into being and ethnic stratification has taken hold, several ideologies and systems have over the course of modern history worked to further rationalize or perpetuate this stratification. Most notorious are the "biological" explanations for ethnic stratification, widely disseminated as recently as 1994 with the publication of Charles Murray and Richard Herrnstein's *The Bell Curve*. The authors, a political scientist and psychologist respectively, claim that American social stratification is the inexorable, natural outcome of genetic IQ differences between whites and nonwhites (the former essentially deemed a permanent, biologically determined **underclass**). Though many mainstream scholars have roundly discounted such an intellectually outdated, pseudoscientific explanation for inequality, similar ideas continue to fuel heated national debate on issues such as affirmative action.

Other explanations offered for ethnic stratification are perhaps as problematic or speculative as the biological explanation, only more subtly so. Anthropologist Oscar Lewis offered a "cultural" explanation in his famous 1966 ethnography *La Vida: A Puerto Rican Family in the Culture of Poverty, San Juan and New York.* While Lewis accepted ethnic stratification and inequality as systemic in the United States, he nevertheless claimed that this stratification was born out of the formation of autonomous ethnic subcultures, perpetuating particular values that ultimately advanced **poverty**. Specifically, Lewis was concerned that black and Hispanic children are socialized into behaviors and attitudes (distrust of authority and early sexual activity, among others) that propagate their powerlessness in escaping the underclass. Although the **culture of poverty** thesis has been contentious since its beginning, the notion still carries much weight, especially in public policy conversations about welfare reform.

Sociologist Stephen Steinberg capably elucidates a third explanation for ethnic stratification in *The Ethnic Myth*. He argues that the behavior patterns characterized by scholars like Lewis as "cultural" are actually symptomatic of existing and historically determined class inequalities between various ethnic groups, with particular attention paid to their (often limited) ability to participate in the U.S. economy. Steinberg takes on, for example, the myth of an intellectual, adaptable, and economically successful **Jewish-American** community. He contends that the timing and locality of Jewish **immigration**, coupled with the specific occupational skills Jews had acquired in Europe, in due course translated into favorable life circumstances for this particular group in a multiethnic United States. It is not, he asserts, biology or culture that accounts for ethnic stratification, but rather social class.

Other scholars, including Melvin Oliver and Thomas Shapiro, argue that historically established networks of wealth accumulation and dispersion—not social class per se—perpetuate ethnic stratification. In their 1995 book *Black Wealth/White Wealth*, Oliver and Shapiro analyzed wealth (measured in total assets and debt) rather than **income** (a standard measure of inequality) to explain ethnic stratification in the United States. With particular attention paid to the legacy of prejudice and discrimination against black Americans, the authors investigate barriers and restrictions against wealth accumulation—for example, the access denied to black Americans in finding, financing, and ultimately owning a home. **Home ownership** is important symbolically (as the ultimate "American dream") but even more so economically (as a home is typically the most significant asset an American will have). Thus, Oliver and Shapiro argue that the narrowing income gap between blacks and whites will not curtail ethnic stratification. Rather, the authors argue that cumulative and self-perpetuating networks of wealth accumulation, denied to blacks and other ethnic minorities, are what uphold ethnic stratification.

Another subject of intense theorizing by social scientists is whether there are potential alternatives to ethnic stratification in the multiethnic United States. These alternatives are often posited as fundamental or eventual social outcomes, though the four explanations for ethnic stratification discussed above do not necessarily anticipate such optimistic or seemingly innocuous results. The most familiar alternative outcome to ethnic stratification is **assimilation**, best explained by Robert Park and other Chicago School theorists of the early twentieth century. Often referred to as "melting pot theory," Park's vision of multiethnic integration is based on his observations of the ethnic mosaic in Chicago, conceptualizing urban ethnic life as a series of concentric circles of acculturation—the core being an "ethnic **ghetto**" and assimilation represented by a group's eventual suburban migration farther and farther from the ethnic core. Although Park allowed for both large and small degrees of ethnic resistance, he believed that assimilation was both unavoidable and preferable for American society.

Some scholars have since recognized that the melting pot theory does not account for the perseverance of inequality and thereby assert a cultural **pluralist** model. Originating with Horace Kallen's *Cultural Pluralism and the American Idea* (1956) and popularized by Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan's *Beyond the Melting Pot* (1963), the cultural pluralist theory offers ethnic groups a coping mechanism for ethnic stratification—that is, the nurturing of distinctive cultural, organization, and behavioral characteristics to manage discrimination. Cultural pluralist theory has been distilled into popular culture through the ubiquitous use of the term "multiculturalism," the "salad bowl" metaphor for a multiethnic America, and Reverend Jesse Jackson's vision for a Rainbow/PUSH Coalition inclusive of workers, women, and people of color. There are nearly as many criticisms of cultural pluralist theory as there are of assimilation theory, the most frequent being that pluralism still does not account for the broader social forces—such as the previously mentioned disparities in housing quality and secure neighborhoods—that sustain stratification.

An effective, long-lasting solution to ethnic stratification in the United States has not yet translated into public policy. Modern academia cannot even come to any shared conclusions about its origins—never mind its future—as demonstrated

by the wealth of disparate research on the issue. Scholars will unfortunately agree, however, that sizable disparities in wealth are the rule, and not the exception, across centuries of interethnic contact.

Suggested Reading

Ellis Cashmore and Barry Troyna, *Introduction to Race Relations*, 1983; Michael Omi and Howard Winant, *Racial Formation in the United States*, 2nd ed., 1994; Stephen Steinberg, *The Ethnic Myth*, 3rd ed., 2001; Mary Waters, *Ethnic Options: Choosing Ethnic Identities in America*, 1990.

EUGENICS

DAVID V. HEALY

Eugenics is a pseudoscientific theory born from misinterpretations of Darwin's theory of evolution. Eugenics, which arose in the mid-1860s, was developed, and named, by Sir Francis Galton as an explanation of the essence and performance of the human race. Though considered a reputable scientific discipline for many decades, its beliefs proved dangerous for many. From its inception, eugenics was infused by the prevalent **racist** and **classist** ideologies of the time. Eugenicists were quick to identify and decry "traits" of nonwhites and members of the **lower classes**, and to use those conclusions to influence government policies. At first, eugenicsguided policies led to registration and tracking of "undesirables," typically through analysis of family trees.

However, even more invasively, eugenicists were also involved in forced **birth control**, selective breeding, and **immigration** control. Typically, policies such as forced birth control were imposed on the poor and minorities as part of punishments for criminal violations, though this was not always the case. Miscegenation laws, including immigration laws, were based on the fears of legislatures and the populace of the times, but were justified by the propositions of eugenicists. Overall, eugenicists were responsible for creating a greater racial consciousness, and using that consciousness to justify the racial enmity common in the late nineteenth century and beyond.

The racial ideologies of eugenics were also partly responsible for the policies of colonialism and imperialism. Leaders of European and American powers used their influence, justified by eugenics, to "prove" that colonized peoples were better off under their control. This "white man's burden" continued well into the twentieth century until colonial systems collapsed because of resistance by colonized peoples.

It was also during the earlier twentieth century that eugenics would be tied to the Third Reich of Germany. Nazis, who held an ideal of Aryan racial purity, utilized eugenics as one of their primary propagandistic enterprises in convincing the German public of their beliefs. Nazi eugenicists theorized an ideal German and then used that concept to weed out "undesirables," including Jews, Gypsies, homosexuals, and others. These theories would eventually be implemented in the Final

Solution, whereby the Nazis rounded up thousands and forced them into extermination camps to be killed en masse. After World War II the extremes of eugenics would discredit the field. Though many of its endorsed practices would continue, they would no longer be under the aegis of eugenics as a scientific field.

The United States, the second-most frequent user of eugenic policies, no longer officially supported the field after World War II. However, numerous eugenics-based laws would persist well into the 1980s and 1990s, including forced sterilization and immigration control. Today, concerns over eugenics are tied into the controversies over genetic engineering. Critics have pointed out the similarities in eugenic and genetic engineering terminology and goals, and some consider genetic engineering to be simply a more modern and technologically sophisticated danger.

Though eugenics is no longer a popularly supported field, it does have its proponents, including several academic journals and advocacy groups. Some writers have drawn upon (or alluded to) eugenic theories to argue that women and certain ethnic groups are (or seem to be) intellectually inferior to **WASP** (white Anglo-Saxon Protestant) males. Charles Murray and Richard Herrnstein's 1994 study, *The Bell Curve*, created controversy in this regard. Murray has insisted that the work has been misconstrued, but there is little doubt that some conservatives embraced it as part of an overall attack on affirmative action and other programs delivering services to minority groups.

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EUROPHILIA

ROBERT E. WEIR

Europhilia refers to the practice of adopting European manners and culture as a way of separating oneself from the **masses**. It was quite popular among Americans of the **upper** and upper **middle class**es throughout the nineteenth century and remains an unheralded trend in contemporary society.

Many Colonial settlers came from Europe; thus before the **American Revolution** it was customary to associate with one's ancestral lands. For upwardly mobile families, the ability to furnish homes with English goods or to dress in clothes imported from Europe was a mark of **status**. Even as the English colonies matured, **luxury goods** were normally associated with European rather than domestic production.

On the eve of the American Revolution, many Colonists launched boycotts of such English goods as tea and cloth, but even then elites enjoyed French goods when they could get them. During and immediately after the war for independence, Great Britain turned the tables and banned exports to her rebellious American colonies or else demanded cash rather than credit. This had the net effect of encouraging American factories, but **elites** retained the idea that domestic goods were less fashionable and of lower quality. Many wealthy families were frustrated by their inability to obtain European imports, and many, particularly in New England, were furious when President Thomas Jefferson signed the Embargo Act of 1807, which forbade British and French imports and exports in hopes of preventing America from being dragged into the war between the two nations. Some merchants were ruined by the embargo. The War of 1812 further disrupted trade with Britain, but the war's aftermath led to a surge of patriotism that removed some of the stigma against American-made products.

Elite prejudices against American goods began to wane at about the same time that they came to embrace European culture. In the early nineteenth century, there was less distinction between **high culture** and mass culture. **Working-class** theaters performed Shakespeare, **opera**, and popular music, even as they took liberties with the presentation and content. As the cultural system known as Victorianism began to develop during the **Gilded Age**, however, many upper- and middle-class Americans came to canonize theater, opera, symphonic music, literature, and art. Part of this process was to ape the manners of Europeans, while denouncing working-class culture as common, crude, and vulgar.

Victorian members of the upper and middle classes often adopted the style and moral concerns that developed in England during the long reign of Queen Victoria (1837–1901). Upon the death of her husband, Prince Albert, in 1861, Victoria's cultural and moral tone became more severe and dour, expressions that made their way across the Atlantic. Like their English cousins, American Victorians heightened concern for being proper and evolved elaborate social rituals to reinforce their sense of order, morality, and taste. By the late nineteenth century, American Victorians mimicked the social and cultural values of European aristocrats, which contrasted markedly with what one saw among immigrants and laborers. Cotillions, formal balls, orchestral music, literary societies, promenading, fancy dress, and dinner parties were common among America's upwardly mobile families, and the works of certain composers, playwrights, and artists were canonized as high culture. German opera and symphonies, unadulterated Shakespeare, the novels of Charles Dickens, and the works of European academic artists became part of a "cultivated" person's cultural world.

Even language came under scrutiny. "Standard" English has always competed with various regional expressions and colloquialisms, but many Victorians became more obsessed with grammar. Jeremiah Wharton's 1654 spelling guide was rediscovered and the dictionaries of Samuel Johnson (1753) and Noah Webster (1784) were often consulted, the latter noteworthy for its expulsion of Irish and Scottish expressions that Webster feared had polluted the English language. Some Victorians even spoke with affected English accents.

Nineteenth-century elites vacillated between seeing European-style culture as a moral tool with which they could instruct and refine the lower classes and viewing it as a retreat that marked their class distinctiveness. The latter course was adopted when popular culture became mass culture as the twentieth century dawned. Many in the lower middle class embraced popular culture. Movies, recorded music, radio, and sports were usually more American in content and form. Elites quickly relegated

these to "low" culture status and retreated more deeply into art, **symphonies**, and opera dominated by Europeans.

Although American artists, composers, and conductors made their marks in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, European works still dominate high culture. In music, for example, works by Mozart, Bach, Beethoven, and other European masters are still performed more often than the works of American composers such as Leonard Bernstein, Aaron Copeland, or Charles Ives, and there have been very few successful American operas. An exception has been theater, where American playwrights came to dominate, though works by Moliére, Goethe, Marlow, and Shakespeare remain popular. Moreover, the high price of theater tickets in most American cities has once again bifurcated theater by class. In community and popular theater one is more likely to see bold liberties taken with past masters, whereas elites often see such innovation as crass. This is particularly true when, for example, Shakespeare is made into movies. Although such films as Mel Gibson's truncated Hamlet (1990), Kenneth Branagh's Much Ado about Nothing (1993), and Michael Radford's Merchant of Venice (2004) got reasonably good reviews in the mainstream press, they did not fare well in elite publications. Filmed revisions of Shakespeare, such as My Own Private Idaho (1994) and 10 Things I Hate about You (1999), were especially scorned, though they did well at the box office.

Europhilia often shows up as affected snobbery, especially in language. Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson (served 1949–53) was excoriated by right-wing critics for his affected British accent, yet conservative commentator William F. Buckley, Jr. has also adopted an affected accent. Even the pop singer Madonna has adopted a faux British accent, and British actors and actresses are a staple in American popular culture. Recent polls suggest that many Americans feel that people with British accents sound more intelligent and, despite an outbreak of anti-French xenophobia when France refused to support the war against Iraq in 2003, many Americans continue to associate France with cultural and gustatory sophistication. Corporations have also long understood the cachet of associating products with Europe, and many American firms have adopted vaguely European-sounding product names.

If the trend toward popularizing Europhilia continues, it bears watching whether culturally and socially isolated elites will continue to view Europeans as arbiters of style and taste.

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EVANGELICALISM

See Creationism; Culture Wars; Religious Fundamentalism; Sexuality; Southern Baptists.

F

FACTORY SYSTEM

ROBERT E. WEIR

Factory system is the name generally given to the emergence of industrial manufacturing in the United States during the early nineteenth century. It led to profound changes in the way social class was constructed.

Although factory production and wage labor strike most contemporary Americans as normal, neither was widespread at the time of the American Revolution. Many of the Founding Fathers, including Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson, were suspicious of factories, and everywhere agrarian ideals reigned supreme. Jefferson even went so far as to recommend that Americans import the few manufactured goods that could not be made by independent yeomen or master artisans, lest the United States fall prey to social problems and inequality associated with British factories. Although Colonial society and the early American republic included wage earners, particularly domestic servants and journeymen artisans, collecting wages was seen as a temporary status until a woman obtained a husband or a journeyman established his own shop.

Samuel Slater's Pawtucket, Rhode Island, textile mill opened in 1793 and is generally viewed as the first American factory. Agrarianism remained the dominant ideology, however, and into the 1830s, most American factories hired small numbers of predominately seasonal laborers. In certain industries, though—notably textiles, shoes, and iron production—factories began to hire hundreds, even thousands, of workers who toiled under a single roof, often for corporations centered far from the factory. Still, by the outbreak of the Civil War, most American factories had just a few employees, production lines were not organized into assembly lines, and skilled workers usually controlled their tools and work patterns. After 1870, American manufacturing entered its economic takeoff phase, and by the turn of the twentieth century, the United States was an industrial giant and wage labor had become institutionalized.

Although the development of manufacturing unfolded at a slow and uneven pace, its social implications emerged earlier. By the 1820s there were already Americans who spent their entire work lives as wage earners, a condition Benjamin Franklin once feared would foster dependency. Throughout the nineteenth century, American workers dreamed of owning a farm, but by the late 1820s a distinct working class had emerged in the United States. Class consciousness seldom developed as later Marxist theorists said it would (or should), but the bulk of working-class Americans did come to view themselves as a separate social class. The nascent labor movement likewise began to articulate itself, with unions emerging from older journeymen's associations and mutual aid societies and beginning their long struggle to improve the lives of workers.

The modern **middle classes** also emerged coterminous with the factory system. Earlier American society contained a fair number of **middling sorts**—shopkeepers, small business owners, and professionals—but their numbers were few and most identified with other Colonial and early republican social groups. The expansion of the American economy and the rise of factories created new opportunities in commerce, business, manufacturing, and the professions. Like the working class, most in the middle class also worked for wages rather than possessing large amounts of land or inherited wealth. Most, however, identified culturally and socially with elites and **nouveau riche** manufacturers, investors, and speculators. Also like the working class, however, those in the middle classes also came to see themselves as a class apart.

Although their mutual rise was as much coincidental as planned, one could easily make the case that the emergence of the factory system and the beginnings of the contemporary social **stratification** are inextricably linked.

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FAITH-BASED CHARITIES

ROBERT E. WEIR

The term *faith-based charity* refers to the principle of funneling resources designed to help the poor, needy, and unfortunate through religious organizations. Although churches, synagogues, mosques, and other religious bodies and their ancillaries have historically played a major role in dispensing aid, the practice has received renewed attention in the wake of President George W. Bush's call for faith-based initiatives to receive an increased share of federal taxpayer dollars to carry out their work.

Bush made his initial "Charitable Choices" call in 2001 and stated his desire to create a White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives. The

House of Representatives passed HB 1407, allowing some taxpayer funds to go to religious groups, provided that the money go solely to administrative costs, that the charity not deny any client on the basis of personal beliefs, and that no money be used for proselytizing. By 2004 some \$3.7 billion of federal money was being dispersed by religious groups.

As noted, religious groups have long been involved in philanthropic work over and beyond missionary efforts. Religious groups have operated poor houses, emergency shelter programs, work-relief efforts, **soup kitchens**, **settlement houses**, food banks, and after-school programs. At various junctures in history, the philanthropic impulse has found strong adherence among religious followers, one notable example being the **Social Gospel** movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Historically, black churches and mosques have been socially active. That said, there also have been periods in which religious groups have tended more toward moral and political conservatism. In the mid-nineteenth century, for example, many Christians allied themselves with **Social Darwinism** and tended to view **poverty** as punishment for sin and unworthiness rather than a condition to alleviate. In recent years, there has also been a tendency for many Christian and Jewish groups to embrace the **self-help** ideology of the modern conservative movement.

Even more troubling has been the tendency for religious charity to wax and wane according to how flush the sponsoring group might be. During the **Great Depression**, for instance, private charities of all sorts proved wholly inadequate for dealing with the staggering human need occasioned by the collapse of the economy. The **New Deal** programs of the 1930s were fashioned in part because of the failure of private charity. New Deal programs formed the very foundation of how subsequent charity and assistance schemes became the domain of the federal government, and in the 1960s, **Great Society** programs dramatically enhanced the role of the federal government in addressing social issues.

This uneven record of private groups is among the reasons many social workers, liberals, and philanthropists fear the renewed emphasis on faith-based charity. As they see it, social problems are too large to be addressed willy-nilly by a disconnected array of private groups, many of which have other agendas that further complicate matters. In this critique, only governments can marshal the needed resources to attack systemic problems.

Local, state, and federal bodies have, however, seen a decrease in available funding, and the trend has been for social budgets to be reduced. This, in part, has fueled calls for private charities to fill the void. However, another part has been ideological. Many conservatives fundamentally disapprove of what they dub "social engineering," object to using tax revenues to fund social welfare policy, and argue that government handouts destroy individual initiative. Some even call government programs forms of "creeping **socialism**" and attempt to paint them as un-American. Only a few extremists would deny the need for some forms of assistance, however; thus, many conservatives have come to embrace the idea of allowing the private sector to address those needs, especially faith-based charities.

This has proved very polarizing because many faith groups discriminate in ways inconsistent with federal law. Many religious charities discriminate in their hiring

practices, link aid to proselytizing programs, or fail to delineate clear boundaries between social work and other agendas. Some object to tax credits for **Catholic** charities, for example, on the grounds that the church also funnels money into campaigns to undermine abortion and birth control rights. Similarly, some groups associated with the Rev. Jerry Falwell openly discriminate against Muslims. Many liberals, in fact, see faith-based charities as part of a "compassionate conservatism" smokescreen whose ideology-driven purpose is to dismantle all publicly funded programs from welfare to public education.

Still others, including the American Civil Liberties Union, feel that any public support for religious groups violates separation of church and state principles; the first amendment to the U.S. Constitution states, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." They also point out that religious groups are not values-free in their approach; some, for instance, treat alcohol and drug abuse as personal sin rather than as diseases, as they are officially classified. Thus, whether Congress intends to promote religion or not, diverting public money to religious charities is a de facto promotion of religion. Indeed, this question is so thorny that some religious conservatives themselves are troubled by it; the Rev. Pat Robertson criticized the Bush initiative as opening a "Pandora's box" for people of faith that might force them to act in ways contrary to their beliefs in order to meet federal guidelines, such as working with the Nation of Islam or other groups that Christian conservatives find objectionable. Many religious leaders, however, see opportunity in the Bush program. Many have counterattacked secular critics by accusing them of religious bigotry. Some have also tarred past relief efforts as failures or products of the political left.

The entire debate has become so polarized that the diversity of groups affected by "Charitable Choice" gets overlooked. It does indeed funnel money to conservative Christian groups such as Focus on Family and Campus Crusade for Christ, but also to Jewish organizations, more liberal groups such as Habitat for Humanity, and such American icons as the YMCA and YWCA. Lost also is the fact that in the short term, it is extremely unlikely that Congress will fund social programs at New Deal or Great Society levels. Those who argue that faith-based charities fill needs probably have a point.

There is, however, little reason to think that faith-based charities can supplant public charities. Their track records are strongest in meeting immediate needs and taking on small projects, but they have proved anemic at implementing long-term programs that truly reverse the gap between haves and have-nots. Goodwill and good deeds have yet to translate into changing the social class structure.

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FALSE CONSCIOUSNESS

MICHAEL A. VASTOLA

"False consciousness" is the phrase applied to the classical **Marxist** definition of ideology that refers to the manner in which **capitalism** tricks individuals into misunderstanding the way in which it works. Karl Marx himself never used the phrase, but in 1893 Frederick Engels explicitly referred to ideology as a process of false consciousness that aims to mystify real capitalist motives.

This definition fits a conception of the historical causes of ideology upon which Marx and Engels had long relied. These causes were based on material circumstances—such as the production and distribution of resources—rather than the psychological assumptions of the Enlightenment tradition that preceded Marx and Engels. Consequently, their materialist theory of ideology was inseparable from the revolutionary politics they saw as precipitating the end of philosophical inquiry—or at least the need for such inquiry—in the form of a **communist** society.

For Marx, the illusory consciousness that typified pre-capitalist society lacked sufficient coherence to be considered ideological. False consciousness arises out of the thought processes embedded in a social order in which division of labor and class-stratification systems lead intellectuals to advance ideals harmful to the proletariat in the service of maintaining existing social relations, including the domination characteristic of capitalism. In The German Ideology (1845), Marx and Engels understood ideology as strictly illusory or mystifying, and its opposite would be a clear understanding of class domination and the historical necessity of **socialism**. In Capital (1867), on the other hand, material reality becomes fundamentally inconsistent with clear thought because it is mystified by capitalist modes of production and the blurring of distinctions between the products (or services), the desire to obtain them, and the **power** relations involved in producing them, a process Marx called *commodity fetishism*. For example, if an individual desires expensive clothing without thought of impoverished workers making it, that clothing is being treated as a fetish by that individual. In Marxian terms there is a need for a special "scientific" discourse that will make evident the real meaning of this structuring.

Both definitions of ideology, with their assumptions about a false worldview, no longer fit the more contemporary conceptions of the term. First, they insist upon a level of certainty—a way of truly "knowing"—that is not theoretically tenable by today's standards. But they also presume an almost complete lack of agency on the part of those allegedly afflicted with false consciousnesses, and they fail to take into account a calculated dimension of belief that would allow individuals to behave as though certain social relations were necessary and permanent, without actually believing that they are. In essence, it may be possible for individuals to engage in economic activities without necessarily approving of them. Moreover, in the wake of the rise and fall of socialist bureaucracies in places such as the former Soviet Union, it is problematic to hold that the **masses** are blind to the truth and a small group of the intellectual elite is endowed with pure vision.

Since the 1950s Marxist and post-Marxist theory has actively engaged with the idea of ideology as something other than false consciousness. This new focus was a logical result of the failure of the proletariat to recognize their historical mission.

Most modern Marxists understand that the construction of ideology is complex and that appeals to false consciousness have not been useful in convincing workers that capitalism has exploited them. Aspects of false-consciousness theory linger in some circles, however, especially in **hegemony theory** and among those citing Frankfurt School theorists, who evoke notions of commodity fetishism, which, as discussed above, serves to hide the economic, political, and ideological relations between humans and systems of production.

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FAMILY TRUST

TINA MAVRIKOS-ADAMOU

A family trust is a form of estate management that has been around for centuries. Family trusts have served many purposes, but they mainly secure the transference of a family business or family estate from one generation to the next. Sometimes, family trusts are called "living trusts," which refers to the legal document that defines title to and ownership of real property and assets. By creating a living trust, one legally establishes a transfer ownership of assets to a "trust," but does so without relinquishing control over those assets. The "grantor" or "settlor" has control over all assets while alive and therefore can make changes at any time. Upon death, those designated as "beneficiaries" inherit the remaining assets. The legal reasoning behind setting up a family trust is that one can avoid costly and time-consuming probate, which is the legal process of taking one's name off a title of an asset and replacing it with a new owner.

There are all kinds of trusts, that is, legal agreements created for specific purposes. There are charitable trusts, welfare funds, unit trusts, and will trusts, for example, but what is specific about family trusts is that they are started within a family, and the beneficiaries are restricted mostly to just family members who are explicitly selected to inherit these assets.

Family trust defined in this way is a form of asset management and estate planning, and it is considered the principle way for the wealthy and those of the **upper class** to ensure that their family property and wealth are transferred to the next generation intact. It is therefore a way for the upper class to keep the wealth in the family and maintain the family name and legacy. The economic life cycle (and lifestyle) is passed down from one generation to the next, and therefore, family trusts have been perceived as forms of **social reproduction**. **Elite** theorists contend that an upper class based in inherited wealth wields a great deal of economic power and likewise has great influence over political outcomes and public policy. They also maintain that America is run by a small group of very powerful elites who monopolize control over the economic, political, and military arenas and who do not allow **pluralism** to function as it should.

Many well-known companies and businesses in the United States are family-controlled. Powerful families often own large numbers of shares in supposedly publicly traded companies, and hence, they have major sway over strategic decisions made in these firms. It is estimated that families in the United States control between 35 and 45 percent of the stock in America's 500 largest companies, including **Wal-Mart**, in which the Walton family owns approximately 38 percent of the shares; and Ford Motor, in which the Ford family controls 40 percent of the voting shares. These facts further the elite theory's premise that there is an unequal and unfair economic environment present in the United States today.

Today, however, the practice of setting up a family trust is being utilized by more families as a way to specify precisely how, when, and in what way they want their assets dispersed once they are deceased. Evidence of this increase can be found in the rise in the number of fiduciary income tax returns that are reported by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The United States Income Tax Return for Estates and Trusts (Form 1041) is used to report income and deductions. Increasingly, families of modest assets are turning to family trusts and are not relying solely on wills. Thus, as the use of family trusts gains popularity, elder-care lawyers and other legal experts are being called upon to provide advice for people who want to utilize this more explicit method of organizing their assets. Family trusts are gaining public interest also because people are using them alongside living wills as a way to plan for medical expenses related to possible disabilities in old age or to make medical choices now in the event that they become unable to speak for themselves.

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FARRELL, JAMES (February 27, 1904–August 22, 1979)

ROBERT E. WEIR

James Thomas Farrell was an **Irish American** novelist whose best-known works appeared in the 1930s and 1940s. His works are lightly regarded by many literary scholars, but some historians cite his work as examples of **proletarian literature** during the **Great Depression**, especially his Studs Lonigan trilogy.

Farrell was born in Chicago and lived in a South Side slum. His Irish American parents were of working-class stock, but like many "lace curtain Irish," held middle-class pretensions. By the early twentieth century, Irish Americans were several generations removed from immigrants fleeing famine, and many assumed an exaggerated sense of propriety and respectability. Farrell attended the University of Chicago, but middle-class values never set well with him. Much of Farrell's writing deals with the clash between Irish American ideals and the rough and raw

ways of the street, the domineering influence of the **Catholic** church, religious bigotry, and **poverty**.

Farrell's most famed works are Young Lonigan (1932), The Young Manhood of Studs Lonigan (1934), and Judgment Day (1935). These books center on William "Studs" Lonigan from his Chicago adolescence to his death. The trilogy deals with Lonigan's journey from idealistic teen to realistic young adult to his frustrated and debased adulthood. They take place against a backdrop of mean streets, economic depression, violence, and sexual assault. At the time, many hailed the trilogy for its frankness of language, its social realism, and the boldness with which it attacked hypocrisy and social airs. Critics, however, complained his work was stilted and read like fictionalized sociological treatises. Farrell was not a great stylist, though his defenders upheld his work as an example of naturalism. His use of stream-of-consciousness writing often led to jolting lapses in structure, a problem that became especially pronounced in later writings.

Farrell not only wrote about the chaos of the 1930s; he participated in it. The anger he felt toward poverty and **capitalism** led him into radical politics. He joined the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), a **Trotskyist** group devoted to a revolutionary vision of **Marxism**. His SWP affiliation led him into contact with the **labor movement**, especially the 1934 Teamsters' **strike**, the Teamsters then having a strong Trotskyist presence. **Communist** groups were fractious in the 1930s, and the SWP was highly critical of Joseph Stalin's regime in the Soviet Union. Farrell became immersed in factionalism as World War II approached. He supported helping the Soviet Union, a position at odds with SWP leadership. After the war, he grew disenchanted with both Stalinists and Trotskyists, became an outspoken anticommunist, and supported **Cold War** programs such as the Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe. He nonetheless went on to join various **socialist** parties and supported socialism for the rest of his life. Many of Farrell's writings directly or obliquely reference radical factionalism in the post–World War II period.

Farrell wrote more than fifty novels as well as numerous nonfiction works, but the only other work that received much notice was his five-book, 2,500-page Danny O'Neill series written between 1936 and 1953. It plows many of the same furrows as the Studs Lonigan trilogy, although O'Neill escapes the streets and lives a more respectable and less tragic life than Lonigan. Once again, a major theme is the tension between the generations of Irish American families, and most commentators see Danny O'Neill as Farrell's autobiographical persona. These books lack the dramatic tension of the Lonigan trilogy, and parts are artlessly written.

By the 1960s Farrell's literary reputation was faltering, though his output remained prodigious. He angered many young radicals with his denunciation of the **New Left**—Farrell rather inexplicably supported U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War—and his personal life was tumultuous; he divorced his first wife, remarried and divorced, and then remarried his first wife, Dorothy. By the 1970s Farrell was using vast quantities of amphetamines to prop up his sixteen-hour writing marathons, though few were reading his work. He died in 1979.

Contemporary critics are largely divided between those who place Farrell in a literary tradition with figures such as Sherwood Anderson, **Theodore Dreiser**, and **Sinclair Lewis** and those who see him as a writer of turgid prose whose reputation was exaggerated by his brief ability to capture the social zeitgeist of the

1930s. Feminists often find Farrell's earthy and aggressive male world hard to stomach; however, the African American novelist **Richard Wright** is among those writers inspired by Farrell's stark realism.

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FASHION

JANEAN MOLLET-VAN BECKUM

Fashion consists of the latest and most admired styles, usually in clothing, but can also be extended to cosmetics, hairstyles, and behaviors. These trends are often set by people who are admired and in the public eye, such as movie and music stars, political figures, and the wealthy. Many factors contribute to what is considered fashionable in a society, and ideals can vary within a culture across social, religious, and cultural boundaries. Fashion is the way in which individuals express themselves outwardly to the world. It is one of the most visible forms of consumption we have, expressing moods, social class, gender, and occupation.

Sumptuary laws are proof that what one wears is attributed to social class. Sumptuary laws are regulations prescribing what different social classes can and cannot wear. Examples of these laws appeared throughout history, from the Greeks to the first European immigrants to North America to the **caste** system in India. English immigrants to the American colonies often transplanted sumptuary laws, though many fell out practice after **Bacon's Rebellion** in Virginia. Some scholars argue that the decline of sumptuary laws was a strategy by **elites** to prevent **lower-class** whites from allying themselves with **slaves** or **indentured servants**.

Before the **Industrial Revolution**, clothing was one of the most valuable possessions a person owned. For this reason, the poor probably never saw new clothes, and the wealthy willed them to deserving relatives upon their death. Even murder for, and theft of, a person's clothes was known, the perpetrator then pawning the clothing for cash value. Preindustrial society clothing indicated very precisely social status, gender, and often occupation and regional variation.

Although not common in locations where **social mobility** was possible, those who were able to move up in social rank usually adopted the clothing styles of those of higher social ranks. However, **nouveau riche** individuals were not completely accepted by their new peers because their refinement and tastes were still of their class of origin. The nouveau riche was only one of the groups scorned for their upward mobility. As with all mass-produced goods, the Industrial Revolution changed how fashion was perceived.

By the late nineteenth century, clothing was less expensive and more accessible to all classes. It is widely believed that this was the beginning of democratization of the fashion and clothing industry because all social classes were able to adopt similar styles at the same time. Many **upper-class** people were upset by the idea that the **lower class** could now dress in the same fashion as they. One example comes from **department store** workers. Mainly **working-class** women were employed in these new stores, but stores catered primarily to the **middle-class** and upper-class consumers, so clerks often dressed in high-class fashion, advertising the products they sold. Seen as "uppity," these female workers were looked down upon by the upper-class customers.

There are two main social theories as to why what is considered fashionable changes. In the first theory, **Georg Simmel** (1858–1918) believed that fashion change was caused by a process of imitation. Lower social classes attempted to emulate the upper classes as best they could on a lower income, though the upper classes always tried to be distinct in their dress and behavior. By the time the lower classes achieved a passable level of imitation, fashion among the upper classes had changed so that elites could distinguish themselves from the **masses**.

Pierre Bourdieu (1930–2002) took a similar, but more complex, approach to why fashion changes. Bourdieu believed lower classes were prevented from complete assimilation of the upper classes' fashions because of economic, educational, and socialization differences. In this regard, imitation had limits. He also believed different social classes used fashion on the basis of their individual cultural needs. For example, a farmer would not wear a high-priced suit to work the field. He would want practical, functional, and durable clothing, not only aesthetically pleasing clothes.

Clothing remains symbolically important in modern society, though it is now often an expression of individuality or membership in a subculture rather than a show of direct social status. These subcultures, however, often project or represent perceived views of social class. For example, an office worker who wears an expensive suit to work is perceived to be of the middle or upper class, whereas the same person in punk or hip-hop street fashion is perceived of a lower class. Changes in a person's daily fashion can also allow them to move between subcultures. For example, the office worker may wear a suit during the week and belong to the **white-collar** subculture. But on weekends, when relaxing with friends, he may opt to wear clothing related to the hip-hop or punk subculture, thus changing his association and perceived class with a change of his clothing.

Despite the ways in which fashion has become more malleable and varied, haute couture remains the preserve of the wealthy. Original clothing, shoes, and accessories from top designers such as Christian Dior, Versace, or Gucci cost many thousands of dollars, and even mass-produced lines are beyond the reach of the average consumer. Since the 1980s, fashion consciousness, the cult of supermodels, and advertising have enticed shoppers of modest means to don items bearing fashion-designer labels, but these are seldom the same items worn by wealthy individuals. The same impulses have given rise to markets for knock-offs, simulacra, and counterfeit apparel. This suggests that the fashion preferences of the upper classes have perhaps attained a hegemonic status akin to that of the nineteenth century.

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Identity in Clothing, 2000; David Muggleton, Inside Subculture: The Postmodern Meaning of Style, 2000.

FEDERALIST PARTY

See Founding Fathers.

FEDERALIST SOCIETY

See Think Tanks.

FEMINIZATION OF POVERTY

GERALD FRIEDMAN

Women constitute a growing share of poor people in the United States. In 2003 adult women were 40 percent more likely to be impoverished than were men. Among adults, women make up nearly 60 percent of the poor, with 14 million adult women living in **poverty**, compared with only 9 million men. Relatively high rates of poverty among women reflect the combination of women's low market earnings with a decline in the flow of funds from fathers to mothers and declining state support for **one-parent families**.

Poverty is rarer among adults able to work full-time or in husband-and-wife households where the husband is present. Poverty is heavily concentrated in households where a single adult is responsible for children without significant outside support. Single-parent households are more likely to be impoverished because the expenses of raising children all fall to a single wage earner and because single parents cannot devote as much time or energy to paid employment because of their responsibilities as caregivers. Poverty is especially common among women because labor-market discrimination lowers their wages; the poverty rate for unmarried women without children is 15 percent higher than for unmarried men without children. But poverty is also more common among women because they are three times more likely to be responsible for children than are men and because single mothers are more likely to be impoverished than single fathers. The presence of children raises the poverty rate among single men; among households with only an adult male resident, the poverty rate is over 13 percent, twice the poverty rate for men in two-parent households. Among single mothers, the combination of low wages for women and responsibilities for children doubles the poverty rate again to 28 percent. The chart on page 258 illustrates these categories.

The costs of raising children explain poverty among parents only if we expect custodial parents to bear the costs of child raising themselves. This is not how we approach poverty among the elderly. Among Americans over age sixty-five, government programs, notably **Social Security**, reduce the poverty rate by over

ADULT	POVERTY,	2003

	IV	Male		FEMALE	
	Number (000s)	Poverty Rate (%)	Number (000s)	POVERTY RATE (%)	
Adults	117,295	8.0	123,154	11.1	
Single Parents	4,711	13.5	14,129	28.0	
Married Couples	57,685	5.4	57,685	5.4	
Other Singles	54,899	10.2	51,340	12.8	
Non-singles	112,584	7.7	109,025	8.9	

80 percent. Among younger Americans and their parents, however, government programs do little to reduce poverty. In the 1990s government programs lowered the poverty rate among the non-elderly by less than 20 percent; the effect is even less since the Aid to Families with Dependent Children's program was repealed in 1995. Now, barely 25 percent of single mothers receive any welfare assistance. Some single parents receive child support from the absentee parent. But over 60 percent of single mothers and almost 80 percent of single fathers in poverty are not promised any support, and the proportion receiving any support at all is even lower. Almost 90 percent of single fathers living in poverty in 2003 received no financial support from the absentee mother, and almost 80 percent of single mothers in poverty received no support. When single parents do receive child support from the absentee parent, the amount is often very low. The average (mean) child support received annually is less than \$4,300 for all parents, and it is even lower for single parents living in poverty, where it is barely \$3,000 for all children, or less than \$2,000 per child. By contrast, the United States Census Office estimates that each additional child adds nearly \$3,300 to the minimum annual budget needed to remain out of poverty.

Poverty need not be inevitably associated with women having children. The time women spend in caregiving roles, including performing housework and shopping for the family, inevitably reduces their earnings by reducing the time they can give to paid labor. **Institutional discrimination** also lowers women's wages so that full-time employed white women earn only 76 cents for every dollar that men earn. (Black women average 66 cents and Latinas just 55 cents.) As a result, in 2002 the median income for a full-time male worker was \$40,668 per annum, compared with just \$30,724 for women; women with college degrees earned only as much as male high school dropouts. Effective programs against discrimination and support for parents are both necessary to end the feminization of poverty.

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FIFTH AVENUE

ROBERT E. WEIR

Fifth Avenue is a major boulevard in New York City. It begins at Washington Square Park in Greenwich Village, and its Manhattan course continues north into **Harlem**, where its name changes at 135th Street. Fifth Avenue runs roughly through the middle of Manhattan and officially separates the East Side from the West Side of the city. It is most famous, however, for its associations with the **upper class**. Although today many of its neighborhoods are quite diverse, the very evocation of Fifth Avenue continues to conjure images of **wealth**, high society, and elegance.

Much of the opulence associated with Fifth Avenue is a product of the **Gilded Age**. It was then that such tycoons as **J. P. Morgan** and Henry Clay Frick built homes on or near Fifth Avenue. The first **department store** appeared in 1869, and soon fashionable establishments proliferated. Famed architects such as Richard Morris Hunt and Stanford White built lavish homes for members of New York City's **elite**. The area has also been home to such luminaries as newspaper magnate Joseph Pulitzer and **socialites** Doris Duke and Barbara Hutton. Indeed, so many wealthy members of New York society have lived on or just off Fifth Avenue that a section of Midtown was dubbed the "Gold Coast" and "Millionaires' Row." Several novels by **Edith Wharton** use Fifth Avenue as a backdrop for upper-class life.

Fifth Avenue is also home to such New York landmarks as the Empire State Building, St. Patrick's Cathedral, **Rockefeller** Center, the Metropolitan Museum of Art, the Guggenheim Museum, and the New York Public Library. Also on or near Fifth Avenue are private **men's clubs** such as the Knickerbocker and the Metropolitan. (Some of these clubs now admit women.)

Fifth Avenue is perhaps best known for stores that deal in **luxury goods**. The most famous of these is Saks Fifth Avenue. Saks began life in 1902 as a men's clothing store based in Washington, D.C. It changed its name to Saks Fifth Avenue when, in 1924, it opened a New York City store on Fifth near Fiftieth Street. It also began dealing in high-quality, high-priced goods, and for many decades, Saks label goods were valued by upscale consumers before **designer goods** were fashionable in the rest of society. Today, Saks also deals in luxury labels such as Armani, Chanel, Gucci, Prada, and Ralph Lauren. Other luxury purveyors on Fifth Avenue include Bergdorf-Goodman, Brooks Brothers, Donna Karan, and Lord & Taylor. It is also home to famed jeweler Tiffany and Company, the toy store F.A.O. Schwartz, and Christie's Auction House.

Fifth Avenue's past reputation exceeds its contemporary reality. Fifth Avenue retailers have fallen prey to same competitive pressures that have beset those elsewhere, and chain stores such as Disney and Warner Brothers have opened outlets along the avenue. Even Saks has struggled, and in 2005 it discontinued its own label. Many wealthy residents have relocated to more private locations, and there are parts of Fifth Avenue that can be charitably described as run-down. It has, nonetheless, spawned many imitators. Among the fashionable shopping and upscale housing areas patterned after Fifth Avenue are the Magnificent Mile in Chicago, Newbury Street in Boston, Rodeo Drive in Beverly Hills, Sloane Street

in London, and Union Square in San Francisco. In New York itself, Madison Avenue and Park Avenue have long rivaled Fifth Avenue as destinations and domiciles for the wealthy.

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Jerry Patterson, Fifth Avenue: The Best Address, 1998; Kate Simon, Fifth Avenue: A Very Social History, 1978.

FILM

BILL BARRY

Movies are among the most popular forms of the popular arts. The **working class** has historically flocked to the cinema, but depictions of working-class life are rarer than workers' presence amid the audience.

Movies depicting workers often reflect larger social movements. In the 1930s, for example, there were some "socially conscious" movies, though these virtually disappeared by the 1980s and are rare today, casualties of the declining **labor movement** and the film industry's emphasis on commercial success. Movies require enormous capital investments, and hence, summer blockbusters, teen-oriented project, and films such as *Star Wars* (1977), with merchandising tie-ins and computergenerated special effects, are more heavily promoted than social dramas.

Movies that portray working-class life can be placed into two basic categories: "labor" movies, which show workers' collective struggles and their organizations, and "worker" movies, which depict workers' lives and situations, often focusing on individual efforts and upward social mobility. Both categories of movies, however, show workers trying to deal with the fundamental class question: how can workers make their lives better?

Labor movies such as Norma Rae (1979), Matewan (1987), Silkwood (1983), Bread and Roses (2000), and 10,000 Black Men Named George (2002) show workers organizing unions in a positive and even inspirational way. In contrast, movies such as FIST (1978), Blue Collar (1978), Act of Vengeance (1986), Hoffa (1992), and North Country (2004) show unions as corrupt or destructive social movements.

"Worker" movies usually feature ambitious working-class individuals who—far from trying collectively to change class relations—use their skills and ambitions to rise within, or even out of, the working class. Movies such as *Breaking Away* (1979), *Coal Miner's Daughter* (1980), *October Sky* (1999), and *Erin Brockovich* (2000) are typical movies of this type.

The silent movie era, which ran from 1909 to the late 1920s, provided a surprisingly large numbers of labor movies. Describing them as "Capital vs. Labor" films, historian Michael Shull estimates that between 1909 and 1919, roughly 150 films—about two per month—showed workers in confrontation with their employers. Many of these early silent movies—luckily preserved by the Library of Congress—depict typical workplaces: sewing shops, mines, factories, and so on. They also portray the conflicted consciousness of the working class trying to find its way: decent

employees are often incited by outside agitators while young working-class women—typified by Mary Pickford in *The Eternal Grind*—fall in love with the children of their employers. Even the famous director D.W. Griffith directed a "labor" movie, *Intolerance* (1916), his follow-up to his glorification of the **Ku Klux Klan** in *Birth of a Nation* (1915).

Historian Steven J. Ross points to the problem of financing and distributing early movies. Although the nascent "flickers" that appeared in the early 1900s required very little capital, the production and distribution of movies was capital-intensive; hence, unions often tried to raise money for working-class stories that could be shown in union halls. These efforts were not terribly successful, and the huge capital investments required for movies has had a marked negative impact on the depiction of workers in movies ever since.

The most famous silent movie depicting working-class life was, ironically, a movie that appeared after the silent era had ended. Released in 1934, Charlie Chaplin's *Modern Times* dramatized a worker driven literally crazy by work on an assembly line. In a vision of **deindustrialization** and the Depression, the worker becomes a service worker and then a migrant worker and even accidentally participates in a **communist** demonstration. Chaplin had showed the difficulties of working-class life for the previous twenty years, and his most famous figure—The Tramp—is a displaced and individualistic worker, a hobo without the support of the **Industrial Workers of the World** (IWW), a group that organized transients. His depiction was generally that of the worker as victim, resourceful but powerless, pitiful and comic at the same time.

In *City Lights*, Chaplin explored for the first time one aspect of social mobility in workers' culture: the sudden, happy, and accidental relationship between a worker and a very wealthy individual who literally makes dreams come true. More modern versions, such as *Working Girl* (1988), *Maid in Manhattan* (2002), and even *Pretty Woman* (1990), reprise the Cinderella (or "Cinderfella") myth of virtuous and ambitious workers who fortuitously find wealth and (presumably) happiness by having relationships above their class.

Although the 1930s could have provided a large number of movies reflecting the rise of industrial unionism, the domination of the movie industry by the Hollywood studios, which were obsessively anti-union, and by the Breen Office (the studios' censorship board, which feared "Reds" as much as sexual innuendo) limited the movies about workers and their struggles. Despite the horrendous economic dislocation associated with the **Great Depression**, Hollywood films were more likely to depict the lifestyles of the **upper class** than those of Americans struggling to survive. This emphasis on glamour, materialism, and wealth remains a staple of Hollywood movies.

Two famous and enduring movies, both directed by John Ford, did take up workers' lives. Although sociologists might argue over the exact class status of tenant farmers in *The Grapes of Wrath* (1940), there is no question that the Joad family experienced precipitous downward mobility because of the Depression. Ford's film is more optimistic than the John Steinbeck book on which the film is based, but it nonetheless shows the radicalization of Tom Joad and the difficulties of family survival during the Great Depression. Ford's *How Green Was My Valley* (1941) is a classic depiction of working-class social history and union organizing, though it

too focuses on upward **social mobility**, with a coal miner's daughter marrying the son of the mine owner.

A similar social ascension is depicted in *The Valley of Decision* (1945), in which the daughter of a disabled Irish steel-mill hand is hired as a domestic worker at the mill owner's house and then marries the son of the owner.

Two other movies from the 1930s show working-class life in a very different way. *Black Fury* (1935) depicts a bitter miners' **strike**, resolved when an individual miner threatens to blow up the mine, and *Black Legion* (1936) shows the hazards of upward mobility as an ambitious skilled tradesman, played by Humphrey Bogart, joins a hate group after being passed over for promotion in favor of a Polish coworker.

It could also be argued that many of the gangster movies of the 1920s and 1930s depicted class issues, given that their criminal antiheroes are invariably ambitious poor young men, often surrounded by examples of "legitimate" wealth acquired by less than ethical methods. Working-class women are likewise stereotyped in gangster films, often appearing as gun molls and "gold diggers."

The 1940s brought the depiction of workers as energetic and brave patriots in a long string of war movies, usually featuring the class polyglot of ethnic characters in the strict—and unchallenged—class system of the military. *From Here to Eternity* (1953) is perhaps the most skillful of these movies, though it omits the scene from James Jones's book in which the main character is in military prison with a former IWW organizer.

The release in 1954 of two very different movies about workers and their struggles highlights how "labor" movies differed from typical Hollywood fare. Not only was *Salt of the Earth* a movie about workers' struggles, but the workers themselves also helped create the film, and many of them played featured roles. Based on a strike at a zinc mine by a local of the Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers in Bayard, New Mexico, the movie was written, produced, and directed by blacklisted Hollywood talent. It shows a heroic workers' struggle, tangled in gender, ethnic, and family issues. Screenwriter Michael Wilson stayed with striking miners for three months in 1951 to gather material for the script and later returned to let the miners "edit" his draft in a unique collaborative experience. Financed in part by the union and using a crew of blacklisted technicians, director Herbert Biberman featured blacklisted actor Will Geer as an evil sheriff. The depictions of struggling workers in a movie provoked more controversy in real life—officers of the International Alliance of Theatrical and Stage Employees refused to allow unionized projectionists to show the movie.

An opposing view of workers and unions emerged in *On the Waterfront*, written and directed by Elia Kazan and Budd Schulberg, who had cooperated in the expansion of the Hollywood blacklist by "naming names." This movie depicts the long-shoreman's union—accurately—as a mobster-controlled organization and provides a starring role for a marginal worker and former boxer who also turns stool pigeon in an attempt to clean up the local. Consistent with other movies about the working class, *On the Waterfront* features an individual inspiring a collective struggle that is as much against the officers of a union as it is against the bosses (the struggle in this case being like the ones depicted in *FIST* or *Blue Collar*). Although not always flattering to either capital or labor, *On the Waterfront*'s gritty realism stands in stark contrast to the rags-to-riches fairy tales that were twentieth-century versions of the **Horatio Alger** myth.

The power of the blacklist and the shift of American culture away from labor movies also impacted gender roles. Sylvia Jarrico, the wife of blacklisted writer Paul Jarrico, noted that after the **Red Scare** of the early 1950s, strong women were considered "sinister" and "manipulative," and hence, one "labor" movie of the period, *The Pajama Game* (1957), featured perky Doris Day as a union officer bedecked in frilly clothes and high heels. In the film, she not only wins a strike but also—in a classic depiction of worker mobility—falls in love with the plant manager. *The Pajama Game* also embodies the ideology of the postwar "classless" society myth. In popular discourse, most Americans were becoming **middle class**. This (false) logic hastened the disappearance of **class struggle** in movies.

Several exceptions stand out; *Norma Rae* (1979) and *Matewan* (1987), *Bread and Roses* (2000), and 10,000 Black Men Named George (2002) each show union organizing in all its complexities, with the main organizer as the hero or heroine for the movie.

With the growth of the service economy, movies such as 9 to 5 (1980), Glengarry Glen Ross (1992), and Office Space (1999) were set in modern office workplaces. Among the most overtly ideological portrayals of workers as the century ended was the glorification of scabs during a strike in The Replacements (2000), but otherwise the working class and its issues have been virtually eliminated from popular movies in the United States. Blue-collar life, if it appears at all, is likely to appear as a mere background detail for film characters. Only a handful of independent directors—such as Barbara Kopple, Michael Moore, and John Sayles—routinely direct their lenses on the working class.

It should be said, however, that direct engagement of class issues has always been rare in mainstream films, with the possible exception of the pre-Hollywood silent era. Mogul Samuel Goldwyn (1882–1974) once allegedly remarked, "Pictures are for entertainment, messages should be delivered by Western Union." His pithy remark is a reminder that movies are a **capitalist** business enterprise. In this regard, it is hardly surprising that they reinforce the status quo far more often than they challenge it.

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FIRST FAMILIES OF VIRGINIA

LISA L. HEUVEL

Better known as "FFVs," the First Families of Virginia claim lineal descent from the most prominent colonial families living in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Virginia. Over the last century, these terms have attracted mixed responses as signifiers of heritage, aristocracy, and ancestor veneration. The FFVs claim connection to the governing Virginia **elite** who accumulated power beginning in the 1660s. The ruling dynasties of Virginia's colonial era were indirectly founded through the efforts of Sir William Berkeley, who encouraged both the younger sons of English gentry and the Royalist supporters of King Charles II of England to take advantage of Virginia's potential. By law, younger sons could not inherit their family estates, and Royalists found Oliver Cromwell's reign inhospitable after the English Civil War.

In the colony of Virginia, both groups found opportunities for lucrative political office and the accumulation of large land holdings, giving rise to a new Virginia aristocracy that maintained its status until after the **American Revolution**. The original promise of Virginia as a New World unlike the hierarchical society of England slowly faded over time as the colony's new leaders gradually evolved into its **ruling class**. Some of their eighteenth-century descendants, including Thomas Jefferson, Richard Henry Lee, and George Washington, led the fight for American independence from their ancestral country.

This genealogical background is only part of a growing interest in preserving Virginia history and historical sites prior to and after the 1907 anniversary celebrating three hundred years of white settlement in Virginia. In 1889 the Association for the Preservation of Virginia Antiquities was founded to protect Jamestown Island from decay, and it soon expanded efforts to other endangered historic sites. On May 13, 1912, Minnie Gaithright Cook (wife of Henry Lowell Cook) instituted the Order of First Families of Virginia, 1607–1624/5, to recognize descendants of the first settlers of Jamestown sent by the Virginia Company of London. Twelve years later, George Craghead Gregory founded the Jamestowne Society, whose membership is made up of descendants of stockholders in the Virginia Company and descendants of landholders and those who had domiciles on Jamestown Island prior to 1700.

The Order of First Families of Virginia, 1607–1624/5, was incorporated in Virginia on July 22, 1913. In 1915 Lyon G. Tyler, then president of the College of William and Mary, wrote an article for the William and Mary Quarterly Historical Magazine, which he edited. Tyler's article described the FFVs not as descendants of the earliest settlers, but as those of the socially and politically prominent families who first served in either the governor's office or colonial council while also maintaining prominence in local affairs.

Tyler listed fifty-seven family names, including Carter, Custis, Lee, and Randolph. Almost a century later, these names are still prominent in Virginia history and place names. However, the historical underpinnings of the FFVs as a formal organization and social classification should also be considered only part of the meaning of FFV in the twenty-first century. Although still considered socially significant by many prior to World War II, by the 1980s the First Families of Virginia were treated as more of an anachronism and less of an aristocracy by most observers. However, the terms FFV and First Families of Virginia continue to be popularly used in Virginia and in general usage as a generic connotation of social class.

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FLAT TAX

GINA L. KEEL

A flat tax is a tax with a single fixed percentage rate for all payers. The flat tax usually refers to an **income tax**, although other bases of taxation can be subject to a single rate as well. It is also called a proportional tax because under it, all taxpayers pay the same proportion of their taxable incomes. A flat tax is distinct from the current **progressive** income tax structure, which uses graduated rates ranging from 10 percent to 35 percent that increase along with income in six brackets.

Advocates of a flat tax on incomes argue that it would improve the simplicity, economic efficiency, and fairness of the system. Simplicity would be enhanced if all or most exemptions and deductions were eliminated; tax returns could be filed on a postcard-sized form. A more simplified system would make compliance easier and reduce the costs of administration, the size of the Internal Revenue Service, and the tax accounting and legal services associated with tax preparation and income sheltering. Proponents also argue that a flat tax would increase incentives to work more and would reduce incentives for legal tax avoidance and illegal tax evasion, thereby efficiently increasing tax yields to the public treasury. A flat income tax appeals to those who see it as more fair because the higher earning classes would pay the same proportion of their income in taxes rather than be penalized for their success by having to pay a higher rate. Also, taxpayers with relatively equal incomes would pay the same tax (horizontal equity) if those who have the means to shelter income, maximize deductions, and avoid taxes could no longer do so. A flat tax could also enhance fairness by ending tax provisions that favor unearned income, such as capital gains and dividends, over wage and salary income.

Opponents of the flat tax argue that progressive or graduated tax rates are fairer because the wealthier have a greater ability to pay taxes, and only higher rates on the wealthier class can approximate equal sacrifice among taxpayers (vertical equity). Beginning in the 1980s, new tax laws reduced rates and collapsed brackets, thereby making the income tax structure much flatter than previous decades. A historic shift to a single-rate flat income tax would immediately benefit those who pay the highest rates and the majority of income taxes and would shift a greater burden onto the middle and lower economic classes.

A flat tax does not require the elimination of exemptions and deductions, although it is usually characterized this way. A standard exemption for all taxpayers, to avoid taxing subsistence needs, would introduce some progressiveness without adding complexity. Many flat tax opponents are skeptical about whether deductions, particularly those benefiting the economically privileged and politically powerful, would be reintroduced into the system, given the nature of interest-group politics in tax policymaking.

Tax systems at the state and national level include flat taxes. For example, states and localities rely heavily on fixed-rate **sales taxes** that are regressive in their impacts, meaning people with lower incomes spend a larger portion of their income on that tax than do people with higher incomes. Federal **Social Security** payroll taxes (FICA) use flat rates on **wages** up to the maximum taxable amount (\$94,200 in 2006) and are therefore regressive in their taxing impact. The Social Security benefits system, however, is progressive because it pays higher benefits—relative to taxes paid in—to lower-income workers.

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FLOYD, CHARLES ("PRETTY BOY")

See James, Jesse.

FLYNN, ELIZABETH GURLEY (August 7, 1890–September 5, 1964)

RON BRILEY

Elizabeth Gurley Flynn was the "Rebel Girl" active in labor organization and leftist politics from the **Industrial Workers of the World** (IWW) to the **Communist Party** (CPUSA) in the first half of the twentieth century.

Flynn was born in Concord, New Hampshire, to **working-class** parents who were descended from a long line of Irish rebels. In 1900 the family moved to the Bronx, where the Flynn flat became a gathering place for **socialists** and Irish freedom fighters. The Flynn family encouraged their daughter's developing social conscience, and by age fifteen, she was speaking on street corners, advocating causes such as women's suffrage and government support for children in order to reduce working-class women's dependence on men. The next year, she was arrested for speaking without a permit, the first of many arrests, which garnered the young radical considerable media exposure.

In 1906 Flynn joined the IWW, and she was christened the Rebel Girl by Wobbly minstrel Joe Hill. As a "jawsmith," or traveling organizer for the union, Flynn participated in the memorable textile **strikes** at Lawrence, Massachusetts (1912), and Paterson, New Jersey (1913–1914). She was also actively involved with the IWW free speech struggles in Missoula, Montana (1908), and Spokane, Washington (1909–1910).

During the post–World War I **Red Scare**, Flynn labored to provide legal assistance to victims of government harassment. She was one of the founders of the

American Civil Liberties Union, an organization that expelled her in 1940 for her association with the CPUSA. Flynn was active in the defense of Italian anarchists Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti, who were accused of murder and robbery in Braintree, Massachusetts. Exhausted by her labors and a tragic love affair with the anarchist organizer Carlo Tresca, Flynn collapsed in 1928, spending the next decade in Portland, Oregon, recuperating at the home of Marie Equi, with whom she was rumored to have been romantically involved.

Returning to left-wing politics in 1938, Flynn joined the CPUSA, and in 1941 she was appointed to the party's national board. Flynn was never completely comfortable with her leadership role in the party because she considered herself a figurehead who had not risen through the ranks. Nor was she considered a major party theoretician. Flynn, however, was a popular speaker who wrote a regular column for the party newspaper *The Daily Worker*. She also continued to organize among **immigrants**, students, and civil rights activists on behalf of the party.

Flynn and other leaders of the Communist Party were indicted in 1951 under the Smith Act, which made it illegal to belong to a political organization advocating the overthrow of the American government. Flynn spoke eloquently in her own defense, but she was sentenced to a three-year prison term in the Alderson federal penitentiary in West Virginia. While incarcerated, Flynn wrote her autobiography *I Speak My Own Piece* (1955; reprinted as *The Rebel Girl* in 1975).



Elizabeth Gurley Flynn (Mrs. J.A. Jones). Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

Following release from prison in 1957, Flynn published a prison memoir, *The Alderson Story* (1963), and continued her involvement with the CPUSA, becoming the first female national chair of the party in 1961. She traveled extensively on the party's behalf and died in the Soviet Union, where she was visiting and writing. She was given an elaborate state funeral in the Soviet Union, but Flynn had requested that her ashes be scattered in the Chicago cemetery containing the remains of the men hanged for the 1886 Haymarket bombing. Although never a feminist, Flynn

carried out important duties in the male-dominated IWW and Communist Party. She remained dedicated to the cause of labor reform throughout her life, always the Rebel Girl.

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FOOD BANK

ROBERT E. WEIR

A food bank is a private or semiprivate charitable agency that delivers direct aid in the form of food to needy individuals. Unlike breadlines and **soup kitchens**, this food is usually unprepared; recipients take it home and consume it individually rather than dining in communal style with others seeking relief from hunger. Food banks—sometimes called "food pantries"—usually stockpile food as a hedge against peak demand, but many operate with minimal resources and volunteer help.

Food banks, soup kitchens, shelters, and other like charities are the products of evolving constructions of **poverty** in America. In Colonial time and during the early years of the republic, seeking relief from poverty was viewed as an individual's responsibility, and hence, institutions such as almshouses and workhouses usually linked assistance with manual labor. During the **Gilded Age**, the idea of **self-reliance** was pushed even further. Members of the **middle** and **upper classes** often viewed poverty as an individual moral failing and decried that well-meaning relief efforts only encouraged irresponsible behavior. American society did not possess well-articulated notions about "social" problems until century's end.

Despite this, some Americans have long felt compelled to assist those in need. This was particularly true of those belonging to religious organizations, with Catholics, Lutherans, Quakers, and the Salvation Army developing charitable wings in advance of the rest of society. New York City Jews formed B'nai Brith in 1843, one of whose tasks was to deliver aid to the poor. The influence of the late nineteenth-century **Social Gospel** movement also helped many see poverty as a social rather than individual concern.

Food banks are organized on the community level and normally deliver assistance on a regional basis. Many belong to nationwide umbrella organizations such as America's Second Harvest, which solicits corporate funding and in-kind donations. It also receives food from the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). The USDA has long donated surplus food to communities to be delivered through private or quasi-governmental agencies. In 2001 Second Harvest delivered more than two billion pounds of food to needy Americans.

Many food banks also receive some support from state and local governments. Despite broader connections, most food banks rely heavily on donations of canned goods, nonperishable items, and funding from private individuals and community

businesses. In 2005 more than 25 million Americans sought sustenance from local food banks. According to a Second Harvest study of those receiving help, more than 9 million were children. Nearly 40 percent of those seeking aid came from among the **working poor**, those families in which at least one member held a full-time job. The elderly constitute another large group served by food banks. The group also reports that many families seeking food already receive food stamps and that 30 percent of them routinely forego medical care in order to pay for food.

The number of people seeking help from food banks has steadily climbed since the 1980s, suggesting that the **wealth** gap between rich and poor is indeed widening and that changes in the American economy have impacted the poor and the **working class** negatively. The **minimum wage**, for instance, has remained frozen at \$5.15 since 1997. With traditional **blue-collar** jobs disappearing as a result of **deindustrialization**, a displaced worker forced to take a minimum wage job would earn under \$10,800 per annum, which would place a family of four considerably below the **poverty line**.

Structural economics form the basis for one of the very few critiques of food banks. Volunteers and charities are almost universally admired, but some analysts argue that private charities simply ameliorate the symptoms rather than the root causes of poverty. They also point out that private charities cannot possibly marshal the necessary resources to deal with extraordinary events such as the **Great Depression** or Hurricane **Katrina**. Indeed, many food banks and shelters exhaust their resources in the course of a normal winter. From this perspective, the work of nonprofit agencies such as food banks is admirable, but only concerted governmental action can hope to shrink poverty in America.

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FOREIGN POLICY ESTABLISHMENT

ROBERT E. WEIR

The term "foreign policy establishment" refers to those charged with envisioning, planning, and implementing American diplomatic, trade, and military objectives vis-à-vis the rest of the world. It refers not only to visible leaders—many of whom are political appointees—but also to career personnel, bureaucrats, and line staff.

The term is fraught with ambiguity and is frequently applied cavalierly to score political points. Foreign policy is complex and sprawling in its formulation and structure. It involves not just the Department of State, but also agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Council, and the Commerce Department. Policy is often hammered out in various **think tanks**—such as the liberal-leaning Brookings Institute or the conservative Heritage Foundation—that, on paper, have no formal relationship to official channels but that, because of the

nature of **social networks**, are highly connected to those in power. Policy is also influenced by private and public trade commissions, corporate **lobbyists**, and groups few Americans know of, including the ostensibly nonpartisan Council on Foreign Relations, which, since 1921, has exerted tremendous influence on policy through task forces, published reports, and access to politicians.

Members of the political right such as **Pat Buchanan** and Rush Limbaugh often denounce the "liberal" foreign policy establishment whenever a cherished global objective is delayed or employment of the military abroad is debated. Likewise, those of the political left such as **Noam Chomsky** invoke a "conservative" foreign policy establishment to decry what they deem needlessly provocative actions toward foreign nationals, neglect toward developing nations, or forceful behavior they interpret as imperialist in nature.

Political rhetoric notwithstanding, American foreign policy objectives enjoyed bipartisan support for most of the twentieth century and beyond. Many political scientists argue that this has been especially the case since World War II. Both Republicans and Democrats, conservatives and liberals, for example, overwhelmingly supported the **Cold War** objective of containing international **communism**, even to the point of offering at least tacit support for **Red Scare** domestic policies. Major military interventions, including the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the invasion of Grenada, both Gulf wars, and unilateral actions designed to curtail terrorism likewise drew support from erstwhile political rivals. Some analysts claim there is no essential difference between the political parties on matters relating to trade, diplomacy, and military intervention.

What is unarguably clear is that diplomacy has historically been and continues to be a career disproportionately staffed by members of the **upper class** and their allies from the upper **middle class**. In the nineteenth century, diplomacy and international trade were viewed as a "gentlemen's" professions and were dominated by graduates from **Ivy League** colleges and the offspring of wealthy families. As the federal government expanded in the twentieth century, however, more jobs fell under the aegis of civil service laws, thereby forcing **elites** to rely on nongovernmental agencies, think tanks, and less official channels to exert influence. The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), for example, consisted almost entirely of Ivy Leaguers and representatives of **Wall Street**. The efforts of the CFR, like those of the foreign service and intelligence agencies, were largely hidden from public scrutiny. Outside of the academic and political worlds, few Americans considered how foreign policy was made until after World War II.

It was, ironically, conservatives who first called public attention to foreign policy after World War II. Republicans and Southern Democrats invoked national security fears, partly as a strategy to attack the **New Deal** and partly because many were genuinely convinced of an internal communist threat. High-profile spy cases, such as that involving State Department official Alger Hiss, cast light on the foreign policy establishment, as did the demagogic speeches of politicians such as Richard Nixon and Joseph McCarthy. The Soviet Union's development of an atomic bomb and a revolution in China that installed a communist government in 1949 also fueled fears that American foreign policy was flawed and its planners inept. Senator McCarthy was especially adroit in attacking the upper-class background of policy-makers.

Despite attacks from the right in the 1950s and attacks by anti-Vietnam protestors on the left in the 1960s, the foreign policy establishment never purged privilege from its ranks. Even President Richard Nixon, who disliked Ivy Leaguers, chose a Harvard man, Henry Kissinger, as his Secretary of State. Kissinger did much to reestablish the anonymity with which agencies such as the State Department and the CIA did their work, while presidents Carter and Reagan worked to rebuild the credibility of the foreign policy establishment following the Vietnam War.

Reagan also deeply politicized the foreign policy establishment. Top posts in government agencies have long been held by political appointees, but many key Reagan posts went to those with such conservative views that liberals cried foul. Since Reagan, more attention has been given to the ideological views of top officials, and sometimes the confirmation process for candidates is bruising. Senator Jesse Helms blocked the 1997 nomination of ex-Massachusetts governor William Weld to become Ambassador to Mexico because Helms deemed Weld too liberal and did not trust him to guard American trade interests. Likewise, liberals (unsuccessfully) battled the 2005 nomination of John Bolton to become U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations because they saw him as too ideologically rigid to negotiate with other nations. Liberals also accused President George W. Bush of imposing an ultra-right ideological litmus test for foreign policy (and other) appointees.

Political rancor obscures the fact that the foreign policy establishment represents class interests as much as (if not more than) ideological agendas. What happens beyond the top ranks remains hidden, but the connection between policy-setters like the CFR and the business community is quite clear. Critics as diverse as **G. William Domhoff Jr.** and **Ralph Nader** charge that the foreign policy establishment is an integral part of the **power elite** and is beholden to the **military-industrial complex**. They assert that foreign policy and trade objectives are designed to serve the interests of the business community, not average Americans. This contention is bolstered by the inordinate number of Cabinet, ambassadorial, and government posts held by leaders of the business community. Scholars of the **corporate class** also note these interconnections. More recent work centers on what journalist Ari Berman dubs "the strategic class," a group of foreign policy experts, think tank theorists, and political strategists who thoroughly dominate the behavior of both Republicans and Democrats.

It could be argued that the term "foreign policy establishment" is too imprecise to be meaningful. Whatever position one takes on its usefulness in analytical discourse, the phrase serves to draw attention to the role of social class and **power** in the making and implementation of foreign policy. Even when policymaking is hidden from plain view, the decisions rendered impact millions of Americans.

Suggested Reading

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FORTUNE MAGAZINE

KEVIN S. REILLY

Fortune magazine is one of the oldest and most influential general business periodicals. It began its life as a lavish, folio-sized monthly publication in 1930. It was the second magazine developed by Henry R. Luce (1898–1967) and Briton Hadden (1898–1930), the owners and founders of Time Inc. Fortune initially addressed "tycoons" and wealthy families but quickly expanded its audience to include important business professionals of all kinds. Ironically, it thrived during the Depression and in the widespread anti-business sentiment of the 1930s and grew to become extremely influential in industry and public policy circles with a circulation of 250,000 by 1945.

Luce created *Fortune* to address the complacency he discerned among American businessmen, whom he faulted for failure to "constitute themselves as a class." Luce encouraged business executives to enter public life—akin to the national aristocracies of Europe—and to be educated leaders with character. *Fortune* was marketed as an intellectual vehicle for visionary leaders in corporate management. The editors were charged with developing business literature that would be a cultural expression worthy of the physical and economic importance of large capitalist enterprise. Talented young writers artfully crafted articles, which were illustrated with color prints and beautiful photographs by Margaret Bourke-White and other well-known modernist photographers. The publishers successfully defined the magazine's role through marketing and design to ensure that it became the bible of the aspiring executive.

The journalistic innovation for which *Fortune* is best known is its "corporation story." These descriptive narratives of companies combined thorough empirical research with colorful analysis of personalities and events within the corporation and with magnificently reproduced photographs of factories and individuals. The formally dressed managers common in *Fortune*'s visual corporate stories were described in terms that framed them as modern male heroes: learned and emotionally reserved, but of rugged constitution and decisive action. This framed the corporate elite in a more flattering light than previous popular images of businessmen. *Fortune* was a consistent voice of corporate modernity. The habits of older rich families were compared unfavorably to the energy of the new corporate professionals. The filthy and brutal labors of mining and meat processing were presented in photographs and words as sanitized narratives of flawless production. Yet men who embraced reform were treated to more flattering coverage than conservatives, and the magazine advocated business-government cooperation consistently from 1930s through the 1950s.

During the 1930s, *Fortune* drew attention for important stories and research innovations. *Fortune* achieved a major franchise with the hiring of Elmo Roper to conduct an opinion poll, the "Fortune Survey," to rival the popular Gallup Poll. After 1932, the magazine also produced significant coverage of foreign affairs and policy. International articles focused on rapid transformations in German, Russian, and Italian industry and society, and its September 1936 issue presciently reported on Japan's military and economic ascendance before other journalists took notice.

Richard Edes Harrison, *Fortune*'s cartographic specialist, produced pioneering maps to accompany this reportage.

The editors were also willing to produce provocative articles critical of American businessmen or politicians. Eric Hodgins's 1934 piece on the international arms industry, "Arms and the Men," was widely quoted and helped spark a Senate investigation into the munitions industry, but such pieces earned condemnation as well as praise. A 1936 series on U.S. Steel contained pointed criticism of the company's executives and their business practices, especially their hostility to the **labor movement**. Although never enamored of most national union leaders, *Fortune* was sympathetic to organized labor within industry and wrote encouragingly of the Roosevelt administration's attempts to curb corporate repression of labor. As a result, some business readers came to consider *Fortune* politically hostile to American capitalism.

Some of *Fortune*'s surprisingly liberal positions on business and politics can be attributed to the makeup of its early staff. Most of the men who did the writing and the women who did the research were young graduates of elite colleges and were deeply engaged in the cultural and political fervor of New York in the 1930s and 1940s. Luce's concern about presenting the best ideas and the best writing led him to hire, among others, Pulitzer Prize–winning poet Archibald MacLeish; James Agee, author of the Depression classic *Let Us Now Praise Famous Men*; and critic and essayist Dwight Mcdonald, who was active in **Trotskyite** politics. During the war, *Fortune* also recruited such well-known men as economist **John Kenneth Galbraith** and writer Alfred Kazin.

The magazine's political vision, however, was far from radical. Its editorial offices operated increasingly like a **think tank** intent on establishing a middle ground between laissez-faire **capitalism** and state **socialism**. Luce and some editors had lost faith in the **New Deal** by the late thirties and cast *Fortune*'s support to liberal Republican businessman Wendell Willkie in the 1940 presidential election. During World War II, the magazine called for the state support of corporate growth and advocated policies that limited competition, kept labor peace, and minimized economic controls. These policies were intended to maximize the production of war material, but they also articulated Luce's vision of large corporations as the key institutions in American society. If government constrained the profiteers and overly aggressive reactionaries, *Fortune* suggested, large corporations and their leaders would produce an era of peace and abundance.

During the **Cold War**, the magazine took a more conservative, explicitly procapitalist turn in editorial direction. In some sense, *Fortune* was more invested in politics during the Dwight Eisenhower administration than it had been previously. *Fortune*'s publisher and Time Inc. vice president C. D. Jackson took leave of the company to write speeches for Eisenhower and ultimately served as a presidential advisor on inter-American affairs and psychological warfare. *Fortune* remained critical of business developments that seemed dangerous to individual liberty, however. In the early 1950s, editor William H. Whyte Jr. produced articles that would become the core of his attack on bureaucratic life, *The Organization Man*. The magazine also created a genre called "the failure story," which recounted businesses gone awry to give variety to the magazine's litany of success stories. Mostly, large business organizations were celebrated as the primary movers in the American economy. The magazine resisted anti-monopoly prosecution of firms, arguing that the benevolent,

rational administration of large companies was not simply one of the great achievements of modernity, but that the material salvation of mankind depended on them. Corporations were the monuments of what *Fortune*, in direct reference to Soviet **Marxism**, called "The Permanent Revolution" of American democratic capitalism.

Fortune's coverage of the troubled American economy and society of the late 1960s and 1970s turned even more libertarian and conservative. The magazine reversed its long-standing acceptance of the idea that business firms had a social accountability beyond their own quest for profit. Government entitlement programs, industry regulations, and federal deficits were all identified as culprits in the national crisis.

Fortune's biggest concern in these later years, however, was its own revenues, as it faced stiff competition from rival business publications. In 1972 its original folio size was reduced because of cost and because young readers found it unwieldy. Fortune also changed from monthly to biweekly publication in 1978. Although forced to compete with flashy, though less substantive, business reporting in other periodicals, Fortune remains a publication interested in showcasing big ideas about business and political economy. In addition to regular reporting, its staff continues to publish significant essays and books on these subjects.

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FOUNDATIONS

LAURA TUENNERMAN-KAPLAN

Foundations are nongovernmental, nonprofit organizations, incorporated under state or federal law, which have their own funds and programs managed by trustees or directors. In general, they have been established to support—mostly through grant-making activities—educational, social, charitable, religious, or other activities that benefit society. The status of modern foundations is defined in the Internal Revenue Service code section 501(c)(3), which provides for four basic categories of foundations:

- 1. *Independent foundations* are privately funded organizations that generally give grants to others. These account for a very large percentage of foundations overall.
- 2. *Company-sponsored foundations* are legally the same as independent foundations but are commonly the charitable arm of for-profit organizations.
- 3. *Operating foundations* primarily use their funding to do in-house research or service and are often large and well-known.
- 4. *Community foundations* allow philanthropists to set up tax shelters and bequests that earmark local charities.

Historically, the idea of foundations dates back to early seventeenth-century English legal traditions of charitable trusts. In the United States, however, it was not until the turn of the twentieth century that foundations took on a prominent place in society. At that time, the richest of the rich—families who had amassed fortunes so vast that they could no longer be controlled by any single individual—followed the lead of industrialist and philanthropist **Andrew Carnegie** and began to create a new type of organization, the charitable foundation, which allowed for the careful disbursement of funds through a large, centralized organization.

Shortly thereafter, community foundations arose out of **Progressive Era** concerns about the need for coordinated raising and disbursement of funds. The first such organization was founded in Cleveland, Ohio, in 1914. These foundations, unlike many private foundations, pooled together the wealth of many individual donors in a single community.

Foundations—whether private or community-based—were a departure from earlier forms of **elite** giving in several ways. First of all, the very act of giving signaled the declining appeal of **Social Darwinism**. Second, foundations marked a shift from personal giving, which was often tinged with paternalism, toward organizing giving along more businesslike lines. Although in many cases personal preferences of the benefactors or their family members continued to direct giving, for the most part the actual disbursement of funds was handled not by the benefactors themselves, but rather by paid, professional administrations who were expected to make informed decisions based on the latest scientific and social scientific data available; this process created a perceived aura of professionalism that often increased the perceived credibility of the projects supported by foundations.

Foundations have not flourished without opposition from those who question their legality and altruism. In 1910, for example, an attempt to incorporate the **Rockefeller** Foundation was defeated in Congress. At a time when the Sherman **Antitrust** Act was being used to dismantle Rockefeller's Standard Oil, opponents of the foundation concept suggested that foundations were simply another way for individuals to create trusts in order to perpetuate large fortunes. In 1936 Eduard C. Lindeman, a faculty member at the New York School of Social Work, published *Wealth and Culture*, a study of 100 foundations during the 1920s; his findings suggested that the reasons for the creation of foundations were mostly economic rather than **philanthropic**, and he condemned their trustees for being arrogant members of the elite class. Lindeman questioned whether the wealthy should be responsible for investigating and shaping public policy and funding welfare efforts focused on the **lower classes**.

Because of their nonprofit or tax-exempt status, foundations have also been carefully investigated by Congress. The Tax Reform Act of 1968, for example, placed some restrictions on foundation activities, demanding more regulation and public accountability.

Today, there are thousands of foundations in the United States influencing society on every level. Many are small and focused on supporting a specific educational or cultural institution, for example, whereas others are large and multipurpose. More than 500 of the largest U.S. foundations—including household names such as the Ford Foundation, the Bill and Melinda **Gates** Foundation, and the Russell Sage Foundation—have assets of over 100 million dollars and impact public policy and social services globally.

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FOUNDING FATHERS

ROBERT E. WEIR

The term "Founding Fathers" refers to the leaders who orchestrated the **American Revolution** and went on to write the U.S. Constitution. Within the United States, some members of this group—such as George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, John **Adams**, James Madison, and Benjamin Franklin—are held in quasi-religious awe. The Founding Fathers are often stereotypically cited to evoke ideals of patriotism, **democracy**, and equality.

The Founding Fathers had acute political talent, but most were highly distrustful of democracy and the **masses**. Historians have noted that the very idea of revolution emerged from disputes within the Colonial **upper class**. Newly enriched merchants, distillers, shipbuilders, and lawyers within the North often occupied second-class **status** vis-à-vis older **elites** with ties to Britain. The same was true of newer members of the gentry class and the **slave** importers in the South. These were the individuals who organized protests against various British taxes imposed after 1763. In essence, many of the Founding Fathers were frustrated elites.

They were able to exploit rising **lower-class** anger in the Colonies. **Howard Zinn** notes that there had been untold numbers of riots, and at least eighteen attempts to overthrow Colonial governments, in the hundred years between **Bacon's Rebellion** and the American Revolution. New elites sought to mobilize the lower classes as the American Revolution drew nigh. Revolutionary leaders were overwhelmingly of the upper class, but the Continental Army and various militia groups drew from the ranks of small farmers, landless agrarians, urban manual laborers, and humble craftsmen.

New elites and the lower orders made common cause to overthrow the British, but the Founding Fathers felt little sentimental attachment to their humbler citizens, and the latter grew restive when the American Revolution failed to alter their economic lot. Independence was formalized by the 1783 Treaty of Paris, and the United States first operated under a loose confederation that granted few powers to the central government. Wars with **Native Americans**, problems securing credit, and tumultuous popular uprisings like **Shays's Rebellion** led many of the Founding Fathers to lobby for a more powerful central government, a task realized by the writing of the U.S. Constitution in 1787.

The U.S. Constitution is a remarkable document, but it was also the product of a specific class of men with strong ideas of who should govern society and whose interests best serve the nation. The historian Charles Beard noted that the vast majority of Constitutional signers were lawyers, wealthy property owners, and



George Washington presiding at the signing of the Constitution in Philadelphia on September 17, 1787. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

businessmen. Moreover, many of them held interest-bearing government bonds that would be jeopardized if the nation's credit could not be secured. A host of other social and economic interests were represented in the Constitutional assembly, including slaveholders seeking to ensure continuation of **slavery**, bankers hoping to curtail inflation, craft and manufacturing interests seeking tariff protection, and landowners with holdings in areas threatened by Native Americans. What was of little interest to them was democracy; nowhere is it mentioned in the Constitution.

Many of the Founding Fathers were well grounded in Enlightenment political theories. According to prevailing notions, democracy was akin to **anarchism** and was often interchanged with the term "mobocracy." Some Founders, including John Adams, Fisher Ames, Alexander Hamilton, Gouverneur Morris, James Otis, and Benjamin Rush, were openly contemptuous of the very idea of common people wielding political power. Hamilton originally proposed that the president—whom he envisioned as a sort of Platonic philosopher-king—and the U.S. Senate be lifetime appointees. Even Thomas Jefferson privately concurred with John Adams that humankind should be ruled by its "**natural aristocracy**."

Jefferson's view was emblematic of those in his social class. The Founders passionately defended **meritocracy** and equal opportunity, but they did not equate these with democracy. They believed that individuals should rise according to their ability, but nearly all believed that ability was circumscribed by breeding and class. These views were somewhat tempered by benign paternalism. Few of the Founders saw any contradiction between their own interests and the health of the



Alexander Hamilton. Reproduction of painting by John Trumbull. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

nation. If **power** and **wealth** were concentrated in the hands of worthy men, they reasoned, those individuals would act as custodians of the national interest (this line of reasoning endures in forms such as the concept of *noblesse oblige* and the **trickle-down theory** of economics). Their views of meritocracy also served to check the influence of mere wealth. Many of the Founders were just as distrustful of unfettered wealth as they were of the unwashed masses.

Many of the pre-revolution social dynamics surfaced anew as ratification debates for the Constitution took place. Some lesser elites felt excluded from what they saw as a power clique, and it was not difficult to mobilize the disenchanted masses, who, rightly, doubted the document's usefulness to them. The final document was a compromise and included the Bill of Rights, the first ten amendments to the Constitution that secured personal liberties and set other parameters that later became the basis for popular democracy.

Nonetheless, the nation brought forth by the Founding Fathers was a republic, not a

pure democracy. There are many aspects of the Constitution that enshrined the Founders' fears of too much public power. Women, Native Americans, and slaves were excluded from full citizenship privileges, and many states imposed property restrictions on white male voters until after the War of 1812. Most significantly, the Constitution created a *representative* government in which elected and appointed officials make decisions. In theory, popular will is expressed through elected officials; in practice, the masses can only express approval or disapproval on Election Day. Moreover, some officials, such as members of the judiciary and (until 1913) U.S. senators, have been appointed rather than elected. The Constitution's famed checks and balances also serve to blunt popular opinion, and the Electoral College can override (and has done so on three occasions) the popular vote in presidential elections.

The Founding Fathers did much to create the enduring American political system. They also wittingly contributed to the equally enduring link between political power and social class.

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FRATERNALISM

ROBERT E. WEIR

Fraternalism refers to the practice of joining voluntary associations whose purposes are fellowship, mutual aid, and (sometimes) public charity. It is a broad term that is applied to semi-secretive societies such as the Freemasons, to civic staples such as the Boy Scouts, and even to hate groups such as the **Ku Klux Klan**. Membership to fraternal (and sororal) orders is generally controlled by existing members, who demand that potential joiners conform to a set of criteria determined by the group. This has tended to segregate American fraternal life by race, ethnicity, gender, religion, and social class.

Modern fraternalism is a remnant of medieval Europe, where upper classes joined various chivalric orders and religious lay societies, and skilled craftsmen, merchants, and manufacturers belonged to guilds. The latter are generally viewed as the forerunners of mutual aid societies and journeymen's associations, which, in turn, were the roots of trade unions. In fact, throughout much of the nineteenth century, the line between unions and fraternal orders was unclear, and groups such as the **Knights of Labor**, the Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners, and the American Railway Union retained strong elements of fraternalism.

Most fraternal orders use special rituals designed to build group identity and solidarity. When Europeans settled North America, they brought ritual fraternal practices with them, especially Freemasonry. Freemasons trace their mythical origins to stone workers laboring on King Solomon's temple, but modern practices derive largely from England, where, in 1717, a Grand Lodge was formed to serve as the focal point for all Masons. In 1738 the Catholic Church denounced Freemasonry, and prejudice against it remains strong among Catholic clerics.

From the start, Freemasonry tended to attract more prosperous and **status**-conscious individuals. Many key figures of the **American Revolution**, including George Washington and Benjamin Franklin, were Freemasons. Despite the reputations of such men, Freemasonry and the Order of Cincinnati, a society of Revolutionary War officers and their sons, were viewed as aristocratic and engendered great opposition. Washington served as first president of the Order of Cincinnati from its founding in 1783 until his death in 1799, by which time many of the order's chapters had collapsed in the wake of public outcry against them.

Many Americans feared Freemasonry because of its admission practices and secrecy. Some whites resented the formation of a black Masonic order by Prince Hall in 1775, but a more serious incident occurred in 1826 when a New Yorker, William Morgan, disappeared. Rumor held that Freemasons had murdered him for revealing their ritual. The timing of Morgan's disappearance coincided with a rising of popular republican sentiments associated with **Jacksonian democracy**. Anti-Masonic political parties formed after 1828, some of which exerted political influence on the state and local levels up to the outbreak of the Civil War.

The latter half of the nineteenth century was a takeoff period for fraternal orders in the United States, with the Freemasons claiming over six million members by 1900. Masonry, however, never lost its association with the **upper** and upper **middle classes**, and it was deemed elitist and aristocratic and was considered a secret power cabal to control the **working class**.

Immigrants often formed ethnic fraternal orders to ease their entry into American society, and many societies had distinctive ethnic compositions. The Ancient Order of Hibernians, for example, was popular among the Irish, as were various Turnverein athletic groups with Germans and B'nai Brith among Jews. Most manual laborers preferred fraternal orders dominated by workers, the Independent Order of Odd Fellows proving particularly attractive. By 1900 there were at least 600 separate fraternal organizations in the United States; even the Catholic Church relented, forming the Knights of Columbus in 1882 and Opus Dei in 1928. As noted, even labor organizations infused fraternal practices into assembly life, and as late as the 1930s, organizers for the **Congress of Industrial Organizations** (CIO) reported surges in recruitment when they convinced fraternal order officers to join the CIO.

In the twentieth century, there was less overt ethnic separation and class conflict in American associational life, and most orders relaxed exclusionary rules, though custom continued to segregate groups. Fraternal orders have historically been male preserves, with women often relegated to membership in auxiliaries. Similarly, people of color and ethnic minorities have not been offered a fraternal hand, either because of overt discrimination or because of custom. Those organizations with the highest percentages of working-class participation, such as the Veterans of Foreign Wars, Moose lodges, and the Elks, have generally been more diverse than groups originally founded by elites or the middle class.

American fraternal groups reached their apex around 1910, when as many as one-third of all adult males over the age of nineteen belonged to some sort of nonreligious voluntary association. Membership spiked again in the 1930s, declined in the 1950s, revived in the early 1960s, and remained vital into the 1970s. Since then, membership and the founding of new associations have eroded precipitously. Some commentators trace this to several reasons, one of which is an overall decline in civil life associated with white flight to the suburbs, a more sedentary lifestyle, and the diversions of popular culture. A second reason involves a shift in politics that places more power and emphasis on lobby and special-interest groups; whereas Americans once sought a greater community, they now seek access to resources for more specialized identity groups. Still another reason may be that fraternal orders never entirely shed their associations with social class. Rotary and chambers of commerce, for example, are largely seen as organizations for the upper crust, whereas the American Legion and 4-H are viewed as friendly to "common" people. Fraternal groups remain an important part of American society, but their immediate future is uncertain.

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FRATERNITIES AND SORORITIES

NEDA MAGHBOULEH

Fraternities and sororities are social organizations formed by college students and established around shared interests, backgrounds, and lifestyles. Generally, sororities are exclusive to women and fraternities exclusive to men, though a small number of fraternities are coed. A uniquely American invention, these groups are known collectively as the "Greek system" because their names traditionally consist of two or three letters from the Greek alphabet.

The modern fraternity or sorority consists of members ("brothers" and "sisters") who typically live in a house located on or near a college campus. Not merely a matter of convenience, group-living situations actively facilitate bonds and familial attachments that survive long after graduation. Members of a fraternity or sorority are collectively dubbed "the house," and they proudly display the Greek letters representing their name near the front door. An unwavering allegiance to one's house and a defense of its most clandestine secrets is crucial for members of Greek society. Similarly, the lifelong influence a house has on the lives of its individual members presents a fascinating example of the power of **social networks** throughout U.S. history.

The first modern "social" fraternity in the United States is widely acknowledged to be Kappa Alpha, formed in 1825 at Union College in Schenectady, New York. Though fraternity-like organizations were founded earlier at the College of William and Mary and Princeton University, Union's Kappa Alpha was the first to thrive as a purely social fellowship rather than an academic one. Many fraternities and sororities have developed into national organizations with "chapters" at individual schools; all adhere to a strict code of laws and rituals binding the chapters together. A major advantage to national membership is the access individual chapters have to resources such as capital (for house loans or renovations) or nationwide "gratis" housing at fellow chapters. Non-national fraternities are considered "local": they do not pay dues to a national office and have the freedom to create their own constitution and bylaws. They do not, however, benefit from the umbrella of resources and legal representation national fraternities and sororities provide.

After the Civil War wreaked financial havoc at many colleges, fraternities and sororities evolved to accommodate an assortment of student needs. Family-style meals, housekeeping, recreation, friendship, and supervision (in the form of "house mothers") were extended to Greeks, usually in palatial neighborhood homes. After World War II, the relative democratization of higher education, facilitated by the GI Bill and other expansions of the public university system, irrevocably altered the social makeup of the national student body. By the postwar era, the exclusive nature of Greek life was ever more important in differentiating campus "blue-bloods" from the nouveau riche and other neophytes now sitting beside them in the classroom. Prohibitive house dues and a subjective membership-vetting system (the "rush") ensured that only candidates they deemed appropriate found their way into the fraternity or sorority house. The system also provided a convenient way to ensure the development of deepening social, romantic, and eventually professional relationships

between members of the privileged class. Thus, as greater numbers of young Americans pursued undergraduate degrees, fraternities and sororities flourished.

By the 1960s and 1970s, membership had dropped off significantly—the secret rituals, formal dances, and general frivolity of Greek life were simply unfashionable on the average campus. To justify their existence during the social justice movements of the era, fraternities and sororities especially emphasized their service-oriented and philanthropic works. Similarly, "rush" was now encouraged among formerly excluded members of the student body. Most notably, particular students of color were singled out to join exclusively "white" houses, and some men-only fraternities actively recruited female classmates to join.

The traditional idea of a fraternity or sorority as a bastion of privilege is perhaps better defined in our times by the "finals clubs" of Harvard, "eating clubs" of Princeton, and "secret societies" of Yale. It remains customary in many schools for some fraternal and sororal groups to cater to **upper-class** students or for existing groups to have secret subgroups that do so, such as the Skull and Bones group at Yale, which several members of the **Bush** family have joined. Although membership in a general fraternity or sorority continues to confer privilege, social contacts, and distinction to some, many Americans think of them as incubators for unhealthy, disruptive behavior in the college community. The Greek system is nowadays notorious for encouraging binge drinking among underage students, facilitating coercive hazing rituals, and encouraging a culture of violence and chauvinism. College administrators and representatives from national organizations face pressure to disband chapters after serious incidents that bring lawsuits or unwanted publicity to the school or house. Some campuses have gone so far as to outlaw the existence of all fraternities and sororities.

Perhaps because media coverage of these incidents has become so commonplace, nearly all of the contemporary academic work on Greek life is concerned with the salacious and dangerous social practices just mentioned. The noticeable lack of inquiry into more nuanced issues, such as class status, might reflect real changes in the composition of fraternities and sororities. Yet to truly understand the impact fraternities and sororities have on American culture, we must turn our attention to the experiences and life outcomes of members and non-members.

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FREE TRADE

ROBERT E. WEIR

Free trade is an economic term that refers to the movement of goods, services, capital, and labor between cooperating nations without encumbering tariffs, taxes, and trade barriers. Supporters of free trade tout the savings to consumers and the

promotion of international stability associated with free trade, but detractors charge that free trade enriches investors and stockholders at the expense of the working class.

Free trade was a central tenant of early **capitalism**, especially among theorists such as Adam Smith and David Ricardo. Smith believed that all economic decisions would be left to the laws of supply and demand, unencumbered by government interference. He and other advocates argued that free trade promoted efficiency, ensured quality, and created opportunities for investors and workers alike; in theory, one's skill could be bargained across borders like any other commodity. Early capitalist theories conflicted with mercantilist ideals, which attached more importance to national **wealth** than to the wealth of private individuals or companies.

By the mid-nineteenth century, free trade was attacked by isolationists and communists, but was also controversial among capitalists themselves. As the Industrial Revolution began to unfold, nascent American manufacturers sought government tariff protection to protect their enterprises from better-established, deep-pocketed competitors. They were aided to some degree by the labor movement and by farmers. Most unions argued that free trade fostered ruinous conditions that destabilized the economy and endangered jobs, and farmers feared that imported agricultural commodities would further suppress farm prices. Groups such as the Knights of Labor paid lobbyists to persuade politicians to support protectionist legislation. Even the working-class icon Henry George found his speeches on free trade questioned by disbelieving workers. George argued that free trade would allow an already peripatetic workforce to bargain for higher wages, but most workers sided with small-scale employers in the belief that free trade destroyed rather than promoted competition.

As industry matured in the United States, large corporations and their stock-holders grew enamored of free trade and argued for laissez-faire government policy in economics matters that would allow the free movement of capital, raw materials, services, and finished goods. By the end of the nineteenth century, the boundaries of the free trade debate were mostly in place; large corporations, finance capitalists, commodity traders, consumer groups, and investors tended to favor it, whereas labor unions, small businesses, and independent farmers opposed it.

Since the 1870s, the federal government has tended toward free trade, but its impact was blunted by America's rise to global industrial dominance. Even unions such as the American Federation of Labor did not forcefully push their opposition to free trade because it did not seem a major threat. Moreover, periodic crises such as World War I, the Great Depression, and World War II led the government to enact economic controls that mediated against pure free-trade principles. Free trade became a controversial issue again after World War II. In 1957 six western European nations established the European Economic Community (EEC), or "Common Market," effectively making much of the continent a vast free-trade zone. By the late 1960s America was beginning to lose global market shares to other nations, especially Germany, Japan, and South Korea. Suddenly, foreign imports enjoyed competitive price advantages over American products; by the 1980s vast sectors of manufacturing—including electronics, rubber, steel, and consumer

appliances—experienced **deindustrialization**. Expansion of the EEC—which reached twenty-five member states in 2005—has put further pressure on American business.

Free trade was also bolstered by rising conservative political tides. For **Ronald Reagan**'s administration, free trade was an article of faith. Many of Reagan's advisors were enamored of **Chicago School** economic theorists, especially Milton Friedman, who saw free trade as a better way to stimulate the economy than government spending programs advocated by economists such as **John Maynard Keynes**. Stagflation during the 1970s gave Reagan license to advance many conservative economic ideas, of which free trade was one. Reagan also envisioned a western hemisphere equivalent to the EEC. This came to pass in 1994, when the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) removed trade barriers between the United States, Canada, and Mexico to create a common market just slightly smaller than the EEC. Discussions have ensued to expand NAFTA to other nations, especially Chile and Peru.

Free trade is currently a centerpiece of the economic phenomenon known as **globalization**, and the level of debate surrounding its virtues and demerits rage with intensity not seen since the nineteenth century. Free trade is not entirely "free" on a global basis. Trade agreements are made between nations, and these often contain numerous exceptions to pure free trade. Loopholes in NAFTA have led to an export of jobs out of the United States and Canada to Mexico, where wages are much lower and environmental standards looser, a set of circumstances that seems to confirm the fears of nineteenth-century critics. Moreover, the government is often reluctant to impose economic sanctions on nations whose imports are unfairly propped up by government subsidies or protectionist policies that keep out American imports. Groups such as the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) charge that both Japan and China have flooded the U.S. market with unfairly traded goods. Still other critics point to rising foreign debt and trade deficits as indications that free trade idealism has overwhelmed sound economic planning. There can be little doubt that free trade has hurt the working class; entire categories of blue-collar labor have essentially disappeared. Some reformers hold that the concept of free trade should be supplanted by that of "fair trade," which would interject ethics into trade decisions.

Defenders of free trade argue that consumers benefit from low-cost imports and that many of the jobs lost in the United States were undesirable ones. They also argue that international security is enhanced by free trade, with economic self-interest trumping political differences within interconnected economic networks. They also bank on hopes that lost jobs in one economic sector will be replaced by new opportunities in others, an optimism not shared by analysts such as **Jeremy Rifkin**.

The immediate future appears to trend in favor of expanded free trade. Conservative **think tanks** such as the American Enterprise Institute, the Cato Institute, and the Heritage Foundation currently have more political clout than liberal free-trade opponents such as the AFL-CIO, the Friends of the Earth, and the Green Party. There have, however, been worldwide protests against the World Trade Organization, and American free traders ironically face some of

their stiffest opposition from ultra-conservatives such as **Pat Buchanan** and H. Ross Perot.

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FRIEDMAN, MILTON

See Chicago School of Economics.

FUNCTIONAL ELITE THEORY

ROBERT E. WEIR

Functional elite theory is an analytical frame in sociology, economics, and political science whose adherents argue that social inequality is not entirely negative, especially in modern **capitalist** societies. From this perspective, elites possess the skills, training, morality, and access to material **wealth** that are necessary for society to operate smoothly. In fact, according to this theory, they are better able to serve mass society and create opportunities for the **lower classes** than any other group. Functional elite theorists often see themselves as occupying a middle position between supporters of absolute power and those who advocate what they see as romantic grassroots **democracy**.

Ideas akin to modern functional elite theory have an ancient pedigree and show up in such classic works as Plato's *The Republic*, but most modern studies derive from the articulation of sociology as a discipline in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Emile Durkheim (1858–1917) laid the foundations for functionalism, a school that argues that society is held together through a generalized consensus over norms and values. He tended to view society as akin to a living organism in which all parts are necessary for the body, or society, to function well. By extension, this implied that each part should play its assigned role. Elites are seen as imbuing society with the very character that prevents it from degenerating into either autocracy or **anarchy**.

Functionalism was challenged by **conflict theorists**, but it held powerful sway and influenced **stratification** studies even of scholars who were not strict functionalists, such as **W. Lloyd Warner** and **Robert** and **Helen Lynd**. Other scholars have openly embraced the idea that elites are necessary for society to function well, among them **E. Digby Baltzell**, **Talcott Parsons**, Robert Michels, and Suzanne Keller. All four were skeptical of the ability of the masses to direct themselves, operate the economy efficiently, or operate without strong leadership. Both Baltzell and Keller even posited the **upper classes** with superior ability and intellect. Parsons often uncritically

accepted the notion that rewards were associated with performance and that American society was characterized by open **social mobility**. A less aggressive defense of elite **power** is embedded in the **Davis-Moore** theory, which takes the view that society is too complex to operate without some sort of leadership.

Not surprisingly, functional elite theory has come under fire. In addition to Marxists and other conflict theorists, critical elite theorists such as C. Wright Mills and G. William Domhoff have called into question the assumed benevolence of elites, and pluralist scholars have attacked the alleged superiority of elites vis-à-vis the masses. Responses to functional elite theory often break down along class and political lines. Those who hold power, prestige, and wealth tend to support the notion that they are entitled to do so because of their hard work, social stewardship, and knowledge, whereas those of lower socioeconomic status charge that elites benefit from social networks and other advantages that are inherently unfair and undemocratic. Conservatives tend to support the assumption that elites are natural, necessary, productive, and positive, ideas that also have currency with some neo-liberals. Most liberals and members of the political left, however, support one or more of the criticisms of elites and see them as dysfunctional.

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FUNDAMENTALISM

MATTHEW PEHL

Fundamentalism—generally described as a reaction against such perceived aspects of "modernity" as scientific naturalism, moral relativism, and social pluralism—has played a part in nearly every major world religion since the end of the nineteenth century. In the United States, however, Protestant Christian fundamentalism has produced the most dramatic social and cultural consequences by far. Rejecting the biblical historical-criticism developed in German universities of the 1870s and 1880s, American fundamentalists insisted on the literal inerrancy of the Bible, the divinity of Jesus, and the reality of Jesus' resurrection and physical return to earth. Today, Christian fundamentalists are vocal and influential forces in debates over politics, law, education, cultural "values," and even foreign policy.

Like many Americans, fundamentalists have generally ignored America's class structure. Some have argued that, because of the ease with which people could achieve **social mobility**, class was essentially a European—not American—problem. Many others have insisted that because individual conversion to Christ ranked as the most important human endeavor, a focus on class was irrelevant and even irreligious. However, a closer look at early fundamentalists reveals that fundamentalism, from both an economic and a cultural perspective, reflected many historic and ideological aspects of the American **middle class**. The story of Dwight Lyman

Moody (1837–1899) offers an important example of this connection. After attaining success in the business world, Moody became an active promoter of Sunday schools and the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA); as many historians have observed, middle-class Protestants such as Moody hoped that the YMCA might "Christianize" the culture of **working-class** youths in tough urban areas. By the mid-1870s Moody had become a talented evangelizer who had mastered the large-scale organizational challenges common to any successful **Gilded Age** manager. In 1889 he founded Moody's Chicago Bible Institute, which became one of the most important fundamentalist institutions and which operated in a manner similar to many major American businesses of the era.

Moody's most famous successor on the evangelizing circuit, the former professional baseball player Billy Sunday, continued to stress middle-class cultural values in the early twentieth century. Indeed, Sunday represents an especially noticeable split between working-class and middle-class cultures. When Sunday joined the Chicago White Stockings in 1883, baseball was still very much a working-class amusement. In 1886 Sunday converted; a few years later, Sunday left baseball to preach, and by 1910 he was a bona fide religious celebrity. Sunday's hostility toward urban degeneracy, **immigration**, and—especially—alcohol illustrates in many ways the rejection of his one-time life with hard-drinking ball players popular among working-class urban dwellers both native and immigrant. Likewise, Sunday's solution to social ills—simple conversion to Christ—obviously differed from such working-class approaches to social problems as unionization and political activism.

In the shadow of World War I and the Russian Revolution of 1917, fundamentalists across the country found a common enemy in Bolshevism. Of course, many Americans succumbed to the **Red Scare** of 1919, but for fundamentalists, the rise of **communism** in Russia came as prophetic proof of the rapid social degeneration that they had been forecasting for decades. The success of a political philosophy rooted in materialism, the "scientific" management of society, and strident atheism served to affirm the apocalyptic worldview that became ever more central to fundamentalist theology. According to the fundamentalist pre-millennial vision, biblical prophecy foretold the inevitable, war-ravaged decline of mankind before Christ would return to institute a thousand-year reign on earth.

The flourishing of the **Cold War**, the founding of the state of Israel, and the looming threat of nuclear war in the 1950s only served to revivify and heighten these beliefs. Fundamentalists' ferocious rejection of **socialism** and communism led them to an equally vigorous embrace of democracy and capitalism (while distrusting such elements of modern democracies as centralized governments and social **pluralism**). Consequently, many hallmarks of working-class life—from trade unions to political parties to racy music and movies—became anathema to fundamentalist leaders. Politically astute fundamentalists such as Billy Graham and Gerald L.K. Smith fused American triumphalism, Cold War paranoia, and Christian theology into a potent and appealing alternative to radical (or even liberal) politics. By the 1980s a new ethos had emerged among fundamentalists. Although they had previously distanced themselves from secular society, the ascension of **Ronald Reagan** to the presidency propelled fundamentalists into coordinated political campaigns on behalf of public programs that reflected their theological understanding of history. In the years since Reagan's election, this trend among fundamentalists

has only strengthened, as can be witnessed by their close relationship with the administration of President George W. **Bush**. Modern fundamentalists are distributed across social classes and are most prominent in the South, the Midwest, Colorado, and California.

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G

GALBRAITH, JOHN KENNETH (October 15, 1908–April 29, 2006)

PETER C. HOLLORAN

John Kenneth Galbraith was an American economist and public official. He was born the son of Scottish immigrants on an Ontario farm on October 15, 1908, and graduated from the Ontario Agricultural College in 1931. After earning a doctorate in economics at the University of California, Berkeley, in 1934, Galbraith worked briefly in Washington, D.C., for the New Deal Agricultural Adjustment Administration. He then taught economics at Harvard University (1934-39) and Princeton University (1939-40) before returning to U. S. government service as the price czar for the Office of Price Administration. As an editor at Fortune magazine (1943-48), he introduced the work of the British economist John Maynard Keynes to the American public. During World War II, Galbraith served in the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey (1945) and in the postwar U.S. administrations in Germany and Japan. Returning to teaching at Harvard (1949-75), he became one of the most popular, influential, and iconoclastic economists in the nation and the prolific author of thirty-three books and more than 1,100 articles. As a result some academic colleagues dismissed him as America's foremost economist for non-economists, or the economist as social critic.

Galbraith also served in the administrations of President Harry Truman and President Lyndon B. Johnson, and his friend President John F. **Kennedy** named him ambassador to India (1961–63). But he is best remembered as an iconoclastic economist with an astringent wit who adhered to Keynesian theory long after mainstream economists moved on. Despite his nonconformity, Galbraith served as president of the American Economic Association (1972) and received honorary degrees from Harvard University, Oxford University, the University of Paris, the University of Toronto, and over forty other universities around the world. He was a founder of the Americans for Democratic Action in 1947 and



John Kenneth Galbraith. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

was an advisor in the Adlai Stevenson, John F. Kennedy, Eugene McCarthy, and George McGovern presidential campaigns. The tall, lanky Galbraith also was an early and prominent opponent of the Vietnam War. Some found Galbraith to be arrogant and difficult, but most admired him for candid views that were unsullied by the fashion of the moment.

Known for his persuasive and lucid writing style, Galbraith's book *American Capitalism:* The Concept of Countervailing Power (1952) criticized the free market economy and predicted that the U.S. economy would succeed with equal management by big business, big labor, and big government. His best-selling book *The Affluent Society* (1958) argued that the United States was rich in goods but poor in social services. He foresaw major govern-

ment investment in the infrastructure, especially highways and schools, and introduced the phrase "conventional wisdom." In his most important book, *The New Industrial State* (1967), he critiqued the corporate state and argued that few American industries were truly competitive. These controversial ideas, persuasive to his fellow Democratic Party liberals, outraged Republicans and both liberal and conservative economists. His third major opus, *Economics and the Public Purpose* (1973), criticized the unrecognized role of women in ever-increasing consumption and the new consumer market economy.

Other Galbraith publications that have earned an international audience include The Great Crash (1955), The Nature of Mass Poverty (1979), three novels—The McLandress Dimension (1963), The Triumph (1968), and A Tenured Professor (1990)—and popular articles in The New York Review of Books, The New Yorker, and The New York Times Magazine. In 1977 Galbraith hosted a popular BBC television series, The Age of Uncertainty. Rejecting the mathematical models that many of his peers preferred, Galbraith was an old-fashioned political economist, public intellectual, and aphorist who challenged economic theories that overlook the reality of working-class and middle-class life. Galbraith retired from Harvard in 1975 and was a frequent commentator on public issues in the media. President Bill Clinton awarded him the Medal of Freedom in 2000, and Galbraith remained an active commentator on economic and political issues until his death.

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GAMBLING

SAMANTHA MAZIARZ

Gambling, or "gaming," is the act of taking a risk or placing a bet on an uncertain outcome in the hopes of winning an advantage. It usually involves a game of chance played for stakes, such as a wager of money, property, or control. Gambling comes in many forms, both legal and illegal, the definitions of which are mandated on a state-by-state basis. Most states allow gambling in the forms of bingo, lottery, **sports** betting at licensed outlets like an OTB (off-track betting) facility, and **casino** gambling. Also variable by state are illegal forms of gambling, which include private card and dice games, unlicensed sports gambling, Internet gambling, underage gambling, and animal fighting.

The most common types of lottery are instant scratch-off games, daily numbers games (in which a player chooses a set of numbers and hopes they will match numbers drawn by the lottery commission), lotto (in which a player picks a set of non-repeating numbers, usually for a large jackpot), and instant terminal games like keno and quick draw (in which gamblers pick numbers or draws that are held every few minutes on an electronic screen, usually at bars and convenience stores).

Because lottery games are officially sanctioned, government enjoys a gambling monopoly. Early American colonists conducted lotteries in order to fund occasional public improvement projects, such as road paving. In the 1800s, however, lotteries were outlawed because of government corruption. Lottery gambling persisted illegally; in fact, many contemporary lotteries are closely patterned after "numbers" running games in black communities, wherein an agent would collect bets on three and four digit numbers from players in the community and would then pay out money to those people whose numbers matched whatever numbers "hit." In **Harlem** in the 1920s, for instance, whatever numbers matched the last three numbers of that day's stock exchange were a "hit" and paid out. Governments in the 1960s revived lotteries, though with a less clear idea of public benefit than in colonial society.

In 1999 a study commissioned by Congress found that state-sanctioned lotteries prey upon the poor and the uneducated and create compulsive gamblers. States spend considerable amounts of money to advertise games and promote the idea that gambling is an easy way to make money and that the odds are beatable. In fact, New York State was reprimanded for its "Dollar and a Dream" campaign and was forced to alter its slogan so as not to convey unrealistic ideas about the ease of winning large jackpots. (By standard odds, a lottery player is seven times more likely to be struck by lightning than to hit a lottery jackpot.)

Government studies also found that state lotteries carefully create the image that they are beneficial to communities and governments. They often tout themselves as means to generate revenue for **education**, when in actuality lottery states actually spend less of their budgets on education than non-lottery states do.

Casinos have historically operated by circumventing state laws. Riverboat casinos—giant boats equipped with slot machines and table games—board passengers in places in which gambling is illegal, and transport them to bodies of water

outside a state's jurisdiction so that the gambling may take place unhindered. **Native American** casinos operate in a similar fashion, in that Indian reservations are considered sovereign land, and therefore the casinos erected on them cannot be regulated by the U.S. government.

Many state governments currently work with Indian casinos, striking profitable deals to place casinos outside of reservations in and around struggling cities. This has raised great controversy between those who believe that casinos are a great source of government revenue and a boon to local economies, and those who believe that they exploit the poor and foster compulsive gambling and crime. Until recently, only Nevada had state-regulated casinos, but the lure of potential revenue for state and local government has led other states to legalize casino gambling.

Studies have shown that most gambling disproportionately targets low-income and minority citizens by preying on their hope for a better life and portraying games of chance as a viable way of attaining a higher quality of living. For example, Ohio's lottery constructed the timing of their marketing efforts to correspond to poor citizens' receipt of **welfare**, **social security**, and payroll checks.

To offset social problems created by legalized gambling, several groups have pushed for education about its dangers. Governments have responded by creating support groups, information packets, and toll-free help hotlines for compulsive gamblers, and many governments have made it illegal to gamble using funds from credit cards.

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GANGS

ROBERT E. WEIR

In the popular imagination a gang is a loosely structured group organized around antisocial, often illegal, activities. Social scientists, however, associate gangs with subcultures, and hence, any organized group with distinctive values and identity that exists in opposition to the hegemonic mainstream could be considered a gang. Normally gangs are marked by a recognizable hierarchy, are organized territorially, and adopt a style and set of practices that dominant groups find distasteful (or define as illegal). Their organized nature differentiates them from mobs. Likewise, an open defiance of social norms defines a gang, as opposed to a cult or so-called alternative lifestyles. Gangs exist throughout America but are generally more of an urban than a rural phenomenon.

The popular view of gangs as collections of marginal and lawless individuals is not new; the association of street gangs with urban violence dates to colonial times, and laws were drafted to regulate the movements and activities of groups viewed as dangerous. Urban society contained numerous gangs on the eve of the **American Revolution**, and one could apply gang definitions to groups that precipitated acts now deemed patriotic, such as protests against the Stamp Act or the Boston Tea Party. For the most part, however, gangs are defined negatively. For example, bands of Irish youths roaming New York's notorious Five Points region in the 1830s were deemed "gangs," even though their levels of violence were often surpassed by those associated with the **labor movement** and by paramilitary groups hired by employers to break **strikes**.

Unlawful and antisocial gangs often proliferate in areas marked by **poverty** and increase in number during periods of social stress. During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries some criminal gangs were ethnic in makeup, appealing especially to unassimilated **immigrants** and their offspring. By the early twentieth century cities such as New York, Chicago, and Philadelphia were home to scores of gangs. The corruption of many urban political machines also proved breeding grounds for gangs. Present-day gangs such as the Jamaican Posse, the International Posse, the Sureños, and the Norteños are heirs to Euro-American gangs, such the Dead Rabbits and the Bowery Boys. Gangs also grow in response to the gap between law and social desire; the drug-running gangs of contemporary society parallel those providing illegal alcohol during Prohibition.

Frederic Thrasher's 1927 work *The Gang* is often viewed as the first important sociological treatise on gangs, the rise of which he linked to the stresses of social change. In 1931 E. Franklin Frazier issued the first of his pioneering works that connected **racism**, poverty, **ghettos**, and social exclusion with the rise of gangs, particularly among African American youth. Despite earlier research and the long history of gang activity in America, however, much of how gangs are viewed today is an offshoot of concerns over juvenile delinquency, which emerged in the 1950s. During the **Cold War** and the economic boom of the 1950s juvenile delinquency was viewed (naïvely) as one of the few social problems that America had not yet conquered.

Edwin Sutherland's (1893–1950) earlier work on differential association was resurrected to explain how growing up in high-crime neighborhoods, where they had extensive contact with norm-breakers, increased the likelihood that youths would become delinquent. This was a key component of the work of Albert Cohen (1955), who argued that gang behavior and delinquency were a response to a perceived lack of legitimate opportunity. Walter Miller (1959) also linked delinquency to lower-class and working-class lifestyles that emerged in areas in which middleclass respectability was absent or frustrated. In such a world street gangs and peer groups are often more important than family or educational ties. Richard Cloward followed some of the same lines of reasoning and used Robert K. Merton's work on anomie (norm breakdown) in studies with Lloyd Ohlin in which they argued that social strain often prompted lower-class youths to bypass approved paths to legitimate social goals. The desire for money, for example, is a basic American value, though one might obtain it illegally. The conspicuous consumption patterns of contemporary gangs shows the American dream remains vital and challenges the idea that gangs are inherently antisocial.

Perceptions of modern gang activity are often filtered through the notoriety heaped upon violent urban groups such as the Crips, the Bloods, the Latin Kings, People Nation, the Black Gangster Disciples, and the Vice-Lords. The violence, robbery, prostitution rings, and drug sales of these groups—and motorcycle gangs such as the Hell's Angels and The Bandidos—have induced middle-class fear and have contributed to white flight to **suburbia**, though studies reveal that gang members are more likely to victimize each other or those within their territory than the general public.

Nonetheless, gangs are a legitimate social concern. At least 120,000 gang members are active in greater Los Angeles, and another 100,000 are in **prison**, where gangs also proliferate. Small cities such as Omaha, Nebraska, have joined larger ones such as Baltimore and Boston in seeing increases in homicide rates spurred by gang violence. Tom Hayden estimates that 25,000 youths have been killed in gang violence since 1980. Scholars continue to seek explanations for rising gang affiliation and the crime associated with it, but in many respects, the economic, social strain, social marginalization, and denied opportunity theories of earlier scholars remain valid. Most studies indicate that gang activity is associated with youth, with just 14 percent of gang members in a 1998 survey being over the age of twenty-four. Studies also reveal that the common reasons for joining gangs include a sense of belonging, the desire for money, the need for protection in high-crime neighborhoods, thrill seeking, peer pressure, and a need for structure in areas with high rates of family and institutional stress. A 2000 study by the National Youth Gang Survey revealed that 50 percent of gang members come from the lower class and another 35 percent from the working class. Given that just 3 percent of gang members come from the upper middle class, one finds high correlation between lower **socioeconomic status** and the likelihood of gang membership.

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GATED COMMUNITIES

ROBERT E. WEIR

Gated communities are restricted-access neighborhoods located in American cities and their suburbs. They are usually guarded, and one must have permission to enter them. Gated communities range in size from modest condominium complexes to sprawling independent cities of over 20,000. Many feature amenities such as golf courses, swimming pools, supervised playgrounds, and community centers. All blur the line between public and private space; frequently the

relationship between them and the greater municipality of which they are a part is ambiguous.

Most gated enclaves cater to the **middle class** and upper middle class and have gained in popularity because of public safety concerns over crime and urban blight. Critics charge they are forms of self-segregation that are also racial and ethnic in nature, though it should be noted that some gated communities are retirement homes with age covenants rather than racial or ethnic ones. That said, whites of Anglo heritage dominate most gated communities, and custom often segregates by religion as well.

Gated communities are not a new idea, nor are they exclusive to any one area of the country. The Los Angeles neighborhoods of Rolling Hills (1935) and Bradbury (1938) are often cited as the first gated communities in the United States in that they were the first to feature around-the-clock surveillance and restricted entry. In practice, however, suburbs have often functioned as de facto gated communities, and many towns and cities have spawned exclusive neighborhoods to which the general public had limited or no access, such as the Eastern Point region of Gloucester, Massachusetts, or the celebrity homes of Hollywood, California.

There can be little doubt, however, that increased perceptions (not always accurate) of urban crime and racial upheaval in the 1960s led to an expansion of the gated community concept. Many who work in urban areas turned to gated communities rather than move to more distant suburbs. Some constitute veritable compounds, sylvan enclaves whose walls shield them from urban problems. There are usually homeowner associations that develop community rules and set fees that go into escrow accounts to maintain the private roads, parks, and facilities inside the compounds. They do, however, routinely rely upon the outside city for such services as water, sewage, and police and fire protection. The private/public relationship can and has led to disputes over issues such as tax rates and building regulations.

Defenders of gated communities cite that they stem the tide of suburban flight, add to the tax base, and provide services that taxpayers must subsidize elsewhere. They also argue that it is facile to pretend that urban areas are doing a good job of providing security and services; hence gated communities are logical and necessary.

Critics see these enclaves as pretentious at best, if not outright attempts to shirk civic responsibility, justify racism, and perpetuate inequality. Some view them in near apocalyptic terms; gated communities have been compared with the South African townships (in reverse) during the apartheid era and have been the subject of movie and book parodies. Social critics also see them as disturbing reminders of the atomization of American society, while some social planning detractors have labeled them forms of "urban pathology." In recent years, living in a gated community has become a **status symbol**, and they have emerged even in towns like Wailea, Maui, Hawaii, which have never had serious crime problems.

Whatever view one takes, few would argue that gated communities are socially diverse. Nor would they argue that they are insignificant. About 10 percent of all new homes are being built in gated communities; in urban areas they make up 30 percent of all new homes. Currently the West (11 percent) and South (6.8 percent) have higher concentrations of gated communities, but the concept is expanding.

Examples of gated communities include Superstition Mountain near Phoenix; Canyon Lake, California; Colonial Heritage in Williamsburg, Virginia; and numerous enclaves in and around West Palm Beach, Florida.

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GATES, BILL (October 28, 1955–)

MELISSA A. T. KOTULSKI

William Henry "Bill" Gates III is among the word's most successful entrepreneurs and **philanthropists** in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. His public persona is that of multibillionaire who contributes greatly to the local and global community and of a businessman who uses varied and shrewd tactics to capitalize on multiple domains. This computer mogul and human rights advocate is thought by many to be the wealthiest man in the world.

Bill Gates's biography is not evocative of the **Horatio Alger** myth because he was born into a wealthy Seattle family. His father, William H. Gates Sr. was a prominent lawyer who was married to Mary Maxwell Gates. His maternal grandfather, the vice-president of a national bank, set up a **trust fund** for his grandson purported to be at \$1 million. Young Gates excelled in mathematics in high school and entered Harvard University in 1973, where he joined the computer science program. At Harvard he met several future business partners, including Paul Allen and Steve Ballmer. Gates dropped out of Harvard after two years, when he and Allen developed a way for the computer language BASIC to communicate with other programs. He married Melinda French of Dallas, Texas, on January 1, 1994, and the couple has three children.

Gates amassed his fortune by creating Microsoft Corporation at a time when microprocessors and home computers were not yet widespread. Microsoft's DOS operating system was integrated into the IBM PCs (personal computers) that launched the early computer revolution. The appearance of IBM-compatible PCs was a boon to Gates, who amassed a fortune in licensing fees for DOS. Gates plowed much of his money into software development and product improvements. With the introduction of Windows 3.0 in 1990, Microsoft's dominance of the software world was solidified. In fact, Microsoft was so big that other firms could not compete; some detractors claimed it hampered innovation and made it difficult for superior products to gain a foothold. Others claim that Microsoft simply pirated ideas from others, which was the basis of a 1988 copyright infringement lawsuit filed by Apple Computer. (Apple lost that case in 1992 and the appeal in 1994.)

Microsoft has also been prosecuted for violation of antitrust laws. In 1998, in the *United States v. Microsoft* case, the company was charged with deliberately

setting up a **monopoly** in the computer software industry. Since Gates was the **CEO** and owned the bulk of the company's patents, he bore the brunt of the deposition examination. In court Gates gave evasive, but evocative, testimony. Microsoft was ordered to relax some of its hold on the computer software market, especially "bundling" practices that made it hard to disable Microsoft programs or to run non-Microsoft programs from a Windows platform. In spite of court-ordered rollbacks in 1998, Windows continues to be the largest computer operating system in the world. Gates served as CEO of the Microsoft until 2000, at which time he shifted to philanthropic pursuits.

While still working with Microsoft, Gates and his wife established the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation in 2000. The foundation's grants provide funds for education, disease prevention and eradication, and other causes. Gates gave over \$28.4 billion to charities between 2000 and 2006, including \$900 million dollars to support the eradication of tuberculosis in developing nations plagued by the disease. A \$31 billion pledge by investor Warren Buffett made the Gates Foundation by far the nation's largest philanthropic foundation.

Gates has made the cover of *Time Magazine* on eight occasions, including 2005, when he shared Person of the Year honors with his wife Melinda and Bono, lead singer of the rock band U2, for their humanitarian efforts. Some Gates critics are skeptical of his altruism and note that the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation was established on the heels of the Microsoft antitrust decision. Some suggest that Gates uses the Foundation to reallocate funds and side-step treaties such as the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Criticism of his motives aside, Gates's immense fortune contributes to the development of computer **literacy**, technology in education, and the eradication of disease.

As of early 2006, Gates's net worth was estimated at \$50 billion dollars. The Gates family has many of the perquisites one would associate with the **nouveau riche**. Gates owns a \$113 million earth-sheltered house in Medina, Washington, with an annual property tax of the same amount as his original trust fund, about \$1 million. His also owns the *Codex Leicester*, a collection of writings by Leonardo da Vinci, which Gates bought for \$30.8 million in 1994, and a rare Gutenberg Bible. For the most part, though, his patterns of **conspicuous consumption** are more modest than many within the American **upper class**.

Gates has received numerous recognitions, including two honorary doctorates, a ceremonial British knighthood, and a flower named for him. Bill Gates is one of the world's most influential people and is routinely found on high-**status** lists. In 2006 he announced his intention to step down as Microsoft head in 2008.

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GENDER STRATIFICATION

CHRISTINE W. HEILMAN

Gender stratification is a type of social stratification that refers to social inequalities grounded in biological differences: within American society males often enjoy privileges that are harder for women to obtain.

Social stratification is a hierarchical system that generates inequalities in resources, creates and reinforces rules of allocation for distributing resources across positions or occupations, and creates and reinforces unequal **social mobility** mechanisms. Social stratification theory focuses on economic inequalities resting on the basis of class. Ascriptive processes attribute the social standing of an individual to traits present at birth, such as gender. Inequality is produced by matching social roles to rewards of unequal value and allocating members of society to the positions related to the unequal rewards. The social role of women, for example, is related to an unequal reward for childbearing and childrearing. Mother-work carries heavy responsibilities but lacks the material rewards of employment. In addition, working mothers must fit motherhood into their lives while maintaining their ambitions in the workplace.

Categories of valued goods and assets within the social system of stratification include those that are economic (ownership of property, businesses, professional practices, factories, farms, liquid assets, and labor power); political (household, workplace, and societal **authority**); cultural (high-status consumption practices, good manners, and privileged lifestyle); social (access to high-status **social networks**, social ties, associations and clubs, and union memberships); honorific (**prestige**, reputation, fame, deference and derogation, and ethic and religious purity); civil (**property rights**, legal rights, and civil rights); and human (skills, expertise, on-the-job training, experience, formal **education**, and knowledge).

In relation to the economic category, poor and working-class women are less likely to own their own homes, businesses, or professional practices because they do not have the lump sum of money needed to purchase them. They are also less likely to be brought into the family businesses by male family members, who prefer sons and nephews as apprentices. Also, making a living on the family farm has become impossible with the rise of agribusiness, as individual farms cannot compete with the factory farm in production of crops or animal husbandry. Women's domestic labor was more valued on the family farm when feeding the workers was an important job. In addition, liquid assets are less likely to be passed down through generations of poor and working-class women, since cash is consumed in meeting basic needs such as shelter and food. Also, women are less likely to belong to a union or to have control over their labor.

In relation to the political category poor and working-class women have little workplace authority over their time or type of work. They may head a household, but their economic responsibility for family members outweighs any authority. They work both outside the home and inside the home with little help from men with domestic chores like cooking and laundry.

Cultural goods and assets that are valued include some that are secured through birth or childhood socialization, like good manners, and these not necessarily provided to poor and working-class women. A privileged lifestyle includes the ability to travel extensively and spend time and money on higher education. Poor and working-class women are less likely to take time off work to travel, and they often must borrow large sums to afford higher education and will have to pay it back while working in a chosen occupation. Women are less likely to work in more lucrative occupations like engineering than in helping professions like nursing.

Social networks are a valued asset that can result in obtaining a high-paying job for the privileged, but poor and working-class women know only members of their own class, who have little access to high-paying jobs.

Civil assets, such as being a member of a legislative assembly, are unlikely for poor and working-class women, who would need social networks to raise the money needed for a run for public office and time off from working and childrearing to participate. Even freedom of association and speech can be curtailed by the need of poor and working-class women to keep their jobs and housing. Unions like the Service Employees International Union have been organizing service and clerical workers, but the risk of losing a job often keeps poor and working-class women from joining.

Skills, training, and education require time out of the workforce, which poor and working-class women cannot afford. Poor and working-class women are more likely to have children early in their lives before beginning an occupation. In addition, the occupations in which working-class women find themselves are less rewarded economically, so their relative economic success may depend on finding and keeping a partner of equal or higher economic status. If they do work, women must pay the cost of day care for their children, which becomes prohibitive when they have more than one or two children. Often, poor and working-class women work in the restaurant industry or in low-paying **pink-collar** jobs. If they have children and must work to support them, they are denied access to training and higher education, which would allow them to enter higher-paying occupations.

A rigid stratification system can predict the wealth, power, or prestige of individuals based on their prior statuses or those of their parents. For example, few poor or working-class women are able to "jump class" through training or education; they replicate the lives of their mothers in childbearing and childrearing. First-generation female college students are more likely to delay enrollment in postsecondary institutions, which is a barrier to degree completion; only 29 percent of first-generation students enroll immediately after high school graduation compared with 73 percent of students whose parents have college experience. Also, first-generation students are less likely to complete the steps to enroll: only 45 percent take the SAT or ACT and only 26 percent apply to a four-year institution. (Comparatively, among students of parents with a bachelor's degree, 82 percent take the ACT or SAT and 71 percent apply to a four-year institution.) First-generation students are more likely to take remedial courses, have trouble deciding on a major, earn fewer academic credits, and have lower grades.

According to Wendy Bottero gender divisions are both social and economic; class and gender overlap. **Capitalism** and patriarchy have worked together to create gender stratification. Indeed the effects of the social markers of class and gender are not experienced separately. Gender theorists have used the concept of **social closure** to explain why women cluster in lower paying jobs and argue that gender

often seals potential avenues of success. It is in the interest of capitalists to recruit cheap female labor, while men control women's domestic labor and exclude them from skilled work. Patriarchy rests on the material base of men's control over women's labor power and their exclusion from essential productive resources. Monogamous heterosexual marriage provides men with control of both jobs that pay living wages and women's sexuality. Women perform domestic labor that men can avoid performing or for which they can avoid providing payment. Childbearing and childrearing consume women's labor and define them socially in relation to men. Children learn their places in the gender hierarchy. In this respect, gender stratification is also a form of **social reproduction**.

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GENERAL STRIKE

ROBERT E. WEIR

A general strike is a tactic used by organized labor in which workers from numerous industries and enterprises withdraw their labor simultaneously. Properly understood a general strike requires that workers place social class above personal interest or the concerns of their particular occupation. The term is sometimes misused to refer to an industry-wide strike, but a true general strike differs markedly from a conventional strike in which workers from a single business or industry walk off their jobs. The general strike is designed to bring such severe economic pressure to an entire region that employers will be compelled to settle their grievances with employees.

The general strike is usually associated with radical labor movements, especially those that espouse general working-class consciousness, as opposed to more cautious organizations such as the American Federation of Labor, whose constituent unions were more focused on securing rights for individual crafts. Within the United States the general strike has been associated with anarchists and left-wing unions such as the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW). Groups such as these saw the general strike as part of a larger plan to disrupt and dethrone capitalism. The IWW saw little purpose in securing concessions from employers per se as capitalism by its nature exploited labor. It hoped to paralyze society economically, socially, and politically via the general strike.

In U.S. history, a handful of strikes tangentially classify as general strikes. During June and July of 1877, railroad workers across North America struck to protest deep wage cuts and harsh job conditions. These strikes were mostly spontaneous

and uncoordinated, but at their height more than 100,000 workers from various industries were off the job. Federal troops were activated to crush the strike, and more than a hundred lives were lost.

The strike of 1877 proved an anomaly in that so many workers from other industries took part across the nation. Most U.S. general strikes seldom spread beyond their immediate environs. May 1, 1886, was supposed to be a nationwide general strike designed to force employers to grant an eight-hour workday, but Chicago was one of the few places where a genuine general strike actually occurred, and it ended in the tragic events of Haymarket Square, where a thrown bomb led to a dozen deaths and a crackdown on radical and labor movements that left the **working class** in a weaker position.

In the twentieth century, the city of Seattle experienced a general strike in 1919, as did Minneapolis, San Francisco, and Toledo in 1934. Although each of these was traumatic and workers won concessions in some cases, none resulted in the revolutionary upheaval of which radicals dreamed. In many respects, talk of general strikes has been more utopian than realistic. In all but a few cases workers have been loath to quit their jobs in solidarity with other workers, and at least in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, anarchist, communist, and **socialist** groups have been unable to attract a critical mass from which to launch a movement to overturn capitalism. This has especially been the case since World War II, when a postwar crackdown on radicals decimated their ranks and pushed them to the margins of American society. Some scholars see the relative paucity of general strikes vis-à-vis Europe and Australasia and the weakness of socialism as barometers of **American exceptionalism**.

Since the 1980s, **strikes** of any sort have proved difficult, though some argue that renewed interest in general strikes would afford better protection for workers who now find themselves isolated in battles against more powerful employers.

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GENTRIFICATION

KAREN BETTEZ HALNON

Gentrification is a controversial and multifaceted process involving strategic invasion of and investment in **lower-class** neighborhoods; transforming them into **middle-class** ones; and ultimately displacing the preexisting inhabitants.

British sociologist Ruth Glass first coined the term *gentrification* in 1964 to describe how **working-class** quarters of London were invaded by the middle classes; how shabby, modest mews and cottages were transformed into elegant, expensive residences; and how this process continued rapidly until all or most of the original working-class occupiers were displaced and the whole social character

of the district was changed. The process of middle-class takeover of economically vulnerable neighborhoods is typically accomplished with the aid of city planners, bankers, and real estate companies. In a typical scenario, a relatively large financial interest purchases numerous properties in a working-class neighborhood proximate to the city, makes modest investments in the properties (e.g., installs new heating, electrical systems, or new doors, or applies new paint inside and out) and sells the properties to individual white-collar owners or investors. These individuals (who are residents or business people aiming to turn a profit via more extensive remodeling and subsequent resale) make more significant and detailed improvements through restoration and refurbishment, often returning the property to its original historical "purity" but also typically with a "thumbprint" of lower-class dereliction. The process of restoration and refurbishment of what was previously a "dilapidated" community continues until the whole social character of the neighborhood is transformed. Integral to the community transformation is the establishment of new cultural and financial investments in the area, such as upscale boutiques, specialty coffee shops, and aesthetically pleasing restaurants with expensive ethnic cuisines. Property values go up, taxes go up, and soon most of the original community inhabitants have been enticed to sell their properties, can no longer afford to live there, or feel they no longer belong (or that their neighborhood no longer belongs to them). Classic examples of gentrification are Washington, D.C.'s Dupont Circle, Chicago's Lincoln Park, New York's SoHo and Greenwich Village, Boston's South End, Philadelphia's Society Hill, and South London's Wandsworth Common.

Gentrifiers seldom, if ever, label themselves as such. To do so would be to self-criticize, since the term itself suggests snobbery. To self-label as a gentrifier would be to examine critically collective consequences. However, while gentrifiers invest, invade, transform, and ultimately displace members of lower-class neighborhoods (via push out and price out), consequences are typically minimized, ignored, or neutralized as incidental to pursuing individualistic needs and desires. For example, gentrifiers are often motivated by the demand for inexpensive inner city housing close to urban centers; the opportunity for a good investment; pursuing or expressing difference, diversity, and distinction; or escaping routine, resisting the dominant ideals of **suburbia**, or pursuing practices that constitute new conditions for experience. In general, gentrification is a means by which the middle classes, lacking adequate resources to mimic the consumption habits of the upper classes, attempt to establish middle-class distinction.

A central yet relatively under-theorized aspect of the gentrification process pertains to its aesthetic dimensions, or how the gentrification process is one of "cultural consecration." This is what French sociologist **Pierre Bourdieu** called the "transubstantiating" application of "**cultural capital**," involving such things as denial of the profane, consecration of the common, expression of cultural competence, upgrading the culturally tenuous, and historicization.

While gentrification proper has declined in recent years, it is reemerging in a "new frontier," the "symbolic neighborhoods" of the lower classes in popular culture. For example, signature tattoos, custom choppers, expensive health club fitness programs, and the like represent a new form of gentrification, or middle-class takeover of lower-class communities. These and related activities have transformed

what was once lower-class distinction into middle-class distinction through activities such as discussing the practices in esoteric language; locating the practices deep in history; treating the practices as optional and autonomous indulgences; gaining the sponsorship of elite institutions; and establishing professional skills and knowledge that provide social distance from the lower classes.

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GEORGE, HENRY (September 2, 1839–October 20, 1897)

ROBERT E. WEIR

Henry George was a journalist, economist, labor activist, and Irish nationalist. Very few individuals were as popular among the late nineteenth-century **working class** as George.

George was born in Philadelphia, one of ten children born to a fiercely Protestant Irish family. George left school at the age of fourteen, signed on as a cabin boy, and made two around-the-world voyages punctuated by a brief stint as a typesetter. He married the former Annie Fox in 1861 and settled in San Francisco. A failed publishing venture left him deeply in debt. Although he soon secured other labor, George's first-hand experiences with **poverty** left a deep impression.

George worked as a gas inspector while writing his magnum opus, *Progress and Poverty*, whose first run was self-published in 1879 and consisted of just 500 copies. It appeared amidst the speculative fever, economic upheaval, and labor unrest of the **Gilded Age** and captured its zeitgeist. George already enjoyed minor renown for his various newspaper articles and pamphlets, but *Progress and Poverty* made him internationally famous. It went through numerous printings in the 1880s and 1890s; in the United States it received more attention than the writings of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels.

Progress and Poverty emerged as the American Industrial Revolution was entering its take-off stage of development. Great fortunes were made, but at the expense of workers. The period predated personal and corporate income taxes. This meant that rapid urbanization and high levels of immigration soon stretched city infrastructures to the breaking point, thereby fostering ghettos, overcrowding, and unsanitary conditions. Progress and Poverty was stimulated, in part, by George's observations of deplorable human conditions in New York City. The book offered a solution for dealing with social problems.

Progress and Poverty is a treatise on economic theory whose central idea, the single tax, captured the imagination of late-nineteenth-century workers, most of whom never read George's dry and didactic text. George tackled David Ricardo's theory on



Henry George. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

rents and argued that, in his day, rents violated the "law of diminishing returns." He radically proposed that society do away with all taxes save one, his single tax on the unearned value associated with land. George directly attacked the notion of land speculation, which was rampant in the Gilded Age. To George, unimproved land that increased in value through no action of those who held it should be taxed at 100 percent of its unearned increment. Land values rose, he argued, through one of two means: improvements made by their owners or advances made by society. For example, a person's land might increase in value because he cleared it, fertilized it, and built upon it. For George, that individual was entitled to all of the fruits on his investment and labor. If, however, land increased in value because society provided railroad links, roads, and other infrastructure improvements, an individual was entitled to none of the increased value.

George believed that his single tax on unimproved land would create surplus

revenue that would eliminate the need for other taxes, fund city services, underwrite infrastructure costs, and provide for humanitarian causes. Economists have debated the soundness of George's reasoning, but his attacks on **upper-** and **middle-class** privilege and their callous disregard for workers and the poor made him a hero among society's lower orders. His open embrace of the **labor movement**, including his membership in the **Knights of Labor** (KOL), also endeared him to workers. He was a capable speaker, a factor that popularized his complex economic theories. The single-tax movement became worldwide and burned with special passion in Australia, Ireland, and New Zealand. Although **Marxism** receives more attention from scholars, the single tax was just as influential, if not more so, for much of the late nineteenth century.

George also traveled to Ireland and, like many **Irish Americans**, became an ardent advocate of home rule for Ireland, which was then controlled by Great Britain. This too enhanced his popularity among the working class. In 1884 George published *Social Problems*, a book whose very title was radical. The prevailing **Social Darwinian** notion among the upper and middle classes was that there was no such thing as a "social" problem: poverty and ill fortune resulted from individual character flaws, not systemic conditions.

Henry George also advocated **free trade**, one of the few positions that engendered debate among workers, many of whom were ardent **protectionists**. In 1886 Henry George ran for mayor of New York City on an independent ticket, finishing a close second to the Democratic victor and far ahead of the Republican candidate,

Theodore Roosevelt. There were widespread allegations that George was robbed of victory by Tammany Hall vote tampering, but across the United States other third parties inspired by George or the KOL did very well in the 1886 elections. For a time it looked as if third parties might seriously challenge the Democrats and Republicans.

In 1897 George published *The Science of Political Economy*, a distillation of his economic theories including a defense of attacks on *Progress and Poverty*. That same year he made a quixotic run for New York City mayor, but died a week before election day. Although the single tax was never implemented, George's ideas formed the basis for land taxes in general and were evoked to argue for income taxes. More than a century after his death, George's theories continue to be debated. New York City sports a Henry George Institute that analyzes current economic policy and argues for the applicability of George's theories in contemporary society.

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GHETTO

CARMELITA N. PICKETT

Ghetto is a term first used in Italy during the sixteenth century to describe a quarter in the city to which Jews were restricted. In modern usage, however, it often refers to dilapidated sections of **inner cities** that are marked by **poverty** and heavy concentrations of ethnic and racial minority groups.

The word was originally used in Italian port cities like Venice, where large populations of Jews were confined to intentionally segregated areas because of their non-Christian beliefs. Ghettos were abolished when Italy unified in 1870, but some remained in Muslim countries and in Russia. When fascists rose to power, more ghettos appeared in Europe during the mid-1930s. Nazis built ghettos in Czechoslovakia, the Baltic states, Hungary, and the Soviet Union. These ghettos often served as holding areas for Jews before they were transported to concentration camps; they were heavily guarded and often separated from other parts of the city by brick or stone walls. Jews lived in deplorable conditions in Nazi ghettos because of severe overcrowding and disease.

The meaning of ghetto has undergone many changes, but in the United States the term is synonymous with low-income neighborhoods that are racially homogenous. American ghettos represent patterns of racial discrimination. Ghettos began appearing in large Northern cities after the Great Migration of African Americans from the South. This migration lasted from 1910 to 1930 and relocated over 1 million African Americans to Northern and Western cities in search of employment opportunities.

The Great Migration often fueled race riots between blacks and whites. Whites felt that the rural black laborers would destabilize their current wages and cause

property values to decline. In 1919 a Chicago race riot erupted when a seventeen-year-old African American, Eugene Williams, drowned after being stoned by a white man. Although his white assailant was identified, police refused to arrest him. News of this incident spread rapidly, and more violence ensued. At least fifteen whites and thirty-eight blacks were killed, over 500 more were injured, and approximately 1,000 African Americans were left homeless from bombings and arson. Race riots occurred in other cities such as Atlanta (1906), East St. Louis (1917), Tulsa (1921), and Detroit (1943).

After World War II the term *ghetto* was popularized in the United States to describe overpopulated poor sections of cities typically lived in by African Americans or other minorities. African Americans continued to leave the rural South throughout the twentieth century in pursuit of industrial manufacturing jobs in such cities as Detroit, New York, and Chicago. Rural African Americans also sought to escape **sharecropping** and terrorist tactics such as lynching, a common practice in the South used to terrorize African Americans while maintaining white dominance.

Although most Americans associate ghettos with poor housing and poor people, prior to the 1970s black ghettos were viewed by some African Americans as communities of prosperous businesses and black institutions. **Segregation** forced African Americans to create their own churches, fraternal organizations, social clubs, and businesses. Black ghettos supported the economic and cultural needs of African Americans. This view is supported by some Harlem Renaissance and African American writers such as Langston Hughes (*Negro Ghetto*, 1931) and August Wilson (*Fences*, 1987). These writers often provided fond and vivid descriptions of the ghetto. To some African Americans the ghetto was simply "home."

In contemporary society, however, housing and economic studies reveal that ghettos tend to support the ongoing **disenfranchisement** of citizens, limiting their access to jobs, health care, and quality **education**. Until American ghettos are abolished, these citizens will continue to face high crime, **poverty**, poor housing, drugs, and joblessness.

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GIDDENS, ANTHONY (1938–)

ROBERT E. WEIR

Anthony Baron Giddens is a British social scientist whose theory of structuration is an important part of contemporary debates over social class. He is the former director of the London School of Economics and Political Science and, since 2003, has been an advisor to British Prime Minister Tony Blair. His views on class and politics are sometimes deemed a "third way" between polarized debates between **functionalists** and **Marxists**, as well as between conservatives and liberals.

Structuration purports to describe social systems as they are rather than as theoretical models would have them be. Giddens criticizes what he calls "closed systems," like the functionalism of Emile Durkheim or the evolutionary theories of **Social Darwinists**. Social systems, he argues, tend toward closed patterns, but they can and do change over time. Giddens claims that individuals are seldom subject to such repressive social structures as to necessitate revolution; in the main they tend to replicate the social structure. Giddens argues, however, that if individuals are not autonomous neither are they helpless; faceless and overwhelming social forces do not prevent individuals from changing society. Giddens sees society as a blend between individual action and social structure, one in which the individual both shapes and is shaped by social structures, although the very nature of the latter derives from repeated acts of individuals in concert with others.

Following Durkheim, Giddens agrees that the reality of social classes based on a division of labor does not ipso facto demand the existence of class conflict. Both agreed that class conflict results from either incomplete economic development or from some social "pathology" (to use Durkheim's term). The rules governing social order, Giddens argues, are ubiquitous and operate on individuals even when they are not conscious of them. This is why traditions, morality, social values, and social institutions are often replicated across generations. Those who benefit from these patterns, such as **white-collar workers**, may view social structure in ways akin to Durkheim's emphasis on social consensus. (Giddens argues that white-collar workers are hard to unionize because their work is neither routine nor homogeneous.)

But Giddens also agrees with Marx's assertion that division of labor can result in a system that favors some classes over others and encases have-nots in a structure of dominance and submission. There is a tendency, often exacerbated by the **mass media**, toward **social reproduction** of existing class relations, but there is no imperative. Individuals have the power to ignore certain social conventions, alter social practices, and reform social institutions. Giddens points to feminism, the **labor movement**, and other social reform movements as examples of how structures can be changed.

Giddens's work has been criticized by the political left as insufficiently attentive to how power permeates social structures, though to be fair, he does not ignore that factor. Another line of criticism takes Giddens to task for making commonsense statements overly complex and obtuse. Nonetheless, Giddens's work is useful in the ways that it puts human agency back into the discussion of class. He sees individuals as neither helpless in the face of social forces nor as romantic revolutionaries. Giddens's construction of social structures is also useful in explaining why class formation is difficult, and his insistence on looking as society as it is rather than as an ideal type restores corrective balance to debates over the nature of authority, class, class conflict, and social change.

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GILDED AGE

PAT REEVE

The Gilded Age generally refers to the last three decades of the nineteenth century. Historians differ over the exact dates of the Gilded Age, but it is customarily viewed as the intermediary period between the decline of **Reconstruction** in the early 1870s and the rise of the **Progressive Era** (circa 1901). As such it also corresponds with what is also called the late Victorian period.

The term came into common usage by 1840, but it derives from the title of a novel written by Mark Twain and Charles Dudley Warner in 1873. The two friends sought to create a novel that would trump the sentimental literature then so popular with Americans. Together they wrote an uncompromising satire of America's economic and political fallibilities. By dubbing the era a "gilded age," Twain and Warner implied that the seeming prosperity of their age was a thin veneer that failed to mask underlying social problems.

Contemporary historians debate whether "gilded age" accurately reflects the complexity of an epoch in which the United States shed its rural past and established itself as a global power. To be sure, this was an age of political venality, unrivaled capital accumulation, and **conspicuous consumption** on the part of the **nouveau riche**. Yet as Walt Whitman declared in 1871, it was also a time when a "new spirit" of **democracy** reinvigorated the rights to freedom and self-sufficiency.

Americans seeking to reconstruct a war-torn democracy reaffirmed its core principles. Movements led by suffragists, farmers, the **working class**, and others mobilized to narrow the gap between democratic theory and practice. Similarly, anti-lynching activist Ida B. Wells called for an end to violence against African Americans, while advocates of the **Social Gospel** and social critics such as **Jacob Riis** and **Jane Addams** spurred Americans to ameliorate the era's inequalities. Yet it was Reconstruction (1865–77), a program of national reunification, that highlighted Gilded Age struggles for the extension of liberty and equality, as well as its failure to achieve such lofty goals.

From 1865 to 1877 Congress debated full citizenship for emancipated African Americans and passed the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, guaranteeing the rights of citizenship for free blacks. Enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 afforded all citizens "full and equal" access to employment, public facilities, and transportation. Protected by law, African Americans rebuilt their families, founded civic institutions, started their own farms and businesses, and created the nation's first interracial governments. For a brief period, black Americans realized their aspirations for self-rule and self-sufficiency.

Ex-Confederates, angered by their loss of control over African Americans, sought to re-segregate the South. In 1865 Southern lawmakers restricted every aspect of African American life by enacting the Black Codes. Vitriolic white supremacists formed secret societies such as the **Ku Klux Klan** to counter Reconstruction and terrorize black Americans into submissiveness. Arguably, the imposition of Jim Crow policies buttressing racial **segregation** was the single biggest blow to the right of Southern blacks. In 1893 the Supreme Court upheld segregation by overturning the Civil Rights Act of 1875 and again in 1896 by ruling in

Plessy v. Ferguson that "separate" but "equal" facilities were legal. Once again living in a system of racial apartheid, southern African Americans endured by fostering racial solidarity and **self-reliance** and by resisting **racism** when and where they could.

Against the backdrop of Reconstruction, ordinary Americans tacked between optimism and fear as they negotiated the major questions of the day. For example, how legitimate were the claims advanced by aggrieved farmers and workers and their political strategies of choice? Could national unity be reconciled with the influx of **Catholic** and **Jewish** immigrants flowing from Russia and central and southern Europe to U.S. cities? Equally compelling were questions posed by federal **Native American** policy and the nation's experimentation with colonialism. Were these actions congruent with the nation's commitment to democracy? Or were they evidence of institutional racism and the republic's insatiable appetite for the land of indigenous peoples? At stake in these debates were the political values that would guide the United States into modernity.

Meanwhile, innovations in government transformed the political landscape. Wartime expansion of federal administrative capacities alarmed defenders of small government and the separation of state powers. After the war, the federal government again flexed its muscles by intervening in commerce and labor. The Interstate Commerce Act (1887) created an Interstate Commerce Commission overseeing the operations of the railroad industry. With this act, the railroads became the first industry subject to federal regulation. Next Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act (1890), which prohibited "every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade." The law's first target, however, was not the railroad industry but the American Railway Union (ARU), led by Eugene V. Debs. ARU members employed by George Pullman, a manufacturer of sleeping cars, struck in May 1894 in response to decreased wages and increased rents in their Illinois company town. In June the ARU successfully mobilized railway workers nationwide to boycott Pullman cars. In an unprecedented act, President Grover Cleveland mustered federal troops to quash the **strike** and run the trains. He then jailed Debs after charging him with violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Relations between the citizenry and federal government were changed fundamentally during the Gilded Age.

Municipal and state political machines also extended their reach after 1865. Machines—unofficial political organization based on patronage and the spoils system—exerted control in electoral politics. Low-wage workers and **immigrants** looked to the machine "boss" for jobs, housing, and other services. Conversely, advocates of good government ("goo-goos") demanded greater transparency and accountability in the political arena. By 1900 most Americas had endorsed calls to professionalize government and dismantle machines such as Boss William Marcy Tweed's infamous Tammany Hall in New York City.

Technological innovations in agriculture and industry also transformed the landscape in which Gilded Age Americans lived. During the **Civil War** demand for foodstuffs and durable goods accelerated the mechanization of agriculture and the intensification of industrial production. These developments spurred, in turn, improvements in communications and railway transportation. Business enterprises seeking greater economies of scale integrated technological innovations with the restructuring of operations, producing corporations of unparalleled scale and productivity. Writing in 1901, the author **Frank Norris** likened Gilded Age commercial enterprises to an octopus that entangled Americans in vast networks of production and consumption.

The consequences for ordinary Americans during the **Industrial Revolution** were mixed. On the one hand, increasing mechanization of production created new jobs for unskilled workers, many of them immigrants. Moreover, the increased availability of food and commodities contributed to a rising standard of living. Furthermore, leaps in productivity greased America's entry into global markets. On the other hand, the mechanization of agriculture contributed to decreasing crop prices, over-cultivation of the land, and irrevocable changes in the patterns of rural life. Likewise, growing mechanization of industry resulted in the deskilling of work, **wage** cuts, and a marked increase in occupational accidents. Aggrieved producers advanced their claims through strikes, boycotts, and campaigns for legal reforms.

Class conflict was a hallmark of the Gilded Age. The permanence of **capitalism** remained contested in the minds of many Americans. The period's extremes of wealth and **poverty** were apparent to all and were celebrated as "natural" by **Social Darwinists** and vehemently opposed by workers, farmers, and reformers. The material wealth generated by industry also produced **robber barons**, who treated workers as interchangeable machine parts. Even some members of the rising **middle class** grew alarmed at excesses within their own ranks. Many more, however, were alarmed by the rising tensions inherent in society and were frightened by **anarchist** and **Marxist** groups calling for the destruction of capitalism. Resurgent labor unions had to contend with both the opposition of employers and (often unfair) associations with radicalism.

After 1865, the **labor movement** achieved unprecedented levels of economic and political organization with the support of the National Labor Union (1866–72), the first national labor federation. Succeeding it was the Noble Order of the Knights of Labor (1869–1919). Led by Terrence Powderly, the organization organized all workers across lines of skill, race, gender, and occupation. Its demands included the eight-hour work day and employers' liability reform. After a series of stunningly successful railway strikes in the 1880s, the Knights declined because of armed resistance by employers and defection by its constituencies to the American Federation of Labor (AFL; 1886–). Federation leader Samuel Gompers, a Jewish immigrant and cigar maker, disparaged the Knights' reform unionism and instead promoted organization based on skilled crafts. Neither the Knights nor the AFL was blameless when it came to inclusionary unionism. Both organizations opposed the immigration of Chinese laborers, and the AFL barred African Americans and women from membership in white male locals. Thus organized labor, like other Gilded Age institutions, simultaneously embraced the least and most expansive conceptions of democracy.

Farmers also established networks of social organizations, called granges, to protect their interests and build community. **Agrarianism** remained both the dominant occupation and a romantic ideal in the late nineteenth century, though farming was clearly imperiled. Granges began as social clubs but soon evolved into political organizations targeting the business practices of merchants and

railways. In 1892 farmers calling themselves **Populists** formed a national People's Party. Its platform included linking the value of the dollar to silver rather than gold—a means of easing farmers' debt—and state ownership of railways. The Populists enjoyed great success early on, but by century's end the party was in decline, and many of its less radical ideas were co-opted by the Democratic Party.

As the above suggests, the nation's best and worst impulses shaped Gilded Age society, much as they have in other historical periods. Yet the extremes of this epoch number among its defining characteristics. Walt Whitman celebrated the idealism of the age, in contrast to Twain and Warner, who fictionalized its excesses and blind spots. Progressive Era Americans would find inspiration in the former while contending with the latter.

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GILMAN, CHARLOTTE PERKINS (July 1, 1860–August 17, 1935)

STACEY INGRUM RANDALL

Charlotte Perkins Gilman was a feminist and author best known for her short story "The Yellow Wall-Paper." Gilman wrote thousands of works, including journalism, books discussing the social realities of women's lives, and poetry. Gilman's major concern during her lifetime was feminism—women's suffrage as well as women's economic independence. She also self-published a magazine titled *The Forerumer* for seven years.

Gilman was born Charlotte Anne Perkins in Hartford, Connecticut. She had a strong lineage; her mother was Mary Fitch Westcott and her father was Frederic Beecher Perkins. This made Gilman the great-granddaughter of the Rev. Lyman Beecher and the great-niece of **Gilded Age** minister the Rev. Henry Ward Beecher and author Harriet Beecher Stowe. Gilman's first marriage, to Charles Walter Stetson, was a difficult one that eventually ended in divorce. They had one daughter, Katherine Beecher Stetson, born March 23, 1885. After the divorce, Gilman moved to California, where she wrote her first books in the 1890s, starting with *In This Our World*, a collection of satiric poems with feminist themes. Gilman became active in Nationalism, a reform movement inspired by **Edward Bellamy**'s utopian socialist romance *Looking Backward*. This work influenced her own utopian novel *Herland*, originally serialized in 1915.

Gilman had three main goals for her writing: reconciling family responsibilities with professional ambitions, being a responsive mother while teaching and writing, and satisfying human needs of love and work. Gilman wanted to explore the value of the ideal woman as one who could experience meaningful



Charlotte Perkins Gilman. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

work, economic independence, and equal human love in a male-dominated society. These beliefs are very strongly reflected in her writing. Gilman was an extremely intelligent woman who in many ways was far ahead of her time and place. The ideas that she represented were alien to most women during the **Progressive Era**. Her works continue to be studied today, and their importance and value has, if anything, increased.

After the birth of her daughter, Katharine, Gilman was beset by depression and began treatment with Dr. Silas Weir Mitchell in 1886. His recommendations, "live as domestic a life as possible" and "never touch a pen, brush or pencil as long as you live" were later satirized in her autobiography and used the discussions in her most renowned short story, "The Yellow Wall-Paper," which first appeared in New England Magazine in 1892. Gilman refused to call herself a "feminist"; her goal as a humanist was to campaign for the cause of women's suffrage. Gilman saw that the domestic

environment had become an institution that oppressed women. "The Yellow Wall-Paper" depicts a depressed woman who slowly descends into madness in her room while her well-meaning husband is often away due to his work at a hospital.

At the time of Gilman's death in 1935, she had lectured both nationally and internationally and had published over twenty volumes of work. Gilman learned in 1932 that she had incurable breast cancer. As an advocate for the right to die, Gilman committed suicide on August 17, 1935, by taking an overdose of chloroform. She "chose chloroform over cancer" as her autobiography and suicide note stated. In 1993 Gilman was named the sixth most influential woman of the twentieth century in a poll commissioned by the Siena Research Institute. In 1994 she was inducted into the National Women's Hall of Fame in Seneca Falls, New York. Her work continues to be evoked by feminists and scholars of **gender stratification**.

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GLASS CEILING

ROBERT E. WEIR

Glass ceiling is a term that refers to restrictions placed on a person's ability to rise in business and society. It is used to describe the experiences of those who struggle to overcome social obstacles and achieve at a high level but encounter conventions and prejudices that block further **social mobility**. Such high-functioning individuals are aware of opportunities above their current station, hence a "glass" ceiling. The term has been appropriated by many minority groups but is generally used in discussing **gender stratification**.

The term originated in mathematics but was first applied to women in a 1984 Newsweek article. By that time the successes of the feminist movement of the past decade and a half had slowed, in part because of a backlash against social movements inherent in the administration of President Ronald Reagan. Women helped maintain American industry during World War II and entered the workforce in large numbers, just as they had done during World War I. When World War II ended, women were displaced from many higher paying positions and supplanted by returning male veterans. Despite popular stereotypes of the post-war "Baby Boom," a real-enough demographic surge, all women did not placidly retreat to suburbia to become mothers and housewives. Women from white working-class families, as well as African American, Latino, and other minority women, often lacked the economic wherewithal to remove themselves from the labor market. Although the number of working women dropped from its wartime peak, it did not retreat to prewar levels. By the 1950s, more women were entering the workforce each year. Even middle-class families began to realize that a sole wage earner was insufficient for a family to attain material comforts associated with the American dream.

As more women entered the workforce, they could not help but notice their lower wages vis-à-vis men and a general inequality in their treatment. The 1963 Equal Pay Act stipulated that the same job had to be compensated equally for all, but this was easily circumvented by manipulating job classifications. Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act theoretically safeguarded women's treatment in the workplace and gave them access to the same jobs and promotions as men, but this too was widely sidestepped, as were affirmative action programs designed to increase representation of women and people of color in the workforce.

Small gains and losses in the workplace coincided with the rebirth of a strong feminist movement in the 1960s, spurred on in part by the publication of Betty Friedan's pathbreaking *The Feminine Mystique* (1963). Much as in the case of the civil rights movement, women's groups also tackled **institutional discrimination**. Laws proved easier to change than entrenched practices, however. Women soon complained of "tokenism," that is, the tendency of companies to put enough women into traditionally male-held jobs to give the appearance of gender sensitivity but not enough to achieve gender equity. This was especially pronounced at the highest levels. Smith College, for example, an **elite** women's college, did not appoint its first female president until 1975, when Jill Ker Conway assumed the post. There was no female president of an **Ivy League** college until 1994, when

Judith Rodin assumed leadership at the University of Pennsylvania. A 1986 study of *Fortune* magazine's top 1,000 industrial and 500 leading service industry firms, appearing two years after *Newsweek* popularized the term "glass ceiling," revealed that 95 percent of all senior managerial positions were held by white males.

Despite more awareness of glass ceiling discrimination, the 1980s backlash has been slow to dissipate. In 2004 just 1.4 percent of *Fortune*'s top firms had female CEOs, a mere 2.7 percent of their top salaries went to women, and only 11.2 percent of corporate officers were women, the latter figure smaller than the percentage (14 percent) of those firms that had no women in senior management positions at all. These numbers are even lower for black and Latino women. This would seem to confirm allegations of a glass ceiling as approximately 50 percent of all professional and lower level management positions are held by women.

The track record is marginally better for **small business**, where women entrepreneurs controlled about 38 percent of all enterprises by 2004. At first glance that statistic looks encouraging, but when one considers that about 30 percent of all business is female-owned, the remaining 70 percent have promoted women at rates only slightly better than the corporate giants. Glass ceiling inequities are also obvious when one considers that about 45 percent of the current workforce is female and just one-third consists of white males.

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GLOBALIZATION

ROBERT E. WEIR

Globalization is a catchall term that refers to aspects of modern society in which economic decisions, trade, culture, and politics are considered in a worldwide context. It is an outgrowth of the post-World War II expansion of multinational corporations and represents the ascendancy of **free trade** policies over those of **protectionism**. Champions of globalization see the world as a vast open market for capital investment opportunities, the procurement of labor and resources, efficient manufacturing, and sales. Critics of globalization see it as a threat to national sovereignty, a blow to American workers, and a license for amoral investors to pursue higher profits without regard to human costs.

Globalization has long been an aspect of economic life. Before **capitalism** fully articulated itself in the nineteenth century, mercantilist nations exploited colonies for raw materials and cheap labor. Indeed, **slavery** could be viewed as a perverse type of globalization; imported Africans mined Spanish silver in South America, planted French sugar cane in the Caribbean, and harvested English tobacco in

North America, these raw materials becoming items of global trade. In Colonial America, one manifestation of this was the infamous triangle trade in which slave-produced sugar in the Caribbean was made into molasses, then shipped to New England and made into rum, which was, in turn, traded in West Africa for more slaves to be sold in the Caribbean. After the **American Revolution**, slavery continued to support global trade. Slave-tended cotton left the South for New England textile mills, much of whose cloth was sold abroad and enriched American investors.

The **Industrial Revolution** brought the United States into a broader global market of raw materials and markets. Nineteenth-century economists such as Jean-Baptiste Say and David Ricardo argued the global economy would be self-correcting and that nations would naturally develop relations to their mutual advantage. In practice, though, global competition was prone to be cutthroat and ruinous, and many within the American **labor movement** argued for protectionist policies to ensure the survival of American businesses and stabilize jobs for workers. Nonetheless, stable **gold** specie exchange encouraged expanding globalization.

Competing imperialist claims, World War I, the **Great Depression**, and the decline of gold as an international standard of exchange slowed the growth of globalization in the early twentieth century. The worldwide depression led many nations to look inward and rekindled protectionist sentiment. Globalization was further disrupted by the military conquests of Germany, Italy, and Japan in the 1930s; indeed, the United States restricted the trade of commodities such as scrap iron and oil to Japan, a decision that may have factored into Japan's decision to bomb Pearl Harbor.

Globalization began anew after World War II. In 1947 the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) reduced trade barriers among twenty-three nations. The number of GATT-compliant nations expanded many times before GATT was disbanded in 1994 and replaced by the World Trade Organization (WTO), which had grown to 150 member nations by 2005. Both GATT and the WTO removed many tariffs and other barriers to free trade. The development of the International Monetary Fund in 1947, the emergence of the European Economic Union in 1951, and the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994 also facilitated the spread of globalization. The United Nations and the World Court promote globalization in social and political matters.

Globalization was not widely discussed in the United States when it reemerged after World War II, partly because new global arrangements benefited the United States and its working class. As the world's dominant economic power, the United States flooded the global market with goods, services, and technology. American factories operated at near capacity, unemployment was low, and retail shelves were stocked with American-made consumer goods. By the 1960s, however, Europe and Asia had recovered from the ravages of war, sported state-of-the-art manufacturing facilities, and aggressively competed with the United States in the global market. U.S. dominance slipped at precisely the time that energy prices soared and the domestic economy soured. By the mid-1970s, American factories producing steel, rubber, textiles, electronics, and consumer appliances began to fail, unemployment soared, and inflation ran rampant. The latter made U.S. goods even less competitive and encouraged foreign importers. Treaties such as GATT precluded protective tariffs; hence many blue-collar jobs simply disappeared.

A resurgent conservative movement, buoyed by the election of **Ronald Reagan** in 1980, also advanced free trade and globalization. Tax credits allowed U.S. firms to set up operations abroad, which supporters claimed made U.S. firms more competitive but which cost untold thousands of jobs. "Capital flight" became the byword of the 1980s, with corporations taking full advantage of Reagan-era tax cuts to relocate operations outside the country, usually in low-wage countries. Tax code changes also made it easier for foreign firms to open U.S. subsidiaries. Since the 1980s, **competitiveness** has been the guiding principle governing the U.S. economy.

Competitiveness is more attractive to entrepreneurs than to workers. There has been a marked increase in fortunes among the **upper class**, but at the expense of others. NAFTA, for example, resulted in a loss of over 200,000 American jobs in its first decade of existence. Globalization has been a disaster for the **labor movement**, which has seen its strength among industrial workers evaporate in the wake of **deindustrialization**. Promised shifts in the economy to replace lost high-wage jobs have not materialized; instead, economic growth has occurred in service industries. It also appears that the **middle class** is shrinking. In addition, the United States faces a massive balance-of-trade deficit as it is now so reliant on imported goods; in 2005, the deficit reached nearly \$726 billion.

There have been worldwide protests at WTO meetings. American antiglobalization activists assert that globalization is simply a rush to exploit labor in the developing world, evade environmental standards, avoid taxes, and evade U.S. laws. They have been joined by protestors elsewhere, some of whom oppose the globalization of culture, which they see as dominated by the debased standards of Western nations.

Globalization is likely to remain contested for many years to come. At this juncture, promises made by globalization supporters of rising global economic conditions, greater stability, international justice standards, and the promotion of international understanding have not materialized. Suspicion remains that globalization is little more than the exploitation of the poor on a worldwide basis.

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GOLD

ROBERT E. WEIR

Gold is a precious and rare metal upon which major monetary decisions have been based, affecting Americans of all social classes.

Because gold and, to a lesser degree, silver are valued globally, they have been a basis of exchange for much of recorded human history. Coins have long been the

basis of domestic exchange within regions and states. Gold and silver came into even greater focus during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when mercantilism, imperialism, and the **Industrial Revolution** stimulated worldwide networks that were, in many ways, setting up the structure for contemporary **globalization**. The rise of **capitalism** also stimulated interest in precious metals, as it placed private **wealth** on par with that of the nation as a whole.

Prior to World War II it was customary for Western nations to back their circulating currencies with gold, silver, or a combination of the two. This presented certain social problems, especially if a nation failed to exercise fiscal restraint and issued more currency in the form of notes than it could support. This happened during the **American Revolution**, when Congress issued currency ("Continentals") that proved irredeemable. The phrase "not worth a Continental damn" entered the vernacular, but many of the **Founding Fathers** found little amusing about the nation's shaky finances.

In 1785 the United States pegged its currency to silver, an act reinforced in 1792. Since the silver was itself valued according to a set ratio, the United States had a de facto bimetallic system. This too proved irksome, as the set ratio tended to make silver more valuable internally than it was internationally; hence foreign traders and international currency speculators demanded gold for silver, leading to a drain on gold reserves. The need for new supplies was a major factor precipitating the California Gold Rush. The government also tried to stop currency devaluation by reducing the weight of coins and taking foreign currency out of circulation.

The price of money was and is more than a bankers' dilemma. The amount of money in circulation has a profound effect on interest rates, prices, and wages. Those who loan money, usually members of the **upper class** and upper **middle class**, favor "hard" money, in which the overall supply is tight; hence interest rates are higher and prices lower. Farmers and others who borrow prefer "soft" money, an increase in the money supply that leads to inflation and drives interest rates down and commodity prices up. Members of the nineteenth-century **petite bourgeoisie** often also preferred soft money as many were retailers and shopkeepers. The **working class** was trapped in the middle; soft money made wages go up, but prices and rents increased as well.

The overall instability of the money system hurt all classes, with economic down-swings like the Panic of 1837 closing banks, businesses, and shops alike. Another depression in 1857 led to a silver panic in the United States, the full ramifications of which had not been resolved by the time of the **Civil War**. As in the Revolutionary War eight decades earlier, inherently inflationary currency was printed by both the Union and the Confederacy, and all gold and silver trading was suspended. Confederate bills were deemed worthless at the war's end, but the overall currency system was unstable, and attempts to reassert bimetallism proved difficult, in part because organized soft money groups pressed to expand the greenbacks (paper money) introduced during the war. Greenbackers insisted that it was not necessary to back paper bills with gold and that inflationary policies benefited the **masses**.

The last third of the nineteenth century saw a huge expansion of American corporations, a factor in the rejection of appeals from the Greenback movement. Another depression in 1873 led the nation to a gold standard, which was bitterly opposed by the **labor movement** and farmer groups, but which President Grover

Cleveland formalized in 1879. Farmers were especially hard hit by hard money policies, and they swelled the ranks of a growing "Free Silver" movement in the late nineteenth century. These groups demanded a restoration of the old 16:1 ratio between silver and gold, a plan that would increase the money supply. Silver advocates were briefly buoyed by the Sherman Silver Purchase Act of 1890, but Congress repealed it three years later. The **Populist Party** made free silver and abandonment of the gold standard a central feature of its campaign, but in 1900 the United States officially abandoned bimetallism, despite the fact that much of the Democratic Party had converted to free silver.

The gold standard probably did reduce strain on reserves, but World War I put pressure on the idea of a global gold standard, and Britain abandoned it in 1914. Moreover, the passage of the 1913 Federal Reserve Act at long last centralized U.S. banking practices and put into place other mechanisms through which deflation and inflation could be regulated. The United States reestablished the gold standard after the war, but it became a victim of the **Great Depression** and was abandoned in 1933. At the same time, President **Franklin Roosevelt** signed a bill making private ownership of gold illegal in most cases. Historians assert that Roosevelt wished to restore the gold standard, but a worsening of the Depression in 1937 deterred him. In addition, many aspects of the **New Deal** were rooted in the economic theories of **John Maynard Keynes**, who was an ardent opponent of the gold standard.

Shortly before World War II ended, the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference was held in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in which Keynes took a leading role. The forty-four gathered nations decided against an international gold standard and set up the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to facilitate currency exchanges. Although currencies were still, in theory, backed in part by gold, conservative supply-side economists have never been happy with the IMF. (The United States backs about 25 percent of circulating currency in gold.)

Within the United States, bullion remained illegal until 1975. The repeal of the gold ban did lead to speculation, especially since stagflation during the late 1970s made currency less attractive. Texas oil billionaire Nelson Bunker Hunt and his brother William attempted to corner the silver market, but sinking prices bankrupted them, and Nelson was convicted of fraud. This incident aside, trade in gold and silver bullion and coins remains a major activity among rich Americans and is a large source of private **wealth**. By early 2006 gold was being traded for about \$540 per troy ounce and silver about \$9.40 per ounce. Although few Americans think much about it, the daily international market in gold, silver, and other precious metals continues to impact the economy as U.S. reserves help determine the value of the U.S. dollar vis-à-vis other currencies. That, in turn, influences investment decisions and places pressure on hiring decisions, prices, and wages. Although the U.S. economy is no longer on a gold or silver standard, these metals continue to impact everyone from rich investors to **blue-collar** workers.

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GOLD, MIKE (April 12, 1893–May 14, 1967)

HOLLY M. ALLEN

Mike Gold is perhaps the most important figure associated with the literary left in the 1930s.

Gold was born Itzok Granich but changed his name to Michael Gold. In his remarkably successful autobiographical novel, *Jews without Money*, Gold describes what it was like to grow up in New York's Jewish Lower East Side **ghetto** in the early 1900s. The characters in Gold's novel confront crime, filth, disease, **poverty**, and death, just as Gold did after his **immigrant** father's business failed in 1905.

Forced to leave school at the age of twelve, Gold nevertheless harbored literary and political ambitions. He initially found an outlet for those ambitions in New York's bohemian radical community in the 1910s. In 1914 he published his first poem in *The Masses*, a radical literary magazine edited by Floyd Dell and Max Eastman. Throughout the 1910s Gold sampled and contributed to a range of radical and **working-class** causes. In 1921, after *The Masses* was suppressed during **Red Scare** raids, Gold joined the editorial staff of *The Liberator*, a literary magazine affiliated with the **Communist Party**. Throughout the 1920s, in addition to his editorial work, Gold wrote plays and helped to establish several radical theater groups. In 1926 he helped to found the *New Masses*, a communist literary journal committed to publishing the writings of workers themselves. Gold ascended to the editorship of the *New Masses* in 1928, a post that he held until 1934.

During his editorship, the *New Masses* regularly published letters, poems, and fiction written by ordinary workers from across the country. The publication of *Jews without Money* in 1930 cemented Gold's status as one of the foremost writers and critics of the emergent proletarian literary movement. Beginning in 1933, he published a daily column in the communist newspaper *The Daily Worker*. Gold saw **proletarian literature** as a powerful weapon of a workers' movement but also as something quintessentially American. In his view, the proletarian literature of the 1930s represented a "second American Renaissance." While the proletarian movement suffered ideological fractures later in the decade, Gold remained a Communist Party stalwart throughout the **Great Depression** years.

Although Jews without Money features a female protagonist, Gold reinforced masculine conventions in his role as editor and foremost critic of proletarian literature. He praised works that celebrated the manly worker and the male-dominated industrial arena, while doubting literature that focused on women's domestic labor and other nontraditional proletarian themes. Both his enthusiasm for authentic working-class writers and his masculine bias are evident in his call for contributors to the New Masses: "Send us a man of art who can stand up to the purposeful deeds of Henry Ford. Send us a joker in overalls," he wrote. He concluded, "Send an artist. Send a scientist. Send a Bolshevik. Send a man."

Never wavering in his commitment to working-class radicalism, Gold was one of the few Depression-era figures who was not cowed by the post–World War II Red Scare. He remained a vital contributor to the American left until his death in 1967.

Suggested Reading

Michael Folson, ed., Mike Gold: A Literary Anthology, 1972; Michael Gold, Jews without Money, 1930; Joseph North, ed., The New Masses: An Anthology of the Rebel Thirties, 1969.

GOLDMAN, EMMA (June 27, 1869-May 14, 1940)

ROBERT E. WEIR

Emma Goldman was an anarchist, feminist, and birth-control advocate.

Goldman was born in Kaunas, a city now in Latvia but then part of Russia. Her Jewish parents, Abraham and Tuave, were members of the **petite bourgeoisie**. Abraham moved his family to St. Petersburg in 1881, at which time Goldman left school to work in a factory. Goldman's teen years were shaped by Russian **anti-Semitism**, harsh working conditions, an incident of sexual abuse, and radical politics. In 1885 she immigrated to the United States to join an older sister in New York City.

Goldman's experiences in America did not live up to her high expectations. She moved into what was essentially a Jewish **ghetto** in New York and was appalled by the widespread **poverty** that plagued the American **working class**. Although already a radical, Goldman cited the injustices associated with the 1886 Haymarket bombing as the reason she converted to anarchism. Eight men were convicted of a Chicago bombing that killed a dozen people, including eight police officers. Most scholars now assert that the eight were convicted because of their beliefs, not the evidence, and radicals of the day certainly believed so. Although Goldman probably embellished the tale, she claimed to have become an anarchist on November 2, 1886, when four of the Haymarket men were hanged.

Goldman placed herself in an informal apprenticeship position with Johann Most, a prominent anarchist immigrant who published the radical Germanlanguage journal *Die Freiheit*. By 1889, though, Goldman was caught up in a debate over anarchist principles between those who espoused advancing anarchism through propaganda and those who favored the direct action approach known as "anarchism of the deed." Goldman associated with the latter and split with Most. She also abandoned her earlier work in attempting to establish an eight-hour workday and instead called upon workers to overthrow **capitalism**.

Goldman's conversion to revolutionary anarchism also entailed shifts in her personal life. She grew increasingly enamored of the theories of Peter Kropotkin, who emphasized a radical **individualism** unfettered by most social constraints. Goldman became fiercely devoted to free speech, birth control, equality for women, and the free love movement. Goldman's name was associated with numerous lovers, including possible lesbian relationships, and her shocking behavior was anathema to the **middle class**.

Among Goldman's lovers was fellow anarchist Alexander Berkman. In the days following the collapse of the 1892 Homestead Steel strike, Berkman attempted to assassinate industrial magnate Henry Clay Frick, a man many saw as a robber baron. Goldman was rumored to have plotted to shoot Frick, but this was never proven. She was, however, sentenced to a year in jail in 1893 for inciting New York City rioters to steal bread. Innuendo also associated her with Leon Csolgosz, the man who assassinated President William McKinley in 1901. Again, no solid evidence linked Goldman to the deed, though some biographers find it feasible that she was involved.

Goldman was briefly a member of the Industrial Workers of the World and was marginally involved in its free speech battles that inspired Roger Baldwin, the founder of the American Civil Liberties Union. In 1906 Goldman established the anarchist journal *Mother Earth*, a publication that gained notoriety for its bold support for birth control, even abortion, and Goldman supported the efforts of Margaret Sanger. This led to an arrest for illegal distribution of birth-control literature in 1916.



Emma Goldman on a street car, ca. 1917. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

In 1917 the United States entered World War I, a conflict bitterly opposed by Goldman and Berkman, who was now out of jail. Many within the radical community, including **Eugene V. Debs**, expressed the opinion that it was a capitalists' war in which workers should take no part. In 1917 Goldman set up several "No Conscription" leagues to oppose the implementation of a military draft. When it was, nonetheless, put into effect, Goldman urged workers to dodge the draft, an act that led to her arrest and a two-year prison sentence. In 1919 Goldman and Berkman were among a large group of radicals deported from the United States during the first **Red Scare**. During her deportation hearing future F.B.I. director J. Edgar Hoover dubbed Goldman "one of the most dangerous women in America."

At first Goldman welcomed her exile, returning to Russia less than two years after its **communist** revolution, but she quickly came to see the Bolshevik government as repressive and intolerant of personal freedom. She was also appalled at the use of the army to repress strikes. She left the Soviet Union in 1921 and penned two books, *My Disillusionment in Russia* and *My Further Disillusionment in Russia*, which recounted her many disagreements with life in the USSR. These books also expressed an emerging rejection of violence as a legitimate tool for social change.

Goldman lived in Berlin briefly before moving to Britain, where she married a Welsh miner. This was clearly a marriage of convenience so she could stay in England, and Berkman remained the great love of her life. While in Britain she wrote an autobiography, *Red Emma Speaks*, which remains widely read. She also obtained a British passport and was allowed a brief visit to the United States in 1934, but she was denied permission to stay in the country. She was in Spain during the Spanish Civil War, perhaps driven equally by the need to busy herself after Berkman's suicide on June 28, 1936, and her enthusiasm for the Republicans battling Francisco Franco. Further attempts to return to the United States failed, and Goldman relocated to Toronto, where she died in 1940. Only upon death did she re-enter the United States; she is buried in Waldheim Cemetery in Chicago, also the resting place of the four men hanged for the Haymarket bombing.

Goldman's politics were too radical to be embraced by the mainstream **labor movement**, but some within the reborn feminist movement during the 1960s and 1970s found inspiration in her no-holds-barred defense of women's equality and her insistence that all aspects of **gender stratification** be eliminated.

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GOLDTHORPE, JOHN (1935-)

ROBERT E. WEIR

John H. Goldthorpe is an emeritus sociologist who spent much of his career at Oxford after stints at the University of Leicester and at Cambridge. Although much of his work mined Western European data, Goldthorpe's studies of **social mobility** and his stratification theories have had profound influence on scholars studying the American class system.

Goldthorpe has been among the foremost critics of affluent worker/embourgeoisement theses that gained currency after World War II. Goldthorpe found very little evidence that members of the **working class** were becoming **middle class** in great numbers. He attacked three prevailing assumptions about advanced industrial societies and **capitalist** economies. First, he found little evidence of common mobility patterns between nations. In a comparative framework, for example, social mobility in the United States seldom matched the rhetoric of its ubiquity. Second, Goldthorpe refuted the idea that social mobility was increasing. The tendency instead has been more toward stasis, and for women, there has been significant downward mobility in occupational terms. Finally, Goldthorpe was highly critical of the conservative view that the economy alone dictates mobility. He argued that factors such as politics and institutionalized class privileges have a profound effect on mobility.

Goldthorpe's mobility studies were integral to how he fashioned stratification. Following the lead of **Max Weber**, Goldthorpe sought to identify class with clusters

that Weber dubbed "class situations" and "status situations," which shaped **life chances** more than one's relationship to the **means of production**, as **Marxists** insist. Working with Robert Erickson and others, Goldthorpe situated class in how work itself is organized and the relationship between **authority** and labor markets. In essence, one can be an employer, an employee, or self-employed, with differing implications for authority, control, and labor market bargaining. In addition, one must consider property owners and agricultural production (though Goldthorpe's work has been criticized for undervaluing the importance of the latter). As John Scott notes, if one looks at the various permutations, at least eleven economic classes exist: large property owners, small employers, farmers, the self-employed, a top echelon of service workers, lower service workers, routine non-manual workers, supervisors of manual laborers, skilled manual laborers, **unskilled labor**, and agricultural workers.

In a 1987 work Goldthorpe argued that much of the activity of modern society takes place in seven class categories (usually rendered simply as Roman numerals I through VII): two top levels of salaried professional and managerial "service" workers; three "intermediate" categories of clerical and supervisory workers whose contractual relations are neither salaries nor wages in the strictest sense; and two levels of the **working class**. Goldthorpe's schema is often shorthanded as a division between the service, intermediate, and working-class sectors, and Goldthorpe has been criticized for his uneven use of categories three, seven, and eleven. However, his conclusion that demographic social classes form over time and that movement in and out of those classes is less common than conventional wisdom holds has become a cornerstone interpretation of social mobility.

His work has been critiqued on other levels as well. Marxists often view his take on authority as incomplete and his definition of property owners as imprecise. The latter point has merit as his definition of property owners encompasses everyone from those holding land to those whose "property" lies in controlling corporations or commerce. Still others have criticized Goldthorpe's economic determinism and charge that he underplays cultural and social determiners of class. Still, Goldthorpe's work has been influential in adding sophistication to how class is defined, and his mobility studies have helped puncture unverifiable myths.

Suggested Reading

John Goldthorpe, *The Constant Flux: A Study of Class Mobility in Industrial Societies*, 1992; Goldthorpe, *The Economic Basis for Social Class*, 2004; John Scott, "Social Class and Stratification," *Acta Sociologica* 45.1 (2002) (online version, http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~scottj/socscot10.htm).

GOMPERS, SAMUEL (January 27, 1850–December 13, 1924)

PETER C. HOLLORAN

Samuel Gompers was an American labor leader who cofounded the **American Federation of Labor**.



Samuel Gompers. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

He was born in London on January 27, 1850, the son of poor Jewish immigrants from Holland. He immigrated to New York City with his parents in 1863. Gompers worked as a cigar maker and joined a local union in 1864, winning election as its president and serving in that position from 1874 to 1881. He founded the Federation of Organized Trades and Labor Unions in 1881, which he reorganized as the American Federation of Labor (AFL) in 1886, and he served as AFL president from 1886 to 1895, and again from 1896 to 1924.

He is best remembered for his opposition to **socialism**, cooperatives, and radical causes and politics, and for competing successfully with the **Knights of Labor** (KOL), a union that disappeared in the early twentieth century. Gompers, who learned cigar-making and union principles from his father, was influenced by the

Marxist idea that the effective economic organization of workers and the emergence of their social class interests required strong central trade union institutions. Unlike the KOL, the AFL under Gompers saw strikes as a primary weapon for labor unions, not actions to be avoided at all costs. Nonetheless, his exclusionary brand of craft unionism prompted Bill Haywood and Eugene Debs to found the Industrial Workers of the World for unskilled workers in 1905.

As the leading spokesman for the American **labor movement**, Gompers focused on higher wages, shorter hours, better working conditions, and more freedom for workers and their unions. By the dawn of the twentieth century he had traveled widely to organize nearly 2 million workers and to develop labor's economic power. During World War I he used his personal prestige to keep organized labor loyal to President Woodrow Wilson. Gompers supported Wilson's wartime aims as leader of the War Committee on Labor and as a member of the Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense. He attended the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 as Wilson's advisor on labor issues. As a result, the AFL maintained strong membership and prestige despite the nationwide anti-union campaign in the 1920s. Although Gompers developed better relations with the government and big business as a leader of the National Civic Federation, the AFL could do little to defend workers in the 1919 steel strike and the 1922 machinists' strike.

The nation's foremost champion of the working class, Gompers made organized workers respected member of their communities. He died on December 13, 1924, in a San Antonio hospital and was buried at Sleepy Hollow Cemetery in Tarrytown, New York. His autobiography, *Seventy Years of Life and Labor*, was published in 1925. In 1937 the Navy named its new destroyer the *USS Samuel Gompers* in his honor.

To his many defenders Gompers was the "father" of the modern labor movement. Gompers did much to disassociate labor unions from radical movements and to advance a pragmatic agenda over idealism. His brand of "pure and simple unionism," a focus on wages, hours, and conditions, was pathbreaking in that Gompers and the AFL were among the first to accept the very legitimacy of **capitalism**. In 1989 Gompers was inducted (posthumously) into the U.S. Department of Labor Hall of Fame.

Gompers also had many critics who decried his cautious views. Historians note that the American **working class** never developed an independent labor party, as was done by workers in numerous European industrial democracies, and they place part of the blame on the AFL's cooperation with the government and with its exclusionary membership policies. Still others accuse Gompers of harboring **middle-class** pretensions and of lacking a sense of solidarity with workers outside of the AFL.

Suggested Reading

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GRAMSCI, ANTONIO

See Althusser, Louis.

GRANT, MADISON

See Eugenics.

GRAPES OF WRATH, THE

VERONICA C. HENDRICK

The Grapes of Wrath is the name of John Steinbeck's famed novel dealing with the plight of Dust Bowl refugees during the **Great Depression**. Some critics have hailed this book as a masterpiece of **proletarian literature**.

John Ernst Steinbeck Jr. was born in California on February 27, 1902, and died on December 20, 1968. Although he was raised in a wealthy farming community, he had the opportunity to interact with poor laborers. These experiences influenced the body of his work, which focuses on the lives of those living in **poverty** in America. Steinbeck also wrote academic studies and newspaper articles discussing the situation of the lower strata of the **working class**, but it is fiction for which Steinbeck is most famous: *Tortilla Flat* (1935), *Of Mice and Men* (1937), and the short stories "The Red Pony" and "The Pearl" were extremely successful. Many of his works were produced as films. Steinbeck was awarded the Nobel Prize for literature in 1962.

Steinbeck won both the Pulitzer Prize and the National Book Award for *The Grapes of Wrath* (1939). This novel, like his other works, makes large social commentary



Film set during the making of *The Grapes of Wrath*, with part of the cast and crew in front of a small, dilapidated house. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

through the tales of his characters. The setting is the time of the Great Depression, a period when over 25 percent of all Americans were unemployed. This affected the poor more than the **middle-** and **upper-class** Americans. In the United States the Depression lasted through the 1930s, coming to a close only with America's involvement in World War II. Steinbeck focused on the lives of farmers during this difficult period. Not only were farms failing because of economic hardship, but massive areas of the South and Midwest were stressed by over-farming and drought. A region of approximately 150,000 square miles became completely unusable. In some parts of Arkansas, Oklahoma, and Texas as much as 60 percent of the population moved to different parts of the country. The protagonists in *The Grapes of Wrath*, the Joads, are representative of these dispossessed people. The Joad family lost their Oklahoma farm because of economic hardship and was forced to make their way to California in search of migrant farm labor. Because so many people were looking for employment, the Joads find money increasingly hard to earn. Everywhere workers were exploited by employers taking advantage of their desperation.

The exploitation of the **underclass** is a major focus in the novel. The novel emphasizes the need for the lower-class workers to unionize and engage in collective action. The political agenda is clear throughout the novel: Steinbeck argues against the power of big business and its ill-treatment of human beings. The novel also exposes the lack of governmental aid to the struggling poor. Steinbeck keys in on the lack of social welfare programs and the cold-hearted approach employers

take toward the poor; in his account, profit trumps humanity. His is a portrait of migrant workers literally starving to death while toiling to sate their employers' greed. The desperate poor are forced to sell their meager belongings to profiteers at less than half their value in a vain attempt to survive. Advertisements promise work in California, but those able to purchase cars and travel west are swindled first by the salesmen and then by the growers. The advertisements prove to be a trick to glut the labor market and drive down pay rates. Steinbeck details the horrible situation in California's immigrant camps, where the Joads briefly stayed, and the brutal treatment the Joad and Wilson families receive from the police. He even made connections between the treatment of the migrant poor and that of **slaves**.

As the novel moves forward, the Joad family slowly unravels; death and jail take two members of the family and another runs off to try his own luck, leaving behind a pregnant wife. The remaining family members move to a government camp, which is a relief for the weary family, but they must eventually move on in search or work. They spend time on a farm where everyone, even the pregnant Rose of Sharon, picks peaches. Here Steinbeck returns to the political agenda of unionization. The Joads realize that their high wages are payment for being strikebreakers. They learn more about the union organizers and discover that one of their friends, Preacher Casey, is the leader. In a dramatic argument, Casey is killed, and Tom Joad takes murderous revenge upon the killer. Tom, who is already on parole, must flee from the police, and his family leaves with him. Ultimately, Tom leaves the family to protect it. He plans to continue Casey's unionizing efforts.

By having the Joads move from one horrific situation to another, Steinbeck emphasizes the difficulties of life during the Depression as well as the day-to-day struggles of migrant farm workers during all time periods. Because of the corruption of the upper-class employers and their unrelenting exploitation of the lower classes, Steinbeck's political commentary focuses on the government's need to provide for the **welfare** of its citizens. The novel concludes with the Joads once again in jeopardy, this time because of a natural disaster. When Rose of Sharon goes into labor, the family is unable to flee. Instead, they huddle on top of the family car, where Rose of Sharon delivers a stillborn child. Although they are completely destitute and the loss of yet another family member has devastated them, Steinbeck ends the novel with an incredible act of kindness. The Joads stumble upon an old man and his grandson. The aged man is starving to death, and Rose of Sharon gives him her breast milk to bring him back to health. Steinbeck uses the humanity of this family to accentuate the contrast with the unfeeling world of those who have financial control over the lives of the poor.

The Grapes of Wrath is considered one of the great works of American fiction, even though its detractors denounced it as **socialist** propaganda. The saga of the Joads was first made into a film just one year after its publication. Director John Ford's eponymous film won two Oscars. It has also inspired songwriters as diverse as **Woody Guthrie**, **Bruce Springsteen**, and Rage Against the Machine.

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Kevin Hearle and Peter Lisca, eds., The Grapes of Wrath: *Text and Criticism*, 1997; Barbara Heavilin, ed., *The Critical Response to John Steinbeck's* The Grapes of Wrath, 2000; David Wyatt, ed., *New Essays on* The Grapes of Wrath, 1990.

GREAT DEPRESSION

HOLLY ALLEN

The Great Depression was the most serious economic crisis that the United States has ever encountered. It began with the stock market crash of October 1929, which ended a decade of remarkable corporate hegemony, and ended in 1941 when World War II revived the U.S. economy. The intervening years were characterized by watershed developments in the U.S. economy, society, and politics. With the advent of Franklin Delano Roosevelt's New Deal, the federal government assumed a much more activist role in U.S. economic and social affairs. Legislation to protect the right to collective bargaining, combined with increasing labor militancy, led to a fundamental shift in U.S. business-labor relations. New Deal social and welfare policies transformed American civic life, creating direct bonds between ordinary citizens and a formerly remote federal government. Such economic and political changes were implemented, in part, to alleviate the widespread turbulence and episodic class conflict that marked the Depression years. Protests ranging from relatively spontaneous anti-eviction demonstrations and food looting to more carefully planned industrial union drives, strikes, and boycotts exemplified the heightened social unrest of the decade. Some Americans sought answers to the nation's plight by searching for a usable past, documenting its popular traditions and folk heritage. Many new definitions of Americanism emerged from the Great Depression, influencing national culture for many years to come.

During the Great Depression, the role of the federal government was transformed, as was the nature of the presidency. While Herbert Hoover remained steadfastly committed to longstanding American ideals of rugged individualism, community self-help, and a hands-off approach to private enterprise, Franklin Delano Roosevelt responded to the nation's worsening economic crisis in his 1932 campaign by promising "a New Deal for the American people." In the first 100 days of his administration, Franklin Roosevelt introduced an "alphabet soup" of relief and recovery measures, which included programs like the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA), the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA), and the National Recovery Administration (NRA). Such measures, as well as later ones like the Works Progress Administration (WPA), reflected Roosevelt's belief that the federal government had an obligation to assure the well being of its citizens. While some of Roosevelt's initial New Deal measures were later declared unconstitutional and even its most successful programs were arguably ineffective in stimulating economic recovery, his expansion of the role of the federal government and his implementation of a permanent social security system under the **Social Security Act** of 1935 signaled the advent of the U.S. welfare state. As a public figure, Roosevelt exemplified the same assertiveness and strategy of direct engagement that characterized his New Deal Administration. Often called "the first modern president," Roosevelt developed a close relationship with the press and with the American people. Always media savvy, he spoke directly and personally to the American people through a range of media outlets, including his weekly series of fireside chats on the radio. The people responded by rallying behind President Roosevelt and supporting his New Deal policies.

If civic life changed dramatically during the Great Depression, so too did the structure of class relationships. Whereas the nation's social and business elite had enjoyed remarkable economic and cultural authority in the 1920s, the Depression decade witnessed unprecedented working-class militancy as well as populist and radical cultural influences. Indeed, the Great Depression was the most important period for the twentieth-century labor movement. In 1935 the relatively moribund craft unionism of the American Federation of Labor (AFL) encountered a new rival in the vital industrial unionism of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). The 1930s witnessed the organization of mass-production industries like auto, steel, and electrical products, as well as vital services like the teamsters and bus drivers. Because many of the new unions enrolled all workers in a plant regardless of their job or skill, their ranks expanded to include many workers whom the AFL had excluded, including Eastern European immigrants, African Americans, Latinos, and women in unskilled occupations. Another feature of unionism in the 1930s was its radical edge, as **communists** and **socialists** played a key role in organizing some workers. Two strike waves exemplify the militancy and vitality of the industrial union movement in the 1930s. In 1934 San Francisco longshoremen, Minneapolis Teamsters, Auto-Lite workers in Toledo, Ohio, and textile workers all along the Eastern seaboard launched epoch labor demonstrations. Three years later, in the winter and spring of 1937, workers launched hundreds of sit-down strikes, prompting *Time* to note that "sitting down has replaced baseball as the national pastime." Among the highlights of the 1937 strike wave was the sitdown of auto workers in Flint, Michigan, in which the United Auto Workers prevailed over General Motors. Likewise, a contest between steel workers and U.S. Steel resulted in victory for the Steel Workers Organizing Committee. Workers who participated in union organizing drives had new weapons in their arsenal because of the passage of the Wagner Act in 1935, which outlawed yellow-dog contracts (that is, signed promises by workers that they would not join labor unions), summary dismissals of union members, and blacklisting, and which created the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to supervise union elections and enforce the guarantee of the right of collective bargaining. The momentum that began in the depths of the Great Depression continued into the war years. By 1945 unions enrolled almost 15 million workers, and about a third of all nonagricultural workers had joined trade unions.

While workers agitated for their rights in labor unions, the broader culture sought for a usable past, which often idealized the "folk" or the "people." Representations of American ideals ranged from communist writings of Mike Gold and Meridel LeSueur, to the left-leaning public art of Ben Shahn and Diego Rivera, to the populist novels of John Steinbeck and films of Frank Capra. Employees on the Public Arts projects and folklorists and photographers working for the Resettlement Administration sought to depict and discover long-standing American ideals of small-town life, folk culture, and traditional gender and family arrangements. While sometimes controversial, particularly when publicly sponsored art or literature expressed subversive themes, this flourishing of an American documentary tradition is one of the greatest legacies of the Great Depression, suggesting how much the nation's cultural landscape, like its politics and economy, was fundamentally altered because of the Great Depression.

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GREAT GATSBY, THE

VERONICA C. HENDRICK

The Great Gatsby is considered the masterpiece of novelist F. Scott Fitzgerald and is a penetrating look at the inner life of the **upper class** during the 1920s.

Francis Scott Fitzgerald was born on September 24, 1896, and died on December 21, 1940. Although he was raised in Saint Paul, Minnesota, he moved to the East Coast of the United States to attend prep school and college. He entered Princeton but failed to graduate. Nonetheless, his writing captures and comments upon the class privilege of such environments.

Fitzgerald's work was especially insightful concerning the "Roaring Twenties" following World War I. It was a period in which great fortunes were made and the mood of the country was optimistic. The **American dream**—the belief that with hard work and a bit of luck any person was capable of rising in social class—was a driving social force. The American public believed that each successive generation would be better off than the previous one and that upward **social mobility** was guaranteed. Fitzgerald worked with this theme and its reverse.

Fitzgerald also focused on the complications of romantic relationships, his own marriage inspiring much of his wiring. Both Fitzgerald and his wife, Zelda Sayre, led wild lives filled with parties and intrigue. The drama in their lives ended badly: Fitzgerald became an alcoholic and suffered mental collapses, while Zelda spent much of her life in and out of mental institutions trying to manage her schizophrenia. Ultimately, Zelda perished in a hospital fire, and Fitzgerald died at the age of forty-four. Their lifestyles were the topic of newspaper stories and gossip mills. They were also reflected in Fitzgerald's second novel, *The Beautiful and Damned* (1922), and can be seen in *The Great Gatsby*.

The Great Gatsby was published in 1925. It is a short novel focusing on life in Long Island, New York, during the 1920s, the halcyon period before the **stock market** crash, the **Great Depression**, and World War II. Underneath the story runs a social commentary about the elitism of the American upper class. The narrator is Nick Carraway, who has just arrived in New York from the Midwest. He is young and naïve. Although it is clear that he has the means and connections to become successful, Nick is just starting to make his way. Nick's naïveté is challenged when his well-established cousin, Daisy Buchanan, invites him to visit her posh home and wealthy community.

Daisy and Nick live near one another, but each town has a different flavor. Daisy lives amid "old money," and her husband, Tom, is representative of this social circle. The Buchanans are not merely wealthy; they have all the required pedigrees for social acceptance: the right family background, listings in the *Social Register*,

the proper college degrees, and membership in exclusive **country clubs**. Nonetheless, Daisy and Tom's marriage has many flaws. The open affair between Tom and Myrtle Wilson is one of the many indicators that their lives are empty and corrupt. Tom's brutishness and Daisy's drinking are other signs. Nick, by contrast, lives in a different town, which he jokingly calls West Egg, in contrast to Daisy's East Egg. In West Egg live families with "new money," many of whom had become social climbers. Many tried to purchase their entrée into society, but most lacked the breeding to be taken seriously by the old money elite of East Egg. Nick lives here because of his youth and his uncertain economic situation. Jay Gatsby, the title character, lives here as well and is the quintessential representative of new money. It is at first unclear where he, or his money, comes from, but something underhanded is clearly part of his economic success. Gatsby does everything to claim refinement and style, creating a fictional back story complete with university and military careers. Gatsby has an enormous house with a classical structure and throws lavish parties every weekend. His money is sloshed around like water, but he lacks things that money cannot buy, the main thing being Daisy, his lost love.

The story interweaves the fates of Daisy, Jay, and Nick, each representing a different rung on the social ladder. Nick acts as an intermediary between Gatsby and Daisy, arranging a reunion between the ex-lovers. The affair that begins between the two is short-lived. Even though their affair is obvious to Tom, Daisy does not reject her marriage in the end. However, Daisy is instrumental in causing Gatsby's murder. While driving home after a confrontation between Tom and Gatsby, Daisy has an accident in which she kills the driver of the other car: Myrtle, Tom's mistress. Tom wishes to protect his wife and exact revenge, so he tells Myrtle's husband, Wilson, that Gatsby was the driver. Wilson also believes that Gatsby was Myrtle's lover and, in a fit of rage, murders Gatsby before shooting himself. Gatsby's desire to face his problems is a sharp contrast to Tom's trickery, which emphasizes the falsity of social labels.

Fitzgerald continues his social commentary on the corruption and emptiness of upper-class life at Gatsby's funeral. Although hundreds turned out for his parties, few come to his funeral. One notable exception is a racketeer who helped Gatsby become wealthy; he is one of the few who mourn Gatsby's passing. The funeral highlights the false behavior of the upper class presented in the novel and implies that even mobsters have more heart than the upper crust.

Shaken by what he has witnessed, Nick returns to the Midwest, a metaphor for virtue and pragmatic values. He not only rejects the social elitism and false morality of Daisy's world; he also declines the promise of vast wealth that fueled Gatsby's lifestyle. That is not to say that Nick rejected Gatsby in entirety. Nick was captivated by Gatsby's charm, though he ultimately concludes that Gatsby's greatness came from living out the American dream. Nick believes that Gatsby is the last of his kind because materialism and decay have corrupted that dream.

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GREAT SOCIETY

MELISSA A. T. KOTULSKI

The Great Society describes a series of legislative acts passed between 1964 and 1968 and signed into law by President Lyndon Johnson. This flurry of liberal reforms attempted to tackle issues of **poverty**, civil rights, **education**, health, city revitalization, and consumer protection. These acts were enacted in a time when Johnson inherited ideals from the Kennedy administration and civil rights and other social movements were in active phase. The programs resulted from of a series of studies, committees, and congressional acts. The Great Society has had a lasting impact, particularly on education and medical care for poverty-stricken people of the United States because, unlike the **New Deal**, it addressed the underlying causes of poverty. Its central principles of amelioration and opportunity continue to under gird anti-poverty programs.

On March 16, 1964, Johnson declared a **War on Poverty** in a message to Congress in which he submitted the **Economic Opportunity Act** of 1964. The bill passed largely intact and was amended in 1965 with funding to implement programs that worked to educate and train poor children, youths, and adults in cities and rural areas. Of the \$962 million in the bill, \$727 million was earmarked to support Titles I and II, which created **Job Corps**, Community Action and adult education programs, and voluntary assistance programs for needy children. The bill also created the **Head Start** program, which delivered direct medical, psychological, and educational benefits to poor children.

Federal legislation on poverty during the Great Society was in response to reports and studies that came out in the early 1960s, such as *The Other America* by **Michael Harrington** and the Council of Economic Advisers' report. Harrington showed that 11 million American adults had less than a sixth grade education, while the Council uncovered that one in five Americans were poor, 78 percent of them white. The War on Poverty presented major solutions that ameliorated and exacerbated the conditions of poverty.

Great Society health and education reforms highlighted the socioeconomic and racial disparities of the United States. By 1964, the federal government had no formal medical care program, yet still spent \$8 billion for health and medical services for the poor. Up through World War II, the American Medical Association (AMA) was a fierce opponent of federal medical programs. Since President Harry Truman's failed health care proposal of 1949, the Kerr-Mills bill was the first limited measure attempting to provide care for the medically needy. Great acceptance of federally funded medical care evolved with health services for Cuban refugees and migrant farm workers in 1962, and Head Start participants and Appalachian residents received medical care in 1965. When Democrats won control of Congress in 1964, Johnson contracted a blue-ribbon panel of experts to counter the AMA's resistance to centralized medical care. Chaired by a Houston heart surgeon, the panel reported on the limited access to first-rate medical care in the United States. By 1965, Congress and Johnson passed the bill that enacted Medicare and Medicaid.

The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 signaled the elevation of education to the status of a right by establishing a statutory federal commitment to

equal educational opportunity, and it created a number of new national educational programs to promote school improvement.

Two major pieces of legislation and one report were pivotal in addressing civil rights under the Great Society. The 1964 Civil Rights Act's Titles I, II, VI, and VII were the most important because they dealt with access to public accommodations without regard to race, creed religion, or national origin. They also banned discrimination in federally funded programs, created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and expanded voting rights. The 1965 Voting Rights Act supplemented the 1964 act to ensure that African Americans were no longer barred from exercising their fundamental American suffrage freedoms. The 1965 Moynihan Report built on the studies of lower-class life of the 1930s by reporting on the breakdown of the African American family. The mood of the nation shifted in the middle 1960s, and the 1968 Civil Rights Act addressed fair housing but also included strong language against urban rioting. Beginning with the Watts riot in 1965, the mid and late 60s were marred by violence in the **inner cities**. Many of these riots involved African Americans who had grown weary of the slow pace by which **racism** was being addressed.

President Johnson's Model Cities program responded to the flight of whites, white ethnics, and the black **middle class** to the **suburbs**, which Kenneth Jackson dubbed the "crabgrass frontier." This redistribution of **wealth** led to gross disparities in resources for the cities, and the Kerner Commission warned that the United States was "moving toward two societies, one black, one white—separate and unequal." The Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Act planned for federally funded urban development and created the Department of HUD. Declaring that improvements on the quality of city life were the most critical domestic program in the United States, the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act programs addressed changes to the urban and metropolitan environment and broadened home loan mortgage and urban sectors insurance, programs for veterans, and flexibility in what was defined as urban.

Consumer protection, environmentalism, eradication of crime, and national culture were also addressed by the Great Society. Most notably, in 1965 **Ralph Nader** began his lifelong stance as a consumer advocate lawyer. His advocacy and book *Unsafe at Any Speed* led up to the passage of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act and Highway Safety Act of 1966.

The Great Society attempted to tap into the idealism of the 1960s by creating programs and legislation to correct the pressing issues of the day. By 1968, riots in U.S. cities, assassinations of key political leaders, the budgetary demands of the Vietnam War, and the election of Richard Nixon shifted the outlook of many Americans. Programs of the Great Society ended with mixed success, in part because of inefficient distribution of funding and the impatience of Americans awaiting fulfillment of Great Society promises.

Since Johnson left office in 1968, scholars and politicians alike have debated the meaning of the Great Society. For conservatives, the Great Society surpassed even the New Deal in its excesses. They charge that it was wasteful, expensive, and antithetical to the American spirit of **self-reliance**; created inefficient federal bureaucracies; and allowed the government to usurp roles best left to the private sector. Liberal critics of the Great Society charge that many programs excluded those

334

being served from the decision-making process, that they were often paternalistic, and that most programs were grossly under-funded and doomed to fail. A few see the Great Society as cruel in that it created rising expectations that it could not fulfill. Liberals also tend to cite expenditures on the Vietnam War as the major reason why the War on Poverty was also abandoned. Nonetheless, between 1965 and 1970, 8 million were raised out of poverty as a result of the Great Society's programs. Many of the programs implemented by the Great Society are still in effect, and its overall legacy continues to have an impact on contemporary social and political discourse.

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GRUNGE AND PUNK CULTURE

See Punk and Grunge Culture.

GUARANTEED ANNUAL INCOME

ROBERT E. WEIR

Guaranteed annual income is a plan that would provide families and individuals with a minimum amount of money irrespective of whether they earned it. Its advocates contain surprising numbers of those on both the political left and the right, with the former seeing it a form of income redistribution rooted in social justice and the latter as a better alternative to **welfare** and as inducing more incentives than the current income tax policy. Its supporters have included Richard Nixon, George McGovern, and the **Rev. Martin Luther King Jr.** There are numerous proposals for instituting a guaranteed annual income, but the three major ones are a guaranteed annual wage, the negative income tax, and the universal demogrant.

A guaranteed annual **wage** (GAW) is generally part of an employment contract that is generally negotiated by a labor union. Under such a contract employees are assured of either a certain number of hours per year or of a compensatory payment to make up the gap between that minimum number and the actual hours worked. Such an arrangement has been used in industries that are subject to seasonal **unemployment** or whose labor needs tend to fluctuate depending on orders, contract bids, or general economic conditions. Labor within food processing plants, for example, is dependent on the harvest, while employment within industries that rely on federal contracts can wax and wane according to the contract cycle. Employers

sometimes agree to provide a guaranteed annual wage because it stabilizes the workforce and relieves them of the necessity of training new employees during peak production periods. It also ensures that highly skilled workers will not sell their labor to competitors. The GAW first became widespread after World War II, and a contract negotiated between the United Auto Workers and Ford in 1955 served as a model for subsequent arrangements. Despite widespread **deindustrialization** from the 1970s on, approximately 15 percent of union contracts still contain GAW clauses.

The negative income tax (NIT) is another way of securing a guaranteed annual income. It was first proposed by the economist George Stigler in 1946 and, in a form with built-in incentives, has enjoyed the support of conservative economists such as Milton Friedman. A negative income tax reverses the logic of the current income tax system, which taxes income above a certain level. A NIT would set a floor income for families and individuals and those earning below that level would receive a check from the government. Incentives could be built into the system by also establishing reduction rates and lower income tax rates for those who receive no NIT benefits. If, for example, a \$20,000 floor was established for a family of four, a dollar-for-dollar reduction of income up to that level would provide recipients little incentive to work. However, a multiplier reduction rate could be implemented that allows employees to keep a percentage of all that they earn up to the floor while paying the remainder in taxes. A 10 percent tax on even a very low wage, thus, increases a family's income dramatically. For example, \$5,000 of earned wages effectively raises family income to \$24,500 per year. A negative income tax might also adopt a middle **progressive taxation** level in which a ceiling is established beyond which no NIT tax benefits are received. The government could, for example, declare that \$75,000 was the maximum level at which one could get any benefit and create a sliding income scale for what can be written off between \$20,000 and \$75,000.

For its advocates the beauty of the NIT is that it would eliminate many current programs, some of which are costly and others of which have built-in limits. With the NIT there would no need for unemployment compensation, **Social Security**, or most welfare direct subsidies. Some economists also link NIT proposals to the idea of a **flat tax** that would eliminate most (if not all) deductions, simplify the tax code, and provide greater incentive for high achievers. Some see the current progressive taxation system as unfairly taxing those who obtain high incomes. The NIT would drastically reduce taxes on the wealthy.

The flat tax also figures prominently into the universal demogrant (UD) scheme, which is simpler than the NIT. Under a UD program every citizen (or family) would, simply, be given a tax-free check in the amount the government determines is adequate for survival. All other income would then be taxed at a flat rate.

The guaranteed annual income has many detractors. One objection is that it is regressive in that the tax burden is far greater for those with low to moderate income than for those with fortunes. Others see it as simplistic and level some of the same charges as are targeted at the way the **poverty line** is currently calculated. Any chosen floor is likely to be arbitrary and ignore mitigating circumstances such as regional standards of living, employment opportunities, local **transportation** costs, specialized medical needs, and regional energy costs. Still others simply

doubt that complex social problems can be reduced to one-size-fits-all formulas and suspect that schemes for a guaranteed annual income are back-door attempts to dismantle programs for the needy.

There is also great disagreement over how any program would be funded. Proposals run the gamut from income and **sales taxes** to funding through **lotteries** or pollution credits. A pilot program in Dauphin, Manitoba, is being monitored, as are modified plans in Portugal and Alaska.

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GUTHRIE, WOODY (July 14, 1912?–October 3, 1967)

RON BRILEY

Woodrow Wilson Guthrie was a prolific folk singer and writer from Oklahoma whose music celebrated the common men and women of America during the **Great Depression**. While Guthrie's "This Land Is Your Land" is often proclaimed as a patriotic anthem, the song's verses denouncing social and economic injustice in the United States are often ignored.

Guthrie was born in Okemah, Oklahoma. His perception of humanity and political ideas were grounded in an agrarian tradition of protest in Oklahoma, where a strong **Socialist Party** operated before World War I. He was equally shaped by a radical Christian tradition that viewed Jesus as the champion of the poor and meek, who would inherit the earth and drive the moneychangers out of the temple. He also endured a tragic family history and the experience of his generation with the Depression and Dust Bowl of the 1930s.

Guthrie's father, Charlie, was an entrepreneur whose real estate schemes were unsuccessful. The family was also beset by a series of fires, which led to the death of Guthrie's sister, Clara, and serious injury to his father. The fires were blamed on Guthrie's mother, Nora, who was institutionalized, suffering from Huntington's chorea, a degenerative disease of the central nervous system that eventually claimed Woody as well.

Guthrie's father moved the family to Pampa, Texas, in 1927, and Guthrie joined them three years later. Guthrie married and attempted to support a young family on his meager earnings as a musician and sign painter. Responding to the impact of the Depression and Dust Bowl on the residents of the Texas panhandle, Guthrie penned such songs as "Dusty Old Dust," with its chorus of "So Long, It's Been Good to Know You."

In 1936 Guthrie, like many Dust Bowl refugees, journeyed to California, where he found work on Los Angeles radio station KFVD, teaming with Maxine Crossman for the popular show "Here Comes Woody and Lefty Lou." While working at

KFVD, Guthrie came into contact with Ed Robbins, an organizer for the **Communist Party** (CPUSA). Guthrie began to perform at party functions and wrote a column called "Woody Sez" for *The People's Daily World*, denouncing the **capitalist** system and the injustices of Depressionera America.

Guthrie's politics were becoming too radical for the progressive Fred Burke who owned KFVD, and Guthrie departed for New York City in 1939. In February 1940 Guthrie wrote "This Land Is Your Land" in response to what he considered the shallow patriotism of Irving Berlin's "God Bless America." After performing at a concert to benefit John Steinbeck's Committee for Agricultural Workers, Guthrie was discovered by folklorist Alan Lomax, who helped Guthrie record his first commercial effort, *Dust Bowl Ballads*. The Oklahoman



Woody Guthrie playing a guitar that has a sticker attached reading "This Machine Kills Fascists," ca. 1943. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

also hosted two radio shows for CBS, but when sponsors pressured Guthrie to abandon his "Woody Sez" column for the communist *Daily Worker*, Guthrie left New York City and secured employment with the Bonneville Power Administration, a series of dams on the Columbia River. Inspired by the potential for public power, Guthrie penned such classic songs as "Roll On, Columbia" and "Pastures of Plenty." In 1966 Washington state honored Guthrie by giving his name to one of the Bonneville power substations.

In 1941 Guthrie accepted an invitation from **Pete Seeger** to return to New York City and join the Almanac Singers, who supported the organizing efforts of the **Congress of Industrial Organizations** and opposed American entrance into World War II. Following Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, the Almanac Singers reversed course and adopted an antifascist interventionist position exemplified by such songs as "The Reuben James." In 1943 Guthrie wrote his autobiography *Bound for Glory*, extolling the virtues of the common people and detailing Guthrie's early struggles. During World War II, Guthrie served in the Merchant Marine with his singing partner Cisco Houston. Near the war's conclusion, Guthrie was drafted into the Army for a year's service, but the discipline of military life did not set well with Guthrie.

During the post–World War II period, Guthrie's opposition to the **Cold War** was apparent in his support of the Progressive Party candidacy of former Vice President Henry Wallace. Guthrie, however, was spared the inquisition of the second **Red Scare** and **McCarthyism**, as he was diagnosed with Huntington's chorea and was institutionalized from 1954 until his death in 1967. Guthrie never denounced his radical views. It is unclear whether Guthrie actually joined the CPUSA, but he dismissed the question by quipping, "I ain't a communist

necessarily, but I been in the red all my life." Guthrie's legacy remains a collection of over 1,000 songs celebrating the struggles of **working-class** men and women.

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HAMPTONS

ROBERT E. WEIR

"The Hamptons" is the name given for nineteen towns and villages located near the extreme southeastern end of Long Island in Suffolk County, New York. Among the better known municipalities are Amagansett, East Hampton, Montauk, Sag Harbor, Southampton, and Westhampton Beach. The Hamptons have been associated with the **upper class** for so long that the phrase reflexively evokes images of **wealth**. To be sure, not all who live in the region are rich, but a typical monthly real estate log reveals that few homes sell for under \$1 million, and sales of over \$25 million are not unusual.

The Hamptons benefit from their proximity to New York City. Much like **Newport**, Rhode Island, the Hamptons are famed for summer "cottages" occupied by those rich individuals listed in the *Social Register* who sought to escape the heat of urban summers. Also like Newport, many wealthy individuals—including film stars, designers, and political families—now reside in the Hamptons full-time.

The region was originally home to **Native American** tribes such as the Montauketts and Shinnecocks. English colonists developed interest in the area because of Sag Harbor's superb deep-water port, but it was not a fashionable destination until the mid-nineteenth century. Sag Harbor, in fact, was a shipping port and whaling center whose town life was dominated by a rough-and-tumble maritime ethos and a peripatetic population until around 1850, when the whaling industry declined. Unlike today, the far reaches of Long Island were difficult to access except by sea.

Railroads and the 1883 opening of the Brooklyn Bridge led to a building boom on Long Island. Steamships delivered service to some Long Island communities, but after the **Civil War**, railroads made travel easier. For a time, there were rival firms, but **robber baron** Austin Corbin's Long Island Rail Road (LIRR) eventually swamped its competitors. Not coincidentally, the LIRR also obtained vast tracts of Native American land, some by honest exchange and quite a bit by trickery. The LIRR reached Sag Harbor in 1870. At first, it carried tourists venturing to see a famed

Comedian Jerry Seinfeld's house in the Hamptons. © Russell Turiak/Getty Images.

lighthouse at nearby Montauk Point, but soon, Corbin and business partner Arthur Benson began to develop the land. A golf course, hotel, and "summer colony" were built, and famed architects such as Stanford White were dispatched to design homes for the **Gilded Age** elites. By the time of Corbin's death in 1896, the Hamptons were a place where high society gathered in the summer for balls, fox hunting, **yachting**, and other upper-crust pursuits.

The Hamptons were rendered immortal and, to some degree, infamous by the novels of F. Scott Fitzgerald, especially *The Great Gatsby*. Fitzgerald depicted a world

of callous wealth occupied by the idle rich who flaunted 1920s Prohibition laws and were oblivious to their own self-destructive behavior. There was some truth to Fitzgerald's fictive images, as the Hamptons in the 1920s were, indeed, a place where business figures cavorted with organized crime figures such as "Legs" Diamond, vacuous stars from the burgeoning film industry, and politicians of dubious honesty. Fitzgerald was also on the mark in noting the importance of the automobile in transforming the Hamptons. There was, however, some backlash against the rich. One manifestation of this was the rise of the **Ku Klux Klan**, which was fiercely proabstinence. It was estimated that by the mid-1920s one of eight Long Islanders belonged to the Klan, many of whom were members of the resentful **working class**.

The **Great Depression** curtailed many of the excesses among the upper classes. After World War II, though, the Hamptons regained lost luster and continue to be both a destination and desired residency of affluent Americans, especially those from metropolitan New York City. Despite its high-profile, upper-income residents, the Hamptons also have a substantial stratum of working-class and lower **middle-class** residents and **immigrants**, many of whom work in domestic, caretaking, childcare, and retail positions and other jobs related to the area's affluent lifestyle. The Hamptons remain both a prestige address and a source of class resentment. Some of the latter surfaced in John Irving's 1999 novel *A Widow for One Year*. In 2001 the murder of financier Ted Ammon also cast notoriety on the area.

The Hamptons are emblematic of other enclaves for the upper class in America. Many American cities have such exclusive sections within their borders or within easy reach. Others include **Beacon Hill** in Boston, Chicago's Gold Coast, Bloomfield Hills and Grosse Point near Detroit, River Oaks in Houston, Beverly Hills and Hollywood in Los Angeles, Miami Beach, the Main Line outside of Philadelphia, and New York's Upper East Side.

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HARLEM

ROBERT E. WEIR

Harlem is the section of New York City north of where Central Park ends at 110th Street; it is bordered by the Hudson and Harlem Rivers, Morningside Heights, and Manhattanville. In the popular mind, Harlem is often viewed as the quintessential American **ghetto** and a repository of African American **poverty**. Like most stereotypes, there is both truth and falsehood to these images.

Harlem was first settled by the Netherlands in the mid-seventeenth century and was named for the Dutch city of Haarlem near Amsterdam. Its current spelling resulted from the English takeover of the colony of New York in 1664. By the time of the **American Revolution**, Harlem was both a desirable neighborhood and a separate village beyond New York City's limits. Alexander Hamilton was among the **Founding Fathers** who lived there. Wealthy estates and farms existed in Harlem well into the nineteenth century, though as early as 1831 it was connected to New York City by railroads. As Harlem became integrated into the rest of the city, it was increasingly a destination for **immigrants**, including Germans, **Jews**, and Italians. Oscar Hammerstein I, a patron of the **opera**, opened the Harlem Opera House in 1889, and as recently as 1917 more than 150,000 Jews lived in Harlem.

Harlem's black identity developed in the early twentieth century, largely as a result of **racism**. As more New York City neighborhoods excluded blacks, many African Americans moved into Harlem, where rents were higher, but where black residents were welcomed. This coincided with what historians call the "Great Migration," an exodus of African Americans from the South and into northern cities in search of employment. By 1920 central Harlem had become a black **ethnic enclave**, and white flight escalated. As more African Americans moved into Harlem, investment and building declined, resulting in deteriorating housing stock, high population density, and rising social problems.

Despite rising crime and widespread **unemployment**, the area was home to a remarkable cultural flowering in the 1920s and 1930s known as the Harlem Renaissance. Famed writers such as Langston Hughes, Zora Neale Hurston, Alain Locke, Claude McKay, and Jean Toomer worked in Harlem, and clubs such as the Cotton Club, the Savoy Ballroom, and the Apollo Theater featured such great musical artists as Louis Armstrong, Duke Ellington, Billie Holiday, and Bessie Smith. Harlem was also the center of black entrepreneurship and political life. Marcus Garvey's Black Nationalist movement thrived in Harlem in the early 1920s, and Harlem was also the headquarters of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (**NAACP**). For a time, both **W. E. B. Du Bois** and A. Philip Randolph resided in Harlem. During the 1930s the **Communist Party** also organized in Harlem, and it maintains a presence there to the present. Before World War II, East Harlem, which was still mostly white, was a center of organized crime run by Jewish and Italian mobs.

The effects of the **Great Depression**, the 1935 and 1943 race riots, continuing white flight, and the relocation of wealthier blacks led to economic decline in Harlem. After World War II, other parts of New York opened to blacks, but



Street scene in Harlem, ca. 1943. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

Harlem remained an African American cultural center. An increasing number of Puerto Ricans and Latinos moved into East Harlem, and it became known as "Spanish Harlem." By the 1960s parts of Harlem had indeed become a ghetto. It had the highest murder, rape, robbery, and drug addiction rates in the city, as well as more health problems. By the late 1960s, Harlem had two-thirds of all city drug addicts, who often used the area's many abandoned buildings to deal and use controlled substances. Harlem reached its nadir in 1968 when a horrible riot in the wake of the assassination of **Martin Luther King Jr.** led to massive looting and burning. This came less than four years after a 1964 riot injured 144 people. The area's poverty and unemployment led to social activism by groups such as the Committee on Racial Equality and the NAACP. Black Muslim leader Malcolm X was very vocal about Harlem's problems before his assassination in 1965. Congressman Adam Clayton Powell Jr. (served 1945–1971) also kept Harlem's problems before the public eye.

Harlem began to revive in the 1990s, though its current surface gentrification is just as deceptive as the ghetto stereotypes. The 1990s also saw racial tension between African Americans, Koreans, and Jews. In addition, as revealed by writers such as **Jonathan Kozol**, public schools in Harlem, the Bronx, and other areas where minority groups dominate remain deplorable and substandard. Nonetheless, renewed law enforcement efforts have drastically reduced crime in Harlem, new

businesses have cropped up, and buildings have been rehabilitated. Former President Bill Clinton located his offices in Harlem.

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HARRINGTON, MICHAEL (February 24, 1928–July 31, 1989)

ROBERT E. WEIR

Edward Michael Harrington was a **socialist**, lecturer, and writer. His 1962 book *The Other America* did much to explode the myth of the United States as a uniformly affluent society and is credited with influencing federal antipoverty programs in the mid-1960s.

Harrington was born in St. Louis, was raised in an Irish Catholic family, and obtained a bachelor's degree from Holy Cross College in Worcester, Massachusetts, and an MA in literature from the University of Chicago. He also briefly attended Yale Law School. Harrington was radicalized through involvement with the Catholic Worker Movement established by **Dorothy Day** and was an active socialist during the 1950s, a time in which many radicals kept a low profile because of the raging Cold War **Red Scare**. Like many socialists, Harrington got caught up in doctrinal splits within the movement, though he shared the antipathy toward **communism** that most socialist groups held. He was involved in the League of Industrial Democracy, a group that gave seed money to the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) in 1962, although Harrington was initially critical of SDS.

Harrington edited *The Catholic Worker* from 1951 to 1953, but left the Catholic Church shortly thereafter. He then joined a **Trotskyite** organization, but eventually joined the Socialist Party led by **Norman Thomas**. Harrington's time working in a **settlement house** in New York City exposed him to hidden pockets of poverty in the United States and was the genesis for *The Other America*.

The Other America was a shocking book when it appeared in 1962. The post–World War II economic boom and the general political torpor of white politics in the 1950s had led many Americans to accept blithe assumptions about society, social class, and economic opportunity. Partly because of a misreading of **John Kenneth Galbraith**'s study *The Affluent Society*, few Americans questioned the rhetoric that America was becoming a **middle-class** society. The Other American destroyed such assumptions and revealed that as much as 25 percent of American society lived in poverty that was too conveniently hidden from view. Harrington's study concentrated largely on three groups: the rural poor living in **Appalachia**, African Americans in the Jim Crow South, and elderly urban dwellers. Harrington called on the government to take action to alleviate poverty.

Harrington's book captured much of the early 1960s zeitgeist and was widely discussed by both the Kennedy and the Johnson administrations. *The Other America* was widely cited during Congressional debates, in the media, and in **academia**. President Johnson referenced it when launching his 1965 "War on Poverty," and the book is often credited as part of the inspiration behind such **Great Society** programs as the **Economic Opportunity Act**, the Appalachian Redevelopment Act, Medicare, and various urban renewal initiatives.

Harrington also embraced the Civil Rights Movement, advised Rev. Martin Luther King Jr., and helped King articulate his opposition to the Vietnam War, a view shared by Harrington. Harrington quit the Socialist Party in 1972, complaining that it had become too conservative. He promptly founded a new group that eventually became the Democratic Socialists of America, a group that is committed to democracy and is willing to cooperate with liberals, yet remains critical of capitalism. Harrington updated *The Other America* in *The New American Poverty* (1984), but this book did not have the impact of the former work. Harrington taught political science at the Queens College of the City of New York University, which now houses the Michael Harrington Center for Democratic Values and Social Change.

Harrington's set of data is outdated, but the basic parameters of his work remain valid. He deserves credit for helping expose affluence as a myth and for peeling back the curtains that hid poverty from plain view.

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HAYWOOD, "BIG BILL" (February 4, 1869–May 18, 1929)

PETER C. HOLLORAN

A colorful and robust leader in the American **labor movement**, William Dudley Haywood, better known as "Big Bill" Haywood, was born in Salt Lake City, Utah, on February 4, 1869. The death of his father, a Pony Express rider and silver miner, when Haywood was age three and his family's chronic poverty forced him to leave school at age twelve. He began working in the Nevada silver mines at age fifteen. Drifting from jobs as a cowboy, homesteader, and lead and gold miner, he learned the value of **working-class** solidarity in labor unions. Although blind in one eye, the stocky, imposing Haywood was dubbed "Big Bill." He joined the newly organized Western Federation of Miners (WFM) in 1896 and rose to the executive board in 1900. He became editor of the WFM's *Miners' Magazine* in 1901 and became the national secretary-treasurer. At the WFM headquarters in Denver, he absorbed radical ideas about **populism**, **socialism**, and class warfare and emerged as a militant labor leader. Known for his thunderous voice, total disrespect for the **American Federation of Labor's** trade unionism, and any unjust laws imposed on his

fellow workers, he campaigned tirelessly for the eight-hour workday and for the oppressed workers he called the roughnecks of the world.

In 1904 Haywood was accused of inciting violence, especially as leader of Colorado's Cripple Creek strike of 1903–04. Charged with the murder of former Idaho governor Frank Steunenberg, Haywood and two codefendants were defended by the radical lawyer Clarence Darrow. They were acquitted in a sensational trial in 1905.

That same year, Haywood joined the socialist leaders Eugene V. Debs and Daniel De Leon to organize the revolutionary labor organization called the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), or Wobblies. The IWW's goal was to overthrow capitalism and reconstruct society on the basis of socialism and syndicalism. Haywood, who disdained Christianity, joined the Socialist Party and served on its national executive board until his reputation as an advocate of sabotage and violence led to his dismissal in 1912. He was an IWW



Bill Haywood with fellow strike leader Adolph Lessig at Paterson, New Jersey, 1913. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

leader during the tumultuous textile workers' strikes in Lawrence, Massachusetts, in 1912, and in Paterson, New Jersey, in 1913, and he then joined Seattle's general strike in 1919. Most significantly, Haywood embraced direct mass action and repudiated the conservative craft-union principles of **Samuel Gompers** and the American Federation of Labor (AFL), preferring the militancy and social **class-struggle** doctrines of the IWW. By 1915 Haywood had led the IWW to organize 30,000 unskilled **immigrants** among western mine, timber, and agricultural workers, and he spurned the AFL's cooperation with President Woodrow Wilson's administration during World War I. This led to his arrest for sedition in 1917. In an infamous Chicago trial in 1918, he was convicted and sentenced to twenty years of imprisonment.

Haywood served one year in Leavenworth Prison, and while awaiting a new trial in 1920, he became frustrated with the internal squabbling at the IWW Chicago headquarters. To many Wobblies, the Soviet Union and **communism** seemed to offer a workers' paradise. Others harbored serious reservations about cooperating with any government. By 1920 the IWW leaders had split over the Russian Revolution and other issues. Haywood escaped from these chronic conflicts in Chicago to the comfortable lecture circuit, but drank heavily as his health deteriorated. A federal appeals court upheld his conviction for conspiracy

to resist the draft registration and to incite insubordination in the armed forces. When Soviet agents offered him asylum and a post as labor adviser to Vladimir I. Lenin, Haywood accepted and jumped bond. In Russia he lived as an unhappy exile and Bolshevik workers' hero until his death on May 18, 1928. He wrote many articles as well as his autobiography, published posthumously in 1929 as *Bill Haywood's Book*. Haywood's ashes were buried in the Kremlin Wall in Moscow and at Forest Home Cemetery in Chicago. The life and career of the dynamic and remarkable "Big Bill" Haywood exemplify the indigenous roots of American radicalism and the fury with which his government pursued working-class rebels.

Suggested Reading

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HEAD START

ARTHUR HOLST

Head Start is a program designed to compensate for the educational deficiencies suffered by economically disadvantaged youth.

During President Lyndon B. Johnson's first inaugural address in 1964, he spoke of a "Great Society" in which all Americans could live in a country where one's fullest educational, vocational, and social potential could be realized. A key part of the Great Society was the creation of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 (EOA), which was responsible for many programs and assistance for the less fortunate. The EOA was directed and controlled by management in the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO). As part of Johnson's plan to improve the welfare of our country, he mapped out a defined educational plan for those children he knew were unable to afford the most prestigious schools, or even adequate public institutions. Accordingly, he set up a program for disadvantaged youths between the ages of birth and five that was first called Project Head Start.

Project Head Start began as an eight-week summer educational program provided by the OEC in 1965 and was initially designed to help break the continuous cycle of poverty by providing short and simple preschool lessons to children of lower-income families. In addition there were detailed plans to help the families fulfill emotional, psychological, social, health, and nutritional needs. When it was first implemented, the program became popular with teachers, child psychologists and specialists, leaders in the community, and especially parents. In 1969 Project Head Start (by then referred to merely as Head Start) was moved from the OEO to the Office of Child Development under the direction of the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

Head Start is now under the control of the Administration on Children, Youth, and Families as part of the revamped Department of Health and Human Services. Currently, about 900,000 children are enrolled in over 1,400 Head Start centers nationwide. The program serves families and children of all fifty states, in both rural and urban communities. Head Start also serves children and their families in the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. territories. Its clientele include many **Native Americans** as well as migrant children from across the globe. Since its implementation in 1964, Head Start has served more than twenty million children and their families.

The Head Start program's guidelines, as set by the federal government, must be followed in order to preserve Head Start's philosophy of promoting a child's social competence. Head Start focuses on education, health, parental involvement, and social services. Its education program helps all children who qualify for Head Start, regardless of mental or physical ability. To provide the best health services possible, Head Start offers a wide range of programs such as dental, medical, nutritional, and mental health services. Parents involved in Head Start are offered programs in education and job training. These parents are also required to serve as volunteers for Head Start events in exchange for preference in available Head Start jobs for which they may be qualified. In the social service component of Head Start, families receive assessments of their needs on both personal and financial levels. Also, the program provides referrals for crisis management and intervention as well as needed emergency assistance.

Although Head Start is an important asset to many underprivileged families, not everyone is eligible for this valuable resource. To be able to use the Head Start facilities, the child must be in a family in which the total income level falls below the **poverty line** set by the federal government. (Current regulations do allow for up to 10 percent of enrollees to come from families that slightly exceed the federal poverty line.) Once granted access to the program, families are considered eligible for one full calendar year at a time, and they must re-apply at the end of that year. Another requirement is that a child can only be enrolled if there are absolutely no other preschools in the area.

Financial and educational assistance is administered by local community-based and nonprofit organizations and local school systems. Grants, however, are administered by the regional offices of the Department of Health and Human Services, with the exception that Native American and migrant programs are administered directly by the Washington, D.C., office.

Some critics claim that Head Start is wasteful and of little educational merit. The program is enormously popular among parents, teachers, and community leaders, however, and most studies assert that critics are incorrect in their assessment of its educational merits. Most students who go through Head Start have higher achievement levels than peers who do not.

Suggested Reading

Head Start Bureau (http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/hsb/); Sherri Oden, Lawrence Schweinhart, and David Weikart, *Into Adulthood: A Study of the Effects of Head Start*, 2000; Edward Zigler and Sally J. Styfco, eds., *The Head Start Debates*, 2004.

HEALTH CARE

See Medical Care.

HEARST FAMILY

ROBERT E. WEIR

The Hearst family is a wealthy family primarily associated with the newspaper industry. To their detractors, some members of the Hearst family demonstrate how **wealth** and privilege among the **upper class** excuse unscrupulous, immoral, and even illegal behaviors. The Hearst family exemplifies the way in which great wealth is heritable in the United States.

The Hearst family fortune first came into being under George Hearst (September 3, 1820–February 28, 1891), who was born in Sullivan, Missouri. He studied at the Franklin County Mining School and made his way to California, where he enriched himself by prospecting during the gold rush. He became an astute investor and businessman with interests in silver, copper, real estate, and other holdings. In 1862 he moved to San Francisco, got involved in politics, and married Phoebe Apperson. The couple had one son, William Randolph. George Hearst served in the California legislature in 1865–66, but failed in a bid to become governor in 1882. Four years later, however, he was appointed to the U.S. Senate and served from 1886 until his death in 1891. Among the many enterprises that Hearst commanded was the *San Francisco Examiner* newspaper, which legend holds came to him to retire a gambling debt. George Hearst took avid interest in the paper, and in 1887 he appointed his twenty-three-year-old son to a position of power at the paper.

Phoebe Apperson Hearst (1842–1919) lacked her husband's bombast, but had a distinguished career of her own. She was a generous supporter of the University of California and in 1897 became UCal's first female regent. That same year, she founded an organization that later evolved into the Parent–Teacher Association (PTA). She was also a cofounder of the National Cathedral School in Washington, D.C., a prestigious **Episcopalian** school for girls.

The most famed member of the Hearst clan was George and Phoebe's son, William Randolph Hearst (April 29, 1863–August 14, 1951). He parlayed his father's newspaper, the *San Francisco Examiner*, into a controversial career. He took over the paper less than two years after being expelled from Harvard for an off-color prank. Hearst was inspired by Joseph Pulitzer's innovative approach to journalism, and when he purchased the *New York Morning Journal* in 1895, he became Pulitzer's main rival. The two men created media empires that presaged the chains and **newspaper mergers** of the late twentieth century. They also advanced an approach to newspaper content often called "yellow journalism," a blend of sensationalism, attention-grabbing gimmickry, and nationalism. Hearst is often credited with precipitating the Spanish-American War through the bellicosity of his papers' coverage, a hyperbolic charge that nonetheless has some merit. At the height of his powers in the 1920s, Hearst controlled twenty-eight newspapers, with holdings in

all the major media markets. Despite his penchant for exaggerated headlines and florid prose, Hearst employed some of the best writers of his day; among them Ambrose Bierce, Stephen Crane, Richard Harding Davis, **Jack London**, and Mark Twain. He did not hesitate to raid rivals to secure talent.

Like his father, William Randolph Hearst also dabbled in politics, serving in the U.S. House of Representatives between 1903 and 1907. Bids to become New York City mayor failed in 1905 and 1909, as did his run for New York governor in 1906. Hearst's financial holdings were greatly reduced by the **Great Depression**, and he was an outspoken critic of the perceived slowness of President Herbert Hoover to alleviate the economic slide. Hence, he was an early supporter of **Franklin Roosevelt** and his **New Deal** programs. In 1934, however, Hearst turned against Roosevelt, and he grew increasingly reactionary as he got older. Hearst appears to have been an early admirer of Adolf Hitler, but his papers were critical of Hitler before World War II broke out. Hearst vehemently denied charges of anti-Semitism, though there is little doubt of his **racism** toward African Americans, Asians, and Mexicans. Hearst was also rabidly anticommunist.

Hearst's private life was just as controversial as his public affairs. In 1903 he married Millicent Veronica Willson (July 16, 1882-December 5, 1974), a vaudeville actress, with whom he had five sons. His New York political aspirations dashed, Hearst spent increasing amounts of time on his family's estate near Los Angeles. In 1919 he began construction of an opulent castle-like mansion at San Simeon that eventually became a sprawling 165-room testament to Hearst's fortune and oversized ego. He also spent time amid Hollywood's burgeoning film industry and began living with actress Marion Davies, with whom he may have had an earlier affair when she was a Ziegfeld Follies girl in New York. Hearst never divorced his wife, but from the 1920s until his death, Ms. Davies was Hearst's paramour, and the two threw lavish parties at San Simeon. Hearst even created Cosmopolitan Pictures to produce films in which Davies starred. Their relationship was not monogamous, however, and Davies's alleged involvement with Charlie Chaplin led to a tawdry incident: in 1924 producer Thomas Ince died on Hearst's yacht, and rumors abounded that Hearst had accidentally killed Ince while trying to shoot Chaplin and had then used his money to buy off witnesses.

Hearst's scandalous life, ruthless business practices, and **conspicuous consumption** gained him many enemies. In 1941 the writer, producer, and actor Orson Welles made *Citizen Kane*, whose storyline paralleled Hearst's own biography too closely for comfort. Hearst tried to suppress the film and failed, but he did manage to limit its distribution. Though now hailed as perhaps the greatest **film** depiction of upper-class excess in movie history, *Citizen Kane* was a box-office bust in its own day.

Millicent Hearst was Hearst's wife in name only. By 1925 she spent most of her life in New York amid society and engaged in philanthropy. Her sons—George (April 23, 1904–January 26, 1972); William Randolph Jr. (January 27, 1908–May 14, 1993); John (1910–1958); Randolph (December 2, 1915–December 18, 2000); and David (December 2, 1915–May 13, 1986)—all followed their father into the newspaper business, as did many of their children. William Jr. won a Pulitzer Prize in 1955, and Randolph's personal life, marked by three marriages, most closely resembled that of his father. William Randolph Hearst III chaired the Hearst

Corporation board until 1992. It is now chaired by George Hearst Jr., another grandson of William Randolph Hearst.

The most recent member of the Hearst clan to achieve notoriety was Patricia Campbell Hearst (February 20, 1954–), a daughter of Randolph Hearst. She grew up amid great wealth and was a nineteen-year-old living with her fiancé when, on February 4, 1974, she was kidnapped by a hitherto unknown terrorist group, the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA). A ransom for her release was paid, but she remained in seclusion until April, when she appeared, rifle in hand, with other SLA members as they robbed a Los Angeles bank. Ms. Hearst proclaimed herself a revolutionary and remained on the lam until September, when she was captured by police. Ms. Hearst obtained the services of high-profile attorney F. Lee Bailey, who argued that she was a victim of brainwashing, deprivation, and sexual abuse. She was, however, convicted of armed robbery and was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment. After just twenty-two months, however, her sentence was commuted by President Jimmy Carter, and in 2001, President Bill Clinton pardoned her on his last day in office. Many Americans decried the leniency shown to Ms. Hearst and argued that it highlighted the inequities of **justice** and class in America. Ms. Hearst went on to appear in a few film roles, married her former bodyguard, and moved to Connecticut, where she resides with her husband and two daughters.

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David Nasaw, *The Chief: The Life of William Randolph Hearst*, 2000; Judith Robinson, *Hearsts: An American Dynasty*, 1996; W. A. Swanberg, *Citizen Hearst*, 1996; Nancy Whitelaw, *William Randolph Hearst and the American Century*, 2004.

HEGEMONY THEORY

BRENDA K. BRETZ

Hegemony theory derives from the work of **Marxist** philosopher Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937), who argued that because society is made up of various subcultures and diverse groups of people with differing and often competing goals and values, these various groups can be ruled or dominated by a single group or class. The key is for the dominant group to make the subordinate groups believe that their interests are being served.

This theory is based on a belief that social structures and political systems exist for the benefit of the dominant group. In order to maintain their dominance within society, that group must either employ a coercive **power** apparatus or obtain consensual and ideological approval to accomplish their goals and maintain their control.

When dominant groups attempt to maintain power by means of force, they use such institutions as the police, army, and judiciary to uphold their authority and to quell any dissension. This approach often yields the opposite result of the one desired. When oppressed groups are forced to comply with rules and regulations and values that are in direct conflict with their own interests, they rebel and strike out, attempting to assert their will through mass uprisings.

The other approach is for the dominant group to establish a widely accepted system of values, morals, ethics, and social structure that holds a society together and creates a cohesive people. Various means of transmitting this system of values are employed, including but not limited to the use of popular culture, religion, the media, and education. These mechanisms are the means by which the dominant class obtains the spontaneous adherence of the population to its power and authority. As a result, the culture and values of the dominant group come to be absorbed by all, even when these values are in direct conflict with a subcultures' own best self-interest.

Critics of this theory state that it implies a **false consciousness** on the part of dominated classes, which suggests that the **masses** of people are gullible, easily manipulated, and politically ignorant. It also leaves little room for individuals to understand and freely choose particular cultural or political systems. In effect, the masses are viewed as irrational pawns rather than free agents, but the dominant classes are presented as acting out of coordinated self-interest. This strikes some as condescending toward the masses and others as overly conspiratorial in respect to dominant groups.

Originally, Gramsci advanced this theory to explain why the **working classes** in **capitalist** societies failed to stage a revolution against the dominant, ruling classes who created social, economic, and political institutions that advanced the interests of the ruling class to the detriment of workers. He and subsequent Marxist scholars viewed hegemony as a lamentable but necessary corrective to Marx's predictions of worker uprisings. Many modern scholars invoke Gramsci to explain how individuals sometimes act against self-interest. Today, this theory is applied more broadly to describe the cultural domination within a society of a particular set of values and standards.

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HERITAGE FOUNDATION

See Think Tanks.

HIDDEN INJURIES OF CLASS, THE

BRENDA K. BRETZ

The Hidden Injuries of Class is a pathbreaking book published by Richard Sennett and Jonathan Cobb in 1972. It is a study of **working-class** and poor men, women, and children in the Boston area on the subject of the work they do, their perceptions

of themselves in relation to beliefs about upward mobility, and their assessment of their **status** in American society.

The authors attempted to discover why workers who have achieved success by measures such as moving from **blue-collar** to **white-collar** jobs or achieving a **wage** that provides for comfortable living still have a strong sense of vulnerability and inadequacy and report lacking the security and freedom that material gains should bring into their lives. The lack of agency to control the outcome of their lives is a common theme in this work. Although the audience for this work is the general reader and the authors have deliberately avoided the use of discipline-specific terminology, there are resources available in footnotes and in bibliography for those who wish to delve deeper into the academic nature of the work.

One methodology employed was participant-observer research in which Sennett and Cobb immersed themselves into the lives of the interviewees and their communities, schools, local clubs, and bars. In addition to immersion, they conducted 150 in-depth private and group interviews between July 1969 and July 1970, resulting in 400 hours of discussion. For the interviews, the researchers abandoned impersonal academic methodology in favor of an oral history approach, asking questions in a conversational manner. In this role, Sennett and Cobb were observers, but with a clearly sympathetic point of view to the plight of those studied.

Two-thirds of those studied were in their late thirties or early forties, and most were the third-generation offspring of immigrants. Interspersed were grandparents in their sixties, teenagers, and fourth-generation Americans in their early twenties. All of the middle-aged and older men had spent most of their adult lives doing manual labor, but by the time of the interviews, some had moved into low-level white-collar jobs. Women were interviewed, but the primary focus was on men.

The study began with the goal of discovering how each generation saw their lives as different from their parents' lives. The information the researchers gathered greatly changed their focus, however. Because so many of those who participated in the study described feeling powerless and inadequate, the authors sought an understanding of why these themes dominated. Cobb's afterword to the book suggests that the feelings of inadequacy and powerlessness resulted from conditions that exist within the very structure of society. Individuals do not live in isolation from others. Even when they choose to avoid contact with others and with societal institutions, individuals' self-perceptions are often a result of the way they see and understand their relationship to others. Individuals understand that there exists a "hierarchy of social legitimacy" that calculates each individual's social worth. Those interviewed displayed a damaged self-image and loss of dignity, supporting the notion that class hierarchy results in lack of equality and loss of respect between classes within our society. This work added immensely to subjective class studies and added to the understanding of how social class is about far more than one's financial standing. Sennett and Cobb described a world in which class expectations often exist independently of economic reality. Among other findings, the authors showed how working-class individuals internalize blame, fatalism, and shame, but also anger from feeling disrespected. They also highlight how working-class men attempt to assert **power** within their families as compensation for the power denied to them by society. They also wish better fates for their children, while cognizant of the fact that success equates a break with the family.

The study falls short in offering any concrete suggestions for change and reform within that very societal structure, and Sennett has repudiated some of the naïve **Marxist** rhetoric employed. Nonetheless, it has also been the model for subsequent studies by other writers seeking broader audiences such as **Jonathan Kozol**, **Barbara Ehrenreich**, Lillian Rubin, Alex Kotlowitz, and Susan Faludi.

Suggested Reading

Susan Faludi, Stiffed: The Betrayal of the American Man, 2000; Lillian Rubin, Worlds of Pain: Life in a Working-Class Family, 1976; Rubin, Families on the Fault Line: America's Working Class Speaks about the Family, the Economy, Race, and Ethnicity, 1995; Richard Sennett and Jonathan Cobb, The Hidden Injuries of Class, 1972.

HIGH CULTURE

ROBERT E. WEIR

High culture is the canonization of certain cultural expressions as sophisticated, complex, and superior, and it is usually defined by social **elites** who consciously set themselves in opposition to the tastes of the masses. High culture is generally consumed by a smaller segment of society, one that sees popular culture as a form of **low culture** that is inferior in content and execution.

It is important to realize that definitions of high culture shift and that the label is often arbitrary. In many ways, it describes the hegemonic power of elite social classes and their preferences more than it describes objective standards by which one can judge art, dance, leisure, literature, music, or theater. Those defining and consuming high culture often do so in a conscious effort to cultivate what they view as taste.

The notion of high culture as currently understood is largely a product of **Victorianism**. Social classes have historically had differing access to culture and different preferences, but the content was not always as divergent as it is today. In Elizabethan England, for example, the **lower class** often stood on ground level to see theater, but they witnessed many of the same plays as aristocrats in private boxes. There were class preferences in culture, especially in music and dance, but for the most part, elite culture competed with various folk cultures rather than a more homogeneous mass culture.

In the American colonies and subsequent republic, elites continued to consume culture to a far greater degree than the lower orders, but there were mirroring forms across the social strata. Members of the **upper class** enjoyed the plays of Shakespeare, **opera**, and **symphony**, but so did yeomen and members of the **working class**. There was, however, a distinct difference in how audiences consumed leisure.

Shakespeare, for example, was more likely to be performed much as he wrote the plays in elite theaters, whereas working-class productions often took liberties with language, plot, and structure.

The rise of the new **middle classes** in the nineteenth century eventuated the closing of cultural ranks by the upper classes and their upper-middle-class allies. The upper ranks of American society feared the outburst of mass political participation associated with **Jacksonian democracy**, as well as the exuberant nationalism of the masses. The latter expressed itself culturally in the infamous Astor Square Riot of 1849, in which the lower orders protested the appearance of English Shakespearean actor William Charles Macready and sang the praises of domestic actor Edwin Forrest, whom they felt had been slighted by Macready and his aristocratic supporters.

Rather than submit to the impulses of popular democracy, however, American elites retreated into cultural **Europhilia**. In the decades following the Civil War, the cultural barriers widened between the classes. Certain forms were dubbed sophisticated and artful—high culture—whereas the pursuits of the masses were viewed as debased and simplistic. These views even impacted the purveyors of culture, with artists, conductors, composers, and directors who once sought the acclaim of all citizens choosing to refocus their art, operas, plays, and symphonies for elite audiences. Practice begat ideology, and criteria for high art evolved. Producing high art, it was said, was the product of specialized training, required greater skill to execute, appealed to the soul and intellect, and was imbued with internal beauty. If high culture engaged the brain, low culture was seen as dangerously passionate, bordering on animalistic. Rowdy sports engendered elite criticisms, and some, such as cockfighting and boxing, were often banned.

The emergence of mass popular culture challenged the elite stranglehold on cultural definitions, in part because many members of the middle class embraced mass culture. There were attempts to tame and control some aspects of leisure, such as public parks, professional baseball, and patriotic celebrations, but elites largely retreated to isolated high-culture spheres, marking things such as classical music, opera, classic literature, and art **museums** as separate cultural arenas. Elites were (and are) only occasionally found in such popular-culture venues as amusement parks, the circus, dance halls, movie theaters, or popular music concerts.

Again, however, the efforts of elites are properly viewed as aspects of mild class conflict rather than objective cultural standards. In virtually every aspect of modern-day high culture expression, one can find antecedents in popular culture. Impressionist art that now fetches tens of millions of dollars at exclusive auctions was once scorned as trash. This is true also of the "pop" art of painters such as Andy Warhol and Mark Rothko, not to mention folk artists such as Erastus Salisbury Field and Grandma Moses. In the field of music, many jazz aficionados cultivate snob appeal for music that their forbearers scorned as primitive noise from African Americans. The work of now-classic writers such as Ernest Hemingway and John Steinbeck was once seen as pulp fiction, and the dances of Martha Graham and Isadora Duncan were viewed as eccentric and weird. Photographs now hang in art galleries, but the form itself was originally denounced as mechanistic and noncreative. Even movies, once dismissed as mindless

escapism, now have elite champions, though these champions largely maintain a distinction between "film," allegedly made by auteurs, and mainstream movies that cater to lesser tastes (many foreign films indulge the modern Europhilia of elites).

The acceptance of certain aspects of popular, low culture by elites has led some culture scholars to postulate the existence of a third category sometimes dubbed "middle-brow" art. That said, the distinctions between high and low culture persist throughout American society. Mass culture products such as pop music, rap, rock and roll, television, NASCAR, Disney World, and Harlequin romance novels are disdained by elites. Their distaste is often accompanied by reworked (but some times questionable) appeals to "standards." For example, television acting is viewed as less challenging than theater acting, and famed rock guitarists are said to possess less technical skill than classical guitarists such as Andreas Segovia.

The relative merits of cultural forms are not easily resolved by scholars, but how one spends leisure time remains a potent marker of class boundaries within a society that is often oblivious to its own divisions.

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HIGHER EDUCATION

WILLIAM DEGENARO

Higher education is a domain historically reserved for the leisure classes, and to this day, **middle-** and **upper-class** Americans are over-represented at colleges and universities in comparison with their counterparts in the **working class**. According to 2001 Department of Education statistics, just over 60 percent of high school graduates immediately pursue higher education. Among those whose families are in the lowest 20 percent of income earners, only 50 percent pursue higher education immediately after high school, a number that jumps to over 76 percent for the highest 20 percent of income earners. So issues of income-based access remain significant. It should be noted, though, that many more members of the working class—and even the **working poor**—pursue a college education later in life.

Popular mythology suggests direct causation between college graduation and earning potential; such mythology is certainly overstated. Going to college is a fundamental component of **American dream** myths. Still, despite the statistical reality that in the United States, a working-class child will most likely grow up to be a member of the working class, some evidence suggests a correlation between college education and upward **social mobility**. According to a 2003 U.S. Department of Education report, 74 percent of students whose parents have some college go to college right out of high school. That number drops to 27 percent for students

whose parents have a high school diploma or less. Persistence and graduation rates divide the classes in even starker numbers. So accessing higher education has at least some impact on earning potential and has an even greater impact on the chances of one's children accessing higher education.

Much research suggests that in working-class homes, young people do not receive various kinds of support conducive to pursuing higher education. Middle-and upper-class families in the United States are more likely to send their children to schools (private or public) that encourage college attendance and teach college-preparatory curriculums. Further, the lower the family income and the less educated the parents, the less knowledgeable families are about the price of attending college. For many working-class and working-poor families, college seems even less accessible than it is, given that some of these families lack knowledge about student loan and other aid programs.

The earliest institutions of higher education in the United States were the **elite** colleges of the Northeast—such as Harvard and Yale—that were committed to classical learning. In the nineteenth century, after the **Industrial Revolution**, as the nation sought ways to strengthen the corporate state, the mission of higher education expanded. The Morrill Act of 1862 allowed states to charter universities that would serve the unique economic needs and interests of the individual state. This led to the growth of research schools and agricultural and mechanical colleges (A&Ms) that could teach technical and scientific fields of study such as engineering and agriculture, fields that attracted a more representative cross section of the population, including first-generation college students and members of the working class. Now, higher education trained not only ministers and attorneys, but also soil scientists and industrial managers. With some notable exceptions, this led to a new hierarchy, wherein old money in large part remained at the older, private colleges and the new upwardly mobile middle class made a home for itself at the more affordable, closer-to-home schools made possible by the Morrill Act. In 1901 the junior college movement began, expanding the class tiers of higher education.

Institutions of higher education during these years of expansion and increasing access came to pledge greater allegiance to the values of the "corporate state," an efficient social order in which individuals cooperate with one another by performing routinized tasks. Hence, colleges became increasingly amenable to programs in vocational fields of study. Culturally, by emphasizing competition and **meritocracy**, the new higher education offered a value system consistent with the values of industrial **capitalism**. This emphasis on higher education as a service to the economy continued to expand throughout the twentieth century, as the American college and university became nearly synonymous in the popular imagination with upward job mobility.

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HISPANICS

See Latinos and Hispanics.

HOME OWNERSHIP

IACQUI SHINE

Home ownership in the United States generally refers to the legal possession and occupancy of a single-family dwelling, either by outright financial ownership or through a mortgage secured by a bank or other financial institution. According to the Census Bureau, 69 percent of Americans owned their own homes in the early twenty-first century, a rate that has remained fairly steady since the 1960s, when 63 percent of Americans owned homes. Home ownership is one of the few ways that most Americans build equity and personal **wealth**.

The ideal of home ownership has long been a persistent element of the **American dream**. It has also been an exclusionary practice because access to it has often been denied to those on the margins of society, including the **working class**, the poor, and people of color. Changes in the conditions and nature of the home and home ownership have always wrought significant social consequences.

Ties between property ownership and qualified citizenship were forged early in the American political experience. **Puritans** required property ownership as a condition of franchise early on, and Thomas Jefferson and other **Founding Fathers** espoused their vision of the republic as a nation of "gentleman farmers" whose independence and liberty were guaranteed by the land they owned. Indeed, until the **Industrial Revolution** brought significant changes to the nature of work and of private life, the home was—at least for white men—a site of what historian Elizabeth Blackmar calls "proprietary independence." The home sheltered work and family life and provided for livelihoods.

The Industrial Revolution deepened class stratifications between and among labor, giving rise to a new **middle class**; the home became an important site for these conflicts. An increasingly "private" domestic site distinct from the "public" sphere of work, the idealized domesticity and implied security of the home could also serve as leverage to control an unruly labor force. Throughout the early twentieth century, the home took on increasing importance as an idealized refuge from the work world, as well as a pragmatic tool for limiting workers' mobility through the expensive capital investments that were their homes. The home was also and increasingly prescriptive space, dictating gendered relationships and family life. By 1900 the private home ownership rate was about 46 percent, and home ownership was often financed by private mortgages, sometimes subsidized by employers, often with prohibitive terms of interest and repayment.

The end of World War I marked the beginning of three decades of rapid changes in home ownership and home financing, as the federal government became more and more involved in supporting investment in private homes. In the years immediately after the war, the prosperity rhetoric of the Harding and Hoover administrations included home ownership, though this seldom included financial

management or policy-based incentives to facilitate home purchases. But the dramatic financial disruptions of the **Great Depression** led to drastic changes in government policy and in the economic and political structures of home ownership. The combination of a steep decline in home construction and massive property foreclosures—eventually reaching a rate of over 1,000 a day—led to dramatic federal intervention into the private housing market. The 1933 Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) provided sweeping mortgage assistance by refinancing mortgages and providing low-interest loans to over one million homeowners. The Federal Housing Administration (FHA), authorized by appropriations from the 1934 National Housing Act, extended many of the provisions, both positive and negative, of the HOLC. By securing private mortgages and extending their terms, the federal government reduced the burden on homeowners and reduced astronomical foreclosure rates. These efforts, and the FHA's provisions for home construction and repair, helped to stimulate the building and real estate industries.

But both the HOLC and the FHA were guilty of institutionalized discrimination and racism in national housing policy. Both pieces of legislation authorized standardized systems of property appraisal whose evaluation mechanisms were racist in intent and effect. The HOLC adopted a now-infamous practice of "grading" neighborhoods by race, class, age, and ethnicity. Those neighborhoods that were deemed to be in significant decline were assigned to the HOLC's "Fourth Grade," or "red" category; neighborhoods in this last grade were thus described as "redlined." Residents in redlined neighborhoods were consistently denied loans by local banks and other financial institutions. Densely settled, diverse urban areas almost always fell victim to redlining, both because of their physical decline and because of their demographic makeup. The standards established by the HOLC and the FHA discouraged investment—or even reinvestment—in many urban areas by making loans to suburban property owners instead, thus giving government endorsement to the ascent of the suburbs and concurrent decline of the American inner city.

Government attention to private home ownership continued in the decades after the Great Depression and World War II. The broadest legislation to emerge from these attentions was the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, also known as the GI Bill. It carried significant and varied social service provisions, including a mortgage program that offered long-term guaranteed mortgages. The postwar housing stock shortage, combined with sharply rising marriage and birth rates, meant that new construction, financed by the GI Bill, skyrocketed. Much of this new construction was routed to the suburbs—both to communities like **Levittown**, New York, and to areas whose development was less deliberately planned. The result of this rapid development was that buying a home became cheaper than renting, and the growth of the suburbs began in earnest. In the decade after World War II, about nine million people moved to the suburbs, mostly settling in homogeneous **middle-class** neighborhoods, often in what was termed "white flight" from integrated inner city areas.

The aggregate effects of American home ownership have included the settlement of large, low-density suburban regions and the enervation of the American inner city; both of these developments have almost always taken place along lines of race and class. By 1970, 63 percent of American households owned their own

homes. Although this statistic has increased gradually in the intervening decades, home ownership among minority households has consistently lagged behind—usually at a rate of about 50 percent. One policy corrective for these imbalances was the Fair Housing Act of 1968, a provision of that year's Civil Rights Act. Administered by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the Fair Housing Act has evolved over time to include measures prohibiting housing discrimination on the basis of race, sex, ethnicity, and disability. HUD and other government agencies such as the Federal National Mortgage Association (also known as Fannie Mae and also a **New Deal** agency) have in recent years made stronger efforts to support a more diverse group of first-time home-buyers, but the success of such initiatives is yet to be demonstrated.

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Homelessness

ROBERT E. WEIR

Homelessness is a condition of being without reliable shelter as either a short-term or long-term condition of existence. Homeless people seek makeshift shelter on America's streets, sleeping in doorways and transportation stations, atop street heating vents, in public parks, and in makeshift structures.

Those **begging** on public streets or pushing appropriated grocery carts filled with their worldly possessions attract attention, but the majority of homeless people are socially invisible. In addition, some people are chronically homeless, whereas for others it may be a temporary status. Homelessness is also a political pawn, with conservatives prone to underreporting and advocates of the homeless susceptible to overcounting. As a result, no one actually knows how many are homeless in contemporary America. During the 1980s, the **Reagan** administration estimated there were around 600,000 homeless individuals; in the 1990s, officials in the Clinton administration pegged the number at closer to seven million. The best available evidence for 2005 suggests that around three million people experienced homelessness during the year, and another five million spent more than 50 percent of their income on housing, placing them in jeopardy of becoming homeless in the future. Estimates run that between 600,000 and 1.2 million Americans are without any shelter on a given evening.

Statistics are much more solid in studies of those who are or have been homeless. The number one cause of homelessness is **poverty**. Although such a statement may appear to be self-evident, a closer analysis reveals that structural issues embedded in the U.S. economy exacerbate this. Popular stereotype holds that homeless people are alcoholics and drug abusers. Such a view often confuses cause with

effect, but it also ignores the fact that more than one in every five homeless people is employed. The high cost of housing leaves many unable to afford shelter. At the height of the **dot-com** boom, for example, some employers in California's **Silicon Valley** sent daily vans to homeless shelters to pick up employees whose wages were insufficient to afford rents. Ironically, another factor in causing a housing crisis has been gentrification. As **inner cities** have been rehabilitated and have attracted a return of affluent residents, the net effect in some neighborhoods has been skyrocketing rents.

In addition, just over 40 percent of all homeless are families with dependent children, roughly the same percentage as single men. In fact, a sizable percentage of the homeless are children, with some 1.2 million individuals under the age of eighteen living in shelters or on the street. **Gender stratification** is also a factor, with the "average" homeless family being a **one-parent family** headed by a woman with two children under the age of six. **Race** and **racism** also play a part; about half of all homeless people are African Americans, though around 35 percent are white.

Another major cause of homelessness is mental illness, though again the boundaries between cause and effect are sometimes blurred; studies reveal a correlation between becoming homeless and developing mental problems. There is little doubt, though, that the deinstitutionalization of mental facilities has contributed to homelessness. In 1955 more than 559,000 individuals were being treated in residential mental facilities; by 2004 this number had shrunk to around 110,000. Many of the reasons for deinstitutionalization were noble. New psychotropic drugs allowed patients to control their illnesses, and the grand plan was for several million community mental health outpatient clinics to monitor individuals and help them reintegrate into society. In fact, less than half of the planned clinics actually opened, and thousands of individuals were cut adrift with minimal support. Again, no one knows how many homeless people are also mentally ill—estimates vary from a low of 23 percent to as high as 60 percent—but most experts agree that the problem is acute.

Governmental policy is also a cause of homelessness. Conservatives championed the tax cuts of the Reagan-**Bush** administrations in the 1980s, but there can be little doubt that massive cuts to social **welfare** problems contributed to homelessness. A survey of twenty-five major U.S. cities revealed that homeless rates soared in the 1980s and have risen steadily since. There is virtually no evidence to support fiscal conservatives' claim that **trickle-down** economics benefits the **lower class** and **working poor**. In fact, rules designed to tighten welfare requirements have contributed to homelessness. For example, public housing rules often limit who may reside in a housing unit, thereby forcing individuals to cast out relatives or run the personal risk of being forced out for violating rules.

Up to one-third of all homeless people are substance abusers. As noted, it is unclear whether this is a cause or an effect of homelessness. What is known, though, is that homelessness correlates with a host of other social problems and diminished **life chances**. Homeless people have higher rates of anxiety and depression than the general public and many suffer from serious physical ailments; in fact, as many as one-fifth have AIDS, and over 25 percent of all homeless people are in need of, but seldom get, medical care. Hunger also stalks the homeless, with one in three reporting having gone without food at some point each month. Homeless

people are also more likely to be victims of violent crime. In a particularly disturbing trend, some cities have seen a backlash against homeless people. Between 2000 and 2006 there were 386 reported attacks on homeless people, with 156 deaths. The actual number of attacks is likely to have been much higher; sociological studies reveal that the poorer one is, the less likely one is to report a crime.

In 1987 Congress passed the Stuart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act to provide money to aid the homeless. The act also requires school districts to provide extra help for children of the homeless. This bill, though well-intended, has not kept pace with the rising levels of homelessness. Most emergency shelters in large cities routinely operate at capacity and turn away those seeking help; during peak periods, they might serve less than two-thirds of those seeking shelter. Homeless programs also do little to address the root causes of homelessness. Another unsettling trend is for homeless people to average about six months at a time without shelter, but also to experience periodic homelessness throughout their adulthood. As many as 7 percent of all Americans will experience homelessness during their lives. In a land with nine million millionaires, homelessness is a poignant reminder of the gross inequities that **capitalism** also fosters.

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HOMOSEXUALITY

See Sexuality.

Housing Policy

ELVIRA JENSEN-CASADO

A good housing policy can turn disorder into order, bring neighborhood stability, stimulate economic development, and even combat crime, but it can also highlight social class divisions. Housing policies have changed much over the years, but current housing policies can be traced back to the **Progressive Era**. It was then understood that not only should housing provide a shelter, but a good housing policy should also have a more general impact on communities.

Unfortunately, the history of housing policies in the United States is full of examples of well-intended interventions that have had unplanned negative consequences. Until the 1960s, the Federal Housing Administration used subventionary and discriminating criteria against inner city neighborhoods. As a result of this policy, property values decreased, and **suburbia** experienced a boom, while the inner cities declined. During the decades between 1960 and 1980, the **inner cities** lost

their middle class, which resulted in the devastation of the communities in these neighborhoods. In 1965 the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) was established to organize and administer programs for housing and community development. This department is charged with finding solutions to the problems of housing and urban development through state, local, or private action. Previous legislation had authorized low-cost mortgage loans administered by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), but it was only with the creation of HUD that federal assistance became accessible on a large scale to plagued urban areas. A 1968 amendment set as a target the construction of millions of new housing units and gave HUD more direct administrative authority.

HUD has not, however, been immune to politics. Under President **Ronald Reagan** in the 1980s, federal housing budgets were drastically cut, and the administrative capacities of the HUD were almost completely eliminated. In the 1990s deep division developed over how to deliver housing assistance and whether it was doing any good; the Department of Housing and Urban Development almost disappeared. During this decade, federal housing policy shifted toward accentuating local block grants, savings and loan programs, and private home ownership.

A good housing policy can help low-income families achieve stability and build wealth. Expanding homeownership has many positive consequences because homeowners gain the opportunity to increase their wealth as property values appreciate. Furthermore, research suggests that neighborhoods with a high percentage of homeownership are more likely to have better city services and community involvement.

In 1995 possibly the nation's worst-run housing agency, the Chicago Housing Authority with the notorious Robert Taylor Homes, was taken over by HUD, which has dismantled most of the area's twenty-eight high rises and has begun constructing mixed-income housing in hopes of reconstituting the neighborhood and encouraging community pride. There is, across the nation, a growing interest in revitalizing the older suburbs and inner cities. The term "Smart Growth" is widely used to envision environmentally sensitive development formulas and better-planned, more-livable communities. Urban planners generally agree that high-density, sky-scraper-like apartment complexes are perceived by residents as dehumanizing. What is commonly known as "warehousing the poor" is thought to damage self-esteem and exacerbate social problems associated with poverty.

Problems persist, however. Today, one in seven families in the United States pays more than half of its income for housing, and HUD's budget has declined 65 percent since 1976, though the federal budget has doubled. There is a need for broader metropolitan development, improved transportation, and reduction of the concentration of poverty. Unless housing policy is linked to the deeper problems associated with urban poverty—such as economic opportunities and access to them—today's HUD revitalization plans may well give rise to future ghettos.

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Howe, Irving (June 11, 1920–May 5, 1993)

М. Ј. Вимв

Irving Howe was a literary and social critic and the founder of the magazine *Dissent* (1954). He also cofounded the Democratic Socialists of America. Born Irving Horenstein, he graduated from City College of New York in 1940 and taught literature at Brandeis and Stanford universities, eventually settling at Hunter College from 1963 to 1986. Howe is most famous for his history of **Jewish** immigrant and intellectual life in New York, *World of Our Fathers*, which won the National Book Award in 1977.

During his lifetime Howe's political activity was often intertwined with his literary pursuits. A **Trotskyist** in his younger years, Howe became a committed democratic **socialist** and published many reviews and articles in the *Partisan Review*, *The New York Review of Books*, and *The New Republic*. Even for his time, he was a radical—and divisive—literary critic who insisted upon seeing literature as political and politics as a form of literature. In his *Politics and the Novel*, Howe examined nineteenth-century fiction, especially that of Henry James, in light of how "the passions of ideology twist themselves about, yet also liberate creative energies." But in his famous essay on modernist literature, "The Culture of Modernism," Howe changed course, arguing that there were certain types of "authentic" literature without political ideology that sourced their sensibility in a pure "realm of experience." Critics of Howe viewed this sea change as shocking (and a little naïve) from someone who had once said that "the knowledge that makes us cherish innocence makes innocence unattainable."

Howe also coined the phrase "New York intellectual" in an essay of the same name in *The Decline of the New*, setting the stage for his later attacks on Ezra Pound and Philip Roth's *Portnoy's Complaint*, saying of the latter that "the cruelest thing anyone can do to *Portnoy's Complaint* is to read it twice." As an editor of Yiddish literature, he introduced Isaac Bashevis Singer to an American audience in the literary anthology *A Treasury of Yiddish Stories*.

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HUTCHINSON, ANNE (July 17, 1591–September 1643)

ROBERT E. WEIR

Anne Hutchinson was a religious dissenter in **Puritan** Massachusetts Bay Colony. Her trial and banishment in 1638, just eight years after the founding of the colony, highlights not only religious tensions within the new English colony, but also class tensions. Some commentators have viewed the support she drew from the nascent merchant class as a precursor of class conflict within the American colonies.



Photograph of a statue of Anne Hutchinson by George Biddle. Courtesy of Eon Images.

She was born Anne Marbury in Lincolnshire, England, the daughter of Francis Marbury, an Anglican minister, and Bridget Dryden Marbury. Her father was such a vocal critic of perceived clerical incompetence that he was jailed on several occasions. In 1612 Anne married William Hutchinson, with whom she had at least fifteen children. The Hutchinsons embraced Rev. Marbury's critique of the Church of England and became ardent followers of Rev. John Cotton, a Puritan minister who managed to be critical of the Anglican church without landing in jail. When Rev. Cotton went to Massachusetts Bay (Boston) in 1634, the Hutchinsons joined him.

Massachusetts Bay was founded for the ostensible reason of becoming a Puritan haven. Its leading light was Rev. John Winthrop, who in 1629 outlined the ideals of the colony in his famed sermon Christian Charity: A Model Thereof. In it Winthrop laid out a vision of a commonwealth in which there would be neither high nor low social rankings; those who had much were called upon to give it to those less fortunate. Winthrop foresaw an uncorrupted agrarian-based theocratic utopia that would be, in a famed phrase, a "city on a hill" for all Christians to emulate.

By the time the Hutchinsons arrived just four years into the colony's existence, it was already drifting from Winthrop's ideals. Puritans seeking to avoid the rigid social hierarchies of England were fast

replicating social distinctions in the New World. The three markers of **status** in Massachusetts Bay were church membership, property ownership, and political office (the colony was also profoundly patriarchal). In practice, all three markers were linked. One could not vote unless one owned property and could not hold office unless one was a church member. Since Puritans practiced a congregationalist form of governance, church membership was a bestowed status voted upon by existing members, who were parsimonious in granting entry into the church. Although social pressure was high to *attend* church, relatively few actually *joined* it. At the time of Hutchinson's trial in 1637, just fifty-four men from a total of 362

simultaneously held church membership, land, and political office; the largest percentage (47.5 percent) held none of the three.

Despite the male dominance of Massachusetts Bay, laws allowed for women's prayer groups, which Anne Hutchinson began holding in her home. Even before Hutchinson left England, she had expressed beliefs concerning God's immediate revelation that were more in line with Quaker beliefs than those of the Puritans. She soon found Massachusetts Bay's strictures more rigid than those of England. Hutchinson expressed the opinion that most of the colony's ministers erred in religious matters, adding her own interpretations of biblical texts and voicing opinions in impromptu sermons. She emphasized private spiritual practices and a personal relationship with God over the revealed word of Scripture, a practice known as antinomianism. In Massachusetts Bay, where the line between religious and political authority was razor-thin, Hutchinson's views amounted to a criticism of the colony's governance.

Governor Winthrop ordered Hutchinson's arrest in 1637. Her two-day trial is often studied by those seeking proof of misogyny and corrupt justice in Massachusetts Bay. Both views have merit, but Ms. Hutchinson was indeed a heretic within the narrowly confined parameters of Puritan society; her own testimony proclaimed beliefs that any Puritan court would have found objectionable. She was banished from the colony, along with sixty followers. After several years in Rhode Island, and following the death of her husband, Hutchinson moved to a section of New York that is now the Bronx. In 1643 she and six (some sources say five) of her children were scalped by Mahican Indians of the Siwanoy tribe.

For students of social class, there is an interesting sociological breakdown in data from the antinomian controversy. Of the fifty-four men at the top of Massachusetts Bay society, thirty-four supported Hutchinson, and twelve went into exile with her. Similarly, sixty-one men held political offices in the colony, and thirty-six supported Ms. Hutchinson. In fact, the richer one was, the more likely one was to prefer Hutchinson over Winthrop. Rich merchants were particularly supportive of Hutchinson, supporting her over the government by a margin of twenty-two to five. Those of modest means, those holding no office, and the poor tended to support the existing government of Massachusetts, perhaps drawn in part by the commonwealth ideal.

Scholars seeking to make sense of what appear at first to be counterintuitive data have to see the antinomian controversy as an early signal of future class conflict. Hutchinson's **individualism**, which she saw in religious terms, could easily be transferred to merchant and proto-capitalist views of economic liberty. Many of the rich, upwardly mobile merchants and men of means had already begun to resist the regulatory thrust of the commonwealth. Some scholars have even argued that the Hutchinson trial is a metaphor of the ensuing and enduring clash between community and individualism.

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IMMIGRATION

JANEAN MOLLET-VAN BECKUM

To immigrate means to enter and settle in a country or region to which one is not native. People immigrate for a variety of reasons, from political persecution to career goals. But the most common reason for immigration over the years has been for economic opportunity. There are two types of immigration, legal and illegal. Legal immigration involves obtaining legal documentation to remain in a county, but the United States also has millions of immigrants whose visas have expired or who entered the nation illegally. There can be little doubt of the myriad contributions immigrants have made to American life, though the processes of incorporating newcomers into society has frequently been fraught with difficulty.

Immigration has long been part of American society. All non–Native American groups are, in essence, of immigrant stock. Even in the Colonial period, the English colonies contained large numbers of non-Anglo immigrants, especially those from various German states. By the 1790s Germans were outnumbered only by English immigrants and Africans forcibly brought as **slaves**. Another half million Germans arrived before 1850. They were welcomed to America. After the **American Revolution**, the **Founding Fathers** considered the new United States to be underpopulated and actively recruited immigrants, though the preference was for those of Western European and Protestant background. In the 1840s and 1850s, the arrival of millions of Irish immigrants fleeing famine was frowned upon by many citizens who were offended by their predominant Roman Catholic faith. Most scholars trace the beginning of anti-immigrant nativist movements to this period.

The post–Civil War **Industrial Revolution** created economic opportunities for immigrants, and around 26 million immigrants arrived between 1870 and 1920. Unlike earlier immigrants, however, many of the so-called "Second Wave" were from French Canada and Southern or Eastern Europe, and they came with language barriers, customs deemed odd by existing groups, and religious practices

that departed from Protestant Christian norms. Ellis Island in New York City harbor was a busy port of entry during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. New York grew rapidly and sprouted many **ethnic enclaves**. Many immigrants spent most of their money on passage and thus settled in New York tenements, hoping to find work. Quite a few immigrants viewed themselves as "birds of passage," temporary sojourners who hoped to save money and return to their native lands.

These tenements were essentially **slums**, and many were divided along ethnic, linguistic, and religious lines. The **poverty** and squalor of ethnic enclaves often bred disease and crime. Those immigrants who could worked for a few years, saved what money they could, and moved to smaller rural communities, to newly opened territories, or to growing cities such as Chicago. Many, however, stayed in eastern industrial cities. The poor conditions of immigrants during the **Gilded Age** served both to stir the conscience of reformers such as **Jacob Riis** and to fuel the anxieties of nativists. By the turn of the twentieth century, the populations of many American cities were made up predominately of first- or second-generation immigrants. Immigrant-restriction groups emerged in response, and certain national groups, such as the Chinese and Japanese, were excluded altogether. Immigration bills in 1921 and 1924 greatly curtailed all immigration to the United States and included national-origins clauses weighted to favor immigrants from Western Europe over those from elsewhere.

World War I left the United States as the world's leading intact economic power. This meant it remained a prime destination for immigrants, its restrictive policies notwithstanding. Myths of the **American dream** were as powerful abroad as within the United States. The **Great Depression** and World War II curtailed European immigration, although Mexican immigration increased during the war. The border between the United States and Mexico was fluid throughout the nineteenth century, and many Mexicans became U.S. citizens after the 1846–48 Mexican War. During World War II, Mexicans were recruited to work both in defense industries and in agriculture, the latter campaign extending officially into the 1960s.

After World War II, immigration policy also shifted to allow more Eastern Europeans to enter if they were fleeing from nations controlled by communists, but quotas favoring Western Europeans remained in place until 1965. The net effect of this was that increasing numbers entered the United States illegally, especially Mexicans and Central Americans. From the 1950s into the 1990s, fewer Europeans sought to settle in the United States, and the makeup of immigrants shifted toward those from Asia and Latin America. The 1930 census, for example, reported that over 11 million of the previous decade's 14 million immigrants had come from Europe; by 1990 just 4.3 million of 19 million had come from Europe, whereas nearly 5 million were from Asia and over 8 million from Latin America. Large numbers of Filipinos settled in the United States after World War II, and larger numbers of Cambodians, Laotians, and Vietnamese came during and after the Vietnam War. Poor economic conditions in Latin America sent millions of Latinos northward, including large numbers of undocumented aliens. A 1986 law penalizes employers for hiring illegal immigrants, but it is so loosely enforced that many companies—especially agribusiness and discounters such as Wal-Mart—often violate it.

The United States no longer has an open door policy as it did in the nineteenth century, but it still has the highest annual immigration rate in the world, around one million legal immigrants per year. What has remained consistent since the 1840s is that immigrants often find themselves grouped into the **lower classes** of American society. Immigrants are often shuffled into jobs that are low-paying, and they are commonly perceived as performing labor that other Americans do not want: factory jobs, agricultural labor, food service, housekeeping, and so on. Historically, however, immigrant salaries have tended to catch up with those of non-immigrants. **Asian Americans** have surpassed Caucasians in educational attainment, and **Jewish Americans** have a higher percentage of affluent citizens than longer-established Protestant groups. Current data suggest that Englishlanguage attainment among immigrants speeds the process of assimilation more than any other factor.

As noted, illegal immigration is a hot-button issue in modern America. The majority of illegal immigrants who come to America arrive via the American–Mexican border and lack proper visas, although there are also large numbers of illegal Irish and Eastern Europeans who do not engender as much controversy. Some feel that illegal immigrants should be accorded the same rights as other Americans. Recent attention has been drawn to allowing illegal immigrants to have drivers' licenses or apply for college scholarships. Supporters claim that even illegal immigrants add more to American society than they take away. Detractors point out that in 1993 alone, California paid out over \$300 million in welfare payments to support children of illegal immigrants. Children born in the United States are considered citizens, even when their parents are illegal, and hence, they are eligible for **welfare** and other support services. Critics claim that this is a drain on resources that should be going to legal citizens. They also worry that illegal immigrants take jobs away from legal citizens.

Suggested Reading

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INCOME AND INHERITANCE TAXES

GINA L. KEEL

Income and inheritance taxes are levies on individual income, corporate income, and inherited **wealth** that historically target those with the greatest "ability to pay." Personal incomes below a certain amount are exempted from the individual income tax so that subsistence income is not taxed. The exemption varies for single and married persons with or without dependents. Taxes apply to net income after exemptions, deductions, and credits. Income tax rates are traditionally graduated or **progressive**; people in the highest income brackets pay the highest tax rates. An

inheritance tax is assessed on the portion of an estate received by an individual. It is not treated as income because it is irregular. An inheritance tax is different than an estate tax (also called a "death tax"), which is levied on an entire estate before it is distributed to individuals. Both inheritance and estate taxes are usually based on graduated rates after exemptions. Inheritance and estate taxes create an incentive to transfer assets before death, and gift tax laws are designed to limit avoidance of inheritance and estate tax by this route. The national government and most state governments levy income taxes. The national government levies only an estate tax; some state governments levy both inheritance and estate taxes.

An emergency income tax was imposed during the **Civil War** that reached into the **upper** and upper **middle classes**. In the 1890s **Populists** demanded a permanent graduated income tax because working and farming classes bore a heavy tax burden under the protective tariff on imports, the primary source of national revenue. Democrats passed an income tax law in 1894, but the Supreme Court declared it unconstitutional on the grounds that it was a direct tax not apportioned among the states. In a concurring opinion of the Court, Justice Stephen Field warned against class legislation that would lead to "a war of poor against the rich." A popular movement aided by Democrats and progressive elites continued to fight for the income tax and a redistribution of tax burdens. The adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment (1913) permitted both a corporate and an individual income tax. A corporate excise tax had already been secured in 1909. Congress initially adopted a modest income tax that less than 1 percent of the population paid. During World War I, steep income and excess profits taxes became more important for revenue than tariffs and excise taxes on consumption goods. A national tax on estates was added in 1916, just as inheritance taxes had helped fund previous wars.

Until the World War II era, the income tax had been a class tax rather than a mass tax. But huge war expenditures required both a broadening of the tax base and a sharp increase in tax rates. Reductions in exemption levels meant that taxpayers with taxable incomes of only \$500 faced a bottom tax rate of 23 percent, and taxpayers with incomes over \$1 million faced a top rate of 94 percent. This was the era of "soak the rich" taxation, but the national government also taxed the wages of working-class Americans for the first time.

From the mid-1960s until 1982, income tax rates were steeply progressive, ranging from about 15 percent for the lowest brackets to about 70 percent for the highest, with a similar structure for corporate income taxes. Under Republican political leadership and informed by supply-side economists, top tax rates were slashed from 70 percent to 50 percent on personal income and from 50 percent to 20 percent on capital gains in 1982. The bipartisan tax reform of 1986 reduced loopholes and deductions, cut the corporate tax rate from 50 percent to 35 percent, and lowered the maximum income tax rate to 28 percent, the lowest since the 1920s. Political shifts and concerns about deficits led to an increase in top personal and corporate income tax rates in the early 1990s. A renewed anti-tax political climate and unified control of government by the Republicans delivered significant tax cuts in 2001. The lowest income tax rate was reduced to 10 percent and the highest to 35 percent, benefiting all income groups, but favoring wealthier groups when all tax changes are considered. In many states, lower federal income

taxes have been offset by higher state income taxes and local property taxes, disproportionately burdening middle- and fixed-income groups. The top corporate tax rate remains at 35 percent, but various deductions and credits that benefit select industries and companies, such as accelerated depreciation allowances for business investment, have significantly reduced corporate taxes paid and have increased corporate tax refunds.

The income tax system continues to be progressive overall, despite a trend toward **flat taxes**; those with high incomes generally pay a higher percentage of their income in taxes than those with low incomes. The U.S. Treasury estimates that the top half of income groups earn 86 percent of the nation's income and pay 96 percent of the income taxes. The top 5 percent of taxpayers earn roughly one-third of the income and pay more than one-half of all individual income taxes. Various tax credits benefit the middle- and working-classes, such as the current per-child tax credit of \$1,000. One of the most important credits to low-income workers is the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), which has proven successful at rewarding work and fighting poverty. Approximately 21 million tax-filers receive an EITC worth on average nearly \$1,800.

Limits to transferring accumulated wealth have been in retreat since 1981, when estate and gift taxes were greatly reduced by raising exemptions and lowering rates. Under current law, the estate tax is being gradually reduced and may be permanently repealed. Critics of the estate tax argue that it discourages work, threatens inheritance of family farms and small businesses, and constitutes double taxation of invested income. Studies show that few small farms and businesses are subject to the estate tax, but many families and businesses pay for expensive estate planning to avoid it.

The effects of repealing the estate tax include eliminating hundreds of billions of dollars in tax revenue over the next decade, making the tax system more regressive, reducing charitable giving, encouraging tax shelters, and increasing the concentration of wealth in the United States. In 1906 President **Theodore Roosevelt** called for new inheritance and income taxes, proclaiming, "The man of great wealth owes a peculiar obligation to the State, because he derives special advantages from the mere existence of government." A contemporary "billionaire backlash" of super-rich activists concerned about increasing economic inequality is fighting repeal of the estate tax. They assert that individual wealth is dependent on society's investments, such as economic development, education, health care, and property rights protection, which contribute to individual good fortune.

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INCOME AND WEALTH

ROBERT E. WEIR

Income and wealth are two of the primary factors in **objective** measurements of class. Although the two terms are often used interchangeably in popular culture, they should not be because they do not mirror each other in perfect correlation. Income refers to the steady revenue one receives over a set time period, usually in the form of salary, **wages**, tips, or commission. Wealth is the basis from which income can be generated. Examples of wealth include real estate, savings accounts, stocks, bonds, and precious goods.

Family income distribution challenges the popular myth that the United States is a **middle-class** society. If this were the case, income distribution of the middle quintiles should resemble the bulge of a Bell curve. In truth, the top fifth commands nearly 50 percent of all yearly income, with the richest 1 percent receiving over 13 percent of all the income generated in a given year. In 2002 the third and fourth quintiles combined—the theoretical "middle"—commanded just over 38 percent of all income. Those in the bottom two quintiles received just over 12 percent, with those in the bottom quintile getting just 3.5 percent of all income. To put it another way, the bottom 60 percent of American households received under 27 percent of the income.

Considering adjustments for inflation, family income has dropped since the 1990s. In 1995 the median family income was \$40,200. In 2004 it was just \$44,389 (some rosier studies push this as high as \$56,000, but this figure is disputed). To have the same purchasing power as in 1995, a family's income should have risen to over \$48,700. In 2004 only 27 percent of American families had aggregate incomes of over \$75,000, and evidence suggests that the income gap has widened greatly between those at the very top and the rest of society. The top 1 percent of American families—roughly 2.8 million individuals—make as much as the next-richest 110 million individuals *combined*. For this group, income has grown over 200 percent since 1979, while family income increased just 9 percent at the bottom and modestly throughout the rest of the range.

Income inequality, however, pales in comparison to wealth inequality. The bottom *balf* of American families command less than 3 percent of the total wealth, whereas those in top 1 percent own a third, and the next richest 4 percent of American families own another quarter. In all, the top 10 percent of American families control 70 percent of the nation's total wealth, including nearly 80 percent of all stocks and bonds. Since 1983 the net worth of the bottom two quintiles has declined by over 75 percent, while the net worth of the top 5 percent of American households has increased by more than two-thirds.

There can be little doubt that changes in tax policy since the 1980s have widened income and wealth gaps. The administrations of **Ronald Reagan**, George H.W. **Bush**, and George W. Bush were dominated by fiscal conservatives, supply-siders, and advocates of **trickle-down** economics. Massive tax cuts, subsidized in part by drastic cuts in domestic spending and **welfare** benefits, have allowed the wealthiest to accrue great savings. Those earning more than \$10 million per year now pay a smaller percentage of their income in taxes than those making between \$100,000

and \$200,000 and a significantly smaller percentage than those making the median income or less.

There is, simply, no credible evidence to suggest that income and wealth gaps are narrowing, despite political rhetoric to the contrary. A dispassionate analysis must also conclude that the idea of the United States as a middle-class society rests more on sentiment and faith than on economic indicators.

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INDENTURED SERVITUDE

ROBERT E. WEIR

Indentured servitude refers to the practice of binding one's self to a sponsor for a specified time in exchange for some service granted by or debt incurred by the sponsor. In North America, the term had its greatest currency during the period preceding the American Revolution and during the immediate decades following it. Normally, one bargained labor in exchange for passage to North America, shelter, and board. In some circumstances, indentures formed apprentice relationships in which they gave labor and received training in a particular skill. Within the lands that became the United States, indentured servants made up the bulk of the labor force in many regions, especially agricultural lands. In the South, as indentured servitude declined, chattel **slavery** increased.

The term indenture derives from *dent*, the French word for teeth. Customary practice called for indenture contracts to be written side by side. The identical contracts were then torn apart in a jagged pattern that evoked teeth; if there was a dispute as to a contract's validity, the pieces could be rejoined to verify legitimacy.

English-speaking colonies made heavy use of indentured servants, largely because England's surplus population produced many landless and poor individuals whose prospects were grim. Many chose to immigrate to English colonies in hopes of economic betterment. Some poor families even sold their offspring to labor recruiters—often sea captains—to raise money to help those remaining behind survive. Between 1620 and 1700, more than 100,000 individuals who left England for North America came as indentured servants. In New England, indentured servants made up more than half the white population.

In theory, these servants received assistance or land once they completed their terms, which customarily ran for four to seven years. In practice, indentured servants were often an exploited workforce. As noted, England contained large numbers of available poor that could replenish labor stocks. In some areas, most notably

the Chesapeake region, a system known as headrights existed, which set aside land for indentures completing their terms. In the event of death, however, benefits went to the sponsor. This actually made it a landowner's best interest to work his servants to death, and many did. Moreover, for the first several decades of settlement in Virginia and Maryland, the death rate topped 60 percent in some years. In short, indentured servitude was seldom the path to upward **social mobility** that its boosters claimed.

By the time the death rate subsided in the Chesapeake, class lines were rigidly drawn, with a landowning elite—sometimes dubbed *grandees* to associate them with older Spanish latifundia practices—holding the richest lands and those closest to seaports, whereas poor farmers and former indentured servants were forced to venture into the western backcountry where they encountered thinner soils, hostile Native Americans, and uncleared lands. Even backcountry land was in short supply. Between 1670 and 1705, fewer than 25 percent of Maryland's former indentured servants received land; many were forced to become sharecroppers or laborers. These were among the complaints that factored into **Bacon's Rebellion**, a 1675–76 upheaval that saw poor farmers, indentured servants, and some runaway slaves join forces to oppose the governor of Virginia. The rebellion failed, but not before Jamestown was put to flame, Native American uprisings took place, and hundreds of lives were lost. In its wake, the Chesapeake region began to reduce the number of indentured servants and import more African slaves.

Indentured labor remained a large factor in Colonial life despite outbreaks such as Bacon's Rebellion and the tendency of servants to run away at a rate higher than that of slaves. In Pennsylvania, more than 100,000 Germans known as redemptioners entered between 1720 and 1750 as indentured servants. Many Scots-Irish immigrants who settled in the Carolinas during the same period also came as indentures. Although Southern planters preferred slaves, an 1808 act forbidding future importation of slaves drove up the price of chattel and led to a new influx of indentured servants.

Contrary to popular opinion, indentured servitude did not disappear after the American Revolution. The latter event did not lead to social leveling; it was customary for elite families to hire servants, but some domestics were also unpaid indentured servants and slaves. One estimate claims that as late as 1850, one in every ten homes had servants, a percentage that had actually *doubled* from 1800. Many **Irish Americans** can trace their ancestry to indentured servants who came to America to flee famine conditions.

After the Civil War, the term indenture passed from common usage, in part because the language of the Thirteenth Amendment suggested its abolition. It would be more accurate, however, to say that the advent of the **Industrial Revolution** changed the nature of indentured servitude. During the so-called second wave of immigration from 1870 to 1910, many émigrés came from eastern and southern Europe. A large number of poor males came over after being recruited by labor contractors and arrived in labor gangs. In exchange for providing passage and employment, labor bosses negotiated wages, kept a cut, and extracted terms of service. Chinese railroad workers, Irish and Welsh mine crews, and Eastern European steelworkers were among those whose agreements with labor recruiters could be seen as de facto indenture contracts.

In the twentieth century, immigration restriction and the two world wars curtailed informal indenture patterns and gang labor recruitment, though these institutions never disappeared. Although few Americans are aware of it, some immigrants still arrive under conditions akin to Colonial indenture contracts. According to recent studies, this is particularly true of many Chinese and Taiwanese immigrants working in seaboard restaurants, of some Southeast Asians in the hightech industry, and of Latinos serving as nannies and domestics. In extreme cases, illegal immigrants endure conditions that parallel chattel slavery; some have even been forced into the sex-trade industry. Migrant labor crews, particularly in agribusiness, also continue to adhere to contract labor practices, despite labor laws restricting the practice and regardless of organizing efforts over the past five decades.

Indentured labor often is and has been a form of labor exploitation that belies the theoretical patron-client mutualism suggested in its structure. Put directly, the power and wealth disparities between sponsors and indentures led to wide abuse on the part of the former. This has led many students and scholars to compare indentured servitude to chattel slavery. Although it is true that both involve coerced labor and unequal power relations, one should exercise caution. Indentures were never legally defined as property like slaves. Thus, they retained minimal rights. They could not be sold, for example, nor could they be maimed, physically punished, or executed without due process (some did suffer such fates, but this took place without official sanction). Above all, indentured servants were considered fully and legally human, however unfair or cruel their masters might be.

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INDIVIDUALISM

ROBERT E. WEIR

Individualism is a much misunderstood philosophy; it posits that society should be organized in a manner in which personal liberty and free choice are given primacy over collective values. Individualists often place optimistic faith in the ability of adults to make informed choices. As such, individualists often align themselves with political theories that argue that government's proper role is to guarantee rights and interfere as little as possible in matters of personal desire, economic activity, and the pursuit of **self-reliance**. In economic terms, individualism is often linked with **capitalism** and viewed as the antithesis of collectivist perspectives such as **socialism** or **communism**, though in practice, such distinctions are overdrawn.

Western individualism draws conceptually upon many sources and emanates from the fact that all government authority is, by nature, coercive to some degree. Although one can find echoes of individualism in Western political and philosophical discourse from the ancient Greeks on, the first known uses of the term "individualism" were pejorative. During the French Revolution, some supporters of traditionalism used it to describe what they viewed as the **anarchism** building within society. Oddly enough, socialist followers of Henri de Saint-Simon also used the term negatively to criticize economic profiteers. Its debut within the United States was likewise pejorative; it was used by utopian followers of Robert Owen and by Alexis de Tocqueville as a synonym for selfishness.

But even before the term was coined or the United States was created, individualism was established as a competing social value. In 1630 **John Winthrop** issued a sermon that challenged the new Massachusetts Bay colony to establish a commonwealth in which community needs would take priority over individual desires. Yet within months, merchants began to bristle over imposed restraints on trade. Some of the colony's most disruptive events, including the expulsion of Roger Williams, the trial of **Anne Hutchinson**, and the Salem witch trials, were also clashes between individualists and collectivists. Such tensions took place elsewhere, and by the time of the **American Revolution**, individualism had found support among many of the **Founding Fathers**. In the debate over ratification of the U.S. Constitution, for example, many refused to accept it until a Bill of Rights was appended to guarantee personal liberties and mediate some of the implications of a stronger federal government.

Individualism meshed well the **agrarianism** of the pre-Industrial Revolution United States. Ironically, the articulation of industry and capitalism shifted support for individualism from lower to upper economic strata. Farmers and the emerging **working class** were more vulnerable to the class implications of commercial society, and many joined collectivist ventures such as farmers' alliances, the **labor movement**, and the **Social Gospel** movement. By contrast, those in the **upper** and **middle classes** tended to embrace economic individualism, especially in the form of laissez-faire capitalism, a key ideal in the articulation of **Social Darwinism**.

Many of the parameters of contemporary debate over individualism versus collectivism were in place by the end of the Gilded Age. Individualists argued that unregulated individualism was linked to meritocracy, self-reliance, innovation, and incentive; collectivists countered that government regulation was needed to address social problems, nurture community, provide equal opportunity, and protect society from selfishness, greed, and the power of privilege. Reforms during the Progressive Era, New Deal, and Great Society frequently bowed to collectivist arguments, whereas political actions such as cutting taxes, reducing welfare benefits, and softening business regulations were more in accord with individualist positions. Current debates over school budgets, affirmative action, income tax reduction, abortion rights, poverty programs, and pornography embody the tensions between individualists and collectivists. As this list indicates, the debate does not easily divide politically into liberals versus conservatives; the latter, for example, tend to be individualists in calling for tax relief and business deregulation, but collectivists in **culture war** issues such as the antiabortion and antipornography crusades. Most social movements tend toward collectivism—such as civil rights campaigns against racism or women's rights battles—but one should also note that U.S. social movements are often not class-based in **Marxist** terms. The United States is also somewhat unique in that the **lower classes** are relatively quiescent and, hence, embody a de facto individualism.

Scholars have linked the promotion of individualism with the triumph of capitalism, an irony in that the freedom of the individual was being touted at exactly the moment in which the economic choices of the **masses** were contracting and **wage** labor was becoming the norm. Individualism now exists as a powerful ideal within American society, one probably embraced by the majority, albeit in an unreflective manner. Individualism is easily confused with personal style and uniqueness, just as it is easily stereotyped by its opponents as a smokescreen for selfishness. Its fringe expressions—including radical capitalism, extreme libertarianism, oppositional subcultures, and utopian anarchism—also contribute to stereotyping. One can say, however, that American society continues to grapple with how to best meet the needs of its citizenry—through relying on individual initiative and personal accountability or through viewing individuals as members of a collective whole within an economic and political society charged with promoting the general welfare.

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INDUSTRIAL RESERVE ARMY

ROBERT E. WEIR

Industrial reserve army, also known as reserve labor, is a term used by Karl Marx to refer to a key component of **capitalist** accumulation theory. According to Marx, Karl Kautsky, and others, it is in the best interests of capitalists to avoid a full-employment economy. Maintaining surplus labor allows capitalists to maximize profits by keeping wages low. Those who have jobs are more likely to accept low wages if they know that others would be willing to work for the same wage or lower. Employers can also discipline their workforces. Unpleasant, even dangerous, tasks can be assigned, labor agitators can be dismissed, the pace of work can be quickened, and conditions can be altered. Marx equated surplus labor with an overall exploitation of labor and the tendency of capitalists to pay subsistence wages. He even compared the industrial reserve army to breeding cattle.

The industrial reserve army was decidedly an integral part of factory production associated with the **Industrial Revolution**. In the United States, women, children, immigrants, African Americans, and unskilled laborers were fodder for the industrial reserve army. Employers did not hesitate to hire and fire workers at will or to

interject reserve workers into their businesses to break strikes or curtail agitation for better wages.

The decline of the industrial system in advanced capitalist systems has not altered the existence of surplus labor; in fact, it has exacerbated the problem. Because of **globalization** and **free trade** agreements, the entire planet can be viewed as reserve labor pools. To pick but one example, unionized New England textile workers were displaced throughout the twentieth century by non-union Southern workers willing to accept lower wages if employers relocated factories to their areas. By the end of the twentieth century, however, Southern workers were losing their jobs to even cheaper Latin American workers, and some employers have sought even cheaper labor in Southeast Asia.

Even American workers who were once thought to be immune from such pressures, such as those in high-tech industries, have lost jobs to workers abroad. Those who maintain full-time jobs face wage pressures from vast numbers of workers who would qualify as being reserve labor: the **unemployed**, the **underemployed**, parttime workers, temporary workers, workers in declining industries, prison labor, and even military personnel. A few critics of the notion of a reserve labor force argue that employers are aware that they cannot drive down wages beyond a certain level, or they will create pauperization levels that would collapse the very socioeconomic structures necessary for wealth accumulation. That said, there is much to the charge that wealth and power within a capitalist system are often linked to maintaining human wage constraints. The proliferation of temporary employment agencies such as Manpower Temporary Services and Kelly Services is one measure showing that industrial reserve armies remain part of capitalist accumulation systems. Observers such as **Jeremy Rifkin** warn that the United States and other advanced capitalist nations are in danger of becoming a two-tiered society of rich and poor unless ways are found to replace lost jobs and wages.

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INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

ROBERT E. WEIR

The term *Industrial Revolution* is used to describe the shift from manual labor to factory-made, machine-driven labor. The key aspects of the Industrial Revolution were machine and factory production, technological change, the expansion of transportation and communications infrastructure, the articulation of national and international markets, urbanization, and the development of a permanent **working class**. The Industrial Revolution required vast sums of money and was thus closely aligned with the rise of **capitalism** in Europe and the United States. Although the term "revolution" is an accurate one to describe the long-term effects of industrialization, the transformation was neither sudden nor even.

The Industrial Revolution first appeared in Great Britain. It occurred as a consequence of British imperialism, which brought access to raw materials and to technological breakthroughs. The first industry to shift to factory production was textiles. In 1733 James Kay's flying shuttle eventually led to the development of power looms to weave cloth. The power loom also benefited from James Hargreaves's 1765 invention of the spinning jenny, a wheel that fed numerous spools simultaneously. Samuel Cartwright is considered the inventor of the power loom, and James Watt's 1765 perfection of the Newcomen steam engine led to more efficient use of water power.

By the late eighteenth century, these technological breakthroughs had begun to transform Britain, leading to dramatic changes in land use, the displacement of small farmers, and the rise of industrial cities. The first phase of the British Industrial Revolution is generally dated from 1790 to 1830, meaning that it was ending at just about the time that the United States' Industrial Revolution was rising.

Several of the **Founding Fathers**, most notably Thomas Jefferson, resisted the notion of the United States becoming an industrial power. Jefferson was aware of the emerging social problems associated with industrialism, and he championed **agrarianism** as the ideal for American society. Samuel Slater and Moses Brown opened a textile mill in Pawtucket, Rhode Island, in 1790 that is generally regarded as the first American factory, but it and subsequent Slater factories were small-scale enterprises. Labor turnover was great because land was still readily available, workers resented the pace of machine-driven work, and the very notion of working for **wages** for one's entire life was viewed with contempt by most Americans.

Two developments destined to change American society were Eli Whitney's 1793 invention of the cotton gin and the introduction of the factory system. The cotton gin, which separated cotton fibers from the plant husk, had a profound impact on the American South. Cotton cultivation increased dramatically and led to an expansion of **slavery** in order to meet the labor-intensive needs of the crop. The first industry to capitalize upon slave labor was textiles. The "Lowell System" rejected Slater's small-scale production in favor of industrial cities devoted to textile production. It was pioneered in Waltham, Massachusetts, but perfected in nearby Lowell, incorporated in 1836 to honor the memory of investor James Francis **Lowell**. The bulk of **Lowell millworkers** were farm girls and women, a way to circumvent the animus against wage labor by employing the part of the population deemed most expendable in an agrarian economy.

The success of Lowell led its capitalist investors, the Boston Associates, to build other textile enterprises throughout the Northeast. Other industries emulated the factory model. Shoes began to be produced in factories rather than by individual cordwainers and cobblers, while vast deposits of iron ore and coal stimulated the growth of the iron industry. Henry Bessemer's various patents in the 1850s eventually also gave rise to steel and proved invaluable in producing rails for the emerging railroad industry. By the **Civil War**, many occupations that were once the purview of skilled craftsmen faced competition from factory-made goods. Some of the first labor unions emerged among journeymen craft workers whose upward **social mobility** was blocked when independent master craftsmen and proprietors gave way to corporate ownership. Deteriorating conditions within new industrial cities also led to the rise of the **labor movement**. Ironically, these substandard

conditions also provided slavery apologists with ammunition to assert that Southern slaves were better treated than Northern factory workers.

Neither industrialization nor the labor movement was articulated fully when war fractured American society in the 1860s. Historians generally see the period following **Reconstruction**, roughly from 1870 to 1920, as the takeoff period for American industry. By World War I, the United States was the world's leading industrial power. The discovery of oil in Titusville, Pennsylvania, in 1859 eventually freed American factories from dependence on water power and led to the expansion of "heavy" industries such as steel, rubber, farm machinery, and railroads. In the early twentieth century, new applications of assembly-line manufacturing proved a boon to production of automobiles. The expansion of the American economy, fueled by industry, led to demands for labor that were met in part by massive waves of **immigration** between 1870 and 1910.

Economic growth exacted a social cost. The development of a permanent wage-earning class and the closing of the frontier limited options for members of the working and lower classes. The pace of industrialization was uneven, and periodic recessions—the worst of which occurred between 1873 and 1878 and then between 1893 and 1897—led to unemployment, labor strife, and misery. As the inherent inequality of industrial capitalism came into sharp focus during the Gilded Age, labor unions such as the Knights of Labor and the American Federation of Labor (AFL) battled robber barons in numerous blood-soaked strikes, and socialists and anarchists questioned the legitimacy of capitalism, as did thinkers such as Henry George and Edward Bellamy. Widespread poverty, long hours of toil, and social unrest led even some members of the middle class to question industrialization's social cost.

Capitalism proved triumphant by the early twentieth century, and American industry entered a mature phase, though child labor, low wages, dangerous working conditions, and monopolies resisted the efforts of Progressive Era reformers to change them. America's global industrial might was challenged anew by the Great Depression of 1929 to 1940 or 1941. During this period, a new labor federation, the Congress of Industrial Organizations, emerged to organize blue-collar workers ignored by the more skill-oriented AFL. Socialist and communist challenges also marked the 1930s. Mobilization for World War II revitalized American industry, and the ravages of that conflict left the United States virtually unrivaled for industrial supremacy at war's end. During the 1950s, American-made automobiles, consumer goods, electronics, glass, rubber, steel, and textiles dominated the global market. The postwar economic expansion also led increasing numbers of the working class to enjoy the fruits of prosperity and the external trappings of middle-class comfort. There was also a marked decrease of labor militancy directed at the legitimacy of the capitalist industrial system; conflicts centered largely on economic, rather than ideological, matters.

American industrial dominance continued into the 1960s, but eroded dramatically in the 1970s. The **military-industrial complex** that won World War II involved a postwar shift in priorities away from technological innovation in the consumer sector. Thus, when European and Southeast Asian industries finally recovered from World War II, their state-of-the-art factories proved more competitive than aging American plants. Likewise, the **Cold War** led the United States

into expensive conflicts in Korea, Vietnam, and elsewhere that drained national resources. The biggest problem, though, was that the United States did not develop energy self-sufficiency. Oil boycotts by petroleum-exporting nations during the 1970s dealt American industry a huge blow. By decade's end, economists spoke of the impact of **deindustrialization** in the United States. Many "smoke-stack industries" such as electronics, rubber, steel, and textiles virtually disappeared from American shores in the latter part of the twentieth century. **Free trade** policies associated with **globalization** also hurt American industries; during periods of high inflation, cheaper foreign-made goods destroyed markets for American products. **Taxation** policies from the 1980s on also made it easier for American firms to relocate factories outside U.S. borders.

These things have had a profound social impact on the very working class that nineteenth-century manufacturers created. As factories have closed, new jobs in what is now routinely referred to as the postindustrial economy have not adequately compensated, trained, or hired displaced blue-collar workers. This is especially true in the burgeoning service industry, which generally pays lower wages, has fewer benefits, and is mostly non-unionized. The Industrial Revolution transformed American society in a host of positive and negative ways; the full impact of postindustrialism has yet to be measured.

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INDUSTRIAL WORKERS OF THE WORLD (IWW)

ROBERT E. WEIR

The Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) was perhaps the most **class-conscious** labor federation in American history. Founded in Chicago in 1905, it reached its apex on the eve of World War I. The IWW was the target of great repression before, during, and after the war, and it also lost members to the newly formed **Communist Party** during the 1920s. Although the IWW still exists, it no longer commands the power it did during the early twentieth century.

At its founding, the IWW brought together numerous members of the Western Federation of Miners and prominent radicals such as **Eugene Debs**, Daniel DeLeon, Mary "Mother" Jones, and Lucy Parsons. It adopted a revolutionary constitution that declared that **capitalists** and the **working class** had "nothing in common" and called upon the latter to destroy the former. The IWW rejected the wage system, advocated the use of **general strikes** to disrupt society, and refused to sign contracts with employers, even if it won wage concessions. Many of its leaders, such as "**Big Bill" Haywood** and **Elizabeth Gurley Flynn**, were influenced by a



Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) demonstration, New York City, 1914. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

blend of anarchism sometimes dubbed anarcho-syndicalism, which postulated that society could be operated cooperatively on a not-for-profit basis in which various productive, distributive, and service units were linked like spokes on a wheel. The IWW also organized its constituent assemblies as industrial unions—that is, by the general type of work laborers performed rather than the specific skill or job they possessed. It was particularly contemptuous of the American Federation of Labor's (AFL) exclusionary craft union mentality and called the AFL the "American Separation of Labor."


The IWW's early years were marked by internal battles over organization and ideology. In 1908 Daniel DeLeon split the IWW when it appeared to him that the organization was abandoning **socialist** precepts and had been captured by Western anarchists, whom he lambasted as "bummery." For a brief time, DeLeon operated a rival IWW from Detroit, but it never supplanted the Chicago group. As DeLeon feared, the IWW came to reject ballot-box politics as a capitalist ploy and urged workers not to vote; Eugene Debs quietly let his membership lapse for this reason.

The IWW never completely reconciled the differences between its eastern industrial workers and the lumberjacks, agricultural workers, dock workers, and miners who made up the bulk of its western membership, nor did it clearly articulate its political views, but its "direct action" tactics involved it in numerous dramatic strikes that captured the imagination of many workers and earned it the fear of conservatives who vowed to destroy it. Direct action—radical responses on the job—helped the IWW organize silver miners in Nevada, harvest workers across the Midwest, and timber workers in Washington and Oregon. Between 1909 and 1912, the IWW used acts of civil disobedience to overturn local ordinances that curtailed free speech and assembly. (Roger Baldwin, the founder of the American Civil Liberties Union, drew inspiration from these campaigns.) It was in the eastern United States, however, that it made its biggest headlines. In 1906 IWW members at a Schenectady, New York, General Electric plant conducted the first sit-down strike in American history. The 1912 "Bread and Roses" strike in Lawrence, Massachusetts, was even more dramatic; the IWW organized 20,000 workers from approximately forty different ethnic groups and won a strike against America's largest textile conglomerate.

Success and direct action strengthened the resolve of industrialists and conservative politicians to destroy the IWW. IWW members were nicknamed "Wobblies," for reasons that are not entirely clear, and by 1912 "Wobblyism" had supplanted anarchism as a favored bogeyman in the mainstream press. Rumors floated that the IWW espoused violence and that it used sabotage to destroy private property. In these matters, the IWW was the victim of its own revolutionary rhetoric; more violence was done *to* the Wobblies than *by* them, and the IWW's

attempt to parse the meaning of sabotage as a "systematic withdrawal of efficiency" was not convincing. Campaigns were launched to crack down on the IWW; in 1913 employers offered no mercy during strikes against silk mills in Paterson, New Jersey. Elsewhere, vigilante groups often took it upon themselves to harass, beat, and murder Wobblies.

The IWW's membership peaked at about 100,000 in 1917, the year the United States entered World War I. The IWW opposed the war and ran afoul of espionage and sedition laws passed to outlaw criticism of war efforts or disrupt wartime production. Hundreds of Wobblies faced trials and were jailed between 1917 and 1920, and violence against IWW members increased dramatically. The IWW never completely recovered from the government-led Red Scare, and key members, including Flynn, cast their lot with the communists during the 1920s. Today, the IWW has fewer than 2,000 members, and it appeals more to intellectuals and youthful radicals than to the industrial laborers and miners who once made up its core.



In this picture from an official IWW journal, workers are depicted as bearing burdens imposed by an exploitative capitalist system. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

The IWW's heyday was brief, but influential. Ironically, the IWW helped the AFL and other mainstream unions; some employers chose to negotiate with those unions rather than face the possibility of dealing with the radical IWW. The IWW also called attention to issues that many Progressive Era reformers ignored, such as civil liberties, racial justice, and working-class poverty. Some commentators credit the IWW with indirect impact on future **New Deal** legislation; in essence, the IWW served as a warning that radical action lurked if reform waned. It also taught future union leaders that supposedly un-organizable groups such as immigrants and transients could be brought into the union fold. The IWW even made inroads culturally; many songs written by Joe Hill, Ralph Chaplin, and others became working-class standards, including the union anthem "Solidarity Forever." And despite its refusal to sign contracts, the IWW also helped improve the material well-being of hundreds of thousands of workers before its decline.

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INEQUALITY MEASURES

See Poverty Calculations.

INEQUALITY THEORY

CHERRY LEI HUNSAKER

Inequality theory describes the arguments for and against the idea of culturally differentiating members of a society by ranking them on a basis of **power**, **wealth**, and **status**. Whether inequality is natural and inevitable or unusual and alarming is a debate that has been ongoing among theorists of inequality.

Inequality, by nature of the word, indicates that there is endorsed differential access to esteemed possessions, knowledge, experiences, and conditions in the human social order. Although specific inequalities are not universal, this unequal access of power is a general characteristic of human civilizations. Social inequality is framed and perpetuated through social structures and cultural norms. There are multiple dimensions to inequality. Public policy, income, jobs, race, ethnicity, gender, and age all contribute to inequality.

Class theorists, especially **conflict theorists**, argue that powerful people are privileged people. Those without power have reduced **life chances** unless they are supported by powerful people. Power is the driving factor in inequality and is closely linked to wealth and status. Although these three elements are ambiguous and difficult to assess, they help shape inequality. Having said this, inequality is not as straightforward as assessing the difference between the rich and the poor. In many countries, including the United States, the existence of a **middle class** adds a layered aspect to definitions of inequality. No matter how one parses class, it is simply inaccurate to see society as simply haves and have-nots.

Much of the inequality in America is institutionalized and rooted in the nation's socioeconomic class stratification. Stratification is complexly organized according to who has access to what necessities and rewards. People in analogous positions are labeled similarly (e.g., **working class**, middle class, **upper class**). The United States places a lot of rhetorical value on equality; however, there are inequalities in almost every aspect of people and life embedded in the U.S. cultural realm. Inequality is heavily layered, and the government plays a large role in perpetuating it. In fact, public policies and political decisions influence inequality the most. Governments often create and reinforce **institutionalized discrimination**.

Income is one layer of inequality. The composition of the family influences **income** inequalities. Factors such as **inheritance** patterns, **taxation**, male and female household ratios, hourly **wages**, and how many hours are allotted to each employee all complicate income inequalities. As these variables shift, family income also changes. Many of these factors are heavily influenced by lawmakers and existing public policy; others reflect culture and society.

The most distinctive of all the inequalities in the United States is connected to the collective ranking of occupations. Members of the public are defined by their job title. In addition to spending a great deal of their early life in preparation for future employment, people devote a large portion of their time to their jobs.

The social construction of **race** in the United States creates another layer of inequality. In the United States, people have been categorized into racial groups on the assumption that these groups are culturally and physically distinct from each other. Many of these groups have been stigmatized and arbitrarily assigned a level of social status on the basis of their social and physical characteristics. Each "race" is subject to certain levels of ridicule, prejudice, and exploitation because of accusations of inherent insignificance. **Ethnic stratification** likewise adds to inequality. Ethnicity is an identity that is either embraced by individuals and groups or arbitrarily assigned because of perceived distinctive cultural attributes. Language and religion are two examples of attributes that are culturally distinctive, but that may block one's path socially and economically. Ethnic groups are often ranked, though not always. The ranking, although ascribed, usually does not prevent individual members from moving about within the system.

A further layer of inequality is the social construction of **gender**. This category usually comes from birth and is not changeable, and it has historically factored into society's division of labor. However, in the United States, male and female labor roles are becoming less distinct. For example, a male nurse was almost unheard of fifty years ago; today, the nursing field is made up of both men and women. Although steps are being taken to reduce stigmas placed on societal gender roles, gender remains a basis for inequality in the workplace as well as in other social realms. Additionally, gender remains correlated with wages, with women on the average being paid less than men. The **glass ceiling** further limits upward mobility for women. Likewise, sexual orientation has been used to stigmatize and discriminate.

Age is an additional layer of discrimination. In general, age categories are ascribed, socially constructed, and highly inconsistent from one group of people to another. In the United States, age is associated with certain privileges and the withdrawal of privileges. For example, the legal right to drive is associated with age as well as the ability to be gainfully employed. Both of these privileges are usually withdrawn from the elderly. The denial of privileges caused by public policies, inequalities in income, discrimination at the workplace, racial stigmatizing, ethnic prejudices, gender discrimination, and age biases often leads to feelings of depression, reduced personhood, social anguish, and aggression.

Theorists are heavily divided as to whether inequalities are an inherent feature of all societies. **Functional elite theorists** often claim that inequalities are either innate or inevitable; others agree with conflict theorists that egalitarian societies have existed in the past and could exist in the future if government and society were committed to equality substantively rather than rhetorically.

Another division among theorists is the nature and function of inequalities. Some theorists, mainly functional elite theorists and **trickle-down** economists, believe that inequalities can be a good thing, reasoning that class inequalities are set up to ensure that the best, most qualified people are recruited, through the offer of the greatest rewards, to fill the most important roles in society. From this logic, inequalities are seen as a way to ensure societal growth and prosperity. On the other hand, conflict theorists allege that inequalities serve chiefly to deny opportunities

to weak segments of the public, thus guaranteeing that there will be people with little choice but to work for low wages and complete essential tasks that are avoided by others. This reasoning for inequality is seen as alarming. Disproportionate inequalities among ethnic and racial minorities, however, do add fodder to conflict theorists' charges.

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INHERITANCE TAX

See Income and Inheritance Taxes.

INNER CITIES

MARIETTA MONAGHAN AND MOHAMMAD GHARIPOUR

In the United States, the term *inner city* is often a synonym for troubled urban areas where the poorest and least educated portions of the population live. This term is used by other English-speaking countries as well, though negative connotations are not as common elsewhere.

Sometimes deprived areas are found outside the city limits, and other descriptive names are used. Regardless of the actual location, many think of inner cities as akin to ghettos, where the **crime** rate is high and **life chances** are limited. Buildings are often dilapidated to the point of being unsafe and unhealthy, and rents, rates of occupancy, and rates of ownership are low; therefore, owners have little incentive to keep the buildings in good repair.

Ironically, some inner city areas began as model neighborhoods, though this did not last long. American cities grew rapidly during the nineteenth-century **Industrial Revolution**, as workers moved into the cities to find work in manufacturing plants. Cities expanded more quickly than transportation systems, and hence, people moved into the urban core to be within walking distance of their employment and food supplies. Many neighborhoods quickly grew crowded with immigrants seeking opportunity amid America's growing industrial expansion. At the time, the smoke and filth from the manufacturing industries were seen as signs of prosperity, not pollution. Nonetheless, overcrowding meant that disease and crime were common, but factory owners continued to lure workers into the inner cities by building solid employee housing. Housing units were advertised as being spacious without being too big and as containing such still-rare amenities as running water and large windows that admitted fresh air and sunlight.

Very few spoke of the nineteenth-century "inner city" with the connotations that are currently associated with the term. It is true that reformers such as **Jacob Riis** photographed and wrote of urban problems, but these were associated with specific neighborhoods, not generalized to infer widespread patterns. (According to *Webster's Collegiate Dictionary*, 1961 was the first time "inner city" referred collectively to the entire urban core.) The benefits of having housing, markets, and work all within walking distance was crucial to the nineteenth-century working class because family livelihood often depended on all members working, including children. A long commute was out of the question. Still, in comparison with the uncertainties of farm life, the city seemed to offer more comfort and opportunity.

Overcrowding and attendant social problems increasingly pushed those who could afford it further from the industrial center. Some workers were willing to walk a little further in exchange for better living conditions, and those who could manage it commuted to work via trolley lines and (eventually) railroads and subways. The problem was that the edges of the city also expanded, and soon those areas just beyond the inner city began to resemble the crowded core. By the late nineteenth century, "street car suburbs" were increasingly distant from the inner city. Members of the **upper class** and wealthier members of the **middle class** tended to move further from the city in conscious attempts to isolate themselves socially.

In the twentieth century, the rise of automobiles went hand in hand with the "Garden City" movement. Garden cities first developed in England and were the progenitors of the concept of "greenbelts," those slices of parkland and open spaces encircling **suburbia**. Garden cities also supplied shopping and other amenities for residents, thereby further rupturing the work, residency, shopping, and leisure connections that once marked inner city life. Radburn, New Jersey, founded in 1929, is generally cited as the first American garden city. It was the forerunner of post–World War II planned communities such as Columbia, Maryland, and the **Levittowns** built in New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania. Automobiles facilitated moves further from one's place of employment. By the 1920s even members of the working class were contemplating moving further from the core.

Racism was also a factor. In the 1910s, many African Americans left the South for Northern and Midwestern cities, pushed by a boll weevil plague that decimated agriculture and lured by jobs in the defense industry. Race riots took place in cities such as Chicago, East St. Louis, and Detroit long before the famed urban uprisings of the 1960s. Spatial mobility patterns were altered by the Great Depression, but "white flight" from the cities became common again after World War II. Returning GIs were offered federal financial assistance to buy houses for their growing families, and increasing numbers moved further and further from the downtown areas. By the 1950s interstate highway systems had made commuting quick and easy. Developers opened new neighborhoods with wide quiet streets, parks, and smaller, newer schools. In the suburbs, single-family housing was the norm, though a few apartment buildings were built along the major roadways. Populations were overwhelmingly white.

By the mid-twentieth century, inner cities were left with disproportionate concentrations of the poorer African American and Latino populations who either walked to their jobs or rode on public mass transit systems or were relying on government welfare to make ends meet. Infamous urban race riots, such as those in Watts (1965), Cleveland (1966), Detroit (1967), Newark (1967), and Miami (1982) hastened white flight, as did court-ordered busing programs in the 1970s that were designed to desegregate public schools. White flight had a trickle-down effect on inner cities, which was first felt in employment.

Many employers followed residents and abandoned inner cities. Even more blue-collar jobs were lost because of mechanization, deindustrialization, and globalization. This placed stress on urban budgets; deprived of tax revenues, cities were forced to slash services and forgo updates to infrastructure and public housing. Even public hospitals feel pressure to move to areas where they can serve clients who are better able to pay, and grocery stores and shops cannot long remain where there are low sales figures. This made inner cities even less desirable; some became little more than repositories for the poor. As Jeremy Rifkin notes, inner city residents now find it difficult to find work near their homes, and those without skills or advanced educational training are even more hard-pressed. By 2006, two of every three new jobs were located in the suburbs.

There have been some hopeful signs. Architects such as Le Corbusier and Louis Kahn pioneered in ways to alleviate overcrowding, restoring parkland, designing rational transportation systems, and alleviating industrial pollution. There is also a growing "New Urbanism" movement that calls for mixed-use **zoning** and a return to the downtown residential neighborhoods that are near shopping, office, and leisure-activity facilities. These neighborhoods often feature mixed income and housing patterns, thereby promoting the erasure of class and racial distinctions. Downtown areas that stood empty for many years have become time capsules that are now the objects of revitalization movements. The hope is that **gentrification** will be the handmaiden of revitalization.

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Institutional Discrimination

ROBERT E. WEIR

Institutional discrimination refers to biases embedded within society, business, education, and other social structures. Some are customary, others intentional, but nearly all are much more difficult to detect or correct than acts of individual discrimination. Whereas the latter are normally overt acts, institutionalized discrimination is multilayered and may not even be obvious to those called upon to perpetuate it. Even more insidious is the tendency of institutional discrimination to become self-perpetuating, thereby reinforcing long-time patterns of unfairness.

Affirmative action programs developed in the 1960s, especially Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, were designed to reverse centuries of discrimination against African Americans, women, and other minority groups. Significant progress has been made on the legal front, but in many cases, de jure discrimination has been replaced by de facto practices that are hard to prosecute. For example, a black entrepreneur might successfully procure a loan from the Small Business Association and open a shop. That individual might be very qualified and competent, yet receive less business than a less-qualified white owner because the majority of potential shoppers are white and are loath to patronize a black-owned store. In such a situation, there is, simply, no one that can be prosecuted for discrimination.

Institutional discrimination is often less detectable than the preceding example. The majority of businesses, banks, commercial enterprises, political offices, and educational institutions continue to be dominated by white males. Because of this, certain biases creep into how daily routines are defined and what is assumed to be "normal." For example, businesses ranging from the U.S. Postal Service through business mailrooms impose requirements of how much an individual can lift. Although these standards appear neutral, women note that many are arbitrary standards based on the average body size of men. Other jobs may have height requirements, again based on the average white male, which serve to eliminate many female, Asian, or Latino candidates who are, on average, shorter in stature. Women are subject to male-defined work cultures that reinforce gender stratification. Women who complain about sexist jokes or do not participate in various bonding rituals are dubbed "poor sports" or "not a team player," and they get passed over for promotion. Even worse are the built-in assumptions of women's priorities and competence, key components of the glass ceiling patterns that limit women's upward mobility. African Americans, Latinos, and other ethnic groups similarly complain that they must constantly prove worth that is simply assumed of white males.

Institutional discrimination feeds on itself. Because one's **socioeconomic status** correlates with **life chances**, a person growing up in **poverty** has fewer chances to attend an **Ivy League** or other high-status college and is thus less likely to be part of **social networks** that will help later in life. The deck is stacked for members of the **upper class** to engage in patterns of **social reproduction** even when unaware of them. The ranks of Wall Street firms, **private** education, the **business aristocracy**, prestigious law firms, **CEO**s, and other upper-tier occupations are naturally replenished by the upper class, whereas it is an uphill struggle for those from the **working class** or even the lower **middle class** to crack class barriers.

Social reproduction ripples through society and facilitates hidden acts of institutional discrimination and stymies attempts to counter it. The 1978 *University of California Regents v. Bakke* decision struck down numerical affirmative action quotas. This makes it easy for institutions to obey the letter of the law while violating its spirit through tokenism, the practice of including a small number of minorities to give the appearance of affirmative action. This practice is said to be rampant in medical and law schools, in many universities, and in prestigious and powerful businesses. Moreover, a significant number of jobs are never advertised; only those within a network hear of them. Even when the positions are posted, some institutions have unwritten preferences. A professor seeking a job at an Ivy League college, for example, stands a better chance if he or she is also an Ivy League graduate.

Yet even those institutions that *wish* to address affirmative action sometimes find it hard to do so. Many colleges, for example, find themselves recruiting the *same* minority candidates because past discrimination has winnowed the applicant pool. Spatial distributions also play a part. States such as Utah and Vermont have a hard time recruiting minority applicants because so few non-Caucasians live there. Likewise, rural and small-town firms may find qualified candidates reluctant to relocate to areas with small or nonexistent **ethnic enclaves**.

The upper classes do not bear total responsibility for institutional discrimination. Americans of all classes have discriminated against gay, lesbian, transgender, and transsexual Americans, patterns that show up in everything from adoption decisions to military recruitment. There is also a generalized assumption that people with physical and mental disabilities are less capable than they often are. Educational and social justice systems also cut across class lines to some extent. Educational achievement is highly correlated with occupational success, yet many minority groups are forced to attend **segregated** and resource-starved schools because of white flight to **suburbia**. Working-class whites in places such as South Boston, Massachusetts, and Queens, New York have waged various overt and covert battles to limit the number of racial and ethnic minorities in their neighborhoods. Likewise, though it is true that leniency within the criminal justice system correlates strongly with socioeconomic status, race and ethnicity also play a key role. White police officers are often accused of racial profiling, a practice that is sometimes embedded within their departments. African Americans and Latinos are likewise more likely to receive harsh penalties than whites committing the same crimes.

Institutional discrimination is a greater problem in America than more highly publicized acts of individual prejudice. Indeed, it may be the single greatest obstacle to equal opportunity.

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INVISIBLE MAN

VERONICA C. HENDRICK

Invisible Man is the name of a novel by Ralph Waldo Ellison (1914–1994) that was published in 1952.

The novel follows the path of a young black man from the South and focuses on multiple scenarios in which the main character confronts a social role dictated to him because of his **race** and class. When the narrator is just a high school student, he is invited to give a speech to an audience of the town's powerful white men. He first believes that he is being honored for his academic achievements, but realizes

as the evening proceeds that he is simply an entertainment for these men. Several humiliating events occur during the evening, the most significant of which is the "Battle Royal," a boxing match in which the blindfolded narrator must fight several hired black teens. After the fight, the teens are thrown coins, which they can collect only if they brave the electric shocks that occur when they pick them off the carpet. Although the narrator eventually gives his speech and wins a college scholarship, this section of the novel outlines an uneven power structure represented by the wealthy white men and the black teens. This divide is repeated throughout the novel, highlighting racial and class inequalities.

While in college, the narrator is again caught in a situation where powerful men purport to help him while using him for their own purposes. This section highlights economic and **class struggle** rather than racial separation. Dr. Bledsoe, the black man in charge of the college, rejects the narrator after he mistakenly takes one of the white benefactors to the poorest section of the black community. Although the benefactor meets several unsavory individuals and is involved in an altercation, he bears the narrator no ill will. Nonetheless, Dr. Bledsoe tricks the narrator into leaving the college and traveling to New York City because he sees the narrator as a threat to the college and to Dr. Bledsoe's own personal advancement. Because of the narrator's class, a young dependent individual with no resources other than his intellect, he is a replaceable commodity: the invisible man represented by the title.

The novel's various scenarios repeat the powerlessness of the narrator and emphasize the vulnerability of the **lower classes**. The narrative links money, **power**, and race, all of which oppress the narrator. In New York City, the narrator discovers he has been duped, is unable to land a job, and quickly becomes a member of Harlem's oppressed black community. As an older man, the narrator looks back on his life and explains why he decided to give up on society and secret himself away in a **Harlem** basement, stealing electricity from the city as an act of revenge and wearing light bulbs in his hair as a symbol of his defiance.

The narrator recalls his membership in one group after another, from a worker in a paint factory to a member of the Brotherhood, a group with a **communist** agenda. Each time, his name is changed by the leaders of the group, and in each situation, he is a pawn for other people's desires. The narrator of *Invisible Man* never tells the reader his name, thus emphasizing that his identity is dependent on other people's views and the social roles they assign him. In fact, it is the search for identity that pushes the character into various situations and creates the social and class commentary of the novel. Becoming increasingly disillusioned with the world, the narrator understands his status in American culture as one of obscurity. He enlists in the Brotherhood to fight oppression, but it too exploits him. The group wants him only as a token; despite the Brotherhood's seeming interest in the welfare of the people of Harlem, the narrator discovers that he and other black Americans are unimportant to the party's goals.

The narrator's membership in the Brotherhood brings various responses, including Ras the Destroyer's hatred. Ras is a militant black man who believes that the narrator has sold out the cause of his people. In attempts to run from Ras and his followers, the narrator takes on other identities and learns that he can easily pass as other men. The narrator discovers the fluidity of identity and cynically concludes that all people are playing roles and that authenticity is a farce. Ultimately, the

narrator makes his invisibility concrete: he turns to a life of isolation and becomes truly invisible to all around him.

The novel does end on a somewhat optimistic note, with the narrator rejoining the world. Nonetheless, the narrator suggests that the situation of invisibility is one with which all people struggle. He believes all people, even if they do not realize it, are simply playing roles they cannot change that are outlined by other more powerful players. He indicates that autonomy and self-knowledge are the best one can hope for in a world so clearly dictated by social class, rigid economic structure, and a firmly established hierarchy of power.

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IRISH AMERICANS

SUSAN CLEMENS-BRUDER

Immigrants from Ireland, who have come to America since the Colonial era, have experienced many generations of prejudice and discrimination. Early Irish **immigrants** to America were more often Scots-Irish whose families had been Protestant Scots imported to Ireland in the seventeenth century. The Scots-Irish shared Protestant religious values with the primarily English population of the North American colonies, but were often seen by the British American colonists as unruly and of a lower class.

In Ireland, the ruling British government instated repressive laws and imposed imperial control that limited civil, religious, and political rights of Irish Catholics and any other religious groups outside the established Church of England. By the late eighteenth century some of the laws had been relaxed, but their long-term effects resulted in an increasingly landless and poor Roman Catholic population. Conditions continued to encourage Ireland's Catholics to seek new opportunities overseas, especially in the United States. In the early years of the nineteenth century, Irish in the United States found employment in heavy labor jobs, such as digging canals and mining coal, which were jobs less appealing to the native-born Americans. Irish Americans were among the least respected immigrants in America.

The number of Irish immigrants averaged 30,000 per year in the 1830s and 50,000 per year by the early 1840s. Anti-Irish prejudice grew correspondingly in response to greater Irish immigration, much of which was Roman Catholic. Evangelical Protestant groups that emerged during the religious revivals called the Second Great Awakening took a staunch anti-Catholic stance, which quickly generalized to anti-Irish sentiments. Native-born Americans argued that Irish immigrants would be more loyal to the Pope in Rome than to the civil government of the United States, which fueled long-standing fears about outside influences

ruing the American Republic. As more Irish entered the United States, nativist political parties such as the American Republicans agitated for new laws that would deny immigrants citizenship and take them out of voting and political positions for twenty-one years. Native-born workers saw Irish immigrants as pauperized labor who would work for lower wages and take jobs away from them. Irish immigrants nonetheless began to find work in semi-skilled textile and shoemaking jobs.

Irish immigrants congregated in the expanding cities of the eastern seaboard, especially Boston, New York, and Philadelphia. In Philadelphia, disputes between Irish Catholics and nativists over the version of the Bible being read in the public schools led to violence in May and July of 1844. Tensions also mounted over temperance reform when nativist Protestants, who considered the Irish to be drunkards, attempted to advance temperance reform. These cultural conflicts forced the Irish to separate further into **ethnic enclaves** and to create expanded parochial school systems. Irish and nativist volunteer fire brigades extended their religious and ethnic conflicts to firefighting, and fights often broke out between the two groups at the scene of fires.

Irish immigration increased significantly from 1845 through 1849 because of a rotting potato blight that struck Europe as a whole, but devastated Ireland. Diminished landholdings had encouraged poorer Irish to almost solely plant the nutrientrich potato to subsist. Over a million people died as a result of the blight, and another million were pushed to leave Ireland. Over 500,000 came to the United States between 1845 and 1849, and another 370,000 arrived in 1850 alone; steady emigration from the disaster continued until the **Civil War**. Prejudice against the impoverished Irish intensified. A revival of nativism resulted in a new political party, the Know-Nothings, who again advocated extending the length of time for citizenship. Cartoons depicted the Irish as dirty, stupid, and dishonest. One cartoon depicting a balancing scale of an African American and an Irish American showed them as perfectly equal, which epitomized the growing prejudice against free blacks and Irish immigrants.

Despite shared space at the bottom of the social scale, conflict occurred between African Americans and Irish Americans as well in New York during 1863. In March, the National Conscription Act opened a lottery system to draft Americans into the Union Army. A person could find a replacement or pay \$300 to avoid service, but **working-class** Americans resented the act, especially Irish Americans whose yearly wages which were often much less than the price of a replacement. In New York, Irish and African Americans competed for jobs, especially in heavy labor on the docks of New York City. Violence took place between black and Irish dock workers that spring, and during the summer, a four-day riot occurred in the city over the draft. Angry Irish Americans represented a significant portion of the rioters.

Prejudice against Irish Americans continued after the Civil War. Irish men struggled to secure better-paying jobs, and young Irish women often could only find work as maids. As a group, in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, the Irish began to secure political power in their urban neighborhoods and new job security in skilled labor, neighborhood businesses, and policing. Access to better jobs increased as non–English-speaking immigrants arrived from eastern

and southern Europe, and English-speaking Irish Americans became useful as literate skilled workers and foremen.

Irish immigrants benefited from the 1924 National Origins Act, which gave preference to northern and western Europeans by setting the immigration quota higher for ethnic populations present in the United Sates in 1890. A secure Irish American **middle class** developed that furthered the rights of the group as a whole and helped the assimilation process for new Irish arrivals. Urban Irish American political blocs solidified citywide and state power. Nonetheless, popular anti-Catholicism helped sandbag Al Smith's presidential ambitions in 1928, and hate groups such as the Ku Klux Klan often attacked Irish American Catholics. Religion kept Irish Americans from full national political acceptance, as shown by John F. **Kennedy**'s presidential race in 1960. Fears about papal influence over American politics re-emerged during the campaign, but Kennedy's popular presidency helped to kill remnants of long-standing prejudice. The final acculturation of the Irish in America can be seen when Americans co-opt Irish culture and Irish pride, notably in the wildly popular celebration of St. Patrick's Day, when all Americans become Irish and the Chicago River is dyed green, and in the popularity of Irish pubs and Irish music.

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IVY LEAGUE

RONALD DALE KARR

Ivy League is a term that refers to Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Brown, Columbia, and Cornell universities, the University of Pennsylvania, and Dartmouth College. The term was coined by a sportswriter in 1935, but the eight schools did not enter into a formal athletic conference until 1954.

During the 1880s newspaper reporters began to refer to the three earliest college football powers, Harvard, Yale, and Princeton, as "the Big Three." All three schools were well established before the **American Revolution**—Harvard, founded in 1636, was the first American college—and were the nation's most renowned, fashionable, and best-funded universities. When their football teams weren't playing each other, the Big Three were mostly likely to face off against squads from Columbia, Brown, Penn, Cornell, and Dartmouth. Except for Cornell (1868), all of these colleges had also been founded before 1775. Early in the twentieth century, the eight schools formed a basketball league and began competing in other sports.

Today, an Ivy League education is popularly regarded as the most prestigious degree among **elite** private American universities, although a handful of non-Ivy schools, such as Stanford and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, are often

ranked higher academically than some Ivy institutions. Within the Ivy League itself, the Big Three have always been preeminent. For example, in 2004 the combined endowment of the Big Three was over \$50 billion, more than three times the total of the five remaining Ivy schools' endowments and each individually larger than any other American university's endowment. In 2006 Harvard's endowment surpassed \$25 billion—a figure that is more than half of the gross national product of some of the world's poorest nations—making it easily America's wealthiest university.

Ivy League schools, especially the Big Three, have long been identified with both academic excellence and social exclusivity. Graduates of private boarding and day schools and **legacy** children have long been given preference in admissions to the Big Three, and although the number has diminished somewhat over the years, 15 percent of Yale's and 12 percent of Princeton's most recent incoming freshmen were related to alumni, and 34 percent of Harvard's and 46 percent of Yale's freshmen had had **private** education before entering college. By contrast, only 15 percent of Yale's 2006 student body came from families earning less than \$60,000, and figures at Harvard and Princeton were just 16 percent and 17 percent respectively. Before World War II, Ivy League schools had strict admission quotas on the number of African Americans (Princeton refused them altogether), **Catholics**, and **Jews**. Today, although Ivy League institutions are far more ethnically diverse than they were a century ago, they continue to draw most of their students from **upper**-and upper-**middle-class** families.

In undergraduate, graduate, and professional education, the Ivy League has consistently ranked among the best in America, with many innovations in American higher education having originated there. The achievements of their alumni in government, business, the arts, and science, especially alumni from the Big Three, are far out of proportion to their numbers. Of the nineteen men who served as President of the United States between 1900 and 2006, nine had earned Ivy League degrees (undergraduate and graduate), all from the Big Three. Exactly half of the 110 men and women who had served on the U.S. Supreme Court as of early 2006 attended Ivy League schools, forty-five at the Big Three. And in the 108th Congress, more than a quarter of the U.S. Senate had an Ivy League background, twenty-two from Harvard or Yale alone. The correlation between Ivy League education and political power verifies studies that these schools are vital in creating social networks that some critics would call a power elite.

America's twentieth-century literary scene is dominated by those who attended Ivy League colleges or graduate schools, including Jack Kerouac (Columbia), Norman Mailer (Harvard), Joseph Heller (Columbia), Erica Jong (Columbia), Susan Sontag (Harvard), John Updike (Harvard), Kurt Vonnegut Jr. (Cornell), John Hersey (Yale), Theodore Geisel, aka Dr. Seuss (Dartmouth), Allen Ginsberg (Columbia), T. S. Eliot (Harvard), Ezra Pound (Penn), Robert Frost (Harvard), E. E. Cummings (Harvard), W. E. B. Du Bois (Harvard), Langston Hughes (Columbia), Archibald MacLeish (Yale), Eugene O'Neill (Princeton), F. Scott Fitzgerald (Princeton), and Thornton Wilder (Yale). Similar lists can be compiled for almost any career, including performing and graphic artists, business leaders, academics, scientists, and inventors.

As the proportion of Ivy League graduates to the entire population grows ever smaller (enrollments being largely stable), the importance of an Ivy League degree seems to be increasing. For example, since 1988, every presidential nominee of both parties, save one (Dole in 1996), has had a degree from Harvard or Yale (or both). And with the appointment of Justice Samuel Alito (Princeton, Yale) in 2006, eight of the nine current Supreme Court justices are graduates of either Harvard or Yale Law School.

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JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY

ROBERT E. WEIR

Jacksonian democracy is an elusive term that refers to an expansion of political rights among white males between 1810 and 1840. It was often accompanied by the articulation of rudimentary **class consciousness** among members of the emerging **working class**.

The American Revolution led to the rejection of aristocratic titles. Though most of the Founding Fathers had not been among the top tier of the Colonial power structure, very few came from society's lower orders, and several, such as the Adams family, possessed great wealth. Most revolutionary leaders were suspicious, even contemptuous, of popular democracy. Mass uprisings such as Shays' Rebellion and the Whiskey Rebellion served only to validate Founders' fears. Even those who championed meritocracy assumed that greater talent and virtue resided in those of proper pedigree and breeding. Most state constitutions linked suffrage to property ownership, allowed debtor prisons, placed control of unsettled lands in legislative hands, and provided for the appointment of key governmental posts. To many commoners, the elites of the new republic differed little from supplanted British aristocrats.

The War of 1812, though a military debacle, accelerated important social changes. Among other things it led to the decline of the Federalist Party, the faction that most favored strong central government, elite privilege, and social deference. The Democratic-Republican Party, originally led by Thomas Jefferson, rhetorically championed **agrarianism**, states' rights, and expanded democracy. After 1816 no Federalist stood for the presidency, and by 1820 the party was defunct everywhere except New England.

The war also produced a popular hero, Andrew Jackson, who won a dramatic victory at the Battle of New Orleans, which was celebrated nationwide even though the war was technically over by the time the clash ensued. An explosion of patriotism followed the War of 1812, increasing pressure for elites to loosen their grip on

power. In the 1820s most states reworked their constitutions to abolish debtor prisons and to allow for universal white male suffrage, irrespective of property status.

The Democratic-Republican Party—today's Democrats—was not as democratic as its rhetoric, however. In the 1824 presidential election, a party caucus manipulated votes to declare John Quincy Adams president, though Jackson won more of the popular and electoral vote. But the tide was turning on such backroom political maneuvers. In 1824 just 27 percent of eligible male voters cast a ballot; four years later nearly 58 percent did so, and they overwhelmingly ousted Adams in favor of Jackson.

The term Jacksonian democracy overemphasizes the role played by Jackson himself. The new president was more the embodiment of a changing society than its catalyst. He was a "Westerner," meaning that he came from west of the Appalachian Mountains, unlike the four presidents from Virginia and two from Massachusetts who preceded him. Jackson was born and raised in what was then the frontier, had very little formal education, and tried his hand at land speculation before becoming a lawyer, then a military man and politician. Even before winning national renown during the War of 1812 Jackson's victories over Eastern Seaboard Native Americans attracted attention. He also cultivated a reputation as a hard drinker, a brawler, and a plain speaker.

Jackson rose to political prominence when an increasing number of white Americans were moving west of the Appalachians, often onto lands claimed by Native Americans. As populations shifted, political power likewise tilted westward. Numerous states moved their capitals inland from the coast to reflect this; for example, Jamestown, Virginia, gave way to Richmond; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, to Harrisburg; and New York City to Albany. It was easy enough for Jackson to package himself as the "Great Commoner" during his campaigns, though, in truth, he inherited a fortune when he was fifteen and was a major **slave** owner. He did, however, open the White House to common people for his inaugural party in 1829, and the masses proceeded to do great damage.

Jackson was a popular president, but many of his actions were couched more in the appearance of helping commoners than in actually doing so. His famed veto of the Second Bank of the United States relied on popular sentiments against aristocraticminded elites, but dismantling the Bank merely transferred funds from federal to state banks. Likewise, his controversial handling of the Nullification Crisis—South Carolina's threat to invalidate the Tariff of 1828—made Jackson appear strong in the eyes of the public, but the tariff itself benefited Northern manufacturers and Southern slaveholders more than the lower classes. His attempts to quash all discussion of slavery indicated that Jackson could be as imperious as the Federalists. Through his minions in Congress, Jackson enacted a "gag" order on slavery debate, hardly a democratic maneuver. Jackson's support for Manifest Destiny—the continental expansion of America—did bring benefits to commoners, though at a cost to Native Americans. Jackson was responsible for opening vast tracts of the Southeast to white settlers through the 1830 Indian Removal Act. As many as 4,000 Natives Americans died on the "Trail of Tears" forced march to Oklahoma, an act Jackson ordered in defiance of a Supreme Court ruling to the contrary. The dubious legality notwithstanding, Jackson's action was hailed by the general public.

Despite the ballyhoo surrounding Jackson's reputation as a champion of the common man, historians generally see the expansion of democracy as a product of pressure from the bottom up, not presidential fiat. Non-importation policies during the War of 1812 benefited nascent American industry. By the 1820s there were early indicators of a coming **Industrial Revolution**. As more and more Americans worked for wages, social classes came into sharper focus, as did debate over America's economic and social future. Although the labor movement was still ill-defined, after 1828 a series of state and local third-party organizations and unionization drives occurred. These mostly disconnected groups came to be called the Workingmen's Movement. Before it fizzled out during the Panic of 1837, the "Workies" engaged in hundreds of **strikes** and challenged existing political power by advising factory laborers and farmers to elect their own members to power. These thirdparty movements did very well on the local level, and their threat led Democrats and the newly formed Whig Party to take up land reform, tax relief, public education bills, shorter workday proposals, and other reforms. The Workies also published more than five dozen journals in which attacks on aristocratic pretense were a staple. Although the Workingmen were as short-lived as they were disjointed, by the mid-1830s the idea of popular democracy (if not always its reality) was firmly entrenched in American political discourse.

By the 1840s the rising **middle class** immersed itself in reform activity, and Jacksonian democracy gave way to other concerns, such as temperance, abolitionism, moral reform, and religious excitement. War with Mexico, geographic expansion, and emerging sectional conflict also diverted attention from popular democratic movements. Still, by 1840 workers and farmers in the United States had acquired basic political rights decades in advance of their counterparts in Western Europe. Enthusiasts see this as an aspect of **American Exceptionalism**, though this is hotly debated. It is also important to reiterate that democracy was still restricted to white males in a nation that denied women the vote, treated **Irish** immigrants with contempt, and held most African Americans in slavery.

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JAMES, HENRY (April 15, 1843–February 28, 1916)

JENIFER B. ELMORE

Henry James was an internationally famous novelist and literary critic. He was born in New York City as the younger brother of the equally famous pioneering psychologist and philosopher William James, Sr. Never comfortable with the flexibility of



Henry James. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

American manners and values, James preferred the clearer social demarcations and expectations of Europe. He lived the great majority of his adult life in England, officially becoming a British subject shortly before his death in 1916.

He published more than twenty novels and novellas in his lifetime, in addition to numerous short stories, collections of short stories, plays, essays, and full-length books devoted to criticism, cultural commentary, autobiography, and travel writing. His most famous works include the critical essay "The Art of Fiction"; the short stories "The Beast in the Jungle," "The Real Thing," and "The Jolly Corner"; the novellas Daisy Miller, What Maisie Knew, and The Turn of the Screw; and the novels The Portrait of a Lady, The Bostonians, The Wings of the Dove, The Ambassadors, and The Golden Bowl.

James's fiction is generally preoccupied with distinctions of class, nationality, and gender, often focusing on the extent to which real connection and communication are truly possible across these dividing

social lines. A pioneer in the styles of both social and psychological realism, James created characters who tend to be plagued with identity crises brought about by changes in their own social positions or with **status** anxiety caused by their proximity to those of different classes. His first major success, *Daisy Miller* (1878), is the story of an adolescent American girl whose father is a self-made, newly rich industrialist in upstate New York. Daisy has the financial means to travel extensively and stylishly in Europe, but she lacks the formal education and polished manners that would make her socially acceptable among even other **upper class** Americans abroad, much less native Europeans, of comparable **wealth**. The story is told mostly from the perspective of another American abroad, a genteel young man named Winterbourne, as he grapples with his own mixed feelings of sexual attraction, social repulsion, and even a kind of national shame toward his fellow American.

Perhaps James's most popular novel among modern audiences is *The Portrait of a Lady* (1881); it constantly reappears in new editions and was adapted into a critically acclaimed film in 1996. It tells the story of Isabel Archer, an independent-minded American heiress, and her painful adult life among jaded and manipulative Americans in Europe, many of whom were **social climbers**. Critics tend to regard James's later novels, however, particularly *The Wings of the Dove*, *The Ambassadors*, and *The Golden Bowl* (published in 1901, 1902, and 1903, respectively) as his stylistic masterpieces. In these novels James most fully realizes the seamless interweaving of aesthetics and morality that he had theorized in "The Art of Fiction" (1884).

More lastingly popular than his socially and psychologically realistic novels are James's ghost stories, especially the novella *The Turn of the Screw* (1898), which has generated an enormous body of published criticism. This body of widely varying and often diametrically oppositional interpretations has arisen largely from the story's narrative complexity. It may be read as a realistic rendering of experience from the point of view of a character who is declining into insanity, or as the fabrication of a sane but unreliable character, or it may be read as a more straightforward story of the supernatural. Besides this major interpretive issue, the story has important gender and class dimensions as well. The more straightforward narrator of the frame story is an educated gentleman spending the holidays with friends at their English country house; the increasingly unstable narrator of the main story is the "youngest of several daughters of a poor country parson," who accepts a position as governess at the age of twenty out of economic necessity and is subsequently terrorized both by her young charges and by the "ghosts" of the previous governess and her lover.

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
JAMES, JESSE (September 5, 1847–April 3, 1882)

ROBERT E. WEIR

Jesse James was an infamous outlaw whose gang robbed banks, stagecoaches, and trains from 1873 to 1882. There is little to commend in the character or deeds of Jesse James, and he would likely be little more than a historical oddity were it not for the way in which he and other outlaws often embody class resentment.

James and his brother Frank grew up in a strict Missouri family; their father, Robert, was a **Baptist** minister. Jesse fought for the Confederacy during the **Civil War** and was wounded. Like many ex-Confederates, he complained of persecution during **Reconstruction** and blamed it for his life of crime. He and Frank eventually recruited three members of the Younger family and others for their outlaw gang. From 1873 to 1876, this gang carried out at least a dozen bank robberies, seven train heists, and four stagecoach robberies. On September 2, 1876, however, a bungled bank job in Northfield, Minnesota, led to a shootout with local citizens in which only Jesse and Frank escaped capture or death. The James gang recruited new members and continued its crime spree until 1882, when Robert and Charles Ford, two new recruits, murdered Jesse James in his Missouri home, hoping to collect a sizable reward. Instead they were arrested and sentenced to hang, though both were later pardoned.

Despite James' bloodthirsty and reprobate life, he was hailed by some as a folk hero both in his lifetime and posthumously. There was brooding resentment



Jesse James, ca. 1864. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

toward railroad robber barons throughout the Midwest, as railroads charged farmers exorbitant rates to ship their grain or to store it in elevators. Some viewed James as a hero for stealing from the railroads, and legends abounded of James engaging in Robin Hood-like acts of philanthropy. Most of those legends were patently false, but James passed into folk hero status. When Robert Ford died in a barroom shootout in 1892, his killer, Edward O'Kelly, was heralded as an avenger. There were even rumors disproved by a 1995 DNA test—that James did not die in 1882, and an Oklahoma man claimed to be James until his death in 1951.

If there is a true candidate for a **philan-thropist** outlaw, it would be Charles "Pretty Boy" Floyd (1904–34), an Oklahoma farmer who turned to banditry in 1921 because he could not find work in rural Oklahoma, where the economy soured long in advance of the **Great Depression**. Floyd pedaled alcohol during Prohibition, did contract shootings, and committed robberies.

Although he committed at least ten murders, some Oklahomans were the recipients of his largess; he bought groceries for hungry families and paid off the mortgages for several families. Like James, Floyd's life ended violently; he was gunned down by police on an Ohio farm.

The folk hero status of brutal outlaws like James, Floyd, John Dillinger, Billy the Kid, Bonnie Parker, and Clyde Barrow can be explained in part by social class. They appeal to the **individualism** Americans are told to embrace but which is often difficult to express in everyday life. To some, outlaws represent the proverbial "little guy" battling corporate society, banks, robber barons, and **elites**. As **Woody Guthrie** put it in a musical homage to Floyd, "Some will rob you with a sixgun/And some with a fountain pen."

One sees a decided class bias in those who embrace outlaw legends. One of the earliest **country music** hits was Vernon Dalhart's "Billy the Kid" (1927), and both George Reneau and Ken Maynard scored hits with Jesse James ballads. In fact, during the 1920s and 1930s, there were dozens of folk and country songs devoted to outlaws, and the genre remains popular. Among the contemporary artists who have done songs about Jesse James are Bob Dylan, Cher, Emmylou Harris, Waylon Jennings, and The Pogues. Guthrie's "Pretty Boy Floyd" has been covered dozens of times; Hollywood has made numerous films about James; and the 1967 **movie** *Bonnie and Clyde*, often hailed as one of the best American films of all time, was a box office smash. Studies of motorcycle gangs, such as the Hell's Angels, reveal

that many of its recruits come from the **lower classes**. One can also see **ethnic** and **racial** strife embodied in contemporary outlaws; in the Latino community *corridos* ballads often have outlaw antiheroes, and a strain of **rap** known as "gangsta" often embraces antisocial values. Both groups have been troubled by gangs, which some critics argue are incited by the valorization of outlaw ideals.

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AZZ

ROBERT PAUL "GABE" GABRIELSKY

The relationship of jazz to social class has been a contentious issue since the emergence of serious scholarship on the subject, beginning in the 1930s. Jazz emerged as a distinct musical form at the beginning of the twentieth century in the American South, particularly in the city of New Orleans and its environs. There tended to be a greater degree of social intercourse among the various ethnic groups of post–Civil War New Orleans than was the case nearly anywhere else in the United States. The mixture of Native American, Spanish, African American, French, Anglo American, and Sicilian cultural influences was unique to New Orleans, and all contributed to the rise of jazz as a distinct musical form. Musically, early jazz, sometimes called Dixieland, was an amalgam of various earlier musical forms and was characterized by a distinctive collective improvisation. According to some jazz writers, collective improvisation and very short solo spaces were functions of the relatively limited skill levels of the earliest jazz musicians, some of whom were at first amateurs who earned their living primarily at other trades.

While jazz was a feature of the cultural life of New Orleans as a whole, it was especially prominent in the brothels of Storyville, the city's red-light district. In 1917, because of repeated fighting and violence involving seamen on leave in the city, the Secretary of the Navy had the bordellos of Storyville shut down. Looking for other venues in which to ply their craft, jazz musicians followed huge numbers of impoverished African Americans from the rural South who were making their way north to find employment, particularly in the steel mills, slaughter houses, and other factories of World War I Chicago. Along the way early jazz bands found employment onboard Mississippi River boats, and their work on these boats made jazz available for the first time to white **middle-class** audiences throughout the Mississippi Valley. Knowledge of jazz spread quite rapidly from that period both among popular audiences and even in Europe among the classical composers of the day.

After 1919 the **Prohibition** era meant that jazz musicians could find ready work in the speakeasies of the North, which became the 1920s equivalent of the New Orleans brothels of the previous decade. The trend of jazz being identified with

illegal, semi-legal, or at least disreputable social elements continued into the early and mid-1930s, when Kansas City, Missouri, a wide-open town under the influence of the Prendergast political machine, became the next jazz Mecca. By this time the art of jazz was evolving considerably, and Kansas City jam sessions became the breeding ground for both swing and the more modern forms of jazz that were to follow, which relied much more heavily on extended solos than did the earlier forms of jazz based in collective improvisation.

There were ironic differences between white and black jazz musicians in the 1920s. Both tended to be of **middle-class** origins, at least in terms of their own subcultures. However, black musicians were often among the best paid, best educated, and best dressed in their community, and as such formed part of their community's elite. In contrast, white jazz musicians in the 1920s and 1930s were often branded as social outcasts in white society and even in their own families precisely because they socialized with African Americans.

Throughout the 1920s and into the 1930s racial **segregation** was the rule not only in society as a whole but also on bandstands and even in recording studios. However, black and white musicians were by no means unaware of each other or their work. They did occasionally play together in after-hours jam sessions, on recording sessions, and in so-called black and tan joints: disreputable night clubs where the races freely intermingled. However, this segregation began to erode in the late 1930s, when some bands, especially under the influence of various liberal individuals and organizations, began to integrate, although initial efforts at racially integrated jazz ensembles were frequently met with hostility from ballroom, theater, and nightclub owners, promoters, and audiences alike. In most parts of the nation, even in most large cities, audiences remained segregated until the civil rights era of the 1950s. The few early exceptions to this included a handful of ballrooms, such as the Savoy Ballroom in Harlem and clubs such as Café Society in New York, that catered to a bohemian, left-wing audience.

It was during the late 1930s and early 1940s, often called the Swing Era, that jazz enjoyed its largest mass audience. For a very brief period jazz was virtually synonymous with popular music as a whole. "Big Bands" of fifteen to twenty musicians toured the land and all but displaced smaller ensembles for most of that period. During the early 1940s the first form of modern jazz, known as bebop, evolved. Bebop developed musically as a reaction to the technical boundaries of big band swing, which, by its orchestral nature and its function as dance music, necessarily placed limits on the length and complexity of individual solos and the complexity of the music itself. Thus bebop, or bop as it was later to be called, was characterized by longer solos, smaller ensembles, and greater musical complexity than the swing music that preceded it.

Sociologically, professional jazz musicians are organic bohemians in the sense that their work is everyone else's play and they sleep while the rest of the world works. As workers, musicians were among the few white-collar workers to organize themselves into a labor union, the American Federation of Musicians (AFM). Indeed, from the 1930s until at least the 1960s, to be a "professional" musician meant to be a member of the AFM. However, in the early days, like the rest of American society, most AFM locals were segregated, and it was not until the early 1950s that the color line in the AFM was effectively broken.

In the period immediately following World War II many jazz musicians were able to acquire formal conservatory educations and even college degrees via the GI Bill. This in turn enabled them to get stable, daytime positions as public school music educators, which greatly extended the knowledge and appreciation of jazz among aspiring young musicians in the 1950s. The development of the long-playing record, FM broadcasting, and other technical advances, as well as the economic boom of the 1950s, made jazz available to a wider, upwardly mobile, and newly suburban audience. At the same time most of the ballrooms where the big bands had flourished a decade earlier had long since closed.

As the issue of race relations was central to the working lives of jazz musicians, it was also very naturally the topic of many blues lyrics and sometimes popular song lyrics as well. The social consciousness of jazz musicians reached a peak during the civil rights era of the 1950s and 1960s with a series of instrumental compositions with politically oriented titles. But the civil rights movement influenced not only song titles, but musical content as well. Jazz musicians began extending the musical frontiers of jazz, beginning with the innovations of bebop in the 1940s, to look more directly at their own cultural heritage. Under the influence of Black Nationalism in particular, jazz began to absorb musical influences from Africa, Asia, and contemporary European classical music, creating what came to be called free jazz or avant-garde jazz.

Since the 1970s so many different styles of jazz have proliferated that it has become increasingly difficult to identify a single jazz community or even articulate a coherent definition of all that is now called jazz. There are jazz command performances in the White House. There are jazz documentaries on public television, and jazz is played by dance orchestras at **debutante** balls. There are jazz orchestras in high schools and middle schools throughout the nation. There are twenty-four-hour "smooth" jazz stations directed toward distinctly middle-class audiences with middle-brow tastes. There are jazz clubs that feature bop-derived mainstream jazz in virtually every urban center in the nation and in the lounges of motels dotted across the highways of the land. There is a revival of swing and vernacular jazz dancing. In the African American communities of America's urban centers, where Dixieland, swing, bebop, rhythm and blues, and free jazz once thrived, today's youth are immersed in the culture of hip-hop, as part of that dynamic tradition of black musical innovation.

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JEWISH AMERICANS

MAXINE LEVAREN

Jewish Americans are those Americans who maintain a connection to the Jewish community, either through practicing Judaism or through cultural and historical ties. Jews have been in the United States since before the **American Revolution**

and have occupied every rung of the social ladder. Jewish migration started with the expulsion of the Jews from Spain, when refugees first immigrated to the Netherlands and then to Brazil and New Amsterdam (later New York City). These early Jewish Americans created their own social structure, although at the same time, they integrated into the economic, political, and social life of the colonies.

These early Jews mostly lived in the port cities of the new colonies, where they were active in commerce and trade, and they interacted with people of different backgrounds and religions. However, at the same time, they established synagogues, which were not only the centers of religious life but also centers of Jewish social life. This was an absolute necessity even after the American Revolution. Although religious freedom was mandated by the new constitution and Jews were accepted because they actively participated in the **American Revolution**, they still had to contend with private prejudice and discrimination.

Another reason for establishing their own social and religious centers was that the openness of American society made it easier for Jews to defect from their religious tradition, especially to Christian denominations that were open to them. Therefore, many of these synagogues adopted conservative and reform arms of Judaism, which were more conducive to participating in the social life of the country while preserving their traditions. In addition, these Jewish communities were always active at fighting discrimination and **anti-Semitism**. In the early years, some states actually prohibited Jews from voting. In addition, Jews had to combat more subtle forms of prejudice, such as negative stereotypes, occasional violence, and discrimination in employment, housing, and education. This exclusion only served to strengthen the Jews' feeling of solidarity.

During the Civil War, Jews supported and fought for both the Union and the Confederacy. Although this emphasized their participation in national life, it also made them scapegoats for people who accused the Jews of backing the "wrong side." Throughout most of the nineteeth century, the majority of the Jewish immigrants were Germans, who were, by and large, educated and economically advantaged, and they participated fully in the business life of the country. However, regardless of their professional and educational accomplishments, they were often excluded from society. These German Jews, who were, as a group, quite successful, formed their own social organizations, which often mirrored society as a whole with their men's clubs, professional associations, and debutante balls.

In the 1880s violent pogroms against Jews in Poland and Russia led to a wave of eastern European immigrants. These new arrivals came from more rural environments and were more religious and less worldly than the Jews that were already here. Although they had escaped a repressive environment, the Polish and Russian immigrants had a difficult time adapting to life in the United States. To them, American life was contrary to everything they believed in. To find work, they sometimes had to violate their religious principles, and they watched their children assimilate into a culture that they felt was strange at best and highly immoral at worst.

To make things even more difficult, the successful German Jews looked down on the newcomers as primitive and uneducated and worried that their strange customs would provoke more anti-Semitism. However, in spite of these barriers, Jews formed a cohesive community, and many of the Jews that were already established in America worked to make sure that the newcomers had equal opportunities and rights. As was true throughout American history, immigrant Jews continued living in the cities, creating small **ethnic enclaves** of families that came from the same general area of Europe. Despite the difficulty in adapting to American life, these Polish and Russian immigrants were anxious for their children to succeed and stressed **education**. However, this education, which resulted in integration with American society, also resulted in the second and third generations distancing themselves from their religion and culture.

Since the latter half of the twentieth century, Jews have increasingly assimilated into American society as a whole. One widely controversial cause of this is intermarriage, which many Jews view as the beginning of the end of Judaism. However, despite those who predicted the end of American Judaism, many intermarried families opt to raise their children Jewish, even if their Judaism is as much a cultural and ethnic identity as a religious one. However, as much as Jews are influenced by American culture, the acculturation also runs in the other direction. Bagels and corned beef sandwiches are widespread in American life, and people of all races, religions, and national origins have been know to describe someone has having a lot of chutzpah (nerve).

Jewish Americans have profoundly affected several areas of American life. Many of the Jewish immigrants already had **socialist** leanings when they arrived in the United States. Since many worked in unskilled professions and saw at first hand the horrible labor conditions, they became active in the labor movement. By the time of the **Great Depression** of the 1930s, many Jews were politically liberal and had a great influence on the Democratic Party. Throughout the twentieth century, Jews continued to be active in liberal causes, such as the civil rights and antiwar movements of the 1960s. Some of the icons of that era, such as Abbie Hoffman, Jerry Rubin, Allen Ginsberg, and Bob Dylan, were Jewish.

Jews have also made a great number of contributions to the arts and popular culture. Some of the more famous Jewish authors are Philip Roth, Saul Bellow, Chaim Potok, and J. D. Salinger. They have also been instrumental in the development of the American motion picture industry, with such Jewish Hollywood moguls as Samuel Goldwyn, Louis B. Mayer, William Fox, Jesse L. Lasky, Carl Laemmle, Marcus Loew, Adolph Zukor, and the original Warner Brothers at the forefront of the American motion picture industry.

Jews also have had great visibility in the world of comedy, with names such as the Marx Brothers, Milton Berle, Woody Allen, and Joan Rivers. Among famous Jewish American musicians are Paula Abdul, Herb Alpert, Sammy Davis, Jr., Kenny G, Billy Joel, Carole King, Barry Manilow, Bette Midler, Paul Simon, and Barbra Streisand.

Jewish Americans have also been active in civic life, serving in the Senate, the House of Representatives, and the Supreme Court. They have also served with honor in all branches of the military.

Jewish Americans continue to build and support their own religious and social structures, though most are fully integrated into twenty-first-century American life.

Suggested Reading

Stephen Birmingham, The Rest of Us: The Rise of America's Eastern European Jews, 1984; Birmingham, Our Crowd: The Great Jewish Families of New York, 1996; Hasia Diner, A New Promised Land: A History of Jews in America, 2000.

JOB CORPS

ROBERT E. WEIR

Job Corps is an educational and vocational training program administered by the Department of Labor that serves economically disadvantaged and at-risk youth between the ages of sixteen and twenty-four. In recent years it has been the focus of debate between liberals, who cite its success, and conservatives, who argue that misleading data hide the program's inherent inefficiencies.

Job Corps was created under the 1964 Economic Opportunity Act, a centerpiece of President Lyndon Johnson's **Great Society** War on Poverty. At the time studies revealed that the unemployment rates for urban youth were often more than ten times higher than overall joblessness, especially for African Americans and Latinos. Job Corps is modeled partly on the Civilian Conservation Corps, a training program from the **New Deal**. Eligible individuals enroll in one of Job Corps' 122 regional residential centers, where they are taught job skills. Since about 80 percent of those who enroll are also high school dropouts, Job Corps also operates educational programs for residents seeking a high school diploma or a General Education Development certificate (GED). Completion times vary by program and individual, but most students stay in Job Corps from six to eleven months.

Each year between 65,000 and 70,000 youth are enrolled in Job Corps, and more than 2 million have graduated since 1964. Job Corps is viewed by its defenders as a program to salvage youth who would otherwise be likely to suffer chronic **unemployment**, become **welfare** recipients, engage in criminal activity, or simply not have the opportunity to succeed. Many of those who attend have been in juvenile court and/or hail from high-crime areas marked by economic deprivation. Job Corps trains residents in a variety of occupations, the bulk of which are **blue-collar** skills, though such **white-collar** training as accounting and computing skills are taught at some centers.

Defenders of Job Corps claim that 66.5 percent of graduates secure meaningful employment after leaving the center and another 14.5 percent pursue further education. They also claim that Job Corps veterans have lower overall unemployment rates, earn more money, are 50 percent less likely to go onto the welfare rolls, and have lower crime rates than their peers. Some tout Job Corps as among the most successful government-funded programs of all time, with one study claiming that graduates reap benefits in excess of program costs by 45 percent.

Many political conservatives are ideologically opposed to government-run social programs, and they are among the harshest critics of Job Corps. Several Heritage Foundation analysts accuse Job Corps of fudging data. They claim, for example, that many graduates do not work fifty weeks per year, that the wage differential between those attending Job Corps and peers who do not is less than \$0.25 an hour,

and that nearly all alleged comparative advantages flatten out after five years. They also criticize Job Corps for its high drop-out rate and for overemphasizing blue-collar occupations that are in decline. Many argue that money would be better spent if shifted to **community colleges** instead. The National Center for Policy Analysis claims that up to 40 percent of all job placements claimed by Job Corps are questionable.

Job Corps is not without problems. About one-third of all enrollees leave in less than ninety days, a figure exacerbated by a zero-tolerance policy for **drugs** and violence implemented in the 1980s and early 1990s. (For the record, most drug and alcohol programs have similarly high drop-out rates.) Data also indicate that Job Corps has very little impact on women who have had children, though those without offspring tend to outperform males. Moreover, Job Corps counts military enlistment as employment, a misleading placement statistic. Most argue, though, that the biggest problem is that the program is chronically underfunded and serves a fraction of those eligible.

President George W. **Bush** put in place new rules designed to measure "results" rather than "process" but has slashed funding for some Job Corps programs despite 2004 campaign pledges to double the number of those getting job training. Especially controversial was a \$4 million cut to **Appalachian** region programs partnered with the **American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations** (AFL–CIO). AFL–CIO leaders cite Bush's ideological dislike of labor unions as the cause. The AFL–CIO and others also criticize the partial **privatization** trend in which over two-thirds of Job Corps centers operate under Department of Labor contracts with the private sector.

Despite ongoing controversy, Job Corps is one of the few proactive schemes that address the unequal opportunity, social disadvantages, and educational deficiencies that plague the **lower classes**.

Suggested Reading

American Youth Policy Forum, "Some Things Do Make a Difference for Youth" (www.aypf.org/compendium/C1S21.pdf); Diane Publishing Company, eds., *Job Corps: Where Participants Are Recruited, Trained, and Placed in Jobs*, 1996; William Finnegan, *Cold New World*, 1998.

JOB TRAINING

ROBERT E. WEIR

Job training is a term that refers to preparing individuals to participate in the **capitalist** economy of the United States. It can refer to employment training for new employees as well as preparing workers who have special needs—such as mentally or physically challenged individuals—or the retraining necessary for those who have lost employment because of layoffs, business closings, or technological change. **Vo-tech programs** have historically prepared high school students for **blue-collar** employment, while business courses have trained secretaries and

low-level office employees. **Community colleges** and agricultural and mechanical colleges often prepare individuals for somewhat more advanced vocational placements. Overall, though, a continuing criticism of American **higher education** is that it prepares the **middle** and **upper class** for more lucrative roles in American society than members of the **lower** or **working classes**.

There are also a host of specialized job training programs, ranging from sheltered workshops that train the mentally and/or physically challenged, to proactive programs designed to help economically disadvantaged individuals. For more on the latter, see **Job Corps**.

Suggested Reading

Jeffrey Cantor, Apprenticeship and Community Colleges: Promoting Collaboration with Business, Labor, and the Community for Workforce Training, 1993; W. Leonard Grubb, Learning to Work: The Case for Reintegrating Job Training and Education, 1996.

JUNGLE, THE

ROBERT E. WEIR

The Jungle is a novel written by **Upton Sinclair** and published in 1906. It follows the misfortunes of Slavic immigrant Jurgis Rudkus and his wife Ona as they emigrate from Lithuania to the Packingtown section of Chicago.

Sinclair portrays Jurgis as a strong, pigheaded individual who initially refuses to see injustices and has a childlike belief in the **American dream**. He willingly accepts dirty, dangerous, and laborious jobs in the meatpacking industry, naively believing that his hard work will attract the attention of his superiors and that he will be rewarded. Jurgis rebuffs the efforts of union leaders to recruit him and ignores the complaints of fellow workers regarding their harsh working conditions. In fact, Jurgis spouts pieties concerning the virtue of hard work that were in accord with conservatives and **Social Darwinists**.

The first half of the book chronicles Jurgis's gritty determination to make good. It also exposes shocking practices within the meatpacking industry, ranging from the dirt, offal, and diseased meat that got made into sausage to the appalling mistreatment of animals and workers alike. There is an unstated but clear message that the industry processed its human resources with the same disregard for safety and dignity as its animal products. Conventional wisdom holds that President Theodore Roosevelt was so disgusted by *The Jungle* that it strengthened his resolve to pass the 1906 Pure Food and Drug Act. In actuality, said legislation was already being discussed before the book appeared, and the Department of Agriculture had already alerted officials and the public of the dangers of adulterated and unsanitary food. Nonetheless, *The Jungle* certainly galvanized official support for **Progressive Era** reforms concerning the nation's food supply and intensified public demand for such ameliorative changes.

The second half of the book deals with the manner in which hubris strikes the once-proud Jurgis, who tragically learns that hard work alone is not the path to **upward mobility**. In fact, Jurgis loses his home, his family, his dignity, and his

health. At one juncture he is **homeless** and comes close to starvation. At long last he comes to consider the necessity of casting aside **individualism** in favor of collective action, a conversion that comes courtesy of his contacts with **socialists**. Most critics consider the latter part of the book weaker; Sinclair adopts a polemical tone more in keeping with his own embrace of socialism.

The Jungle remains one of the more widely read social reform novels. There can be little doubt that Sinclair intended it as an indictment of industrial capitalism. Somewhat to his chagrin, many readers focused more on his sensational and stomach-churning exposé of packinghouse procedures rather than his labor policies and social class commentary. Sinclair presented industrialist capitalists and their upperand middle-class allies as having complete contempt for the **poor**, immigrants, and the **working class**. The book ends with an orator exhorting the masses to rise and promising "Chicago will be ours." This deliberate evocation of Marx's famed "workers of the world, unite!" cry from The Communist Manifesto makes it clear that Sinclair ultimately hoped that The *Jungle* would be a call to action. That hope proved as naïve as Jurgis's belief in hard work, but The Jungle nonetheless remains a searing portrait of class injustice, factory abuses, disregard for consumers, and human degradation.



Poster advertising *The Jungle* by Upton Sinclair, showing lion standing on skull of steer. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

Suggested Reading

Carl Jensen, Stories That Changed America: Muckrakers of the Twentieth Century, 2000; Upton Sinclair, The Jungle, 1906; Sinclair, The Autobiography of Upton Sinclair, 1960.

JUSTICE (CIVIL)

STEVEN A. ADELMAN

American folk wisdom holds that all citizens are equal in the eyes of the law. Critics charge, however, that **wealth**, **power**, **authority**, and **status** give members of the **upper** and the **corporate classes** greater access to justice and sometimes allow them to manipulate outcomes. But because American law grows and changes, the truth lies somewhere between the two extremes.

One could cite numerous examples of this, but many of the themes played out in an infamous civil lawsuit from the late twentieth century, which involved a cup of McDonald's coffee. Advocates for accident victims and **consumer** groups said that this case showed how well the legal system protects people from uncaring corporations that put profits over people. On the other hand, defenders of American business complained that American juries were out of control and that our civil justice system encouraged people to file frivolous lawsuits that actually cost consumers millions of dollars each year.

The McDonald's case demonstrates how the legal process has evolved to protect the rights of individual plaintiffs as well as the corporations they sue. Accident victims got their "day in court," the chance to seek compensation even from powerful business interests. Nonetheless, corporations have far greater resources than the people who sue them, and the legal system provides layers of protection from excessive verdicts from jurors who believe that big businesses can easily afford any award against them.

In 1992 seventy-nine-year-old Stella Liebeck paid \$0.49 for a cup of coffee at the drive-through window of a McDonald's restaurant in Albuquerque, New Mexico. She was in the passenger seat. Liebeck put the cup between her legs and removed the lid. The car was not moving. While she was adding cream and sugar, the cup tipped over, spilling scalding hot coffee on her lap. Liebeck suffered third-degree burns to her groin and inner thighs and spent eight days in the hospital. Upon release, Liebeck asked McDonald's to reimburse her medical bills, about \$11,000. McDonald's offered her only \$800, so Liebeck sued.

Before the trial, there were several chances to reach an out-of-court settlement. Liebeck's lawyer initially offered to settle if McDonald's would pay her \$300,000. McDonald's rejected that offer, as well as a mediator's recommendation of \$225,000 delivered just days before the trial.

The jury found in favor of Liebeck and against McDonald's. They found that Liebeck suffered \$200,000 in compensatory damages for her injuries and medical bills but reduced it to \$160,000 because they felt she was 20 percent at fault for spilling the coffee in the first place. The jury also awarded Liebeck \$2.7 million in punitive damages to punish McDonald's for serving dangerously hot coffee. McDonald's demanded a retrial, claiming that the verdict was improper. The judge refused but reduced the punitive damages from \$2.7 million to \$480,000. Both Liebeck and McDonald's filed appeals, but the parties reached an out-of-court settlement, reportedly for about \$600,000. (A condition of the settlement demanded that the exact amount be kept confidential.)

The McDonald's coffee case has stirred debate, some of it based on the law and quite a bit rooted in myth. Some critics denounced the entire suit as frivolous, asserting that Liebeck bought hot coffee and McDonald's gave her what she paid for. They charge that Liebeck carelessly spilled coffee on herself and should not have been able to sue. There is some truth to the latter point. Liebeck did not claim to be blameless, rather that McDonald's was serving coffee that was dangerously hot, knew of the danger this posed, but persisted. The jury decided that she was right.

At trial, Liebeck proved that McDonald's corporate policy was to keep its coffee 20 to 30 degrees hotter than was drinkable so it would not have to make fresh batches during the day. McDonald's executives admitted that the coffee was so hot when it was sold that it was "not fit for consumption." The company acknowledged

that people sitting in cars and wearing their seatbelts could not just stand up and wipe such hot coffee off themselves fast enough to prevent massive burns. McDonald's even admitted that in the ten years before Liebeck was burned, it had received more than 700 reports of people getting hurt when they spilled McDonald's coffee on themselves. But up to the time Liebeck got hurt, the company did nothing to reduce the danger of burns from its coffee.

Those who did not follow the facts of this case often formed opinions based on hearsay and rumor, one of the most persistent of which was that Liebeck was driving and inattentive. Proverbial common sense dictates that coffee is hot; hence Liebeck was the author of her own misery. In truth, American civil justice generally makes each person responsible for the harm they cause, even if they are victims. The Liebeck jury did hold her responsible for 20 percent of the accident, but it also found a pattern of McDonald's serving coffee so hot that it routinely burned customers—hence, the award against the company.

The jury also learned that McDonald's earned \$1.35 million a day just from selling coffee. Since punitive damages are intended to punish a person or company for past wrongdoing and to discourage similar conduct in the future, the amount of the verdict must be large enough to send a clear message. In other words, if a punitive damages award against a large company is too small to hurt, then the company may not change its bad practices. The jury's award represented two day's worth of coffee profits for the multinational giant.

Critics complained that the \$2.7 million punitive damage award was an example of a runaway jury giving an old lady a windfall from a big corporation. But the legal system protected McDonald's, too, as demonstrated in the trial judge's decision to reduce damages.

Sir Winston Churchill once said that "democracy is the worst system in the world, except for all the others." The same can be said for the American civil justice system at the beginning of the twenty-first century. It allows any individual to sue any person or corporation for his or her injuries. But the legal process is often long, and big corporations have much more money to spend on lawsuits. Even if a jury finds for the plaintiff, the judge can reduce the jury's award, as happened to Liebeck. The justice system's harshest critics argue that what was unique about the Liebeck case was that it was exceptional; most individuals who suffer harm, especially those who are poor, lack information about and access to the justice system or are easily intimidated into settling or dropping potential lawsuits. Anecdotal evidence suggests there is some truth to such charges. Consumer Product Safety Commission data issued in 2003 (for 2000–01) revealed there were 279 product recalls during the period but that only two resulted in lawsuits. In addition, 4509 Americans died in consumer accidents, and more than 13.6 million injuries were sustained. Critics argue that too many of these incidents are ignored or are quietly settled in ways that protect corporate interests. In some cases, dangerous practices are perpetuated through silence. Each year approximately 3.4 million workers are injured on their jobs. Again, very few of these result in litigious action against employers.

On the other hand, *Liebeck v. McDonald's Restaurants* (No. CV-93-02419, 1995 (New Mexico District, August 18, 1994) demonstrates that every corporation is potentially accountable for its actions and that the principle that no one is above

414 ★ JUSTICE (CIVIL)

the law remains valid. Even a little old lady can sue, win, and force a company to change its practices for the better. After Liebeck's case was resolved, McDonald's lowered the temperature of its coffee.

Suggested Reading

American Association of Justice, "ATLA Press Room: McDonald's Scalding Coffee Case" (http://www.atla.org/pressroom/FACTS/frivolous/McdonaldsCoffeecase. aspx#WSJ); The American Tort Reform Association (www.atra.org); The Association of Trial Lawyers of America (www.atla.org); Public Citizen (www.citizen.org); Overlawyered (http://www.overlawyered.com/2003/12/mcdonalds_coffee_revisited.html).



KATRINA

RICHARD JENSEN

Katrina is the name of a devastating hurricane that hit the Gulf Coast and New Orleans at the end of August 2005, causing extensive damage and exposing flaws in the American social, economic, political, and technological systems.

Four major hurricanes hit Florida in 2005, but that state handled them with aplomb, giving no hint of the nation's lack of preparation for Katrina. New Orleans emergency planners had previously worried that the vast network of levees that protected New Orleans, 80 percent of which is below sea level, could not handle the direct hit of a category 4 or 5 hurricane. Katrina began as a category 5 storm but weakened to category 3 when it reached the city on August 29, and the storm's eye passed to the east of the city. Meanwhile President George W. **Bush** and Mayor Ray Nagin declared a state of emergency, and a series of poorly coordinated plans went into effect.

A major metropolitan area includes many political, economic, and social subsystems. During the crisis—one of the greatest natural disasters in American history—some systems worked well and others worked poorly. The National Weather Service provided highly accurate and timely warnings, the news media did a good job in reporting at all levels what was happening, and evacuation systems based on moving large numbers of people by automobile via interstate highways—designed in the 1950s for just such an emergency—worked well. Most families and neighbors took care of their own, with car pools that moved a million people out of harm's way in a matter of hours. The hurriedly established reception centers across the South took in upward of a million refugees regardless of race or social class. Red Cross, U.S. Army, and Salvation Army canteens gave out millions of meals. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) gave out cash allowances for living and housing expenses, and states such as Texas and such cities as Houston and Baton Rouge coped well with the displaced persons burden.



Stranded residents in Jefferson Parish are brought to an elevated bridge area by boat to await transportation by truck to the main staging area at I–10 and Causeway during the evacuation of New Orleans, 2005. Courtesy of FEMA.

The military response to the disaster was prompt, with 17,000 federal forces supporting 43,000 state national guardsmen. The U.S. Coast Guard, though it had never handled any crisis as large, moved its ships, planes, and helicopters inland, where they could be safe, mobilized its reserves, set up a secure command and control system, and within hours began a massive operation that rescued 22,000 people, even though its own facilities were damaged by the storm and by looters. In the aftermath the Pentagon recommended that civilian agencies emulate Coast Guard interagency task forces.

The oil industry, the main economic base of the region, comprising hundreds of offshore drilling and pumping rigs as well

as refineries and pipelines on shore, coped well. All the workers evacuated in time, and though many rigs and refineries were damaged, disrupting oil production and raising prices, the industry handled repairs in speedy fashion. The **gambling** industry located along the Mississippi coast had a unique problem. Because of state restrictions casinos were on boats tethered to shore. The staff were evacuated, but the boats were ruined. The **transportation** network nearly collapsed when Interstate 10 was destroyed, but highway crews made repairs in record time. Mississippi was hit almost as hard as Louisiana by wind and storm surges, though it received less publicity and handled its evacuation and recovery missions more efficiently than Louisiana.

Congress allocated \$107 billion in relief, although disputes on how to use the funds stymied state and local governments. The national insurance industry had a very profitable year in 2005 despite payouts of \$40.6 billion to 1.7 million Katrina victims. Over half of the insurance payments went to businesses and institutions that were damaged. Two billion dollars went to cover 300,000 claims for destroyed cars and trucks, while 660,000 Louisiana homeowners and another 335,000 in Mississippi received \$16 billion in payments. About 20 percent of policy holders received less than expected because most policies excluded flooding caused by levee breaks or ocean surges. In court the industry argued that its salesmen were not authorized to tell buyers they were "fully" covered by their hurricane policies, but the National Flood Insurance Program, established by Congress in 1968, covered \$22 billion in Katrina losses. Long-term repairs have produced a construction boom and have also attracted thousands of illegal **immigrants** willing to work in very unpleasant conditions.

Also on the negative side, many systems worked poorly during the crisis. Approximately 1,300 people died, 49 percent of them black. (African Americans were 60 percent of the population at risk.) The most glaring problem was the failure to deliver quick aid to refugees in city shelters, a situation often spotlighted on television. Most hospitals and nursing homes were evacuated promptly, but those

that were overlooked became scenes of horror and death. The New Orleans Police Department collapsed, with its communications system flooded out, its leadership in disarray, and worst of all, upward of a third of its officers deserting (and some joining looting bands). The failures of New Orleans and Louisiana state officials to plan ahead or to coordinate during the crisis drew national censure. Likewise, the slowness with which city and state officials developed a recovery plan and allocated the billions in federal financial help was more evidence that the state's political system was dysfunctional, especially when measured against the performance in Mississippi. The **higher education** system a year after Katrina was still reeling and uncertain about long-term recovery plans. No one could predict whether New Orleans could recover as a major tourist destination or recoup its pre-Katrina population. Most evacuees have not returned to New Orleans, and as of early 2007, it was unclear how many will return as the economy remains in shambles. City voters nonetheless reelected its mayor in 2006.

The massive damage to rural and coastal areas probably could not have been prevented given American preferences. Many of the damaged areas were new developments, testimony to the insatiable demand for seacoast homes irrespective of flood and hurricane dangers. However, to everyone's astonishment the worst damage was linked to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. It was primarily responsible for designing, building, and maintaining the levee system that protected lowlying New Orleans. While experts realized that the levees would not hold against a direct hit from a category 4 or 5 hurricane, Katrina was a category 3 and it missed the city. The levees disintegrated because an unexpectedly strong water surge crashed into walls that were much weaker than the designs called for. The Corps took full responsibility.

Politically the sharpest criticism was levied at the Bush administration, especially FEMA head Michael Brown, an inexperienced, incompetent patronage favorite. Brown's main goal appeared to be protecting himself and shifting the blame. But even after Brown was fired, FEMA mishandled distribution of emergency cash, rent money, housing plans, and policy coordination, which severely hurt the reputations of the Department of Homeland Security and President Bush. Criticism of FEMA spilled into national politics, with the Congressional Black Caucus, some members of the Democratic Party, and a few allies on the left charging that racism was the reason for FEMA's poor performance and that Bush would not have allowed white folks to suffer. Several observers contrasted the swift response of agencies dealing with wealthy Floridian hurricane victims with the slowness of FEMA. Most Democrats took up the theme that Bush himself was incompetent and grouped the Katrina fiasco with the ongoing quagmire of the war in Iraq as proof of his inability to lead. Conservative commentators retorted that New Orleans had always been a sink of despair, attracting a fatalistic **underclass** that could not handle their own affairs and ceded control to corrupt officials who put personal gain ahead of civic duty.

Debate over Katrina served to refocus attention on the American class structure. Hurricane Katrina was so powerful that vast damage was inevitable. How much of the failed human response was due to poor planning, to incompetence and fear, to corruption and inefficiency and criminality, or to a lack of concern for people of color or the **poor** has yet to be sorted out.

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Douglas Brinkley, *The Great Deluge: Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans, and the Mississippi Gulf Coast*, 2006; Ivor van Heerden and Mike Bryan, *The Storm: What Went Wrong and Why During Hurricane Katrina*, 2006.

KENNEDY FAMILY

FRANK A. SALAMONE

The Kennedy family is a study of upward **social mobility** in the United States. The family's rise is a storybook case of the **American dream**, as it went from impoverished immigrant beginnings to one of the most powerful political families in the country. All eight of former president John F. Kennedy's great-grandparents were **Irish** immigrants, none of whom had much money or property. In fact, his great-grandmother Bridget had property valued at \$75 in the 1860 census. Thus, if we use the length of time that a person's ancestors have been in a class as a mark of that class, Kennedy's roots are firmly in the **working class**.

Little wonder, then, that the American **elite** viewed him and his family as **nouveau riche**, even though most Americans viewed them as almost royalty. This fact further underscores the rapid ascent of the Kennedy family and the reason that this ascent is viewed so differently within different classes in America. It also explains their fundamental commitment to American values while embracing liberal politics.

Moreover, the manner in which the family moved through social classes is quintessentially American. It included hard work and **self-reliance** as well as shady dealings. For example Patrick Joseph Kennedy, John F. Kennedy's grandfather, went from brass finishing to liquor dealing. The money he made bought respectability enough to win election five times to the Massachusetts House of Representatives and three times to the Massachusetts Senate. Additionally, Joseph Patrick Kennedy, John F. Kennedy's father, is reputed to have been a liquor importer during Prohibition and to have sold his business to a mobster.

Given the attitude of the elite Boston **Brahmins**, a class mainly descended from the **Puritans**, regarding the role of probity and ancestry, it is little wonder that they never truly accepted the Kennedys. In addition to the stigma of being descendants of recent **immigrants**, the Kennedys were also Roman **Catholics**. The American **upper class** in general and the Massachusetts Brahmins in particular were strongly anti-Catholic. A true sign of class difference was the fact that the **lower** and **middle** classes were untroubled by either the Kennedy ancestry or religion. Before John Kennedy and his brothers were elected to office, there were a number of successful politicians in the Kennedy family who rose to power through support form the lower and working classes.

Patrick Kennedy (c. 1823–November 11, 1858) sired the American line of Kennedys. He was born in County Wexford, Ireland, and worked on the family's small farm. The Kennedys, like many Irish families, suffered during the Potato Famine. It is not known if this is what drove Patrick to emigrate, but in 1848 he and his betrothed, Bridget Murphy, left Ireland and settled in Boston. They married

in 1849 and had five children. He died of cholera when still in his thirties, but Bridget saved enough to buy a stationary store in Boston, which became the basis for the family's rise to success.

Patrick Joseph Kennedy (January 14, 1858–May 18, 1929) was the first Kennedy to serve in public office. He attended Boston College, but his major achievement was to immerse himself in Democratic Party politics at a time when patronage and loyalty translated into reciprocal favors. He cultivated contacts that secured election to both the Massachusetts House of Representatives and the Senate. He married Mary Augusta Hickey, whose father was a well-to-do businessman, which added to the family's financial security.

Joseph Patrick Kennedy Sr. (September 6, 1888–November 18, 1969) was Patrick's son, and it was he who made the family wealthy and powerful. He attended prestigious Boston Latin High and Harvard College before entering business. He cashed in on his father's business and political connections and became a bank manager when he was just twenty-five. In 1912 he married Rose Fitzgerald, whose father, John "Honey Fitz" Fitzgerald, was rich, influential, a Congressman, and a colorful two-time mayor of Boston. In 1919 Joe Kennedy joined a **Wall Street** brokerage firm dominated by other rich Irish Americans, which some analysts accused of manipulating prices and other unethical practices. Kennedy collected his gains in 1928, just before the **stock market** crash of 1929 precipitated the **Great Depression**.

Kennedy had also made money through real estate speculation. During Prohibition his company was the exclusive American agent for both Gordon's Dry Gin and Dewar's Scotch. Liquor importation was permitted for medicinal reasons, and Kennedy stockpiled both products in anticipation of the end of Prohibition in 1933. Kennedy invested heavily in real estate, the Chicago Merchandise Mart, and a race track in Hialeah, Florida. He was also involved in Hollywood, where he refinanced a number of insolvent studios and restored their financial health. His name was linked romantically to several starlets, including Gloria Swanson. Kennedy bought a small studio specializing in Westerns, which he parlayed into bigger enterprises. He and a group of investors founded RKO Studios, Radio Keith Orpheum.

Like his father, Joe Kennedy became involved in politics, supporting Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1932. Roosevelt rewarded Kennedy by making him the first chairman of the Security and Exchange Commission, a job he performed admirably. In 1935 he headed the Maritime Commission. In 1938 Kennedy was named ambassador to Great Britain. Kennedy assumed this post just one year before World War II began in Europe. Kennedy enjoyed his high position in London, though his Irish ancestry may have led him to ignore Winston Churchill's warnings about Germany. Instead, Kennedy supported the appeasement policies of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, a position that led to his resignation in 1940 and strained relations with President Roosevelt. His blindness to the German threat called his judgment into question, and his detractors also claimed he supported Francisco Franco's rise to power in Spain.

Kennedy had presidential ambitions of his own, which he soon abandoned and transferred to his oldest son, Joseph Jr. Following Joseph Jr.'s death in combat, he transferred these ambitions to his next son. Joseph Sr. even struck a deal with Wisconsin Senator Joseph McCarthy to secure John's election to the Senate.

McCarthy was at the height of his powers during the **Red Scare**. Kennedy was friendly with his fellow Irish American and gave money to McCarthy's own reelection campaign in exchange for a promise to avoid Massachusetts and not support the Republican senatorial candidate. John Kennedy won a U.S. Senate seat in 1952, upsetting a popular Republican, Henry Cabot Lodge. His younger brother Robert briefly served as one of McCarthy's senior staff members. Senator Kennedy avoided anti-McCarthy speeches during the latter's fall from grace. He did draft, but never delivered, a speech calling for McCarthy's censure.

Thereafter, Joe Kennedy kept in the background and observed the careers of sons John, Robert, and Ted unfold. He suffered a stroke in 1961 but lived until 1969, by which time both John and Robert had been assassinated. It is rumored that his death was hastened by depression and a refusal to eat.

John Fitzgerald Kennedy (May 19, 1917–November 22, 1963) was born in the affluent section of Boston known as Brookline. He received what was by then the standard Kennedy private education: Catholic schools through third grade, then the elite boarding school Choate, and a degree from Harvard. He also attended Princeton and the London School of Economics, but poor health interrupted his studies at each. Poor health, including Addison's disease, dogged him throughout his life. A bad back kept him out of the Army, but he enlisted in the U.S. Navy and became a decorated war hero. He married Jaqueline Bouvier in 1953. Her family was well established in the upper class and was related to another upper-crust family, the **Auchincloss**es.

Kennedy was elected to the House of Representatives in 1946. By the time Kennedy was elected to the U.S. Senate in 1952, the public viewed him as a member of the American aristocracy, though his Catholic background and his father's unsavory past made the family suspect among the Brahmins. Kennedy used his uncertain status to his advantage and often cast himself as a populist. He was considered a vice presidential candidate in 1956, but was passed over. In 1960, however, he captured the Democratic nomination for president and defeated Richard Nixon in a close race. His election was a major breakthrough for Catholics, as it vindicated long-standing animus against the faith and signaled full assimilation.

The Kennedy presidency was marked by a number of significant class issues. First, he and his wife Jacqueline cast a glamorous image, though Kennedy in private was a womanizer who, like his father, had a weakness for actresses. He was linked romantically with Marilyn Monroe, among others. More substantively, Kennedy came to support civil rights, rallying the nation toward support for **Martin Luther King Jr.**, affirmative action, and the use of federal power to enforce desegregation orders. He also sought changes to bring about equality in a number of areas. His "New Frontier" programs advocated broad tax relief, educational reform, anti-**poverty** programs, and regulation of big corporations. In one case he forced the U.S. Steel Corporation to rescind a proposed 3.5 percent price increase, an act that caused many wealthy businessmen to turn against him.

Kennedy's support of civil rights brought him more enemies. In the fall of 1962 Kennedy sent 23,000 troops to the University of Mississippi to enable the enrollment of its first black student, James Meredith. In 1963 two African American students enrolled in the University of Alabama. Both cases precipitated riots. The sight of mistreatment of civil rights demonstrators led Kennedy to declare a "moral

crisis" in America. It must be said, though, that the most significant advances against poverty and **racism** were enacted after his death, during the **Great Society** programs of President Lyndon Johnson.

Many of Johnson's class-based actions had their genesis under Kennedy. Several executive orders by Kennedy increased the amount and quality of surplus food available to **unemployed** Americans and expanded the Food for Peace Program to help the needy abroad. Kennedy was unsuccessful in implementing a universal health insurance plan, but he was able to expand the food stamp program during a mild recession early in his presidency. He also expanded unemployment and welfare benefits, extended Social Security benefits to an additional 5 million people, put through the most complete housing bill in American history, supported public transportation improvements, increased money for urban renewal and housing for the elderly, and increased the **minimum wage**. His support for the space program led to an expansion in related technology firms. All of these initiatives were expanded during the Johnson administration.

Kennedy's foreign policy, however, was firmly rooted in **Cold War** assumptions. Tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union were high, and his presidency was marked by a failed invasion of **communist** Cuba in 1961, the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961, and the Cuban Missile crisis of 1962, the latter of which brought the nation to the brink of nuclear warfare. Kennedy later supported a testban treaty on nuclear weapons, but his most fateful decision was to increase the U.S. presence in South Vietnam to counter incursions from communist North Vietnam. No official combat troops served in Vietnam under Kennedy and some say that he planned to disengage from Vietnam, but this was not done by the time of his assassination in Dallas, Texas, in 1963. Many social critics feel that the Vietnam War sandbagged the opportunity to change social class dynamics in America.

Jacqueline Lee Bouvier Kennedy Onassis (July 28, 1929–May 19, 1994), Kennedy's widow, left her mark on American class relations as well. As First Lady she was known for her aesthetic taste, and she served as a style trendsetter. She exuded her privileged background, often wore **designer** gowns, and was a model of courage and elegance in the aftermath of her husband's murder. She also championed the underdog and continued civic work for a time, despite a preference for privacy. Her 1968 marriage to Greek shipping magnate Aristotle Onassis was decried by many, but she remained a role model for many women until her death.

Robert Francis Kennedy (November 20, 1925–June 6, 1968) was the seventh child of Joseph and Rose Kennedy. He too received a private education, served in the Navy, and graduated from Harvard. He also obtained a law degree from the University of Virginia. He married Ethel Skakel in 1950 and the couple had eleven children.

Much of his political career was tied to that of his brother John. He managed John's 1952 Senatorial campaign and his 1960 run for the presidency. He made his mark as the Senate's chief counsel during 1956 hearings on organized crime. "Bobby," as he was often called, was especially dogged in investigating mob influences in the **labor movement** and had a vitriolic and well-publicized clash with Teamsters president Jimmy Hoffa. When John assumed the presidency in 1961, Bobby served as his attorney general. He continued to attack organized crime, though his critics claimed this was window dressing and that the Kennedy administration had

ties with the mob. It is known that Bobby authorized wire taps against the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr., but he appears to have had a change of heart and acted aggressively to support civil rights leaders during violent clashes in the South.

Bobby remained attorney general after his brother's assassination, but the aristocratic Kennedy and the earthy President Johnson did not get on well; Johnson privately complained that both Kennedys treated him with disrespect. Kennedy left his post to run for the U.S. Senate and won a seat from New York in 1964, despite having little previous connection to the Empire State. He won a reputation for supporting civil rights and Johnson's Great Society programs, but he became an outspoken opponent of the Vietnam War. He declared for the presidency in 1968 and was the leading Democratic candidate when he was assassinated on the eve of winning the California primary.

Edward Moore "Ted" Kennedy (February 22, 1932–) is the youngest of nine children born to Joseph and Rose Kennedy and is currently the senior U.S. Senator from Massachusetts. His education parallels that of his elder brothers, including a degree from Harvard. Like Robert, he obtained a law degree from the University of Virginia. He was first elected to the U.S. Senate in 1962 during a special election to fill his brother John's seat when he became president.

Ted Kennedy was considered by many to be presidential timber, but his personal life was marred by too much controversy. In 1969 Kennedy was involved in an auto accident on Chappaquiddick Island that left an aide, Mary Jo Kopechne, dead. Rumors circulated that Kennedy was drunk, and Kennedy-haters claimed that he murdered Kopechne to cover up an affair. The scandal lingered long enough to scuttle 1980 plans for the White House. He also shocked many by divorcing his first wife, Joan Bennett Kennedy, in 1982. Mrs. Kennedy struggled with alcoholism, but divorce is forbidden by the Catholic church. He remarried Victoria Reggie, a lawyer, in 1992.

The liberal reputation of his brothers John and Robert is often exaggerated, but Ted Kennedy consistently ranks at or near the top of lists of the most liberal members of Congress. He supports free universal health care, abortion rights, a major boost to the minimum wage, aggressive anti-poverty measures, and strong environmental policies. He has been very outspoken in opposing tax breaks for the rich and legislation that he feels hurts the American **working class**.

Numerous other Kennedy relatives have had careers in politics. The list includes Sargent Shriver, a son-in-law of Joseph and Rose Kennedy and the first director of the Peace Corps. He was a vice presidential candidate in 1972. His son, Mark, has been active in Maryland politics, as has Kathleen Kennedy Townshend, Robert's oldest daughter. Shriver's daughter, Maria, is married to actor-turned-California governor Arnold Schwarzenegger. Ted Kennedy's son, Patrick Joseph, was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives from Rhode Island in 1995 and continues to serve. Joseph Kennedy II, one of Robert's children, served six terms in Congress and was considered a frontrunner for Massachusetts governor in 2000 until his campaign was derailed by divorce and a sexual scandal involving his brother Michael, who was his campaign manager.

Michael died in a skiing accident in 1997, another tragedy in a long line for this colorful and controversial family. John F. Kennedy Jr. and his glamorous wife, Carolyn Bessette, died in 1999 when their private plane crashed. Before his death he

founded and edited *George*, a glitzy magazine that combined lifestyle and politics. Many consider that mix, salted with controversy, to be emblematic of one of America's richest, stylish, and most influential families.

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KERBO, HAROLD (August 9, 1948–)

ROBERT E. WEIR

Harold R. Kerbo is a leading scholar of American **social stratification** and comparative systems. His text, *Social Stratification and Inequality*, is considered by many to be the definitive undergraduate resource for the study of social class.

Kerbo is a native of Tulsa and obtained his BA and MA from the University of Oklahoma and his PhD from Virginia Polytechnic Institute. Since 1977, Kerbo has taught at California Polytechnic Institute, where he chairs the Department of Social Sciences. He also has extensive experience teaching and researching abroad, especially in Japan, Germany, Thailand, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

Kerbo has contributed to the understanding of social stratification in three major areas: views on poverty, social movement theory, and comparative stratification systems. He has been highly critical of the manner in which many studies of the **lower class** have been conducted. Many of these, he argues, focus on poverty as pathology and ignore its systemic causes. Major **foundations** are more comfortable funding studies that suggest the existence of a **culture of poverty** because an emphasis on culture and **individualism** shifts the gaze from the very political and economic structures of which foundations are a part. **Elites** have been so successful in effecting this shift that many poor Americans have embraced the idea that they helped create their own situations. Kerbo argues that one should look at social stratification rather than poverty and focus on **power**, social control, and the ability of elites to define **values**.

Kerbo's research on social movements takes a useful middle position between two opposing views as to why such movements form. Scholars adhering to the "breakdown-frustration" thesis see social movements largely as products of anger, desperation, and deprivation, whereas "resource-mobilization" theorists emphasize movements' desires to gain access to economic and political assets. Kerbo argues that both operate, but for different groups. "Crisis movements," such as African Americans seeking racial justice or poor people seeking economic opportunity, are more likely to adhere to the breakdown-frustration model, whereas "affluence movements," like ecology activism or abortion rights, often focus on resource mobilization. The same breakdown is also evident in the workplace, with wage earners in the lower **middle class** and lower classes more prone to suffering

from **alienation** than those in the upper echelons, who exercise more control over their jobs.

Kerbo's comparative studies cast light on how other nations' economic, social, and political practices differ from those of the United States, even when **capitalist** economic systems suggest greater similarity. For example, despite Japan's reputation for corporate dominance, there are actually more checks on corporate power there than in the United States. Likewise, Japan has higher levels of **social mobility**. Kerbo's global studies suggest that the United States has only moderate levels of affluence, opportunity, and social equality when compared to other advanced capitalist nations.

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KEYNES, JOHN MAYNARD (June 5, 1883–April 21, 1946)


KRISTIN SOLLI

John Maynard Keynes was one of the most influential economists of the twentieth century. As the son of a renowned British economist, John Neville Keynes, John Maynard Keynes was born into a well-to-do family in Cambridge, England. He was educated at Eton and later King's College, Cambridge, two of the most prestigious educational institutions in the United Kingdom. After earning a degree in mathematics, he was hired by the British civil service, only to return to Cambridge to teach economics three years later. At this time he also started working for the British Treasury. In this capacity, he was appointed to attend the Versailles Peace Treaty Conference following World War I. After the peace negotiations, Keynes resigned from the Treasury because he strongly disagreed with the Allies' approach of demanding stringent economic reparations from Germany. In a book called *The* Economic Consequences of the Peace (1919), he argued that this strategy would lead to overall economic instability and political unrest in Europe. The book sold well and made Keynes a public figure. Throughout his career, Keynes published prolifically, participated frequently in public policy debates, and served as an important adviser to the British government in economic matters. Keynes was also interested in art and intellectual endeavors broadly conceived and was a part of the Bloomsbury Group, a circle of artists and intellectuals that included such luminaries as Virginia Woolf and E. M. Forster. He remained a fellow of King's College until his death.

Keynes provided a drastically new way of thinking about the role of government in economics, a shift that is often referred to as the "Keynesian revolution." In his most famous book, *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money* (1936), he offered an incisive critique of neoclassical economic theory, the set of principles that formed the basis for economic policies and practices at the time. Neoclassical economic theory, also known as laissez-faire economics, holds that the government

should stay out of trade and business because markets work best when left to regulate themselves. Written during the throes of a sustained global economic depression in the 1930s, *The General Theory* argues that governments both can and should intervene in the market to keep the economy healthy. Full employment and a more equal distribution of **wealth** and **income**, he argued, was the way out of the **Great Depression**, and government intervention was a necessary means to get there.

Specifically, Keynes proposed that during economic recessions governments can revive the economy by creating jobs for the unemployed through financing public works and programs. As such Keynes argued that governments should focus on restoring the spending power of the masses of ordinary workers in order to create a greater demand for goods. This demand would then encourage private enterprise to invest and hire more workers. In this way Keynes introduced the idea of a mixed economy in which the state and private enterprise both play important roles in maintaining



John Maynard Keynes, ca. 1946. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

a stable economy with low unemployment and steady wages.

Rather than leaving the market to the "invisible hand," in other words, Keynes argued that the state should take on an active role in managing the relationship between supply and demand. Keynes did not see his theories as a departure from the capitalist free-market economic model, but as measures that helped defend this economic system against contingencies. Indeed some describe him as the man who saved **capitalism** from itself.

Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal-era programs are often associated with Keynesian economics. FDR, however, was far from convinced by Keynes's proposals. In particular he was suspicious of Keynes's recommendation of deficit spending—that the government spends more than it recoups in taxes—as a way out of economic slumps. Only toward the end of the 1930s and into World War II were Keynes's principles more fully implemented. In the post—World War II era, these principles dominated U.S. economic policies, with presidents as different as Richard Nixon and Jimmy Carter citing Keynes's influence. Some economists even refer to the large budget deficits during the era of neo-liberal Reaganomics in the 1980s as a Keynesian legacy, an assessment that probably does not sit well with most proponents of Reagan's economic policies. Outside the United States, Keynes's thoughts were eagerly picked up by proponents of the social democratic welfare state in England and elsewhere.

Keynes's ideas have had a tremendous impact on public policy and economic theory; the fact that "Keynesianism" is the name of a separate branch of economic theory testifies to this point.

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KING, MARTIN LUTHER, JR. (January 15, 1929-April 4, 1968)

RAMI KHALAF SR.

Martin Luther King Jr. was an African American **Baptist** minister and a political activist who advocated social change through nonviolent means. He rose to fame in 1955, when he helped organize the Montgomery bus boycott, a key battle in the movement to end **segregation.**

Martin Luther King Jr. (whose first name is listed as Michael on birth records) was born in Atlanta, Georgia, to the Rev. Martin Luther King Sr. and Alberta Williams King. He obtained a BA in sociology from Morehouse College in 1948, a Bachelor of Divinity degree from Crozer Theological Seminary in Chester, Pennsylvania, in 1951, and a PhD in systematic theology from Boston University in 1955. He married Coretta Scott on June 18, 1953, in Alabama, and his father performed the wedding ceremony. The younger King stayed in Alabama, working as a pastor to the Dexter Avenue Baptist Church in Montgomery, one of the most distinguished black churches in the state.

On December 1, 1955, Rosa Parks, an African American seamstress, refused to give up her seat to a white man on a segregated Montgomery, Alabama, bus. The Rev. King was persuaded to use his church as the operational center for a bus boycott and protest that lasted for 382 days. The situation became so tense that King's house was bombed and he and scores of other activists were arrested. African Americans suffered from Jim Crow laws and customs that confined them second-class citizenship, but the Montgomery activists were willing to endure humiliation by the police and the legal system, beatings, imprisonment, and even violent death to defy the system.

The situation ended when the Montgomery bus system capitulated and the Supreme Court outlawed racial segregation on public transport. Black Americans recognized the need for a leader like Martin Luther King Jr. and his commitment to nonviolent resistance. For the next thirteen years he was able to expose and extricate American society from many wrongs. In 1957 King helped start the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), an organization that would become a moral force for Southern black churches and which trained black activists in nonviolent protest tactics. A year later King published his first book, *Stride toward Freedom: The Montgomery Story*. By then he was the spiritual leader and most effective member in the SCLC and remained so until his death in 1968. King was influenced by the nonviolent civil disobedience used successfully by Gandhi in India against British colonial aggression.

FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover waged a bitter war of surveillance and harassment on King, declaring him "the most dangerous man in America." King was wiretapped in 1961 under the belief that he was a **communist** or communist sympathizer, but when the government could not find such evidence, they tried to use



Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. addresses a group of Watts residents following the summer riots of 1965. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

his sexual peccadilloes to blackmail the Reverend King and force him out of the leadership of the civil rights movement. King resisted all such pressures and by the early 1960s commanded a widespread following that allowed him to deflect threats and criticism.

King and his followers recognized that nonviolent protest against Southern segregation would attract extensive media coverage of the struggle for black equality and **voting rights**. Indeed, journalistic accounts and televised footage of the daily deprivation and indignities suffered by Southern blacks, and of segregationist violence and harassment of civil rights workers and marchers, produced a wave of sympathetic public opinion that catapulted the civil rights movement to the fore of American politics in the early 1960s. In 1963 King addressed a civil rights rally in Washington, D.C., and delivered his "I Have a Dream" speech, one of the most famous in American history. The next year he won the Nobel Peace Prize and in 1965 attempted a march from Selma, Alabama, to Montgomery, which was scuttled by such violence on the part of white racists that large amounts public opinion swung in favor of civil rights protestors. King's energies were instrumental in helping push the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.

But King also challenged America on its most fundamental priorities; he reminded citizens and politicians that civil rights laws were empty without human and economic rights. Noting the huge income gaps between rich and poor and that a disproportionate number of those living in **poverty** were black, King developed a

class perspective that called for radical change in the structure of the American society and the redistribution of **wealth** and **power**. He supported the **War on Poverty** and many **Great Society** reforms, but he also annoyed Hoover, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, and President Lyndon Johnson through inflammatory rhetoric and wealth distribution theories they deemed **socialist**.

King saw the Vietnam War as unnecessary and as a threat to domestic reform; hence he opposed it. He also embraced the militant **labor movement** and criticized the government's neglect of the **working class** and the poor. King lambasted class privilege with such vehemence that detractors called him a communist, President Johnson turned hostile toward him, and financial backing from corporations, foundations, and some unions dwindled.

King also faced criticism from some of his supporters who thought it risky to mix race and class politics. Many feared this would alienate Democratic Party allies of the civil rights movement, but King was unfazed by their criticism.

By 1968 King viewed himself as a democratic socialist and stated a desire to unite the poor regardless of their color. One of his final national projects was to assemble a multiracial army of poor that would descend on Washington to protest in a peaceful manner using nonviolent civil disobedience until government agencies produced a people's bill of rights that included jobs programs aimed at rebuilding America's inner cities.

King inspired the **Poor People's Campaign** and march on Washington, D.C., but did not live to see its culmination. In keeping with his view that poverty was color blind, King left the march to journey to Memphis, Tennessee, to support a sanitation workers' **strike**. He was assassinated on April 4, 1968, reputedly by career criminal James Earl Ray, though many believe there was a wider assassination plot. The widespread urban riots that followed his assassination violated Dr. King's principles, but he has since been honored as an exemplar of positive social change. King has become such an icon of the civil rights movement that his commitment to the **lower class** and working class of all races is often overlooked.

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
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KNIGHTS OF LABOR

ROBERT E. WEIR

The Knights of Labor was the largest and most powerful labor union federation of the late nineteeth century. It is usually considered the first important American labor federation. Between 1869 and 1917, more than 2.5 million workers held membership and more than 10,000 local Knights of Labor locals were formed. Although some scholars see the Knights of Labor (KOL) as a transitional union between fraternal-based brotherhoods and more rationalized, bureaucratic structures like that of the **American Federation of Labor** (AFL), the KOL cannot be so neatly categorized since many of its ideals and practices were far in advance of their time.

The KOL was founded in Philadelphia in 1869 by members of a tailors' union that had just collapsed. Its early guiding spirit was Uriah Stephens, a man who was profoundly influenced by fraternal organizations like the Freemasons. Stephens was convinced that traditional craft-based unions were inadequate to deal with conditions emerging from the Industrial Revolution. A new breed of entrepreneurs, many of whom were robber barons, cared little for their work forces and was more likely to do the bidding of stockholders than fret over the material conditions of the working class. Moreover, the rise of new corporate structures meant a decline in traditional paternalism, even among less capricious industrialists, as local ownership and community ties



Frank J. Farrell, delegate of District Assembly No. 49, introducing General Master Workman Powderly to the tenth annual convention of the Knights of Labor, 1886. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

tended to disappear within a framework of investors, imported management, and off-site decision making.

Complicating matters further was the nascent nature of labor law. Many states still had legislation that outlawed unions as illegal combinations and conspiracies, and even where such statutes did not exist, courts, **middle-class** opinion makers, and governments routinely sided with employers. Conditions for **wage** earners, especially newly arriving immigrants, were grim. Low wages and long hours prevailed in most places, and few workers enjoyed fringe benefits of any sort. Given such a milieu, labor union development was uneven and difficult. Between 1828 and 1837, some unions and reformers tried to form Workingmen's parties to put forth a political agenda for working people, but these failed to weather a severe recession that hit in 1837. This was also the fate of the National Trades' Union (1834–37), a short-lived effort to unify labor.

Workers did manage to organize trade unions—organizations based on common skills—and a handful had national organizations, but most remained weak. The Civil War temporarily derailed efforts to form a larger federation in which constituent unions could act in concert. In 1866 the National Labor Union (NLU)

formed to bring together trade union leaders, groups devoted to reducing work hours, and other reformers. The effectiveness of the NLU, however, seldom matched the power of its rhetoric, and it passed from the scene in 1873. Even before that date American trade unions were in steep decline, a condition that led Stephens to fashion the early Knights of Labor upon a fraternal foundation. The KOL operated in complete secrecy and developed dense and arcane ritual practices modeled on Freemasonry. This meant that organization proceeded at glacial pace, but the KOL continued to grow at a time in which other groups were collapsing. The KOL wrote its first constitution in 1878, the year before Stephens stepped down as KOL leader and was replaced by Terence Powderly, who lobbied to make it a more open organization; in 1882 the KOL abandoned total secrecy and began functioning more like a modern labor federation, although it never totally jettisoned ritual fraternalism. The KOL's constitution gives insight into some of its views on class as well as ambiguities surrounding it. The KOL upheld the dignity of toil, railed against the "pauperization" of the masses, and evoked the Biblical dictum, "in the sweat of thy face thou shalt eat bread." It also called for an end to the wage system, advocating a combination of land reform that would put settlers on farms and cooperative factories and stores owned and controlled by workers. Although the KOL, in theory, extended membership to most who acceded to its principles, it expressly forbade lawyers, land speculators, gamblers, liquor manufacturers, and bankers. These groups were deemed parasitical and, hence, not true workers.

Yet the KOL also advocated for shorter hours and mandatory arbitration of labor disputes, which implied some level of acceptance of the wage system, and counted small employers among its ranks. Ideologically, the KOL ran the spectrum from conservative, pro-business Republicans to anarchists. To the degree there was a dominant view, many Knights held **socialist** views. These also ran the gamut from respectable Christian socialism to revolutionary **Marxist** viewpoints. In the mid-1880s Lassallean socialism was widespread, and Knights spoke of the virtues of its ideals of evolutionary, ballot-box socialism even though the KOL was officially nonpartisan. Ideological purity of all stripes, however, was largely confined to its leadership ranks; in practice, most Knights held vaguely defined "fairness" principles.

The working class was restive during the last quarter of the nineteeth century. The KOL was too small to have played an active role in the cataclysmic 1877 railway strikes, but it benefited from worker anger when those strikes failed. By the early 1880s, the KOL had expanded from its Pennsylvania base and had established itself in industrial cities, mining regions, railroad towns, textile centers, and pockets of rural discontent. It also clashed with some of the era's most despised robber barons. In 1885 the KOL unexpectedly won a strike against rail interests controlled by Jay Gould, a particularly loathsome monopolist. KOL membership soared from just over 111,000 to nearly 750,000 in less than a year; by the end of 1886 the KOL may have had over a million adherents, though the central organization was too small and harried to know for certain.

The KOL could not sustain its rapid growth, although it remained a very powerful organization into late 1889. It did battle with some of the late nineteeth century's most powerful business interests: Chicago meatpackers, the New York Central Railroad, New England textile manufacturers, and the Union Pacific

Railroad. By the 1890s, however, it was in decline, a victim of lost strikes, a concerted effort to crush it, internal dissension, and territorial disputes with the AFL, which had formed in 1886. In the wake of the 1886 Haymarket Square riot, the KOL was also hurt by allegations of harboring bomb-throwing radicals, though in truth, the KOL's leadership repudiated anarchism and had not sanctioned the Chicago gathering that culminated in Haymarket.

The KOL limped into the twentieth century and closed its national office in 1917. Because the AFL survived and the KOL passed from existence, some scholars have fixated on the archaic practices of the Knights to argue that it was ill-suited for modern conditions. In truth, although most Knights did not have eloquently articulated views of class, the KOL as a whole was far more progressive than the AFL. Knights upheld principles of both gender and racial equality at a time when most AFL unions would not even organize women or African Americans. Moreover the AFL accepted the permanence of **capitalism** and, hence, the **stratification** system that accompanied it; the KOL did not. Knights also engaged in non-capitalist enterprises, like worker-owned cooperatives, that many AFL leaders deemed unrealistic.

It would be more accurate to say that many Knights held views on social class that were more radical than those of trade-conscious members of the AFL. The KOL bore the early brunt of conflict with organized capital, and it pioneered in nascent forms of industrial unionism—that is, organizing workers making the same product rather than having the same skill. (Many early AFL unions formed in places where older craft production methods were still in place.) It was also one of the first successful international labor unions, with KOL branches being formed in Australia, Belgium, Britain, Canada, France, Ireland, New Zealand, and South Africa.

Suggested Reading

Leon Fink, Workingmen's Democracy: The Knights of Labor and American Politics, 1983; Norman Ware, The Labor Movement in the United States 1860–1895: A Study in Democracy, 1929; Robert Weir, Beyond Labor's Veil: The Culture of the Knights of Labor, 1996.

Kozol, Jonathan (September 5, 1936–)

ROBERT E. WEIR

Jonathan Kozol is a prize-winning writer and activist whose works deal with issues of race, social class, and injustice.

Kozol was born in Boston, the son of Harry, a psychiatrist, and Ruth (Massell) Kozol, a social worker. He graduated summa cum laude from Harvard University in 1958 with a degree in English literature. He was awarded a Rhodes scholarship but did not complete his studies at Oxford; instead, Kozol moved to Paris to write a novel. He returned to the United States in the early 1960s, was inspired by the civil rights movement, and moved from Cambridge to the predominately African

American Roxbury section of Boston. Kozol taught fourth grade at a Roxbury elementary school but was fired for reading poems by Langston Hughes to his class. At the time Hughes's work was deemed too controversial, and his writings were not on the approved curriculum list.

Kozol then taught in the Boston suburb of Newton (1966–68) and at a Boston alternative school set up by neighborhood activists (1968–71). He has subsequently taught classes at various schools, colleges, and universities, but his greatest acclaim has come from his nonfiction writing. In 1967 Kozol published *Death at an Early Age*, in which he chronicled his battles with the Boston school board, its neglect of black children, and the manner in which the educational system stigmatized black children. The following year *Death at an Early Age* won a National Book Award. In 1972 Kozol published *Free Schools*, a look at alternative education. Despite his own experience in democratic alternative education, however, Kozol is now an outspoken critic of **school vouchers**, a system that he sees as elitist, an abrogation of public school funding, and an excuse for neglecting children living in poor districts.

Kozol has published scores of articles and over a dozen books, many of which struck the conscience of readers and reformers. Two books, *Breaking the Silence: Breaking the Bonds of Adult Illiteracy in the United States* (1979) and *Illiterate America* (1985) disputed the notion that literacy is universal in the United States. Kozol cited numerous studies that indicate that as many as one-third of all adults are functionally illiterate. As in the case of most of his writings, Kozol also linked illiteracy to broader issues of **racism**, **classism**, and neglect.

Kozol has been particularly effective in highlighting the gaps between American myth and American reality. In 1988 Kozol spent time at a New York City shelter. His book *Rachel and Her Children* (1988) was an early work highlighting the plight of **homeless** families and served as an antidote to rosy nostrums on economic opportunity emanating from the **Reagan** administration. Kozol showed that there were over 1,400 children living in temporary shelters, allowed residents to speak in their own voices, and raised serious doubts concerning the thesis that most homelessness is the fault of the individual. In 1989 this book was awarded the Robert F. Kennedy book prize as well as a Conscience in Media Award.

Savage Inequalities: Children in America's Schools (1991) is a searing indictment of institutionalized inequality and an indirect critique of those who say that there is little connection between money and quality education. Kozol visited schools across America, both inner-city schools with low per-pupil spending and well-funded ones in affluent suburban areas. The contrast that emerges is one in which poor children use the cast-off books from suburban districts, cannot properly sterilize lab equipment, sit in gymnasium study halls for want of substitute teachers, and are chased from cafeterias because of leaking, raw sewage. They lack computers, audiovisual materials, athletic facilities, and most of the amenities that kids in predominately white and affluent areas take as their birthright. As Kozol indicates all of these factors determine the life chances of individual pupils.

Kozol followed Savage Inequalities with Amazing Grace: The Lives of Children and the Conscience of a Nation (1995), which won the Anisfield-Wolf Book Award the following year. Kozol visited the Mott Haven section of the South Bronx, a neighborhood riddled with drugs, crime, AIDS, substandard housing, high unemployment, and a host of other social problems. It is a bleak book in which Kozol

contrasts the hopes of children with society's utter disregard for their lives. It also sparked debate between those who hailed Kozol for his blunt assessment of contemporary power and those who called it an angry screed based on impressions rather than sound social science.

Kozol tempered some of his anger in his sequel, *Ordinary Resurrections: Children in the Years of Hope* (2000), in which he returned to Mott Haven to see how children express their dreams and how their teachers, parents, and community leaders nourish them. It also led Kozol, who is Jewish, to look at the various ways in which religion, especially African American Protestantism and Latino Catholicism, sustained hope amid disheartening external circumstances.

In 2005 Kozol returned to themes of racism and unequal education in *The Shame of the Nation: The Restoration of Apartheid Schooling in America*, a book prompted by studies that show that American schools are now more racially segregated than they were at the time of the famed *Brown v. the Board of Education of Topeka* Supreme Court decision of 1954. Kozol's use of the term apartheid is deliberately provocative and implies that the United States supports a de facto version of the very social system that it once condemned in South Africa.

Kozol writes with passion, and the success of his books induces equally passionate reactions. To his critics he is a classic "bleeding heart liberal" and **muckraker** who overlooks irresponsible behavior, wallows in negativity, and seeks to blame society for situations caused by reckless individuals. To his supporters (who vastly outnumber critics) Kozol is a compassionate social observer whose works remind Americans that classism and racial injustice are widespread contemporary problems, not historical artifacts. In this regard Kozol's challenge is nothing less than for America to live up to its own ideals.

Suggested Reading

Jonathan Kozol, Rachel and Her Children: Homeless Families in America, 1988; Kozol, Savage Inequalities: Children in America's Schools, 1991; Kozol, Ordinary Resurrections: Children in the Years of Hope, 2000.

Ku Klux Klan (KKK)

GREG BROWN

The Ku Klux Klan is the most recognized, demonstrative, and organized of all American supremacist organizations. Klan tactics have ranged from business blockages, to arson, to murder, and its influence on U.S. history cannot be overstated. Intrinsically woven into the American social fabric, the Klan's history is characterized by influential political power interspersed with intervals of stagnation and fragility. Perhaps most noted for the habits of burning crosses and wearing satin robes, Klan members have more recently been characterized in the U.S. media as ignorant, lower-class buffoons. However this characterization lacks historical context and masks the danger of an organized group of violent individuals with an agenda of aggression directed against races, ethnicities, and religions other than their own.



Ku Klux Klan members supporting Barry Goldwater's campaign for the 1964 presidential nomination at the Republican National Convention clash with an African American protestor. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

The KKK was originally founded by six disenfranchised former Confederate soldiers as a thrill-seeking fraternal organization. Masquerading as ghosts, they draped themselves and their horses in sheets when they played pranks on friends and family. An unfortunate by-product of their amusement was creation of a racist movement with deadly consequences. Nathan Bedford Forrest, a former slave owner and officer in the Confederate army, gained control of the budding organization to mobilize white males, who felt increasingly powerless under the stricture of Reconstruction, to intimidate black voters and terrorize black communities. Forrest's campaign of violence and terror was not sanctioned by the newly

developed Southern bureaucracy and in due course outraged blacks and whites alike. Consequently Forrest formally disbanded the Klan in 1869, though the effectiveness of his demobilization was limited in scope, and pockets of likeminded supremacists remained so active that President Ulysses S. Grant used the 1871 Civil Rights Act to deploy federal troops against residual KKK groups and their imitators.

Like other illegitimate organizations that experience periodic success, the Klan again gained national prominence during the 1920s when the organization was revived. Using the nativist fears of the American public, the KKK successfully recruited undereducated individuals troubled by mass waves of "statue-worshipping heathens," namely **Catholic** immigrants from Ireland and Italy. For a decade the Klan grew in numbers and influence, counting congressional representatives, senators, and state governors as supporters. This far-reaching influence enabled the Klan to spread across large cross sections of the country, establishing chapters in all regions. However like its early predecessors, the new Klan's appeal was short-lived due because of its inability to control relatively autonomous local branches from committing atrocious acts of violence that proved too extreme for mainstream America to ignore. By the mid-1930s, the Klan had again lost favor, and its membership fell to an all-time low.

Although seriously wounded by anti-Klan sentiment, the extremist ideology did not die and resurfaced shortly after the Supreme Court's school desegregation decision in 1954. Seeking to widen its appeal, the KKK provided equal opportunity to all hate-mongers during the 1960s, promising political reform and social change. The Klan platform gained traction and rekindled long-simmering fears about federal influence in local Southern politics, in particular. Individuals faced with limited employment opportunities and economic deprivation were particularly vulnerable to inflammatory political rhetoric embraced by Klan-friendly politicians. Violence directed primarily at blacks and **Jews** proliferated in the South. Incidents of Klan aggression were reported in Florida, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi,

Virginia, Louisiana, and the Carolinas, while the silence of many local and state governments appeared to grant tacit approval for acts committed against non-whites. For example, Alabama Governor George Wallace, who blocked the threshold at the University of Alabama in defiance of federal integration mandates, promoted an atmosphere conducive to Klan violence for political gains.

Unsurpassed levels of civil unrest and disorder marked the 1950s and 1960s. While personal homes, community centers, and even religious institutions were devastated through vandalism and arson, attackers often went unpunished by the establishment. Some cases even involved active involvement of local law enforcement. Perhaps the most important act was one that brought national attention and the media spotlight to the growing turmoil in the South. In 1963 a firebomb exploded at the 16th Street Baptist Church in Birmingham, Alabama, killing three young girls. Public reaction was swift, severe, and signaled an end to public apathy, and the incident eventually resulted in the FBI's crippling of Klan groups across the country. Threats of public exposure and sanctions for employers hiring Klansmen induced many participants to hang up their robes. Use of informants resulted in prosecution of some other members, and federal scrutiny, including Congressional investigations featuring hearings that exposed high-ranking Klan leaders who remained loyal to the cause, resulted in precipitous falls in Klan membership.

During the 1970s the Klan was forced to regroup and redevelop recruitment strategies. Faced with a shortage of new members, rival Klan chapters—long characterized by competition—were now openly at war with one another. The charismatic David Duke headed the most notable of the groups, Louisiana's Knights of the Ku Klux Klan. Duke's approach was less violent and more discreet and resilient. By creating an image of a well-educated, more intellectual organization, Duke successfully elevated his group and subsequent racist organizations to a more sophisticated level. This practice had an enormous effect and insulated members from law enforcement scrutiny. By suggesting that the Klan was a fraternal organization comprised of hard-working, **middle-class** members and by publicly condemning violence and criminal activity, Duke even successfully recruited on college campuses. He also instituted internal reforms to extend invitations to women and Catholics, two groups that had previously been denied access. Duke's personal magnetism was strong enough that he successfully ran for a seat in the Louisiana House of Representatives.

Many rival chapters, decimated by criminal prosecution and civil litigation, were forced to disband or declare bankruptcy. However, some of the supremacist movement's prominent leaders—such as Tom Metzger—emerged as important figures in the growing anti-government and militia movements. In fact the Klan's most important contribution to the legacy of intolerance in the United States is the foundation it laid for future organizations, such as White Aryan Resistance, Aryan Nations, and various other reinvigorated neo-Nazi groups.

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Michael Newton and Judy Ann Newton, *The Ku Klux Klan: An Encyclopedia*, 1991; Craig Wade Wyn, *The Fiery Cross: The Ku Klux Klan in America*, 1987.

LABOR MOVEMENT

ROBERT E.WEIR

The labor movement refers to organized attempts by working men and women to wrest concessions from their employers. Such efforts take any of a number of forms, ranging from such relatively nonconfrontational means as employee associations to revolutionary movements. In the United States most workers have attempted to gain control through the formation of labor unions and via legal and political processes rather than through revolutionary methods. It is also generally true that the U.S. labor movement is weaker than that of other capitalist democracies.

Worker organizations predate **capitalism**. The modern labor union had its genesis in the Middle Ages, first in the guild system, then in journeymen's associations formed to blunt the power of master artisans. Labor unions as such, however, were rudimentary by the time Europeans settled North America. The first were journeymen's groups, and most job actions against employers were small-scale and localized. A few groups, though, were noted for their effectiveness, among them the carpenters; Carpenters' Hall in Philadelphia was an important gathering site for rebellion leaders in the days preceding the **American Revolution**.

Journeymen groups provided the base from which unions evolved. Texts routinely cite a Philadelphia printers **strike** in 1786 as the first within the new United States, but no effective federation of unions emerged for many more decades. As the American economy diversified beyond its **agrarian** roots, some journeymen—mostly in urban areas—organized into craft unions, a structure that places workers of similar skills in the same union. As local markets became regional and national, a few craft unions similarly formed national organizations to address issues pertinent to all members of that craft.

The articulation of the factory system in the early nineteenth century led workers to contemplate forming broader federations—a union of unions—to coordinate issues important to all those working for **wages**. Central labor unions formed in cities, wherein representatives of various craft unions discussed ways to pressure

employers on matters of mutual concern, such as the length of the work day. The development of mass production, such as the textile city of Lowell or the shoe industry of Lynn, Massachusetts, stimulated discussion of forming national labor federations. Such dreams were premature as the American **working class** was in a state of **class formation** for much of the early nineteenth century, but several key developments portended the future. Between 1828 and 1837 a series of third-party groups loosely (and somewhat misleadingly) called the Workingmen's parties agitated on the local and state level. Many of them spoke of putting working men into political positions, and some were briefly successful. Strikes convulsed many cities and the **Lowell mill girls** created a union often viewed as the first such structure formed by women.

These early efforts were undone by a combination of the Panic of 1837 and repression. The United States had no national laws governing collective bargaining, and in many states, worker groups were viewed as illegal criminal conspiracies. The very battle for recognition concerned unions for the next 100 years, with the issue of union legality not being fully resolved until the passage of the National Labor Relations Act of 1937. This did not mean, however, that organizational efforts stalled. Craft unions continued to form and strikes grew more frequent as it grew increasingly clear that many workers were destined to collect wages for their entire lives rather than becoming independent yeomen.

The Civil War interrupted organizational efforts, but in 1866 the National Labor Union (NLU) revived dreams of a national federation. The NLU did not survive, but the American Industrial Revolution entered its takeoff stage in the 1870s, which brought great wealth to some members of the upper and middle classes but also highlighted growing class inequities. The 1870s also saw several violent class-based clashes, such as the Molly Maguire agitations in Pennsylvania and a nationwide series of railroad strikes in 1877. Economic downturns and repression decimated the ranks of craft unions but created a climate ripe for a federation to combine worker efforts. The Knights of Labor (KOL), formed in 1869, became that organization.

The KOL was not a craft union, but rather a hybrid federation whose governing executive board oversaw a bewildering array of local affiliates, some of which were organized by craft, some by gender, some by **race** or ethnicity, and many of which were "mixed," meaning that workers of different walks of life sat in the same assembly. It even had prototypical industrial unions, those which organized workers within a production mode regardless of their skills. The KOL was the first American labor group to organize African Americans, **immigrants**, women, and unskilled laborers on an equal basis with skilled, white, native-born males. By its apex around mid-1886, the KOL organized as many as 1 million workers.

The KOL arose during the **Gilded Age**, a time that proved both fertile for organizing and frustrating because of the number of obstacles thrown in the way of working-class advancement. Many different types of organizations arose to address problems of **poverty**, **robber barons**, long hours, and low wages. The KOL, eighthour leagues, the Anti-Poverty Society, the **Social Gospel** movement, and revitalized craft unions sought changes mostly within existing power relations, while various **anarchist** and **socialist** groups spoke of overturning capitalism, some through evolutionary methods, others by revolution. In 1886 the **American Federation of**

Labor (AFL) formed from the remnants of an earlier organization and gathered craft unions under its aegis. The 1880s and 1890s also saw the rise of third-party movements such as the Greenback-Labor Party, various groups associated with **Henry George**, the Socialist Labor Party, and the **Populist Party**; each spoke of placing common people at the seat of political power.

The period's organizational accomplishments were impressive, but the odds were long against the labor movement. Capital/labor relations were marked by violence, repression, and frustrated hopes. An 1886 bomb thrown in Chicago's Haymarket Square provided pretext for a **Red Scare** that decimated radical groups and badly damaged the KOL as well. Courts routinely sided with employers against workers, as did mainstream newspapers, **Social Darwinist** thinkers, and much of organized religion and the upper and middle classes. The AFL and KOL also battled each other.

By 1900 many of labor's gains had been rolled back, organizational efforts were in tatters, and the KOL was nearly defunct. The AFL remained, but its exclusionary craft unionism and policies that allowed affiliates to practice racism and sexism left millions of workers unrepresented. In 1905 the radical Industrial Workers of the World formed to revive the KOL's broader vision and graft it to a revolutionary agenda. The IWW, its gains for workers notwithstanding, had the ironic effect of making the AFL seem more respectable. The IWW was the target of brutal repression, some of it encouraged by the AFL. Both organizations grew during the **Progressive Era**, and long overdue reforms emerged that took the sting out of some of the worst abuses of the Gilded Age. Socialists did quite well in local elections, often because of the broad support they commanded from working-class voters. AFL head **Samuel Gompers** hailed the 1914 Clayton Act, a tentative step in legalizing unions, as "labor's Magna Carta," though that proved overly optimistic. Progressive Era reforms tended to come from the top down, and even the AFL sometimes found itself the target of repression. Moreover, the era's reforms did little to eliminate the bitter opposition of the business community to any sort of unionization or sway conservatives from efforts to seek court-ordered reversals of child labor laws, strike settlements, and other gains. Violent actions on the part of anarchists and the IWW's penchant for revolutionary language also harmed labor's cause by making it easier to justify repression of labor movements.

World War I brought temporary capital/labor/government accords that benefited the AFL but allowed suppression of the IWW to continue. The AFL's ranks grew temporarily, but the same postwar Red Scare that led to the deportation of anarchist **Emma Goldman** and the jailing of socialist leader **Eugene Debs** rippled throughout organized labor. After a series of dramatic strikes in 1919, a capitalist backlash ushered in a decline for organized labor and in **Socialist Party** (SP) strength, though the newly formed **Communist Party** (CP) of the United States gained a small following.

The Stock Market Crash of 1929 and the ensuing **Great Depression** proved to be a rich time for labor organizing, economic collapse notwithstanding. Both the Communist Party and the Socialist Party found it easier to recruit, and each enjoyed modest success at the ballot box, the SP more so than the CP, though communists proved to be better grassroots organizers. During the Depression communists set up soup kitchens, organized rent strikes, and galvanized the masses in

public protest against deteriorating conditions. They also helped nascent unions establish themselves and revitalized numerous moribund groups.

Despite a resurgence of radicalism, organized labor's major gains were made through the rise of industrial unionism and through President Franklin Roosevelt and his New Deal programs. By the 1930s AFL-style craft unionism was outmoded and, numerous leaders, including John L. Lewis, pressed it to organize workers by industry rather than craft. The reluctance of AFL leaders to do so led to an internal revolt that eventuated the creation of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). The CIO was involved in numerous job actions, including a famed sit-down strike against General Motors in 1936–37, which established the United Auto Workers union. The CIO succeeded in organizing mass-production industries such as auto, electronics, glass, rubber, steel, and textiles. By the end of the 1930s, organized labor—including the AFL—was resurgent, and by 1940 more than 9 million workers belonged to unions.

A major reason for union success was the Roosevelt administration. Although FDR's support for labor was often more tepid than legend holds, at least his administration was not as overtly hostile as those of the preceding six decades had been. Moreover, Roosevelt understood that his initial election and subsequent reelection bids were highly dependent upon working-class support. Many New Deal programs were targeted specifically at helping working people, including new laws governing child labor, creating a minimum wage, establishing a Social Security system, providing for unemployment compensation, and creating jobs for displaced workers. The crowning achievement was the National Labor Relations Act, which not only granted legal status to unions and exempted them from antitrust laws, but also created legal mechanisms for protecting the rights of workers seeking to set up unions. The New Deal forged a bond between unions and the Democratic Party that persists to the present and has largely deterred motivations for an independent labor party.

During World War II, as in World War I, unions enjoyed a close working relationship with the federal government and made even more gains. War-time cooperation between capital and labor again came to an abrupt end after the war, however, and a conservative backlash slowed organized labor's gains. In 1946 the Republican Party regained control of Congress and the following year enacted the Taft-Hartley Act, which gave greater power to employers in dealing with unions, outlawed certain union tactics, required unions to submit to economic scrutiny from which capital was excluded, and made it illegal for communists to hold union offices. Another Red Scare and the outbreak of the **Cold War** served to make the social and political climate difficult for radicals of varying persuasions. The CIO expelled nearly 1 million of its members because they were in unions too closely aligned with the Communist Party.

The postwar economic boom also curtailed militancy. In the early 1950s AFL head **George Meany** claimed that the working class was fading from the scene because workers were becoming **middle class**. He based his rosy assessment on impressive wage and benefit gains made by several unions and by the unleashing of individual spending that took place after World War II. AFL leadership increasingly embraced the view that union bureaucracy should mirror that of business and that cooperation with the state was essential. To that end the AFL largely cooperated with efforts to rebuild Europe and to short-circuit the rise of global communism. Critics argued that tying unions to **consumerism**, American foreign policy objectives, and Cold War

thinking harmed the movement and destroyed its militant base. In the mid-1950s, however, such thinking took a backseat to efforts to overturn the Taft-Hartley Act and to further gains made by **blue-collar** workers. In 1955 the AFL and the CIO set aside their differences and merged into a single 15.5 million-member organization.

The AFL–CIO won numerous favorable union contracts into the 1960s, but some of the tensions noted by critics began to surface. Corruption plagued some unions, especially the Teamsters, but social tensions proved even more nettlesome. The civil rights movement challenged the exclusionary polices of conservative AFL–CIO affiliates, and by the late 1960s some workers opposed the federation's support for U.S. policy in Vietnam. Wildcat strikes took place in which younger workers ignored contracts with employers and the advice of union leaders to stage spontaneous walkouts. In some places black militants seized informal leadership, coordinated job actions, and in some cases opposed union leaders. Elsewhere women and Latinos complained of being marginalized within their own unions. Even some AFL–CIO leaders grew wary of the federation's cautious leadership, most notably Walter Reuther, who led the autoworkers out of the federation.

As organized labor sought to redefine itself amid the social change and political tensions of the 1960s, few leaders paid attention to looming economic shifts. Heavy industry began to face challenge from imports, and American factories failed to keep pace technologically with foreign competitors. The energy crisis of the 1970s crippled manufacturing, as did the hyper-inflation that ensued. By the late 1970s the American economy saw massive **deindustrialization**, and some industries in which America was once dominant disappeared from American soil. Given that organized labor was highly concentrated in production industries, the percentage of unionized workers began to dip.

In the 1980s the dip became a precipitous slide. Most of the jobs created during the decade and beyond have been in the professional and service sectors of the economy, neither of which is heavily unionized. Moreover, several administrations, especially those of **Ronald Reagan** and George W. **Bush**, were openly hostile to labor unions and manipulated public opinion to vilify unions as greedy, inefficient, and outmoded. Buoyed by government support unseen since the Gilded Age, some employers seized the initiative to dismantle unions, wrest wage and benefit concessions from their workforces, and impose top-down decision-making models. They justified their actions in the name of **competitiveness**. Others took advantage of favorable **tax** policies and moved factories out of the United States, while some employers simply could not cope with the pressures of **globalization** and folded. By the 1990s, blue-collar work had contracted, and the high-wage lifestyles wrought by post-World War II prosperity were imperiled.

In 1995 the AFL—CIO replaced much of its conservative leadership and new president John Sweeney promised a return to the militant and grassroots tactics of the 1930s. Several unions made heroic stands and halted the push for concessions, and the federation greatly improved its record on advancing women and ethnic minorities into leadership roles, but the AFL—CIO continued to hemorrhage members and has been unsuccessful in countering the negative images many Americans hold of unions. By the early twenty-first century, the Sweeney administration faced its own challenge from workers complaining of its bureaucratic structure and timidity. In 2005 several unions—led by the service workers and the carpenters unions—quit the

AFL-CIO and formed a new 6 million-strong Change to Win federation. The AFL-CIO has about 9 million members, meaning that the two federations combined have roughly the same number of members that the AFL-CIO had fifty years earlier.

Those sobering levels point to two major challenges for organized labor: the need to adapt to changed economic conditions and the need to recruit. Several critics complain that the relationship between organized labor and the Democratic Party has yielded little for labor and should be discontinued, while others call for openly confrontational tactics with employers. In an age of movable capital and globalization, however, militancy is risky. More strikes are lost than won, weak labor laws allow for strikers to be replaced, and workers whose jobs can be outsourced face long odds. Most observers agree that if organized labor is to have a future it must do several things: organize globally, concentrate domestic efforts in service industries and professions that are more resistant to outsourcing, and reverse public opinion. The latter is crucial; although the working class continues to be the largest social class in America, Americans overwhelmingly perceive themselves to be middle class. As of 2006 just 12 percent of Americans belong to unions, and only 8 percent of them are in the private sector. Reversing the way Americans perceive class is probably a prerequisite for revitalizing the labor movement.

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LATHROP, JULIA (June 19, 1858–April 15, 1932)

STACEY INGRUM RANDALL

Julia Clifford Lathrop was a social worker and reformer in the United States at the turn of the century.

Lathrop was born in Rockford, Illinois, and she graduated from Vassar College in 1880. In 1890 she moved to Chicago and joined **Jane Addams** at Hull House. Lathrop was a member of numerous board and charities, including the Illinois Board of Charities. In 1901 she resigned from the Board of Charities in protest against the low quality of the staff of many of its institutions. In 1909 she became a charter member of Clifford W. Beers's National Committee for Mental Hygiene.

In 1912 President William Howard Taft appointed Lathrop to head the newly created U.S. Children's Bureau of the Department of Commerce and Labor. She was the first woman to head a statutory federal bureau at the appointment of the president with consent of the Senate. With a limited budget and staff she first undertook a study of infant mortality and developed a plan for uniform birth registration. Subsequent studies by the bureau centered on **child labor**, mothers' pensions, illegitimacy, juvenile delinquency, nutrition, and the treatment of the mentally retarded. Following passage of the Keating-Owen Child Labor Act in 1916, a Child Labor

Division was created within the bureau to enforce it. (The law was declared unconstitutional in 1918; the U.S. Supreme Court also struck down a 1919 revision in 1922.)

During World War I the Children's Bureau took on added responsibilities for the children of servicemen and of working mothers. During 1918–19 Lathrop also served as president of the National Conference of Social Work. Lathrop campaigned hard for the Sheppard-Towner Act, which offered federal funds to states for programs of maternity and infant care. This act was passed shortly after her resignation in 1921 due to health concerns.

From 1922 on she lived in Rockford. In that year she was elected president of the Illinois League of Women Voters, and in the same year she was appointed to a presidential commission investigating conditions at the immigration station at Ellis Island, New York. She died in Rockford on April 15, 1932, and was buried in the city's Greenwood Cemetery.

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Jane Addams, Twenty Years at Hull-House: With Autobiographical Notes, 1910; Addams and Jane Firor Scott, My Friend, Julia Lathrop, 2004; Christopher Lasch, The New Radicalism in America, 1889–1963: The Intellectual as a Social Type, 1966.



Julia Lathrop. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

LATINOS AND HISPANICS

LAURA HERNÁNDEZ-EHRISMAN

Latino and Hispanic are terms used in the United States to categorize the ethnic identity of persons whose ancestry hails from the Spanish-speaking countries of Latin America or the settlers of the Spanish-held southwestern United States. "Hispanic" can also refer to those who come from Spain. Latino refers exclusively to Latin America, but can also include Brazil. The word Hispanic is derived from Hispania, the name given by the Romans to the Iberian Peninsula during the period of the Roman Republic. In the United States its use began to circulate after 1970. It became more popular following its inclusion in the 1980 U.S. census, in which

people were asked to voluntarily identify if they were of "Spanish/Hispanic origin or descent." The census category is not a racial category. People who identify as a Hispanic identify with any racial group. However, the mass media frequently use the term as part of a physical description of a person's appearance. Thus a Hispanic is assumed to have brown skin and dark hair and eyes. Many Hispanics identify as mestizo (mixed European and Amerindian) because this ancestry is embedded in Latin American culture and history.

In contrast "Latino" is a self-chosen term, sometimes preferred because it is not as closely associated with Spain and thus emphasizes a heritage that is indigenous to the Americas. The word "Latino" itself is derived from the French "Latin," shortened from *latinoamérica*, and had its origins when the French wanted to build their empire from Mexico in the 1860s. However in the late twentieth century Latino has come to refer to a grassroots effort for social justice against the legacy of the U.S. domination of the Western hemisphere. Thus all of the peoples of this hemisphere form a pan-ethnic political unity based on this history of unequal treatment as Latin Americans or as Latinos living within the United States.

Because both of these terms refer to such broad categories of persons, however, people often identify with specific countries of origin, objecting to the cultural homogenization of any pan-Hispanic or pan-Latino identity. For example, the largest group of Hispanics/Latinos is composed of people from Mexico. Often people will identify as Mexican-American or *Mexicano*. In particular regions such as California and Arizona, the term "Chicano" became popular during the civil rights and social justice movement of César Chávez. In Texas the term *Tejano* is popular, while in New Mexico the term Spanish-American is preferred. Among Puerto Ricans in New York, the term *Nuyorican* is common. Another key to understanding objections to both the labels "Hispanic" and "Latino" is the role of racial and class differences and the differences between the customs of first-generation Latin American immigrants and historical minorities in the United States. While lumped together in the same category in the U.S. census, often the internal diversity among these groups leads members not to self-identify with each other.

As of 2004 there were 40,424,528 Hispanics in the United States, which constitutes about one in seven Americans. Latinos are the largest minority group in the United States. As of July 1, 2004, Hispanics accounted for 14.1 percent of the population. The percent of Hispanics in poverty was 22.5 percent. Though some Latinos have reached the **middle class**, recent research by the Pew Hispanic Center has shown that this middle class is very vulnerable to economic downturns as well. After the 2001 recession passed, over one-quarter of the value of Hispanic wealth was lost in just two years. In contrast the wealth of white households continued to grow, albeit at a slower pace than before the recession. Most Hispanics fall into the lowest category of wealth, and the size of their middle class is relatively small in comparison to whites. Among the reasons for this disparity are that minorities have limited access to financial markets and face greater barriers to homeownership. Compared to whites Hispanics are also relatively young, not as highly educated, and are more likely to be **immigrants**. They also are more likely to live in regions where homeownership is less attainable, such as New York and California. The Pew Center concludes that the wealth gap should decrease as all of these factors change, however.

One concern that unites Latinos is immigration. Research from the Pew Hispanic Center suggests that there are 11.5 to 12 million unauthorized migrants currently living in the United States, based on data from the 2000 census. This makes up about 30 percent of the foreign-born population. Most native-born Hispanics have positive attitudes toward immigrants but few favor increasing legal immigration from Latin America. A small portion (between 20 and 30 percent) of predominantly U.S.-born Latinos are concerned that undocumented immigrants are hurting the U.S. economy, while a significant number of Mexicans surveyed demonstrated that many were willing to work in the United States without documentation. This could indicate a growing political divide within the Latino community. Overall research has demonstrated that employment opportunities have increased for Latinos since 2001, but wages have stagnated. Another trend worth noting is that new immigrants continue to take low-skill jobs. In spite of strong demand for immigrant workers, their growing numbers and concentration in certain occupations suggests that the newest arrivals are competing with each other in the labor market to their own detriment. These trends contribute to a continuing ambivalence about immigration. While the majority of both foreign-born and native-born Hispanics continue to believe that immigrants make valuable contributions to American society, the most recent arrivals also contribute to a growing wage gap between Hispanic and non-Hispanic workers.

Suggested Reading

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LAW OF THE JUNGLE

ROBERT E. WEIR

Law of the jungle is a term whose modern usage implies the necessity for a form of radical **self-reliance** because of the highly competitive nature of modern society. The term implies that individuals who are not prepared to do battle in business and society are likely to become casualties. It has also come to refer to conditions in the **inner cities** in which violence, crime, and **poverty** have created every-man-for-himself conditions.

The original use of the phrase apparently comes from the Rudyard Kipling collection of children's stories, *The Jungle Book* (1895). In Kipling, though, the "law" was a literal one—that is, a code with which animals cooperated and which ensured mutual survival. It evolved into its contemporary meaning through **Social Darwinism** and came to surpass the phrase "survival of the fittest" in popularity.

By the 1890s Social Darwinism was under attack by reformers opposing monopolies, by the labor movement, and by clerics embracing the Social Gospel

movement. The latter rejected the rapacious and deterministic economic logic of Social Darwinism, especially assertions that economic and social systems were akin to biological organisms; thus it was only "natural" that for the strong to exploit the weak. Most Social Gospel advocates saw attempted social applications of Charles Darwin's biological theories as antithetical to a civilized and just society. In many respects the shift to the law of the jungle replaced biological metaphors with those purporting to represent harsh reality. In this respect it purported to show the way society actually worked rather than an ideal state. Critics saw law of the jungle references as backdoor Social Darwinian justifications for inequality and unfair treatment of society's most vulnerable members.

By the twentieth century, however, the phrase "law of the jungle" was an established part of the American lexicon and even made an appearance in Charles and Mary Beard's classic work *The Rise of American Civilization* (1949). It retains its sheen of descriptive realism, even though most associate it with cutthroat competition in the business world and/or the breakdown of social order in the **ghetto**. There are even "guidebooks" that purport to advise business leaders how to survive the law of the jungle. Contemporary references to the law of the jungle as the standard of how the world really works are ironic given that the phrase was not synonymous with chaos in its original use, and it stood as an antonym for civilization.

Nonetheless, the law of the jungle does dovetail with notions of American **individualism**. In the minds of some Americans, all collectivist programs, especially **welfare** and other anti-poverty measures, do more harm than good as they make members of the **lower class** dependent upon the government and, hence, incapable of making the hard decisions necessary in a **capitalist** economy. In essence the law of the jungle will doom these individuals. Likewise those who cannot live by their wits in impoverished ghettos will not survive.

Suggested Reading

Elijah Anderson, Code of the Street: Decency, Violence, and the Moral Life of the Inner City, 2000; Michael Panzer, The New Laws of the Stock Market Jungle, 2004.

Law Schools

See Education; Legacies.

LEGACIES

ROBERT E. WEIR

The term *legacies* refers to the practice by colleges and universities of giving special admissions preferences to the children and relatives of alumni. It primarily refers to undergraduate admissions but can also apply to graduate schools and top medical and law schools. Admissions into graduate, law, and medical schools are also

indirectly affected by legacies as many of the more prestigious schools give great weight to where applicants obtain their undergraduate degrees.

Legacies were originally developed by **Ivy League** colleges as a way to retain **WASP** privilege. By the 1920s some college administrators felt their schools had a "Jew problem"; that is, too many Jewish Americans were excelling academically and gaining entrance to Ivy League colleges. By 1920, for instance, Columbia University was nearly 40 percent Jewish. The idea of giving legacies preferential admissions apparently originated with Harvard President Lawrence Lowell, himself the scion of a famed New England family. Ivy League colleges had long been the training ground for the children of the **upper class** and a place where they developed social networks that helped them later in life. Harvard, Princeton, and Yale were the first three schools to set quotas to limit the number of Jewish admissions and to reserve places for legacies. Lowell and others argued that legacies were important as colleges and universities rely heavily on alumni donations to endow their institutions. In the Harvard Class of 1940, 43 percent of its graduates came from millionaire families. As recently as 2003 the president of Middlebury College in Vermont argued that without alumni donations, tuition would nearly double for all students. (Ironically, calls for white quotas surfaced again in the 1980s and 1990s, especially on the West Coast, where Asian Americans gain admission at much higher rates than Caucasian students.)

The very idea of legacies is at odds with that of a meritocracy, and critics charge that the academic reputations and overall scholastic quality suffer as a result of legacies. A 1992 study of Harvard revealed that at least 200 of its incoming first-year class would not have been admitted under its normal admissions criteria. Studies also indicated that legacies had, as a group, considerably lower Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) scores than the rest of the student body.

Legacies came under harsh attacks during the social upheavals of the 1960s, in part because ideological shifts made defense of overt class privileges less tenable and because many Baby Boom children from **blue-collar** and **working-class** families began applying for college. Schools that routinely admitted 90 percent of its legacy applicants were forced to deny obviously unqualified students. But this did not stop the practice altogether; a 1991 study revealed that one-fifth of Harvard admissions between 1950 and 1990 received legacy preference. In 1991 Dartmouth admitted 57 percent of legacy applicants and the University of Pennsylvania 66 percent, percentages roughly 2.5 times higher than their overall acceptance rates. Overall, top colleges admitted about 43 percent of legacy applicants in the 1980s.

Legacies have been (and are) de facto affirmative action programs for the rich and conduits for **social reproduction**. During the 1960s, however, **Great Society** programs designed affirmative action programs for women and minorities. Until the 1978 Supreme Court ruling *Regents of University of California v. Bakke*, many schools set quotas to meet affirmative action guidelines. The *Bakke* case overturned rigid numerical quotas but had the unforeseen effect of drawing new attention to legacy admission practices. They came under analytical scrutiny even more as new affirmative action challenges arose. The *Bakke* decision left affirmative action intact conceptually but rendered it less popular socially. In 2001 state courts outlawed racial preference admissions to the University of Michigan Law School. This was reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court in 2003, but preferential admissions of any sort remain

contested legal terrain. In 2004 President George W. **Bush**, whose own admission to Yale was due to his legacy status, stated his belief that legacy systems should end.

The future of legacies is in some doubt, and most schools have scaled back the practice. Just 5 percent of Middlebury's incoming 2003 class consisted of legacies, down from 12 percent in 1965. Still, preferences persist. Yale accepted 30 percent of its legacy applicants for the class of 2008, a considerably lower rate than in the past but still three times higher than its customary acceptance rate. According to the *Yale Daily News*, admissions officers are instructed to give special preference to children of **Fortune 500** families and those of powerful **CEOs**.

It is difficult to verify some of the many rumors about legacy preferences, and it should be noted that all colleges and universities maintain differing standards for some types of students, most notably athletes and groups who fall under affirmative action guidelines. Senator Ted **Kennedy** has introduced legislation that would require schools to reveal the use of legacy status in determining admissions. No matter what one thinks of the practice, though, it must be said that legacies are reflections of class privilege.

Suggested Reading

Jerome Krabel, *The Chosen: The Hidden History of Admission and Exclusion at Harvard, Yale, and Princeton*, 2005; Nicholas Lemann, *Big Test: The Secret History of American Meritocracy*, 2000; James Traub, "Ivory Tower Intrigues: The Pseudo-Meritocracy of the Ivy League," *Slate* (http://www.slate.com/id/2128377).

LEGITIMATION

PETER BRATSIS

Legitimation usually refers to the securing of the consent of the governed. Max Weber defined it as a command-obey relationship; a command is obeyed without the need for physical coercion. Consent does not imply an absence of **power** or deep agreement between the government and those who are governed. Rather it implies that, regardless of the means through which this consent was secured, people obey the laws and policies.

The question of class and political legitimacy has intrigued many theorists, including Aristotle, Niccolo Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Karl Marx, and Weber. In American political thought, the problem was most notably addressed by James Madison in the *Federalist Papers* as well as by Alex de Tocqueville in *Democracy in America*. The attempt to establish political legitimacy has underpinned important moments in American politics, such as Jeffersonian **democracy**, the **Progressive Era**, and the **New Deal**. In American political history examples of crises of legitimation include **Shays's Rebellion** and the **Civil War**.

The impediment that social class represents for political legitimacy is partly a product of how class is understood. In **Marxism** basic contradictions exist between some classes, which preclude a stable or nonantagonistic ordering of political life. By contrast Weber argued that only in special cases do class differences lead to

political conflicts. These occur when conflicts of interest are obvious to the participants, such as may be the case with debtors and creditors or tenants and landlords. Within both of these analyses, however, examining the class dynamics of a society is necessary for understanding political power and its legitimacy.

The ratification of the U.S. Constitution demonstrates ways that class conflict impacts political legitimacy. As Charles Beard argued in his An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution, those who drafted and supported the Constitution tended to be wealthy individuals who, having been frightened by Shays's Rebellion and other popular attacks on private property, shared John Jay's belief that "those who own the country ought to govern it." The problem, however, was to accomplish this within the confines of political reality. Accordingly, Federalists avoided secret meetings for drafting the Constitution and implemented a well-financed publicity campaign to win its ratification. The document stipulated that the House of Representatives would be elected by popular vote and that only the House could tax and allocate monies. In this way the House provided legitimacy to the government and helped garner the support of many within the dominated classes. However, as Madison explained in Federalist Paper #10, the separation of powers outlined by the Constitution also inhibited the possibility of a "tyranny of the majority." In the event of a unified majority from below trying to assert class interests through the House, the separation of powers would make it very difficult for them to gain control of state power and/or to violate the property rights and privileges of the wealthy.

The New Deal was also a product of class conflict and the attempt to secure political legitimacy. In the face of mass unemployment and civil unrest, welfare state programs such as unemployment compensation and minimum wage laws were enacted to help secure the consent of the dominated classes. It should be noted that it is not only the legitimation of political power vis-à-vis the dominated classes that is important, but also the legitimation of political power vis-à-vis the dominant classes. As Fred Block has noted, in **capitalism** the state depends upon those with resources to invest and engender economic activity. If the state enacts policies that the capitalists dislike, they can choose not to invest, even if it precipitates an economic and/or political crisis. Normally the state opposes the will of capitalists only during preexisting crises, such as the **Great Depression**, wars, or severe popular unrest. The Great Depression, however, also illustrates the need of the state to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of both the economically powerful and the dominated classes. The rarity in which public policies contravene the will of capitalists is an indication of the unequal share of power between classes under advanced capitalism.

The 1960s saw a crisis of political legitimacy in the form of popular unrest that challenged the dominant classes within American society. Once again key concessions were made in the face of struggles from below, especially in regards to educational policy and racial **segregation**. However most of time there is relatively little challenge to the political order despite significant disparities of power and wealth between social classes. Scholars seek to explain legitimacy in the face of stark class inequalities by referencing factors such as nationalism, **consumerism**, religion, and popular culture. Some cite Thomas Hobbes, who asserted that a key state function was to provide security by transforming a potentially rebellious multitude into

a unified people. The formation of a national identity buffers politics from social class and legitimizes political power. **Seymour Martin Lipset** argues that national identity plays precisely such a role in the United States. Other authors, such as Antonio Gramsci and Henri Lefebvre, have stressed the role of schooling, the media, mass consumption, and suburbanization in forging the **hegemony** that operates as political legitimacy.

Contemporary American examples such as the aftermath of hurricane **Katrina** and the widening inequality gap continue to highlight how political order remains relatively unchallenged despite stark class differences. Fear and the war on terror have also received attention as a potential mechanism through which legitimacy has been secured. The question of class and legitimation continues to be at the fore of American politics and of political and social inquiry.

Suggested Reading

Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 1971; Nicos Poultantzas, Political Power and Social Classes, 1978; Max Weber, Economy and Society, 1978 [1925].

LENINISM

WESLEY BEAL

Leninism is a political and economic amendment to classical **Marxism**. It is associated with the work of Vladimir Lenin (also known as Vladimir Ulyanov and Nikolai Lenin, 1870–1924), a leader of the Bolshevik party and the first premier of the Soviet Union. Leninism is often viewed as the most radical—and sometimes, unfairly, as the militant wing—of the Marxist camps, calling for a hands-on approach to instigating, enacting, and sustaining revolution.

The fundamental project of Leninism is to reconcile Marxism with the imperial stage of capitalism, which Lenin referred to as "monopoly capitalism," that succeeded the industrial capitalism to which Karl Marx responded. Though it was later to be followed by what Ernest Mandel has called "late capitalism," the imperial phase of capitalism garnered Lenin's perverse respect as the consummate manifestation of capitalism. Indeed, in "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism" (1917), Lenin warns that **imperialism** has concentrated financial and production centers into monopolies that, because of their international nature, were all the more protected from proletarian incursion. The development of imperialism, Lenin understood, meant the dissipation of national boundaries that fostered divisions between those who shared the same class status in different nations. Lenin hoped that, as these national boundaries eroded, the international proletariat would be able to unite in their common cause, and he stressed that socialism could not survive in one country alone, thus advocating the necessity of worldwide revolution. Of particular note here is the Leninist tenet that demands the cooperation, both domestically and internationally, of the proletariat and the peasantry, marking a revision of Marx's dismissal of the peasantry's usefulness to the revolution in *The* Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon.

One of the more controversial aspects of Leninism lies in its advocacy of the Marxist concept of a "dictatorship of the proletariat." Indeed much of its revolutionary power relies on this vanguardism. According to Leninism the dictatorship of the proletariat is not meant to be a continuous state of affairs but is instead designed to facilitate what Lenin, referring to Engels's terms, calls "the withering away of the state." The dictatorship of the proletariat is "a 'special repressive force' for the suppression of the bourgeoisie by the proletariat" to secure the initial traction of the revolution. After the state apparatus has sufficiently withered, Lenin writes in *The State and Revolution*, "the government of persons is replaced by the administration of things and the direction of the process of production." Often misconstrued as an **anarchist** paradigm, the goal of Leninism is a centralized system to administer the mechanisms of production and thus abolish the class system.

With Marxists' recent focus on **globalization**, many have returned to Leninism to conceive of global relations and strategies for responding to them, drawing particularly on Leninism's emphasis on international responses to imperialism. One such scholar who has revisited Leninism is Slavoj ŽiŽek, who, in *Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism?*, proposes a return to the Leninist model: "The Leninist stance was to take a leap, throwing oneself into the paradox of the situation, seizing the opportunity and intervening, even if the situation was 'premature.'" The radical activism of the Leninist model has strong appeal, especially as revolution seems a more and more distant prospect. And its brand of theory, advocating action and full engagement with social bodies, offers a potent alternative to many contemporary Marxist fields, which often explore more abstract concepts of social relations and only obliquely address revolutionary concerns. Though widely discounted by practitioners of "high" Marxist theory, Leninism perseveres in the many radical activist programs that strive toward the abolition of class systems.

Suggested Reading

Vladimir Lenin, *The State and Revolution*, 1917; Joseph Stalin, *The Foundations of Leninism*, 1952; Slavoj ŽiŽek, *Did Someone Say Totalitarianism*, 2002; ŽiŽek, "What Is to Be Done (with Lenin)?" *In These Times*, 1/24/2004.

Lenski, Gerhard (August 24, 1924-)

SANJEEV A. RAO JR.

Gerhard Emmanuel Lenski is professor emeritus of sociology at the University of North Carolina. Lenski holds a BA and PhD from Yale University. He served on the faculty of the University of Michigan and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, where he become department chair and chair of the division of social sciences. Lenski has published many articles and books, and he has made major contributions in the sociology of religion, social **stratification**, and social theory.

Lenksi's influential *The Religious Factor: A Sociological Study of Religion's Impact on Politics, Economics, and Family Life* (1961) helped define the use of empirical data in

the field of sociology of religion. By empirically investigating and comparing the white, black, Protestant, **Catholic**, and **Jewish** communities in Detroit, Lenski was able to document the social impact of religious group membership.

He made a theoretical distinction between associational involvement in religion and communal involvement in religion. Associational involvement meant participation in church activities and frequency of church attendance. Communal involvement meant the degree to which the primary relationships of the individual (marriage, kinship, and friendship) are limited to persons in the same socioreligious group. The strong communal involvement of Jews was attributable to the religious endogamy (same group marriage) that was very prominent in this group. The strong communal bond among black Protestants appeared more a result of discrimination and **segregation** of African Americans by the white population. Lenski concluded that socioreligious groups had replaced ethnic groups as the main basis in the contemporary urban society of the United States.

In his *Power and Privilege: A Theory of Social Stratification* (1966) Lenski attempted to answer the question, "who gets what and why in society?" He responds by reconciling the **functionalist** and **conflict** perspectives of stratification. He traced the development of stratification in different societies throughout history. Lenski identifies five types of societies based on their surplus: hunting and gathering, simple agricultural, advanced agricultural, industrial, and special. In technologically simple societies, age and sex tend to be the only basis of social stratification. As technology advances and surpluses in valued resources occur, social inequality increases. With the advancement of technology, goods and services are determined by **power**—that is, by those who control the surplus of valued resources. He further proposed that as technology continues to develop in industrial societies, social **inequality** tends to diminish. His main point was that since stratification is socially developed, it is also socially modifiable.

Lenski is perhaps most renown for his ecological-evolutionary theory (EET) of societal development, which was an expansion of his social stratification theory. He constructed this sociological theory along with Jean Lenski and Patrick Nolan. EET takes a macrosociological perspective by asserting that human societies are part of a global ecosystem. This theory is concerned with how and why societies change and how these changes create differences among societies. According to the EET the basic characteristics of human societies are the influence of its biophysical and social environments, our species' genetic heritage, and the influence of prior social and cultural characteristics. To understand a society's sociocultural system, one needs to look at five basic components found in every human society: population, culture, material products, social organization, and social institutions.

Lenski classified all societies by the main form of technology used when interacting with their environment. Human societies are explained by their modes of production based on hunting/gathering, simple and complex horticulture (agriculture without the plow, irrigation, or animal energy), **agrarian** production (plow, metals, irrigation, and animal energy), and industrial production (machine production, nonhuman, nonanimal energy sources). Subsistence technological advances result in an increase in the size of societies and leads societies to establishing more permanent settlement. The type of technology used also shapes the degree of social complexity and content of ideology found in a society.

While EET emphasizes the importance of technology, it does not claim that technology can explain everything in sociocultural evolution. It recognizes that other forces have also played a part. For example since subsistence technology sets the limits on what is possible in a society, an advance in that area is a necessary precondition for any substantial growth. Subsistence technology influences the relative costs of societies' options. Because technologically advanced societies enjoy a great advantage, they are more likely to transmit their social and cultural characteristics to future generations. Thus the nature of this world system has been increasingly shaped by the process of technological advance and increasingly reflects the characteristics of technological advanced societies.

Overall Lenski's contributions to sociology have been immense. While some may criticize his work, he has brought new ways of looking at religion, social stratification, and human societies in a larger context.

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Gerhard Lenski, The Religious Factor: A Sociological Study of Religion's Impact on Politics, Economics, and Family Life, 1961; Lenski, Power and Privilege: A Theory of Social Stratification, 1966; Lenski, Ecological-Evolutionary Theory: Principles and Applications, 2005; Lenski, Patrick Nolan, and Jean Lenski, Human Societies: An Introduction to Macrosociology, 1999.

LEVITTOWN

ROBERT E. WEIR

Levittown is the name of several post–World War II planned communities built to accommodate a surging demand for housing. Starting in 1947 the firm of Arthur Levitt and Sons constructed new suburban communities in New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. Planned communities per se were not a new idea, but Levittown evokes the zeitgeist of the 1950s and etched itself into the American psyche as either an aspect of the **American dream** or of "cookie-cutter" conformity.

The Levittown communities were the brainchild of William Levitt, who pioneered the use of prefabricated and interchangeable materials, which allowed for quick building. His brother Alfred did many of the designs, and their father, Abraham, used his skills as a lawyer to do much of the legal work. By 1951 as many as thirty houses a day were being constructed, roughly as many as most construction firms could build in a year. The first Levittown was built on what was once a 1,200 acre potato farm on Long Island, 25 miles from downtown Manhattan.

Levittowns were a response to both pent-up **consumerism** and a postwar "baby boom" that yielded an 83 percent increase in live births between 1940 and 1950; for most the 1950s nearly 4 million children were born each year. In 1947 Congress also authorized a bill that eventually led to the building of the interstate highway network. All of these factors, plus a revived economy, contributed to even more families moving to the suburbs. In 1940 for example, only 19.5 percent

of the U.S. population resided in suburbs; by 1960 nearly 37 percent lived in suburbia.

The various Levittowns typified emerging patterns. The homes were modest, similar, and sturdy but not opulent. At about \$8,000 each, they were within the means of many ex-GIs now working in America's booming industrial sector. Not coincidentally their cheap price tag made them eligible for various federal housing loan programs set up for returning soldiers. Houses were built in rows along nearly identical subdivision streets. Each had about 1/7 of an acre of land upon which sat either a ranch-style or Cape Cod home of approximately 750-800 square feet. To some Americans moving to Levittown represented the culmination of middle-class dreams of an ownership society, and Levittown was a place where parents could raise children in relative safety and comfort while pursuing materialist goals. To critics Levittown represented mind-numbing conformity, uniformity, and dullness. Sloan Wilson used a Levittown-like suburb as his setting for *The Man in the* Gray Flannel Suit, and songwriter Malvina Reynolds lampooned its ilk in the popular song "Little Boxes," with lyrics such as "Little boxes on the hillside, Little boxes made of ticky tacky/Little boxes on the hillside, little boxes all the same/There's a green one and a pink one and a blue one and a yellow one/And they're all made out of ticky tacky and they all look just the same." Each of the three Levittowns contained between 15,000 and 17,000 homes.

Levittown also represented several other less savory aspects of the 1950s. First, they were predominately white; African Americans seeking to live there were often forced to leave because of the intense racism they encountered. As late as 2000 Levittown, New York, was over 94 percent white, and fewer than 1 percent of its residents were African Americans. Second, many Levittown residents came to resent the Cold War conformity that permeated suburban culture. Many women who later embraced feminism and children who became political activists in the 1960s cited the stultifying cultural and social atmosphere of Levittown and its suburban imitators as factors in their rebellion. Finally, many sociologists criticized the new suburbs for their tendency to isolate families and fray the social fabric. In The Lonely Crowd (1950) David Riesman criticized suburbs as among those factors making Americans "inner-directed," as opposed to "outer-directed," community-oriented groups. He was among the first to foresee the decline of civic life, a process that eventuated political shifts in attitudes concerning issues ranging from taxation and school funding to infrastructure improvements and social welfare policies.

By the 1960s the original Levittown plans seemed dowdy, and newer planned communities such as Reston, Virginia, and Columbia, Maryland, were less austere and catered more to the upper middle class. All three Levittowns persist, though they are no longer homogeneous in architecture. Ironically many of the original homes now sell for more than \$200,000.

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Pamela Conrad, Our House: The Stories of Levittown, 1995; Dolores Hayden, Building Suburbia: Green Fields and Urban Growth, 1820–2000, 2004; Barbara M. Kelly, Expanding the American Dream: Building and Rebuilding Levittown, 1993.

LEWIS, JOHN L. (February 2, 1880–June 2, 1969)

ROBERT E. WEIR

John Llewellyn Lewis was an important twentieth-century labor union leader. During the late 1930s Lewis was considered by many to be one of the most powerful men in America. He oversaw the rise of the **Congress of Industrial Organizations** (CIO), a federation that helped revitalize the **labor movement**.

He was born in Lucas, Iowa, to struggling Welsh **immigrant** parents. He did not finish high school; at age sixteen he took up coal mining, as had other family members. Lewis joined the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA), which was then led by John Mitchell. Mitchell managed to win the support of President **Theodore Roosevelt** during a 1902 dispute with coal operators, but the UMWA was not a very powerful organization when Lewis obtained his first important union post in 1903. Three years later he split with Mitchell over the latter's overly cautious leadership. Lewis became UMWA secretary-treasurer in 1908. In 1920 he rose to the UMWA presidency and held that post until 1960.

His early years as UMWA head were not successful ones. Following World War I a **Red Scare** ensued that was used by some employers as an excuse to suppress labor movements of all sorts. The 1920s saw the UMWA on the losing end of such violent and traumatic **strikes** as the one that culminated in a 1921 shootout between private security forces from the Baldwin-Felts Agency and UMWA supporters that left ten people dead in Matewan, West Virginia. Approximately forty more miners would die in the next two years, as most of the coal mines in West Virginia and Kentucky were placed under martial law. This was typical of repression of union movements during the 1920s. By 1932 the UMWA had only 75,000 members, down from 500,000 in 1917.

Repression and the harsh economic realities of the **Great Depression** caused Lewis, a lifelong Republican, to support **Franklin Roosevelt** for the presidency in 1932. When Roosevelt won, he paid back the favor by consulting with Lewis on key **New Deal** labor bills. The UMWA quickly recouped members, and Lewis began to pressure its parent federation, the **American Federation of Labor** (AFL), to organize workers into industrial rather than craft unions. Lewis argued that the deskilling of **blue-collar** work brought by assembly line production and new technology rendered it problematic to organize workers into multiple craft unions rather than into a single group that reflected the *product* that was being made. Lewis became involved with the CIO, which began life as a reform movement within the AFL. The AFL, however, was dominated by craft unionists wishing to preserve traditional privileges.

This dispute eventuated a split within organized labor, with several unions—including the UMWA—bolting the AFL to form an independent CIO. Lewis was elected its first president. The time was auspicious for industrial unionists, and after several dramatic **strikes**, basic industries such as electronics, steel, and textiles had effective unions for the first time. A famed **sit-down** strike against General Motors brought automakers into the CIO fold, and Lewis's own UMWA also did well; by 1937 over 90 percent of the nation's hard coal miners were UMWA members. Lewis parlayed success into political leverage; his lieutenant, Sidney Hillman,



John L. Lewis (right) talking over the coal situation with Representative Nolan, Chairman of the Labor Committee of the House of Representatives, 1922. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

was a key Roosevelt advisor, and organized labor's overall strength played a big role in pressuring for the passage of such important bills as the National Labor Relations Act, the Social Security Act, and the Fair Labor Standards Act. There was even speculation that Lewis might be a serious presidential candidate in 1940, should Roosevelt decide to step aside.

FDR instead stood for and won election to a third term, the prelude to a series of surprising responses from Lewis. He campaigned for FDR's more conservative opponent, Wendell Willkie, and told his CIO colleagues he would quit if Roosevelt—whom he saw as leading the United States into war—was reelected. True to his word,

Lewis stepped down as CIO president in 1940, though he remained head of the UMWA. Lewis turned against FDR just as abruptly as he once embraced him. In 1941 the UMWA struck to oppose government wage controls, and in 1942 Lewis led the UMWA out of the CIO. Lewis outraged many Americans by calling coal strikes in 1943, when U.S. troops were fighting World War II. Some conservatives called for Lewis to be arrested for treason and for miners to be drafted. Although Lewis hammered out a favorable contract, Congress passed legislation outlawing wartime strikes. Strikes in 1946 and 1948 gained the UMWA royalties on each ton of coal mined as well as many other benefits.

Miner militancy may have backfired, however. When Republicans regained control of Congress in 1946, Lewis was the poster child for those complaining that labor unions commanded too much power. The 1947 Taft-Hartley Act placed constraints on labor unions, and though Lewis called upon unions to ignore its provisions and strike for its repeal, neither strategy panned out. Neither did a 1950 strike call; President Truman issued an injunction against the miners, and Congress contemplated seizing the mines.

For the remainder of his career Lewis concentrated on UMWA members. Under his leadership miners made big strides in gaining wage increases, forcing the passage of mine safety laws, and in advancing awareness and treatment of mining-related illnesses. Lewis successfully negotiated contracts in the once-union-resilient bituminous mining regions, and the UMWA also gained notice for the generous welfare and pension plans that covered members. There was also relative calm in the industry for much of the 1950s, a peace that critics charged came from Lewis's dictatorial control over the UMWA and the quashing of rank-and-file militancy. Lewis was also open to nepotism charges as he openly advanced his daughter Katherine within the UMWA bureaucracy.

Lewis retired in 1960, though in name only; few decisions were made without consulting Lewis first. By his death in 1969 the UMWA was in decline and riddled by corruption. That year UMWA reform candidate Joseph Yablonski lost a hotly contested (and possibly rigged) presidential election to Tony Boyle. Less than a

month later Yablonski and his family were murdered, a crime for which Boyle was convicted in 1974. The UMWA faced an internal Miners for Democracy insurgency movement, which eventually gained control and rooted out corruption.

Lewis was posthumously elected to the Labor Hall of Fame, but the UMWA's post-Lewis history has tarnished his reputation. Some blame Lewis's personality-driven policies for the union's subsequent problems, and some historians see his 1940 split with Roosevelt as folly and his subsequent actions as driven by vindictiveness rather than the best interests of the **working class**. Lewis has inspired equally passionate admirers; to his supporters Lewis was a leader who understood that the interests of capital and labor are fundamentally rooted in conflict rather than cooperation. They also rightly point out that the UMWA's record on dealing with **racism** was superior to that of many other unions.

Suggested Reading

Melvyn Dubofsky and Warren Van Tine, John L. Lewis: A Biography, 1977; John Lasslett, The United Mine Workers of America, 1996; Robert Zieger, John L. Lewis: Labor Leader, 1988.

LEWIS, SINCLAIR (February 7, 1885–January 10, 1951)

Andrew Reynolds

Sinclair Lewis was a critically acclaimed and popular novelist whose works were noted for their satiric portrayals of post–World War I American society.

Most important among his many works of fiction are *Main Street* (1920) and *Babbitt* (1922), two titles that have become part of the American vernacular. The first describes—and derides—life in the Midwestern hinterlands that awkwardly and painfully made the transition to twentieth-century modernity. Lewis's fictional Gopher Prairie was stifling in its backwardness, complacency, and isolation. The second title refers to Lewis's most famous character, George F. Babbitt, whom his creator intended to be a portrait of the average American businessman, "one of the ruling caste of Good Fellows." "Babbittry" has become synonymous with that particular blend of boosterism, jingoism, vulgarity, and hypocrisy associated with the conservative and **social climbing** white **middle class**, especially during the Roaring Twenties. Through these and other writings Lewis became a leading voice decrying the **capitalist** culture of the time.

Lewis may have grown into an icon of the Jazz Age, when he was purposefully controversial, peripatetic, and alcoholic, yet he began life as "Harry," the third son of a country doctor, born in the tiny town of Sauk Centre, Minnesota. There he gained a reputation for bookishness, oddness, and imagination. These traits, when combined with his physical awkwardness and poor complexion, won Lewis few friends, and he struggled in vain to earn the respect of his father. Stricken with "poetical fever" in his teens, Lewis continued to write during his time at Yale University and after graduation, remaining committed to a literary career that began in earnest with the publication of his first novel, *The Hike and the Aeroplane* (1912).



Sinclair Lewis, with his wife, just before leaving New York for Stockholm to receive the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1930. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

His early books reveal the influence of his literary hero H. G. Wells, both in his taste for adventure stories featuring modern technology and in his penchant for what he termed "socialistic" writing-the latter apparent in business novels such as Our Mr. Wrenn (1914) and The 7ob (1917). While Lewis always remained a staunch critic of Victorianism and the bourgeoisie, his nickname "Red" referred more to his copper-colored hair than the consistency of his political views, and he never achieved the "radical novelist" status of his sometimefriends Upton Sinclair and Jack London.

Lewis's early novels reveal hints of his ability to satirize social types and harvest ripe fields of material for American letters. His first great satirical success, however, came with *Main Street*, an instant best-seller heralded as the definitive fictional protest against village life. The story follows Carol Kennicott, an educated yet quixotic woman, as she strives and fails to reform and sophisticate her neighbors. *Main Street* gained Lewis the lifelong friendship and admiration of news-

paper editor H. L. Mencken, and his follow-up novel, *Babbitt*, found Lewis dissecting Mencken's "Booboisie" with all the delicacy that Lewis's father brought to amputating limbs in his home surgery. Though tediously derisive at points, *Babbitt* displays Lewis's mature style at his best. Lewis painstakingly researched his subject matter, in this case the real estate business, which allowed him to reproduce the textures and even the dialects of modern life. These skills helped make his next several novels, including *Arrowsmith* (1925) and *Elmer Gantry* (1927), immensely successful depictions of medical science, evangelical religion, and other subjects.

In 1930 Sinclair Lewis became the first American to win the Nobel Prize in Literature. At the time Lewis reportedly said that the award was "fatal," as he could not live up to it. This proved prophetic. Some scholars speculate that his artistic decline during the **Great Depression** was advanced by his obsessive ambition to write a "labor novel," a great populist work that he felt obligated to produce. He played with this pet idea for decades, trying out various titles, and concepts that included modeling his protagonist on **Eugene Debs**. Lewis even visited **strike**

picket lines and consulted young radicals about the direction of his story—all to no avail. Lewis's failure, and the weakness of his output after the 1920s, exposed his persistent weaknesses as a writer: He loved to shock the **middle class**, yet he could never convincingly step outside its point of view. When he attempted to do so, he often lapsed into sentimentalism. Undeniably Lewis took risks by marching in support of women's suffrage, by denouncing the dangers of the political right in his anti-fascist *It Can't Happen Here* (1935), and attacking racism in his *Kingsblood Royal* (1947), yet his motives for social protest were never quite clear. An inveterate mimic, actor, and seeker of attention, his biting critiques seldom came with demands for social change. As one of the highest-paid authors of his generation, Sinclair Lewis slapped the bourgeoisie to his own profit.

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Catherine Jurca, White Diaspora: The Suburb and the Twentieth-Century American Novel, 2001; Richard Lingeman, Sinclair Lewis: Rebel from Main Street, 2002; Mark Schorer, Sinclair Lewis: An American Life, 1961.

LIFE CHANCES

ROBERT E. WEIR

"Life chances" is a term originally used by **Max Weber** to refer to the possibility of any individual within a social class of obtaining the **status** that person seeks. Weber related the term to the ownership of goods, lands, services, and other resources and linked it to power. In simplest terms access to resources was correlated with power; thus those who had them increased their "chances" of obtaining desired statuses.

Since Weber, however, the concept of life chances has been more directly linked to **stratification** studies, though application of the term itself has been broadened to look at individuals within the totality of economic and social systems. Despite claims that the American social system is an open one, many scholars point out that society's parts are so interconnected that advantages or disadvantages accrue to members of a class that can be independent of their own actions. Those with more disposable income, for example, can afford better health care, thereby increasing their life chances of longevity in ways in which a poor person seeking to elevate himself or herself cannot. Likewise, a child growing up in an affluent household is more likely to have access to computers and other technology that increase their chances of educational and vocational success vis-à-vis a poor child who may, in fact, be brighter or work harder. At the upper end of the social scale, a child born into wealth is likely to benefit from **social networks**, though he or she may be of mediocre ability.

Life chances studies often refute assertions of individualism, upward mobility opportunities, and other aspects of the American dream. In starkest terms the lower down one is on the socioeconomic scale, the more likely one is to be less healthy, experience substandard education, obtain less-rewarding and remunerative employment, suffer from infectious diseases, and die at a younger age. In keeping with Weber, one is also less likely to achieve a desired status.

Suggested Reading

Dennis Gilbert and Joseph Kahl, *The American Class Structure*, 1993; Alex Thio, *Sociology: A Brief Introduction*, 2000; Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, 1957 [1947].

LIFE EXPECTANCY

ROBERT E. WEIR

Life expectancy is the projected span that a newborn can be expected to survive until dying. It is frequently expressed as an average, but a detailed breakdown of data reveals that it is among those **life chances** that are correlated with social class, **race**, ethnicity, and gender.

Life expectancy data can be deceptive unless one looks at various subcategories. For example, in 1900 the average life expectancy of Americans was just 47.2 years. This figure on its own does not show how high rates of infant mortality skewed the statistics, nor does it break down data by class. Members of the **upper** and upper **middle class** routinely lived into their sixties and beyond. At the other end of the scale, members of the **working class**, who toiled in dangerous occupations such as mining, railroading, or stone carving, frequently died while still in their early thirties.

Unless a location has been ravaged by external factors such as disease or warfare, the trend in human history has been toward longer life spans. Anthropological evidence suggests that early humans usually died around the age of twenty, and as late as classical antiquity most people died before the age of thirty. One does not see a dramatic leap in life expectancy until the early twentieth century, when quantum improvements in health care, nutrition, and prenatal care were made.

Those improvements also highlight health inequalities, however. There are direct correlations between life expectancy and factors such as education, nutrition, occupation, and access to health care. Members of the upper and middle classes tend to be better educated and are more aware of good nutritional habits. Some critics charge that fast food and junk food purveyors target lower income Americans and entice them to consume diets higher in sugar, saturated fats, and chemical additives. In 2005, for instance, McDonald's launched an ad campaign aimed at African American youth that some black leaders found objectionable. Studies indicate that obesity levels tend to be higher among the **lower classes** and that those who are obese die five to seven years earlier than the national average. The same is true for those who smoke, a demographic also disproportionately higher among the lower classes.

Economic status and access to **health care** are perhaps even bigger factors. More than 50 million Americans lack health care insurance. The poor visit doctors less often than those with insurance and tend to have more severe health issues when they do, many of which would have been more easily treatable if they had been addressed earlier. On the average, the poor live 6.6 years less than middle and upper class Americans, whereas billionaires exceed the national average by 3.5 years. Groups in which there are higher concentrations of poor, especially African Americans, **Native Americans**, and Latinos, have higher mortality rates than white middle

and upper class Americans. African Americans, for example, experience infant mortality rates twice as high as those of whites. In some particularly acute pockets of poverty in urban **ghettos**, as few as 37 percent of residents can be expected to live to age 65.

In 2005 American life expectancy reached 77.6 years, with white women exceeding 80. Although the upward trends in life expectancy are encouraging, the United States ranks only twenty-fifth in the world. Most analysts see little chance that this rating will improve dramatically without an overhaul of the health care system and increased attention to the economic, social, and health challenges facing the lower classes.

Suggested Reading

Donald Barlett and James Steele, Critical Condition: How Health Care in America Became Big Business—and Bad Medicine, 2004; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Life Expectancy" (http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/lifexpec.htm); Russell Wright, Life and Death in the United States: Statistics on Life Expectancies, Diseases and Death Rates for the Twentieth Century, 1997.

LIPSET, SEYMOUR MARTIN (March 18, 1922–)

SANJEEV A. RAO JR.

Seymour Martin Lipset is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace at Stanford University, which is a public policy research center devoted to advanced study of politics, economics, and political economy—both domestic and foreign—as well as international affairs. He has taught at George Mason University, Stanford University, and Harvard University. He previously held the presidency of the National Academy of Arts and Sciences. He is the only person to have been president of both the American Sociological Association and the American Political Science Association. The author or coauthor of many books and monographs, he has edited over twenty books and published more than 400 articles. Lipset earned his BA from the City College of New York and his PhD from Columbia.

Known for his comparative approach and detailed empirical research, Lipset has written on a wide variety of political topics and issues. He is most well known for his pioneering work on democratic theory and on the degree to which the American experience is exceptional.

According to Lipset, **democracy** must have foundations that sustain differences and disagreement among groups as well as institutions that maintain validity and consensus in order to succeed and survive. The differences between the left and right spectra in the Western democracies are no longer as pronounced, in part because the basic political problems of the **Industrial Revolution** have been solved. Democracy is positively related to the level of economic development and legitimacy. Lipset looked at indices such as **wealth**, industrialization, urbanization, and **education** in a path-breaking work, *The Social Bases of Politics*, to reach these conclusions.

Lipset's assertion of a direct causative relationship between economic development and democracy has been subjected to extensive research in the past forty years, and there is much historical data to support his assertions. By producing greater income and advanced levels of education, economic development largely determines the form of the **class struggle** by permitting those in the lower strata to develop more gradualist views of political change. Economic development promotes democracy by generating more democratic values and attitudes, a less polarized class structure, a larger **middle class**, and a more vigorous, autonomous associational life.

To Lipset, **legitimacy** is the efficacy of a political system. An effective democratic government is one with an efficient bureaucracy and a decision-making system. Legitimacy upholds the belief that existing political institutions are the most suitable for society. Legitimacy depends on how a government handles a transition to a new social structure and how it handles the entry of new groups to the political process.

Legitimacy can be challenged through "cleavages" such as religion, suffrage, and the distribution of wealth. If tensions such as these are resolved one at a time, it will contribute to the stability of the political system; however, if these issues are carried over from one historical period to another, then the population will become disillusioned and disenchanted. He believes that a stable democracy requires relatively moderate tensions among contending political forces.

Like Alexis de Tocqueville, Lipset wrote a great deal about American exceptionalism. The term was invented by Tocqueville and was significantly noted in much of the "foreign traveler" literature of the nineteenth century as visitors to the United States compared and contrasted what they saw to their own countries. Lipset derived his conclusions from a wide range of empirical data, especially from European countries, Canada, and Japan.

Lipset based this contention on what he calls the "American creed" of liberty, egalitarianism, **individualism**, populism (people have more power to vote), and laissez-faire economics (considered anti-statism by some). This American core set of values arose out of the **Revolutionary War** and helped make the America "the first new nation." Unlike other societies, such as Europe, that rely more heavily on the social bonds of ethnicity and history, the United States did not have any feudal structures, aristocracies, or monarchy.

This American creed, while widely shared in our society, does not preclude conflict but instead limits the scope of that conflict. The result is a paradox, or as Lipset terms it, "a double-edged sword." On one hand America's uniqueness has the admirable qualities of being the most religious, optimistic, patriotic, rights-oriented, volunteeristic, hard-working, and individualistic country. Yet at the same time, it is has the distinctiveness of having the highest crime rates, the lowest percentage of eligible people voting, the least egalitarian income distribution, lower **welfare** benefits, the lowest savings rate, and the lowest level of taxation among other developed countries. Lipset thus terms the United States an "outlier" compared with other countries in the scales of comparison.

Lipset feels that the differences between the United States and other nations are narrowing as the rest of the world develops and Americanizes. Also as Lipset points out, America has adopted institutions, such as federal welfare and a large peacetime

military organization, that were once considered un-American. He also notes that social tension relating to race and ethnicity are no longer unique to the United States, as one witnesses such tensions in Europe and especially France.

Lipset, along with Gary Marks, continued this theme of exceptionalism in *It Didn't Happen Here*. They explained that **socialism** failed in the United States because of a convergence of many factors, including the exclusionary two-party political structure of the United States, its large **immigrant** population, and strategic blunders of socialist leaders, such as not forging strong connections to the **labor movement**.

Some of Lipset's work has been modified over time and in some cases roundly criticized. For example, AE has been disparaged for its emphasis on values rather than economics. Others have maintained that if America is viewed from institutional and class perspectives, it may not be so unique. Still, Seymour Lipset remains a giant in the fields of sociology and political science.

Suggested Reading

Seymour Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics, 1959; Lipset, American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword, 1996; Lipset and Gary Marks, It Didn't Happen Here: Why Socialism Failed in the United States, 2000.

LITERACY

MELISSA A.T. KOTULSKI

Literacy is, at its core, the ability to read and write. As scholar Jerome Bruner argues, however, true literacy far transcends the mere mastery of reading and writing, as such skills are mechanical and tell us very little about comprehension or one's ability to function in society. There are many ways to be illiterate in the twenty-first century. According to a 2001 report issued by American Management Association on Workplace Testing, more than one-third of job applicants lacked basic communications skills necessary to perform jobs they sought. Still the focus of American mass literacy efforts, as in most developed nations over the past century and a half, has been on **public schools** for youth and children.

Officially 99 percent of all contemporary Americans are considered to be literate. This is a deceptive figure, however. Six major categories of literacy are the sacred (using print in religious practice and instruction); the useful (using print to mediate practical activities); the informational (using print to convey or acquire knowledge); the pleasurable (reading for the fun of it); the persuasive (using print to influence the behavior or beliefs of others); and the personal-familial (using letters to stay in touch with family and friends). There is a decided difference between mere recognition of words and mastery. Minimally being literate is having the ability to read and write, to decode and encode. On a deeper level, it means to be well read, learned, to posses the ability to abstract from context, and to apply concepts in one's everyday life. In the twenty-first century, literacy also includes being able to decode culture and have at least rudimentary facility with computers.

The concept of literacy developed in America alongside the economic and social transitions from the 1600s through the present. The earliest attempts at a literate society were sacred and persuasive and occurred when printing presses made text accessible to more people. Because many American colonists were heirs to a Protestant Reformation tradition that placed emphasis on reading the Bible, a far greater percentage could read and write than is often presumed. Some scholars believe that as many as 60 percent of all adult males and 30 percent of adult women could read on the eve of the American Revolution. This did not mean, however, that the masses read much beyond their Bibles, and even that was often done in groups within the confines of a church. Prior to the American Revolution being formally educated was reserved for elites, and only a minority of that group was extensively trained. Reading was a cultural commodity that the upper classes feared might initiate the lower and middling classes to class restructuring. In addition, many states expressively forbade teaching slaves to read or write. Social control was further enforced by associating suffrage with the ability to sign one's name. After the abolition of slavery and the collapse of **Reconstruction**, some states misused literacy clauses as a way of withholding voting rights from African Americans.

In the nineteenth century literacy efforts shifted, although primary schools' expectations for study performance remained modest and geared toward students learning to conform to their **socioeconomic status**. The most widely used early reading in American schools before the 1820s was *The New England Primer*, with more than 2 million copies printed. A variety of locally supported educational institutions flourished in the early republic, from Sunday fee-paying and charity schools to classes in workhouses. By the 1850s the elementary common school evolved from the model of day-long weekday schooling, often fee-based, which developed in colonial times. By 1850s more than half of those aged seven to thirteen were enrolled for one or more years of formal public schooling, although attendance was often irregular and seasonal.

Enrollments grew rapidly between the **Civil War** and the turn of the twentieth century, as primary schools became more accessible throughout society and white students attended for longer periods. The **Industrial Revolution** stimulated education efforts. The United States was among the first industrial nations to tout the virtues of free public education, a secondary function of which was to delay the entry of young people into the workforce. The latter concern mattered more to the upwardly mobile **middle class** seeking entry into **white collar** jobs than to the **working class**, which needed income from all family members to make ends meet. In addition **segregation** relegated African Americans to separate educational facilities, many of which were inferior to white schools; some **regions** failed to provide altogether for black education beyond the primary grades. Still by the dawn of the twentieth century **child labor** laws had raised the minimum age for employment, and the number of public schools grew dramatically between 1890 and 1920. Although high school education was not yet a mass institution, the American educational system was viewed as a model for other nations to emulate.

Public **vocational** education gained a foothold in 1917 with the passage of the Smith-Hughes Act. Still no more than 20 percent of those who entered high school graduated in 1920. Only the **Great Depression**, which removed most of the opportunities for youth employment among the working classes, pushed the portion

of graduates to 50 percent by 1940. The post–World War II "Baby Boom," once it reached the high schools, created the foundation for a more powerful youth culture. The 1960s marked a change in what it meant to be literate. During the 1960s the promises of the 1954 *Brown v. Board of Education* decision, which desegregated public schools, the Secondary and Elementary School Act, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 gave more hope that literacy and education would be accessible to a broader society. By the 1990s, however, it was clear that work remained undone; *The Educational Reform Decade* prepared by the Educational Testing Service expressed concern for the undereducated **underclass**.

The claim that the United States has a 99 percent literacy rate is overly optimistic. New waves of immigration have attracted many Hispanics, Eastern Europeans, and Asians have fueled debates over bilingualism, as some immigrants are illiterate in their native languages and have little or no facility with English. But there is room for improvement throughout society if literacy is construed to include more than rudimentary communication skills. Although scholars such as Jeff McQuillan have argued that many of the claims that American literacy is in crisis are myths, a 2003 National Assessment of Adult Literacy conducted under the auspices of the Department of Education raises red flags. Although just 2 percent of adults are considered to be nonliterate, some could not be tested at all because they lacked even elementary English skills. Moreover, 14 percent of adults performed below "basic" levels in their ability to read prose, 14 percent could not comprehend a simple document, and 22 percent underperformed in facile quantitative tasks. Just 13 percent of adults were considered "proficient" in any of these areas. Given the high correlation between income and life chances in America, the report suggests that **poverty** and historical inequalities continue to impact society at a foundational level.

Suggested Reading

Jerome Bruner, *Literacy: An Overview by Fourteen Experts*, 1991; Institute of Education Sciences, Department of Education, 2003 National Assessment of Adult Literacy Survey (http://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/pubsinfo.asp?pubid=2006471); Jeff McQuillan, "Seven Myths about Literacy in the United States," Practical Assessment, Research and Evaluation, 1998 (http://pareonline.net/getvn.asp?v=6&n=1); John Willinsky, *The New Literacy: Redefining Reading and Writing in the Schools*, 1990.

LITERATURE

JENIFER B. ELMORE

American literature, like all national literature, has been deeply intertwined with issues of social class from its beginnings. Literacy and access—the practical ability to read and write and the ability to acquire written texts, respectively—are largely functions of economic **status**. The connections between social class and literature in America are complex and can be examined from numerous angles. Social classes stem from inequalities of **wealth**, labor, and **power** among various subgroups in a

society, but they overlap with other cultural categories such as **race**, **gender**, and ethnicity, and they entail numerous cultural markers such as **education**, speech, manners, and appearance. The study of literature and social class therefore encompasses all of these class-related categories not only as they appear within literary texts (among fictional characters, for example) but also in terms of the actual historical dynamics at work among the various participants in literary production and consumption (such as writers, critics, and readers) throughout American history.

Looking at social class from within works of literature reveals that, while many literary texts address issues of class overtly, others have significant class-related implications without being self-consciously "about" class divisions and struggles. Early examples of the former include several works by Benjamin Franklin, especially his Autobiography (1791) and his essays in Poor Richard's Almanac, which was published in annual editions from 1733 through 1758. Nearly twenty years before the start of the American Revolution, Franklin's "The Way to Wealth" articulates (albeit with some level of sarcasm) what was already becoming a deeply ingrained belief system in the American colonies: work hard, do not waste time or money, save as much as you possibly can, do not go into debt, be a good and honest person, and you will eventually become economically comfortable and perhaps even wealthy no matter how humble your beginnings. This message has never disappeared from American literature, but it has weakened and resurged as circumstances have changed. In the early years of the United States, literary treatments of social class tended to contrast the egalitarianism and dynamic meritocracy of the young republic with the static and oppressive aristocratic values of England. While class boundaries among white American males were certainly never as rigid as those of England in this period, class-based inequalities that did in fact exist in America (many of which were based on race and ethnicity) were routinely ignored or denied in the interests of promoting a national ideology of utter classlessness.

The economic rewards of hard work and moral virtue remained a theme of American literature throughout the nineteenth century, appearing in many genres and intended for various audiences. Lydia Maria Child, who later became a prominent abolitionist writer, published The American Frugal Housewife in 1829. Promoting the virtues and rewards of frugality, self-reliance, and domestic industry, this cookbook and domestic handbook went through at least thirty-five printings in the next twenty years. After establishing her career with several successful and critically acclaimed works of fiction, the prominent antebellum writer Catharine Maria Sedgwick contracted in the 1830s to write a series of fictionalized moral and social handbooks aimed at the working classes. The prominence of class in these works is evident in titles such as Live and Let Live, or Domestic Service Illustrated; The Poor Rich Man, and the Rich Poor Man; and Means and Ends, or Self-Training. These works were widely circulated and continued to be reprinted and reissued into the 1870s. The amazingly prolific and popular writer **Horatio Alger** began publishing his "rags to riches" moral fictions aimed at young boys before the Civil War and continued until his death in 1899. Alger's stories extol the virtues of hard and honest work, but his heroes typically raise their socioeconomic status not through their hard work or their talents but rather because some wealthy person inevitably intervenes to reward their moral virtue with financial security. Alger's stories, together with stories by other authors that express a simple faith that moral virtue will always be materially rewarded, are frequently referred to collectively as "Horatio Alger stories."

In the middle decades of the nineteenth century much of the literature that intentionally reflected harsh social realities and economic struggles focused more on race (especially slavery) than on class per se. Frederick Douglass's 1845 autobiographical account *Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, an American Slave* and Harriet Beecher Stowe's 1852 novel *Uncle Tom's Cabin* are obviously about the specific injustices of the institution of **slavery** in America, but when we consider that slaves were legally established as a permanent social and economic underclass, then class-oriented descriptions and analyses apply just as well to these works as to works about European peasants or urban factory workers. Literature about the political and economic oppression of women in American society also became more common in the antebellum period. Sara Willis Parton (pen-named Fanny Fern) wrote numerous essays for newspapers, magazines, and her own books that satirically decried the unfair situations of women who worked for a living; "Soliloquy of a Housemaid" (1854) and "The Working-Girls of New York" (1868) are just two examples.

The most often studied writers of the antebellum era did not generally focus on issues of class overtly. The romantic writer Ralph Waldo Emerson's most famous essay, "Self-Reliance" (1841), repeatedly denies that socioeconomic factors define or determine a person's true identity while advancing a philosophy of ultraindividualism. On a more realistic note, while Herman Melville is mostly known for his deeply philosophical adventure novels, two of his most famous shorter works, the short fiction "Bartleby the Scrivener" (1853) and the satirical sketch "The Paradise of Bachelors and the Tartarus of Maids" (1855), explore the human costs of class and labor inequalities in antebellum America. Though known as an American romantic writer, Walt Whitman's most celebrated poem, "Song of Myself" (1855), is a democratic manifesto that catalogs American classes and laborers in an effort to assert an essential unity of all Americans, but its juxtaposition of so many diverse living situations documents the historical reality of class distinctions as much as it envisions national camaraderie: "Of every hue and caste am I, of every rank and religion,/A farmer, mechanic, artist, gentleman, sailor, Quaker,/Prisoner, fancy-man, rowdy, lawyer, physician, priest."

After the Civil War class emerged as a major preoccupation of American literature. Novels and stories about abject poverty, extreme wealth, the immigrant experience, and factory labor proliferated in the later nineteenth century and early twentieth century, during a time of rapid technological and industrial change, an unprecedented consolidation of wealth at the top, and a massive influx of mostly poor immigrants to the United States. In literary history this period came to be known as the age of American literary realism and naturalism. Significant treatments of class from the heyday of American realism include **Henry James**'s *Daisy Miller* (1879), Mark Twain's *Huckleberry Finn* (1884), William Dean Howells's *The Rise of Silas Lapham* (1885), Charles Chesnutt's *The House Behind the Cedars* (1900), and **Edith Wharton**'s *The House of Mirth* (1905). Important works about class by American literary naturalists include Stephen Crane's *Maggie*, *A Girl of the Streets* (1893), **Frank Norris**'s *McTeague* (1899) and *The Octopus* (1901), **Theodore Dreiser**'s *Sister Carrie* (1900), and **Jack London**'s overtly **socialist** novel *The Iron*

Heel (1908). Abraham Cahan, himself a Russian **Jewish** immigrant, focused on the experiences of Jewish **immigrants** to New York in his novels *Yekl* (1896) and *The Rise of David Levinsky* (1917). All of these writers primarily wrote fiction, but other realists wrote nonfictional accounts and analyses of socially and economically marginalized Americans. Rebecca Harding Davis's 1861 sketch "Life in the Iron-Mills" (about the harsh realities of life for manual laborers in factories and mills), Booker T. Washington's 1901 history *Up from Slavery*, and **W. E. B. Du Bois**'s 1903 treatise *The Souls of Black Folk* are three important examples.

Perhaps the most famous fiction of class from the prosperous period between the end of World War I and the beginning of the Great Depression is F. Scott Fitzgerald's *The Great Gatsby* (1925), which chronicles Jay Gatsby's shady rise from mysterious origins to ostentatious wealth and his self-destructive fall. The novel affirms the possibility of dramatically upward social mobility in America but questions the cost of such transformations to the individual psyche. The best-known writer of fiction about the Depression era is John Steinbeck, whose 1939 novel The Grapes of Wrath tells the story of the impoverished and displaced Joad family, who must reinvent themselves in the face of severe new economic realities. Steinbeck was also a vocal activist within the Democratic Party from the Franklin Roosevelt through the Lyndon Johnson administrations; he supported the **New Deal** and actually edited Johnson's Great Society platform of 1964. Farther to the political left and less well-known but nevertheless important writers about social class from the midtwentieth century include Michael Gold, Meridel LeSeuer, and John Dos Passos. On the conservative side, the Fugitive Agrarians of the South, including John Crowe Ransom and Robert Penn Warren, wrote poetry, fiction, and nonfiction that tended to romanticize the South while promoting a return to agrarian values.

Despite the prevalence of social class as a theme of American literature, the relationship between the literary and socioeconomic realms was not regularly subjected to rigorous scholarly analysis until the latter decades of the twentieth century, when large numbers of literary scholars turned their attention away from analyzing and evaluating the formal, aesthetic aspects of literary texts to understanding their social and economic implications. In this period, which has continued into the twenty-first century, literary scholars have become less like art historians and more like social scientists. While literary writers continue to publish works that both highlight and suppress the issue of class in America, numerous scholarly studies of the class dimensions of literary "merit," the categories of "high-brow" and "popular" literature, the relationship between fictional and historical conditions, and other intersections of literature and class continue to question the most fundamental assumptions that Americans make about imaginative art and economic reality.

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LIVING WAGE

LAURA HERNÁNDEZ-EHRISMAN

Living wage refers to the hourly wage necessary for a person to achieve a basic standard of living. The formula for determining a living wage varies, but most are based on a forty-hour-per-week position, with no additional income, and include the cost of housing, food, utilities, transport, and health care. The term is often used as an alternative to the minimum wage, which is set by law and is often lower than a living wage. There is no set method of determining a living wage, but the most popular method is to use the poverty and benefit standards of the federal government. For example a worker employed forty hours a week and supporting a family of four at the federal poverty line would need to earn \$8.20 per hour, a significant difference from the federal minimum wage of \$5.15 per hour.

While efforts to increase the federal minimum wage have stalled, grassroots campaigns to create living wage ordinances have had increasing success. Most of the living wage campaigns focus on the level of municipal government because business opposition has greater impact at the state and federal levels. Living wage campaigns also tend to be local because of the variations in the cost of living in different geographic locations. The first living wage ordinance was passed in Baltimore in 1994, and since then ordinances have passed in over fifty municipalities and struggles are being waged in an additional seventy-five cities.

Living wage campaigns are conducted at the grassroots level, but most coalitions are led by affiliates of a national organization. The Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN) is the largest community organization of low- and moderate-income families in the United States. ACORN has an active membership of over 175,000 families organized into more than 1,200 neighborhood chapters in more than eighty-five cities across the United States. Living wage campaigns have also received significant support from the labor movement and religious groups. Often these ordinances only apply to certain types of businesses, such as those receiving government contracts. For private firms in these cities, this has meant that they must be willing to pay substantially better wages than the national minimum wage. In cities such as San Francisco, California, Santa Fe, New Mexico, and Madison, Wisconsin, broader ordinances have passed.

Local businesses, especially hotel and restaurant owners, have fought living wage ordinances in many municipalities. Opponents argue that these laws hurt their businesses and will necessitate job cuts. Thus critics argue that living wage ordinances will actually worsen the plight of the lowest skilled workers. Higher wages will price unskilled workers out of the job market and cause **unemployment** among the poor. Critics also argue that these ordinances will place an undue burden on city budgets and force cuts in benefits to low-income families. In addition businesses will be discouraged from locating in municipalities, and this will also increase unemployment and **poverty**. Reaction against these ordinances also led some states, such as Arizona, Oregon, Colorado, Utah, Missouri, and Louisiana, to ban the ordinances.

Those who support living wage ordinances state that the research has not shown these predictions of massive job loss to be true. Instead the consensus has been that employment losses are modest, and the laws have sizable positive effects on low-wage

workers and have reduced urban poverty. In addition many of the businesses most affected by these ordinances—hotels, restaurants, and retail outlets—would not relocate, as they are dependent on their existing locations. Meanwhile, with increased wages, workers would have more money to spend and would therefore pay more in taxes and would rely less on government subsidies.

Some living wage advocates have taken the movement a step further and have lobbied for a national living wage of \$7.25 per hour. While local ordinances are important, the ultimate goals of living wage activists are part of a much larger effort to eradicate poverty. These campaigns have become tools for union organizing and confronting wage inequality.

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Robert Pollin and Stephanie Luce, *The Living Wage: Building a Fair Economy*, 1998 (http://www.livingwagecampaign.org; http://www.epinet.org).

LOBBYISTS

STEPHEN E. SUSSMAN

Lobbyists are persons who attempt to influence government policies and actions. Lobbying is the process of petitioning government to influence public policy and is an important part of the democratic process. The right to form groups and to present the groups' ideas is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. Today because of the size and complexity of government, individual citizens cannot effectively petition the government for redress of grievances. Federal and state governments deal with large numbers of complex economic and political issues, allowing little time for direct constituency contact. Just as few people would think of appealing to the courts without the benefit of counsel, few people would consider dealing with government without the benefit of a lobbyist. This has given rise to professional lobbyists. Interest groups, such as business, professional, ideological, and trade associations, may employ lobbyists. These lobbyists devote their efforts to one organization and/or interest. Other lobbyists are located in law, consulting, or public relations firms. These independent lobbyists offer to influence government policies for a fee.

Many lobbyists are lawyers and former government officials who are familiar with the political environment. The growth of professional lobbying has meant a concentration of power over government within an **elite** group of people, with personal and professional connections that help gain them access to policymakers and legislators. The primary way to gain access to legislators is through campaign contributions. Interest group contributions not only help lobbyists gain access but also help elect people friendly to the group's goals. As the cost of campaigns continues to rise, legislators must depend more heavily on the contributions of organized interest groups.

Membership in interest groups generally requires dues. Many interest groups have strong member bases and huge financial resources, giving them frequent access to public officials. Business and professional organizations usually have few problems maintaining a membership, and members of these groups gain substantial

benefits by joining. The American Bar Association, American Medical Association, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce are examples of business and professional organizations with a strong membership. As a result they employ very powerful lobbyists and have great access to government.

Citizens groups largely rely on ideological appeal. Large citizens groups, such as the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP), Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD), and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), have huge financial resources because of their extensive membership. These interest groups tend to have members who drop in and drop out of the group but have little trouble replenishing their ranks and thus can hire very effective lobbyists. Smaller interest groups, with limited financial resources, may not be able to afford an effective lobbyist. As such some critics argue that modern lobbying efforts undermine **democracy**.

Americans who are disadvantaged economically cannot afford to join interest groups, and many may not have the time or expertise to find out what group might represent them. As a result some scholars suggest that interest groups and lobbyists are the privilege of the **upper** and **middle class** and those who belong to unions and special interests. Those living in **poverty** depend largely on indirect representation. Issue-oriented groups advocating improved health care, affordable housing, **social security**, and **education** may represent lower income groups if the policy positions involve the problems of the poor, but their efforts are not limited to the poor. Additionally efforts on behalf of the poor come from public housing officials, **welfare** workers, public-interest groups, and others groups that speak indirectly for the poor. The poor remain outside the interest group network and have little direct voice of their own.

Lobbying is a difficult job, demanding hard work and long hours. Not only is it difficult to get government officials to do what one wishes, but one must contend with other lobbyists trying to persuade officials to take a contrary position. To be competitive lobbyists must be seen as reliable sources of information. Optimally they cultivate reputations as the real policy experts. Lobbyists perform useful functions by providing information to the government, by educating the public, and by preparing legislation. Detractors suggest lobbyists are a "third house" of Congress. However there is no doubt that lobbyists are a powerful force in the American political system.

Suggested Reading

Jeffrey Birnbaum, *The Lobbyist*, 1993; Birnbaum and Alan Murray, *Gucci Gulch*, 1988; Richard Hays, *Who Speaks for the Poor: National Interest Groups and Social Policy*, 2001; Alan Rosenthal, *The Third House: Lobbyists and Lobbying in the States*, 1993.

LONDON, JACK (January 12, 1876–November 22, 1916)

GREG BROWN

Jack London pioneered magazine fiction writing and was one of the first Americans to become a financially successful novelist. Born John Griffith Chaney in San Francisco, London experimented with many literary forms during his career,

including love stories and science fiction. However his best known works are the adventure novels *The Call of the Wild*, *White Fang*, and *The Sea-Wolf* and essays promoting **socialist** values and describing early twentieth-century **working-class** life.

London concluded early in his youth that his only hope of escaping the low-wage work trap was to get an education, and throughout his life he saw writing as a business and his ticket out of poverty. His own financial success hardly quelled his overriding concern for the working class. Through rigorous self-education, London raised himself out of the squalor of the lowest classes and began to write stories and books drawn from life experiences collected in the course of work onboard a sealing schooner, in a jute mill, at a power plant, or learned while enjoying the pleasures and surviving the hardships of the Klondike Gold Rush and hobo living.

London's socialist politics emerged through reading Karl Marx's descriptions of class struggle, first-hand observation of child labor and the horrendous working conditions in most factories, and his familiarity with privation and exploitation, including a brief period in a New York prison as a convict laborer. During his early years in California, London joined the Socialist Labor Party of Oakland. He spoke to workingmen across the country, touting socialist candidates for political office while scorning the plutocrats who ran the country; championed a vision of California as a white, workingman's utopia; and unsuccessfully ran for mayor of Oakland as a socialist candidate in 1901 and 1905. London's politics led him to promote municipal ownership, a theory most clear in his bleak novel *The Iron Heel*, which offers a fictional account of socialist revolution and American oligarchs who resort to fascistic principles to protect their positions as elites.

London was also influenced philosophically by other prominent scholars. Charles Darwin's concept of "survival of the fittest" is ubiquitous in London's adventure stories, and the **Social Darwinian**, racialist, and superman ideals and theories of Herbert Spencer, Thomas Huxley, and Friedrich Nietzsche, respectively, play prominent roles in London's body of work. Ironically he was a great believer in **individualism** as well as the fundamental differences—whether physical or mental—between races. London's racialism developed over time from abstract ideas about Anglo-Saxon racial superiority to encouraging the struggle for racial separation. His earlier "Klondike" stories pitted white men against nature's elements, while his later "South Seas" writings explored the struggle of white men in opposition to nature, but also against other races.

The self-defeating nature of individual success through hard work is another recurrent theme in London's writing, and his lead characters often represent an anti-Horatio Alger. The story of London's rise to **middle-class** success eventually resulted in his failure to achieve a sense of belonging within lower class culture. Though his work brought him wealth and fame, London's suicide at the age of forty was the result of alcoholism and mounting debt.

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LONG, HUEY P.

(August 30, 1893-September 10, 1935)

MICHAEL T. BERTRAND

Huey Pierce Long was a controversial Louisiana politician who catapulted to national fame during the **Great Depression**.

Long was born in a log cabin (albeit a rather substantial one belonging to middleclass parents) situated in poverty-stricken rural north-central Louisiana. He built his political career by promoting himself as a champion of the disinherited common man. He served as Louisiana governor and U.S. senator from the late 1920s until his death in 1935. Utilizing his immense popularity with the masses (and despite incurring the wrath of almost as many enemies), the "Kingfish" established a dominance of state politics unprecedented in American history. Long briefly gained a national following at the height of the Great Depression, when he advocated a program for the redistribution of the nation's wealth, and seemed poised to challenge for the presidency before an assassin's bullet struck him down. His legacy in Louisiana still resonates.

As controversial as he was colorful, Long provided a voice to many of the dreams, insecurities, and resentments of his rural, **working-class** constituents. Despite the fact that Louisiana could boast of bountiful natural resources and the



Huey P. Long, replying to General Hugh S. Johnson, 1935. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

South's largest city and leading port, state government had woefully neglected the needs of a majority of its citizens. Once elected, Long halted such blatant disregard. He enacted a progressive program involving massive public works, educational and health reform, and a revised tax structure that placed more of a burden on the wealthy and big business. Such measures, while routine elsewhere, were uncommon in Louisiana and drastically improved the lives of those long accustomed to economic estrangement.

A master at bombastic oratory and fiery rhetoric, Long regularly assailed the corporate entities, big-city bosses, and privileged planters (along with their political allies) who sought to maintain the status quo of mass inequality. Like other Southern demagogues who relied on a populist approach, Long indeed couched his attack in class terms, pitting individuals and local communities against the

incursions of large, powerful, and socially indifferent economic and political interests. He differed from his regional counterparts, however, in generally avoiding the divisive issue of **race**. For Long the troubles tormenting Louisiana emanated less from black and white conflict than they did from the wide disparities that existed between the haves and the have-nots. Accordingly, unlike most of his demagogic predecessors and contemporaries, the irreverent former door-to-door salesman translated his scorching verbal assaults into substantive accomplishments that tangibly benefited his state's underprivileged populace.

In retrospect Long was a conventional progressive reformer, not a revolutionary. Despite his often militant rhetoric, the immodest "messiah of the masses" sought not to destroy **capitalism** but to expand its parameters. This was dramatized in the ill-defined, yet highly propagated and popular, message of "Share Our Wealth" that he hoped would sweep him into the White House. Although that dream never materialized, Long did more than any previous Louisiana politician to bring the have-nots into the economic mainstream. For many, however, the dictatorial methods he used and the autocratic (and often corrupt) power he wielded would forever call his many accomplishments into question.

Suggested Reading

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LOTTERIES

See Casinos; Gambling.

LOWELL, JOSEPHINE SHAW (December 16, 1843–October 12, 1905)


SHERI BARTLETT BROWNE

Josephine Shaw Lowell, a prominent social reformer and feminist, was the third child of affluent parents Francis and Sarah Shaw and grew up in Staten Island, New York. A bright, motivated, compassionate young woman, Josephine worked with her mother in the Woman's Central Relief Association during the Civil War. She married Charles Russell Lowell Jr., a Harvard graduate who died in battle in 1864, just one month before the birth of their daughter Carlotta. Traveling between Staten Island, Manhattan, and Virginia, where the Lowells had resided prior to her husband's death, Lowell began a lifelong career in social justice work.

Inspired by her liberal Unitarian faith and belief in the fundamental worth of all human beings, Lowell first put her energies into the National Freedmen's Relief Association of New York. This organization was devoted to establishing schools

for African Americans in the South. In the 1870s and 1880s, Lowell sought societal changes benefiting working-class and poor women that also would enlarge the professional opportunities available to women of her social class. She achieved both goals while operating within a traditional framework that did not challenge nineteenth-century mores regarding women's sphere. Known for promoting reform efforts that attempted in every way to empower constituents rather than impose charity from above, the organizations that Lowell led or influenced set new standards in training employees and recipients, improved record keeping, eliminated duplication of services, and provided tangible relief to the needy.

Lowell advocated improving the conditions of women in prisons and the insane; assisted in the establishment of reformatories for young girls; supported increases in benefits for dependent children and widows; and she was an activist on behalf of New York **settlement houses**. In the emerging fields of social service and philanthropy, which were increasingly led by women, she was a leader in scientific man-



Josephine Shaw Lowell, from a crayon portrait by Samuel Worcester Rowse, 1869. Courtesy of Eon Images.

agement and information gathering. From 1876 to 1889 she served as the first woman commissioner on the New York State Board of Charities, the gateway agency for both the poor and reformers to access social services in the state.

Deeply concerned about the plight of workers, Lowell lobbied for maximum hour legislation, supported the **labor movement**, advocated extending the scope of public education, and sought ways to make government services more accessible to the needy public. She supported these endeavors while at the helm of the Consumer's League of the City of New York during the 1890s, an organization committed to the forging of alliances between **middle-** and working-class women. It also possessed an all-female governing body. At the same time Lowell also maintained that individuals had a responsibility to work toward **self-reliance** and practice industry, thrift, and virtue. For these reasons she generally opposed direct **poverty** relief and argued instead for institutional facilities that would assist only the most desperate in society: the orphaned, the mentally ill, and prisoners.

Lowell turned to other progressive political causes as well. She protested the United States' entry into the Spanish-American War, viewing it as a betrayal of American **democracy**, and joined both the New England Anti-Imperialist League and the New York Anti-Imperialist League. In 1904 the national Anti-Imperialist League, which evolved out of the New England organization, elected Lowell and

many other prominent suffragists to vice presidencies. She held this post until her death the following year.

Outspoken, innovative, determined to reach across the barriers of gender and class, and at times controversial for her remedies to the problems wrought by a rapidly changing industrial society, Lowell was one of the most significant philanthropists, social critics, and welfare reformers of the late nineteenth century.

Suggested Reading

William Rhinelander Stewart, ed., The Philanthropic Work of Josephine Shaw Lowell, Containing a Biographical Sketch of Her Life together with a Selection of Her Public Papers and Private Letters, 1911; Joan Waugh, Unsentimental Reformer: The Life of Josephine Shaw Lowell, 1998.

LOWELL FAMILY

RONALD DALE KARR

Aside from the **Adams** family, no **Boston Brahmins** have produced as many accomplished individuals as have the Lowells. The founder of the family, a Bristol merchant named Perceval Lowle, arrived in Newbury, Massachusetts, from England in 1639. Several generations later a descendant, the Reverend John Lowell (1704–67), son of a Boston merchant, was the pastor of a church in Newbury (later Newburyport). His son, John Lowell (1743–1802), first put the family on the map, and all prominent Lowells since have been his descendants.

John Lowell followed his father to Harvard and after graduation returned to his native town, where he became Newburyport's most successful lawyer. In 1776 Lowell relocated to Boston in the wake of the British evacuation. He was chosen state representative, constitutional convention delegate, and even represented the state in the Continental Congress, all the time amassing a fortune providing legal services to mercantile interests. First appointed a federal judge in 1782, he was later named to another federal post by George Washington.

Judge Lowell married three times, each time to a daughter of a prominent merchant. With his first wife Sarah Higginson (d. 1772) he had three children. The third John Lowell (1769–1840) followed his father into law, serving as a state representative and authoring propaganda for the Federalist Party. His son, John Amory Lowell (1798–1881), followed his half-uncle, Francis Cabot Lowell, into the textile business (he even married his half-uncle's daughter!) and served as a corporate executive and banker in Boston for more than fifty years. His two sons, John Lowell (1824–97) and Augustus Lowell (1830–1901), continued the family's successes. John was a prominent lawyer and judge, and Augustus, through his skillful management of the family's business interests, particularly in cotton manufacturing, vastly increased the family fortune.

Three of Augustus Lowell's children became public figures. As President of Harvard University from 1909 to 1933, Abbot Lawrence Lowell (1856–1943) oversaw the enormous growth of that institution, in the process becoming one of America's most respected educators. His brother Percival Lowell (1855–1916) became the

nation's best-known (and most controversial) astronomer, a tireless searcher for nonexistent Martian canals but also the founder of the Lowell Observatory in Arizona, which successfully discovered the planet Pluto in 1930, the existence of which he had predicted. Their sister, Amy Lowell (1874–1925), an acclaimed poet and critic, helped promote many newer writers, including Ezra Pound and Robert Frost.

Boston's best-known businessman and philanthropist in the postwar era was Ralph Lowell (1890–1978), a grandson of Augustus's brother, John. A banker, Ralph Lowell was the leader of "Vault," a **social network** of business leaders who largely shaped city policy, most notoriously urban renewal, in the 1950s and 1960s. He also directed Lowell funds into the establishment of WGBH, a public radio and television station that soon emerged as one of the nation's best.

Judge John Lowell's second wife, Susan Cabot (d. 1777) bore him a son, Francis Cabot Lowell (1775–1817), who became one of the pioneers of the American Industrial Revolution. A wealthy Boston merchant, he carefully observed the English textile industry and then, during the War of 1812, reinvested his mercantile wealth in cloth manufacturing. With the support of other merchant families he organized the Boston Manufacturing Company in 1813 and, using English technology, introduced the large-scale integrated production of cotton cloth at Waltham the following year. Lowell, Massachusetts, founded by his company five years after his premature death, was named in his honor. Francis Cabot Lowell's son, John Lowell (1799–1836), after a few years in managing textiles, spent the remainder of his short adult life traveling, dying in Bombay. He had directed that after his death \$250,000—a vast sum in those days—would go to a Lowell Institute, which would sponsor lectures aimed at raising the moral and educational standards of Massachusetts. The Institute has thrived over the years, supporting both the Harvard extension school and public television. John Lowell's nephew, Edward Jackson Lowell (1845–94), was a published historian and writer.

Through his third wife, the widow Rebecca (Russell) Tyng (d. 1816) Judge John Lowell fathered the Reverend Charles Lowell (1782–1861), a Boston minister. Three of Charles's children became published authors, most notably James Russell Lowell (1819–91), Harvard professor, editor of the *Atlantic Monthly* and the *North American Review*, prominent poet, and U.S. minister to Spain and Great Britain. His elder brother, the Reverend Robert Traill Spence Lowell (1816–91), an Episcopalian priest, was also a successful author. The latter's great-grandson, Robert Traill Spence Lowell IV (1917–77), better-known as Robert Lowell, was a renowned poet and anti-Vietnam War activist.

The deaths of Robert Lowell in 1977 and Ralph Lowell a year later brought to a close the long line of prominent Lowells. Lowell descendants through female lines have also included prominent individuals, such as the brothers McGeorge (1919–96) and William Bundy (1917–), architects of the Vietnam War under presidents Kennedy and Johnson and great-grandsons of Augustus Lowell.

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LOWELL MILLWORKERS

VICKY HILL

The Lowell millworkers were among the first industrial employees in the United States. While the owners of these cotton textile mills in Lowell, Massachusetts, tried to avoid creating a permanent American **working class** by hiring young women to staff their mills and by implementing paternalistic labor policies, those preventive measures were ultimately unsuccessful and may have unintentionally fostered the group solidarity that enabled the millworkers to stage some of America's first industrial labor strikes in the 1830s and 1840s.

In the post-Revolutionary era, Americans still imported the vast majority of their manufactured goods from England and were conflicted about the idea of developing large-scale manufacturing in their own country. Although they desired the economic freedom from England that domestic industry could provide, they were deeply concerned about potentially negative effects of wage labor. Many people agreed that the Jeffersonian ideal of a citizenry of independent yeoman farmers, beholden to no one else for their livelihoods, was the only way that democracy could work. Additionally they were horrified by the polluted industrial centers of England with their ill-fed and poorly educated laborers.

These fears of industrialization helped to shape the way manufacturing was developed in the United States. In 1826, in the wake of new developments in the mechanization of textile manufacturing, a group of Boston capitalists built and incorporated Lowell as a large industrial mill town and expanded production rapidly. In an attempt to avoid the **proletarianization** of wage laborers that had occurred in England, these mill owners employed young, single, native-born women, whom they assumed would only work temporarily until marriage. To reassure these women's parents about the morality of factory life, the owners developed a policy of corporate paternalism. The women were required to live in factory-owned, supervised boardinghouses, to be in by 10:00 P.M., to attend religious services regularly, and to abstain from alcohol. These policies not only helped the mill owners recruit a steady supply of labor from area farming families, they also facilitated management control over the workforce by keeping its members supervised, orderly, and sober.

To contemporary observers, the project initially seemed successful. Mill work offered young women higher wages than they could earn at other traditional female jobs, such as domestic service, and the paternalistic restrictions that seem so confining to modern sensibilities were probably very similar to the rules the millworkers had lived under at home. And although conditions in the mills were probably never as utopian as promoters claimed, visitors still marveled at the clean, orderly, semi-rural mill environment, evidence that American industry had avoided the ills of England.

But in the mid-1830s a slump in the textile market motivated mill owners to speed up production, lengthen workdays, and reduce wages. In February 1834 after a new reduction in piece wages was announced, more than 800 women walked out of the Lowell mills in one of the nation's first industrial **strikes**. The women framed their battle as a struggle for social equality and justice and referred to themselves

not as workers, but as "daughters of freemen," linking their cause to that of their "patriotic ancestors" in the American Revolution. The women were resisting what they perceived as a challenge to their social equality; they saw themselves, as daughters of freemen, as the social equals of the overseers. Wage cuts undermined this equality and implied a subordination that these women did not accept.

Though the 1834 strike was unsuccessful, it did establish a precedent for collective action, and in October 1836 the women struck again, this time to protest an increase in boardinghouse prices with no corresponding wage increase. Between 1,500 and 2,000 women left work this time, strategically stripping key departments of workers so that production slowed to a trickle. This time most of the mills conceded to the strikers' demands, and the boardinghouse price hikes were rescinded.

Many women workers at Lowell maintained their activism through the 1840s as they agitated for various labor reforms, but by the 1850s mill owners began to hire impoverished and desperate Irish immigrants who had fled the potato famine. These new employees were willing to work for lower wages than the native-born daughters had and were initially much less likely to protest working conditions or wages.

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Lower Class

ROBERT E. WEIR

Lower class is the designation on the social stratification scale to reference those in society with the least amount of **income**, wealth, **prestige**, **power**, **status**, and **cultural capital**. Exactly who is in the lower class depends upon how one chooses to parse class in America.

Some analysts forgo the term *lower class* in favor of terms such as **underclass**, thereby limiting membership to those living in **poverty**. **William Julius Wilson** is among the scholars who believe that the term *underclass* better describes the desperation of those at the bottom of American society and argues that the very structure of American society makes it nearly impossible for the underclass to rise. Historian Paul Fussell also avoids the term *lower class* and proposes a nine-tiered class system in which the poor would be distributed into categories such as "mid prole" (a variant of **proletarian**), "low prole," "destitute," and "out-of-sight," as marked by descending levels of deprivation. By contrast, the famed stratification model of **W. Lloyd Warner** clouds classification in a different fashion. Warner subdivided the lower class into higher lower and lower lower categories, reserving the latter for the poor and the desperate. The upper lower class, however, incorporated most of the members of the **working class**, as Warner reserved **middle class**

status for **white-collar** professionals and a very small percentage of specialized and highly paid **blue-collar** workers.

Most scholars agree that the **homeless**, **welfare** recipients, institutionalized individuals, and those living below the **poverty line** are members of the lower class, but the larger debate over **inequality measures** determines who else is situated within the lower class. If one uses median family income as a guide (\$46,326 in 2000) and divides income groups into quintiles, then families living on less than \$18,500 per year would probably be considered members of the lower class and the bottom 10 percent, who live on less than \$10,500, would certainly be considered lower class. The quintile method, however, does not take into account family size, geographic location, or other social factors that mediate relative poverty. These factors especially come into play with the **working poor**, a group that contains families who incur mounting debt to sustain the artifice of higher status.

Two other factors that make classification difficult are self-perception and popular culture appropriations of the term. *Lower class* carries negative connotations; hence studies using **subjective methods** of class placement reveal that very few individuals claim membership in it. Even those who are chronically **unemployed** or those living in squalor are more likely to call themselves members of the working class or middle class than to choose among alternatives such as poor, destitute, underclass, or lower class. Popular culture plays a big role in shaping self-perception. Magazines, films, and television often conflate social class with being "classy," that is, demonstrating taste, refinement, and respectability. Pejorative terms such as "white trash," "cracker," and "trailer trash" are freely employed as put-downs of Caucasians viewed as lacking "class," while racial slurs or phrases such as "ghetto boy," "wetback," and "Apu" are used to elide ethnic and social class insults.

However one configures the lower class, several unassailable facts hold. First, members of the lower class have reduced **life chances**. The lower class suffers high rates of such social problems as unemployment, criminality, chronic disease, alcoholism, drug addiction, domestic violence, and premature death. Second, the lower class ranks at the bottom of factors that confer success and status in American society: educational attainment, income, **property** ownership, occupational prestige, net worth, social involvement, and so on. Third, although the largest numbers of Americans in the lower class are Anglo whites, African Americans, **Hispanics**, and other minority groups are disproportionately represented. Fourth, the American lower class is largely unorganized and quiescent politically; indeed, it appears to be more fatalistic than the poor of many other nations.

Finally, attempts to shrink the lower class have met with mixed and limited success. Most economists agree that inequality is an unfortunate byproduct of **capitalism**, but also a natural one. Battles rage, however, over the degree to which inequality should be countenanced. A small number of conservatives hold modern-day **Social Darwinian** views, through which they would abandon the lower class to their own devices, but most conservatives hold that business deregulation is the best route for ensuring that **trickle-down** economics will create opportunities for **self-reliance**. Liberals counter that it is incumbent upon government and communities to combat inequality in an interventionist fashion. Such famed government-directed initiatives such as **New Deal** and the **Great Society** have sought to alleviate poverty

and close the gap between social classes. Although millions have been aided by such efforts, government programs have not eliminated the lower class, and poverty levels have remained stagnant since the 1970s. Twenty-first-century Americans continue to debate whether the lack of progress over shrinking the lower class represents a natural condition that cannot be altered, or a correctable problem in search of a solution.

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LUXURY GOODS

MICHELLE DAGNINO

Luxury goods, such as expensive cars, designer handbags, and diamond watches, are goods for which demand is supposed to rise as one's income rises. As people become wealthier they buy more luxury goods, although eventually the relative value of those items changes as income rises. While a \$2,000 Louis Vuitton purse would be an extravagant expense for any average person, for someone who makes \$20 million a year it would be very inexpensive. As one's income increases so does the ability to buy luxury goods, and the extravagance of these goods can grow exponentially, such as transitioning from collecting cars to collecting airplanes.

Luxury goods carry with them a **status** of importance and **wealth**. Many people buy luxury goods, although they may not be able to easily afford them, because they signify that one has achieved a level of success and material comfort that is unattainable to the majority of the population. Luxury vehicles are one such type of good that carry heavy judgments about wealth and class status. Sometimes certain products are classified as "luxury items" even though they do not meet the requirements to be called luxury items, such as the automobile manufacturer Hummer. A Hummer automobile is considered a **status symbol** even though none of the vehicles in the Hummer line meet the technical requirements to be classified as a "luxury" car. But because of their extraordinary expense, Hummers are a status symbol of wealth and grandiose aspirations since the upkeep of such a car can be costly on a monthly basis.

A recent change in consumer demographics has created a great deal of opportunity for luxury brands in the marketplace. Brands like Starbucks, Lexus and BMW, Williams-Sonoma, Restoration Hardware, Victoria's Secret, Coach, Panera Bread, and Callaway have all taken the consumer's desire to have the best of even the smallest of items—for example a cup of coffee—and make the process of consumption seem an exclusive endeavor. People will economize on necessities such as groceries in

order to buy an \$800 pair of designer shoes. The lure of many luxury goods lies in their association with class and "taste" rather than with utility. Conceptions of luxury items versus items that are necessities have changed over the years, particularly since the mass availability of credit has made luxury (or at least the appearance of luxury) available to all. As such, for many people, designer goods have become a need rather than a want.

Entire communities have been built around luxury buying, such as Rodeo Drive in Beverly Hills and **Fifth Avenue** in Manhattan. These streets, which have at times been referred to as "cathedrals of consumption" for the religious fervor they inspire in their buyers—men and women who can spend in a day what the average American makes in a year—are lined with stores such as Chanel, Dior, Escada, Prada, Gucci, Cartier, Van Cleef & Arpels, and Rolex, all of which carry accessories that run to tens of thousands of dollars and clothes and jewelry that can cost up to hundreds of thousands of dollars. Since these stores are frequented by the rich and famous, for those who aspire to the same glamour and success, buying the luxury goods worn by celebrities and the wealthy allows people to emulate a lifestyle that is largely unattainable for the average American. As such luxury goods are often items of **conspicuous consumption**.

Suggested Reading

Pamela Danziger, Let Them Eat Cake: Marketing Luxury to the Masses—As well as the Classes, 2004; Michael J. Silverstein, Neil Fiske, John Butman, Trading Up: Why Consumers Want New Luxury Goods... and How Companies Create Them, 2003; James B. Twitchell, Living It Up: America's Love Affair with Luxury, 2002.

LYND, ROBERT STAUGHTON (September 26, 1892–November 1, 1970) and **HELEN** (March 17, 1896–January 30, 1982)

ROBERT E. WEIR

Robert Staughton Lynd and Helen Merrell Lynd were prominent American sociologists whose *Middletown* studies published in 1929 and 1937 are considered models of social survey research.

Robert Lynd was born in New Albany, Indiana, and grew up in Louisville, Kentucky, amidst **middle-class** comfort. His father, a banker, was able to send Robert to Princeton, from which he graduated in 1914. He worked an assistant editor for *Publishers Weekly* before serving in a noncombat role during World War I. Lynd entered Union Theological Seminary in 1920, intending to pursue a career as a Unitarian minister. While doing missionary work in Montana during 1921 and 1922 he became aware of social class but wrote of his experiences there with the same detachment he would later bring to his first book. In 1921 he married Helen Merrell, with whom he had two children. Lynd eventually obtained a PhD from Columbia and joined the sociology faculty there in 1931, after an administrative stint at New York City's Social Science Research Council. He remained at Columbia until 1960.

Helen Merrell was born into a strict Congregationalist home in La Grange, Illinois, though her family's financial circumstances were less secure than those of her future husband. She graduated from Wellesley College in 1919, rejected her parents' religious parochialism, and—under the tutelage of Mary Chase—became interested in philosophy and social justice, the latter a carryover also from her parents' disapproval of racism and elitism. She went on to obtain an MA and PhD from Columbia. She taught social philosophy at Sarah Lawrence College from 1928 to 1965.

The Lynds are best known for their two studies of Muncie, Indiana. *Middletown*, published in 1929, was a bestseller and is considered a sociological classic, though it followed a circuitous route to fame. **Capitalists** such as John **Rockefeller** were distressed by labor violence and touted the advancement of religion as a possible means of social control. In 1922 Robert was sponsored by the Committee on Social and Religious Surveys (CSRS) to do research on religious attitudes. He and Helen selected Muncie, Indiana, largely because its small size (roughly 38,000) lent itself to extensive study not, as popular myth would have it, because they felt it was in any way "typical."

The Lynds quickly realized that it made little sense to study religion out of its greater social context and launched a community study that measured social change in Muncie from 1890 to 1923. They were among the first researchers to apply methods common to cultural anthropologists in an American context, but their sprawling findings were dubbed as unusable by the CSRS. Luckily the Lynds were encouraged to submit the work to Harcourt, Brace, and in 1929 *Middletown: A Study in Modern American Culture* was published.

The work was divided into six parts: "Getting a Living," "Making a Home," "Training the Young," Using Leisure," "Engaging in Religious Practice," and "Engaging in Community Activities." It revealed a community in transformation as the material promises of the **Industrial Revolution** filtered down to the **masses**. Rendered in a neutral tone, the Lynds portrayed Muncie families as willing to work hard to obtain homes and purchase status symbols of modernism such as automobiles, refrigerators, and movie tickets. Although they showed that Muncie families retained an interest in religion, were deeply patriotic, and that 90 percent of children lived in two-parent nuclear families, they also portrayed a community deeply riven by social class. The working class and middle class had such divergent values, cultural tastes, and lifestyles that the book's few critics charged that the Lynds exaggerated. One difference noted by the Lynds was an overall decline in civic involvement among workers and the erosion of importance in class institutions such as the labor movement. Many families seemed far more fixated on purchasing appliances, obtaining indoor plumbing, and going to movies; one financially stretched woman even told the Lynds that she would prefer to go without food rather than give up her car. They also noted that Sundays were devoted increasingly to recreation rather than religion.

During the **Great Depression** Robert returned to Muncie without Helen, though she helped him write *Middletown in Transition* (1937). Robert had expected to find anger, pessimism, and political fervor after six years of economic deprivation, but his interviews instead revealed patience, optimism, and a lack of revolutionary zeal, despite rising **poverty** rates and an overall increase in social problems. He

also noted the inordinate amount of social and financial power wielded by the Republican Party and the Ball family, canning supplies magnates who later endowed Ball State University. The tone of this work was more political, with a mild **Marxist** tinge. Robert's final book, *Knowledge for What?* (1939) attacked the very fact gathering of his first two books and endorsed activism as a path to social change. Both Lynds were investigated by the FBI for possible subversive activity, though neither was an ideologue or a revolutionary.

Helen had a more prolific scholarly career than Robert. In 1945 she published a book on the history and political thought of England in the 1880s as well as *Field Work in College Education*, which endorsed the off-campus studies conducted by college students. She also grew alarmed that the devotion to conformity she and Robert noted in their first Middletown study was spreading in the 1950s. She critiqued this in *On Shame and the Search for Identity* (1958). She found herself accused of being a **communist** during the post–World War II **Red Scare** but battled her accusers and was an outspoken critic of McCarthyism. One of the Lynds' children, Staughton (1929–) took up the radical mantle as a civil rights activist, opponent of the Vietnam War, **New Left** thinker, and labor advocate.

Robert and Helen Lynd remain best known for the two *Middletown* studies. In 1977 Theodore Caplow, who took Robert's position at Columbia and was his former student, returned to Muncie, and he and several colleagues eventually published *All Faithful People: Change and Continuity in Middletown's Religion* (1983). This and *Middletown Families: Fifty Years of Change and Continuity* (1985) showed an increase in religious attendance in Muncie since the Lynds' study but a decline in awareness of social class. Caplow also headed a 1999 study, dubbed *Middletown IV*, which confirmed the trend toward more interest in religion, detected an increase in time spent between children and parents, but also noted that just 52 percent of Muncie children lived with both their birth mother and birth father.

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MAGAZINES

MICHELLE DAGNINO

Despite widespread reports that newspaper and magazine readership is declining, 1,006 new magazines hit newsstands in 2004. Increasing numbers of them are aimed at specific niche markets.

To some extent, magazine readership has long broken down along social class lines. In the nineteenth century, for example, women of the upper **middle class** read *Godey's Lady's Book* and *Harper's Bazaar* to enjoy poetry and short fiction, become aware of new trends in art, and apprise themselves of latest **fashions**. Intellectuals among the **upper class** often preferred literary magazines such as *The North American Review* or *Atlantic Monthly*. By contrast, members of the English-speaking **working class** often preferred less expensive and racier pulp journals such as *The National Police Gazette* or pastime publications such as *The Sporting News*. Middle-brow tastes were met by magazines such as *Popular Science*, *Scribner's*, and *Collier's Weekly*, the latter two of which became known for their **muckraking** investigative pieces in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

By the twentieth century, magazines were clearly aimed at specific classes. *Town and Country* catered (and still does cater) to the upper class, the **nouveau riche**, **socialites**, and the affluent. The middle class continued to consume *Scribner's* and *Collier's*, as well as *Harper's* and *McClure's*, and publications such as *Redbook*, *Ladies' Home Journal*, and *McCall's* targeted middle-class women. Workers often preferred journals with a particular ideological bent, such as *The Masses*, or those more germane to their lifestyles such as *Popular Mechanics*. Arguably the most popular reading in many pre–World War II homes was the Sears, Roebuck catalog.

The advent of easily reproducible photography led to an expansion of mass-market magazines whose golden age was, roughly, the mid-1930s to the early 1970s. Photo-based magazines such as *Click*, *Life*, and *Look* entered the American mainstream along with magazines featuring light fiction and illustrations, such as *The Saturday Evening Post*, and those creating fantasy images, such as the numerous

Hollywood fan magazines (the latter were the progenitors of such current massculture celebrity-based magazines as *People* and *Us*). Publications such as *House* Beautiful and Glamour were aimed at middle-class women, but sought crossover readers from the working class. Among the latter group, Readers' Digest has captured a wide swath of readers since it began publication in 1922. It is often claimed that only TV Guide—which debuted in 1953—had a higher readership in the second half of the twentieth century. Overall, though, middlebrow mass-market publications have declined; **Oprah Winfrey**'s O, The Oprah Magazine is a rare example of a recent startup with a large audience from across social classes. The Oprah Magazine and other magazines such as Simple or Martha Stewart's Living are referred to as lifestyle magazines because they sell us on the idea of a very particular conception of what our lives should be like—affluent, spiritually fulfilled, organized, socially conscious, and above all, consumerist. These magazines are regularly devoted to topics such as organizing your closet, homemade guacamole, and financial planning all in one issue—subtly selling the idea that if we followed the credo of the magazine, then we too could be just like Martha Stewart or Oprah Winfrey.

Juliet Schor is among those scholars who argue that modern magazines function largely to sell the very idea of **consumerism** to the masses. By the latter half of the twentieth century, numerous magazines advanced the idea (though not the reality) of a glamorous lifestyle based on materialism. *Playboy Magazine* sold sex, but also promoted upper-end consumer electronics, automobiles, and **luxury goods**, a model imitated in slightly less risqué form by *Esquire*, *Vanity Fair*, and *Vogue*.

By the end of the twentieth century, many magazines flaunted ideals of wealth and luxury, and so-called lifestyle magazines proliferated. Typical in this regard is GQ (Gentlemen's Quarterly), a monthly magazine that focuses on men's fashion and style. The term "GQ" is now an adjective synonymous with classic cool and sophistication. GQ features articles on celebrities, technology, books, music, and sex. It is aimed at an older, more affluent audience than other "men's magazines" such as Maxim or FHM. The magazine, launched in 1933 by Esquire, primarily attracted a gay readership in its early years. In 1983 editor Art Cooper introduced a broader variety of articles on topics from cooking to cars and reached out to a broader readership, eventually establishing GQ as a general men's magazine. Many of the world's most popular celebrities have graced the cover of GQ, and it is closely associated with a wealthy, well-dressed, well-educated type of male.

GQ is typical of the way lifestyle magazines now focus on luxury, celebrity, novelty, and manufactured images of chic. Magazines such as Cargo, Domino, Lucky, and Shop Etc. exist solely to advise consumers on what to buy, whereas those such as Cigar Aficionado, Bon Appetite, Gotham, and New England Home make little attempt to disguise their pitch toward conspicuous consumption.

The publications just mentioned are aimed at those who have disposable income or who are willing to take on debt to indulge themselves. As such, these magazines are not mass-appeal publications. They are among those magazines whose readership generally corresponds with **socioeconomic status** (SES). Other publications that cater to the affluent include *Forbes'*, *Fortune Magazine*, *Gourmet*, *Town and Country*, and *Travel and Leisure*. Surveys also report that subscribers to such vaunted publications as *National Geographic*, *Smithsonian Magazine*, and *The New Yorker* tend to have substantially higher than average incomes.

Suggested Reading

Pamela Danzinger, Let Them Eat Cake: Marketing Luxury to the Masses—As Well as the Classes, 2005; Anna Gough-Yates, Understanding Women's Magazines: Publishing, Markets and Readership, 2003; Peter Jackson, Nick Stevenson, and Kate Brooks, Making Sense of Men's Magazines, 2001.

MALDISTRIBUTION OF **W**EALTH

GERALD FRIEDMAN

The term *maldistribution of wealth* refers to a dispersal of wealth in which some have more than is *fair*. In the United States, most wealth is owned by a relatively small share of the population. Members of the Forbes 400, a listing of the country's wealthiest **upper-class** individuals, all possessing more than \$600 million, own nearly a \$1 trillion, or nearly 5 percent of the country's total wealth. Including other members of the wealthiest 1/2 of 1 percent of the population, or about 1.5 million people, the richest Americans own over a quarter of the United States, and the richest 10 percent of Americans own nearly 70 percent of the country. The poorest 40 percent of Americans, by contrast, own virtually nothing; their debts nearly equal their assets. Nonwhite Americans have substantially less wealth than white Americans. Half of all white Americans have money, assets, and property worth over \$120,000, but black Americans average only \$17,000.

The best way to have a large fortune is to inherit it. Nearly a third of the fortunes on the Forbes 400 belong to individuals born into **middle class** or even poor families. A majority, however, began with a large head start. Familiar names such as **Rockefeller**, Getty, Bass, and du Pont—as well as descendants from founders of the next generation of retail fortunes, such as **Wal-Mart** and The Gap—inherited their way onto the Forbes list. The key to great wealth in America still has more to do with what your father did for a living than your intelligence, energy, or level of education. Over half the wealth on the list, \$300 billion, belongs to individuals who started their work life with at least \$50 million and, now, average \$1.6 billion.

In addition to inheritance, great differences in wealth reflect differences in annual **income**. The wealthiest 20 percent of Americans, with annual incomes of over \$98,000, enjoy almost half of all income received by Americans, ten times the share received by the poorest 20 percent, whose income is less than \$24,000. The richest 1 percent of Americans has more income than the poorest 40 percent. Blacks and women are disproportionately found in the bottom part of the income distribution because they are among the wealth-poor Americans. Black men earn 30 percent less than white men; and white women earn 40 percent less. The poorest Americans are in households with a mother and her children but no father present. Female-headed **one-parent** households have an income of less than half that of households in which a male is present.

Philosophers have condemned wide disparities in wealth and income and have recommended that a fair society have an egalitarian distribution. Because the pleasure people take from additional income declines with their income, an additional dollar brings less pleasure to a rich person than to a poor person, and one might increase a society's total well-being by redistributing income from rich to poor. The American philosopher John Rawls suggested that if people were unaware of which social class they would be in, they would choose a very even distribution of income; to minimize the risk that they would be very poor, they would forsake the chance to be very rich.

Responding to these ideas, many countries reduce income disparities with government redistributive programs, such as progressive taxation and the provision of social insurance. In comparison with other affluent democracies, these are all limited in the United States, where the **life chances** of the poor are relatively limited. Great disparities in wealth and income challenge our democratic society's commitment to an egalitarian social order. "This mixture of equality and inequality," the economist Arthur Okun charged, "sometimes smacks of inconsistency and even insincerity." For his part, Okun defended unequal rewards as necessary for an efficient economy because they give workers incentives to work hard. But the need for work incentives can hardly justify allowing huge differences in inherited wealth or in allowing some, such as white men, to have incomes inflated by institutional discrimination against other groups. Okun, furthermore, underestimated the costs of the use of incentives and social inequality, including the costs of enforcing property rights, the spread of communicable disease, and the decay of cooperation where there are wide disparities in living standards. These negative effects may explain why, contrary to Okun, in different countries and regions, rising inequality is associated with lower productivity and living standards.

Suggested Reading

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MAN IN THE GRAY FLANNEL SUIT, THE

ROBERT E. WEIR

The Man in the Gray Flannel Suit is the name of a 1955 novel authored by Sloan Wilson (1920–2003). In 1956 it was made into a Hollywood film starring Gregory Peck and directed by Nunnally Johnson. Many scholars see *The Man in the Gray Flannel Suit* as a novel that captured the zeitgeist of the conformity, hope, and disappointment of white **middle-class** society in the 1950s.

The book follows the plight of Thomas and Betsey Rath, a young married couple with three children living in Westport, Connecticut. Thomas Rath, a former GI scarred by war memories, works in a soul-deadening public relations job for United Broadcasting Corporation president Ralph Hopkins. His duty is to write self-serving speeches on health and education for Hopkins, a character based on Wilson's former boss, Time Inc. executive Roy Larsen. Every day, Rath leaves his

cookie-cutter home in **suburbia** and commutes to Rockefeller Center, then reversing the trip after a long workday. The gray flannel suit Rath wears symbolizes playit-safe conformity and the slow death of the **American dream**. Rath worries constantly about money, and he and his family cannot help but notice that their home, car, and possessions are adequate but mildly shabby. They worry that they are not keeping up with their neighbors, who, in turn, share their **status** anxiety. Many of the adult characters in the book abuse alcohol.

Many readers ignore (or downplay) the book's redemption-through-family themes and focus on the ways in which the book symbolizes the trends and strains of post–World War II America. The Raths, like many middle-class families, have been seduced by **consumerism**, and they measure their worth by materialist standards. They also internalize much of their dissatisfaction, hold outwardly trustful views of **authority** figures, and battle a host of personal and generalized neuroses. Like many suburban marriages, that of the Raths is marked by a lack of communication. *The Man in the Gray Flannel Suit* is often invoked by critics of postwar pressures for conformity, the dullness of life in **Levittown**-like suburbs, and the hollowness of middle-class value systems. Other novelists—including John Cheever, Jean Kerr, Grace Metalious, and Max Schulman—also explored these themes.

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Loren Baritz, The Good Life: The Meaning of Success for the American Middle Class, 1982; Kenneth Jackson, The Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States, 1985; Sloan Wilson, The Man in the Gray Flannel Suit, 1955.

MANAGERIAL CLASS

ROBERT E. WEIR

The managerial class is the group within society that administers and controls important state and economic functions. It consists of salaried workers and is generally viewed as a sector of the **middle class**. It is sometimes called the "New Class."

Defining social class is difficult and contentious, though scholars generally agree that the classic **Marxist** take on class is reductionist. Marx argued that one's social class was defined by the relationship to the **means of production**. In his scenario, ownership conferred **power** on the **bourgeoisie** at the expense of an exploited **proletariat**. He did not take into account the complicated relationship that would emerge between those who owned the means of production and those who managed them.

Discussion of the role of an intermediate managerial class began in earnest with the publication of John Burnham's *Managerial Revolution* in 1941. Burnham's provocative work dismissed the future of both conventional **capitalism** and revolutionary **socialism**. He also dismissed **democracy**, an empowered **working class**, and an all-controlling **upper class**. Instead, Burnham looked at those who actually ran society and its institutions. He argued that the people who owned businesses,

capital goods, and other resources had ceded the running of their enterprises to managers, bureaucrats, engineers, attorneys, researchers, and other professionals. This group's expertise is necessary, and without it, neither customary **elites** nor the **nouveau riche** could long survive. In effect, this middle level of managers and technocrats possess great **power**, though they do not own the means of production and do not command the greatest degree of **wealth**.

Burnham's ideas were revived in 1977 by John and **Barbara Ehrenreich**, who noted that the **New Left** did not comprise workers, the poor, or people of color, the groups that had the most at stake in changing society. Rather, the New Left was dominated by intellectuals and members of the middle class. The Ehrenreichs argued that this "professional-managerial class" represented a new force for social change if the socialist ideology present within it could tap into working-class anger.

That hope, to date, has proved naïve. Instead, the managerial class has used its education, expertise, and **social networks** as **status** markers. In general, the managerial class has shown more interest in advancing its own position than in altering the status quo. **Nicos Poulantzas** argued that this group, more than any other, is marked by **contradictory class location**, a condition that blunts its self-awareness and consciousness.

Not all observers agree that a managerial class exists, and even those who accept its existence argue over its importance. Some critics assert that the term merely describes the economic functions of some individuals and that there is little evidence of **class consciousness**. Moreover, the tasks these individuals perform and the various professions represented are more dissimilar than alike. Still another line of reasoning takes its cue from **Max Weber**'s classic study of bureaucracy and argues that complex societies demand equally complex organizations with specialized functions. In this regard, organizations are not dependent on any single individual or group of individuals; bureaucracy defines and assigns tasks, not the people performing them.

Those who posit the existence of a managerial class usually take one of three views. The most optimistic reading sees the managerial class as the product of American **meritocracy**, proof that expertise is key in upward **social mobility**. Some even see this group as important to the maintenance of a **pluralist** society that prevents dangerous concentrations of power by any one group.

This view is dismissed by both some conservatives and many liberals and radicals. Conservatives such as William F. Buckley bemoan the loss of control implicit in a managerial class. In his view, such arrangements limit the power of stockholders to control corporations and decrease potential public oversight of organizations. Some **critical elite theorists** see the emergence of the managerial class as antithetical to top-down power structures that they believe are in society's best interests. Many on the political left dismiss the idea that the managerial class has independent existence and see the members of this class as servants of the **corporate class**. A few, however, retain the original optimism of the Ehrenreichs.

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Professional-Managerial Class," *Radical America*, 11 (March–April 1977), pp. 7–31 (Part 1), (May–June 1977), pp. 7–22 (Part 2); Nicos Poulantzas, *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism*, 1978.

MAOISM

ROBERT E. WEIR

Maoism is a revolutionary ideology derived from the teachings of Mao Zedong, the leader of China's communist takeover in 1949. It is a variant of **Marxist**-Leninist thought.

Karl Marx postulated that an urban **proletariat** would be the backbone of a revolutionary movement. In Russia, Vladimir Lenin, the architect of the 1917 Bolshevik revolution, modified Marx to argue that the **Communist Party** was the vanguard of a **working-class** upheaval and would provide the organizational and ideological support necessary to bring unity to disconnected and dispirited worker groups. China, however, lacked the industrial proletariat articulated by Marx or the urban networks described by Lenin. Mao Zedong saw the rural peasantry as the locus of power, not urban workers. Mao argued that revolution resulted in three steps: mobilizing the peasantry, creating a rural base that could coordinate various guerilla movements, and enacting a final conventional warfare movement that would overturn **capitalism** and lingering rural feudalism.

Mao's other major contribution to communist thought was the notion of ongoing **class struggle** until communism was finally established. Older strains of Marxist thought called for capitalism to be overthrown and for an intermediary state-coordinated **socialist** economy to emerge to transition society to communism, at which point the state would wither away. Class struggle, however, was to end with the destruction of the **bourgeoisie** because worker representatives would direct socialism. Mao was dubious of this and felt that the vestiges of capitalism would be inherent in socialism as well, and thus vigilance and ongoing class struggle were necessary.

Maoism had limited appeal in the United States until the late 1960s. By then, Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and other New Left groups had begun to fracture. SDS split into several groups, and debate raged over how to view the Progressive Labor Party (PLP), an offshoot of the Communist Party USA (CPUSA), which separated from the CP in disgust over the bureaucratic and state capitalist tendencies of the Soviet Union. The PLP and SDS merged in 1964, but in 1969 several SDS splinter groups grew angry over the PLP's denunciation of the Black Panther movement and its criticism of decisions made by South Vietnam's Vietcong guerillas. From this debate came the formation of the Revolutionary Youth Movement (RYM), a group espousing Maoism. It eventually called itself the Revolutionary Youth Movement II.

The RYM also disputed the PLP's internationalism. The PLP argued that nationalist movements tended to work against the notion of Marx's famed "workers of the world unite" dictum. This criticism did not sit well with the RYM, which admired Maoist China. For a time, the RYM envisioned itself as the conduit for



Poster claiming the Revolutionary Communist Party and its chairman, Bob Avakian, were the targets of the "most vicious attack" by the government since the 1960s. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

exporting Maoist ideology and revolution, much as some Old Left groups represented the interests of the Soviet Union. Like other Marxist-Leninist groups, RYM leaders saw themselves as revolutionary vanguards.

The RYM II itself split, and its diehard Maoist faction combined with another group founded in California's Bay area. In 1975 the Revolutionary Communist Party USA (RCP) was formed and is currently the major Maoist group within the United States. It was the brainchild of Robert Avakian, who still coordinates much of the RCP's program, though he has lived in exile since the 1980s. The RCP has engaged in provocative, though hardly revolutionary, activities. It burned an American flag at the 1984 Republican convention, an act that led to a Supreme Court ruling that flag desecration is an act of free speech, a decision that continues to outrage conservatives. More recently, the RCP has taken part in protests against the World Trade Organization and against U.S. wars in Iraq. It also released statements calling President George W. Bush a "Christian fascist."

The RCP is opposed by other Maoist groups, many of whom accuse "Chairman" Avakian of setting up a cult of personality akin to Mao's own. Combined, however, Maoist groups have more critics than members. Much as the CPUSA has struggled with the legacy of repressive Stalinism, so too have Maoist

groups struggled to remove the stigma of China's Cultural Revolution (1968–76), a upheaval that led to massive loss of life and suppression of liberty in the name of rooting out counterrevolutionary ideals. This situation posed a fundamental crisis for American Maoists because the Cultural Revolution often attacked the very group that forms the core of U.S. Maoist groups: intellectuals. In addition, it has proved difficult to argue that the Chinese Red Army is a peasant army or that China's flirtation with the free market economy—sometimes called "New Democracy"—is a transitional stage between capitalism and socialism. Ironically, the PLP remains more "purist" in its Marxism than most American Maoists. At present, American Maoism has a following in some university towns, but is mostly a fringe movement.

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MARCANTONIO, VITO (December 10, 1902–August 9, 1954)

ROBERT E. WEIR

Vito Marcantonio was a seven-term Congressman from **Harlem** and is considered one of the most radical members to have sat in the U.S. House of Representatives. He was the target of **McCarthyism** and was accused of being a communist, but to his constituents, he was a champion of the **working class**, minority groups, and the poor.

Marcantonio was born in New York City to Italian **immigrant** parents. Despite family **poverty**, Marcantonio graduated from New York University in 1925 and passed the bar exam in 1926. He worked as a lawyer, immersed himself in Republican Party politics, and served as an assistant U.S. district attorney in 1930 and 1931. He was elected to Congress as a Republican in 1934, though his emerging leftwing politics and his unabashed support for **Franklin D. Roosevelt** and the **New Deal** made him an uncomfortable fit within the GOP. He lost his seat in 1938, left the Republican Party, and joined the American Labor Party (ALP), a New York State political party formed in 1936. The ALP supported the **labor movement**, and most of its members were **socialists**, though the party often supported candidates of other parties they felt were sympathetic to workers. In that spirit, the ALP supported Roosevelt for reelection in 1936, 1940, and 1944.

In 1938 Marcantonio ran for Congress on the ALP ticket and won a seat from a Harlem district whose residents were a mix of southern European immigrants, Puerto Ricans, and African Americans. Marcantonio was an ardent supporter both of civil rights and of Puerto Rican self-determination. These positions and his outspoken calls for **unemployment** relief made him popular among his constituents, who reelected Marcantonio five times.

When World War II broke out, Marcantonio lobbied on behalf of the American Committee for Russian War Relief and urged the U.S. government to open a second front in Europe to relieve German pressure on the Soviet Union. His support for the USSR proved problematic after the war. The ALP had close ties with both the Communist Party and the Socialist Party, and Marcantonio personally defended African American radicals W. E. B. Du Bois and Paul Robeson, both of whom would be investigated for Communist Party activities in the 1950s.

In the post–World War II **Red Scare**, Marcantonio was a vociferous critic of the bullying tactics and Red-baiting of Senator Joseph McCarthy. Marcantonio was considered so radical that, in 1950, the Republican Party, the Liberal Party, and the Democrats agreed on a fusion candidate, James Donovan, who defeated Marcantonio. He returned to practicing law and took on several cases of clients battling the House Un-American Activities Committee. In 1954 he had just begun a campaign to reclaim his seat in Congress when he died of a massive heart attack after stepping off a subway train. More than 20,000 New Yorkers attended his funeral.

The ALP did not long survive Marcantonio, its only elected congressman (the ALP's Leo Isacson won a special election in 1948, but lost in the general election and served in Congress just several months). The ALP's support for Henry Wallace's mercurial Progressive Party campaign against incumbent Harry Truman cost the ALP its Democratic allies, and its association with socialists and communists

made it the target of repression. The ALP did so poorly in subsequent elections that it lost official party status and, in 1956, disbanded.

Vito Marcantonio was one of the few third-party candidates to win election to the U.S. Congress during the twentieth century, and his unapologetic left-wing politics made him especially unusual. Although some members of Congress have had friendly relations with the Democratic Socialists of America, there were no more independent socialists elected to Congress until 1991, when **Bernard Sanders** was elected as Vermont's sole representative.

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MARRIAGE

CHRISTINE W. HEILMAN

Marriage is a legal union between two adult partners that is sanctioned by the state. Partners must purchase a marriage license from the state in order to marry, and they often must submit to a blood test for health reasons. Often, the partners choose to have a religious ceremony and a celebration with family and friends to mark the beginning of the marriage, but the ceremony can be performed by a judge. Although marriage is romanticized in American popular culture, roughly half of all marriages end in divorce in the United States.

Marriage for those in the **working** and lower **middle classes** is strongly linked to economics. In contrast to cultural practices during the period after World War II, when early marriage and low divorce levels were the norm, the majority of marriages and remarriages today begin as cohabitation, which is considered the modal path to marriage. However, marriage decisions after cohabitation are often based on economic factors, including earnings, occupation, or educational attainment of the partner, and failure to meet financial goals may keep the partners from marrying. When cohabitation ends, the economic effect on women is devastating, leaving a substantial portion of the women in **poverty**, particularly African American and Hispanic women.

Although big weddings are very expensive and often beyond their reach, many cohabiting men and women in the working class and lower middle class do not want to settle for a marriage ceremony performed by a judge in a downtown courthouse. The financial goals for those of a lower **socioeconomic status** (SES) may include saving money for a big wedding that the partners will pay for themselves or obtaining educational credentials such as a GED (General Educational Development) diploma.

Also, some working-class and lower-middle-class women believe it is the male partner's responsibility to support the family. However, in 1999 the U.S. Census Bureau reported that the median income for families in which only the husband worked was \$37,616, whereas the median income for families in which both spouses worked was \$63,751. The economic reality is that most married women with young

children will be in the workforce. In 1950 only one in three women participated in the labor force, whereas in 1998 three in five women participated in the labor force. The participation of women is expected to increase more rapidly than that of men by the year 2008, by which time women will make up 48 percent of the labor force. In addition, young women with children have increasingly become part of the labor force; in fact, between 1960 and 1987, the participation rate of women twenty-five to thirty-four years of age doubled. The conflict that young mothers working outside the home encounter comes from the patriarchal tradition, which holds that the public domain belongs to men, whereas wives and their services belong to husbands, who expect that family life will be the responsibility of women. Only job flexibility makes it possible for women with small children to work. In addition, the cost of day care must be factored into their working lives.

Entering the labor force is primarily determined by three factors: the level of any non-labor income available to women, the age of children in the home, and **education**. Also, women who are married are less likely to work outside the home than single, separated, or divorced women, although the Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that more than 60 percent of married women with children under the age of six also work outside the home. Among both male and female workers, employment opportunities and pay scales are generally affected by education. More educated women can earn more in the workforce, and they are more likely to be in the workforce in better-paid, more prestigious jobs, possibly because of self-selection resulting from the motivation for career orientation.

Working-class women are less likely to attend college, and they often feel pressure from their mothers to marry up in social class, though this is unlikely. Just as people of higher socioeconomic status have greater access to higher education, so too partners from the same economic class tend to marry each other instead of someone from a different social class. **Wealth** accumulation varies by gender and family type, which affects the pressure on singles to marry, particularly single women. There are significant differences in the wealth between households headed by single females and households led by married couples. In addition, single women's wealth accumulation is substantially lower than that of single men. Overall, women's education and career plans are significantly related to the balance of power in the relationship with a significant other.

The issue of women and economics in marriage was addressed by **Charlotte Perkins Gilman** in *Women and Economics* (1898). She argued that middle-class women had been made more feminine and less human by their financial dependence on men. She advocated for an equal economic partnership, which would address the inequalities and social behavior of both sexes. Alas, many aspects of Gilman's work remain relevant.

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MARXISM/MARXISTS

CHUCK BARONE

The Marxist view of class defines class in terms of hierarchical power relationships within the structure of production. This view is in contrast to those who view class in gradational terms based on **income** or **status** hierarchies or relational theories that focus on the technical division of labor.

The contemporary Marxist view of class is based on the nineteenth-century ideas of Karl Marx, who viewed class in terms of antagonistic relations of domination and exploitation. Marx viewed history as a series of different modes of production (economic systems), each with their own particular exploitative social relations of production. It was these social relationships that defined the class structures of society in Marx's view. In the capitalist mode of production, Marx identified two primary classes, the **bourgeoisie** (capitalist class) who owned the **means of production** (capital goods) and the proletariat, or **working class**, who possessed only their labor power. The dominant position of the capitalists allowed them to exploit subordinate workers, which in Marx's view generated conflict and class struggle. Class conflict and struggle play important roles in Marx's historical materialism theory of the evolution of human societies, which he saw as a series of stages from slavery to feudalism to **capitalism**, each with their own exploitative class structures. Each successive mode of production allowed for greater advancement of the forces of production, but each was limited by the existing social relations of production that made up class structures. Marx predicted that eventually, class conflict and struggle over the contradictions of capitalism would lead to state-directed socialism and then communism, wherein classes and class domination would no longer exist.

Subsequent Marxist scholars have developed a theoretical analysis that, although faithful to Marx, captures much more of the complexity of the class structures of advanced capitalist societies. These scholars began by noting significant groups of people who occupied **contradictory class locations** between the bourgeoisie and proletariat and who were neither one nor the other. The result was the identification of a **middle class** of small business owners who own their own means of production, but do not rely significantly on **wage** labor. Although Marx noted the existence of what he called the **petty bourgeoisie**, this class was not well integrated into his overall theory of the capitalist class structures. Marxist scholars note that although this class occupies an important position, it is not one that plays a significant role relative to labor, and its interests are usually subordinate to the interests of big business.

Marxist scholars have also identified what is sometimes referred to as a **new middle class** of middle managers, technocrats, and supervisors who do not own the means of production but have a great deal of (delegated) authority and control over the working class. Also sometimes included in this class are teachers, police, social workers, and others whose role is the reproduction of capitalist social rela-

tions of domination. The class scarcely existed in Marx's day, but has grown significantly with the development of capitalism and the subsequent growth in the scale and scope of corporations. Members of this class play a significant role within corporate capitalism, yet they are not independent of those who have the ultimate authority and control—capitalists.

Marxist scholars have gone well beyond just elaborating the more complex class structures and relations of capitalism. They have analyzed class formation (how classes are organized as collective agents), class struggle (the actual practice of realizing class interests), and **class consciousness** (the awareness of one's class interests). Marxist scholars have not abandoned the emphasis on class conflict and exploitation, but although their analysis of class structures offers important insights into the nature of contemporary capitalism and the dynamics of class relations, they do not predict the inevitability of class-based revolution. They do, however, believe that Marxist class analysis helps the understanding and framing of an emancipatory theory of alternatives and social justice.

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Mass Media

CHUCK BARONE

How people view and understand the larger world beyond themselves (their subjective experiences) is heavily dependent on the mass media. According to social scientists, the social role of the mass media is to communicate messages and symbols; to amuse, entertain, and inform; and to instill individuals with the values and beliefs and codes of behavior necessary to integrate them into the larger society and culture. The question is what kind of values, images, and messages will be communicated? The answers depend on the organizational structures of the mass media and the structures of power in the rest of society. Mass media representation tends to reproduce the dominant views of society.

The United States holds to the ideal of a free press, one free of governmental control. Generally, this is true, although there are notable exceptions such as government regulation during wartime or political attempts to manipulate information. The free press and media are further compromised by structural economics. In many cities, **newspaper mergers** have created **monopolies**. Mergers are endemic to the American mass media. Currently, five mega mass-media corporations control over half of all media outlets, including television, radio, newspapers, magazines, movies, and books. The reach of these corporations is global. One of the largest is Time Warner, a corporation whose primarily responsibility is to its shareholders. Like any

other **capitalist** enterprise, it is in business to make money. This raises a question then about who controls and influences the mass media; it is a question of **power**. Media experts disagree about who has power and control within a sprawling media landscape that includes corporate owners and managers, editors, program directors, professional journalists, and media consumers.

There is less disagreement about the ways in which different socioeconomic classes are represented by the mass media. Mass-media representations present class images that are more favorable to the **upper** and **middle classes**. The United States is portrayed essentially as a predominately middle-class society, giving a distorted view of the realities of class in America. When members of the working class or lower socioeconomic classes are portrayed in the mass media at all (they are underrepresented), they are often depicted and viewed through negative stereotypes. Television shows usually portray working-class men as buffoons: as dumb, immature, and irresponsible but lovable. Such characters are set against more mature and sensible wives. Ralph Kramden, Archie Bunker, and Homer Simpson are representative of the buffoonish television working-class male. On the other hand, a typical middle-class series presents both parents as wise and working cooperatively to raise their families (in some cases, a middle-class wife is portrayed as ditzy). The inversion of gender status in working-class sitcoms is a statement about class.

Media studies also reveal that news stories related to the **labor movement** and the working class are both underreported and negatively framed to distort the news in ways that favor corporations and cast labor unions in a negative light. Sorting out the exact causes of such class biases is not easy given the complexity of the mass media industry.

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MASSES

ROBERT E. WEIR

The term "masses" is often used simply to refer to the general public and usually implies those who are neither ultra rich nor exceedingly poor. Who, exactly, this involves is imprecise. Those who divide American society into quintiles would likely consider those in ranks two, three, and four to constitute the masses, whereas others using the term might mean those whose earnings are within set parameters of the median **income**. In 2004 the median family income was \$43,389 per annum.

Those using median income as a measurement of who belongs to the masses generally set up a numerical range on either side of the median that incorporates the majority of American families. For example, if the range is \$25,000 at the low end and \$100,000 at the upper, more than 50 percent (52.45 percent) of all families are represented and, thus, by a simple majority, could be seen as the masses.

The problems with such a designation are obvious. Nearly 45 percent of all American families made less than the median income in 2004, but a range of \$25,000 to \$100,000 considers fewer than 19 percent of those families as belonging to the masses. In practical terms, using either quintiles or household income to determine the masses is not much more useful than the sort of unscientific use of the term one might hear in casual conversation. Moreover, using any sort of numerical determination tells us nothing about individual **class consciousness**, nor does it weigh for **regional** variations, lifestyle choices, or **subjective** measures of social class.

The term "masses" is used with greatest precision by **Marxist** scholars. The masses in this line of thought are that sector of society with revolutionary potential. In many Marxist models of social change, a "vanguard" achieves class consciousness and revolutionary awareness in advance of others. Over time, the determination, proselytizing, and organizational skills of the vanguard galvanize a broad and heterogeneous sector of society, and this group channels its exploitation and anger into revolutionary action. That critical group is the masses, the veritable army of revolution.

The Marxist understanding of the masses has problems of its own. Marxists have, historically, associated the masses with the working class, a group understood to be a proletariat that lacked access to the means of production. This material reality was to be the lens through which class differences could be magnified and class consciousness developed. Although Karl Marx himself anticipated there would be "refuse" among the proletariat—his famed *lumpenproletariat*, an unreconstructed rabble that could not develop class consciousness—he did not foresee circumstances in which the relationship to the means of production was not central to the way in which individuals would see social class. Many of those claiming membership in the American middle class, for example, base their identity on subjective rather than material factors. Classical Marxism evolved from an industrial mindset that is increasingly less relevant in economies such as that of the United States in which the decline of blue-collar work, a weak labor movement, and material prosperity (or the illusion thereof) have muted the appeals of the vanguard and sapped the strength of those groups once seen as the building blocks of a mass movement. In addition, many presentday members of the working class view themselves as middle class and hold many of the values of the very **bourgeoisie** that a Marxist revolution was supposed to topple.

Neo-Marxist activists and contemporary Marxist scholars have long sought correctives to classical theory in order to adapt to changes within advanced **capitalist** economies. Few would now define the masses the same way that Marx and Friedrich Engels viewed it when they published *The Communist Manifesto* in 1848. They have not, however, made much progress in imparting revolutionary zeal among the masses, regardless of how the masses are defined. As of the early twenty-first

century, the inexact popular usage of the term "masses"—to mean simply a generalized public—is, oddly enough, the most useful one.

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McCarthyism

ROBERT E. WEIR

McCarthyism is an imprecise term frequently used as a catchall reference for the **Red Scare** that ensued after World War II. This term came into such use because the early 1950s were dominated by the bombastic Senator Joseph R. McCarthy of Wisconsin. From the time he made his first speech attacking **communism** in 1950 until his censure in 1954, McCarthy dominated the news, held dramatic Senate hearings, struck fear into those called before his committee, and was responsible for generating public hysteria. In actuality, fear of communism predated McCarthy and endured beyond his censure. Nonetheless, anticommunism and McCarthyite scare tactics have helped reshape perceptions of social class in America. Some scholars see a link between McCarthyism and the strains of **working-class** conservatism that eventually weakened identity with the working class.

Marxism and its variants have had a hard time taking root in American society. Indigenous forms of radicalism predated the introduction of Marxist ideology, and for a time, it was viewed as a foreign import. During the Gilded Age, Marxist thought made inroads among the working class and among intellectuals, but even numerous socialist parties repudiated revolutionary Marxism, as did groups in the mainstream labor movement, such as the Knights of Labor and the American Federation of Labor. A late nineteenth-century backlash against all radical movements further weakened the appeal of Marxism.

Most members of the **Industrial Workers of the World** were sympathetic to Marxism, and the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution inspired many radicals and led to the founding of the **Communist Party** USA (CPUSA). The post–World War I Red Scare retarded CPUSA growth, however, and the United States refused to recognize the new Soviet government until 1933. Various strains of radicalism revived during the **Great Depression**, and communists played a key role in energizing the labor movement, especially the **Congress of Industrial Organizations** (CIO); the CPUSA may have had as many as 100,000 members by 1939. To alarmed critics, the 1930s appeared a "Red Decade," and many conservatives accused President **Franklin D. Roosevelt** of coddling communists, sometimes seriously and sometimes to generate opposition to the **New Deal**. In 1938 a congressional committee headed by Representative Martin Dies investigated alleged communist infiltration of various New Deal programs. The United States forged an alliance with the Soviet Union during World War II, but this was a marriage of convenience rather than mutual respect.

McCarthyism was presaged by the 1940 Smith Act, which made it illegal to belong to an organization that advocated the overthrow of the United States. It was used to persecute **Trotskyists** in a series of trials that began in 1941 and stretched into 1944, during which over 300 individuals were tried for subversion despite the U.S.–USSR wartime alliance. After 1949, the Smith Act was also used against the CPUSA. The 1939 Hatch Act forbade federal employees from partisan political activity, but it was also used to weed out accused leftists in government employment. Before World War II ended, the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) renewed congressional investigation into alleged communist subversion. President Harry Truman reinforced the Hatch Act when he signed into law the 1947 Federal Employees Loyalty Program, an act that eventually terminated hundreds of federal workers.

By 1950 a climate of fear had permeated American society. An investigation of Hollywood studios was underway, the Soviet Union possessed atomic weaponry, China had undergone a communist revolution, several atomic spies had been apprehended, and the Cold War was in full force. On February 9, 1950, Senator Joseph McCarthy made an inflammatory speech in Wheeling, West Virginia, in which he purported to possess a list of 205 known communists within the U.S. government. His speech embodied the unsettled zeitgeist of the 1950s and propelled McCarthy to fame, even though a committee headed by Senator Millard Tydings found McCarthy's charges to be without merit. In 1953, Republicans took control of the Senate, and McCarthy transformed a minor committee into a platform to launch a communist witch hunt. For a brief moment, Senator McCarthy was one of the most powerful men in America, and a summons to appear before his committee meant one's career was ruined. Attacks from critics such as CBS news anchor Edward R. Murrow and McCarthy's ill-advised investigation of the U.S. Army and his own excesses led to a full Senate censure on December 2, 1954, and he died from complications from alcoholism in 1957. The Senate and HUAC continued hearings into the 1960s, however.

In the long term, McCarthyism broadly construed had a profound impact on social class relations. The American left often romanticizes the **class consciousness** of the working class; at no time, for instance, have more than 35 percent of American workers even been enrolled in labor unions, let alone revolutionary organizations. Many Marxists attempt to explain the lack of revolutionary zeal among American workers by pointing to repression, **false consciousness**, and capitalist exploitation. These views may have merit, but they also underplay the degree to which workers simply reject Marxian precepts. Long-term trends suggest that more American workers have been liberal than radical.

Many analysts have also been slow to appreciate innate conservative trends within the working class. In McCarthy's Wheeling speech, he attacked "the traitorous actions of those who have been treated so well by this Nation." He went on to note, "It has not been the less fortunate, or members of minority groups who have been traitorous to this Nation, but rather those who have had all the benefits that the wealthiest Nation on earth has had to offer . . . the finest homes, the finest college education and the finest jobs in government we can give." A subsequent line blaming those "who are born with silver spoons in their mouths" resonated with many within the working class, and McCarthy's electoral support among **blue-collar** voters was quite high.

Many Americans came to equate patriotism with anticommunism, a position that translated into support for Cold War policies. The CIO was forced to purge about 1 million members from unions too closely aligned with communism, but even this did not help it when it launched "Operation Dixie," a campaign to organize the non-union South between 1946 and 1953. It faltered, in part, because CIO organizers were Red-baited.

In addition, the post–World War II economic boom served to deflect many of the critiques of **capitalism** that were standard among radical organizers. AFL head **George Meany** famously observed that the American working class was disappearing as blue-collars workers became **middle class**. By 1957 a combination of repression, fear, and declining working-class militancy reduced CPUSA strength to fewer than 75,000, and it continued to hemorrhage members until, by the early twenty-first century, it had fewer than 6,000, most of whom were the very intellectuals and children of privilege denounced by McCarthy.

When radicalism resurfaced under the aegis of the **New Left** during the 1960s, its core was made up of intellectuals, college students, and the middle class. Groups such as **Students for a Democratic Society** attempted to organize the working class, and a few unions saw acts of shop-floor militancy, but there were also many in the blue-collar working class who reacted with disgust to the New Left's opposition to the Vietnam War, its embrace of countercultural values, and its perceived antipatriotism. Many whites also reacted negatively to the burgeoning Civil Rights Movement, which it also associated with the New Left, and some resented **Great Society** programs that appeared to be government "handouts" that weakened **self-reliance** efforts associated with work.

Barry Goldwater's conservative presidential campaign attracted widespread blue-collar support in 1964, as did George Wallace's quixotic third-party bid in 1968. Hubert Humphrey's inability to solidify the white working-class vote threw the 1968 election to Republican Richard Nixon, who actively courted working-class patriotism and anger. In 1980 the same group supported **Ronald Reagan** in large numbers, and they have also been numbered among the ardent supporters of **Pat Buchanan** and George W. **Bush**.

Just as working-class radicalism has been romanticized, so too has working-class conservatism been exaggerated. In 1960, for instance, **Seymour Martin Lipset** averred that workers were "authoritarian" in outlook, and more recently, rightwing pundits have declared the death of radical ideology. Labor union members continue to exhibit liberal voting trends, numerous reform groups thrive, and, like most electoral groups, overall patterns among **wage** earners are too varied to allow for definitive labels. What has occurred, though, is a weakening of the very term "working class," as an identity marker and as an analytical category in most segments of American society outside of the academy and organized labor. McCarthyism should not be viewed as the sole cause of this, but rather as a contributing factor in the ongoing manner in which Americans understand and debate social class.

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Oshinsky, Senator Joseph McCarthy and the American Labor Movement, 1976; Patricia Sexton, The War on Labor and the Left: Understanding America's Unique Conservatism, 1991; Jeff Woods, Black Struggle, Red Scare: Segregation and Anti-Communism in the South, 1948–1968, 2004.

McDonald's

YANNICK THORAVAL

McDonald's is an American fast-food restaurant franchise. The company began in 1940 with a restaurant opened in San Bernardino, California, by brothers Richard and Maurice McDonald.

After World War II, the population of California and the number of automobiles on the highways increased dramatically. In 1948 the McDonald brothers reorganized food preparation in their restaurants to parallel the assembly line common in heavy industry and better serve an emerging mobile and speed-oriented **middle class**. They removed more than two-thirds of all their offerings, including any foods that needed to be eaten with a knife and fork. Part of their new efficiency regime involved using a milkshake machine sold to the McDonald brothers by salesman Ray Kroc (1902–84). In 1955 Kroc opened his own McDonald's franchise in Illinois, and in 1961 he bought out the McDonald brothers. It was Kroc who made McDonald's into an international empire. The company has since expanded into a globally recognized brand, with over 28,000 restaurants in 122 countries around the world.

McDonald's is often invoked as an example of the fast-food culture that dominates American society and that has transformed both eating habits and family patterns. Ideals of 1950s family values—often based as much in myth as in fact—have been challenged by fast-food culture. Norman Rockwell images of nuclear families gathered around the dinner table must contend with the reality that half of all the money spent on food in American society goes into the coffers of fast-food franchises. In 2000 Americans spent more than \$110 billion on fast food.

As one of the most successful franchises in America, McDonald's has drawn considerable attention, both positive and negative. The company is often criticized for targeting a socially and politically disenfranchised workforce that is typically made up of adolescents, **immigrants**, and unskilled workers. McDonald's is also criticized for its aggressive marketing toward children and minority groups. Among American children, only Santa Claus is more recognizable than McDonald's corporate icon, the clown Ronald McDonald. The company's synergy policies with toy companies, Fox Kids Network, and Disney are part of its marketing strategy of creating youthful consumers. McDonald's also has franchises in public schools, in colleges, and in many poor urban neighborhoods. In the latter, McDonald's and other fast-food restaurants such as Burger King and Wendy's are often among the few businesses in the area. The company's defenders suggest that McDonald's offers employment opportunities for those who might otherwise have difficulty finding work and that it is willing to commit to areas of high **poverty** that other companies ignore.

McDonald's has been involved in a number of high-profile lawsuits, including libel and copyright suits to personal injury claims, the latter ranging from injuries suffered from scalding coffee to public health class-action suits alleging McDonald's contributes to American obesity problems. These lawsuits have typically garnered considerable media attention and have variously impacted the public's perception of the McDonald's corporate image.

In an effort to distance itself from growing concerns about America's obesity epidemic, McDonald's has recently unveiled a marketing campaign that promotes fitness and healthier alternatives to some of its traditional menu items. The company hopes this new image will appeal to the growing number of health-conscious consumers.

In the United States, McDonald's customers typically represent a diverse cross section of American society. The speed and efficiency of service made possible by the company's assembly-line production methods suit those with little time to spare. The relatively low cost of restaurant menu items also caters for budget-conscious consumers, though typical expenditures at McDonald's are higher than the cost of preparing a family meal. Child-friendly dining environments, often complete with play areas or video arcades, also appeal to parents with young children. Also, the company's marketing campaigns have historically aimed at a wideranging social and cultural target audience. For these reasons, dining at McDonald's is an experience whose social class implications are contested and ambiguous.

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McMansion

WESLEY BEAL

McMansion is a derogatory colloquialism that refers to a particular style of architecture that—as the name suggests—combines the bulky volume of a mansion with the aesthetic bankruptcy of a McDonald's franchise. Often situated in **gated communities** or golf course communities, these homes are intended to be a "super-sized" version of suburban tract housing, the neighborhood planning system that produces many indistinguishable homes in the same development.

McMansions commonly feature building materials similar to those used in tract homes, so the qualitative difference between the two modes of housing is largely the square footage that separates them, though McMansions do tend to exhibit more distinct façades that often draw on grandiose historical styles. With the primary difference between the McMansion and other homes in **suburbia** being sheer looming magnitude, owners of these homes often receive criticism for what

many perceive to be displays of conspicuous consumption, a phrase coined by American economist Thorstein Veblen in 1899 to explain the consumption of luxury goods and services not for their use-value, but for their ability to flaunt one's superlative social status and bounteous wealth. Indeed, we see conspicuous consumption in the sheer magnitude of these homes and in the carefree wastefulness of their energy usage, the efficiency of which drops further as more square footage is added to the floor plan. Accordingly, McMansions are often seen as asser-



McMansion-style development in San Jose, California. Photo by Sean O'Flaherty / Wikipedia.

tions of class status, especially of **middle-class** homeowners hoping to climb to higher class status while still not being able to afford even more expensive customized homes.

Because they are closely associated with the mass-produced tract homes, McMansions bear the stigma of inauthenticity, of a cookie-cutter aesthetic. Therefore, the McMansion carries the connotation of a lack of class—in the sense of refinement—or taste, an inability to discern truly valuable property as only the genuinely wealthy can. By linking a homeowner to a vulgar lack of sophistication, evidenced by its very likeness to a McDonald's fast-food meal, the McMansion associates the homeowner with the **nouveau riche** division of the **upper classes**, which characteristically flaunts its wealth without regard to "sophisticated" methods of consumption. As with the term "nouveau riche," the rhetorical force of "McMansion" attempts to distinguish the wealthy from the truly wealthy on the basis of refined and vulgar commodities.

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Means of Production

ROBERT E. WEIR

The term *means of production* refers to the material and physical components involved in creating society's goods. In classic **Marxism**, one defines one's class by noting one's relationship to the means of production.

Karl Marx was a materialist who believed that societies needed to satisfy tangible needs and desires. He rejected the older labor theory of value that posited that goods had no intrinsic worth and derived worth only from the amount of labor necessary to produce them. Marx agreed that labor is and should be considered the creator of wealth, but he recognized that factors other than toil were involved in production, including machines, tools, raw materials, natural resources, land, and workshops. Because those items were invariably held as private property, it made little sense to divorce work from ownership patterns. Ultimately, he argued, those who controlled the means of production held more **power**. Under **capitalism**, labor is generally alienated from the means of production, with workers using infrastructures owned by a non-laboring **bourgeoisie** to produce wealth that enriches the latter. Although Marx recognized various gradations in society, there was a tendency within capitalist societies to produce two social classes: producers and non-producers. He believed that the wage system designed to appease producers would prove untenable and that a worker **proletariat** would overthrow the bourgeoisie. Key to this was seizing the means of production.

Subsequent scholars have disputed or parsed Marx's construct of the means of production. Many economists have criticized Marx for treating the means of production as if they were intrinsically organic rather than looking at those who make decisions about how to use and distribute the means of production. Because decision making is a human activity in which power is applied in different ways, alienation of labor is not necessarily a byproduct of capital-labor relations. Some labor historians have raised questions as to what constitutes control. There are hosts of formal and informal ways in which workers can exert control over work processes and manipulate the means of production, not the least of which is the skill they command. It is one thing to own the means of production, but quite another to *create* goods using them. Some feminist scholars attack constructs of the means of production as privileging some economic activities over others. In this sense, factory relationships and work are often deemed more integral to defining the class system than family relations and domestic labor.

Postmodern theory and **postindustrial** economics pose more challenges to scholars using the means of production as an analytical category. The very idea to use "means of production" in analysis is a product of industrial society and carries assumptions that have been challenged. Economic relations alone have not defined modern and postmodern society; ideological and social stratification systems have grown more diverse, not simpler. Marxist materialism also fails to resonate with some scholars. What, exactly, is meant by "means" or "production"? What happens if the "product" is intangible rather than material? Intellectual property, information, human services, and research do not fit well into the original construct. **Globalization** and movable capital resources have also divorced production from consumption, further complicating matters. In the United States, the number of those making material goods has been in steady decline for decades. The identities of those owning the means of production are less clear in postindustrial societies and global economies.

Problems notwithstanding, Marx deserves credit for calling attention to built-in stresses in economic and social relations. The relationship of individuals to the means of production remains an important **objective** factor in determining social class in America, but most scholars also look—as did Marx—to **subjective** determiners.

Suggested Reading

Karl Marx, *The Communist Manifesto*, 1848; Marx, *Capital*, 1867; David Montgomery, *Workers Control in America*, 1979.

MEANY, GEORGE (August 16, 1894–January 10, 1980)

ROBERT E. WEIR

George Meany was an important twentieth-century leader in the **labor movement**. He was the president of the **American Federation of Labor** (AFL) from 1952 to 1955 and of the merged AFL and **Congress of Industrial Organizations** (AFL–CIO) from 1955 to 1979.

Meany was born into a **working-class** family in New York City, and he attended public school only until he was fourteen, at which time he became a plumber. As a skilled tradesman, he fit the profile of workers in whom the AFL was most interested. Meany got involved with locals unions at an early age, and in 1922, when he was just twenty-six, he became a paid business agent for the United Association of Plumbers and Steamfitters union. He never again performed **blue-collar** labor.

During the **Great Depression**, Meany worked for the New York State Federation of Labor and lobbied the legislature to pass numerous relief and protection bills to aid strapped workers. In 1939 he was named secretary-treasurer for the national AFL. Although Meany shared the craft union biases of most AFL leaders, he was often at odds with what he saw as overly cautious policies on the part of AFL President William Green. When Meany took over as AFL head upon Green's death, he sought rapprochement with the rival CIO and was instrumental in bringing about a merger of the two. Meany's hope was that a combined AFL–CIO might have the political clout to counter those forces seeking to roll back gains made by organized labor during the **New Deal** and in World War II. He was particularly opposed to the anti-labor Taft-Hartley Act (1947) and sought its reversal.

Meany also made decisions that critics argued hurt the long-term viability of organized labor. He was the consummate bureaucrat and favored a top-down decision-making model. To that end, he was suspicious of rank-and-file militancy. He acceded to Taft-Hartley provisos that banned **communists** from union leadership positions. He was equally uncomfortable with social reform movements; the AFL–CIO was frequently and justifiably criticized by women and civil rights leaders for its slowness in forcing unions to accept female and black members, in promoting minorities for union leadership, and in offering logistical and financial support for human rights movements. These were among the many issues with which Meany clashed with AFL–CIO vice president **Walter Reuther**.

Meany's anticommunism and heightened patriotism also led the AFL and the AFL–CIO into closer alignment with **Cold War** policies than many analysts felt was advisable. In 1951 Meany became head of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), a group that today monitors workers' rights on a global basis. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, however, the ICFTU's major function was to steer labor unions in rebuilding nations away from communist influence. So tied was the ICFTU to U.S. foreign policy that many considered it an arm of the Central Intelligence Agency.



George Meany. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

Meany also headed several boards whose purpose was to mobilize the military and resist the spread of communism. His strident anticommunism led Meany to support both the Korean War and the Vietnam War. The latter became problematic given the changing demographics of the 1960s. By the mid-1960s, many younger workers saw Meany as a dinosaur who was out of touch with the rank and file.

Meany forged close ties between the AFL-CIO and the Democratic Party, an alliance some felt was unwise, but which continues to the present. In the 1960s, though, it paid dividends, and Meany was frequently consulted by presidents John F. **Kennedy** and Lyndon Johnson on matters relating to labor. Meany had a key role in fashioning several Great Society programs. His sole break with the Democrats came in 1972, when he refused to endorse peace candidate George McGovern. This served to alienate Meany further from younger workers. His support for the war in Vietnam caused a rift with the United Auto Workers (UAW), which pulled out of the AFL-CIO in 1968. UAW President

Walter Reuther opined that under Meany, the AFL-CIO gave blind allegiance to the U.S. State Department. Meany responded by stubbornly blaming the **middle class** for antiwar protests.

Meany was also widely criticized for his views on social class. In 1955 Meany famously remarked that workers were not interested in a separate labor party and that rising standards of living were making the working class a thing of the past; blue-collar workers would soon join the middle class. Meany was an outspoken champion of **capitalism** in a form that embraced **Keynesian** notions of government intervention into the economy, another factor in his discomfort with **New Left** politics in the 1960s.

In his later years, Meany was as conservative and cautious as William Green had been in the 1940s. Hence, under Meany's tutelage, the AFL–CIO was ineffective in responding to the initial surges of **deindustrialization**, **globalization**, and other anti-labor assaults by organized capital. He died in 1980, about the time that down-sizing, demands for concessions, and union-decertification became dominant in American corporate culture.

Decades after his death, Meany remains a controversial figure. His many supporters contend that he modernized the labor movement, built a bureaucracy that responded pragmatically to changing economic relations, presided over a prolonged period of

working-class prosperity, and helped draft enduring pieces of legislation that continue to benefit workers and the poor. In the view of his detractors, he cooperated with the destruction of labor's militant base, placed personal ideological concerns above the interests of the labor movement, was an unimaginative bureaucratic cipher, and left the AFL—CIO ill-prepared to respond to social, political, and economic change.

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MEDICAL CARE

ROBERT E. WEIR

Medical care within the United States is a hotly contested system in which politics, economics, and social class collide. There is near universal agreement that access to good medical care has a dramatic and positive correlation to elevated **life chances** and that advances in research, pharmacology, and technology make the United States poised to be a leader in world health care. There is also, however, a general consensus that current health care delivery systems have not maximized that potential and that the quality of health care varies widely depending on factors such as **income**, occupation, **race**, **ethnicity**, **gender**, and **region**.

Because of the uneven manner in which health care is delivered in the United States, the World Health Organization (WHO) ranks U.S. health care low vis-à-vis other first-world nations. For example, a 2005 WHO report showed that infant mortality rates within the United States were 6.4 per thousand live births, a rate comparable to Eastern European nations whose economies are in transition after the collapse of **communism**. The U.S. rate is much higher than that of peer nations such as Great Britain (5.1), France (4.2), Germany (4.1), and Japan (3.2). It is even higher than that of financially strapped Cuba. Similarly, life expectancy is lower in the United States (77.8 years) than in Britain (78.5), France (79.7), Germany (78.8), and Sweden (80.5). In all, twenty-eight nations have higher life-expectancy rates than the United States. The United States also has the dubious distinction of having exceptionally high obesity rates. In a 2005 WHO study of thirty-six nations, just six had higher obesity levels than the United States. In 2005 the WHO ranked U.S. medical care just thirty-seventh in a list of 190 nations, just above Slovenia and lagging behind such nonwealthy nations as Costa Rica, Morocco, and Colombia.

This does not mean that medical quality in other nations is superior. In the United States, health correlates most highly with income and occupation. Most medical care is private and delivered on a fee-for-service basis, an increasing problem given that since the 1990s, health care costs have risen roughly three time faster than the official inflation rate and five times faster than wages. The cost of

prescription drugs has risen even faster, and by 2006 nearly 16 percent of the gross domestic product was consumed by medical costs (it will rise to 20 percent, or \$4 trillion, by 2015). The elderly and disabled can meet some of their medical costs through Medicare and various other **Social Security** programs, and those in **poverty** can sometimes qualify for Medicaid, but over 30 percent of the poor have no coverage. Most Americans pay for health care through medical insurance or out of pocket. The most common form of payment is through employer-sponsored health insurance, though skyrocketing costs have strained such programs. A 2006 Kaiser Family Foundation report notes that since 2000, health insurance costs have risen 73 percent. This has caused many employers to seek ways to contain costs, the most common methods being to deduct part of the premium from workers' wages or shift to cheaper plans that offer less coverage and higher deductible payments when subscribers see doctors or fill subscriptions. Quite a few employers have dropped health care coverage altogether.

Thus, by 2006 some 46.6 million Americans (15.5 percent) of Americans had no health coverage, and millions of others were in rudimentary or expensive plans that discourage use for all but catastrophic reasons. Many Americans who have coverage are in "managed care" systems such as health maintenance organizations (HMOs), which require primary care doctors to approve specialist care and which sometimes discourage physicians from ordering expensive tests, hospitalizations, or long-term care. Likewise, most HMOs focus on illness rather than preventive care and offer less coverage for programs such as prenatal care, exercise regimens, or physical therapy. Some advocates for free universal health care argue that HMOs seeking to contain costs actually drive up overall expenditures on health care through ill-considered parsimony. Because their plans do not adequately cover expenses, individuals often forgo having routine procedures such as annual checkups or using drugs that could control conditions such as asthma, high blood pressure, elevated cholesterol, or diabetes. They then seek help only after they become seriously ill and require expensive treatments.

The net effect is that healthiness and wealth correlate positively in the United States. More than half of families making less than \$20,000 per year have no health insurance, a situation that is nearly unheard of among families making more than \$100,000. In fact, the average annual cost of health insurance now exceeds the yearly income of a worker making the minimum wage. According to a 2006 USA Today report, cost prevents 41 percent of uninsured Americans from seeing a doctor when unwell, in comparison with just 9.2 percent of those who carry insurance. A report from Harvard University indicates that 32 percent of those filing for bankruptcy each year lack health insurance and had an average of \$12,000 of medical debt. Data from Harvard researchers Majid Ezzati and Christopher Murray data leave little doubt that income and health are correlated. Poor Native Americans in South Dakota, for instance, have a life expectancy of fifty-eight and urban African Americans sixty-six, in comparison with ninety-one for affluent Asian American women living in well-to-do Bergen County, New Jersey. Ezzati and Murray's research also shows drops in life expectancy in areas of Appalachia marked by rural poverty. Nearly every ailment—from alcoholism to heart disease and cancer—rises as one descends the socioeconomic status (SES) scale.

As the data noted here suggest, health is also correlated with race and ethnicity. In 2002, 89.3 percent of non-Hispanic whites carried health insurance, whereas the rates for African Americans and Latinos were 79.8 percent and 67.6 percent, respectively. Among immigrants who had not yet obtained citizenship (or were illegal), just 43.3 percent had health insurance. African Americans, Latinos, Asian Americans, and other ethnic minorities also often complain of discrimination and disrespect when receiving treatment. A 1999 New England Journal of Medicine study, for example, noted that black cardiac patients were 40 percent less likely to receive catheterization procedures than whites exhibiting the same symptoms. The study also revealed that black infants were 2.5 times more likely to die before their first birthday than white babies, that African Americans are 50 percent less likely to receive heart bypass surgery, and that they are 25 percent less likely to receive pain medications.

Women also complain that the American health care system is gender-biased. Although a public outcry stopped the practice in most medical plans, many private insurers used to pay for Viagra prescriptions for male erectile dysfunctions, but would not pay for pap smears and mammograms for women. Numerous studies also indicate that dosages of many drugs on the market have been calibrated from clinical trials that used only men in their studies and that overall, diseases and conditions that impact men are much more likely to attract research funding than female conditions, the exception being breast cancer research. For many women, the biggest concern is lack of access to adequate medical care. This is especially acute for poor women, who are more likely than males to head **one-parent families**.

On top of other factors, where one receives treatment can also determine the quality of treatment one receives. Wealthy individuals have greater access to top disease specialists and private hospitals, as opposed to poor and working-class patients, who must often wait in crowded and understaffed public hospitals that lack state-of-the-art equipment and must often make do with less-qualified medical personnel. According to the Public Health Research Institute, inner city hospitals in Detroit, Chicago, and other cities have much higher rates of hospital-transmitted infections than private and suburban facilities. In all, about 6 percent of patients pick up infections from hospital staff, especially from those so harried that they cannot take as much care to sterilize instruments, wash their hands, or keep hospital areas germ-free.

Where one lives is also a factor. According to Health Care Watch, an individual who lives in Minnesota is likely to get far better health care than one who lives in Mississippi, which ranks at the bottom. Overall, heath care is far better in the Northeast, upper Midwest, and far West than in the Southwest, Upper Plains, or Deep South, the latter of which has the nation's weakest health care systems.

These sobering inequalities have fueled the call for a single-payer health plan similar to those in place in Britain and Canada. Such programs would be funded through taxes and would make health care access universal and cheap. Such proposals have run afoul of politics and personal preferences. Caucasians and Republicans tend to oppose single-payer plans in greater numbers than Democrats, African Americans, or Hispanics. Just 31 percent of Americans making over \$100,000 favored such a plan, according to a 2006 American Consumer Institute

poll. Those most in favor come from moderate-income groups, which are now feeling the worst pinch from soaring medical costs. Many Americans fear such a plan, and studies from Britain, Canada, and New Zealand reveal they are not the panacea that advocates claim. Overall, they deliver better routine care for the masses, but delays for certain procedures and for most elective surgery are far longer than in the United States. Advocates respond that a single-payer program would greatly improve health access for most Americans and that private insurers, pharmaceutical firms, and physicians catering to the wealthy have hoodwinked the general public with a fear campaign. The rejection of President Bill Clinton's phased single-payer program in 1993 has derailed such programs for the present, though most analysts feel that some sort of health care reform is inevitable. In 2006 Massachusetts legislated a plan that makes it the first state to mandate that citizens have health insurance, just as it mandates possession of auto insurance. In theory cheap plans will be available for those who must buy their own plans.

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Mellon Family

RAMI KHALAF SR.

The Mellon family is perhaps best known for its prowess in banking and finance. The patriarch of the family fortune was Thomas Mellon (1813–1908). He was born in Ireland's County Tyrone in Ulster Province to farmers Andrew and Rebecca Wauchob Mellon. In 1816 Thomas's grandfather, Archibald Mellon, immigrated to the United States, settling in Westmorland County, Pennsylvania; Thomas and his parents followed two years later, when Thomas was five.


Being a yeoman farmer himself, Andrew Mellon planned the same future for Thomas, who had different ambitions inspired by viewing mansions of prominent landowners and reading books like *The Autobiography of Benjamin Franklin*. At age seventeen, Thomas enrolled at the Western University of Pennsylvania at Pittsburgh, from which he obtained a bachelor's degree in 1837. Upon graduation, Thomas Mellon worked in a law office in greater Pittsburgh and clerked for the Allegheny County Prothonotary. On December 15, 1838, he was admitted to the bar, and in early 1839, he opened his own law firm focusing on civil cases.

On August 22, 1843, Thomas married Sarah Jane Negly, the daughter of Jacob and Barbara Negly, who owned one of the mansions that inspired his drive for

wealth. In 1859 Thomas Mellon was elected assistant judge of the Common Pleas Court of Allegheny County and began a ten-year judicial career. A shrewd man, Mellon invested most of the proceeds from his legal work and bought large portions of downtown Pittsburgh real estate. In late 1869, he retired from the bench and opened a bank, T. Mellon & Sons' Bank, with his two sons Andrew and Richard as partners. The Smithfield Street bank was fronted by a life-sized statue of Benjamin Franklin.

During the Panic of 1873, the Mellons almost lost their bank. When prosperity returned, those who survived that panic thrived in the less competitive business environment. The Mellon family investments included downtown real estate, coalfields, and outstanding loans to rising steelmaker **Andrew Carnegie**.

Thomas Mellon retired from the daily management of his bank's affairs in 1882, and his sons assumed control of the largest bank in the nation outside of New York. In 1885 Thomas Mellon published an autobiography primarily for the benefit of his family. It provided very few insights into great events such as the **Civil War**, territorial



Andrew Mellon and his son, Paul, aboard the S.S. Fort Victoria bound for Bermuda, ca. 1921–32. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

expansion, or the **Industrial Revolution**, though it did betray his **racism** against **Native Americans** and his belief in **Social Darwinism**. Mellon opined that those who lived in **poverty** were lazy and deserved their fate.

Thomas Andrew Mellon lived to be ninety-five. Of his children, Andrew William Mellon (1855–1937) was the most successful. He took over the lion's share of duties in his father's bank, became an industrialist and an active philanthropist, and was Secretary of the Treasury from 1921 until February 12, 1932, when President Herbert Hoover appointed him ambassador to the United Kingdom. His term at the Treasury Department was marred with controversy. In 1923 he drafted what came to be known as "Mellon Plan," a program for lowering taxes incorporated into the Revenue Act of 1924. Although Mellon also cut public debt lingering from World War I, his tax cuts and reduction of Treasury surpluses was deemed unwise when the Great Depression began in 1929. This may have hastened his decision to accept an overseas posting. He left his ambassadorship when Franklin D. Roosevelt assumed office in 1933. Over the course of his life, Andrew Mellon also enjoyed success in ventures as diverse as the lumber trade, banking, oil, steel, shipbuilding, and construction. He took his place alongside magnates such as John D. Rockefeller and Henry Ford as one of America's wealthiest individuals. A further example of his business sense was his decision

to invest in manufacturing carborundum steel, which Mellon built into the Carborundum Company.

The Mellons gave generously to support educational, cultural, and research causes. In 1937 Andrew donated his art collection, plus \$10 million, to build the National Gallery of Art in Washington, D.C. The Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, the product of the merger of the Avalon Foundation and the Old Dominion Foundation, is named in his honor, as is the 378-foot U.S. Coast Guard cutter *Mellon*. Andrew's son Paul (1907–99) ran many of the family philanthropic groups. He also added to the family coffers through an advantageous second marriage to an heiress of the Warner-Lambert pharmaceutical fortune.

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MEN'S CLUBS

JANEAN MOLLET-VAN BECKUM

Men's clubs are private institutions where members are able to develop **social networks**, relax, and discuss topics of mutual interest in a private setting. They are historically white and male. Men's clubs have morphed over the years to include women, but still retain their **class-conscious** boundaries. Recent years have seen minority groups form their own clubs, but many are still excluded from tradition-bound clubs. Many clubs are specific to particular interests such as golf or tennis; others cater to professions such as lawyers or doctors. Still others are general clubs where families of **elite** status have been members for generations, and only the **wealthy** and "acceptable" are admitted as members.

New members are rigorously screened and normally have to be nominated by several current members. The particularly wealthy and well-traveled individuals may belong to several clubs in several cities where they are apt to spend time. This overlapping of social club membership adds a cohesion to the **upper class** in general as introductions between members in different cities can occur. This creates class-based networks of jobs, potential marriages, and friends, thus perpetuating the upper classes. It also insulates them from the **lower class**, women, and non-whites. Many **fraternal** organizations began life as men's clubs, but have evolved into more civic-oriented societies.

Downtown men's clubs originally were places for having lunch and dinner, and some offered rooms for overnight boarding for out-of-towners visiting for business or pleasure. As country pursuits became more popular, and the suburbs arose, the **country club** also grew in popularity. Over time, downtown clubs became primarily a place for lunch and business contacts.

By the mid-nineteenth century, **working-class** men began forming their own clubs for recreation and camaraderie. The clubs often offered classes, debates, and

lectures on a wide range of topics, from science to politics. They were essentially a place for working-class men to do as the upper classes had been doing for decades, a place for peers to relax and network. Many of the working-class clubs allowed women at certain events such as Bible classes. There was often a link between these clubs and the **labor movement**.

In the 1890s young, single men—mostly from the middle class—who were not already involved with a particular club through family or work ties began forming their own organizations to meet their individual interests. Although not as influential as the upper-class men's clubs, these organizations provided the same basic support system and purposes. They created a relaxing environment for friends to gather and play games, entertain women, and get away from the usually crowded tenements in which they lived. All forms of nineteenth-century men's clubs responded to a prevailing social fear that many social institutions—especially churches—were becoming feminized. Some clubs actively promoted a set of ideals dubbed "Muscular Christianity."

Although many men's clubs now admit women, some still stick to the traditional gender-discrimination rules. One of the most famous of these is the Bohemian Club of San Francisco. Formed in 1872, the club still holds an annual summer camp where high-profile members from the world of business, politics, and the upper class gather. Parties, lectures, rituals, and general entertainment are held over three weeks. The club's original members consisted mainly of artists, writers, and local businessmen. Today, it is the epitome of elitist networking, where current and former world leaders relax next to the world's current and future business leaders.

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Mergers and Acquisitions

TINA BRAXTON

Mergers and acquisitions are ways that business entities combine. When companies of approximately equal size join together to form a new company, the transaction is called a merger. In an acquisition, a larger business takes over a smaller one. Often, these buyouts are transacted by mutual agreement. In a hostile takeover, the target company's stock is bought on the open market, against the wishes of its directors.

A merger or acquisition can enable a company to eliminate a competitor, gain additional assets, or sell to new markets. Proponents say business combinations improve efficiency and profitability. Critics point out that these benefits accrue to shareholders and directors, whereas less powerful individuals, such as employees or customers, are often adversely affected. Almost always, staff is cut to reduce costs. Entire departments, such as payroll, become redundant and may be eliminated.

Plants may be shut down. Money freed up by these increased efficiencies is often invested in technology, resulting in more layoffs. Changes in business climate or the availability of new technologies, resources, or capital can set off waves of mergers and acquisitions, bringing widespread economic disruption.

Mergers and acquisitions are not unique to corporate business. Since antiquity, landowners have built great estates through strategic marriages, through lending to distressed landowners and later foreclosing on the loans, through controlling access to water, supplies, or markets, and through outright force. This has meant dispossession and impoverishment of those holding smaller parcels and their employees or tenants. **Slaves** acquired with land were often sold.

Industrialization brought a focus on economies of scale, as well as a need for large pools of resources. Buyouts of small businesses when their owners suffered some misfortune had long fueled growth in manufacturing and mercantile businesses. In the nineteenth century, technology made large businesses with access to capital far more efficient, and the resultant competition drove masses of small enterprises out of business. The ancient apprenticeship-journeyman system by which young men learned a craft, honed their skills, and eventually opened their own businesses virtually disappeared, leaving most of the working class with no alternative but wage labor in an unregulated market.

Meanwhile, some retailers with access to capital began buying up similar businesses in other neighborhoods or cities, establishing chains. By operating their own warehouses and consolidating administration, these chains could sell a greater variety of goods at lower prices than smaller businesses could. Their geographic reach and economic clout spread quickly and devastated the business climate for small, family-operated shops, limiting yet another path to **middle-class** comfort.

Large manufacturers developed a system of vertical integration—buying their suppliers and distributors, which spread the destruction of small firms into other sectors. Giants emerged in manufacturing, transportation, and financial services. By establishing trusts, these powerful companies began combining to form monopolies or to set prices and divide up markets, creating regional monopolies. The Sherman Antitrust Act, enacted by Congress in 1890, forbade "combinations in restraint of trade" and forced the breakup of several large trusts, such as Standard Oil. The ambiguous wording of the act, however, enabled businesses to use it against the labor movement. In 1914 Sherman was superseded by the Clayton Antitrust Act, which banned monopolies, price-fixing, and market allocation, but specifically exempted labor unions. Other legislation regulates mergers and acquisitions in specific industries deemed essential to the public interest, such as banking and media. Much of this regulation has been relaxed in recent years, at the behest of business interests.

In the twentieth century some companies began buying other companies in different, unrelated industries, forming conglomerates. Conglomerates are less vulnerable to downturns in any particular industry, because their diverse holdings are not likely to experience problems at the same time.

In a corporate raid a company not seeking to off-load assets is bought and dismantled. Usually the target company is healthy but experiencing a drop in stock prices because of market conditions. Once the buyout is accomplished, the buyer dismantles the target company, closes plants, and sells equipment, inventories, and

other assets. This often results in massive **unemployment** and can devastate whole communities. Unlike traditional mergers and acquisitions, normally financed with cash or stocks, corporate raids are usually accomplished with borrowed money, with the target company's assets pledged as collateral. From the 1970s to the mid-1990s, a wave of these leveraged buyouts drastically reshaped the U.S. economy. Many stable, well-paid jobs disappeared as responsible companies were destroyed; smaller businesses in hard-hit areas also shut down because of insufficient sales; and home foreclosures increased. Grocery stores and drugstores also closed, leaving some urban neighborhoods or small towns without these vital services. Wealth became concentrated in fewer hands. These trends have not reversed.

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Bryan Burrough and John Helyar, *Barbarians at the Gate: The Fall of RJR Nabisco*, 1990; Charles R. Geisst, *Deals of the Century: Wall Street, Mergers, and the Making of Modern America*, 2004; Vertical Integration & Corporate Mergers (http://faculty.washington.edu/~krumme/readings/mergers.html).

MERITOCRACY

GREG BROWN

A meritocracy is a method of governance based on rule by ability rather than by preexisting social position, wealth, ethnicity, accident, or other determinants of social position. Meritocratic organizations stress talent and competence, and the term is often used to describe societies in which social class, **status**, and **power** are assigned through competition. Meritocracy is often contrasted with oligarchy (the rule of a minority over the majority). However, the social and economic structures are controlled by **elites** in both cases. What differentiates meritocracy from oligarchy is not the absolute number of members of a ruling or leading class, but the criteria used to choose elites. Hence, aggressively competitive societies that accept significant inequalities of wealth and power are often described as meritocracies and contrasted with egalitarian societies.

Proponents of meritocracy judge that a meritocratic system is more just and productive than other systems. Meritocracies in principle promote equal opportunity through equality before the law and a society free of **race**, age, and **gender** discrimination. Merit is assumed to be distributed "normally" in the population, with the shape of the distribution of merit resembling a "bell curve" with small numbers of incompetent people at the lower end, most people of average abilities in the middle, and small numbers of highly talented people at the upper end.

Critics of meritocracy argue that a system in which social position is determined by objective characteristics is still unrepresentative and thus unstable. For example, characteristics such as intelligence or effort are plainly impossible to measure accurately, and therefore, any implementation of meritocracy necessarily involves a high degree of conjecture and is inherently flawed. **Social Darwinism**—which holds that Charles Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection can be applied

to social institutions—also justifies social inequality on the basis of meritocracy. Moreover, to the extent that differences in talent and productivity are the results of genetics and biology, merit-based systems in which pairs of intelligent and successful people produce offspring will, through natural selection, generate new social inequalities.

The United States is sometimes described as a successful meritocracy in which people are judged on their individual abilities rather than their family connections, though American history is replete with betrayals of meritocratic ideals. For example, the **Founding Fathers** did not view women or blacks as full citizens of the Republic, political dynasties are common, and family connections can ensure acceptance at the best private universities. In fact, in most **Ivy League** institutions—the eight supposedly most select universities of the Northeast—**legacies** make up more than 10 percent of every class. At a few institutions, legacy students are over three times more likely to be admitted than others.

Nonetheless, most Americans see nothing wrong with inequality of income so long as it comes with opportunities for **social mobility**. Social critics assess that this belief in the myth of meritocracy can result in attitudes reflecting acceptance of the greater power and prestige of the wealthy and connected and views of the poor as lazy, unproductive, and deserving of their low status in American society.

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Stephen McNamee and Robert Miller, *The Meritocracy Myth*, 2004; Edward Wolff, *Top Heavy: The Increasing Inequality of Wealth in America and What Can Be Done about It*, 2002; Michael Young, *The Rise of the Meritocracy*, 1870–2033: An Essay on Education and Equality, 1961.

MIDDLE CLASS

ROBERT E. WEIR

Middle class is a maddeningly imprecise term that refers to the social class to which most contemporary Americans *think* they belong. As an analytical category, middle class often measures identity and aspirations with more accuracy than it describes the objective material standing of those claiming middle-class **status**.

Historically the term middle class has always been problematic. In essence, members of the middle class are defined by negation; that is, they are neither members of an elite **upper class** nor members of a more precarious **lower class**, yet they often share the ideological and cultural values of those above them but share the need to work with those below them. Moreover, there is such profound diversity within the middle class in terms of **wealth**, status, **prestige**, and security that most social scientists subdivide the middle class into at least upper and lower categories. In the past four decades, **Marxist** analysts have often spoken of **contradictory class location** to expose the gaps in how the middle class constructs its own identity vis-à-vis the material reality of some of its members.

The middle class as we now speak of it is, in part, a product of the **Industrial Revolution**. In the agrarian-based economy of Colonial society and the early republic, there were indeed individuals who were neither wealthy landowners nor independent yeomen, but even the activity of merchants, shopkeepers, and clerks was often ancillary to agrarian production. Historians routinely refer to such individuals as **middling sorts** because, for the most part, they lacked **class consciousness** and did not see themselves, as Marxists put it, as a class apart. Land ownership remained such a powerful ideal that many of the middling sorts aspired to purchase land. This was true also of wage earners such as craft workers, domestic servants, **indentured servants**, and casual laborers. In their case, wage earning was viewed as a temporary status to be abandoned once capital was raised and land was acquired.

The Industrial Revolution accelerated emerging social and economic trends. Wealthy merchants and investors had long resented their ambiguous social status, and some scholars claim they developed class awareness, though they did not articulate clear class values. More significantly, industrialization further advanced the shift away from agrarianism to an economy based on money, material wealth, property ownership, and income. In essence, it ushered in the triumph of capitalism.

The shift to a money-based economy altered social class composition. Traditional elites often found themselves in possession of great prestige and influence, but relatively lesser wealth than the **nouveau riche** emerging from the manufacturing, investment, and professional sectors of the economy. The demands of the new economy also tended to freeze many workers into a permanent wage-earning status that led to a distinct **working class**. The group between the two is that which became labeled the middle class.

The problem of class definition was, from the start, profound. Middle-class individuals came to view themselves as moral guardians and often resented the snobbery, perceived decadence, and special privileges of the upper class, yet also saw the lower orders as debased, dangerous, dependent, and dirty. Thus, they often aped the values, politics, and cultural practices of the very elites they distrusted; in a word, the middle class cultivated taste. In turn, traditional elites viewed the new middle class as crass **social climbers** and tasteless practitioners of **conspicuous consumption** and as ill-mannered. Moreover, because middle-class wealth was new, few of them lived off of investments, and they shared work patterns and values with the working class rather than elites. Unlike the working class, however, middle-class individuals usually did not engage in manual labor, their very office attire being the origin of the term **white-collar worker**.

The passage of time further complicated middle-class identity. By the late nine-teenth century, some families, such as the **Rockefellers**, had been wealthy for several generations. Although their commercial pursuits still made them suspect to some elites, the patronage of wealthy middle-class members had come to sustain upper-class cultural institutions such as **museums**, the **opera**, and symphony orchestras. By then, it was unclear as to which class ultra-rich investors and manufacturers belonged, but it was certain that it made little sense to consider them in the same category as lower-level managers, functionaries, and service-providing professions.

If wealth complicated matters, values further muddied the waters. Over time, some middle-class values and practices became less consonant with those of the upper class. "Character" became more important than "honor," for example, and the very conception of "respectability" became linked with meaningful and productive work rather than the dilettantism and idle luxury that middle-class individuals came to associate with elites; education, in particular, came to be seen as something that should yield pragmatic returns rather than an end in its own right. Morality, broadly construed but often narrowly defined, became another marker of middle-class identity, as did a tendency toward sentimentality. By the end of the nineteenth century, some members of the middle class were as prone to denouncing the hypocrisy of overbearing and "aristocratic" nature of the upper classes as they were to condemning working-class rabble. Moreover, the emergence of popular, mass-culture entertainments such as professional sports, the circus, amusement parks, and movies led many within the middle class to shift their cultural practices more toward activities favored by the working class.

For much of the nineteenth century, capitalism remained contested, even as it expanded, but by the twentieth century, it was clearly dominant, and older agrarian ideals were rapidly disappearing. The middle class, though distinct, was relatively small for most of the nineteenth century, but it grew larger and more complex in the twentieth. The American economy had clearly shifted toward production of goods and services; by 1910 just fewer than 35 percent of American workers were engaged in agricultural production, a figure that dropped to 15.3 percent in 1950 and that is now under 2 percent. The explosion of the service sector in particular led to increases in white-collar jobs, everything from plant managers and college professors to retail clerks and office workers. As white-collar options expanded, however, the gap between those at the top and the bottom widened, with clerks and other service workers often earning less money and living less-lavish lifestyles than some high-waged members of the working class.

It probably never made sense to view the middle class as a single entity, but by the twentieth century, to do so was simply indefensible intellectually. Stratification scholars such as **W. Lloyd Warner** subdivided the middle class into upper and lower categories. The upper middle class, Warner argued, was made up of high-income executives, professionals, and business people who live in comfort, have large amounts of disposable income, tend toward high-brow taste, have high prestige, and often exert political and social influence. By contrast, the lower middle class is made up of individuals such as teachers, clerical staff, low-level managers, sales personnel, and others whose incomes are modest and who often incur personal and family debt, prefer mass culture, and occupy respectable, but not powerful positions in society. Members of the lower middle class take an especially pragmatic view of education, linking it to **upward mobility**.

Warner was also among those scholars who realized that measurements of class were becoming difficult because self-identification was often more grandiose than material reality. This trend accelerated after World War II for several reasons. First, in comparison with the **Great Depression** and wartime rationing, the postwar period appeared prosperous, and the **American dream** seemed more attainable. Second, the labor militancy that marked the 1930s declined. As unions themselves began to decline, the term "working class" lost its honorable associations and began

to connote marginality, struggle, and debasement. Third, political tensions during the Cold War created pressures for conformity. Related to these was the penchant of office-holders and office-seekers to evoke hypothetical "average" Americans to heighten their own appeal and solicit support for everything from foreign policy initiatives to tax reform, trade agreements, and social programs. Politicians also began to discover that political gain could be made by presenting the middle class as imperiled. Those appeals have had impact; several commentators suggest that a "fear of falling" is a defining characteristic of the modern middle class, one that has made them more prone to embrace conservative politics.

Americans may fear falling, but the National Center for Opinion Research shows a rock-steady belief on the part of most Americans that they are members of the middle class (in some surveys, nearly 95 percent claim this). By the turn of the twenty-first century, 36 percent of American families making less than \$15,000 per year and 71 percent of those earning more than \$75,000 said they are middle class, though the former group earned less than half of the \$40,800 median income, and the latter group was clearly in the top 20 percent income bracket.

This set of data presents challenges to social scientists. Some have begun to detach class from ideology and lifestyle and use income as the sole measure of class. By traditional quintile measurements, 40 percent of Americans belong to the middle classes (lower and upper) by earning 80 percent to 120 percent of the median income. Such an arbitrary measure, however, tells us little about how much disposable income a family has (which would vary according to region), how many wage earners are needed to attain that income, how much prestige they command, how much property they own, or how the income is derived.

Still others have tried to identify the "average" family situation and have developed criteria of living space (about 1800 square feet), number of bathrooms (two-plus), levels of education (21.5 percent have college degrees), and a host of other factors. About all that anyone agrees upon is that middle-class membership is overwhelmingly white (roughly 75 percent) and that the percentage of middle-class families is grossly exaggerated. The definition of middle class was born in ambiguity, and there it remains mired.

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Martin J. Burke, The Conundrum of Class: Public Discourse on the Social Order in America, 1995; Barbara Ehrenreich, Fear of Falling: The Inner Life of the Middle Class, 1990; Theresa Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, and Jay Westbrook, The Fragile Middle Class: Americans in Debt, 2001.

MIDDLETOWN

Andrew Reynolds

Middletown was the name chosen by **Robert S.** and **Helen Lynd** to refer to Muncie, Indiana, which they made the subject of the first and perhaps most famous community study in American sociology. Published in 1929, Middletown: A Study in American

Culture has the distinction of being one of the few best sellers produced by sociologists, and the book has never been out of print. Such achievements could not have been predicted given the project's unusual genesis.

Middletown began as one of several studies of American religious life commissioned by the philanthropist John D. Rockefeller Jr., who imagined organized religion as a potential solution to the class conflicts disrupting business and industry during the early 1900s. The director that Rockefeller's institute eventually settled on to conduct this study was Robert Lynd, an idealistic Presbyterian minister who had previously written an expose of the brutal working conditions maintained by the Rockefeller-controlled Standard Oil Company in Wyoming. Neither Robert, a former publishing executive turned social reformer, nor his wife, Helen, a Columbia graduate in philosophy, possessed significant training in sociology. Nevertheless, they took charge of this proposed study of religion in a small industrial city and ambitiously transformed it into a full-fledged community survey, which Rockefeller's institute refused to support once completed.

The things that peeved *Middletown*'s original backers are the same qualities that many readers have found most engaging and laudable. Rather than examine religion in isolation, the Lynds explored the interactions between different modes of behavior. From cultural anthropology, they adapted a typology of six principal categories of human activity: getting a living, making a home, training the young, using leisure, engaging in religious practices, and engaging in community activities. The Lynds spent nearly two years (1924–25) in Muncie studying these activities, using an unusually wide range of research methods that included participant observation, interviews, questionnaires, statistics, and documentary research. In addition, they considered not one but two moments in Muncie's history, incorporating research about the year 1890 to serve as a baseline against which to compare their present-day findings. The result was perhaps the first attempt at a holistic, ethnographic, diachronic approach to urban sociology.

Although the book's anthropological approach most impressed its initial public, who felt the very texture of their everyday lives to be newly exposed by social science, *Middletown* remains of interest for its unique account of the transition from small-town agrarian to urban industrial America. The book argued that modernization occurred unevenly across and within the six categories of activity and that varying rates of change caused many of the hardships and social problems found in the nation's Middletowns after World War I. For instance, a Middletown woman might employ nineteenth-century psychology to raise her children while being herself subjected to the twentieth-century psychology of advertisers, as her husband operated an up-to-date machine under a Victorian, laissez-faire system of labor. According to the Lynds, making a living often commanded a vanguard position. The most rapid changes occurred as a result of **capitalism**'s concern for increasing production and consumption. Indeed, they argued that class—defined via paid work—had become the major determining factor of all other activities and a predominant cause of social friction.

Over the years, readers have been attracted to *Middletown*'s criticisms of capitalist society and **consumerism**, and the book is regularly compared to **Sinclair Lewis**'s *Babbitt*, though it retains sympathy for its subjects, which is generally missing from the novelist's satire. As writers, the Lynds sought to diagnose the irregularities

of a rapidly transforming culture, and as activists, they supported the type of reform measures soon to appear under Franklin Roosevelt's **New Deal**. Though they remained progressives on these fronts, their book has frequently received criticism regarding its race politics, more specifically the Lynds' selection of ethnically homogeneous Muncie and their overt erasure of African Americans from the picture. Their defense of these decisions—explained as stemming from the need to analyze cultural change apart from racial change—rings hollow. It remains disappointing that the Lynds excluded these groups when they were willing to engage with so many other variables.

In its methodology and its very title, *Middletown* raises the unavoidable questions of representation and typicality. Does the term "middle" describe the region (the Midwest) or the population (the average American), the town's urbanity (poised between village and metropolis) or its culture (the middlebrow)? Or might it suggest a midpoint in the transition to modernity? Perhaps never quite representative, even in its own time, Middletown has become—because of subsequent studies of Muncie, including the Lynds' *Middletown in Transition* and the Middletown III project—the most intensive long-term study of an American community.

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Indiana Magazine of History, 101.3 (2005); Luke E. Lassiter et al., eds., The Other Side of Middletown: Exploring Muncie's African American Community, 2004; Dan Rottenberg, ed., Middletown Jews: The Tenuous Survival of an American Jewish Community, 1997.

MIDDLING SORTS

ROBERT E. WEIR

Middling sorts is a term used to describe individuals of modest means in Colonial America and in the early republic, before it made sense to speak of a middle class. The social status of middling sorts was ambiguous. Many owned small businesses, yet little property; owned their own shops, yet worked with their hands; or operated small farms, but employed no outside wage laborers or indentured servants. As such, they were too humble to be considered elites or independent yeomen, but were not wage earners. The idea of an intermediate category of "middling sorts" is part of the cultural inheritance from Great Britain, though without the problematic classification of propertied gentry (non-aristocratic landowners); American versions of the gentry were generally viewed as elites.

Scholars have long understood that **class formation** is a process rather than a *fait accompli* and that social classes change over time. It is simply a mistake to think of the contemporary middle classes either as an eternal feature of American society or as synonymous with earlier versions of class. Scholars, however, debate class definitions because categories involve both **objective** measurements such as **wealth**, occupation, and material well-being and **subjective** factors such as reputation, **prestige**, culture, and self-identity. If one assumes, however, that a social class consists of individuals sharing similar levels of material comfort, some degree of **class**

consciousness, and institutions through which the collective values can find expression, it is doubtful that a separate middle class existed before the early nine-teenth century. Business owners, for example, were often master artisans working alongside their employees and sharing many of their values and cultural practices. Authority was often paternalistic or embedded in relations viewed as mutual by both parties. Within the larger community, a barter economy and informal credit arrangements coexisted with a cash economy, leading some scholars to view it as proto-capitalist rather than a full-fledged capitalist system. This view is bolstered by the fact that many small business owners shared the humbler citizens' antipathy toward the rich.

Some researchers locate the articulation of middle-class values in the eighteenth century, but as long as employers, small farmers, and shopkeepers perceived themselves in mutual economic and social relationships with employees and the broader community, it is hard to make the case for separate social classes. It is equally hard to argue for the existence of a **working class** by most measures of social stratification. Neither group could be said to have developed views of being a class in and of itself or of creating more than rudimentary organizations to advance an agenda.

The spread of the **factory system** in the early nineteenth century hastened the process by which local markets yielded to regional and national ones. This also tended to segregate once-unified productive, wholesale, and retail activities into discrete market functions, often with the resultant loss of local control over economic relationships. By the late 1820s, a host of customary economic and social practices were eroding, and new corporate, commercial, and business practices were emerging. As society grew more complex, and a money-based economy began to challenge **agrarianism**, groups that once saw their interests and values as mutual parted ways. In essence, the middling sorts gave way to the middle class, and their employees became the working classes. Mutualism was a victim of class consciousness, with **class struggle** marking relations for much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

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MIGRANT LABOR

ELVIRA JENSEN-CASADO

"Migrant labor" is a term is given to workers, mainly agricultural, who move from place to place to harvest crops or fruit as they ripen. Since the 1940s, thousands of workers have come from other countries, especially Mexico, to work in United States. Migrants (legal or illegal) who travel to the United States typically do so for

economic reasons. Migrants are a cheap workforce, and they very often have few, if any, legal protections. Migrants may be transported by a contractor or travel on their own.

Migrants can also be internal, however. In the 1930s a fatal combination of economic depression, severe droughts, and increased output resulting from mechanization triggered a large migration from Plains states such as Arkansas, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas toward the West. In *The Grapes of Wrath*, John Steinbeck depicted the misery of these migrants. During World War II, an urgent need for labor in the defense industries led to more internal migration. Southerners, especially women and African Americans, relocated to industrial cities and took jobs in defense plants. Unlike agricultural laborers, however, they were protected by wage and labor laws.

Also during World War II (as in World War I), the federal government recruited guest agricultural workers from Mexico under the *bracero* program, ostensibly to meet manpower shortages, but also to fulfill the demands of agribusiness (see **Agrarianism**) for cheap labor. Many relocated permanently to the United States. By the 1950s, much of the harvest was planted, tended, and harvested by a mobile workforce, especially those of Mexican, Filipino, Puerto Rican, Jamaican, and Latino heritage. Conditions and wages were often poor. In the 1960s this migrant labor force coalesced under the leadership of César Chávez and began to organize marches and strikes. In 1962 Chávez founded a group that later became the United Farm Workers of America, a union that seeks recognition of the importance and dignity of all farm workers. During the 1970s, more than 65 percent of California's grape cultivators signed contracts with the United Farm Workers.

Although information, ideas, goods, and highly skilled people move freely, low-skilled workers encounter many obstacles and dangers. They are frequently marginalized and denied the rights held by regular citizens. New migrants and settled migrants often form an **underclass** in the receiving country. Most developed countries feel the need for low-skilled laborers to perform undesirable tasks, but fulfillment of those tasks does not lead to easy social acceptance.

Immigration fulfilled labor needs until the 1920s. Since that time, employers and much of the American public have preferred short-term workers who return to their homelands upon completing their assigned tasks. This has been especially the case since World War II. The bracero program formally lapsed in 1964, but a pattern of illegal entry into the United States from Mexico was already well established. In 1954 the government tried to control illegal entry of Mexicans by repatriating 1 million illegals, but a 2005 estimate places the total number of illegal immigrants to the United States at over 10.3 million. This is in part because that the demand for cheap labor has never changed. Authorities spend billions of dollars trying to stop illegal immigration at the southern border of United States at the same time that thousands of legal immigrants enter through the airport doors. One of the problems is the enormous difference between North and South; wages for equivalent work can be eight times higher in the United States than in Mexico. Both local and national politicians use migrant labor as a punching ball when in need of votes, yet seldom design effective strategies to deal with meeting American labor needs or addressing regional wage disparities.

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Susan Ferriss, Ricardo Sandoval, and Diana Hembree, *The Fight in the Fields: Cesar Chavez and the Farmworkers Movement*, 1998; Daniel Rothenberg; *With These Hands: The Hidden World of Migrant Farmworkers Today*, 1998; Charles Dillard Thomson and Melinda Wiggins, eds., *The Human Cost of Food: Farmworkers' Lives, Labor, and Advocacy*, 2002.

MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX

ROBERT E. WEIR

The term "military-industrial complex" was coined by President Dwight Eisenhower to describe a post–World War II alliance between business, the military, and politicians. Eisenhower used this phrase in his farewell address as he left the presidency on January 17, 1961.

Eisenhower saw this growing power as dangerous and antithetical to the nation's long-term economic and political interests. He warned that increased spending on military hardware would shift industrial production away from consumer goods. An even greater concern was that the alliance was inherently dangerous to American **democracy**. By placing such enormous economic and political **power** in one place, a **corporate class** could easily fall prey to self-interest or be influenced by lobbyists and others whose agendas were not necessarily the economic well-being of the American public.

Many of Eisenhower's predictions proved to be true. Particularly alarming was America's fall from industrial dominance. Shortly after World War II, the United States was the world leader in such products as automobiles, electronics, glass, rubber, and steel. By 1980 the United States was importing many of these items, a shift that entailed the loss of tens of thousands of **blue-collar** jobs, the weakening of the **labor movement**, and rising trade deficits. The U.S. economy is now so thoroughly integrated with the military that the loss of military contracts can lead to soaring **unemployment** in regions dependent on military production. It has also unhinged rational economic decision making to some degree. When the Cold War ended in the 1990s, for instance, there was no longer a need to make many of the weapons and delivery systems that had fueled the arms race. To cancel such programs, however, requires the cooperation of the very politicians who are part of the military-industrial complex, most of whom are loath to curtail spending that would cause economic distress in their regions. Hence, taxpayers continue to pick up the tab for some weapons that the military itself does not want.

The long-term economic and social class implications of the military-industrial complex are still unfolding. See **Corporate Class** for more on the latter.

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Dwight Eisenhower, Farewell Speech to the Nation, 1961 (http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/ike.htm); Chalmers Johnson and Sharon Kay, eds., *Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic*, 2005.

MILITARY RECRUITING

ROBERT E. WEIR

How the military meets its personnel needs has, historically, been conditioned as much by social class as by patriotism. The armed forces fill their ranks through either voluntary or compulsory methods, the latter of which often meet with resistance. Social class can also determine how a recruit is assigned, promoted, and treated.

Social class has long been a feature of military life. During the American Revolution, most of the leaders came from the upper class, whereas most foot soldiers in the Continental Army and impromptu local militias (such as the Minutemen) were of artisans, farmers, and journeymen. Many were poorly clad, underfed, and exposed to privation. Moreover, most were paid in scrip and greenbacks that proved of little value after the war, an impoverishing factor that led to postwar popular uprisings such as Shays's Rebellion and the Whiskey Rebellion.

Modern military conscriptions (drafts) first appeared in France in 1798 during the Napoleonic wars, but it was not until the **Civil War** that a draft appeared in America. Both the Confederacy and the Union used conscription to meet military needs, but the practice met with resistance in both sections. The Southern law passed on April 16, 1862, and made all whites age eighteen to thirty-five eligible for three years of military service. Subsequent amendments raised the upper age limit to forty-five and then fifty. The Confederate draft was decidedly class-based. Until popular anger caused the policy's revocation, it was possible for wealthy Southerners to hire substitutes, but all forms of the draft exempted those who held more than twenty slaves. There were also exemptions for civil servants and a host of other professions that favored the privileged, and the Southern draft met resistance in the backcountry, where small farmers were less likely to own slaves.

The North enacted a draft on March 3, 1863, and it induced immediate disapproval from many Union residents. Some resented being drafted to fight for the end of **slavery**, whereas recent **Irish** and other **immigrants** saw the law as affecting the poor and not the wealthy. That charge had merit; numerous upper- and **middle-class** occupations were exempt from the draft, and it was possible to hire a substitute or simply buy an exemption for \$300, a trifling sum for the rich, but more than a half-year's pay for most laborers. In New York City, the imposition of the draft sparked several days of rioting that left dozens dead and millions of dollars of property damage. The draft was so unpopular that more substitutes than draftees served, and in some places, such as New York, as few as 6 percent of those eligible to be drafted ever served. Still, class tension was so prevalent among Northern soldiers that many units were led by popularly elected "political generals" rather than those trained at West Point.

Until the mid-twentieth century, the United States had a small standing peace-time military, and hence, it could meet its needs on a volunteer basis. Officers usually came from the upper and upper middle class and recruits from society's lower ranks, but there was little public discussion of military recruiting until World War I erupted in Europe. When the United States entered the conflict in 1917, another draft was instituted, and again, protests greeted it. The war was not immediately

popular, and various **anarchist**, **socialist**, and radical groups opposed it. A constitutional challenge to the draft was set aside by a 1918 Supreme Court ruling, and the U.S. government launched a propaganda campaign in support of the war and passed laws such as the Espionage Act of 1917 to quash dissent. Leftists such as **Eugene Debs**, "**Big Bill" Haywood**, and other members of the **Industrial Workers of the World** were prosecuted for impeding the war effort and for encouraging the **working class** to evade the draft. More than 65,000 individuals declared themselves conscientious objectors (COs) to the war, and over 300,000 evaded the draft.

The United States again reduced its troop strength upon the war's completion, and voluntary service replaced the draft. The 1940 Selective Training and Service Act (STSA) was America's first peacetime conscription act, though it came on the cusp of World War II. For two years, a lottery system determined service, but it became universal when hostilities ensued. The United States entered the conflict in December 1941, and tours of duty were extended to the duration of the war, plus six months. The STSA expired in 1947, but was renewed in 1948.

There was relatively little opposition to the wartime draft, though 12,000 filed as COs, and a few resisters were jailed. Nonetheless, elements of **racism** and class bias remained present. African Americans served in segregated units until 1953, despite an order from President Truman to integrate the military six years earlier. Women remained excluded from combat units until the 1980s. As for whites, the lower one's **socioeconomic status**, the more likely one was to be assigned to the infantry, and the less likely one was to be promoted.

The draft remained in effect after World War II; it was the first time in American history that the nation did not disarm following a conflict. The emerging **Cold War** led to increasing manpower needs, as did the opening of U.S. military bases overseas. The STSA was expanded in 1951 by the Universal Military and Service Act, a more aggressive draft aimed at meeting personnel needs during the Korean War.

The Cold War and the relentless **Red Scare** associated with the 1950s led millions of American males to reconsider military service. The high-profile tours of duty of popular culture icons such as Ted Williams and **Elvis Presley** also removed much of the perception (if not the reality) that the military was stratified by social class. By the late 1950s, military service was widely accepted as a rite of passage for boys on the cusp of adulthood. Local judges often gave troubled teens a choice between jail or enlistment, the poor saw military service as an avenue for upward **social mobility**, and middle-class males often enrolled in officer-training programs to control their destiny better. Moreover, the 1944 Servicemen's Readjustment Act, better known as the GI Bill, linked military service with benefits such as educational training, medical care, and low-interest home loans, which dovetailed with post–World War II notions of an emerging middle-class society.

Equity was more apparent than real. The Marine Corps and Army received recruits that were, on the average, poorer and less educated than the recruits of the Navy or Air Force, and the latter two tended to offer training skills more adaptable to civilian life. The American combat phase of the Vietnam War (1964–73) was destined to magnify class issues associated with the military. Although the percentage of African American and Latino troops serving in Vietnam was roughly equal

to their overall representation in American society, such troops—as well as poor whites—were far more likely to serve in direct combat. Occupational exemptions and student deferments meant that affluent whites found it easier to avoid service. In one New Mexico congressional district, not a single draftee came from a family with a net worth of over \$5,000, and the 1970 Harvard graduating class of 1,200 men saw only fifty-six of its members enter the military and only two of them serve in Vietnam, neither in combat. There were 248 sons of congressional representatives who came of age during the Vietnam conflict; only twenty-eight served in Vietnam. Many who later became conservative supporters of the military dodged Vietnam or service of any sort. Actor Sylvester Stallone of *Rambo* fame lived in Switzerland during the war, former Vice President Dan Quayle sat out the war in a National Guard appointment wrangled by his powerful father, and former Representative Newt Gingrich and Vice President Dick Cheney never served at all.

As the Vietnam War grew more unpopular, draft resistance and desertion rates skyrocketed. According to **Howard Zinn**, the number of college students enrolled in the Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) dropped from nearly 192,000 in 1966 to just 72,459 in 1973, and many universities threw ROTC off campus. More than 170,000 Americans obtained CO status, up to 100,000 Americans fled the country to avoid the draft, and many times that number simply refused to register or show up for induction. Anti-Vietnam protests increasingly turned into broader attacks on the **military-industrial complex**. Many intellectuals and protestors revived arguments dating back to Sigmund Freud and H. G. Wells that conscription was a form of **slavery**. The U.S. military first responded by scaling back the draft; between 1969 and 1973, a lottery was put into place. In 1973 the draft was ended. As Vietnam wound down to its conclusion, so too did antiwar protests.

The all-volunteer military met with initial challenges, but increased military spending under presidents Jimmy Carter and **Ronald Reagan** allowed for generous recruitment packages that proved attractive, especially to cash-strapped college-bound students. Many liberals retain notions of the military that are holdovers from the Vietnam era—mainly that it is a repository for the poor and disadvantaged. In truth, standards for induction have steadily increased, and many in the **lower classes** lack the educational preparation for entrance. Overall recruitment levels rose until the outbreak of the second Gulf War in 2003.

The early twenty-first century profile of the U.S. military is more in line with overall demographics. African Americans and Latinos still serve in disproportionately high percentages, and recruiters often target neighborhoods where other economic options are limited, but the average recruit now comes from a family whose annual income is just slightly under the national norm. That same recruit also has more education and a higher IQ than the aggregate public at large. In addition, African American recruitment has fallen steadily since the invasion of Iraq in 2003; blacks made up 24 percent of recruits in 2000 but just 17 percent by 2005. Social and economic vulnerability are no longer the primary inducements for service.

Declining recruitment since 2003 has revived discussion of a new draft, perhaps one that offers an option of nonmilitary service as well. Such an idea has proved a hard sell among the middle classes, and two separate bills put before Congress in 2003 went down to resounding defeat. The American public has recently shown support for the idea of military service, but the historical contempt for compulsory

service remains. Since 1980 men reaching the age of eighteen have been required to register with the Selective Service Agency in case a new draft is needed, but even such a seemingly benign bill required mild compulsion in order to implement, and perhaps as many as 20 percent of American males are in noncompliance.

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MILL, JOHN STUART (May 20, 1806–May 8, 1873)

TINA MAVRIKOS-ADAMOU

John Stuart Mill was an influential British liberal thinker of the nineteenth century whose wide-ranging interests spanned from philosophy and moral and political thought to economics and logic. Mill's major works include System of Logic (1843), Essays on Some Unsettled Questions of Political Economy (1844), Principles of Political Economy with Some of Their Applications to Social Philosophy (1848), On Liberty (his most famous political essay, 1859), Utilitarianism (1863), Subjection of Women (1869), and his Autobiography (1873).


He was greatly influenced by his father, James Mill, who taught him exclusively from a very early age and steered his intellectual development, grooming him to become a major contributor to the scholarly discussions of his time. Later, Mill was influenced by his wife, Harriet Taylor Mill, who became the efficacious voice behind his ideas promoting the political emancipation of women and, more generally, women's rights. In 1865 Mill was elected to the House of Commons within the British Parliament, and he held the Liberal Member of Parliament (MP) seat for Westminster until 1868, a seat that had attained a reputation during that era of being a "radical" one. His main preoccupation while MP, although unsuccessful in the end (in part because it was considered precocious), was to support the amending of the 1867 Reform Bill to give women the right to vote.

Mill became known within the British political world as an articulate exponent of liberalism, the political belief that liberty is a political value of importance above and beyond all others. In his essay titled "On Liberty," Mill framed an argument for the freedom of the individual by stating that "the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection." This much quoted principle embodies the notion that no government has the right to prevent the free development of human individuality, and Mill thereafter gained the reputation of being a classic defender of political and social rights.

Many have likewise turned to John Stuart Mill for popularizing the idea of utilitarianism, which was originally articulated by British philosopher Jeremy Bentham, who brought forth the notion that governments' modus operandi should be

to promote the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people. Mill sought to broaden the Benthamite principle of utility, however, to include the notion of liberty and the role and importance of the individual within society, and he supported the political participation of the emerging working class in Britain.

As with utilitarianism, John Stuart Mill likewise sought to extend classical economic thought by including noneconomic factors into his discussion, such as emphasizing the role of history, and he made connections in his writings among government, tradition, and custom and related them to class structure. Mill's main discussion of social classes is found in his Principles of Political Economy with Some of Their Applications to Social Philosophy (1848), in which he emphasized the practical aspects of political economy that he felt needed to be balanced with the more theoretical discussions that had been articulated by previous classical writers on the subject, such as Adam Smith and David Ricardo. Although ini-



John Stuart Mill. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

tially adhering to the basic principles of a laissez-faire system, Mill maintained his concern with political freedom, coming to realize later that a free-market economic environment needed also to secure for laborers **minimum wages** and education that allowed them to enjoy political freedom and participate in and support **democracy**.

Affected by industrialization and the ensuing emergence of new social classes in society brought on by **capitalism**, Mill focused many of his comments in the *Principles of Political Economy* on capitalist production, distribution, **wages**, population, investment, and growth. This work was so influential that it became a major economic textbook of the time and had as much impact in the United States as in Britain.

His *Autobiography* was written twenty-five years after *Principles of Political Economy* and after the 1848 social revolutions across Europe. Mill was drawn to some of the notions of decentralized **socialism**, particularly the ideas of Robert Owen and Charles Fourier, who discussed cooperative productive and distributive networks as possible, even desirable. Mill, however, never gave up his emphasis on individual liberty as the most important political imperative. Perhaps more than anything else, Mill will be remembered for his fair-minded way, his concern for individual liberty (of both men and women), and his uncanny ability to elucidate the interconnections among the most important social, political, and economic issues of the time. Mill was often invoked as the capitalist antidote to unfettered **Social Darwinism**.

Suggested Reading

John Stuart Mill, *Principles of Political Economy with Some of Their Applications to Social Philosophy*, 1848; J. M. Robson, ed., *The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill*, 33 volumes, 2000; John Skorupski, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Mill*, 1998.

MILLS, C. WRIGHT (August 8, 1916–March 20, 1962)

MICHAEL A. VASTOLA

Charles Wright Mills was an American sociologist. The Texas-born Mills earned his PhD from the University of Wisconsin at Madison in 1941, and he accepted a faculty position at Columbia University in 1946, where he taught until his death from a heart attack at the age of forty-five.

Mills wrote prolifically during his short and controversial career. His topics ranged from theories about methodology in the social sciences to analyses of corporate power in the United States. He was greatly influenced by **Marxism** and by **Max Weber**, though Mills was critical of certain aspects of both Marxist and Weberian thought. Marxism's most visible influences on Mills can be located in his intense interest in class stratification in capitalist societies, as well as its impact on social institutions such as universities and large corporations.

In his first major work, White Collar (1951), Mills referred to white-collar workers as "the unwilling vanguard of modern society." By this he meant that these socially alienated individuals—whose alienation was greater than that of the traditional proletariat—were part of the new bureaucracies that made up industrial society in the United States of the 1950s. The white-collar workers' plight resulted from their work being completely divorced from material production, yet every bit as boring as forms of labor that produced material objects. This analysis drew heavily upon the conventional Marxist critique of the division of labor in which small tasks are delegated to specific, specialized groups who, in the name of efficiency, perform the same simplistic, unsatisfying, and repetitive tasks throughout their working lives.

In many ways, White Collar was more of a general social criticism than a scholarly sociological analysis. This approach characterized most of Mills's mature work and provided him with the opportunity to critique structures of power in subtle ways that do not lend themselves to empirical or strictly statistical descriptions. For instance, Mills insisted that the social and economic paradigm under which the white-collar worker labored was maintained and reproduced by a less overtly repressive form of power than previous forms of exploitation. His notion that psychological and covert forms of domination—manipulation instead of physical repression—is viewed by many as crucial to understanding modern society's oppressive power structures.

Mills's second major work, *The Power Elite* (1956), is often seen as his magnum opus. Mills critiqued what he saw as the three major organizations of **power** in the United States: the military, corporations, and political **elites**. Mills contended that the corporate elite had the greatest influence within the general social structure, but that each group was intimately related to the others because of the social, racial,

and economic homogeneity of their respective leaders. In fact, they tended to replicate themselves to the point where they were interchangeable within elite ranks. This also meant that military, corporate, and government networks overlapped, with the same individuals active in each.

Mills was less certain (and inconsistent) about whether elite control was conspiratorial or a product of the manipulative, sometimes hidden forms of domination that keep the division of labor consistent in American society. He prophetically argued that military concerns—which he dubbed a "metaphysic"—were ascendant. (He even saw union officials as complicit with the military metaphysic.) In 1961 President Dwight Eisenhower evoked the power elite when he warned of an emergent military-industrial complex that threatened American democracy.

Mills's method of analysis in his major work was driven by his desire to critique society without pretending to be neutral. In fact, he insisted that neutrality was both impossible and undesirable, a trait that separated Mills from most of his contemporaries and the overwhelming majority of today's mainstream sociologists. His controversial approach was brilliantly articulated in his last major work, The Sociological Imagination (1959). Here Mills expounded upon the many strengths and significant weaknesses of his unique system of thought. First, Mills was unapologetically indebted to the Enlightenment tradition and its emphasis on the primacy of reason, which he viewed as crucial for the creation of a just society. This led Mills to place intellectuals at the social foreground and to demand that greater imagination be brought to bear on a "humanist sociology" capable of connecting personal and social phenomena to the study of history. In other words, Mills opposed the very ideal of social science as detached, supposedly objective studies of the social world. In his personal life, Mills was prone to flamboyance, and he spoke approvingly of social activism, which was in its infancy when he died. Mills married three times, liked fast motorcycles, and embraced a bohemian lifestyle. As a conflict theorist, he had little patience with ideology and proclaimed that the activist traditions of the Industrial Workers of the World were more to his liking than the philosophical musings of doctrinaire Marxists.

One shortcoming of Mills's conception of legitimate intellectual labor lies in his uneasy relationship with the possibility of objective analysis. Likewise, Mills's conception of the intellectual—when coupled with his belief that the **masses** were afflicted with **false consciousness**—can be criticized for drawing upon an elitist notion of emancipation. At times, his schema seems to suggest that only a clear-thinking academic elite can liberate the masses. But ultimately, Mills's most controversial positions are the ones that act as thoroughgoing critiques of class society and the power structures that reproduce it. His ideas found immediate application in the 1962 Port Huron Statement penned by Tom Hayden on behalf of the **Students for a Democratic Society** (Hayden had written his MA thesis on Mills). Likewise, the very existence of a power elite is now taken for granted by many contemporary scholars.

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Irving L. Horowitz, C. Wright Mills: An American Utopian, 1983; C. Wright Mills, White Collar, 1951; Mills, The Power Elite, 1956; Mills, The Sociological Imagination, 1959.

MINIMUM WAGE

Laura Hernández-Ehrisman

Minimum wage refers to the minimum rate a worker can be paid per hour as set by statute. The first federally mandated minimum wage was established in 1933 as part of the National Recovery Act, when a twenty-five-cent-per-hour standard was set. However, the Supreme Court declared the act unconstitutional in 1935, and the minimum wage was abolished. The same twenty-five-cent minimum wage was reestablished in the United States in 1938 as part of the Fair Labor Standards Act. The last year the minimum wage was changed was 1997, when it was set to \$5.15 per hour (workers under age twenty can be paid \$4.25 an hour for their first ninety days of employment). Individual states also have minimum wage laws, ranging from \$2.65 in Kansas (for some jobs not covered by the federal rate) to \$7.63 an hour in Washington. For workers living in states with minimum wage laws, the worker is entitled to the higher of the two wages. Minimum wage laws apply to most labor, with some exceptions for agricultural work.

The first minimum wage statutes came in the context of the **Great Depression** and were designed to alleviate **poverty** and help the nation's **working poor**. The benefits of subsequent minimum wage increases disproportionately help working households at the bottom 20 percent of the income scale. Single women and minority groups also benefit from increases, as they are also over represented among the working poor.

Those who oppose minimum wage laws, including many economists and many small businesses and retailers, argue that increasing the minimum wage will simply increase unemployment, as small businesses that pay such wages are forced to make layoffs. Some argue that minimum wage laws prevent the poorest individuals from breaking into the job market. Specifically, they argue that these laws hurt teenage and entry-level workers with few skills, who need low-level jobs to break into the labor force. Other arguments against the minimum wage include the belief that there are more effective ways to fight poverty, including the Earned Income Tax Credit and other tax benefits for those in the lowest income brackets.

The historical record has demonstrated that most minimum wage workers are, in fact, adults and are primarily members of the **lower class**. In the past two decades, minimum wage workers have been concentrated in the retail trade industry. They are also the least likely group of workers to be represented by unions. Supporters of minimum wage laws also point to recent research by Princeton economists David Card and Alan Krueger. Having examined the fast-food industry, they argue that job losses resulting from minimum wage laws are minimal if not nonexistent. Critics have claimed that their research is flawed; however, other economists have supported their results. A 1998 EPI study failed to find any systematic, significant job loss associated with minimum wage increases.

The real value of the minimum wage has varied over the years. In 1968 the minimum wage had its highest purchasing value, when it was \$1.60 an hour (\$7.51 in 2005 dollars). Between 1979 and 1989, the minimum wage lost 31 percent of its real value. By contrast, between 1989 and 1997, the minimum wage was raised four times and recovered about one-third of the value it had lost in the 1980s. Today,

the minimum wage is 32 percent of the average hourly wage of American workers, the lowest level since 1949. The real value of the minimum wage is \$4.15 (in 2005 dollars).

During his presidency, Bill Clinton gave states the power to set their minimum wages above the federal level. In early 2006 Maryland became the eighteenth state in the nation to enact a law that raised the minimum wage above the federal level. As of 2006, for example, each of the New England states had minimum wages that exceeded the federal floor, with figures ranging from a low of \$6.75 per hour in Massachusetts to a high of \$7.40 in Connecticut. In addition, some counties and cities observe minimum wages that are higher than the state as a whole. Community activists have also turned to **living wage** campaigns, often at the level of municipal government. Many progressive politicians in the United States advocate linking the minimum wage to the Consumer Price Index, thereby producing small annual increases rather than the larger hikes that tend to be adopted when legislation to raise the minimum wage is passed.

Democrats, after recapturing Congress in the 2006 elections, have made raising the minimum wage a centerpiece of their agenda. Barring unforeseen political wrangling, the federal rate should rise to \$7.25 per hour by 2009, a level that is still considered too low by many experts and one that is eclipsed by several state laws.

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David Card and Alan Krueger, Myth and Measurement: The New Economics of the Minimum Wage, 1997; Economic Policy Institute (http://www.epi.org).

MOLLY MAGUIRES

MARK NOON

The Molly Maguires were an alleged group of **Irish American** assassins active in the coalfields of Pennsylvania in the 1870s. In all, twenty Irish laborers alleged to be Molly Maguires were hanged between June 1877 and October 1879, the prevailing sentiment at the time being that justice had been served. Later, however, Eugene Debs declared that those who died were "the first martyrs of the **class struggle** in the United States."

Considerable debate rages over who the Molly Maguires were, and some analysts altogether doubt the existence of the secret society. Others see them as ruthless, alcoholic cutthroats and still others as **working-class** martyrs battling **robber barons**. Many researchers share Debs's view that the Mollies embodied class struggle in America's developing industrial economy. The battle pitted exploited miners against the corporate capitalists who controlled the mines and railroads.

Northeastern Pennsylvania's anthracite coalfields were indeed violent. At least sixteen men were murdered between 1862 and 1875, many of them high-ranking mine officials. There were also numerous beatings and incidents of industrial sabotage. Blame was placed on the Molly Maguires, a secret terrorist organization allegedly named for an older Irish peasant organization that attacked landlords. In

America, the Mollies were also associated with the Ancient Order of Hibernians (AOH), a fraternal organization. All those convicted of Molly Maguire crimes were members of the order, and the Mollies may have been a secret society within the AOH. The group was also frequently linked with the Workingmen's Benevolent Association (WBA), an emerging trade union in a period hostile to the **labor movement**. Founded in 1868 by Irish-born miner John Siney, the WBA battled mine owners during the Long Strike of 1875, a losing six-month effort that ended when hungry miners were forced to accept a 20 percent pay cut.

The WBA was defeated by the Philadelphia and Reading Coal and Iron Company (PRCIC), the corporate power that dominated the lower anthracite region. Its ambitious president, Franklin B. Gowen, was determined to break unionization efforts. To that end, he hired undercover operatives from the Pinkerton National Detective Agency, including James McParlan, who infiltrated the AOH and provided evidence crucial to the conviction of the Molly Maguires. McParlan's testimony has been called into question, and some scholars view him as an agent provocateur. His investigation was also marked by vigilantism against suspected members of the Mollies and their families. Gowen, who was a district attorney in Schuylkill County—the center of Molly Maguire activity—prior to heading the PRCIC, served as star prosecutor at the Molly Maguire trials. His active role has fueled claims that the railroad company president used the region's violence as pretext to demonize and destroy the union. Gowen was largely successful at creating the impression that the Molly Maguires and the WBA were one and the same. Historian Harold Aurand judged the investigations and trials as "one of the most astounding surrenders of sovereignty in American history," one in which a private firm hired private investigators to bring charges against those singled out by the company. In Aurand's words, "the state provided only the courtroom and the hangman."

Gowen also planted the view that the crimes were rooted in the savagery of the Irish, an image that dovetailed with prevailing nativism and popular anti-Catholicism. The Mollies' myth was sealed by an 1878 dime novel, *The Molly Maguires and the Detectives*, ghostwritten by detective agency president Allen Pinkerton (1819–84). Employers across the nation found it expedient to raise the specter of secret-society violence to crush labor unions, with "Molly Maguirism" spreading fear among the **middle class** in much the same fashion as **anarchism** and **communism** later would.

The image of the Molly Maguires as a violent band of thugs endured until the **Great Depression**, when two books were published that depicted the convicted men more sympathetically by addressing the motivation for the crimes. *The Molly Maguires: The True Story of Labor's Martyred Pioneers in the Coalfields* (1932) was written by Anthony Bimba, a labor historian and member of the **Communist Party**. Bimba, himself a victim of a **Red Scare** in 1926, viewed the executions of the Mollies as a travesty of justice and nothing short of state-sanctioned murders. J. Walter Coleman's *The Molly Maguire Riots: Industrial Conflict in the Pennsylvania Coal Fields* (1936) was more subtle and was the first to question the tactics of the Pinkerton Detective Agency and the fairness of the trials of the accused men.

In the late 1950s Dartmouth professor Wayne G. Broehl took advantage of newly opened files from both the Reading Railroad and the Pinkerton Detective Agency. His *The Molly Maguires* (1964) was the standard work on the subject for several decades, though critics question the author's acceptance of contemporary accounts of the Molly Maguires and his perceived pro-Pinkerton bias. In the same year that Broehl's book was published, a semifictional account appeared that was more sensitive to the plight of the miners. Arthur H. Lewis, a journalist and native of the coal region, penned *Lament for the Molly Maguires* (1964), which was later optioned for a Hollywood film.

The Molly Maguires (1970), produced by Paramount Pictures and starring Sean Connery and Richard Harris, brought the Molly Maguires back into the public consciousness. It was directed by Martin Ritt (1914–90), who was noted for themes of social justice; he and the film's screenwriter, Walter Bernstein, had both been blacklisted in the 1950s for their political activities. The film is now praised as an artistic success, but it flopped at the box office. Some detractors say it was more about social justice in the 1960s than in the 1870s, with heavy parallels drawn between the Irish Molly Maguires and militant movements such as the Black Panther Party and the Weathermen offshoot of **Students for a Democratic Society**. Historian Joseph Curren is among those who noted that miners with blackened faces resorted to filmic violence that was legitimized much as radical black revolutionaries justified their own actions.

Ritt denied that *The Molly Maguires* was a parable of any sort, though he did develop racial and labor themes in later films such as *The Great White Hope* (1970), *Sounder* (1972), and *Norma Rae* (1979). Recent works on the Molly Maguires—including documentary films, Web sites, and even a musical play—generally depict them as victims and martyrs. *Making Sense of the Molly Maguires* (1998), written by Kevin Kenny, an Irish native and a history professor at the University of Texas at Austin, locates the Molly Maguires in Irish history as well as within the social, cultural, and political world of post—**Civil War** America. He points to ethnic gang warfare as the source of much of the violence in the region—perhaps as much of a factor as labor conditions.

With the **deindustrialization** of the mining industry in northeastern Pennsylvania, some area residents see the Mollies as a symbol of the region's ethnic and working-class heritage. For many, the Molly Maguires represent not only coal miners and their capacity for hard work, but also resistance to oppression. Even more ironically, working-class communities impoverished by the closing of mines are increasingly turning to tourism to aid the local economy. One such village is Eckley, Pennsylvania, the primary site of the filming of *The Molly Maguires*. It has been preserved by the Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission and attracts tourists interested in learning more about life in nineteenth-century mining villages. Other communities have sought to cash in by conducting tours of coal mines, **Gilded Age** mansions, and the prisons where Molly Maguires were chained and hanged. There are also periodic reenactments of the trials.

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MONDAY NIGHT FOOTBALL

ADAM R. HORNBUCKLE

Monday Night Football (MNF), a long-running sports broadcast that has had social class implications, debuted on September 21, 1970, with a game between the Cleveland Browns and the New York Jets. One of the American Broadcasting Company's (ABC) most successful television shows, MNF ranked as the second-longest-running prime-time television show, behind 60 Minutes of the Columbia Broadcasting Service (CBS). Popular among American men, especially younger middle-class professionals and the working class, MNF ended its thirty-six-year association with ABC with a game between the New England Patriots and the New York Jets on December 26, 2005, and began the 2006 season with ESPN.

Traditionally, the National Football League (NFL) played most of its games on Sunday, but in the mid-to-late 1960s, the NFL experimented with prime-time telecasts. Before the start of the 1970 season, NFL Commissioner Pete Rozelle approached the three major television networks with a proposal to televise one prime-time game a week. Although each of the networks expressed reluctance to disrupt regularly scheduled programming with a prime-time football game, ABC signed a contract with the NFL to begin televising the games at the start of the 1970 season. ABC's decision came after Rozelle revealed his intention to take the proposal to the fledgling independent Hughes Sports Network, owned by the reclusive billionaire Howard Hughes.

Monday Night Football became an instant success, largely because of Roone Arledge, then the president of ABC Sports programming. After an Emmy-winning career at NBC, he had joined ABC to produce college football games in 1960. Arledge approached college football telecasts from the perspective of the program rather the game, creating an entertaining spectacle through the innovative use of cameras, microphones, and film editing. He placed the game in the broader college experience by capturing overhead views of the game, the college campus, and surrounding environs. Arledge captured the action of the gridiron as well as the emotion and excitement of the spectators, cheerleaders, band members, and coaches. As a result, spectators deliberately became an integral part of the performance, waving banners, running out on the field, and wearing unusual and outlandish costumes. Slow motion—stop action instant replay, however, may have been the most revolutionary of Arledge's innovations, and the NFL adopted the technique to review disputed plays. MNF also pioneered the use of computerized graphics, such as a first down marker superimposed onto the field during play.

Monday Night Football appealed to middle-class professional and working-class males partly because of its cast of announcers rich in personality and NFL playing experience. The original broadcast team of Frank Gifford, Howard Cosell, and Don Meredith, from 1971 to 1983, with short appearances by retired players Alex Karras, Fred Williamson, Fran Tarkenton, and O. J. Simpson, set the tone of the commentary. While Gifford described play-by-play, Meredith analyzed the videotape instant replays, and Cosell provided color commentary. The lively exchanges between the caustic Cosell and the glib Meredith popularized the show, boosted its ratings, and won Meredith an Emmy. In 1983 Cosell left MNF amid controversy

surrounding his description of the Dallas Cowboys' African American wide receiver Alvin Garrett as a "little monkey."

Al Michaels, Frank Gifford, and Dan Dierdorf formed the core of commentators from 1987 to 1997, with Lynn Swann providing commentary from the field from 1994 to 1997. In the following year, Lesley Visser replaced Swann in providing on-field commentary, becoming the first *MNF* female announcer. Visser's hiring also addressed charges that *MNF* and the NFL in general relentlessly promoted macho values and engaged in de facto **gender stratification**. Retaining only Michaels in 2000, ABC revamped the *MNF* announcement team with Dan Fouts, Dennis Miller, Eric Dickerson, and Melissa Stark. Trying to recapture the raucous commentary of the original *MNF* crew, ABC inserted Miller, a comedian, to enliven the dialogue. In 2002 *MNF* adopted a two-man announcing team, composed of Michaels and John Madden, with a single reporter on the field. Many of the show's critics considered these two to be the best announcers in *MNF*'s history.

As MNF football evolved, it increasingly became an entertainment spectacle rather than a sports broadcast. When the show first began airing, halftime was devoted to reviewing highlights from the games played the previous Sunday, with Cosell describing the action. ABC soon abandoned this format, televising instead the entire halftime show, some featuring popular music stars. Celebrities such as Plácido Domingo, John Lennon, President Bill Clinton, and even Kermit the Frog, often appeared during the game. Beginning in the late 1980s, ABC set the opening theme song to country and **rock 'n' roll** beats, with contributions from Edd Kalehoff, Hank Williams Jr., and Kid Rock. Williams—who asked the television audiences, "Are you ready for some football?"—sang Don Meredith's signature song "Turn Out the Lights, The Party's Over" (actually a Willie Nelson song, but popularized by Meredith on MNF) at the end of MNF's last broadcast on ABC.

Some critics of the NFL see *MNF*, along with other professional football telecasts, as an embodiment of the **culture wars**. From such a perspective, the NFL promotes a conservative political agenda. Feminists decry the emphasis on cheerleaders wearing skimpy outfits and their juxtaposition with hyper-masculine bodies of football players. Other critics point to the NFL halftime spectacles that promote ultra-patriotic **country music** stars and flag-waving pageants. These charges gained more credence when ESPN briefly hired reactionary radio host Rush Limbaugh as a weekly commentator in 2003. Limbaugh was, however, forced to resign after making racially insensitive remarks about black NFL quarterbacks, a gaffe that revitalized the **racism** charges circulating since Cosell's 1983 remarks.

Supporters of NFL football say that MNF and the sport are now ingrained manifestations of American popular culture that transcend race, gender, and social class. They see gender and racial insensitivity as isolated incidents.

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MONETARY SYSTEM

See Gold.

MONOPOLY

W. LAWRENCE NEUMAN

A monopoly is a supplier or seller of a good or service that has little or no market competition. Monopolies are said to be antithetical to **capitalism** because they undermine the very nature of competition and the law of supply and demand that form the basis of the free enterprise system. When monopolies arise, a single company sells what and as much as it desires, for any price it wants, and delivers products or services of any quality it chooses. Consumers have few alternatives because even the few other firms that might exist independently of the monopoly must pattern their own decisions after it if they hope to survive.

In theory, economic monopolies have been illegal in the United States since passage of the 1890 Sherman Antitrust Act. During the **Progressive Era**, the U.S. government vigorously prosecuted several monopolies, including John **Rockefeller**'s Standard Oil Company. Nonetheless, a company can be a local or a temporary monopoly. If there is one gas station in an isolated rural area with no nearby competition, it is a de facto monopoly. Patent and copyright laws can also create national monopolies. A patent is legal protection that allows an inventor or team of inventors to register a new product idea with the government. For a time, usually seven years, only patent holders can make that product. A company with a patent, say for a new pharmaceutical drug, may charge very high prices at first and lower prices as the patent is about to expire. It may allow a few other companies to make the same product but charge them a licensing fee. Something similar occurs for artistic and intellectual creations, or "intellectual property." If someone records a song, writes a book, or produces a film, a copyright gives them legal protection similar to a patent.

"Natural monopolies" occur when a product's technical features or method of distribution prevent competition. For example, water and sewage services are a natural monopoly because it is not feasible for many competing water and sewer lines to go to each building. At one time, telephone service was a natural monopoly, and the Bell System (AT&T) controlled most telephone service in the United States. Technological changes rendered the Bell System untenable, and court battles that culminated in 1984 forced a breakup of the Bell System. Other companies were given access to phone lines and granted the right to sell competing equipment and offer consumer services, thus ending Bell's monopoly. Governments sometimes take over and provide the service when natural monopolies exist. Many municipalities, for instance, operate utilities systems.

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, European imperial powers such as Great Britain created monopolies to operate their colonies. In some countries, the government creates a monopoly by limiting who can legally sell certain products, such as tobacco, matches, or salt. In the nineteenth-century United States, rapid

industrialization and a lack of regulatory laws allowed some companies to become monopolies or create entities called "trusts," legal arrangements in which property or stock is held indirectly. It was common for large firms to buy shares in competing firms in order to control them or manipulate prices. Such arrangements attracted less notice than simply buying and destroying competitors. Other firms achieved monopolistic control through a process known as vertical integrations, wherein they bought controlling interest in all of the subsidiary businesses necessary to manufacture and deliver a product. **Andrew Carnegie**, for instance, invested heavily in coal, coke, and mining interests necessary for making steel, as well as the railroad networks that delivered it to market. By the late nineteenth century, monopolies and trusts controlled numerous businesses, including oil, beef, steel, tobacco, and sugar. Although public outcry and protest resulted in **antitrust laws** that broke up trusts and made monopolies illegal, the net result was a shift to oligopoly.

An oligopoly is similar to a monopoly; however, instead of one company, several companies divide a market. For example, instead of one automobile manufacturer, three or four huge car companies operate. As long as no new competitors appear, and the companies do not compete seriously, the outcome is akin to a monopoly. Critics charge that prices are higher and quality is lower than they would be with full competition. In some countries, cartel laws curtail anticompetitive oligopolies.

In **socialist** economies, such as the former Soviet Union, the government ran all businesses, and the state was a monopoly. In capitalist economies, government services such as the postal system, roads, schools, and fire protection are types of monopolies. Extreme free-market advocates favor privatization of public services, including roads and postal delivery. Opponents of such plans argue that the most likely outcome would be that the class that owns the businesses providing these services would benefit, and others would suffer. Even those who think that consumers of all classes could benefit from economic competition argue that privatization is inherently undemocratic because it undermines the principle that government should provide core public services equally to all people and be subject to public oversight.

A monopoly has implications for all classes. The capitalist class that owns a monopoly can get very wealthy. A person who achieves a monopoly, even for a short time, can quickly become a billionaire if the product sold is an important one. This happened with **Bill Gates**, the founder of Microsoft. The tremendous profits mean that all classes associated with a particular company can benefit. **Middle-class** and **working-class** employees of the monopoly may receive higher salaries and benefits, whereas everyone outside the monopoly is disadvantaged. Even other capitalists find they cannot compete and must bend to the monopoly's power. Once competition is weakened, the risk emerges that middle- and working-class consumers will receive low-quality products and poor service, pay high prices, and have few alternatives.

The current U.S. economy has both monopolistic and competitive sectors. The "monopoly sector" has oligopolies rather than true monopolies, which are illegal. These oligopolies retain monopoly-like features in that they are coercive in their impact on the rest of the economy. Their middle- and working-class employees receive good wages and benefits, and their capitalist and upper-middle-class owners,

investors, and **CEOs** receive high salaries and profits. They tend to be large, operate in key industries, and perhaps even cooperate with the **labor movement**. Without competitors to force lower costs, such companies seek stable production. It accepts unions rather than face disruptive work stoppages. But such large-scale concerns also dominate what economists call the "primary labor market"; that is, they set the standard for wages and prices, siphon talent from below, and exert pressure on less powerful companies. Ultimately, they serve to winnow the market for many goods and services, a process that can harm workers by eliminating jobs.

Government regulations, legal attacks, international competition, and technical innovation threaten monopolies and oligopolies. Therefore, large firms often seek to weaken certain government regulations, control innovation, buy competing companies, and block foreign competition. Often they use nationalistic slogans, such as "Buy American," argue for protectionist laws to discourage imported goods (see **free trade**), or advocate in favor of domestic-content laws. Few capitalists admit they want to limit competition and achieve monopoly-like status. Instead, they claim to be defending local business and local jobs, a strategy to win support from middle-class and working-class employees. Once these businesses achieve a monopoly-like status, however, most consumers suffer in the long run, which is a reason that lawsuits continue to be vigorously pursued against firms that appear to harm competition.

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Samuel Bowles and Richard Edwards, *Understanding Capitalism*, 1985; Charles R. Geisst, *Monopolies in America*, 2000; Martin Sklar, *The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism*, 1988.

MOORE, WILBERT

See Davis-Moore Thesis.

Morgan, J. P. (April 17, 1837–March 31, 1913)

ROBERT E. WEIR

John Pierpont Morgan was a financier and industrialist who at the time of his death was one of the world's richest individuals. Morgan's wealth was so expansive that he twice bailed out the **stock market**. Indeed, so powerful was Morgan that he was sometimes referred to as the "Zeus" of **Wall Street**. One of the world's largest banking firms still carries his name.

Morgan typifies the problems involved in making generalizations about the **upper class** during the **Gilded Age**. He was born into wealth, and hence his story is devoid of the **Horatio Alger**–like drama of self-made individuals such as **Andrew Carnegie**. Morgan was a shrewd businessman, but lacked the public bombast of Cornelius **Vanderbilt**, the crassness of Jay Gould, the publicity-seeking mentality

of "Diamond" Jim Brady, or the overt amorality of John **Rockefeller**. Yet like each of them, he could be a ruthless **robber baron** who seldom allowed sentimentality to intrude upon business decisions. He was also a paradox in that he was a private man prone to moralizing, yet he also engaged in adulterous affairs and indulged in patterns of **conspicuous consumption**, which he condemned in others. Two of his famed dalliances were with actress Lillian Russell and Broadway impresario Maxine Elliott.

Morgan's grandfather, Joseph, did so well in business that he bequeathed more than \$1 million to his son, John's father, Junius Spencer Morgan (1813–90). Junius was as overbearing as J. P. would later become. After a brief apprenticeship as a dry-goods clerk, Junius Morgan formed a banking partnership with George Peabody and moved to London. In 1864 this firm became J. S. Morgan & Company and became the conduit through which most British investments in the United States were funneled. Junius further advanced his financial outlook by marrying Juliet Pierpont, the daughter of a wealthy **Boston Brahmin** family. John Pierpont Morgan was the oldest of their five children.

Morgan was born in Hartford, Connecticut, and attended prestigious English High School in Boston and the University of Göttingen in Germany. He was known as a rake and heavy drinker as a youth, but under his father's iron tutelage, he quickly entered into a business career track. Junius sent John to New York, where he worked as an accountant for a banking firm from 1857 to 1860. In 1860 he opened the ostensibly independent J. P. Morgan & Company, though he acted as the New York agent for George Peabody & Company, the firm in which his father was a partner. He worked for Peabody from 1860 to 1864 and then for the renamed J. S. Morgan & Company. During the Civil War, he nearly got embroiled in a shady venture with Simon Stevens, who was refitting obsolete rifles and selling them back to government suppliers. Luckily, Morgan recalled his loan to Stevens and was unsullied by the subsequent scandal. The affair left Morgan with a mania for detail in subsequent investments, nearly of all of which were made after painstaking research.

"J. P.," as he preferred to be called, also encountered personal grief in the 1860s. In 1861 he married the sickly Amelia Sturges, but their union was cut short; she died of tuberculosis in 1862. J. P. was depressed for quite some time, but on May 3, 1865, he married Frances Louise Tracy (1842–1924), and the couple eventually had four children. By the time of his remarriage, Morgan was a member of his father's reorganized firm of Dabney, Morgan & Company, Charles Dabney having been Morgan's first business mentor.

There can be little doubt, however, that Morgan was capable of calculated business dealings. Beginning in 1869, he began building a railroad empire by grabbing control of various lines. He was not afraid to take on other powerful entrepreneurs such as Gould, Jim Fisk, and Jay Cooke, and he usually bested them. Morgan was earning more than \$75,000 per year by the early 1870, a salary comparable to over \$1 million today. That salary plus various other investments allowed Morgan to cultivate imperious manners and live in luxury independent of his birth family. A Manhattan brownstone was quickly supplemented by a country estate near West Point, and Morgan began to indulge passions for art collecting and **yachting**. His boats, like his homes, grew progressively larger. His final domicile was a spectacular



John Pierpont Morgan. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

home on Madison Avenue designed by famed architect Charles McKim. It cost the unheard sum of \$1.2 million when it was finished in 1906 and is now home to the Pierpont Morgan Library.

When Charles Dabney retired in 1871, the senior Morgan saw to it that his son was a partner in the reorganized Drexel, Morgan & Company. This was one of the few firms to thrive during the Panic of 1873, occasioned by a collapse of Jay Cooke's banking and railroad empire. Morgan astutely profited from the depression and picked up some of Cooke's assets at fire-sale prices. Shortly thereafter, he also began investing in Thomas Edison's experiments with electricity. By the 1880s, he was already one of the wealthiest men in the world, and he was soon to grow even richer.

Morgan's father died in 1890, and three years later, Anthony Drexel passed away. In 1893 J. P. Morgan & Company was created, formalizing what had been a reality for some time. Morgan parlayed his considerable fortune into an unfathomable one. An 1891 merger of several electric companies resulted in General Electric. In 1893 another financial panic ensued, and

Morgan developed a scheme known as a "voting trust" to help stabilize Wall Street and, not coincidentally, make a huge profit. In a voting trust, stockholders temporarily transfer voting rights to a trustee who assumes debt and risk in exchange for stock, the right to reorganize companies, and the ability to manage their finances. Morgan gained power over about 16 percent of the nation's total railroad mileage through this maneuver.

When the depression stretched into 1895, and government **gold** reserves dwindled, Morgan also engineered a gold transfer in exchange for interest-bearing government bonds. This deal was widely denounced by the press, the **labor movement**, and many members of Congress, and Morgan's \$10 million loan was said to have been repaid six times over. In 1907 Morgan once again bailed out Wall Street by forcing large banks to advance credit lines to investors at 10 percent interest.

When Andrew Carnegie decided to retire, Morgan purchased his steel firm and, in 1901, reorganized it as U.S. Steel, the world's first corporation with over \$1 billion in assets. He also took on Cunard, the world's premier steamship line, by creating the International Mercantile Marine, which built the *Titanic*. Morgan was supposed to sail on the *Titanic*, but canceled at the last minute. He could not avoid congressional hearings into Wall Street's influence, however. He fared badly in

testimony before Representative Arsène Pujo during 1912, and public opinion turned against Morgan. He died while traveling in Rome the following year.

Morgan left behind a fabulous art collection that included Leonardo Da Vinci's notebooks and numerous other priceless books and art treasures. He also left behind the world's richest private bank. His son, John "Jack" Pierpont Jr. (1867–1943), took over the firm and proved to be cut from the same cloth. Jack helped finance World War I and also donated his London home to the U.S. government, which used it as its embassy for many years. It was he who endowed the Pierpont Morgan Library in New York. His sister, Anne Morgan (1873–1952), was a noted philanthropist and champion of women's rights, ironic given that her father refused to allow women to work in his companies.

J. P. Morgan & Company has reorganized numerous times since 1913, but remains powerful. Its performance partly determines how the **Dow Jones** average is computed. It has now merged with other banking firms such as Chase Manhattan, Chemical Bank, First Chicago, Manufacturers Hanover, and Bank One to create an enterprise that in 2006 had over \$1.2 trillion in assets.

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Mormons

GREG BROWN

The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS, or "Mormon" church) is headquartered in Salt Lake City, Utah. Its 12.5 million members—less than half of whom live in the United States—cover the world, and church membership and growth are particularly strong in Latin America, the South Pacific, and the Philippines.

Much of the Mormon identity comes from its peculiar origins. Mormons are Christians who believe their church to be the restoration of Christ's original church established on Earth. The church's founder, Joseph Smith Jr., was the son of a yeoman New England family. As a teen, Smith prayed for direction and over the next several years recorded several personal revelations. He founded the church on April 6, 1830. In addition to the Christian Bible, Mormons accept the Book of Mormon as a religious history of an ancient people on the American continent. A significant consequence of this tradition has been the development of an enduring sense of territoriality that sociologist Thomas O'Dea suggests is "the clearest example to be found in our national history of the evolution of a native and indigenously developed ethnic minority."

Doctrinal, social, and political differences—especially New England Mormons' abolitionist views on **slavery** and the endorsement of plural marriage—plagued relations with other settlers on the American frontier. Following the death of Smith at



A late nineteenth-century version of the angel Moroni delivering the plates of the Book of Mormon to Joseph Smith. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

the hands of a mob in Carthage, Illinois, in 1844, Brigham Young (1801–77) became church president. Young led most of Smith's followers to the Salt Lake Valley, where, isolated from the rest of the nation, the Mormons set out to establish "Zion in the tops of the mountains."

Young sent LDS missionaries to Europe and the South Pacific and encouraged converts to "gather to Zion." As Mormon converts arrived in Utah's Great Basin, Young sent them elsewhere in the West to establish colonies from northern Mexico to Alberta, Canada. Church-sponsored ships carried emigrants across the Atlantic, and converts traveled by rail as far as possible and then continued by wagon once in the United States. Some groups who could not afford wagons pulled two-wheeled handcarts across the American prairie. The church established an endowment, the Perpetual Emigrating Fund, to help the new arrivals and bolster solidarity, and it encouraged newcomers to assimilate as quickly as possible. Salt Lake City's foreignborn population during the 1880s ran as high as 80 percent. However, there were very few conflicts because European immigrants lived and worked as equals among native-born members and often married out of their cultural groups.

Because of the Mormons' practice of polygamy and their political and economic isolation, many nineteenth-century Americans questioned their loyalty to the United States. In fact, Young encouraged his followers to be self-sufficient so that they would not have to depend on outsiders for goods and services. Church leaders counseled LDS communities to live the "United Order"—wherein believers shared material resources. The experience of communal economics had varying success for several years, but eventually, most attempts failed as members grew to support the American ideal of free enterprise as the American population shifted west to envelop Utah.

By the middle of the twentieth century, the church had given up its communal and cooperative efforts and in large measure embraced **capitalism**. Although there are still some misgivings about the church's claims to be the only true church, most Americans now see Mormons as law-abiding citizens who embrace all aspects of American life. Mormons today have a variety of occupations and had moved from the bottom of the economic scale in the 1940s—based on education, family **income**, occupational **prestige**, and perceived social class—to the highest in the middle category by the 1980s. Despite a rather conservative family status for

women, LDS-dominated Utah was the second state in the United States to extend women the right to vote, and LDS matriarchs were active in the early twentieth-century campaigns for national suffrage.

Church leaders still encourage Mormons to be self-sufficient, and the church has operated its own **welfare** system to help members and nonmembers since 1930. Faithful members fast for a day once a month and donate the money they would have spent on those meals to help the needy. LDS leaders also encourage members to use their own resources and seek their extended families' assistance before coming to the church or the state for aid. The church also counsels members to maintain a year's supply of food and other necessities for distribution in times of emergency. Mormons continue to place a high value on education—LDS scripture encourages members to "seek learning even by study and also by faith"—and its emphasis has led to an especially educated LDS population in the United States.

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Movies

See Film.

MUCKRAKING

VICTORIA GRIEVE

Muckraking refers to a style of investigative journalism that its defenders credited with exposing social ills and that its critics denounced as cheap sensationalism.

During the years between 1890 and World War I, a reform impulse swept the United States in response to the social and economic challenges arising from industrialization. Although not united by any single goal or method, **Progressive Era** reformers shared a fundamental belief that Americans needed to challenge political corruption, urban social problems, dishonest business practices, and **poverty**. Progressives believed that if the public were educated about social ills, citizens would mobilize to reform and improve their society. Changes in journalism helped spur the Progressive movement by drawing public attention to social problems. In the 1890s the rise of inexpensive, popular mass-market magazines such as *McClure's* and *Munsey's* gave the "new journalists" a forum for their reporting and access to millions of **middle-class** readers.

In 1893 S. S. McClure launched America's first mass-market magazine that combined an engaging format—which included fiction as well as articles on science, art, and history—with an affordable price that attracted millions of readers. A host

of new magazines such as *Cosmopolitan*, *Collier's*, *Everybody's*, and the *Saturday Evening Post* soon joined *McClure's* in attracting readers away from the more sedate *Atlantic Monthly* and *Harper's* magazines. Known as muckrakers, the new journalists of the Progressive Era believed their work would motivate activism and correct social problems. Efforts at reform in government, politics, and business were not new, but the arrival of national mass-circulation magazines such as *McClure's* provided muckrakers with both sufficient funds for in-depth investigations and an audience large enough to arouse nationwide concern. The muckrakers wrote about **child labor**, prisons, religion, corporations, insurance companies, and most often, political corruption.

One of the earliest muckraking books, *How the Other Half Lives*, was written by a *New York Tribune* police reporter, **Jacob Riis**. The 1890 exposé about urban slums and the poverty of their immigrant residents attracted much attention, including that of New York Police Commissioner Theodore Roosevelt. Modern technological advances in photography, including the invention of flash powder, allowed Riis to take nighttime photographs of filthy conditions in tenements, sweatshops, and saloons. Such exposés produced social outrage and encouraged legislation to address such social ills.

Exposés of political corruption and corporate scandals required reporters to substantiate their stories. Magazines and newspapers hired talented young journalists who completed meticulous research and saw themselves as objective reporters of social issues. In 1903 **Lincoln Steffens** documented local political corruption in "The Shame of Minneapolis," and in 1904 he published a collection of his articles in the book *The Shame of the Cities*. His investigation of state politicians, *The Struggle for Self-Government*, was published in 1906. Another journalist, Ida Tarbell, uncovered John **Rockefeller**'s unfair business practices in a series of articles in *McClure*'s between 1902 and 1904. She published the series in her 1904 book *History of the Standard Oil Company*.

Muckraking journalism was popular with readers and lucrative for magazine owners. Middle-class readers responded to calls for social activism, and muckraking reached a peak between 1902 and 1908. Perhaps the most famous muckraking novel was published by a young socialist in 1906. **Upton Sinclair**'s *The Jungle* exposed the filthy and dangerous working conditions in Chicago's meatpacking factories, and the public outrage inspired by the book led to regulatory legislation, the Meat Inspection Act of 1906.

President Theodore Roosevelt coined the term "muckraker" in 1906. Irritated by a story by David Graham Phillips titled "The Treason in the Senate," which accused congressmen of political corruption, Roosevelt compared investigative journalists with the muckraker in John Bunyan's *The Pilgrim's Progress:* "the man who could look no way but downward with the muck-rake in his hands; who would neither look up nor regard the crown he was offered, but continued to rake to himself the filth on the floor." Nonetheless, the investigative journalism of the muckrakers created public support for many of the reforms of the Progressive movement. At the state level, their accomplishments included abolition of convict systems and implementation of prison reform and child labor laws. At the federal level, the Pure Food and Drug Act and the Meat Inspection Act were passed in 1906, conservation measures preserved forest lands and reclaimed millions more

acres, and the Sixteenth Amendment authorizing the income tax and the Twentieth Amendment guaranteeing women the right to vote were passed. Finally, large trusts in the oil, beef, and tobacco industries were dissolved. Muckraking declined after President Roosevelt's attack and as public interest in social reform began to wane.

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Matthew Schveirov, *The Dream of a New Social Order: Popular Magazines in America*, 1893–1914, 1994; Judith and William Serrin, eds., *Muckraking! The Journalism That Changed America*, 2002; Cecelia Tichi, *Exposes and Excess: Muckraking in America*, 1900–2000, 2004.

MUDSILL THEORY

SAMANTHA MAZIARZ

The mudsill theory claims that every society always has and always must contain two groups of people: the lower, **working classes** who toil away performing menial labor and the **upper classes** who in turn are left free to refine and advance society.

The mudsill theory was originated by Southern politician and wealthy plantation owner James Henry Hammond, in a pro-slavery speech he delivered to the U.S. Senate on March 4, 1858. Hammond maintained that the laboring classes needed little intellect or skill, but would ideally be submissive, loyal, and hearty. The idea is named for the analogy that the "superior" classes must rest upon the "inferior" classes the way houses must rest on a basic foundation, also known as a mudsill.

Hammond and others used this philosophy to justify slavery and other forms of labor exploitation. Hammond argued that black slaves were better suited to embody the mudsill itself than white wage laborers because, he claimed, slaves were permanently employed, all their needs were met by their masters, and their savage lifestyle and inferior **status** as a race meant that they were actually elevated by their bondage. White people on the other hand would be degraded as laborers according to Hammond, and he maintained that it was unethical to condemn one's white brothers to the life of drudgery and servitude that wage labor entailed. Because they were not properly compensated, white laborers' superior aspirations would eventually provoke them to rebel. He warned that because, unlike black slaves, white workers were allowed to vote, there was danger that if "they knew the tremendous secret" of the ballot box, they as a majority would wield the necessary power to reconstruct society, revolutionize the government, and overthrow their oppressors. In his speech, Hammond threatened to send lecturers and agitators north to enlighten the white working classes, in order to catalyze this rebellion. Ironically, although slavery has been abolished, the working classes have yet to unite and fully seize the power of the vote.

By asserting this flawed theory as scientific fact, the moneyed **elite** was able to secure its powerful status and to designate the subjugation of the many by the few as the rightful course of nature. This theory has become so deeply embedded in

society, some argue, that despite its obvious flaws and utter lack of credibility or evidence, many have accepted its precepts as the status quo, either resigning themselves to being exploited or striving to escape exploitation by becoming one of the exploiters.

Suggested Reading

Africans in America: Part Four, Mudsill Theory (http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/aia/part4/4h3439t.html), includes excerpt of "Speech of Hon. James H. Hammond, of South Carolina, on the admission of Kansas, under the Lecompton Constitution: delivered in the Senate of the United States, March 4, 1858"; Kenneth D. Allan, Explorations in Classical Sociological Theory: Seeing the Social World, 2005; John Bates Clark, The Distribution of Wealth: A Theory of Wages, Interest and Profits, 2005.

MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS

See Competitiveness; Globalization.

MUNICIPAL SOCIALISM

ROBERT E. WEIR

Municipal socialism refers to the implementation of socialist precepts on the local level. Although **socialism** is extremely diffuse conceptually and diverse in practice, municipal socialism is generally understood to involve attempts to place important city services into the hands of the citizenry rather than private owners, especially utility and **transportation** systems. It also places greater emphasis on citizen oversight of city operations, on delivering key services to the **masses** rather than favoring those who hold **wealth**, and on the concept of the public good.

Municipal socialism is often overlooked in American political history, with the dominance of Republicans and Democrats taken as a given. It is true enough that national power has been dominated by two major parties since the nineteenth century and that the winner-takes-all electoral system militates against the success of third-party movements (smaller parties generally fare better in the proportional representation schemes favored by many parliamentary democracies). Scholars have long been fascinated by the question posed by **Werner Sombart** in 1906: why is there no socialism in the United States? Sombart notoriously (and ahistorically) asserted that American **capitalism** had delivered sufficient prosperity to dissuade the **working class** from forming a separate labor party or otherwise seeking to revamp their economic system.

Socialism is often too narrowly associated with revolutionary **Marxism**. In general, American workers have preferred Lassallean ballot-box politics to revolutionary upheaval, a fact that socialists themselves have recognized. Until the late 1920s, more American socialists practiced Lassalleanism than Marxism, **anarchism**, religious socialism, or **Leninism**. (Ironically, many socialists behaved like reformist

Lassalleans even while professing Marxism.) The **Socialist Party** formed in 1876 and immediately began to contest elections; in 1901 it and several other parties became the Socialist Party of America. If one looks at local politics, there have been numerous elected socialists. Moreover, several socialist politicians—including **Victor Berger**, **Vito Marcantonio**, and **Bernard Sanders**—have served in Congress.

Socialists have enjoyed their greatest success on the local level, however. The extent and impact of ballot-box socialism is hard to assess, though. As noted, socialism is hard to define and manifests itself in many forms, many of which are denounced as false by those holding competing ideological views. In addition, many parties and politicians who practiced socialism did not call themselves socialists. For example, between 1874 and 1883, the Greenback-Labor Party advocated regulation of the banking system, railroads, and other state-controlled measures. The party won power in several cities, but its candidates seldom called themselves socialists. Between 1886 and 1892, **Knights of Labor** candidates and followers of **Henry George** contested hundreds of elections and won at least sixty of them. In a similar vein, in the 1890s the Populist Party won local elections, governorships, and several congressional seats (see **Populism**). Because most of those elected lacked the overt ideological identity of individuals such as Daniel DeLeon or **Eugene Debs**, their socialist views are generally overlooked.

Perhaps the most dramatic illustration of the ideology problem is the mayoralty of Samuel Jones. Jones (1846–1904) was a wealthy Toledo, Ohio, industrialist, but also a follower of socialist thinkers such as Leo Tolstoy and William Morris. In an exceedingly rare move for his time, Jones instituted profit sharing in his factory, granted an eight-hour workday, abolished overtime, set up an insurance fund for workers, and encouraged the formation of labor unions. In 1897 Jones became the Republican mayor of Toledo. When the GOP dumped him in 1899, Jones ran as an independent, won reelection, and served until his death. He was a deeply religious man nicknamed "Golden Rule" Jones, and he put his faith into action as mayor. He forbade police to harass the poor, built several parks, intervened to secure the release of poor prisoners, used city funds to pay for popular entertainment, coordinated relief efforts for the **unemployed**, and took steps to municipalize Toledo's utilities and street cars. Yet Jones is often classified as a **Progressive Era** mayor rather than as a socialist.

Some scholars have favored the term "sewer socialism" to denote how municipal socialists concentrated on pragmatic city concerns. The term is descriptive in that most socialists behaved as reformers and "good government" advocates, not ideologues. The heyday of municipal socialism is generally considered to have been from 1901 to 1917, which corresponds with the Progressive Era and further muddies identity issues. The Socialist Party of America had grown to over 150,000 members by 1912, and five times that number subscribed to *Appeal to Reason*. In 1911 there were seventy-three cities with socialist mayors and more than 1,200 other elected socialist officials across the nation. Socialists did especially well in areas of the Midwest that today are considered more conservative, including Kansas, Iowa, Missouri, Ohio, and Oklahoma. In 1914–15, thirty-three socialists were elected to state legislatures, and in North Dakota the Citizens' Non-Partisan League controlled the governor's office and the legislature. That group established state-run banks and flour mills, a **progressive tax** system, and other progressive

measures. In 1916 Milwaukee elected its second socialist mayor, Daniel Hoan, who held that office until 1940. Hoan oversaw reforms in sanitation and education and municipalized city power, water, and parks.

Municipal socialism most flourished when the movement was not overly ideological. Many socialists opposed U.S. entry into World War I, a stance that caused a drop in support and that opened the door for political repression during the postwar **Red Scare**. Socialists also split over the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, with some of its adherents converting to communism and embracing revolutionary rhetoric and becoming suspicious of electoral politics. Municipal socialist movements declined for a time—though Minnesota's Farmer-Labor Party remained active—and then revived in the late 1920s. Barre, Vermont, for instance, elected socialist Fred Suitor mayor in 1929. Several cities also turned to municipal socialism during the **Great Depression**. In Bridgeport, Connecticut, the socialist Jasper McLevy parlayed deteriorating economic conditions and support from the **labor movement** into a successful mayoral bid in 1933 and held that post until 1957.

McLevy's success was typical in that Socialist Party members gaining election in the 1930s tended to be pragmatists. They also drew much of their strength from **blue-collar** workers and recent **immigrants** and did best in places such as **Harlem** where the middle class had a smaller presence. The **Communist Party** also contested elections, but mostly for symbolic reasons and, until its 1935–39 Popular Front phase, usually denounced ballot-box politics. Municipal socialism did not duplicate its earlier success, however, perhaps because **New Deal** Democrats seemed a more practical option for most working-class voters. By the time World War II ended, some socialists had gravitated to the Democratic Party, where they made up its left wing.

The second Red Scare made life difficult for all progressives, and the Socialist Party's membership dipped to under 2,000 members by 1955. Even the popular McLevy was ousted from office in 1957. When political repression faded in the 1960s, and the **New Left** began to revive socialist ideals, key socialist leaders such as **Michael Harrington** retained ties to the Democratic Party even while trying to rebuild an independent movement. Municipal socialism did not disappear. For example, Detroit elected two openly socialist city council members in the 1980s, and the socialist-leaning Green Party has done well in local races since the 1980s. In 2000 Californians elected sixty-seven "Greens" across the state.

The most spectacular recent success, however, has come in Burlington, Vermont. In 1980 socialist Bernard Sanders toppled an entrenched Democrat mayor, and the Progressive Coalition of socialists, liberals, and independents gained considerable clout on the city council. The Sanders administration fit the classic profile of "good government" reform: streamlining city services, creating youth programs, increasing spending on the arts, expanding the city voter rolls, converting the city's lakefront to public use, and enacting moderate city takeover of services. Sanders was elected to Congress in 1991, but as of 2006, the Progressive Coalition remained in power in Burlington.

Municipal socialism calls into question the idea that the United States lacks a socialist identity or that political change outside of the two-party system is impossible. The legacy of municipal socialism endures in forms that many Americans

seldom consider: public education, city-owned medical centers, public utilities, city transit systems, and various city-owned services.

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MUSEUMS

MURNEY GERLACH

Museums were first created by the ancient Greeks as *mouseion*. They were temples for the muses and places of learning with historical objects and materials gathered from around the Mediterranean. Some scholars believe that the first great ancient museum was in Alexandria, Egypt, located close to the central library. Before its destruction in the third century CE, it was a repository of knowledge and a forum for public and civic discourse.

Modern museums also evolved from European practices during the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries. Wealthy individuals often assembled "cabinets of curiosities," and the jewels of antiquity and aristocratic governments were placed in palaces, classical buildings, monuments, and estates. The purpose was to preserve the rich private art, sculptures, and material culture of the past and the "treasures" of their own ages. The British Museum, which opened to the public in 1759, is usually seen as the first modern museum. The Louvre opened in Paris in 1793, but was mainly a display of aristocratic jewelry; the Hermitage in St. Petersburg, Russia (1764), is customarily identified as Western society's first museum devoted to art.

Museums opening in the United States after the American Revolution—including historic Colonial homes, mansions, and private collections—emulated the great museums of Europe, but also catered to popular tastes that mirrored the diversity of the new nation's religious, political, and social experiences. In the nineteenth century, museums also began to draw upon the objects, cultures, and history associated with **immigration**, the frontier, Manifest Destiny, and westward expansion.

American museums, like America's great libraries, developed first in cities. Thanks to the endowment of British philanthropist James Smithson, the United States gained a national museum, the Smithsonian Institution, which opened in 1846 and soon grew to a complex of various museums. After the **Civil War**, many other great museums opened, such as New York's Metropolitan Museum of Art (1872), the Boston Museum of Fine Art (1876), and the Philadelphia Museum of Art (1876). The opening of the latter coincided with a world fair, and museums frequently opened in the wake of such events. The Chicago Art Institute obtained its current home after the Columbian World Exposition of 1893, the Missouri History

Museum opened after the 1904 St. Louis World Fair, and the California Palace of the Legion of Honor (San Francisco) opened after the Panama Pacific Exposition of 1915. Vanishing **Native American** cultures proved an early fascination, an irony given that the same Caucasian groups who reveled in the exoticism of Native cultures also tended to support government policies aimed at obliterating those cultures. Exoticism was also on display at many American world fairs, and it too was filtered through **Social Darwinism**, **racism**, and popular **eugenics**. Many of the objects and cultural representations found in American museums in the nineteenth and into the twentieth century were shocking by modern standards. In 1903, for example, the Bronx Zoo displayed Ota Benga, a living pygmy from Belgian Congo, in a cage with monkeys and an orangutan.

Museums also reflected social class. Fine art, anthropology, and natural history museums became associated with the **upper class** and the **nouveau riche** during the **Gilded Age**. Along with the opera, theater, and symphony orchestras, museums were places where elites cultivated taste. As such, their directors, curators, and **boards of directors** became dominated by those of high **socioeconomic status** (SES). They also became establishments to which **philanthropists** gave money. The **masses** tended to frequent less savory "dime museums" operated by men such as P. T. Barnum. These were often little more than "freak shows" combined with assortments of oddities and curiosities (the closest modern equivalent would be the Ripley's Believe It or Not! museums).

Museums have never completely obliterated their class boundaries. According to the American Association of Museums, founded in 1906, there are 12,000 to 15,000 museums in the United States, but these break down into numerous types: art museums, zoos, natural history and science museums, history collections and sites, technology centers, aquariums, and planetariums. Most modern museums attempt to be inclusive and diverse, and much more attention is played to class, race, creed, and gender. They also seek to address the horrors of the past and to honor those who struggled to overcome them. Examples of this include the Holocaust and Native American museums in Washington, D.C., and a new African American museum that is in the planning stage.

To be accredited by the American Association of Museums, an institution must be a legally organized nonprofit museum and have an educational purpose, a formal mission statement, some paid professionally trained staff, research facilities, and regularly scheduled programs and exhibits that interpret collections for the public. They must also adhere to formal collection and preservation techniques.

Most museums seek to engage their communities in dialogues over museum literacy, cultural sensitivity, social concerns, and diversity issues. Fundamental to that engagement is the belief that museums are meeting places for the future and "agents of change" and "transformation" to help the public develop a better understanding of material and visual culture, as well as diverse classes, races, and ethnicities.

But museums also continue to magnify some of the divisions they wish to alleviate. The Smithsonian Institution has found itself embroiled in controversy over how to represent controversies such as the decision to drop atomic bombs on Japan during World War II, its depiction of **slavery**, and an exhibit on sweatshops. Moreover, the enormous cost of running most museums means they are not entirely

public institutions and must rely on wealthy donors to build collections, expand, or meet operating costs. This means that the wealthy often exert influence on what is represented and how it is represented. Museum curators and administrators sometimes act as cultural **elites** and make decisions that are unpopular with the taxpaying public. In 1990, for example, the Cincinnati Contemporary Arts Center displayed homoerotic photos taken by Robert Mapplethorpe that led to obscenity charges being filed against the museum's curator. Less dramatically, numerous museum curators have been accused of snobbery and of cavalierly ignoring mass taste, battles that often emerge when museums seek to buy avant-garde art or sell part of their collection.

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MYERS, GUSTAVUS (March 20, 1872–December 7, 1942)

SAMANTHA MAZIARZ

Gustavus Myers was a writer and historian whose works dealt extensively with class. Myers was born in Trenton, New Jersey, to Julia and Abram Myers. Though he was raised in **poverty** (his father was a soldier under Napoleon and later a speculator during the California **gold** rush) and was working in a factory by fourteen years of age, he did receive some private schooling in Philadelphia. He wrote for several newspapers and magazines there and in New York City. He was the brother of the painter Jerome Myers, and he wed Genevieve Whitney on September 23, 1904, who later gave birth to two daughters. He gained a reputation as a prolific **muck-raking** author and is remembered primarily for this, as well as for his status as an American historian, social reformer, and member of the **Populist** and **Socialist** parties. He died in the Bronx of a stroke in 1942 and was buried in New York's Woodlawn cemetery.

Myers's published book-length works concentrated largely on class, **capitalism**, and bigotry, often focusing on corrupt, illegal or immoral practices employed by those in power who sought to unethically increase their own wealth, scope of control, and authority. Myers did not hesitate to name names, and he described, in minute narrative detail, the shady dealings of individual businesspeople, politicians, companies, and families as well as the momentum of socioeconomic and political trends. Known for his meticulous research and balanced reporting, even those perturbed or incriminated by his exposés could not attack his credibility. The information he put forth was painstakingly verified and unimpeachably accurate. He did not rely on vague editorializing or sensational invective, but rather on hard evidence and indisputable documentation through official primary records.

Because he routinely censured such revered American institutions as **democracy**, capitalism, and race privilege, he was seen as a controversial figure and was often skewered by critics and the media. Myers did not concentrate on the abstract ideas of these American institutions, but pointed instead to the corruption that thrived within them. One of his most popular books, *History of the Great American Fortunes* (1910), detailed the manner in which particular famous, historic, successful families manipulated business and industry in order to accumulate their immense wealth. He followed up with another volume titled *A History of Canadian Wealth* in 1914. Another popular work, *The History of Tammany Hall* (1901), focused on the corruption of the supposed "champion of the people" of Tammany Hall (a New York Democratic political machine), which existed to manipulate democracy and the working class in order to enrich the few people in power of Tammany Hall. It drew comparisons recently when the Enron scandal broke because executives in both outfits used their economic power to control legislation and maneuver democracy to their monetary benefit.

His book *History of Bigotry in the United States* (1943) was more favorably received by critics and was considered to more evenly combine in print his social criticism, analysis, and patriotism. This work inspired the creation of the Gustavus Myers Center for the Study of Bigotry and Human Rights, which was founded in 1984 and which annually awards the Gustavus Myers award to recognize books that seek to understand the causes of bigotry so as to most effectively combat it.

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MYRDAL, GUNNAR (December 6, 1898–May 17, 1987)

GINA L. KEEL

Gunnar Myrdal was a Swedish economist, academic, and statesman best known for his voluminous work An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy (1944). This study was commissioned by the Carnegie Corporation and is an early example of well-financed, institutionalized research relying on many contributors. An American Dilemma has greatly influenced the fields of sociology and political science; it is also remembered for informing the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education (1954). NAACP (National Association of the Advancement of Colored People) lawyers led by Thurgood Marshall used the findings in Myrdal's book as evidence of the damage done to black Americans under segregation, and the court's Brown opinion cites the book in a footnote.

In *An American Dilemma*, Myrdal characterizes the "Negro problem" as a moral issue and a white man's problem, in terms of cause and potential remedy. He argues

that the American creed is based on equalitarianism, "an ideology denouncing class differences" and committed to belief in free competition and boundless opportunity. In the moral and rational United States, African Americans are an anomaly in the structure of society that triggers "individual and collective guilt" in whites reminded of the conflict between their beliefs and their practices.

Myrdal recounts in great detail the social, economic, and political status of African Americans in the late 1930s. Even after the end of **slavery**, they were a "color caste" separated from whites and without opportunity for mobility as a group. Myrdal traveled to the Southern states and was surprised to find African Americans afraid of him, "suspect of possible danger," and denied ordinary respect by whites, such as the titles of "Mr." or "Mrs." Fear of whites was rational, he wrote, given that the "Negro cannot claim the protection of the police or the courts."

Myrdal declared the economic situation pathological. The Negro caste included **lower**, **middle**, and **upper** economic classes, but the lower **working class** was disproportionately large. The great majority of African Americans, whether in the rural South or the Southern or Northern city **slums**, were "destitute," without property, and struggling day by day to meet subsistence needs and take any employment available. That employment usually consisted of jobs that most whites would not take—agricultural fieldwork, laundering, cooking, and cleaning—and blacks were the "first fired" when depressions came. Economic disparities were greatest in the South, where three-fourths of African Americans lived. Although the South was generally poor, **poverty** rates for African Americans (70 percent or more) were double those of whites. The plight of African Americans was a "vicious circle" because "poverty itself breeds the conditions which perpetuate poverty."

The American creed did not condemn economic inequality in itself, but it did require that no one should fall under a "minimum level of living" or be denied "equality of opportunity, fair play or free competition." These guarantees were systematically denied African Americans, and economic inequality was maintained as a barrier to social equality. **New Deal** policies of the 1930s often exacerbated economic hardships. Myrdal explains how the Agricultural Adjustment Act led to agricultural **unemployment** by restricting production and how **minimum wage** legislation undermined "Negro jobs." At the same time, Myrdal notes that "large-scale public relief" was a major source of jobs for African Americans during the Depression, despite discriminatory administration, and permanent federal employment opportunities were increasing.

Myrdal was optimistic that the American dilemma would ease and that race relations would improve as white racial attitudes changed. Contemporary scholars have argued that Myrdal was prescient in this regard, even as issues related to race continue to challenge American society and politics.

Gunnar Myrdal continued to focus on social economics and questions of poverty and broadened his inquiries and public service internationally. He completed a study of South Asian countries for the Twentieth Century Fund titled *Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations* (1957) and emphasized population control, wider land distribution, and educational and health investment policies.

In 1974 Gunnar Myrdal, with Frederick Hayek, received the Nobel Prize in Economics. His prize lecture was titled "The Equality Issue in World Development."

Suggested Reading

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
NAACP

STEPHEN E. SUSSMAN

The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) is a nonprofit organization established with the objective of ensuring the political, educational, social, and economic equality of minority groups. The NAACP defines itself as an organization seeking "to end racial discrimination and segregation in all public aspects of American life." Both in influence and in size of membership, the NAACP is the foremost civil rights organization in the United States. The mission of the NAACP is to "ensure the political, educational, social and economic equality of rights of all persons and to eliminate racial hatred and racial discrimination." It is the nation's largest and strongest civil rights organization. In 2006 the organization had over 300,000 members and 2,200 branch chapters, including college and youth chapters. Membership in the NAACP is composed mainly of African Americans, but members of other races also belong.

On February 12, 1909 (Abraham Lincoln's birthday), the NACCP was founded in New York City by a multiracial group of activists, under the leadership of Harvard-educated scholar **W. E. B. Du Bois**. In 1910 Du Bois left his teaching post at Atlanta University to work at the NAACP. For twenty-five years, Du Bois worked as editor-in-chief of the NAACP publication *The Crisis*. In its early years, Du Bois was the organization's most prominent spokesperson. When Du Bois left the organization in 1934, Roy Wilkins replaced him as editor of *The Crisis*. In 1955 Wilkins was named executive director of the NAAC; he held this position until his retirement in 1977.

The NAACP was founded to fight **segregation** laws and to rally public support against lynching and other violence against African Americans. In addition to the abolition of lynching, another priority then, as now, was equal **education** and the opening of all publicly supported institutions to all races. The new organization grew so rapidly that by 1915 it was able to organize a partially successful



Poster with the slogan "The NAACP is people, join." Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

boycott of the film *The Birth of a Nation*, which portrayed blacks of the **Reconstruction** era in a distorted light.

The first president of the NAACP from its founding to 1930 was Moorfield Storey, a white American. Storey consistently and aggressively championed civil rights not only for blacks but also for Native Americans and immigrants. The NAACP has always been a racially diverse organization and did not elect an African American president until 1975. Kivie Kaplan, who served as president from 1966 until his death in 1975, was a white Jewish American.

Since its beginning, and with increasing emphasis since World War II, the NAACP has advocated nonviolent protests against discrimination and has disapproved of extremist groups, such as the Black Panthers in the 1960s and 1970s and the Nation of Islam in the 1980s to the present; many such groups have criticized the organization as passive. The association nevertheless remains the largest and most influential civil rights organization in the United States. The NAACP's headquarters are in Baltimore, Maryland, with additional regional offices throughout the United States. A sixty-four-

member board of directors led by a chairperson runs the NAACP nationally. The board elects one person as the president and chief executive officer for the organization; Bruce S. Gordon was selected as president and chief executive officer in 2005 following the resignation of Kweisi Mfume, who had headed the organization for nine years. Civil Rights Movement activist and former Georgia state representative Julian Bond was appointed chairperson in 1998 and has held that office through 2006.

Departments within the NAACP govern specific areas of action. The legal department focuses on court cases, such as systemic discrimination in employment, government, or education. The Washington, D.C., bureau is responsible

for lobbying the U.S. government, and the education department works to improve public education at the local, state, and federal levels. The goal of the health division is to advance health care for minorities through public policy initiatives and education.

The NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund (LDF), an independent legal aid group, argues in court on behalf of the NAACP and other civil rights groups. It was founded in 1940 under the leadership of Thurgood Marshall as part of the NAACP. Marshall joined the NAACP national legal staff in 1936 and became its chief legal officer in 1939 before the creation of the LDF. The best-known case in the history of the LDF was Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas (1954), the landmark case in which the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly outlawed legal racial segregation of public education facilities. Other major cases argued by Thurgood Marshall and the NAACP's LDF included Smith v. Allwright (1944), which ruled a Southern state's exclusion of African American voters from primary elections was unconstitutional; Shelley v. Kraemer (1948), which ruled that state judicial enforcement of racial restrictive covenants in housing was unconstitutional; Sweatt v. Painter (1950), which ruled against the concept of separate but equal facilities for African American professionals and graduate students in state universities; and Cooper v. Aaron (1958), in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that the states were bound by the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions and had to integrate the Little Rock School District.

On the heels of the school desegregation victory, the NAACP pushed for full desegregation throughout the South. Starting on December 5, 1955, NAACP activists, including Rosa Parks, who had served as the chapter's secretary, helped organize a bus boycott in Montgomery, Alabama, to protest the segregation laws on the city's buses when two-thirds of the riders were black. The boycott lasted 381 days.

With pressure from the NAACP and other groups, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act (1964), aimed at ending racial discrimination in employment, education, and public accommodations, and the Voting Rights Act (1965). After solving its financial problems in the 1990s, the NAACP was able to launch a major getout-the-vote campaign in the 2000 U.S. presidential election. Over 10.5 million African Americans cast their ballots in the election, one million more than the 1996 presidential election.

Today, the NAACP continues to work on public policy issues such as economic empowerment, education, health, and programs for young people, including the Youth Empowerment Institute. It focuses much of its activity on legal and economic issues, cognizant that these are central to dismantling a race-based social class system.

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NADER, RALPH (February 27, 1934–)

MELISSA A. T. KOTULSKI

Ralph Nader is best known as a lifelong champion of **consumer** rights and as a Green Party candidate for president. His causes have been varied and have included investigations of the auto industry, the meat industry, the Federal Trade Commission, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Food and Drug Administration, airline safety, nursing homes, the medical profession, and numerous other public and private agencies. He is also an advocate for environmentalism and for protection of personal privacy rights.

The origins of his dedication to these causes come from a family committed to the **democratic** promises of the United States. Ralph Nader was born in Winsted, Connecticut, to parents who emigrated from Lebanon. His father, Nathra Nader, arrived in the United States in 1912, succeeded, and returned to Lebanon, where he married Rose Bouziane. They returned to the United States and settled in New England, where they had three children. By the time he was eight years old, Ralph was accompanying his father to court hearings in order to learn to be critical of the judicial system.

This critique of the law continued through Nader's undergraduate career at Princeton, where he graduated magna cum laude in 1955, and his subsequent study at Harvard Law School. Nader has used his legal degree from Harvard as leverage in his battle for social justice. Throughout his career, Nader has remained a consumer advocate, fighting for what he calls "body rights." His first foray into consumer rights was against the auto industry; key speeches and his 1965 book *Unsafe at Any Speed* hastened the passage of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act and Highway Safety Act, both in 1966. Both pieces of legislation were part of Lyndon B. Johnson's **Great Society** programs. The meat industry was made safer for consumer consumption by Nader's pressing for the Wholesome Meat Act of 1967, the first law in sixty-one years to regulate that industry.

Nader's most influential period was from 1969 to 1976, when he was productive in backing several successful pieces of legislation as a consumer advocate. During this time, he founded several consumer interest groups, such as the Public Interest Research Group, the Center for the Study of Responsive Law, and the Public Citizen. Some of these groups were informally referred to as Nader's Raiders. In the 1970s, Nader joined forces with the Union of Concerned Citizens to question the safety of power plants. And in 1973 he founded Congress Watch, a group to lobby Congress on safety issues concerning nuclear power. By 1977 his height of popularity had waned, and the Consumer Protection Agency was failing to sway Congress to pass legislation he favored, and Nader resigned as the head of Public Citizen.

During the administration of **Ronald Reagan**, Nader was highly critical of the sway the business community had over government. Nader identified what he called the "Reagan Corporatist Revolution" and dubbed Reagan the "Teflon President" who avoided details, cultivated amiability, and avoided impromptu media events.

Nader's disillusionment with the two-party system evolved throughout his years as an advocate. Initially, he supported the Democratic Party because of its rhetorical support for consumer causes. At the height of his popularity in 1972, the New

Party asked Nader to run for president. Nader declined the offer because he believed that it would simply take votes from the Democratic candidate and ensure Richard Nixon's reelection. But Nader was quite disenchanted with President Jimmy Carter (1977–81), who soured him on the Democratic Party. His popularity rebounded in the early 1990s, and he considered running for president in 1992. In that year, he gave a speech titled "America, What Went Wrong?" in which he stated that both political parties were beholden to corporate interests, which jeopardized democracy and consumer rights. In a speech about "growing up corporate" given at Harvard Law on February 15, 1992, Nader encouraged voters in the presidential race to enter "none of the above" on their ballots as an unofficial vote for him. In 1996 he accepted the Green Party nomination for president, though he did not campaign, accept contributions, or place ads. Although the Democrat Bill Clinton won his second term, Nader received 580,627 total votes that year.

Nader found himself the lightening rod of controversy in 2000, when he ran for president as a strong proponent of campaign finance reform. The results of the 2000 election were disputed because of irregularities in the Florida ballots, and many argue that Nader contributed directly to the court-decided victory of George W. **Bush** because he took votes away from the Democrat Al Gore. Many of the liberals who once admired Nader became his bitter enemies, and he did nothing to relieve their ire by choosing to run again in 2004 in an election Bush once again won by the electoral votes of a single state.

Nader continues his consumer advocacy, and in January of 2006, he offered a four-point agenda for U.S. automakers to make vehicles safer and more fuel-efficient. To his admirers, Nader is a champion of consumers, an advocate for the poor, and one of the few to stand against the power of the **corporate class**. To detractors on the right, he is a meddlesome, anti-business **socialist** and a practitioner of the politics of paranoia. Some on the left agree that Nader is prone to fanciful conspiracy theories, and quite a few remain furious with Nader for his quixotic presidential campaigns at a time in which a swing of several thousand votes could have altered results. They accuse him of worsening the very causes he champions.

Suggested Reading

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NATIVE AMERICANS

DAVID V. HEALY

Native Americans, a term referring to the group of people descended from America's first inhabitants before European colonization, are an often-overlooked group of people when considering most social theory, class included. Native Americans themselves are a diverse group, with hundreds of culturally separate bands, tribes,

and nations throughout North America alone. These individual groups are as distinct from one another as European, Asian, and African cultures, a fact often ignored by policy directors.

Before European colonialism, each Native group had its own standards and cultural traditions to manage property, wealth, and ownership. Because most tribes were nomadic, many Native cultures rejected concepts of property ownership, instead supporting systems in which only the minimum of possessions was retained in order to make travel easier. For sedentary Native cultures, social classes did exist, though not in terms exactly comparable to societies in other parts of the world. Oftentimes, economic classes were tied to matrilineal clans, though many Native cultures were patrilineal.

These traditional economic matters were disrupted upon the invasion of European forces into the Americas. Europeans refused to accept Natives' cultures, and combined with European efforts to dominate them politically and religiously, economic control drastically altered Native systems. Despite Native resistance, Europeans eventually engendered a system of dependence on the part of Native Americans, whereby Europeans largely dominated exchange between the cultures.

This new pattern of trade changed internal Native social patterns, including class relations. Most notably, Europeans refused to acknowledge matriarchal societies, which radically changed Native cultures that had to newly rely on males in order to interact with the dominant European paradigm of social relations. In many cases, men used their newfound powers of social influence to dominate political and economic affairs for their nations, often at the expense of women, who, in many cases, were then treated as poorly as European women. Eventually, a new class of "chiefs" arose, who used the influence of monopolized relations with Europeans to control their tribes—a position that would become more solid and influential as European forces pressed harder to dominate Native cultures.

However, some Native cultures chose to adapt to the European standards rather than resist outright, leading to modern cultures that retain many traditional patters of social arrangement. Unfortunately, these groups are far from the majority, and many of the tribes and nations who resisted are presently dominated by the national powers that remain in the wake of European colonization in the Americas. In reservation environments, few class distinctions can be made. Though leaders exist on reservations, there is little difference between them and other reservation residents because of the often horrifically bad economic conditions on reservations. Many reservations are well below the poverty line and exist on land with no considerable agricultural or material value to support economic growth. In many cases, Native Americans on such reservations are turning to casinos or are housing toxic-waste dumps in order to support their local societies, two options with their own considerable drawbacks.

Historically, a few Native Americans have managed to achieve financial success, though the number is not great. The number of Natives attaining **middle-class** status did not rise significantly until the 1950s, when Native Americans made their way into cities, often at the direction of government programs. The rise of the Native American middle class was largely a result of **job training** and employment available in urban areas, two opportunities in short supply on reservations. It should be noted that not every Native American who relocated to cities succeeded; however,

those who did encountered new economic conditions that far surpassed those with which they were familiar. Over time, the economic prosperity of the urban Native American middle class carried on, as they were able to send their children to college and pass down their economic standards.

Today, Native Americans are present in nearly all social classes. Although there is a noticeable middle class in the Native community, statistics still prove that Native Americans, as a people, are below average in economic conditions, life expectancy, and many other factors. As an aggregate, Native Americans continue to rank at or near the bottom on a host of negative social indicators, including infant mortality, chronic unemployment, substance abuse, and health problems.

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NATURAL ARISTOCRACY

ROBERT E. WEIR

The idea of *natural aristocracy* suggests that society should award exceptional rank and privilege to those who deserve it because of their hard work and talent. The Greek roots of "aristocracy" imply government by the "best." A natural aristocracy is closely linked to the concepts of **meritocracy** and **self-reliance**. It is generally juxtaposed against an "artificial" aristocracy that assigns social and political superiority on the basis of one's birth and breeding.

The idea of a natural aristocracy is an ancient one. In Plato's *Republic*, for example, the philosopher-kings who rule the ideal society are natural aristocrats who govern society in a wise, dispassionate, and selfless fashion because their very natures dispose them to do so. Plato's good society was designed to allow lesser ranks to indulge their passions and appetites freely, lest they be tempted to take up leadership roles for which they were ill-suited. Embedded within Plato's thinking lies both the appeal and the problems associated with a natural aristocracy. On one hand, it makes logical sense for a society to be led by its most talented members; on the other, any aristocracy is, by nature, elitist, and the word "natural" is open to interpretation. It is thus an ambiguous term. In contemporary society, natural aristocracy has been invoked by the political right in defense of the **critical elite theory** as well as by the left to support affirmative action programs.

In the United States, the debate over a natural aristocracy famously traces itself to an 1813 letter exchange between John **Adams** and Thomas Jefferson. Adams and Jefferson agreed that there was, in the latter's words, "a natural aristocracy among men; the grounds of this are virtue and talents." Adams, however, felt that nature provided virtue and talent through the social position, breeding, and bloodlines that paralleled those of his own **Boston Brahmin** family, whereas Jefferson

quoted numerous Greek texts to refute an "artificial aristocracy" of birth and wealth. Jefferson asserted that **democracy** and equal rights would assure that talent would rise to the top.

Both men were aware of the writings of British statesman Edmund Burke (1729–97), a critic of the French Revolution. Burke linked natural aristocracy to "practical liberty," as opposed to the "revolutionary liberty" he saw in the excesses of the French struggle. Burke's conservatism resonated with Adams, who also opposed the French Revolution, whereas Jefferson admired its *élan* and its emphasis on human reason. Adams remained deeply suspicious of mass democracy and saw it as prone to **anarchy** and chaos, as did Burke and many of the **Founding Fathers**. Burke and Adams felt that only a select few were capable of self-government, that human nature was weak, and that it was "natural" that society should stratify.

The Adams-Jefferson split has remained central in American society. In his two-volume opus *Democracy in America* (1835, 1840), Alexis de Tocqueville noted the tensions. Tocqueville admired American democracy, but also found that the rejection of tradition and customary social relations fostered an **individualism** that was antithetical to community, that Americans simply assumed success as their birthright, that popularity was valued above ability in politics, and that too much faith was placed in the masses. In a famed phrase, Tocqueville warned of an emerging "tyranny of mediocrity."

Still, notions of self-made individuals in a free society have made natural aristocracy hard to resist. It shows up in everything from the novels of James Fenimore Cooper to debates over educational testing. The Adams-Jefferson debate indirectly shaped the formation of SAT tests for college admissions. (SAT once stood for Scholastic Aptitude Test, but since 1994 it is no longer an acronym.) Precursors of the SAT date to 1901, but in 1941 Dr. James Conant, the president of Harvard, spearheaded the creation of the modern College Board. Conant was alarmed that Harvard was becoming an automatic repository for **legacies** and children of the **upper class**, many of whom were not academically worthy of admission to Harvard. He evoked the notion of natural aristocracy to argue for an objective measure for college admissions.

During the **Cold War**, some Americans revived the idea that the natural aristocracy and the birth aristocracy tended to be synonymous. This was the implication of an influential 1957 work by Russell Kirk, who noted that the Founding Fathers' emphasis on cultivating a natural aristocracy did not mean they favored a society without limits or one that collapsed class distinctions; in essence, American society should be a blend of democracy and aristocracy. Kirk argued that the natural aristocracy was studious, moral, and talented, but that members of it also tended to be individuals of **wealth** and property. Kirk's work attempted to synthesize his fervent support for free-market **capitalism** with his views that men of character were more likely to come from the upper class and that the American merit system would weed out the unworthy.

Kirk's arguments were also rooted in Cold War attacks on **communism**, ironic in that Michael Young's 1958 book *The Rise of the Meritocracy* (the first known use of the latter term) sarcastically predicted a bottom-up assault on meritocracy. New variants of the Adams-Jefferson debate emerged in the 1960s. Affirmative action

programs (as well as student aid programs aimed at the **working class**) spurred hot debate. Conservatives argued that these programs were a perverse social experiment that robbed natural aristocrats of their rightful leadership roles and fostered mediocrity. Conversely, liberals insisted that affirmative action and a broadly educated public served to promote meritocracy.

These same debates have resonated for more than four decades. In the 1980s and 1990s, a new twist was added when several studies revealed that SATs, rather than promoting educational democracy, often reinforced class privilege. Children from wealthy families were better able to hire tutors and test coaches to improve their scores and secure favorable college admissions, though they might be less intelligent than students with lower scores. Moreover, the SATs were said by many to be race- and class-biased in their construction; others charged that they simply did not measure ability or potential in any meaningful way. Conservatives generally refute charges that the SATs are biased and argue that race, ethnicity, and gender should not override objective achievement when admitting students to college.

Nearly two centuries after the Adams-Jefferson debate, Americans continue to evoke natural aristocracy in ways that are more ideological than precise, though there is not even consistency within groups. Among conservatives, for instance, commentator Rush Limbaugh places emphasis on character and pedigree to rail against the tyranny of mediocrity he feels is embodied in liberal reform. By contrast, many other conservatives argue against the consolidation of political and economic power emblematic of corporate culture and political dynasties such as the **Bush** family. In their view, many wealthy families seek to build artificial aristocracies.

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NEGATIVE INCOME TAX

See Guaranteed Annual Income.

NEIMAN MARCUS

ROBERT E. WEIR

Neiman Marcus is an upscale retailer that caters to the materialistic desires of the **upper class** and the **nouveau riche** of the upper **middle class**. Other retailers who fall into the same category include Saks Fifth Avenue, Bloomingdale's, Nordstrom,

Tiffany's, and Bergdorf Goodman. The latter is owned by the Neiman Marcus Group and is its anchor in the fashionable **Fifth Avenue** district of Manhattan.

The retailer was founded in Dallas in 1907 by Herbert Marcus Sr., his sister Carrie, and her husband, A. L. Neiman. The original store burned, but the second Neiman Marcus on Main Street in Dallas became such a fixture of the upwardly mobile lifestyle that it was declared a Texas historic landmark in 1982. The first store outside of Dallas appeared in Bal Harbour, Florida, in 1971, and there are now satellite locations in more than thirty cities.

Although the retailer claims to pander to all budgets, it is often reviled as a symbol of decadence and **conspicuous consumption**. The bulk of its merchandise comes from big-ticket designer labels. Its clothing lines, for instance, include Armani, Calvin Klein, Chloe, Donna Karan, Gucci, Oscar de la Renta, Prada, Versace, and Yves Saint Laurent. It is not unusual to find dresses, shoes, and handbags costing several thousand dollars on Neiman Marcus shelves and in its catalogs. The latter have served to draw positive and negative attention to Neiman Marcus. Its Christmas catalogs routinely offer unique gifts for the ultra wealthy, including even **yachts** and private jets. Each year it also offers "his and her" automobiles, always **luxury** cars.

The Christmas catalog is more of a publicity stunt than a reflection of normal retail practice, but it has sharpened the focus over the **wealth** gap in America. Neiman Marcus was singled out by *New York Times* columnist Maureen Dowd after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York and Washington. Dowd challenged readers to view American hedonism and "solipsism and wretched excess" through the eyes of Islamic fundamentalists and the poor of developing nations. Neiman Marcus is also targeted by animal rights activists who decry its practice of selling expensive fur coats.

Neiman Marcus is also viewed as a center of "Bobo" culture. Bobo is a term coined by commentator David Brooks in 2001 to describe the "new" American upper class; it is a diminutive for "bourgeois Bohemians." Brooks argues that Bobos evolved out of the culture wars disputes of the 1960s and the economic disputes of the 1980s. In essence, the loosening of traditional mores and values in the 1960s has merged with the materialism of 1980s yuppies. Even though conservatives continue to contest cultural issues, and progressives rail against hedonism, both are waging lost causes. Brooks calls the Bobos the "new establishment" and "an elite based on brainpower."

The long-term viability of Bobos is uncertain, but thus far, the September 11 attacks have not caused Americans to reassess materialism. Neiman Marcus and other luxury retailers saw a dip in sales in 2001, but quickly regained market strength. American **consumerism** has become more polarized since the 1980s, and twenty-first-century trends have accelerated the spiral. Cut-rate retailers such as **Wal-Mart** and Target have captured more trade from the **lower class** and the lower middle class, and stores such as Neiman Marcus siphon off the wealthier clientele. The retailers who have struggled (or disappeared) have been those that once commanded a broad customer base among high-waged members of the **working class** and mid-level professionals. Onetime juggernauts such as Macy's, Sears, and J. C. Penney have been forced to revamp, and such once-revered stores as Bonwit Teller, Filene's, Gimbel's, Hudson's, Jordan Marsh, Montgomery Ward, and Wanamaker's have disappeared.

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NEW CLASS

See Managerial Class.

NEW DEAL

HOLLY M. ALLEN

The New Deal was a series of relief and recovery measures implemented by the federal government under President **Franklin D. Roosevelt** between 1933 and 1937. Problems such as **unemployment**, workplace injury, and access to union representation had formerly been outside the purview of the federal government. Faced with a national economic crisis of enormous proportions, with the New Deal, Roosevelt sought to restore balance to U.S. economic and civic affairs through increased federal intervention in the economy, in state and local governance, and in the lives of ordinary Americans. The result was a fundamental shift in U.S. political culture, one that resulted in a new conception of "social citizenship" and the formation of a distinctly American **welfare** state.

The **Great Depression**, which began with the stock market crash of 1929, hit American workers particularly hard. As the nation's economic fortunes plummeted, workers who retained jobs often experienced wage and hour reductions, denial of union representation, and the loss of homes. Even harder hit was that one-third of a nation that was thrown out of work altogether. The United States, unlike European industrialized nations, did not provide social insurance to its workers prior to the New Deal. The unemployed thus had little recourse other than private charity and county poor relief when they became destitute. President Herbert Hoover, who held office until 1933, refused to consider direct federal intervention in the economy, touting private economic recovery, self-reliance, and community selfhelp instead. As the economic situation worsened, Roosevelt's 1932 campaign promise of a "New Deal" for the American people, which would restore economic power to the "forgotten men" at "the bottom of the nation's economic pyramid," garnered him the support of unemployed and working-class Americans. New Deal social and relief measures ensured Roosevelt's popularity with American workers, even when fears of alienating powerful Southern Democrats and business interests led the president to hedge on his commitment to social welfare after 1936.

Among the most important New Deal measures were emergency relief programs such as the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA, 1933–34), which gave grants-in-aid to the states for unemployment relief, and its successor, the Works Progress Administration (WPA, 1935–43), which provided employment

to 8.5 million Americans on federal relief projects. Federal Relief Administrator Harry Hopkins expressed the transformative implications of federal work relief when he proclaimed that the federal government must guarantee the worker's right "to earn an honorable living." Such rhetoric was a far cry from traditional poor relief, which was punitive and miserly both in rhetoric and in practice. Not only did the WPA provide work at subsistence wages to millions of Americans; the projects that workers completed also left a visible imprint on communities in the form of school buildings, roads, airports, murals, and other installations. Although the New Deal expanded the conception of citizenship to include basic social and economic rights, not all Americans shared equally in its benefits. Relief jobs and dollars were never sufficient to meet the needs of more than a fraction of the unemployed. And although discrimination on the basis of "race, creed, or color" was federally prohibited, it was often practiced in states and localities, particularly in the South. Women also confronted discrimination by relief administrators who were eager to preserve the male breadwinning ideal.

Whereas New Deal relief measures targeted jobless Americans' emergency needs, other laws addressed the need for a permanent system of social security. The **Social Security** Act (SSA, 1935) established a range of entitlement and welfare programs. It set up two entitlement programs, Old-Age Insurance and Workman's Compensation, which served most private-sector workers. It also set up welfare programs, including Aid to the Blind, Aid to the Deaf, and Aid to Dependent Children. By excluding agricultural and service occupations, the SSA's entitlement programs left out most African American, **Latino**, and female workers. Because they were largely excluded from the entitlement programs, women were among the primary clients of Aid to Dependent Children (later Aid to Families with Dependent Children), one of the SSA's more punitive welfare programs. Thus, like its relief measures, the New Deal's social security programs perpetuated racial and gender inequalities that beset the larger culture of Depression America, inscribing them in the charter documents of the U.S. welfare state.

In addition to relief and social security, the New Deal made significant strides in protecting workers' rights through labor legislation. Section 7a of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA, 1933) stipulated that "employees shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing . . . free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers." Although later declared unconstitutional, the NIRA boosted labor militancy, which was already on the rise in the early part of the Depression, increasing organized labor's allegiance to the Roosevelt Administration. Succeeding the NIRA was the National Labor Relations Act, or Wagner Act (NLRA, 1935), which outlawed "unfair labor practices" such as yellow-dog contracts and blacklisting and created the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to supervise union elections and enforce the right of collective bargaining. The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA, 1938) further consolidated the alliance of the labor movement and the Democratic Party by establishing minimum wage, maximum hours, and anti-child labor provisions. Again, as with New Deal measures, New Deal labor policy had its pitfalls. Roosevelt hedged on his commitment to workers' rights after 1936 and distanced himself from the Congress of Industrial Unions during the labor conflicts of 1936–37. Nevertheless, the **labor movement** vote was firmly behind the New Deal once more in the 1940 elections, when organized labor contributed more to the Democratic Party's campaign chest than any other group.

Other New Deal measures, including the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA, 1933), the Rural Electrification Administration (REA, 1935), and the Resettlement Administration (RA, 1935), benefited farmers and other rural Americans. Large farmers benefited disproportionately under the AAA policy of paying farmers to reduce crop areas, whereas tenant farmers and sharecroppers in the South found it difficult to obtain a fair share of AAA benefits. At the same time, all rural dwellers enjoyed the life-changing effects of electrification, and the RA sought to redress the hardships of small farmers and **sharecroppers** in particular. The New Deal's agricultural programs demonstrated features common to all New Deal policies: regardless of rhetorical commitments to nondiscrimination, benefits were often unequally distributed, and the federal government was often unwilling to enforce nondiscriminatory mandates at state and local levels, particularly in the South. Moreover, as with other New Deal policies, agricultural policies were effective in garnering political support for Roosevelt and the Democratic Party as farmers joined other groups within the New Deal Coalition. Finally, rural electrification, like the municipal structures and artworks of the WPA, tangibly reflects the enlarged and often enriching role that the federal government played in the lives of ordinary Americans during the New Deal years.

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NEW DEAL COALITION

HOLLY M. ALLEN

During the 1930s liberals, labor unions, white ethnics, African Americans, farm groups, and Southern whites united to form the New Deal Coalition. Though never formally organized, the coalition was sufficiently cohesive to make the Democratic Party the majority party from 1932 into the 1980s. Democrats won seven of nine presidential contests and maintained majorities in both houses of Congress from 1932 to 1964. The divisiveness of the Civil Rights Movement and the Vietnam War, the increasing segmentation of the labor force, the waning influence of unions, and the relative weakness of Democratic Party leadership are among the factors that led to the coalition's erosion in the late 1960s. Although some groups remained stalwart supporters of the Democratic Party after 1964, notably liberals and African Americans, other groups, including Southern whites and some unionized **blue-collar** workers in the North, increasingly threw their support to the Republican Party. Labor unions continued to support the Democratic Party, but their endorsements counted for less and less as the **labor movement** went into steady decline.

Throughout its years of vital operation, the New Deal Coalition owed much of its power to the support of workers and labor unions. Prior to the Great Depression, the working class divided politically along racial, ethnic, and cultural lines. Employers relied on ethnic divisions, along with more overtly repressive measures, to prevent unionization in mass-production industries. As Lizabeth Cohen observes, the coming of age of second-generation ethnic workers and their shared engagement with a mass-mediated consumer culture in the interwar years undermined ethnic divisions and helped to create a more Americanized working class. As the Great Depression hit working people hard, Franklin D. Roosevelt's promise of a **New Deal** to help those "at the bottom of the nation's economic pyramid" gained him a majority of working-class voters in 1932—a majority that only grew larger over the course of the decade as workers reaped the benefits of New Deal social and relief measures. Stung by Roosevelt's landslide victory over Republican Alf Landon in 1936, conservatives accused Roosevelt of recklessly fanning the fires of class conflict for his own electoral gain. When workers made up an even larger share of Roosevelt's supporters in 1940, one journalist declared that the New Deal had "drawn a class line across the face of American politics." As Bruce Nelson observes, the New Deal was a major factor in ushering large sections of the working class into the American mainstream.

Working-class Americans benefited significantly from New Deal social and relief measures. Relief programs such as the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) and the Works Progress Administration (WPA) helped millions of working-class Americans by providing relief payments and public works projects for the unemployed. Workers also agitated for and benefited from more permanent social security measures, most notably the **Social Security** Act (SSA) of 1935, which provided workman's compensation and old-age insurance for wage-earning Americans and their dependents. Finally, New Deal labor legislation, most notably the Wagner Act of 1935, protected workers' right to organize and promoted the growth of industrial unionism. None of these measures was perfect; the WPA only helped about 40 percent of the unemployed, and the SSA excluded agricultural and service workers, thus discriminating against African Americans, Latinos, and women. Perhaps most significantly, Roosevelt hedged on his commitment to labor and social welfare after the 1936 election and distanced himself from industrial unions during the labor conflicts of 1936–37. It is a testament to the strength of the New Deal Coalition that, in spite of such limitations, the support of workers, unions, and African Americans remained steadfast for Roosevelt, and for many other Democratic leaders and policies, for a quarter-century after the Great Depression ended.

For all its faults, though, the New Deal and the coalition it fostered helped the Democratic Party dominate politics for decades to come. Republican control of Congress, the White House, and state government tended to be shallow and brief until the rise of **Ronald Reagan** after 1980.

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NEW LEFT

PETER BRATSIS

The term *New Left* refers to the radical social movements as well as the neo-**Marxist** theoretical currents of the 1960s and 1970s. The term *Old Left* usually refers to activists in the 1930s. The Old Left typically understood class in economic terms, was workplace-focused, and was often directly connected to the **Communist Party**. In contrast, the New Left was usually outside the Communist Party and tended to reach beyond the older understandings of class. As such, the New Left is distinct in terms of its timing and its revisionist tendencies in relation to orthodox Marxism and its understanding of class.

The most important theorist of the New Left within the United States was Herbert Marcuse. Through such books as *Eros and Civilization* and, especially, *One-Dimensional Man*, Marcuse examined the role of repression and **alienation** in contemporary societies and stressed the paucity of cultural life and critical thinking that contemporary **capitalism** had precipitated. Concurrently, however, Marcuse and most of the New Left were critical of the Soviet Union and the bureaucratic repression that characterized Soviet society. For Marcuse and similar radical thinkers of the era, the key problems of capitalism extended well beyond the problem of exploitation, and the **working class** was no longer viewed as the only agent, or even as a necessary agent, for radical social change. Students, ethnic minorities, poets, artists, and many others became significant agents for change within the New Left.

Other key thinkers within the New Left in the United States were **C. Wright Mills** and Tom Hayden. The European New Left drew upon thinkers such as Henri Lefebvre, Antonio Gramsci, **Louis Althusser**, Cornelius Castoriadis, Andre Gorz, and Guy Debord. Political organizations, journals, and events usually associated with the New Left include **Students for a Democratic Society**, the Berkley Free Speech Movement, the Black Panthers, *New Left Review*, *Socialisme ou Barbarie*, the May 1968 uprisings in France, the "hot autumn" of 1969 in Italy, and the antiwar movement and Civil Rights Movement within the United States.

In terms of social class, the neo-Marxist thinking of the New Left provided many innovations for class theory. Primarily, the role of politics and culture was brought back into the understanding of class. Examined and highlighted were the schools that help shape individuals into class agents, the alienated forms of social life that **suburbanization** and **consumerism** had instituted, and the class roles of the state and popular culture. Individuals in contemporary society were no longer simply producers; they were also consumers, residents, commuters, sexual beings, and so on. Perhaps must significantly, the older Hegelian-Marxist model of class-in-itself and class-for-itself was abandoned by many theorists of the New Left. Class now referred to dimensions of **power** within all sorts of social practices. Thus, being black or female in the United States also overlapped with the question of class

because of the realities of the power invested in these structures and because of how inherently tied to capitalism these realities were. After all, the segmentation of the labor market along gendered, ethnic, and racial lines is integral to capitalism. By emphasizing that class was not a matter of academic definition or a question of how individuals may identify or perceive themselves, the New Left was able to avoid the scholasticism of many older theories of class and adhere to a much broader set of political sensibilities and strategies. In this light, student organizations, the black power movement, feminist groups, anticolonial agitation, and national liberation movements were seen as harmonious with Marxism and working-class struggles.

The social upheavals and political projects of the New Left and the 1960s themselves provoked a new wave of class politics and struggles from the right. The socialled **culture wars** as well as the broader social conservatism characteristic of **Ronald Reagan**, Margaret Thatcher, and assorted neo-liberals can be understood as a response to the cultural and political challenges of the New Left. Equally importantly, many of the countercultural components of the New Left, from the music to certain styles of dress and sexual expression, were incorporated into contemporary consumer society, commodified, and stripped of their political character. However, much of contemporary radical thought is situated within the trajectory opened by the New Left, and in spite of the relative absence of popular political challenges to **bourgeois** society, attempts to understand the cultural and political dimensions of class struggle and domination have continued.

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NEW MIDDLE CLASS

ROBERT E. WEIR

The new middle class is an imprecise analytical category used by many scholars to differentiate the nineteenth-century American **middle class** from subsequent iterations. Class definitions are contentious, but most analysts agree that the middle class that emerged in the early nineteenth century bears faint resemblance to that which evolved during and after the **Industrial Revolution**.

The old middle class consisted largely of property owners, with the **means of production** owned (or controlled) by those engaged in business, retail, professions, or agriculture. A lower stratum of clerks, bureaucrats, and less-prestigious professionals existed, but their numbers were not large until after the **Civil War**. The old middle class often shared the political and cultural values of the **upper class**, and its members were noted for refinement, moralism, careful investments, and parsimony. Some **nouveau riche** indulged in **conspicuous consumption**, and wealthy Americans were often associated with **philanthropy**, but much of the old

middle class was shrewd with money, its charitable tendencies constrained by **Social Darwinism**.

The expansion of the American economy in the latter part of the nineteenth century complicated class definitions. Many antebellum business owners controlled modest enterprises and amounts of property that were dwarfed by the emergent commercial, industrial, and business empires of men such as John Rockefeller, Andrew Carnegie, and others. Many of the new entrepreneurs and businessmen commanded fortunes greater than those in the upper class, but they lacked the pedigree and prestige necessary for inclusion. Moreover, they shared the values and cultural practices of the older middle class more than those of the upper classes, whom they often viewed as decadent and idle. They were, however, more prone to conspicuous consumption.

The situation was complicated further by the increasing complexity of the economy, which created a host of new managerial, administrative, clerical, retail, professional, and government opportunities. Although the nature of the work and the salaries they carried differentiated such employees from the **working class**, their material wealth and lifestyles were such that it made little categorical sense to consider the middle class as homogeneous. Rising prices in the early twentieth century, coupled with the lure of mass culture and popular culture entertainment, changed both the consumption patterns and the values of many middle-class individuals, especially those of humbler means. By the early twentieth century, several observers began to speak of the "new middle class" and noted the various gradations within it. Later scholars such as **W. Lloyd Warner** even articulated a separate "lower middle class."

At this point, however, the term became increasingly problematic. Some began to lop off the wealthy and view the lower middle class as the mythical "average American." Others even included certain members of the working class in this category, a formulation at the root of the debatable idea that the United States is a middle-class society, although this view didn't come into sharp focus until after World War II.

In the last third of the twentieth century, other commentators applied the "new middle class" label to technocrats, engineers, computer specialists, and other higher-echelon workers in the postindustrial economy. Radical scholars use the term in still other ways. **C. Wright Mills**, for example, mostly restricted identification of the "old" middle class to the early 1800s and the "new" to the lower middle class, which he saw as alienated and restive. Following Mills, those employing a **Marxist** analytical frame see the new middle class as professional and salaried workers on a careerist pathway, and they juxtapose them against a declining **petty bourgeoisie** of self-employed individuals. The new middle class is subordinate to capital, even though its members have some autonomy over their labor. The new middle class is reckoned to constitute just over 20 percent of the workforce, and though its members often do not identify with the working class, economic dependency and frustrated desires for upward **social mobility** make this new middle class a potentially volatile social force.

It remains to be seen whether the academic community can agree what "new middle class" means. It is a useful term for describing the historical evolution of the middle class and for highlighting its heterogeneity, but it has not helped challenge the popular belief that most Americans are, simply, middle class.

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NEW SOCIAL HISTORY

ROBERT E. WEIR

New social history is a way of viewing human history that emphasizes narrative, perspective, and interpretation rather than seeing facts as static or seeking a grand synthesis—often called a "metanarrative"—that allegedly explains eras, the significance of historical phenomena, or national character. The new social history often invokes phrases such as "bottom up history," "history from the bottom rail," "everyday life," and "total history." These phrases call attention to social history's emphasis on individuals and groups that were marginalized in more conventional historical studies.

Until the 1960s much American history was written with built-in assumptions or ideological biases that sought to explain forces as diverse (and elusive) as the success of the American economy, the endurance of its political institutions, or the national character. As such, emphasis was placed on elites, leaders, and institutions. The rich, powerful, and famous appeared as historical actors, whereas the masses were customarily viewed as more passive or as followers. The new social history restored a human side to historical events and added complexity, nuance, and multiple viewpoints to the way historians interpreted those events. For example, rather than study slavery as an institution, new social historians turned their gaze to the lives of slaves. Even labor historians once showed a preference for economic history and labor union bureaucracy; the new labor history placed emphasis on the nature of work, working-class identity and culture, workers' families, worker subcultures, local politics, and unorganized workers as well as those in unions. Women's history underwent a profound revolution, shifting from its emphasis on a handful of famous women to an examination of all women and the manner in which gender bias operates across time. Women's history dealt severe challenges to older male-constructed paradigms of change and continuity. Other fields to undergo revision included cultural, Native American, urban, rural, immigrant, and quantitative history. As these fields gained in popularity, some older disciplines such as military, diplomatic, constitutional, and economic history were deemphasized on some campuses.

The new social history is not a separate school, but rather a way of seeing history from many different perspectives and of using different types of evidence. American variants developed from European models first developed in France in the 1920s and Britain in the 1930s. French historians were especially influential in applying rigorous social science analyses to demographic and economic data to generate results that defied conventional wisdom. British historians, especially E. J. Hobsbawm and E. P. Thompson, had a profound impact on U.S. labor historians

in the 1960s and 1970s, with Thompson's *The Making of the English Working Class* (1963) serving as a seminal text. Thompson argued that **class consciousness** emerges whenever common experience leads a group of workers to see their interests as separate from the interests of others and to embed those differences in culture, expressed in traditions, values, ideas, and institutions. That formulation comes close to representing the present-day majority paradigm for American social historians. So too did Thompson influence the sources that historians consult; written documents retain importance, but credence is also given to oral history, religious life, music, and subjective sources such as letters, diaries, poems, and family lore.

The social movements of the 1960s and 1970s—especially civil rights, the peace movement, rank-and-file union rebellions, and feminism—also impacted many historians. As such, the workings of **power** became and remain a key aspect of the new social history. Many historians embraced **conflict theory**, though quite a few came to view conventional **Marxist** analysis as in need of retooling or altogether inadequate. In particular, historians began to notice the gaps between official history—as embodied in speeches, manifestos, legislation, and resolutions—and the way people actually lived. The chasm between leaders' pronouncements and rank-and-file desires and behavior highlighted the need to look at history from the bottom up.

In the 1980s and 1990s, European intellectuals such as Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida swayed some American social historians. Foucault's work showed that the **social reproduction** of power is more pervasive than most realize and tends to blunt the ability of individuals (and most groups) to alter society. Derrida's postmodernist approach to language has proved attractive to many historians studying disenfranchised groups; Derrida's insistence that "texts" (broadly construed) do not belong to their authors and that all interpretations of them are therefore equally valid calls attention to how meaning is socially constructed and insists that no single interpretation should be privileged.

In the early twenty-first century, there has been some backlash against the use of postmodernist tools in historical analysis, especially regarding the ideas that language is meaningless and that few (if any) judgmental standards are valid. A few critics have complained that the new social history has so fragmented metanarratives as to render the entire discipline of history diffuse, whereas still others argue that social historians are more devoted to political correctness than to historical accuracy. A smaller group complains that there is nothing "new" in approaches now more than forty years old and calls upon colleagues to articulate new theories and analytical methods. These complaints notwithstanding, the new social history should be credited with reviving an awareness of how class, race, gender, ethnicity, and other social factors have shaped and have been shaped by the masses. Its future is bright, given that it is now the dominant paradigm in social and cultural studies.

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New York Yankees

ROBERT E. WEIR

The New York Yankees are a major league baseball team. To critics, the Yankees represent the very worst in capitalist inequality and illustrate how the American class system is unfairly tilted toward those who have resources. In essence, the Yankees are a sports metaphor for the sociological concept of **life chances**. Defenders of the Yankees see them as an example of how the free market is supposed to work and believe that those who attack the team's business philosophy are attacking the very nature of **capitalism**.

Since the team's founding in 1903, the New York Yankees have finished first in the American League thirty-five times and have won the World Series twenty-six times. This easily makes them the most successful major league baseball team in history. Part of the team's mystique stems from its 1920 purchase of Babe Ruth from the Boston Red Sox, the Yankees paying the then-unheard-of sum of about \$350,000. Prior to purchasing Ruth, the Yankees had never won a pennant; shortly thereafter, they became the dominant team in major league baseball. It also meant that the taint of money has dogged the club's reputation since 1921.

New York is the nation's largest population, commercial, and media center. This means that the Yankees can (potentially) generate greater revenue than any other team because, under major league baseball's operating agreement, there is no revenue-sharing plan. The current outcry against the Yankees is not new; from 1936 through 1964, the Yankees went to the World Series twenty-two times in just twenty-nine years. A commonly repeated adage of the time compared the Yankees to big business and held that "rooting for the Yankees is like rooting for U.S. Steel." Nor is the charge that the Yankees buy talent a new one; in the 1950s, for instance, the Yankees frequently traded players and money to small-market teams such as Kansas City in exchange for rising stars such as Roger Maris, the first player to break Babe Ruth's single-season home run record.

After lean years in the late 1960s, controversy erupted anew when a group headed by George Steinbrenner purchased the Yankees in 1973. Steinbrenner is noted for his abrasive personality and free-wheeling spending. In 1975 an arbitrator's ruling led to a stunning change in baseball's reserve clause, a contractual agreement that bound players to a team until their employer chose to trade or release him. After a 1976 lockout, contracts for players with sufficient major league service were considered binding only for the length of the contract. The resulting free agency led to soaring salaries, a condition that favored deep-pocketed teams such as the Yankees. When Mickey Mantle signed a \$100,000 contract in 1963, he was the first major league player to do so; by 1984 the average major league salary was \$330,000, and thirty-six stars made over a million. Several strikes and lockouts in the 1980s and early 1990s only strengthened the free agents' bargaining power.

George Steinbrenner was among the owners who adapted to free agency by negotiating lucrative merchandising and media deals that allowed him to spend freely. His detractors accuse him of ruining baseball's finances through reckless attempts to buy baseball's best talent. Since the start of free agency, it has indeed been difficult for small-market teams to hold on to their best players. In 1998, for

example, the payroll of the Baltimore Orioles topped the major leagues at nearly \$69 million; at the other end of the spectrum, the Montreal Expos spent just \$9.1 million. (The Yankees had the second highest payroll at \$63.4 million.)

Since 1999 the Yankees have perennially topped a salary list that has skyrocketed. In 2002 the Yankees spent \$132 million for their forty-man roster, and the next richest team, the Boston Red Sox, spent \$108 million. At the bottom of the list, Tampa Bay invested just \$34.2 million in payroll, not even a quarter of what the Yankees spent. Just three years later, in 2005, the Yankees spent \$206 million, more than \$70 million more than Boston's second-highest payroll, and Tampa Bay actually reduced its total salaries to \$29.9 million. The net effect has been to exclude the smaller media-market teams such as Tampa, Kansas City, Pittsburgh, and Cincinnati from competitive contract bidding.

Free spending and soaring salaries have had an unanticipated impact on the class system in that they have made it harder for working-class and lower-class individuals to attend games. The average major league ticket for 2005 cost \$21.17, but some teams charge far more. The Boston Red Sox had the dubious distinction of having the highest ticket prices—over \$44 per seat—whereas Tampa and Kansas City tickets average under \$14. One estimate holds that a family of four attending a game in Boston would spend well over \$200 for their outing.

It should be noted that, though Steinbrenner and the Yankees get much of the blame for this, baseball tickets are cheaper than tickets to professional football or basketball games, and the Yankees do not charge the highest prices. Moreover, some working-class fans give Steinbrenner credit for spending a higher proportion of his profits on improving his team rather than pocketing them as some owners have done. (Studies indicate that, the poverty cries of owners notwithstanding, most franchises are profitable. Moreover, attendance has risen.) The Yankees have also continued spending despite a "luxury tax" enacted in 2003 that taxes teams that spend above a salary ceiling (\$128 million in 2005) and that puts the money into a revenue-sharing scheme; in other words, the Yankees and Red Sox, the only teams over the threshold, partially subsidize the rest of the league.

The questions of whether the free-spending habits of the New York Yankees are good for the game and whether major league baseball should impose salary caps akin to those of other sports are issues for others to debate. But in the matter of social class, one must say that disturbing trends are in motion, though it seems facile to blame them solely on the Yankees and other wealthy franchises. First, as noted earlier, soaring ticket prices may well serve to make watching live professional sports a pursuit too expensive for the working class and lower class. More distressing, though, has been the demand of team owners that municipalities raise tax revenues, enact tax breaks for franchises, and build supporting infrastructure to subsidize the building of new stadiums. Many of these new stadiums come with luxury suites and executive amenities that are underwritten by taxpayers. Wealthy team owners also hold local politicians hostage by threatening to move their teams if concessions aren't granted, thereby removing jobs from the area and reducing entertainment options. Some cities, most recently Washington, D.C., when the bankrupt Montreal Expos relocated there in 2005, were forced to reallocate resources to major league baseball that were badly needed for local schools, municipal employees, and social programs.

Although it is convenient to scapegoat teams like the New York Yankees or owners like George Steinbrenner, they are symptoms of underlying problems more than their cause. As long as society doles out **corporate welfare** to sports franchises and places a higher value on sports entertainers than on schools, neighborhoods, public safety, and social needs, one should expect the unfairness and inequality that follow.

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NEWPORT

ROBERT E. WEIR

Newport is a Rhode Island seaside resort located on Aquidneck Island south of Providence. Since the nineteenth century, it has been known as a summer retreat for the **upper class**. During the **Gilded Age**, many members of the **nouveau riche** built fanciful mansions along Bellevue Avenue alongside those of older upper-class families.

Newport's association with the rich and powerful is ironic given that Rhode Island was originally a haven for religious dissenters and individuals who embraced what today would be dubbed cultural diversity. Roger Williams established the first permanent settlement in 1636, having been expelled by the **Puritans** from Massachusetts Bay for his views in favor of religious tolerance and against theocracy. In 1639 **Anne Hutchinson** and her followers arrived on Aquidneck Island after leaving Massachusetts Bay. Land on the southern part of the island was purchased from local **Native Americans** when the first settlement divided, and William Coddington and John Clarke laid the foundations for Newport. It soon became a thriving port and a town in which Baptists, Quakers, Natives, and **Jews** freely interacted.

Newport's favorable location on Narragansett Bay gave rise to a thriving port city that by the early eighteenth century was surpassed only by Boston, Charleston, New York, and Philadelphia. Merchant trade brought great wealth to Newport, and its first large homes appeared. Some of this wealth came from the infamous "Triangle Trade," in which locally distilled rum left Newport and was traded for **slaves** in West Africa, which were then sold in the Caribbean.

Newport's merchant glories faded during the **American Revolution**. The British occupied the town and disrupted trade. It began to recover in the early nineteenth century, but was dealt a fatal blow by the embargo against British goods imposed by President Jefferson in 1807 and by the subsequent War of 1812. Newport suffered economic decline until rich families from Boston and New York began summering there beginning in the 1830s. Its first hotels catering to well-heeled visitors appeared in the 1840s, and the summer home of Florida plantation owner George Noble Jones—later dubbed "Kingscote"—opened in 1841. It is often

viewed as the first of the opulent summer "cottages" that began Newport's association with the upper class. Intellectuals and artists also began to discover Newport.

Other mansions followed Kingscote, but the Civil War interrupted the development of Newport as an upper-class enclave. The next four decades, however, saw some of America's richest families build summer homes in Newport. Samuel Ward McAllister is often credited with making Newport a center for **socialites**; in the 1850s, he began inviting friends from New York's "Four Hundred," a list of social elites, to Newport. The social scene emerged in full bloom in the 1870s, when the Astor family began summering in Newport and eventually refurbished Beechwood House. By the 1880s, Newport was the premier summer location for the upper class, and ornate mansions arose, many of which were built by socialclimbing industrialists, financiers, and robber barons seeking prestige. Parvenu families—including the Vanderbilts—were known for throwing lavish parties marked by conspicuous consumption, which some older families considered crass. Within the upper class, there was tension between the old-moneyed "Nobs" and the arriviste "Swells." Both groups united, however, in their disdain for middle**class** visitors who began to arrive on trolleys and steamships and emulate the style of the rich. The upper classes sought to limit access to beaches, popular strolling areas (such as Cliff Walk), carriage routes, and country clubs. Many sought to convert their properties into de facto gated communities. By the late nineteenth century, the culture of money had trumped that of birth, and Newport had become a place where social networks were forged, where fortuitous marriages were arranged, and where an exclusive lifestyle took place. Newport became a center for both yachting and tennis, the latter still a refined activity. Lower middle- and working-class visitors were confined to amusement parks and other areas that were **segregated** from the rich.

In many ways, Newport embodied the excesses of the Gilded Age. It was a place where the rich routinely spent \$4,000 a week—a figure more than five times the average annual wage for laborers—to maintain residences only used two or three months per year. Newport's local U.S. Naval base—opened in 1860—provided some jobs on a year-round basis, but most of its working class and lower middle class consisted of servants, shopkeepers, tourist industry workers, and others who were dependent on the summer social season. By World War I, Newport's heyday was behind it, a victim of changing fashion and escalating costs. It enjoyed a brief revival in the boom economy of the 1920s, but many of the mansions closed during the **Great Depression**, and nearly one-third of them were demolished. Many were converted to other uses, and most of the mansions a modern visitor sees are the result of extensive historic preservation efforts that took place after World War II.

In 2000 Newport was home to 26,475 individuals, a figure that represents a steady decline in population since 1940. The town was also hard hit by the removal of the destroyer fleet in 1970, though the Navy maintains a small presence. Newport touts itself as a diverse community today, but that is somewhat deceptive. Although it is no longer the center of society, wealth and exclusivity are still in evidence, and many of its shops, hotels, and restaurants are beyond the budgets of most Americans. It continues to be a playground for the rich and a place where many come to network, marry, sail, and relax.

As a site for **cultural tourism**, Newport stands among locales such as Bar Harbor, Maine; the Berkshires; Cape May, New Jersey; the **Hamptons**; Jacksonville, Florida; and Saratoga, New York. It is a place where the quintessential "average" American can vicariously associate with opulence.

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NEWSPAPER MERGERS

TINA BRAXTON

Newspapers proliferated between the mid-eighteenth and late nineteenth centuries because of rising literacy, technological advance, and geographic expansion. In 1801 there were about twenty dailies in the United States and an unknown number of less frequent papers. The 1850 census found a total of 2,526 newspapers; by 1880 there were 11,314. Since the mid-1890s, this increasing trend has reversed as a result of buyouts and **mergers**.

As newspaper publication expanded, editorial viewpoints varied, usually mirroring editors' views. Selection and writing of news stories might also reflect the editor's opinion, but with independent papers flourishing, different perspectives remained available to the reading public. With the contraction of newspaper ownership, business considerations eclipsed the newspaper's function as a source of information or a platform for ideas. Advertisers' and shareholders' interests determined editorial content and news selection.

Early newspapers were expensive and catered to businessmen. In the 1830s, smaller-sized newspapers, printed on fast, steam-powered presses and priced at one penny, were mass-marketed to waged workers. Though politically neutral, these "penny papers" fostered public discussion of issues and political inclusion. The small-paper format spawned an expansive alternative press including foreign language, labor, and radical newspapers. The first African American newspaper, Freedom's Journal, appeared in 1827. Abolitionist newspapers such as William Lloyd Garrison's Liberator and Horace Greeley's New York Tribune played a vital role in turning Northern public sentiment against slavery.

As the nineteenth century progressed, faster presses, the telegraph, and the professionalization of journalism improved newspapers and expanded readership. The rise of a substantial **middle class** provided both a market and the creative energy for socially liberal newspapers. Muckraker journalism focused public attention on corruption, poverty, and problems of industrialization. By 1880 the trends that had brought improved news coverage—technology and professionalism—had also raised costs, especially start-up costs for new newspapers. Fewer failed papers were replaced by new ones, leaving many cities with only one daily. Wealthier

publishers most often remained in business—some operating their papers at a loss, subsidizing production with revenues from other holdings. Their news coverage often touted pro-business views, especially as labor unrest wracked the nation.

By the mid-1890s the number of newspapers was declining. As chains bought out distressed publishers, salesmanship and business methodology colored news reporting and editorial policy. William Randolph **Hearst** built one of the first newspaper empires. He began his career publishing stories about government and business corruption, and in 1895 he bought the *New York Morning Herald*, renaming it the *New York Herald*. To compete with Joseph Pulitzer's *New York World*, Hearst turned increasingly to sensationalism to sell papers, while aggressively seeking advertisers. As he continued to buy newspapers and other businesses, Hearst's politics moved substantially to the right. Hearst's sensationalism did more than sell papers; it manipulated events. His overblown editorials are credited with causing the Spanish-American War. The *Atlanta Georgian*, which Hearst purchased in 1912, prominently featured lurid stories of black men raping white women, instigating racial strife and contributing to the growth of Jim Crow discrimination.

Competition from radio and, later, television squeezed independent newspapers, accelerating their takeover by chains. Today, most chains also own magazines, radio, and television stations. Some chains are controlled by conglomerates with holdings in completely different industries. General Electric, for example, owns numerous media companies, in addition to manufacturing and financial services companies. Critics of newspaper mergers and acquisitions cite the primacy of business issues over journalistic ones as a danger to **democracy**. As newspapers become "big business," publishers' interests run contrary to those of **consumers** and workers. The gap between readers and publishers is more protracted if the publisher is a publicly held company, owned by stockholders and run by directors. Such companies are in business only to make money. They buy newspapers to increase their overall profits and frequently have a compelling interest in withholding news on labor, environmental, or negative business practices, to avoid compromising their other business interests. In the hands of such an organization, a newspaper can become a propaganda tool, used to misinform the public and protect the illegitimate interests of the corporate class. Newspaper buyouts frequently involve staff cuts and labor strife. News staff are hired, retained, or fired based of conformity to publishers' views. Several newspaper chains are known for union-busting.

The Newspaper Preservation Act of 1970 allows agreements between newspapers in the same city to combine certain business operations and share facilities, while maintaining separate news staffs. This may have slowed the demise of some papers and preserved competition in some cities. But corporate engulfment of newspapers and news coverage continues.

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Putting Democracy at Risk, 2005; Michael Schudson, Discovering the News: A Social History of American Newspapers, 1978.

NOB HILL

ROBERT E. WEIR

Nob Hill is a section of San Francisco that served as a nineteenth-century preserve for many of the city's **nouveau riche** railroad barons, mining entrepreneurs, and wealthy businessmen whose fortunes rose during and after the 1849 gold rush. It is an example of how wealthy individuals in the **Gilded Age** sought to insulate themselves from the masses. Indeed, Nob Hill's name is said to derive from "nabob," a term that originally referred to officials of India's Moghul Empire but that had passed into popular parlance to mean a rich, powerful, and often pompous individual.

The discovery of **gold** transformed San Francisco. Only fifty citizens lived within the town confines in 1844, and but 850 lived there in 1848, the year gold was discovered nearby. By July of 1849, about 5,000 adventurers and prospectors had arrived, many of whom were living in tents and other temporary shelters. By the end of 1849, the population had swelled to more than 25,000. The city continued its spectacular growth and counted 56,802 citizens in 1860. The Civil War of 1861 to 1865 notwithstanding, there was great clamor to connect California to lands east of the Mississippi River via a transcontinental railroad. In the midst of war, Congress chartered the Union Pacific Railroad in 1862 and the Central Pacific in 1864. Associated with the latter were four individuals who became Nob Hill luminaries: Charles Crocker, Mark Hopkins, Collis Huntington, and Leland Stanford. The first transcontinental railroad was completed in 1869.

As San Francisco grew, wealthy citizens sought to distance themselves from the working class and the rowdy transients who concentrated in areas such as the Tenderloin and Rincon Hill. Legend holds that Dr. Arthur Hayne and his wife, actress Julia Dean, were the first to build a home on Nob Hill, sometime around 1858. The area now bounded by Bush, Larkin, Pacific, and Stockton Streets remained largely sagebrush and grass until the opening of a cable car line in 1873. Soon, rich San Franciscans were moving up to Nob Hill and adjacent Russian Hill, where they had commanding views of San Francisco Bay and, not coincidentally, were far removed from the masses. They built elegant mansions, famed for their elaborate facades and well-groomed gardens. The area's exclusive clubs and lifestyles marked by conspicuous consumption epitomized the grandeur available to the Gilded Age upper class, and many of the residents embodied the contemptuous attitudes and exploitative practices brought to bear against the lower orders.

A 1906 earthquake and fire destroyed most of Nob Hill, with only Leland Stanford's mansion escaping devastation. It remains an expensive and exclusive area, however, with some of the city's more pricey hotels—including the Huntington and the Hopkins—being built on the ruined foundations of former mansions. Wealthy San Franciscans rebuilt on Nob Hill, and it is still known for its palatial homes. Today, however, most would consider Pacific Heights and several other

neighborhoods to be slightly more prestigious than Nob Hill.

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Nob Hill being photographed after the San Francisco earthquake in 1906. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

Nonprofits

MURNEY GERLACH

Nonprofits are legal, nongovernmental organizations that are incorporated under state law as charitable or not-for-profit corporations and that have broad public purposes. Today, nonprofits are of great philanthropic significance and serve to direct charitable giving and altruism in America. They are created to break down class barriers and promote public welfare, health, education, and good works.

Nonprofits are endowed with a social and public purpose derived in part from the ancient Greek concept of **philanthropy**, a term that literally means to love mankind. Today, nonprofits constitute an enormous business and economic force. According to *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, there are currently 247 major nonprofits in the United States, and *The Chronicle of Philanthropy* notes that their combined 2005 assets surpassed \$349 billion. These public, private, charitable, community, religious, and nonprofit entities, foundations, and corporations constitute a central driving economic force in America. They also promote diversity, humanitarianism, issue awareness, and the cultural integration of social classes.

Historical precedents of the modern nonprofit organization include Frenchman Stephen Girard, who came to America in 1776, financed the War of 1812 with John Jacob Astor, and quietly made the largest gift in the early American republic, \$7 million for Girard College in Philadelphia to help orphans and indigent children. Many modern philanthropists also follow the lead of Andrew Carnegie, whose influential 1889 article "Gospel of Wealth" encouraged those of wealth to give away their fortunes to public trusts rather than leaving it all to their families. Carnegie wrote, "The best means of benefiting the community is to place within its reach the ladders upon which the aspiring can rise." The Carnegie Corporation of New York remains a potent nonprofit organization and funds projects that seek to break down class, racial, and international barriers, not only in the United States, but also globally. In 2006 investor Warren Buffett took Carnegie's advice to heart and announced his intent to donate \$29.1 billion to the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.

The best nonprofits and foundations strive to promote international literacy, social justice, **democracy**, disease eradication, development, and education. Their

nonprofit status isolates them from the pecuniary gains and competitiveness of forprofit **capitalism**, even though many operate much as modern businesses do. More specifically, nonprofits are required to have a public service mission, must meet legal guidelines for not-for-profit or charitable organizations, must have a governance structure that precludes self-interest and private financial gain, and must possess a special legal status that allows them to accept tax-deductible gifts. Nonprofits are exempt from paying federal taxes, and most develop clear strategic plans and long-range targets.

Among the better known of America's myriad nonprofit entities are the United Way, the Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center in New York, the Cleveland Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, Easter Seals, and Save the Children. The top nonprofits generated a median 9.6 percent return on endowment investments in 2005. Nonprofits are also investors and take some risks, but most are cautious in their investments and seek to keep their mission in mind as they make financial decisions.

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NORRIS, FRANK (March 5, 1870–October 25, 1902)

JENIFER B. ELMORE

Franklin Benjamin Norris Jr. was an American novelist and essayist whose fictional representations of biological Darwinism and **Social Darwinism** established him as a founding figure of the movement known as American literary naturalism. Naturalism is both a philosophy and a style of literature that interprets human behavior and motivation as the predetermined results of biological drives such as survival and reproduction. It is linked to evolutionary principles such as survival of the fittest, genetic heredity, and natural selection and to environmental factors such as early childhood experiences and education, class disadvantage or privilege, **poverty** or wealth, and employment or **unemployment**.

Norris was born in Chicago, the first of three sons of the successful businessman Benjamin Franklin Norris and the actress Gertrude Doggett Norris. Frank exhibited an early interest and talent in visual art; his education included boarding school in the San Francisco area as well as art school at the Julian Academy in Paris. After leaving Julian, he studied for four years at the University of California at Berkeley, but he never received a degree because of his shortcomings in mathematics. He subsequently studied writing and French for a short time at Harvard University before signing on as a reporter for the *San Francisco Chronicle* in 1895. He married Jeanette Black Norris in 1900, and they had one daughter, Jeanette, in 1902.

Highly influenced by the French novelist Emile Zola—known as the "father of literary naturalism"—Norris rejected the literary idealism and sentimentalism that had prevailed during most of the nineteenth century in favor of the more intense and pessimistic strain of realism. Zola had been one of the first to focus his writings on the lower classes, especially the urban lower classes. Like Zola's, Norris's fiction features great contrasts of wealth and poverty, success and failure, and not just contrasts among different characters, but also contrasts for the same character at different times.

His most famous novel, McTeague (1899), was inspired by the 1893 murder of Sarah Collins, a San Francisco cleaning woman. Sarah was killed by her drunken and enraged husband Patrick Collins, an unemployed ironworker and alcoholic, because she had left him and refused to give him money. The novel charts the rise and fall of McTeague, who, through his hard work as a self-taught dentist and his wife's thrifty financial management and remarkable luck, seems to overcome both the biological handicap of low intelligence and the social handicap of being a first-generation Irish American. The novel spirals downward, however, as McTeague's lack of intelli-



Frank Norris. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

gence and his tendency toward alcoholism and violence eventually overpower all positive factors: he beats his wife to death and ends up handcuffed to a corpse in Death Valley.

Norris himself occupied a relatively privileged position in society. *McTeague* is relevant to social class not only in terms of its content but also in terms of its crafting. In exploring the power of heredity and early environment over the "civilizing" influences of financial comfort and **middle-class** professionalism, Norris's novel ultimately confirms and perpetuates the same stereotypes of Irish **immigrants** as drunken and violent that put men like McTeague at such a disadvantage in the first place. McTeague was not even a real Irish surname. Norris coined it from the Irish name "Teague," which was a common ethnic slur in nineteenth-century America; it was used to refer to Irishmen in much the same way that "Jim Crow" was later used to refer to black Americans.

Norris's next novel, *Vandover and the Brute*, was similarly naturalistic, but his publisher considered it too disturbing, and it was not published until after his death.

Norris broadened his scope from single characters to an entire social and economic system in his planned trilogy *The Epic of the Wheat*. The idea was to expose the workings of post–**Civil War** American **capitalism** through a detailed exploration of the wheat industry, from the humble farmworkers who actually grow the wheat to the Chicago Board of Trade that speculates on it and sets the prices, to the railroad companies that transport it around the country, to the poor urban dwellers who work to buy the bread made from it. The first two parts of the planned trilogy, the novels *The Octopus* and *The Pit*, were published to great success in 1901 and 1903, but Norris died of peritonitis following an appendectomy while he was still planning the final installment.

Norris's other published works include the novels *Moran of the Lady Letty* (1898), *Blix* (1899), and *A Man's Woman* (1899); the short-story collection *A Deal in Wheat and Other Stories of the New and Old West* (1903); a wide variety of journalistic pieces from war correspondence to book reviews; and numerous essays on literary criticism, including some that explore social function of literature and others that concern the relationship between realism, romanticism, and naturalism.

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NOUVEAU RICHE

WESLEY BEAL

French for "new wealth," the term *nouveau riche* is used to describe one who has acquired his riches within his own lifetime, as opposed to an "old money" figure who inherits his wealth from prior generations. Usually, the term bears a derogatory connotation that a person flaunts this new **wealth** ostentatiously, as if to imply that, having only recently ascended from the **lower** or **middle classes**, the person lacks the discriminating taste to put that wealth to an "appropriate" use. The term therefore aims to distinguish the newly rich from the "old money" category according to the latter's discerning sophistication, leaving the nouveau riche in a position characterized by uncultured kitsch and vulgarity.

Much of this notion of vulgarity stems from what **Thorstein Veblen** called **conspicuous consumption** in his 1899 work *The Theory of the Leisure Class*. The nouveau riche often consume and collect **luxury goods** merely for the **status** they confer. One example of conspicuous consumption is the purchase of a **McMansion**, which owners think asserts **elite** class status because of its ostentatious size. McMansions, like many commodities associated with the nouveau riche, often bear the stigma of coarse, tasteless vulgarity. The practice of conspicuous consumption is associated with attempts at class ascension and, more importantly, with the rhetorical gestures to contain them.

In many instances, the United States itself has been likened to an example of nouveau riche in comparison with the Old World empires of Europe because the United States tends to favor lowbrow vulgarities such as **film** instead of **high-culture** expressions such as opera. But this internationalized nouveau riche distinction serves the same purpose as the domestic use: it separates the established part of the **upper class** from the emergent members. The importance of this rhetorical distinction lies in its attempt to codify the class structure and render **social mobility** an inert dream.

Notable examples of nouveau riche figures in literature include Jay Gatsby from F. Scott Fitzgerald's *The Great Gatsby* (1925) and Molly Brown (played by Kathy Bates) from James Cameron's film *Titanic* (1997). Molly Brown faces social adversity on the fateful voyage because her brash and gaudy "new money" character offends many of the "old money" passengers who share her luxurious accommodations, illustrating the intra-class tension that arises with the emergence of the nouveau riche.

Suggested Reading

David Brooks, *Bobos in Paradise: The New Upper Class and How They Got There*, 2000; Dean Knudsen, "Socialization to Elitism: A Study of Debutantes," *The Sociological Quarterly* (June 1968), pp. 300–308; Thorstein Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, 1899.



OBJECTIVE METHOD

ROBERT E. WEIR

The objective method is a method of determining social class that uses measurable criteria such as **income**, **occupation**, **education** levels, **life chances**, and economic standing.

Although there is general agreement that social stratification exists in American society, class definitions are hotly disputed. Scholars adhering to objective methods of determining class often resort to statistical measures such as census data, Department of Labor studies, and the Consumer Price Index. They also employ measures such as the Lorenz curve and the Gini index, which are used as **poverty calculators**, or they conduct questionnaires designed to produce hard data. The goal is to arrive at values-neutral conclusions.

Many social scientists are troubled by the imprecision of class studies that are based on **subjective** factors such as reputation or self-evaluation. For example, in some polls, as many as 95 percent of Americans identify themselves as members of the **middle class**, a figure that is patently absurd. Most researchers at least begin with objective class measures to sort myth from social reality.

Objective measures have their own sets of problems, however. One commonly used method divides the population into quintiles, a process that can involve setting arbitrary dividers between ranks, especially those in the middle. A careful researcher can minimize arbitrary factors, but a more serious problem with the objective method is that it cannot tell us how class functions in society. An individual might, for example, possess wealth that would place him in the upper echelon of society yet be viewed with contempt by his peers and exercise relatively little social **power**. Without considering **prestige**, one gets an inaccurate picture of such an individual's social standing. In contrast, a self-made person might have very little education yet command great wealth and respect. Finally, the objective method places less emphasis on **class consciousness**, class interests, or culture. Many scholars would argue that identity with a set of interests is a key marker of class.

Most researchers attempt to integrate objective and subjective factors, and some also incorporate **reputational** findings. Debate rages over what weight to assign each, but relatively few scholars ignore objective data altogether.

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Leonard Beeghley, *The Structure of Social Stratification in the United States*, 2004; Rhonda Levine, ed., *Social Class and Stratification: Classic Statements and Theoretical Debates*, 2001.

O'HARE, KATE RICHARDS (March 26, 1876–January 10, 1948)

SHERI BARTLETT BROWNE

Kate Richards O'Hare was a **socialist** activist and prison reformer. Born Carrie Katherine Richards in Kansas to pioneering parents Andrew and Lucy Richards, she remembered her childhood on the Kansas prairie as carefree and idyllic. In stark contrast, the years after 1887, when her family was forced to abandon their homestead and move to Kansas City because of drought and bankruptcy, were years of **poverty** and deprivation. The suffering that she and her family members lived through and witnessed among other Kansans made a lasting impression; their experiences shaped her commitment to **working-class** causes and drove her political and reform ideals.

After a brief stint as a teacher in Nebraska, Richards returned to Kansas City in 1895. She apprenticed as a machinist in the same company where her father worked—despite ridicule and harassment from her male counterparts—and eventually joined the International Association of Machinists. Reading voraciously about poverty and socialism, she was drawn to labor activists and political radicals, who influenced her thinking. Hearing Mary "Mother" Jones speak in the fall of 1895 was the catalyst that brought her into the **Socialist Party**.

For the next twenty years, Richards, who married fellow socialist activist Frank P. O'Hare, devoted her life to educating herself and others about socialism, the **labor movement**, **Marxism**, and economic history. She attended the International School of Social Economy and became a widely known and extremely popular orator, second only perhaps to **Eugene Debs**. From 1910 to 1917, she and her husband edited the *National Rip-Saw*, a journal that was the second largest in circulation among socialist journals during that time period. While raising four children, Kate Richards O'Hare traveled the country, and when World War I broke out in 1914, she continued to speak on socialist topics, adding antiwar messages to a lecture titled "Socialism and War."

O'Hare was arrested in 1917 after violating the Espionage Act, which made it a crime to interfere with the enlistment or recruitment of the military. For eloquently proclaiming her innocence at her sentencing, the judge gave her a harsh five-year sentence in the Missouri State Penitentiary, a prison unreformed by **Progressive Era** social change. O'Hare ultimately served only fourteen months before her sentence was commuted by President Wilson, but her time spent at the prison gave

her a new calling. Through her letters to her husband and friends, and with surveys undertaken while she was imprisoned, O'Hare documented the appalling conditions there, especially for women prisoners, and the brutality of the convict-lease system. Upon her release, she devoted the rest of her life to prison reform.

Moving to California with her second husband, Charles Cunningham, in 1938, O'Hare began working with penal officials to reform the state's notoriously abusive prison system. Through her essays and editorials and especially *Crime and Criminals* (1921), O'Hare became a respected authority, and she held the position of Assistant Director of Penology for the state of California for one year. Her work and writings contributed to significant changes at the infamous San Quentin prison, and she participated actively in the State Crime Commission until her death from a heart attack in 1948.

Although she formally retired from the Socialist Party after her imprisonment in 1917, in her reform efforts she still sought advice from and alliances with trade unionists and labor organizers to change California's penal system. Her life's pursuits reflected the many tragedies and challenges she overcame, and socialism's message of collective action and struggle on behalf of the poor and voiceless in society inspired her throughout her career as a prison reformer.

Suggested Reading

Phillip S. Foner and Sally M. Miller, eds., *Kate Richards O'Hare: Selected Writings and Speeches*, 1982; Sally M. Miller, *From Prairie to Prison: The Life of Social Activist Kate Richards O'Hare*, 1993.

OKIES

ROBERT E. WEIR

"Okies" is a term that was used in the 1930s to refer to farmers and others who fled southwestern states to escape from the Dust Bowl—a term coined by Associated Press reporter Robert Geiger in 1931—and other detrimental effects of the **Great Depression**. Their plight was captured in photographs for the Farm Security Administration (FSA) by Dorothea Lange and popularized by John Steinbeck in his **proletarian novel** *The Grapes of Wrath*. Director John Ford made Steinbeck's 1939 work of fiction into a feature film in 1940.

From 1931 to 1939, nearly every state in the United States experienced below-average rainfall for unusually long periods, with twenty-seven states in the Great Plains, Southwest, and Great Basin particularly hard hit. A combination of overplanting, drought, runoff from winter blizzards, and deep plowing left drought-stricken areas susceptible to wind storms that, in several locales, blew away topsoil. Farmers already hard-pressed by declining commodities prices found it difficult to survive, especially sharecroppers and tenant farmers. Many of them simply abandoned the land and left to seek other opportunities. Between 1931 and 1940, the Plains states saw an exodus of about 2.5 million people, with some 200,000 migrating to California.



Oklahoma dust bowl refugees in San Fernando, California, ca. 1935. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

Steinbeck's novel follows the plight of the Joad family from Oklahoma, and they have come to symbolize the prototypical Okie, but migrants also left Arkansas, Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, Nevada, and eastern Texas in large numbers. Quite a few were desperately poor and were forced to make their way carrying most of their possessions with them and sleeping in makeshift roadside camps. Many of those seeking a better life in California were disappointed. Deceptive handbills from unscrupulous growers seeking to attract too many applicants as a way of reducing advertised wage rates lured some. Unsanitary and overcrowded camps—dubbed "Okievilles"—awaited those who were not lucky enough to find a place in camps constructed by the FSA. Okies also encountered harsh discrimination; workdays could be as long as sixteen hours for agricultural workers, some of whom made but \$4 for a seven-day week.

Some conservatives say that Okie discrimination and agribusiness brutality are myths created by Steinbeck, whom they accuse of being a **communist** sympathizer, and by propagandists such as folk singer **Woody Guthrie**. They point out that about half of the Okies who came to California were from urban areas, that California wages and **unemployment** compensation rates were above the regional average, and that Okies had been coming to California in large numbers since 1910. They also claim that few Okies had deep roots, with the average tenant farmer moving five times in his work life irrespective of the Dust Bowl. They even claim that California suffered a labor shortage and welcomed migrants and that discrimination against Okies was exaggerated.

The conservative claims are, however, ahistorical. Although the number of Okies arriving may have been fewer than the 300,000 claimed by Steinbeck, and

although it is true that the exodus from the Plains predates the Dust Bowl, the documented cases of abuse and discrimination are so plentiful as to leave little doubt of their truthfulness. Both Steinbeck and Guthrie addressed the efforts of officials to keep Okies out of California. To cite but one real-life example, in 1937 Los Angeles Police Chief James Davis dispatched 125 officers to the California-Arizona border to turn away migrants, an action that led the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) to sue the Los Angeles Police Department. There are also surviving photos and handbills that show how some Californians attempted to racialize the Okies, posting notices such as "No Niggers or Okies Allowed." And is there little doubt that agribusiness stoked anticommunist hysteria; they feared unionization efforts such as the 1933 strike in San Joaquin Valley by the Cannery and Agricultural Workers Union, which forced a 25 percent wage increase.

The Okies stand as a testament to perseverance and courage as well as exploitation. Although few bothered to track the long-term livelihood of the Okies, many Okies managed to reconstruct lives in new homes. By the 1940s there was a robust enough Okie community to attract a new breed of economic opportunists: those leaving the Plains for factory and war-industry jobs in California. By then, the term had begun to lose its association with dust and **poverty**.

In the late 1990s the term Okie was revived with deliberate irony. Many latter-day transplants from small towns and eastern cities had relocated to technology centers such as California's **Silicon Valley** during the computer boom of the 1980s and early 1990s. When the industry underwent severe restructuring during the "dot-com" collapse, journalists and industry analysts spoke of "dot-com Okies," as some Silicon Valley workers became **homeless** and others fled the region.

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James Gregory, American Exodus: The Dust Bowl Migration and Okie Culture in California, 1989; Keith Windscuttle, "Steinbeck's Myth of the Okies," New Criterion, 20.10 (June 2002); Donald Worster, Dust Bowl: The Southern Plains in the 1930s, 2004.

ONE-PARENT FAMILIES

ELVIRA JENSEN-CASADO

The term *one-parent families*, also known as single-, lone-, or solo-parent families, refers to families that include one adult guardian with one or more children, where the other partner is dead, divorced, or otherwise missing from the family unit. Some social stigma is still tied to single-parent status, regardless of how it was acquired. A key characteristic usually is the limited resources of time and money. Single mothers are more common than single fathers. According to the 2000 U.S. Census, 84.6 percent of all one-parent families are headed by women. This group has the highest rate of **poverty** across all demographic groups. More than 40 percent of single mothers live in poverty—some studies place the figure at closer to 60 percent—whereas only 11 percent of two-parent nuclear families are poor. Race

further exacerbates the problem, with African American single-parent families nearly three times more likely than whites to be poor.

The reasons for single parenthood are complex and varied. Some parents chose one-parent status by adopting or intentionally becoming pregnant, whereas others, especially teenage girls, become pregnant by accident. Teenage single motherhood is often accompanied by other social problems related to relatively low educational attainment and lack of **job training**, both of which increase the likelihood of poverty and decrease chances for **social mobility**. Gender further complicates matters. Women, as a group, still earn less than men and perform a disproportionate amount of child care. When the mother is a teenager, unless she gets support from her own family or (rarely) from the father of her children, it is hard for her to even obtain a high school diploma. This reality often traps her into jobs that pay the **minimum wage**, an amount that places her below the **poverty line**. Recent cuts to **welfare** programs further reduce her **life chances** as well as those of her children.

Divorce is a major cause of one-parent families. About one-half of all first marriages end in divorce, and courts routinely favor mothers over fathers in child-custody decisions. According to the Department of Health and Human Services, 84 percent of all child care payments are made by men. Divorced mothers face many of the same problems as teenage mothers, in terms of low pay, child care burdens, and lack of job training. Moreover, approximately 40 percent of fathers remove themselves from active contact with their children once divorced. Women routinely charge that court-ordered child-support payments are inadequate to maintain a qualitative family life, but an even deeper social problem is that many payments are not made. Despite the toughening of federal and state laws that make it harder to evade responsibility, more than two of three child care accounts are in arrears, and only three states had a collection rate of above 70 percent for 2003, a year that the Federal Office of Child Support estimated that more than \$96 billion in uncollected payments was withstanding. Although the media image of "deadbeat dads" may be unfair in some cases, the consequences of neglecting familial duty continue to fall more heavily on women.

According to the National Institutes of Health, since 1970 the number of children living in a single-parent home has doubled, and single-parent families now make up one-third of all families with children. The number of single-parent families headed by fathers is increasing, and these now constitute about 15 percent of the total number of one-parent families. Even though past research argued that children from one-parent families have stronger tendencies to drop out of school and to have more psychological and social problems, recent studies indicate that these problems are more closely correlated to poverty than to parenting. When income is considered, substantially fewer differences appear between children of two parents and children of single parents. Nonetheless, single parents very often experience a variety of stressors directly related to poverty, which impact family relations, depressions, hopelessness, and despair.

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Lori Holyfield, Moving Up and Out: Poverty, Education, and the Single Parent Family, 2002; Bruce Katz, ed., Redefining Urban and Suburban America: Evidence from Census 2000, 2003; Kris Kissman and Jo Ann Allen, Single-Parent Families, 1992.

ORGANIZATION MAN

KEVIN S. REILLY

Organization man is a colloquialism of U.S. origin most commonly used in a pejorative sense to describe a man (no equivalent phrase exists for women) who subordinates his individuality and desires to the business organization for which he works. The term connotes a **white-collar** manager with a strong sense of loyalty to his firm and a long tenure within its bureaucracy.

Although it normally conjures up images of the generic 1950s businessman, the term actually arose during the nineteenth century in political parlance. First used in the 1870s, "organization man" was synonymous with the less common "machine-man" and referred to an unfailingly loyal member of a political machine. A good "organization man" often owed his job to the powerful Tammany Hall Democratic machine in New York, but the term soon became widely applied to candidates and political appointees from any urban party organization. Journalists used the phrase this way into the early 1950s when political machines diminished.

The modern business usage of the term emerged in the 1920s, when it suddenly appeared in classified ads to describe ideal employees for large companies: "must be an organization man," "thorough organization man," or "excellent representative and organization man." Business magazines in the 1930s and 40s would also occasionally describe a sober, loyal, and diligent corporate manager as an "organization man." The mocking term for a sycophantic employee, by contrast, was "company man"—a rube who was uncritical of his superiors or, similarly, a laborer favoring his employer over fellow workers.

With the publication of William H. Whyte Jr.'s book *The Organization Man* (1956), the term became widely used to define a major American social type of the post–World War II era. Whyte, an editor at *Fortune* magazine, had discovered what he thought was an unhealthy willingness among new college graduates to settle into white-collar corporate jobs. Like those who conducted similar academic studies of the period, he attempted to identify the changes in work, ideas, and social life wrought by the expansion of large corporate bureaucracies.

Whyte argued that the organization man had forgone competitive **individual-ism** for security and was the key operative in a larger "organizational society." He had traded the Protestant **work ethic** for the "social ethic": a faith in group belongingness as the ultimate need of the individual and a belief that applied science could achieve that end. The institutional structures of mass society, Whyte said, were arrayed against individualism and validated this social ethic. **Higher education**, personnel testing, business bureaucracies, and even popular culture all rewarded a false kind of group unity. The suburbs inhabited by organization men and their families reproduced this phenomenon into the next generation.

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James Gilbert, Men in the Middle: Searching for Masculinity in the 1950s, 2005; C. Wright Mills, White Collar: The American Middle Classes, 1958; William H. Whyte Jr., The Organization Man, 1956.

OTHER AMERICA, THE

JOHN A. GRONBECK-TEDESCO

The Other America is a book by Michael Harrington that reveals the social structure of poverty in the United States during the 1950s and early 1960s. Published in 1962, it expanded upon an article written by Harrington for Commentary magazine that documented the day-to-day struggles of poor Americans. This theme was developed more fully into a nine-chapter sociological profile on American poverty, which became The Other America. The book stands as a rejection of the popular economic thinking of the day that deemed America an abundant society, ripe with luxury and bountiful consumption. Works such as John Kenneth Galbraith's The Affluent Society (1958), in particular, had presented the United States as a country in a permanent state of prosperity, with the assertion that poverty would slowly and naturally whither away. Rather than depicting a people of plenty, The Other America portrays the United States as divided into two nations: one of comfortable affluence and a bourgeoning middle class and another, invisible America in which a culture of poverty thrives.

The book probes the social makeup of America's **lower-class** population. Its intention is to make visible the daily struggles of poor people living in the United States. Drawing from facts, statistics, and economic theory, Harrington shows how class divisions in America are rising yet increasingly hidden from mainstream society. Here behind the veneer of popular culture are the lives of 40,000,000 to 50,000,000 unskilled workers, minorities, **migrant** farm workers, and the elderly who are subject to a structural economic disparity embedded in the social matrix that perpetuates their circumstances. **Racism**, environment, regional disparity, urban crowding, and mercurial economic hardship all contribute to the growth and maintenance of America's economic underworld. Harrington notes that this culture of poverty is especially pervasive in minority communities, as indicated by the obstacles faced by Filipino and Mexican immigrants and by African Americans in urban settings. Racism and other social factors, therefore, become part of American culture and are cyclical in nature but remain overlooked by the majority of people.

In addition to the material hardships faced by poor people, *The Other America* illustrates the psychological toll of living in economic need. Poverty produces a hopelessness that further destabilizes the chances for personal growth, yet the poor are held responsible for their own destitution. Harrington seeks to redress the notions that poverty is a lifestyle choice or that impoverished Americans enjoy an idyllic simplicity that the middle class and rich yearn for but cannot achieve. Herein lies the difficult world of the destitute—the reality of what Harrington calls the "twisted spirit" of living below the **poverty line**.

The book makes clear that these economic conditions are part and parcel of a problematic modernity, one in which abject poverty arose concomitantly with technological development. Social advancement grew along with economic depravity. *The Other America* displays a lower-class livelihood that has been institutionalized, the result of neglectful economic planning and scant financial compensation. Central to the book's argument is the difference between the poor of the 1950s and the poor of the **Great Depression**. During the 1930s, public consciousness about poverty sparked social

programs under the **New Deal**, the fruits of which were absent by 1962. The welfare state created in the 1930s has been rendered defunct. Labor organizations such as the **AFL–CIO**, champions of the **working class** during the 1930s, by the 1950s were experiencing lackluster results in organizing rural migrants and industrial workers. In the end, the book blames both the government and everyday Americans for not doing their part in ending poverty in the United States.

The Other America was well received and widely acclaimed by many sections of society. It alerted the public to an alternative reality, much like John Steinbeck's *Grapes of Wrath* had done a generation before. Striving to reach what he saw as an aloof **middle class**, Harrington unveiled the debased conditions that remained clandestine from mainstream American culture. The book caused a surge in public awareness about America's economic "other." Its publication is credited for jump-starting President John F. Kennedy's economic policy and President Lyndon Baines Johnson's **War on Poverty**.

Suggested Reading

Robert A. Gorman, *Michael Harrington: Speaking American*, 1995; Michael Harrington, *The Other America: Poverty in the United States*, 1962; Maurice Isserman, *The Other American: The Life of Michael Harrington*, 2000.

OUTLAWS

See James, Jesse.

OUTSOURCING

ROBERT E. WEIR

Outsourcing is the practice of contracting work once handled in-house to another company. It is one of the biggest single threats to traditional **blue-collar** labor in contemporary society, and it is increasingly displacing service-sector and **white-collar** work as well. A deliberate corporate strategy aimed at cutting costs by reducing a company's outlay of **wages** and paid benefits, outsourcing is often part and parcel of a large program, often dubbed "downsizing," that also includes strategies such as business consolidation, store and plant closings, and implementation of technology to replace workers. American business leaders claim that outsourcing is necessary to remain competitive in the global market, but labor unions complain that outsourcing is often simply an excuse to shed well-paid workers and increase stockholder profits.

American industries once made most of their products on site, often also manufacturing the very parts that went into the finished product. By the 1990s, however, car manufacturers often outsourced more than 70 percent of the goods and services needed to create an automobile. This trend has been especially acute in the

appliances and electronics industries. Whereas in the 1950s American manufacturers dominated the global market, by the 1980s, almost all jobs with the exception of wholesaling and retailing the finished product had been outsourced to low-wage countries in Latin America and Southeast Asia. The practice of sending jobs out of the country altogether has come to supplant earlier practices of shifting work from unionized plants to non-union facilities often located in the U.S. South. The shoe and textile industries, for example, developed in New England in the nineteenth century, but had largely moved to the South by the 1950s. Now, both industries are dying in the South, as Brazilian shoes and Chinese textiles flood the market. Treaties such as the North American Free Trade Agreement and the granting of most-favored-nation trade status to China have exacerbated outsourcing problems. Once proud U.S. industries such as apparel, electronics, glass, rubber, steel, and textiles are now considered "sunset industries" that have either disappeared entirely or will do so in the near future.

Outsourcing has always been a feature of U.S. business, but there can be little doubt that its pace and strategy accelerated in the 1970s as a response to skyrocketing oil prices, aging factories, and hyper-inflation. It must be acknowledged, however, that corporate greed also played a major role. Workers and union leaders sometimes accepted wage cuts and outsourcing in the name of making their employers more competitive. Between 1969 and 1976, some twenty-two million manufacturing jobs disappeared. Workers were promised that savings would be put back into businesses to prevent future job loss, but this often turned out to be a lie. During the anti-union administrations of Ronald Reagan and George H. Bush during the 1980s, it became clear that breaking labor unions and cutting wages was the real goal. Workers fought back in bitter strikes during the 1980s and 1990s against firms such as Caterpillar, Eastern Airlines, Fieldcrest Hormel, International Paper, Phelps-Dodge, Pittston Coal, Ravenswood Steel, and Staley. A few strikes were won, but most ended badly. By the twenty-first century, it was standard practice to outsource jobs even in highly profitable firms. Executive office complexes, for example, found it more profitable to lay off their cleaning staff and hire outside contractors, many of whose workers are poorly paid and have no benefits.

As noted, blue-collar jobs have been greatly impacted. More than 800,000 U.S. jobs fled to Mexico between 1980 and 1995. The **middle class** is starting to pay more attention to outsourcing because now many white-collar jobs are fleeing as well. Publishers, for example, now routinely outsource copyediting and printing. The computer industry has seen many of its semiconductor design and manufacturing functions shift overseas, and even information technology services now routinely reroute calls to low-wage workers in India and Pakistan. Outsourcing and downsizing are two of the biggest challenges facing American workers in the immediate future. Some commentators fear that these practices threaten to bifurcate America into a two-tiered have and have-not society.

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OWNERSHIP SOCIETY

ROBERT E. WEIR

"Ownership society" is a concept placed in vogue by President George W. **Bush** in 2003. Its central tenant is that private ownership, **self-reliance**, and self-sufficiency better serve individuals than entitlements, government regulation, or tax-supported programs. Bush called for partial privatization of the **Social Security** system by allowing younger workers to invest part of their funds in the **stock market** or private retirement accounts. His plan also called for extensive tax cuts and for creating individual health care accounts, deregulating aspects of Medicare, expanding **home ownership**, and greatly curtailing the role of government in most social services. In theory, an ownership society would be one in which individuals had a greater say in how their assets were managed, and they would take a more active role in the decision-making processes associated with those assets.

Some observers link the Bush plan to ideas articulated by David Howell, the British Secretary of State for Energy (1979–81) in the government of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Thatcherism may have been influential, but the Bush proposal taps into much older notions of property, **individualism**, and the negative state. In Colonial times, the prevailing notion was that property conferred a "stake in society" mentality among those who held it and made them more responsible citizens. The **Puritans**, for example, required both church membership and property ownership as prerequisites for voting. Religious qualifications eroded before property requirements, though the amount needed for voting had lessened in most places on the eve of the **American Revolution**.

Nonetheless, many of the **Founding Fathers** took their cue from philosopher John Locke (1632–1704) and continued to link citizenship and property ownership. This position was particularly pronounced by Federalists such as John **Adams**, Alexander Hamilton, and George Washington. In 1791 Vermont became the first state to decouple property from suffrage, but it was not until 1821 that most states had done so, and not until the 1841–42 **Dorr Rebellion** that Rhode Island followed suit.

The United States has a long tradition of anti-statism. This has fueled individualism and has made Americans suspicious of centralized authority and programs. Proponents of the "negative state" from the anti-Federalists on have argued that government's proper role is to guarantee liberty, thus freeing individuals and businesses to pursue their aims without needless interference. These beliefs have also claimed allegiance from American presidents such as Andrew Jackson, Benjamin Harrison, Calvin Coolidge, and Ronald Reagan, as well as both Bushes. Negative-state politicians, economists, and theorists have often viewed social reforms emanating from the Progressive Era, the New Deal, or the Great Society with alarm. In their view, social engineering fosters dependency, siphons resources from private enterprise into the less efficient public sector, and takes decision-making power away from individuals and places it into labyrinthine bureaucracies. They also tend to reject the very notion of progressive taxation, which they see as an incentive-crushing illusion.

Critics of ownership-society theories argue that civil society would collapse and the **law of the jungle** would prevail if all individuals were abandoned to their own devices. Many charge ownership-society adherents with trying to revive the **Social Darwinism** of the **Gilded Age** and point to the social unrest of that era as proof of its infeasibility. They see ownership rhetoric as greed hiding behind a string of hollow platitudes—in essence, as a dodge for avoiding social responsibility and taxes, especially inheritance and capital gains taxes. Opponents point to soaring **poverty** and family debt rates from the 1980s on as further evidence of why ownershipsociety ideals are unobtainable for a large segment of the American population.

The American public has given a mixed reception to President Bush's plans. There is support for tax relief, but broad opposition to cuts in Social Security or Medicaid. Most economists caution that debt management would be a necessary first step for families to participate fully in an ownership society.

Suggested Reading

Robert Reich, "What Ownership Society?" (http://www.tompaine.com/articles/what_ownership_society.php); James Surowieki, *The Wisdom of Crowds: Why the Many Are Smarter Than the Few and How Collective Wisdom Shapes Business, Economies, Societies and Nations*, 2005; White House, "Fact Sheet: America's Ownership Society: Expanding Opportunities," August 9, 2004 (http://www.white house.gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040809–9.html).

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
PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS

See Catholics.

PARSONS, ALBERT R. (June 24, 1848–November 11, 1887) and **LUCY** (c. 1853–March 7, 1942)

SUSAN CLEMENS-BRUDER

Albert R. and Lucy Eldine Parsons were American radicals and champions of the downtrodden. Their lives centered on activities designed to challenge American society to keep the ideals of the American Revolution accessible to the working class. They came to national attention when Albert was charged in a May 4, 1886, bombing incident at Haymarket Square in Chicago. A rally had been called to protest the deaths of several workers during a fight that had broken out between strikers, scabs, and police on May 1 at the McCormick Harvester Plant. That day was unusually tense because the International Working Men's Party proposed nationwide strikes on the same day to instate a mandatory eight-hour workday; Albert and Lucy Parsons led a march through Chicago on May 1. After the McCormick incident, Parsons and other anarchist labor leaders called for a mass meeting at Haymarket Square on May 4, to protest the police action in defense of businesses at the expense of the working class. Over 3,000 attended the rally, but a steady rain whittled away the participants. Approximately 180 police arrived, and they had begun moving through the crowd when a bomb exploded. Eight police officers died, as did four workers killed by police fire. The arrest and trial of eight radicals, including Parsons, who turned himself in on the first day of the trial, divided Chicagoans by class and stirred passions across the United States and abroad. Four of the defendants, including Parsons, were hanged in 1887. Critics have long contended that conviction of the



Poster showing three portraits of Lucy Parsons from the book *Lucy Parsons: American Revolutionary*, by Carolyn Ashbaugh, 1976. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

defendants was based on political prejudice, circumstantial evidence, and class bias.

The radicalism that led Parsons to the Haymarket incident evolved over a quarter of a century. He joined the army at age fifteen under his older brother's Confederate command, became disgruntled with postwar white Southerners, and became a Republican to further the rights of freed slaves during Recon**struction**. He served as an Assistant Internal Revenue Assessor and joined a typographical union. He and his wife, Lucy Waller, whom he married in 1871, decided to leave the post-Reconstruction South and settle in Chicago, where they became involved with radical parties that became the International Working Men's Party. The two may have also left the South to escape animus toward Lucy, who may have been born a slave. She was variously described as being African American, of mixed race, or Spanish, the latter explanation likely being a way for her to "pass" in white society.

The "labor question" had been Albert's passion for many years. In

Chicago, Parsons worked for the *Tribune* newspaper but was fired during the nationwide 1877 railway strikes after giving a speech at a Chicago rally at which he told workers they should elect officials who pledged to end private ownership and restore workers' rights. Albert was questioned by police, but not chastened. He joined the **Knights of Labor** because of their credo that wage labor must end and that cooperative production and distribution should supplant **capitalism**. In 1884 he broke with trade unionists and quit the Typographical Union because he felt craft unions were parochial, though he continued his association with the German and **socialist**-dominated Central Labor Union. He also became editor of Chicago's English-language anarcho-socialist weekly newspaper *The Alarm*. In his autobiography, Parsons used the language of natural law, cooperation, republicanism, and the Declaration of Independence to explain his definition of anarchy. He saw no contradiction with simultaneously being a unionist, socialist, and anarchist.

Lucy Parsons continued to work for labor and the socialist cause after Albert's execution. She published a biography of her husband's life in 1889, which included a brief essay on the **labor movement**. She gave a speech at the 1905 organizing

convention of the **Industrial Workers of the World** in favor of women's suffrage, and she continued to work in the background for labor causes until she died. In 1892 she briefly edited *Freedom: A Revolutionary Anarchist-Communist Monthly*. Unlike contemporary activists such as **Emma Goldman** and **Margaret Sanger**, however, she saw gender reform as a subset of class liberation and did not take up causes such as free love or birth control, even though she had a series of lovers after Albert's death. By the second decade of the twentieth century, she was directing her energies toward alleviating **poverty**, and she soon found herself in the orbit of various communist groups, though she did not join the **Communist Party** until just three years before her death. Lucy Parsons's radicalism was remarkable in its boldness for a woman of color in Jim Crow America.

Suggested Reading

Paul Avrich, The Haymarket Tragedy, 1986; Lawrence M. Lipin, Producers, Proletarians, and Politicians: Workers and Party Politics in Evansville and New Albany Indiana, 1850–87, 1994; Lucy Eldine Parsons, Life of Albert R. Parsons with Brief History of the Labor Movement in America, 2005.

Parsons, Talcott (December 13, 1902–May 8, 1979)

KRISTIN SOLLI

Social theorist Talcott Parsons was highly influential in developing the functionalist school of sociology in the mid-twentieth century. Born in Colorado Springs, Colorado, Parsons graduated from Amherst College with a major in biology in 1924. After studying at the London School of Economics, where he worked with anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski, he received a PhD in sociology and economics from the University of Heidelberg in Germany, writing a dissertation on capitalism in the works of Karl Marx, Werner Sombart, and Max Weber. In 1927 he returned to teach at Amherst for a year and was then offered at position at Harvard University, where he remained until his retirement in 1973.

Parsons's theories were particularly influential in the 1950s and early 1960s when he was a dominant figure in the discipline of sociology in the United States as well as abroad. Parsons's brand of sociology is known as "functionalism," a school of thought concerned with understanding the overall nature of social order. Influenced by biology, the founders of functionalism believed that social systems and biological systems share important structural characteristics. A biological organism consists of an array of organs that complete separate but necessary tasks to keep the organism as a whole healthy. Functionalism posits that much like such organisms, a society is a system made up of interdependent components that work together to sustain social order. Also like biological systems, a social system is best understood as a self-regulating system that always seeks balance, or "equilibrium," as it is often referred to in functionalist terms.

Expanding on these ideas, Parsons's main interest was to articulate a general theory of how social systems work by studying the constituent parts of such systems. In the

books *The Structure of Social Action* (1937), *The Social System* (1951), and *Towards a General Theory of Action* (1951), he proposed a comprehensive theoretical apparatus with which to label the different elements of a society and analyze the functions they fulfill. Some of the most important components of this theoretical framework include the idea of the four different "system levels" that make up the interdependent parts of a society (the cultural system, the social system, the personality system, and the behavioral organism); the "pattern variables," a typology that describes the relationship between types of social organization and modes of social action; and the "AGIL model," which outlines four functions that a social system must carry out to sustain itself (adaptation, goal attainment, integration, and latent pattern maintenance).

These theoretical models all attempt to develop an understanding of how various elements of society contribute to the maintenance of social order. For example, Parsons stressed that social institutions such as the family and the educational system each perform tasks that are vital for the stability of the society as a whole. In line with this thinking, Parsons saw social stratification as a necessary component of modern societies. He argued that the unequal distribution of **prestige**, **power**, and **wealth** functions as a reward mechanism that helps assign the most qualified people to the jobs that require the most training and skill. Given that a society with a high level of differentiation will break down if everybody has the same kind of job, Parsons held that class differences are one way in which modern societies seek to maintain equilibrium.

Parsons's ideas about class, as well as his theoretical framework in general, have faced sharp criticism from other social theorists, including such scholars as C. Wright Mills, Ralf Dahrendorf, and David Lockwood. In particular, Parsons's critics have argued that a functionalist view of society assumes that there exists an ideal social order upon which all members of a given society agree. This view, they say, ignores the possibility that struggles and conflicts are integral parts of societies rather than systemic "disturbances" that cause "disequilibrium." In a Parsonian world, disagreement over values is seen as problematic and must be kept in check in order to maintain the equilibrium. His theories, in other words, rest on a normative assumption that the existing equilibrium should be maintained. Parsons's proposition that social stratification is a mechanism that is essential to maintain social order has been seen as an argument in support of a capitalist social model, and his consensus-oriented view of society has been interpreted as an expression of a conservative political view that legitimizes the status quo. Regardless of Parsons's personal political views, his theories certainly suggest that he was a strong believer in the existence of equal opportunity and that he saw the United States as a meritocracy in which people are largely free to choose their class position.

Despite widespread criticism of his consensus-oriented theoretical assumptions, of the universalism of his macro-sociological "grand theory," and of his convoluted prose, Parsons is an absolutely central figure in the history of sociological thought. Although his influence fell sharply throughout the 1960s, he remains one of the most important sociological thinkers of the twentieth century.

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Talcott Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action*, 1937; Parsons, *The Social System*, 1951; Parsons and Edward E. Shils, eds., *Toward a General Theory of Action*, 1951.

PATRIOTISM

See McCarthyism.

PAWNBROKERS

TINA BRAXTON

Pawnbrokers are individuals who make small loans secured by items of personal property that are forfeited and sold if the loan is not repaid. The loans are based entirely on the value of the collateral, with no consideration of the borrower's creditworthiness. Thus, virtually any person with acceptable collateral may borrow from a pawnbroker, and the loan funds are available quickly. Interest rates are high—300 percent is not unusual. This is because the cost of making a loan is the same, regardless of the amount, and most loans are small. Loan amounts are calculated according to the resale value of the collateral; one-third the amount the item might fetch in a bad business climate is a typical formula. Because affluent individuals can usually get more desirable credit terms elsewhere, the vast majority of pawners are **working class** or poor.

Pawnbrokers typically make loans against jewelry, firearms, musical instruments, tools, household electronics, and automobiles. Other high-value household items, such as fine silver, are also usually accepted. About 80 percent of pawned items are redeemed, and most persons who borrow from a pawnbroker do so many times.

Pawnbrokerage is probably the oldest form of banking. References are found in ancient Chinese, Greek, and Roman sources. The book of Deuteronomy contains rules for pawnbrokers, forbidding practices that would cause destitution or severe stress for the borrower, indicating that the practice of pawnbrokering has always been socially problematic. In cultures in which **slavery** was a norm, slaves were used as collateral, causing enormous distress to slaves who were sold when the debts their masters secured were not paid. In premodern times, children were sometimes pawned by their parents and enslaved if not redeemed. Pawning stored grain or the tools of one's trade brought a risk of penury and disaster.

Because medieval Christianity and Islam barred charging interest on loans, pawnbrokerage provided a niche for Jews and, while they remained numerous, for pagans. Pawnbrokers developed a folklore around the Early Modern period, during which some European rulers pawned their treasure to finance wars. This occurred because of changes in society and warfare—the need to hire mercenaries and procure the latest in weapons technology. Because of political instability, other forms of credit were not available for large enough sums. Some pawnbrokers made huge fortunes during this period—notably the Lombards, who also financed wealthy merchants. However, a popular story about Queen Isabella pawning her jewels to finance Columbus's expedition is not true.

Pawnbrokers have always been most common in urban areas because of population concentration and the earlier development of money economies. Pawnbrokers first appeared in the New World in port cities. During the nineteenth century, their business expanded rapidly as a result of industrialization and the

growth of cities. Poorly paid industrial workers had frequent cash shortfalls and also frequent emergencies, due to dangerous working conditions, unhealthy living conditions, and a volatile economy that brought periodic **unemployment**. They pawned clothing, bedding, furniture, and household objects as well as "valuables," sometimes redeeming them at payday and hocking them again soon afterward. Loan amounts were often under five dollars. **Middle-class** reformers became interested in pawnshops and their effect on poor borrowers. In some places, they attempted to regulate pawnshops and cap their interest rates, but pawnbrokers then added service charges, bringing the cost of loans back to previous levels.

With the boom economy that followed World War II, pawnbrokers stopped making loans against low-value household goods and most kinds of clothing. In the 1990s rising **poverty** created more business for pawnshops. The number of pawnshops in the United States has increased by 142 percent since 1986, and new, highly controversial loan products have been introduced. Title loans require an unencumbered automobile title for collateral. If the borrower defaults, the car is forfeited. Payday loans cash postdated checks for a fee that amounts to an interest rate as high as 500 percent. These new loan products have brought renewed criticism against pawnbrokers as exploiters of the poor. Pawnbrokers respond that they are merely providing credit to customers who cannot meet bank qualifications.

Pawnbrokering is among the most highly regulated forms of business. Most regulation today is aimed at tracking and recovering stolen property. Still, though loan amounts and items pawned have changed over time, and regulations seek to curb some abuses, the clientele and its reasons for borrowing remain quite similar, with economic distress and bad credit ratings topping the list.

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PEONAGE

See Reconstruction.

PESOTTA, ROSE (November 20, 1896–December 7, 1965)

SARAH CROSSLEY

Rose Pesotta was an **anarchist** labor organizer and vice president of the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union (ILGWU) from 1933 to 1944. Born in the Ukraine in 1896, Pesotta **immigrated** to the United States in 1913 and quickly set

to work as a seamstress in the garment factories of New York City. Prior to immigrating, Pesotta had dabbled in class-conscious politics in the Ukraine; her father was a Bundist—a member of the left-wing Jewish working-class movement—and Pesotta herself smuggled political pamphlets for a radical anti-czarist political group as a young child.

As an anarchist, Pesotta was drawn to an ideology that put a premium on free will and wholly rejected ideas such as private property, government, and authority; she found physical and intellectual freedom in anarchist tenets. She read works by anarchist intellectuals such as Mikhail Bakunin and Peter Kropotkin, attended political lectures, forged lifelong friendships with the likes of **Emma Goldman**, and worked fervently (but unsuccessfully) in the defense of fellow anarchists Sacco and Vanzetti, who were executed for a Massachusetts payroll robbery and murder in 1927. Pesotta was an intellectual, but she also believed that action



Rose Pesotta, ca. 1944. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

had to accompany ideas and that workers were at the heart of any class-conscious revolution. Thus, unlike many of her comrades, Pesotta tailored her anarchist convictions to work within the organized **labor movement**.

Pesotta's involvement with the ILGWU began almost as soon as she entered the dress factories, first quietly, as part of a small anarchist faction and later as one of the ILGWU's most effective organizers. ILGWU leaders saw Pesotta's political convictions as both a blessing and a curse. She was a fiery orator, a dedicated labor organizer, and, like the mostly socialist leadership, a staunch anticommunist. Yet her convictions and political affiliations would later cause friction between her and the ILGWU ruling elite, as well with other anarchist intellectuals, who opposed her becoming a paid leader of a democratic organization.

Despite the discomfort that came with being an outsider in the labor movement, Pesotta clearly understood her convictions and for whom she was working: the rank and file. She often warded off criticisms of her position as a labor organizer by referring to the workers' need for leadership and education. Pesotta also believed that sexism and **racism** hindered the movement, which was above all a movement based on **class consciousness**. Such convictions often won the hearts of the workers she was organizing while frustrating the ILGWU hierarchy.

Pesotta envisioned a truly democratic labor union run by the workers, themselves—a union that empowered its members through experiential teaching and learning. For such an occurrence to happen, she believed, the workers had to be educated. Wherever Pesotta went to organize new locals for the ILGWU, her first priority was always to set up an education program that included liberal arts classes ranging

from English, history, and theater to economics, public speaking, and classes on contemporary labor problems. **Strikes** and other forms of direct action also provided workers with a more practical education. The classroom would teach critical thinking, creativity, and artistic expression while protest and direct action would hammer home the importance of worker solidarity.

Pesotta's affiliation with both the anarchist movement and the American labor movement were continually at odds. Her ability to reconcile the two came out of an understanding that both movements sought to advance the status of the working class. She believed that political movements must always be accompanied by action from both leaders and workers. She understood herself to be of the working class rather than outside or above it.

By 1942 Pesotta had made the decision to leave labor organizing, citing irreconcilable differences and a failure of the union leadership to acknowledge her physical and intellectual contributions to the ILGWU membership. Pesotta returned to work as a dressmaker, determined to continue her grassroots activism.

World War II and Adolf Hitler's annihilation of the European Jewish population led her to consider her **Jewish** identity, which had never before been a concern. She became active in the Zionist movement, supporting the newly created state of Israel and continuing her social activism at a transnational level, working briefly for the Anti-Defamation League of the B'nai B'rith (ADL). Despite her initial enthusiasm, her position at the ADL failed to live up to her expectations. She returned to her sewing machine as a dressmaker until her death in 1965 from cancer.

Suggested Reading

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PETITE/PETTY BOURGEOISIE

W. LAWRENCE NEUMAN

The petite (meaning small or lesser) bourgeoisie is a social class between the major classes of modern **capitalism**. It refers to self-employed small-business owners who might run enterprises such as a "mom-and-pop" retail store, a family restaurant, a very small farm, or a two-person repair or plumbing business. It might also refer to small-scale professional businesses, such as a solo to three-person medical doctor's office.

Traditional **Marxist** theory said the petite bourgeoisie was not a part of the **bourgeoisie** (i.e., the capitalists), the **proletariat** (i.e., the workers), or the aristocracy. Although Karl Marx emphasized two main social classes, capitalists and workers, he also wrote about the petite bourgeoisie. Marx thought as the capitalist economic system advanced, capitalists would buy up one another until a few huge, powerful firms remained. Most other people would become impoverished workers, and the petite bourgeoisie would disappear. The petite bourgeois was only central in early phases of capitalism, in the transition from a feudal to a capitalist system.

Non-Marxist theory also saw its demise but called it the "old middle class." It is "old" because proprietors and small business owners who dominated nineteenth-century towns were replaced in the twentieth century by a "new" urban **middle class** of **white-collar** corporate employees.

Members of the petite bourgeoisie are not anyone else's employees; they own a business even though they have very few or no employees. They are not part of the capitalist property-owning class because they do not live by exploiting workers and reaping the profits themselves. Many work alone as sole proprietors, have a small family business with a few family members as employees, or employ a few helpers. There is no absolute size cutoff at which a **small business** owner-operator ceases to be in the petite bourgeoisie. However, an owner who has over five non-family employees is generally not considered petite bourgeoisie.

Scholars have focused on three issues concerning the contemporary petite bourgeoisie: its economic place, its cultural symbolic importance, and its political role. From the nineteenth century through the mid-twentieth century, the petite bourgeoisie declined, and many predicted its demise. Yet by the onset of the twentyfirst century, it was clear that this class was persisting. The class saw its resurgence beginning in the 1970s. Despite many new entries, high turnover, and business failures, the class has remained strong. Three factors played a role in the resurgence. First, increased immigration stimulated self-employment in small-scale retail and manufacturing. Recent immigrants have replicated historical patterns of opening small shops, restaurants, and labor-intensive businesses and often rely on family labor. Second, the postindustrial economy has stimulated the service sector. Risk-taking innovators who can take advantage of fast-changing conditions and low start-up costs can begin their own small businesses. Finally, other economic changes also came into play. Large firms increasingly subcontract to small businesses rather than relying on permanent full-time employees to perform tasks. Also, new Internet and communication technologies permit more one-person, home-based businesses. A related factor is the growth of franchises. In this case, a local owner-operator buys a license and follows rules to be part of a nationally branded product or service system. For example, a two-person carpet-cleaning business may pay fees so that it can advertise that it is part of a national carpetcleaning brand.

The petite bourgeoisie is at the core of the "rags-to-riches" **Horatio Alger** entrepreneurial myth, which is fueled by those individuals who take risks, begin their own businesses, and achieve success. Many **blue-collar** workers or salaried employees of large companies dream of quitting their jobs, starting their own businesses, and being their own boss. It fits a romantic ideal of the free market in which small business owners take risks and succeed because of hard work, ingenuity, and luck. Far from being the doomed group Marx foresaw, the petite bourgeoisie has become an American folk hero trope.

Politically, the petite bourgeoisie has been an unstable coalition partner. Wary of big government, big unions, and large banks or corporations, this class can support liberal or conservative politics. An emphasis on being small-scale with local roots and having blue-collar origins can lead it to left-wing alliances. At other times, a commitment to property ownership and **self-reliance** fosters a more conservative ideology. Some scholars suggest this class is the backbone of extremist

right-wing movements. In the face of economic threats and if offered political power, the group can be a supporter of fascism.

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PHILANTHROPY

TINA MAVRIKOS-ADAMOU

Philanthropy is a word and concept originating from a Greek root that broadly translated means "love of mankind." There are many and varied interpretations of what philanthropy is and what its expressions are, but most would agree that it refers to the voluntary act of giving (of time, services, or money) by an individual or group to promote and support some common good, as well as referring to money donated by foundations or trusts to either nonprofit organizations or charities. The former definition is more abstract and is open to interpretation and debate, incorporating the notion of humanitarianism, whereas the latter is more concrete and tangible in quantifiable terms.

Tracing the development and origins of American philanthropy in its broadest sense could begin with examining the first colonists in the seventeenth century who came to the "new world" without much knowledge of what they would find and with only themselves to rely on. Because of the social and economic conditions of the time, these first settlers lacked what we would now term "public assistance" and instead took up this public responsibility on their own, to assist each other and in the end promote the common good. The notion of helping others, a rudimentary principle of philanthropy, was thus formalized and saw its expression from barn raising to house building and setting up schools and churches. In addition, groups such as the **Puritans** of Massachusetts Bay and the Quakers of Pennsylvania at least rhetorically embraced the idea that those of **wealth** were responsible for helping the less fortunate.

By the eighteenth century, American political culture had woven into the fabric of civil society the importance of voluntary associations, and the flourishing of these organizations was proof of their importance as well as their necessity. The significance of philanthropic acts filled a crucial space in American political culture and, through a process of political socialization, was passed down from generation to generation over the centuries, taking new shapes and forms but essentially remaining central for the maintenance of **democracy**. By the nineteenth century, philanthropy was an essential element in American society because the very concept of "social problems" was in its infancy, and hence, the government was less likely to deliver aid to the needy than individuals inflamed by religious or humanitarian passion. In the late nineteenth century, the **Social Gospel** movement called attention to the needs of the poor.

Philanthropy in the United States often has a **middle-class** dimension, detectable not only by the number of citizens who give money to charities, but also by the innumerable citizens who give their time volunteering in nursing homes, hospitals, and orphanages and by the public educational system that promotes activities that instill in young people the importance and significance of philanthropic gestures. Anything from schoolchildren writing Valentine's Day cards to veterans in public hospitals to children singing for retirement associations can be interpreted as embodiments of philanthropy that are taught in public schools and that promulgate philanthropic principles.

However, philanthropic acts are not just a middle-class phenomenon in American society because one can detect similar and parallel expressions by those of the **working class**, who also partake in these types of activities and who likewise incorporate them into their set of norms and ideals of the common good. **Blue-collar** workers have long engaged in philanthropic work ranging from mutual aid societies to membership in fraternal organizations devoted to public charity.

Nonetheless, the most salient and visible expressions of philanthropy are monopolized by foundations and trusts that provide a substantial amount of money to charities and nonprofit organizations. Hotly debated are the issues of whether these foundations and trusts are part of the social **elite** of society and what the motives are behind their donations. Some critics also charge that **upper-class** philanthropy helps the rich by allowing tax write-offs or that many of the recipients of such philanthropy—such as the opera, **museums**, and symphony orchestras (see **high culture**)—benefit the rich more than the general public.

However, some of the most prominent American philanthropists do not fit the conventional mold of philanthropy. One such example is Will Keith Kellogg (1860–1951), the "inventor" of modern-day breakfast cereal, who never got past the sixth grade, but nonetheless changed the breakfast-eating habits of millions of people. The Kellogg Foundation, whose assets as of 2006 were approximately \$7 billion, has donated and supported charities concerned with children's health and welfare worldwide. (It originally supported only U.S. organizations, but later internationalized.) Kellogg wanted to donate his money so that children could become socially engaged, learn about philanthropy and volunteerism, and become leaders and entrepreneurs.

Perhaps the world's best-known philanthropist is **Bill Gates**, whose Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation had a 2006 endowment of approximately \$27 billion. Like Kellogg, Gates is a self-made billionaire. His foundation has provided funding for promoting better health conditions for those residing in developing nations, and he has extensively provided money for research into new drug treatment for diseases such as tuberculosis. Much of his foundation's money has gone to immunizing children in the underdeveloped world. The foundation's stated goal is "bringing innovations in health and learning to the global community."

People may perform philanthropic acts irrespective of their social position and personal wealth and income, and it is up to the individual to decide how (and how much) to contribute to the common good. Philanthropy may encompass many activities, and the significance of these activities is not to be measured solely in monetary terms, given that ultimately a philanthropist's goal is to improve human well-being.

In 2006 investor Warren Buffett announced his intent to donate more than \$31 billion to the Gates Foundation, which will make it the nation's largest charitable foundation.

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PINK-COLLAR WORKERS

ROBERT E. WEIR

The concept of "pink-collar workers" is important in **gender stratification** research. Pink-collar jobs are generally those considered "women's work" and reflect long-term social patterns that have often been reinforced by chauvinism and sexism. Pink-collar employment is viewed as a middle stratum between physical (and often dirty) **blue-collar** jobs and professional, salaried tasks associated with **white-collar** work.

The first known use of the term *pink collar* appeared in *McCall's* magazine in 1975 in an article discussing Louise Kapp Howe's forthcoming book *Pink Collar Worker* (1977). Howe noted that both blue- and white-collar work were dominated by men; hence, work itself was defined in male terms. There are, however, numerous **wage**-earning jobs traditionally associated with women—such as florists, typists, secretaries, and telephone operators—as well as professions in which women are overrepresented, such as elementary school teaching, nursing, and library work. Most of the fields in which women are concentrated provide lower pay than comparable male jobs and score lower on **prestige** scales. Many of the jobs in which women have clustered are viewed as extensions of gender-segregated housework, a phenomenon that feminist scholars dub "social housekeeping." Social work, for example, was seen as mothering applied on a large scale, and elementary school teaching a collective form of socializing children.

Pink-collar work stands midway between blue- and white-collar employment. Some observers use the phrase "pink collar **ghetto**" to note the second-class treatment pink-collar workers receive. Like blue-collar jobs, jobs in the pink-collar sector are viewed (often wrongly) as requiring less skill or education and of including less critical work. Pink-collar work is generally not manual labor and often requires little physical strength, and thus, it is also sometimes seen as not "hard." Like white-collar work, pink-collar jobs take place in settings that are cleaner; in essence, one dresses "up" for a pink-collar job and "down" for a dirtier blue-collar task. But, like blue-collar workers, pink-collar workers take orders rather than give them. They are often the assistants and staff overseen by white-collar workers such as the retail clerks, receptionists, and secretaries who report to managers. They often also perform tasks that serve blue-collar workers, such as the inventory clerks who order

parts for mechanics or the payroll specialists and bookkeepers who make sure they get paid. Because pink-collar workers are neither the ultimate decision makers nor the ones performing "hard" work, pay scales have historically been lower. This has been true even of tasks that should be considered white-collar employment because of the training and skill involved. Until recently, elementary education teachers—a field dominated by women—received lower pay than secondary school teachers, where men were more prevalent. This was justified by arguing that elementary teaching required less content mastery or ability to enforce discipline. The nursing profession was and is similarly devalued. The myth that pink-collar work is somehow easier persists even in fields such as data entry and phone sales, though both jobs operate under fast-paced, assembly-line conditions.

The term "pink collar" is less in vogue currently than when the feminist movement held a higher public profile. Some have argued that pink-collar distinctions are disappearing as work changes and laws forbidding discrimination are implemented. Certain fields have indeed declined; the proliferation of computers, for example, has led to a decline in need for secretaries, typists, and file clerks. Other fields, notably retail, are no longer as gender-segregated as they used to be, whereas other fields, such as the civil service and law, have been altered by force of law. Women across society have entered once-male-dominated blue- and white-collar jobs in great numbers; in 2004, for example, more than 78,000 women were full-time police officers.

It would, however, be premature to proclaim the death of pink-collar work and mentality. The 2000 census revealed that the notion of "women's work" persists. Teaching and nursing remain the most common jobs for college-educated women, and overall, women remain heavily concentrated in lower-level office jobs, book-keeping, sales clerking, waitressing, and service industry work. They remain underrepresented in blue-collar jobs such as trucking, mechanical repair, and construction as well as in white-collar fields in science, computers, and business. Those women who do manage to penetrate the blue-collar world are often advocates of **equity pay** because of wage differentials that persist on that level, whereas white-collar women complain of the **glass ceiling** that retards their advancement.

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PIVEN, FRANCES FOX (October 10, 1932–)

AMY DAHLBERG CHU

Frances Fox Piven is a political scientist, educator, and activist who since the mid-1960s has wielded political science as a tool for democratic reform. Piven was born in Calgary, Alberta, Canada, in 1932. She arrived in the United States in 1933 and was naturalized in 1953. She earned a BA in city planning (1953) and an MA (1956)

and PhD (1962) in political science, all from the University of Chicago. Piven is a professor of political science and sociology at the City University of New York and has held faculty positions at Columbia University and the University of Boston.

Between 1965 and 2000, Piven collaborated with sociologist **Richard Cloward** on numerous publications and political initiatives. Piven met Cloward in 1963 when she was a research associate for Mobilization for Youth, a community service organization connected with Columbia University School of Social Work. In 1965 Piven and Cloward circulated an article they had co-written titled "Mobilizing the Poor: How It Can Be Done." The article was published in *The Nation* in 1966 under the title "The Weight of the Poor: A Strategy to End Poverty." Piven and Cloward surmised that the 8 million Americans on **welfare** at that time represented less than half of those eligible for benefits. They called for a massive campaign to increase the welfare rolls, theorizing that the upsurge would bankrupt the welfare system, create a profound social crisis, and necessitate radical reform. Leftists seized on the "Cloward-Piven strategy," or "crisis strategy," as a promising blueprint for social reform. Although the strategy helped to boost recipient numbers between 1966 and 1975, the revolution its proponents envisioned never transpired.

Piven is perhaps best known for her conceptualization, along with Cloward, of the "social control theory." In *Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare* (1972), Piven and Cloward argued that officials expand welfare during periods of civil disorder and then roll back benefits after political stability is restored. Welfare, they concluded, manipulates the poor and relegates them to low-paying, menial jobs. *Regulating the Poor* was well received and quickly became a social science classic. Nevertheless, many critics have accused the authors of using selective evidence to back up their thesis. Historians, for instance, have argued that they formulated their theory based on events of the 1960s and misapplied it to other periods. Piven and Cloward continually defended their theory, rejoining that its critics are biased toward the privileged classes.

Piven played a dynamic role in the welfare rights movement of the 1960s and 1970s. In conjunction with Cloward, she conceptualized and helped to organize mass protests on the part of welfare recipients. Her efforts led to the formation of the National Welfare Rights Organization in 1966. Piven's activism helped to reduce extreme **poverty** and drew attention to the urgency of welfare reform. However, when the National Welfare Rights Organization folded in 1975, the movement had achieved only a few of its ambitious objectives, the most sweeping of which was a complete overthrow of the social welfare system.

In the 1980s and 1990s Piven concentrated on preventing and reversing welfare cutbacks. In 1983 her study of voter participation also led her to initiate the Human Service Employees Registration and Voter Education Campaign (HumanSERVE). HumanSERVE sought to increase voter registration, especially among the poor, by convincing the government to enable citizens to register to vote when they applied for drivers' licenses or public aid. Piven's concept led to passage of the National Voter Registration Act, or "motor voter bill," in 1994.

Piven has authored or coauthored ten other books and dozens of articles. In *Poor People's Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail* (1977), she and Cloward analyzed twentieth-century protest movements to determine whether political lobbying or mass revolt was a better means of effecting social change. Piven's other

publications include Why Americans Don't Vote (1988), The Breaking of the American Social Compact (1997), and The War at Home (2004).

Piven has served as a board member for the American Civil Liberties Union and the Democratic Socialists, as vice president of the American Political Science Association, and as president of the Society for the Study of Social Problems and the American Sociological Association. Her many honors have included the C. Wright Mills Award of the Society for the Study of Social Problems in 1972, the Eugene V. Debs Foundation Prize in 1986, and the American Sociological Association's Distinguished Career Award for the Practice of Sociology in 2000.

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PLANNED PARENTHOOD

MAXINE LEVAREN

Planned Parenthood is the foremost family planning organization in the United States. It was started through the efforts of **Margaret Sanger** and several of her associates. Sanger's first clinic opened in 1916; seven years later, she formed the Birth Control Clinical Research Bureau (CRB) to disseminate contraceptives. In 1939 the American Birth Control league and the CRB merged as the Birth Control Federation of America with Sanger as its first president. That organization changed its name to Planned Parenthood Federation of America in 1942.

Although she had nurse's training, Sanger never became a registered nurse. Nonetheless, from the beginning of the twentieth century until her death in 1966, Margaret Sanger was involved in sex education for women. For her efforts in distributing information and promoting birth control, Sanger was arrested and jailed several times because the Comstock Laws, which outlawed **pornography**, also prohibited disseminating information about contraception and other sexually oriented health information.

Ironically, although today Planned Parenthood is embraced by political and social liberals, one of Sanger's motivations for promoting birth control was linked to **eugenics**; she wanted to improve the population by limiting reproduction among the poor and uneducated population. She believed that using criteria of race and class were valid for deciding who would benefit by birth control. In fact, her first efforts were to open clinics for poor and working-class women, feeling that they, and society at large, would benefit by fewer babies born to families living in poverty. Today, Sanger's early motivations are cited by antichoice groups that equate abortion with eugenics.

From its inception, Planned Parenthood has promoted reproductive rights, including exerting pressure on the medical establishment to approve birth-control

devices and test new methods of birth control. In 1960 the Federal Drug Administration approved the sale of oral contraceptives ("the pill"), and birth control became more widely accepted. Before then, Planned Parenthood's primary mission was to provide birth control and fight for legalization of contraceptive devices.

In the United States, public discussion of sex has always been controversial. Planned Parenthood has, by necessity, been politically active. It is committed to safe access to birth control and legal abortion, the latter legalized by the 1973 Supreme Court ruling Roe v. Wade. To this end, Planned Parenthood opposes parental-notification laws and prohibitions against late-term abortion. Another important mission is comprehensive sex education, emphasizing safe sex and preventing pregnancy. The organization contests abstinence-only sex education, believing that it ignores the reality of teen sexuality and could lead to more unwanted pregnancies. These issues have often put Planned Parenthood at odds with religious fundamentalists and conservatives who have picketed clinics, sought to overturn birth-control laws, and—in some cases—harassed clinic clients and murdered doctors providing abortion services.

Today, Planned Parenthood offers a wide variety of contraceptive devices, including abortion and sterilization services. Local clinics offer pregnancy testing and counsel women about their options for dealing with pregnancy, including referrals to sources for financial assistance. The organization also offers medical services related to reproduction, such as screening for breast, cervical, and testicular cancers; testing and treatment for sexually transmitted diseases; and treatment for menopausal symptoms.

Ironically, although the motivations are different, Planned Parenthood still offers its services mostly to the most disenfranchised, but now its financial support comes largely from the upper classes (and government funding in states where it is available for organizations that advocate for abortion choice. Because of the high cost of health care and the increasing numbers of uninsured, the organization's patients are largely poor and minority women, as well as teens, who cannot access these services elsewhere. This reality leads many to interpret attacks on Planned Parenthood as backdoor assaults on the lower class and disenfranchised.

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PLURALISM

MAURO STAMPACCHIA

Pluralism in a political and social context refers to a guiding principle that permits peaceful coexistence and competition between differing interests, social and political groups, ideas, and lifestyles. It is an essential component of most conceptions of **democracy**. Some view a pluralistic society as a vigorous counterpart to a government-directed political and social system and as an intermediate political force that limits the influence of the state and fosters the potential of **individualism**.

Pluralism evolved out of such political doctrines as the separation of and balance of power that emerged in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century constitutions. Modern pluralism, however, has broader implications. In fact, pluralism asserts that political and social spheres cannot be separated and stands in opposition to the Machiavellian idea that politics alone can resolve a given problem.

Alexis de Tocqueville, in his *Democracy in America*, stressed the importance of free association in the New World political system and in the "American way of life." Whereas in Europe public initiatives were left to governments or aristocrats, in the United States, public problems had to contend with free associations that mediate the power of the government. Democratic pluralism is often posed as a competing social model to assertions that mass democracy is a chimera and that society is in fact ruled by a **power elite** such as that posed by **C. Wright Mills**. Advocates of American pluralism argue that society consists of too many competing groups for power elites to take hold. The plurality of groups and competing elites, coupled with the balance of powers doctrine, is thought to limit the **power** of any single group. As Robert Dahl and others have argued, although powerful and wealthy individuals may assert more **authority** than others, they must gain the consent of varying interest groups and abide by political rules if they hope to resolve conflicts peacefully. Pluralism is thus not only a perspective, but also an explanation of how American society functions.

Pluralism is also a qualification of **socialist** thought. Although the mainstream interpretations of **Marxism** appear to emphasize the role of the state and politics, many socialists (and **anarchists** as well) also tend toward pluralism. This is in keeping with original meanings of socialism that linked the concepts of "social" and "association." In nineteenth-century France, Pierre Jacques Proudhon strongly advocated that only the federation of the many groups in which many individuals participate, and not a state authority, could assure emancipation and happiness. This idea was shared by parts of the **labor movement** in both Europe and the United States. In the twentieth century, even before the Russian Revolution, many socialists returned to the idea that political and economic power should be diffused. Some envisioned a socialist society based on a "pluralistic" state, whose basic structures would be labor unions or guild-like organizations that would regulate society's productive, distributive, and cultural products. Such ideas were central to the syndicalism of the **Industrial Workers of the World**.

Socialist versions of pluralism have not taken hold in the United States, but there is evidence to suggest that power is less centralized than power elite theorists suggest. Contemporary politicians, business leaders, social planners, and decision makers must contend with a multiplicity of citizen groups, lobbyists, organized special interests, grassroots pressure groups, consumer advocates, and social reformers. Some pluralists argue that not only are elites less powerful than assumed, but they are even unnecessary. Political power is diffused across American society in ways that are not entirely encapsulated by the electoral process. In essence, public opinion is integral to decision making.

In recent years, pluralism has lost favor among social theorists. Some see it as an optimistic but flawed extrapolation of social upheaval in the 1960s and 1970s. Although few modern theorists adhere to the idea of an unmediated power elite as suggested by Wright, many postulate the existence of a **corporate class** that exercises undue influence and orchestrates political and economic processes. In this regard, pluralism may be more apparent than real. Nonetheless, the collapse of the state-command economies and political systems in the former Soviet bloc boosts the pluralistic approach to social, class, and ethnic questions. **Globalization** necessitates a multicultural, pluralistic approach to the new international scenery and also reduces the likelihood that a nation-state will act unilaterally. Whether this will, in turn, reshape American politics remains to be seen.

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POLANYI, KARL (October 21, 1886–April 23, 1964)

DIETER BÖGENHOLD

Karl Paul Polanyi was an Austrian-born economist known for work that was considered unorthodox in its day but that has inspired many subsequent scholars.

Polanyi was born into a **bourgeois** Vienna family, though some members of his family were **socialists** and were involved in the **labor movement**. Polanyi studied law and philosophy at the University of Budapest, from which he obtained a PhD in 1908. He served in the Austro-Hungarian army during World War I and then returned to Vienna, where he worked as journalist, immersed himself in socialist politics, and cared for postwar refugees landing in Austria. Being Jewish, Karl Polanyi lost his employment in 1933 as fascists took over Austria. Polanyi took refugee in England, where he worked as a tutor and instructor for the Workers' Educational Association, an adult education charity and conducted research. For this he received very little money, and in 1940 he moved to New York City. He taught briefly at Bennington College before assuming adjunct work at Columbia University, where he worked until retiring in 1953. Polanyi never achieved a tenured professorship anywhere and was forced to live much of the time in Canada because his wife's avowed **communism** made her ineligible to enter the United States.

Among the five major books published by Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (1944) became a classic. Polanyi sought to employ history to understand the present and to trace the socioeconomic and political developments that had led to two world wars and a worldwide economic crisis during the 1930s. Among Polanyi's central arguments is that the very idea of self-regulating markets is misleading and utopian. All markets, he argued, need some degree of institutional regulation to protect and harmonize society. In fact, **capitalism** required powerful central governments to prevent the chaos that ensued from unbridled economic activity.

The Great Transformation is a rich empirical study. It focuses on British economic and social history in eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but Polanyi intended his remarks to reflect the nature of Western capitalism in general. The establishment of liberal market economies and laissez-faire-capitalism, which emerged in full force in the late nineteenth century, is the "great transformation" for which the book is named. Polanyi did not, however, view the transformation as entirely positive. He rejected the idea that self-regulating markets were natural or historical. Although he acknowledged the thoroughness with which precapitalist social and economic institutions were dismantled, he was skeptical of the long-term viability of free market capitalism because he felt it had destroyed socially cohesive forces such as community, **status**, and reciprocity.

Polanyi pioneered in studying economics within the context of history and culture rather than as an isolated mechanism. As such, he rejected the idea that markets and competition operated outside of social contexts. Polanyi integrated sociology and anthropology into his studies and drew upon scholars such as Marcel Mauss, Bronislaw Malinowski, and Alfred Radcliffe-Brown. Following Mauss, he sought to analyze faits sociaux totaux and asserted a much broader conception of economic activities, of which market transactions were only one part. This comes across most forcefully in Trade and Market in the Early Empire (1957), which demonstrates the different principles of economic integration in human societies that can dominate, coexist, and overlap. In addition to integration through markets and corresponding principles of market exchange, human beings have also operated economic activities through reciprocity and redistribution. People are always embedded in diverse social networks of communication and exchange. These networks were once primarily connected to family and kinship patterns, but in modern societies, people are also involved in broader networks of friendship and social contacts in work, neighborhood, and leisure. Reciprocity relations are social relations based on norms indicating rules of giving and taking, which are typical of kinship-based societies. Polanyi argued that such symmetric patterns of exchange are hidden by a pure neoclassic "market view" of economics. Another pattern of social embeddedness is through redistribution. Societies have differing institutionalized principles for caring for their members that affect how they view and disseminate wealth.

Not surprisingly, Polanyi also has critics, especially among conservatives who reject the **Marxist** implications of his work and advocates of an unfettered market economy. Others argue that Polanyi romanticized the past and that his evidence for reciprocity and redistribution in precapitalist economies is sketchy. Nonetheless, Polanyi's ideas have become popular in recent years, especially among those who see neoclassic constructs as sterile and empty. Polanyi's insistence that real economies are socially embedded in different frameworks of thought and institutions is now accepted thinking among most scholars, including his critics. The Karl Polanyi Society based in Montreal, Canada, continues to promote Polanyi's legacy.

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Polo

ADAM R. HORNBUCKLE

Polo is an equestrian sport that is often viewed as the reserve of the **upper class**. Although that is not entirely accurate, the cost of maintaining horses makes it a sport that is generally confined to those of above-average financial means.

Polo originated in Persia about 4000 years ago and has traditionally been a game played by two opposing teams of two to four horsemen who attempt to strike an object, with long-handled wooden mallets, down a long field and across their opponent's goal line. Until the modern era of the game, the object was usually the skull of a goat. Polo as it is played today originated in Punjab, India, in 1862, when a group of British copied the sport from some tribal horsemen. Introduced to Great Britain in 1869, the game became very popular throughout the military and the upper social classes.

James Gordon Bennett Jr., the owner and publisher of the *New York Herald*, introduced polo to the United States. His father, a Scottish immigrant who built the *Herald* into a profitable newspaper, had amassed a small fortune, which Bennett inherited and used to propel himself into New York City's more fashionable social circles. A member of the exclusive New York Yacht Club since age sixteen, he won the world's first transatlantic **yacht** race in 1866. During a trip to England in 1875, Bennett became so fascinated with polo that he purchased the equipment and horses to field a team in the United States and hired an expert English player to coach the team. During the winter of 1876, he and his associates played the first polo match indoors at the Dickel's Riding Academy. Later that year, Bennett established the Westchester Polo Club in New York and played the first outdoor game on May 13, 1876, at the Jerome Park Racetrack, which later become known as the polo-grounds. In 1879, the Meadow Brook Club, on Long Island, New York, became the center of polo in the United States into the twentieth century.

By 1890 the proliferation of polo throughout the northeastern United States demanded the formation of an organization to provide leadership to the sport. On March 21, 1890, H. L. Herbert, who had handicapped the sport in 1888, established the Polo Association, which later became known as the United States Polo Association (USPA), with Herbert becoming its first chairman. The USPA coordinated games, standardized rules, and established handicaps. In the early twentieth century, polo spread to Texas and California, but the Meadow Brook Club remained the home of the USPA. Polo had its greatest growth between the world wars, with most of the participants coming from the military; 1,276 of the 2,889 players registered with the USPA were cavalry officers. Military domination of the sport peaked in 1940 with 1,432 registered participants. In the 1950s the Oak Brook Polo Club near Chicago, Illinois, became home to the USPA, as the Meadow Brook Club closed to make way for a highway.

Polo remained an upper-class sport until the 1980s when an increasing number of USPA registrants identified themselves as "budget-minded horsemen." In 1986 the headquarters of the USPA moved to Lexington, Kentucky. Women as well as men participate in polo, though most competitions do not mix genders. Despite attempts to democratize the sport, it remains the preserve of the well-heeled. There

are around 275 clubs associated with the USPA and just 3,500 polo players across the nation.

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Poor People's March

TINA BRAXTON

The Poor People's March was a 1968 effort to call attention to the problem of **poverty** in America by organizing the poor as a class, and to demand federal action aimed at eliminating poverty. Originally conceived by the Reverend Dr. **Martin Luther King Jr.**, the plan called for the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) to bring thousands of poor persons, including African Americans, **Latinos and Hispanics**, **Native Americans**, and poor whites, from urban and rural environments, to Washington, D.C., where they would live in a shantytown and engage in lobbying and demonstrations. King also planned a second and third phase, involving mass arrests and an economic boycott of major U.S. corporations, but these activities were not carried out. The campaign was plagued with problems from the start and lasted only six weeks. It has been called "the Little Bighorn of the Civil Rights Movement."

King had come to view structural economic inequality as a fundamental problem in American society, one that drastically increased the effects of racial discrimination, but also negatively affected people of all races. By 1967 he also saw the Vietnam War as an economic drain that had forced defunding of President Lyndon B. Johnson's ambitious but fading "War on Poverty." King hoped to focus on poverty as a curable but neglected problem and to build white middle-class support for substantive economic change. But few middle-class people would support such a radical proposition.

King did not live to see the Poor People's March; he was assassinated on April 4, 1968, shortly before the campaign was to begin, while leading a sanitation workers' strike in Memphis, Tennessee. His colleagues in the SCLC leadership had expressed doubts about the planned march, but they decided to follow through with it.

The marchers traveled to Washington in caravans of buses and cars, coming from the East and West coasts, the Midwest, **Appalachia**, and the Deep South. There was also a Freedom Train and even a Mule Train, originating in Quitman County, Mississippi, the nation's poorest county. The first groups arrived on May 14 and moved into newly constructed tents and A-frame shacks.

This shantytown, called Resurrection City, covered fifteen acres of the D.C. mall and had its own zip code. It included medical facilities, a communal dining tent, a Poor People's University, and a cultural center called the Soul Center.



Poor People's March in Washington, D.C., 1968. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

Resurrection City elected its own legislature and provided its own police force. The nearby Hawthorn School provided additional housing. A group of SCLC ministers, under King's successor, Ralph David Abernathy, managed the entire project from the Pitts Hotel.

Crowding and primitive conditions already made the shantytown uncomfortable, and heavy rains persisted through most of the campaign, increasing the misery by saturating the simple structures and turning the ground into a sea of mud. Continuous arrivals and departures made organization difficult. Most participants could not stay for the duration. Those with

jobs could not afford a long, unpaid absence; others simply had to get back to their families. The population of Resurrection City fluctuated wildly, from about 7,000 persons to just several hundred.

The participants demonstrated daily at various locations in Washington and met with different groups of officials to present their demands. Major demands were access to jobs at an adequate family wage, a livable income for persons who were unable to work or who were caring for children, representation in the oversight of government programs by persons affected by those programs, and full funding for housing and **education**—including **bilingual** and multicultural education. Native American delegations called for restoration of their traditional lands and Mexican Americans for the protection of farm-worker rights. Though they were the smallest group present, white Appalachians were included in every demonstration and lobbying delegation, to underscore the systemic, nonracial nature of poverty.

The focus on class and economic issues brought hostile press coverage and alienated the SCLC's traditional supporters—the **labor movement**, progressive business leaders, students, and middle-class liberals. Previously, King and the SCLC had focused on racial discrimination, framing it as an aberration that barred entry of African Americans into the mainstream of American society. This reflected favorably on the mainstream, by implying that inclusion was desirable. The Poor People's March, on the other hand, condemned the system itself as biased and unfair—rather than focusing artificial barriers to it—and demanded radical change. Most middle-class people could not accept this critique; they benefited from the system and considered it fair.

Other manifestations of class brought condemnation from the press and a cold shoulder from the officials with whom the marchers met. Accustomed to the kind of kid-gloves treatment from police that poor people rarely experience, the press complained of "aggressive" treatment at the hands of Resurrection City's internal police force. In contrast to middle-class spokespersons such as Martin Luther King, the Washington establishment found the marchers and their elected leaders—all of whom experienced poverty firsthand—distastefully strident and militant.

Conflict also erupted between marchers and SCLC ministers. The marchers, who had to live in muddy shanties, resented the ministers' comfortable accommodations at the Pitts Hotel. Their elected leaders, especially Reies Tijerina, who represented the Mexican American delegation, regularly sparred with Reverend Abernathy. When Abernathy arrived at Resurrection City in a chauffeur-driven Cadillac and refused to get out, lest he muddy his shoes, he was roundly criticized by both the marchers and the press.

After several arrests at Resurrection City and violence at some of the demonstrations, the shantytown was abruptly closed down by police and quickly dismantled. No part of the marchers' legislative agenda was adopted.

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POPULISM

MICHAEL T. BERTRAND

The Populist Party was the informal name of the People's Party of America. The term "populism" was subsequently applied (and misapplied) to those who champion the political will of the **masses**.

The twentieth century witnessed many instances in which groups of ordinary yet alienated individuals protested collectively against what they perceived as an encroaching political, economic, or governmental threat to their community. These generally grassroots movements often adopted or were bestowed the label of "populist." The connotation is not necessarily positive. Many often equate populism with an irrational and reactionary response to the changes that accompany modernity. Its complex and often confusing nature can be discerned by examining such dissimilar populist figures as **Huey Long**, Gerald L. K. Smith, Father Charles Coughlin, George Wallace, H. Ross Perot, David Duke, Jesse Ventura, Ralph Nader, and Pat Buchanan. The identification of these individuals with populism depends on one's definition of the term. For many, the populist revolt began and ended in one specific historical moment. For others, that one historical moment established a precedent that was repeated several times, with some variations, over the next century. Although both interpretations are applicable, to understand populism in either manifestation requires a comprehension of its late nineteenth-century origins.

The Populist Party, or People's Party of America, existed for only a few years, yet it represented one of the most successful third-party political movements in U.S. history. Although they sent few members to Congress and never elected a president, the Populists did much better on state and local levels and did much to

alter the status quo. They challenged a variety of society's accepted axioms: the inexorability of a two-party political system, **Social Darwinism**, laissez-faire economics, government inactivity and disregard for its citizens, and racial inequality. What began life as a series of disconnected political pressure groups representing farmers evolved into a centralized movement that embodied the plight and predicament of the nation's dispossessed. In responding to one of the country's worst economic depressions, the Populist Party promoted an activism rare in American politics. Yet within a nation undergoing rapid urbanization, its distorted image as a group of radical hayseeds seeking to plow under the advances of the **Industrial Revolution** ultimately doomed its political chances. Its critique of **capitalism**, however, was genuine and would live to fight another day.

Rooted in the problems of western and southern farmers, the Populist Party emerged in part from the Grange (Patrons of Husbandry) and the Farmers' Alliance movement. Both organizations initially formed to break down the physical isolation historically separating farmers. Once brought together, farmers discovered that they shared common grievances. One widespread complaint involved the discriminatory rates that railroad companies charged for storing and transporting agricultural commodities. In addressing this inequity, the Grange, operating chiefly in the Midwest and West, where agribusiness (see Agrarianism) motivations coincided with pervasive **middle-class** values, was particularly effective in inducing the unprecedented passage of state regulatory legislation. The Farmer's Alliance, especially its founding southern faction, focused primarily on addressing the needs and concerns of economically insecure farmers. In the South, because of a long-term decline in cotton prices, large numbers of former landholders fell into sharecropping and tenancy. The alliance established programs emphasizing cooperation and government intervention to prevent and eradicate such dependency. When Democrat-controlled southern state legislatures failed to adopt a subtreasury plan, farm activists decided to form their own political party. (The subtreasury scheme was the brainchild of Alliance leader Charles W. Macune. It was a complex plan designed to stabilize cotton prices and reduce reliance on credit by controlling the supply of commodities.)

The People's Party (Populists) formed in 1892, and the party's original platform was very innovative. It desired, among other things, to nationalize railroads, eliminate absentee land ownership, and enact the subtreasury plan. Such planks reflected a widely held perspective that generally divided the world into producers (those who actually worked to create a product) and consumers (those who used or exploited the labor of others for their own gain). Although the Populist Party demonstrated vast potential, it faltered because of bad luck (its initial candidate for president died upon the eve of the election), timing (the Democratic Party coopted what the Populists considered their issue, candidate, and thunder), and changing demographics (voter turnout reflected a major population shift from the countryside to the city). By 1896 in seeking to gain votes from various debtor groups victimized by an economy based on "hard" currency (based on the gold standard), the party discarded its earlier comprehensive platform in exchange for a single issue that linked inflation (through the coinage of silver at a sixteen-to-one ratio vis-à-vis gold) to prosperity. Populism hence compromised its identity and began to fade.

One dramatic effect, however, would linger. In the South, for political expediency, many Populists, including Tom Watson of Georgia, had called for southern tenant farmers and sharecroppers to set aside their racial differences for the sake of casting off class oppression. Politically united, the black and white underclass indeed posed a significant threat to entrenched Democratic rule. Conservative incumbents resorted to fraud, manipulation, and corruption at the ballot box (and racist demagoguery in the campaign) in order to fend off this insurgency. As a result, Populist candidates, including Watson, frequently "lost" elections in black belt districts seemingly favorable to their cause. Finally, as a means to prevent any future biracial political coalitions that might challenge Democratic control, southern state governments began formalizing mechanisms to disenfranchise African American voters. Class-based rather than race-based, such techniques often eliminated not only black voters, but poor white voters as well. Ironically, many former members of the Populist Party, including Watson, supported disenfranchisement because it promised to eradicate dishonesty and racist rhetoric in electoral politics.

The Populist revolt of the 1890s represented an attempt by farmers to carve a niche for themselves within a nation moving away from agriculture. In the midst of losing their traditional role as the economic and social foundation of American culture, farmers struggled to regain their independence and privileged status (however mythical they may have been). It is this populist legacy that has lingered, giving sustenance to various "people's" movements throughout the twentieth century. It also impacted the Democratic Party, which adopted many of the Populists' safer mass-appeal planks while jettisoning those tinged with **socialism**, such as nationalizing transportation and communication systems. Some political scholars credit populism with preparing Democrats to embrace progressive politicians such as Al Smith and **Franklin D. Roosevelt**.

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PORNOGRAPHY

М. Ј. Вимв

Pornography is a complex issue that involves a wide array of divided opinions. Critics and feminists have long condemned pornography as objectifying women and catering to male privilege.

Pornography—as a cultural form, an individual practice, a cultural institution, or an industry—has always existed in American history. In the **Progressive Era**, for example, pornography was associated with threats to the nuclear family.

Accordingly, the *concept* of pornography was abstracted to argue for a stricter sexuality that reinforced Victorian mores. Pornography continues to be demonized in such a manner and has evolved as a political and legal matter that has served as a revealing index of changing attitudes and values toward those in and against **authority**. Explicitly linked with a corrupt or corrupted sexuality, pornography has been gradually folded into bigger social costs for the public at large and increasingly mainstreamed since the "sexual revolution" of the 1960s. But by the close of the 1980s, pornography was, by dint of its prevalence, not so much a symbol of anomie as it was an upshot of a century-long process of negotiation that ratified transgressive behavior—still not the accepted norm but now ineradicable—as part of the fabric of modern life. Estimates today put the porn business in the United States earning between \$10 billion and \$14 billion annually.

In recent decades, scholars have linked pornographic representations to assumptions about sexuality and social class. Though not necessarily endorsing pornography, some ascribe the antipornography movement's motivations to a **middle-class** or **upper-class** revulsion against pornography's "lower-class" sensibilities. Because pornography trades in sexualized representations of the human body, traditionally deemed "lower" than "higher" aesthetic forms (such as painting and sculpture), some view the cultural dimensions of porn to be the product of class divisions between those who oppose it and those who consume it. Despite such assumptions, critics still charge that pornography naturalizes certain types of male sexuality and stigmatizes women.

Class-based debates over pornography often mask more fundamental views on the human body. In Western society, views of the body and its appropriate use are often rooted in Judeo-Christian mores that discourage sexual expressiveness. In contemporary society, however, the question of appropriate bodily expression is no longer an extension of sexual ideology but what, in fact, constitutes it. It is the subjective ownership of one's body—the ability to manipulate it, to flaunt it, to sell it—that determines modern sexuality. In effect, sexual intercourse has become a political as much as ethical discourse. Control or liberation of the body is the dividing line at which each side in the debate organizes (or is organized by) a line of argument. Increased public emphasis on sexual liberation, gay rights, and women's sexuality since World War II has also served to politicize the body.

The present-day politics of pornography are also complicated by the fact that those classes with the greatest authority and **power** are themselves consumers of pornography. Defining and regulating obscenity has been tied to the class identity of **elites** from the **Gilded Age** to the present. Self-styled reformers often asserted a position of moral and social superiority to rail against the "white slave trade" (prostitution) and to engage in **culture wars** to suppress **homosexuality** and regulate the content of **film**, books, and other media. Consumption of pornography has historically cut across class lines—even though it was stereotyped as a lower-class pursuit—but today it does so more overtly and openly. Since its debut in 1953, for example, *Playboy* magazine consumers have disproportionately come from higher **socioeconomic status** (SES) levels. By 1972 one of four male college students regularly read and viewed it. In like fashion, the rise of high-speed Internet—access

to which rises with **income**—has also increased consumption of pornography among the classes that once sought to control it. By 2006, one of every four searches conducted online was for pornography.

Many argue that pornography is essential to an awareness of sexuality and class as currently conceived. As something that can sanction or challenge sexual practices, pornography is very much a tool in understanding not only how sexual acts can symbolize political acts but also how sex is now (or has been) practiced, performed, documented, and archived for so many people across so many class boundaries.

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Laura Kipnis, Bound and Gagged: Pornography and the Politics of Fantasy in America, 1996; Andrew Ross, No Respect: Intellectuals and Popular Culture, 1989; Linda Williams, Hard Core: Power, Pleasure, and the "Frenzy of the Visible," 1989.

Postindustrialism

See Deindustrialization.

Poulantzas, Nicos (September 21, 1936-October 3, 1979)

W. LAWRENCE NEUMAN

Nicos Poulantzas was one of the most significant social-political theorists of the 1970s. He was very prolific, publishing six major books in French, all translated into English, and over a hundred essays and articles in ten short years. He committed suicide in 1979.

Born in Athens, Greece, to a father who was a professor and leader in the Greek legal establishment, Nicos excelled in school and entered the School of Law in Athens in 1953 to study philosophy and politics. After summer study in Heidelberg, Germany, he moved to the Sorbonne University in Paris to complete graduate work. He received a doctorate in 1964. His brilliance was quickly recognized. He joined the leading French intellectual life that included Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Simone de Beauvior. He contributed to, and was quickly made the editor of, a French intellectual journal, *Archives of the Philosophy of Law*.

Despite his training in law and philosophy, Poulantzas shifted his attention to issues of the state and social class, and he joined the structuralist **Marxist** school of social theory that sought to update Karl Marx's ideas. Poulantzas's book *Pouvior politique et classes sociales* (translated as *Political Power and Social Classes*, 1973) appeared just a week before the 1968 major uprising of French students, who read the book widely.

Structuralist Marxism is an abstract philosophy and removed from ordinary life. It emphasizes the laws and invisible structures of a capitalist system more than examining the actions of people. Poulantzas defined social classes as locations created

by economic structures. In his view, classes are not collections of people that share certain characteristics. Instead, people fill the structurally created locations. Once in a location, people are constrained to think and behave in certain ways based on that location; in effect, they become social classes. Economic structures are powerful forces shaping society, but the structures that determine how people live are more than purely economic. Ideological and political structures are interwoven within the powerful economic structures.

Poulantzas emphasized that late **capitalism** differed from its earlier forms, meaning that the contemporary class system differed from what Karl Marx described. One major change was the increase of divisions within social classes. There were now intra-class fragmentation and **contradictory class locations** that were not a part of the main classes. The fractions or segments within the main social classes have two implications. First, they make conflicts internal to social classes more common and significant. Second, they allow short-term political alliances to form across major social classes. Poulantzas also emphasized a class called the "new **petty bourgeoisie**" that emerged in late capitalism, by which he meant **white-collar** workers. More specifically, they are mid-level managers, technical professionals, and supervisors who are neither capitalists (owners of wealth-capital and makers of key decisions) nor workers (sellers of labor who must follow orders). They usually identify with the capitalist class and falsely believe they share its antagonistic relations toward the **working class**.

Poulantzas emphasized actual control of production over formal, legal ownership. For example, the capitalist class owns the **means of production**, but it may not be the dominant class. Controlling the means of production and using that control are more important than formal, legal ownership such as owning shares in a company. Bankers or corporate managers who actually make the key decisions and investors who actively exert financial power have the most importance.

Poulantzas was a central figure in the structuralist-instrumentalist debate in Marxist political sociology. The American **G. William Domhoff** and the Briton Ralf Miliband are among the scholars who disagreed with Poulantzas and other structuralists such as Louis Althusser. The main issue of the debate was how the capitalist class controlled government or the state. Instrumentalists such as Domhoff and Miliband insisted that individual class members actively and directly controlled the state by holding public office, making campaign contributions, lobbying, or having personal contacts with top government leaders. Structuralists countered that the state is not an instrument of the capitalist class and that direct involvement by capitalists in ruling was unnecessary and perhaps even counterproductive. To them, the very structures of capitalism, as an economicsocial system, ensure capitalist control. Direct involvement by class members was equally unnecessary and threatened damage to the long-term interests of capitalism because of shortsighted and personal interests. Poulantzas argued that capitalism was self-replicating and that the deep interconnections between finance, production, and politics insured that the state would always protect capitalism. The very existence of the state depends on a healthy capitalist economy, and thus, a failure to protect and advance capitalism would quickly trigger both economic depression and political chaos, irrespective of which class actually holds the reins of state power.

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Ted Benton, The Rise and Fall of Structural Marxism, 1984; Bob Jessop, Nicos Poulantzas: Marxist Theory and Political Strategy, 1985; Nicos Poulantzas, Classes in Contemporary Capitalism, 1975.

POVERTY

CHERRY LEI HUNSAKER

Poverty is generally referred to as a state resulting from a lack of sufficient income that leaves affected persons without basic needs such as food, water, shelter, clothing, or emotional or physical health.

There are many methods to measure poverty. The most common method in the United States is to calculate a federally established threshold and compare income with this threshold. When a family's income fails to meet the federally established standard, the family is considered to be in poverty.

Thresholds are calculated in one of two ways—absolute or relative. Absolute thresholds measure income poverty by determining whether the household has sufficient income to purchase basic things such as food, clothing, and shelter. Absolute thresholds are calculated by considering the cost of living and family size. If one's household income falls below the calculated absolute threshold, he or she is considered to be below the **poverty line**. This threshold is adjusted yearly. For example, in 2000 the threshold for a family of 4 was \$17,463, but by 2005 the threshold had risen to \$19,806.

By contrast, relative thresholds measure income poverty by comparing household incomes with other households in society. Some theorists point out that the poverty line is a poor measure of true poverty because it fails to take into account the low threshold vis-à-vis median income. Although the poverty line has risen over the years, the 2005 threshold is just 28 percent of median income, whereas the 1959 threshold was over 48 percent. Absolute thresholds rate only the ability to obtain basic needs, whereas relative thresholds measure comparative economic disadvantages. Poverty in the United States is most commonly measured by determining absolute thresholds, but relative thresholds account for perceptional poverty as well. Even the poorest Americans would be "well off" in some parts of the world, but American society constructs social expectations that go beyond necessities. Relative poverty theorists note that poverty must be considered subjectively and qualitatively. To have very little in a nation that values materialism makes one poor both in the eyes of others and in one's self-perception.

Examining the gross national product (GNP) is one way of measuring other dimensions of poverty. This method is based on the assumption that as income rises, conditions improve. However useful this measuring tool is, it can be problematic because the United States has the highest amount of human poverty among Westernized nations and yet the highest per capita income.

Income poverty is not the only dimension of poverty that concerns the United States. Life is not valued only in material terms, and hence, poverty is not isolated to economic measures only. Poverty includes more than solely a lack of material

goods; it includes the inability to achieve a healthy, innovative life, have a positive self-image, and benefit from the respect of others. Because of these emotional needs, other indices were created to measure additional aspects of poverty. One of the alternate poverty measurements includes the physical quality of life index (PQLI), which takes into consideration life expectancy, infant mortality, and literacy to evaluate the quality of life. The human development index (HDI) is a supplementary method used to determine poverty. It uses calculations based on life expectancy, education, and gross domestic product. To further break down aspects of poverty, the gender development index (GDI) and the gender empowerment measure (GEM) are used. These look at the gender analysis of poverty.

Poverty in America can be looked at in many different ways. A common division is between urban and rural poverty. Urban and rural poverty rates differ from region to region. However, overall, the rural poverty rate is higher than the rate of urban poverty. In urban areas, poverty is often analyzed within neighborhoods. Poverty rates for specific neighborhoods are determined by dividing the number of poor people in the neighborhood by the total number of neighborhood residents. Neighborhoods are considered to be poor when they reach poverty rates of 20 to 40 percent (depending on the researcher). Poor neighborhoods in urban areas are often referred to as barrios, **ghettos**, and **slums**.

Urban poverty in the United States is heavily linked to the workings of city and municipal governments. Careless bureaucracies add to income inequality and limit the success of poverty mitigation. Poverty is perpetuated by discrimination, **segregation**, **immigration**, closed social-mobility patterns, the poor quality of **innercity** schools, crime, and job loss resulting from **deindustrialization** and **globalization**. Lifestyle aspects that factor into rural poverty include, but are not limited to, family structure, employment, and **education**.

Language is often a barrier for new immigrants to accessing social services and employment. Many also come to the United States with low educational achievement. These hindrances often impede economic success, yielding poor living conditions such as inadequate housing, low employment rates, poor schools, and high crime rates. Immigration affects both urban and rural poverty rates.

In both urban and rural areas, service-sector jobs play an increasingly large employment role. However, these jobs generally do not pay high wages, and workers receive few benefits. People in these situations are known as the **working poor**, employed individuals who do not earn enough to raise themselves or their families from poverty. Although there are many working poor in both urban and rural America, there are higher rates of working poor in rural areas.

Contrary to conventional wisdom, Caucasians are the largest group of poverty-stricken individuals in urban America. White poverty is not as apparent as the poverty of other ethnic groups because whites tend to be distributed throughout cities rather than concentrated in particular neighborhoods. In contrast, African Americans generally have the highest occurrence of poverty in rural America. Hispanics also make up a large portion of the rural poor.

The poverty dynamic between men and women is another factory at which poverty experts look. As noted, the GDI and the GEM analyze gendered poverty. Poverty affects all groups of people, but women are more likely to be impoverished than men in affluent nations, especially in the United States. In fact, the category

with the highest number of impoverished people is **one-parent families** headed by women. Job choices are limited for such women because of child care responsibilities. This places them at a competitive disadvantage in a society where full-time workers are favored. The demands on a mother's time and the select jobs available to her further the **feminization of poverty**.

Poverty affects its victims' safety, mental and emotional well-being, physical health, and learning abilities. In the United States, poor children are more likely to live in unsafe neighborhoods and be victims of violent crimes than non-poor children. Poverty—especially when it is connected to job loss, job instability, or economic instability—can be linked to depression, stress, and poor parenting skills. Poverty-stricken children show higher levels of emotional problems, and babies born into poverty generally have lower birth weights. Other common physical health threats linked to poverty are lead poisoning, malnutrition, hospitalization, infant death, and stunting. Over all, poorer families have more health problems than children from affluent families. Poverty has also been found to cause developmental impairments in children; poor children are more prone to learning disabilities.

There are multiple programs to improve the lives of the poor and alleviate the affects of continued poverty, including **Head Start**, various **welfare** programs, and local agencies such as ACORN (Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now). Calculating and addressing poverty is both controversial and politically charged, however, and most serious analysts assert that efforts to alleviate poverty are woefully inadequate when compared with actual need. The official poverty rate has generally been calculated at between 12 and 13 percent for the past quarter century, with the 2000 rate of 11.3 percent during President Clinton's final year of office being viewed as the low point. By 2005, it had risen to around 13 percent, a figure that the George W. **Bush** administration disputed, but that most analysts felt was too low. Nearly all scholars dismiss official poverty rates as too low.

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POVERTY CALCULATIONS

ROBERT E. WEIR

Although social scientists agree that American society is unequal, there is relatively little agreement as to the meaning of poverty or how to measure it. In absolute terms, poverty exists when some individuals possess all **income**, **wealth**, and assets, and others own nothing at all. Such a condition is rare; most poverty is relative rather than absolute. Unfortunately, this often makes determinations of poverty

partially or wholly subjective rather than objective. Although it may be true on one level to say that an American family of four living on \$7,500 would be rich in comparison with an average family in Bangladesh, such a statement tells us little about comparative standards of living, **status**, purchasing power, or **life chances**. Most social scientists thus seek relative ways to measure poverty and strive to be as objective as possible.

Sociologists also seek ways to measure poverty that allow assertions to be tested. For example, some scholars have claimed that in the United States, unequal distributions of wealth and income have remained relatively constant since 1910; without ways to calculate poverty, there is no way to test such a thesis. Nor is there any way to validate popularly held views that the United States is the world's "richest" nation, that it is a **middle-class** society, and that its citizens are better off than those living elsewhere.

In 1905 Max O. Lorenz developed a way to graph income and asset distribution. The so-called Lorenz curve allows statisticians to plot social data on a grid vis-à-vis an idealized society in which all members have exactly the same amount. The Lorenz curve is the basis of many quintile breakdowns in which scholars compare the top 20 percent to the bottom 20 percent and so on.

The Lorenz curve was also the graphic basis for the Gini index, which was developed by Italy's Corrado Gini in 1912. He developed a mathematical formula expressed as a coefficient to measure income and inequality more accurately. This index also allows for regional or national data to be compared by adjusting for differences in size and distribution and shows how data changes over time. When plotted on a Lorenz curve, the Gini index disputes the notion that poverty has remained relatively stable since 1910; in fact, it shows a large increase in poverty after 1970. Even more disturbingly, it indicates that the United States has much higher rates of poverty, absolute and relative, when compared with Canada and much of Europe, and that the relative rates are higher in the United States than in India!

Another measure of poverty uses the consumer price index (CPI) to determine the **poverty line** inside the United States. The CPI calculates living costs pegged to a baseline year (currently 1980) and analyzes the effects of inflation. The CPI looks at the food, housing, and durable goods to determine a "cost of living index." Those whose income falls below the index are considered poor. The CPI, however, suffers the same overall weakness as a method that measures poverty relative to how much a family deviates from the median income; that is, neither adjusts for regional variations. For example, a family living in rural Mississippi and earning \$45,000 a year would be substantially better off than the same family in Boston or San Francisco.

Other scholars have developed indexes to measure inequality, but a truly scientific determination of poverty remains somewhat elusive, and a certain amount of subjective judgment is part of many attempts at defining the poor.

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Leonard Beeghley, *Angles of Vision: How to Understand Social Problems*, 1999; Gordon Fisher, "Setting American Standards of Poverty: A Look Back," *Focus*, 19 (Spring 1998), pp. 47–53; Goetz Kluge, Wealth and People: Inequality Measures (http://www.poorcity.richcity.org/calculator.htm).

POVERTY LINE

ROBERT E. WEIR

The poverty line refers to the measurement tool by which official **poverty** is determined in the United States. Like all **poverty calculations**, it is controversial. Conservatives charge that the method of calculation overstates poverty because it does not account for a person's material possessions or nonmonetary transfers such as food stamps, subsidized housing, or heating assistance. Liberals counter that the line is calculated by outdated methods and that the floor is set at an unrealistically low figure. Analysts of all sorts note that any specific and absolute cutoff is arbitrary and makes sense only in bureaucratic logic. By current federal standards, however, a family of four is considered poor if its income falls below \$19,307 per annum.

The poverty line is the brainchild of Mollie Orshansky, who developed it between 1963 and 1964 on behalf of the **Social Security** Administration. She based her calculations on dietary standards issued by the Department of Agriculture (DOA), used prevailing assumptions that families spent roughly one-third of their income on food, and pegged the poverty line to the DOA's lowest category for meals that delivered sufficient nutrition (Orshansky's use of the one-third figure was based on "multiplier effect" figures developed by DOA in 1955). Orshansky made no attempt to measure quality of life or relative poverty; rather, she confined herself to the question of mere sustenance. Her figures were used by President Lyndon Johnson when he declared a **War on Poverty** and launched **Great Society** programs to address it. Several of Orshansky's minor assumptions were altered by changes made in 1973, 1981, and 1990, but the current poverty line is figured roughly the same way as it was in 1965, when it was first announced publicly. The 1973 revisions mandated that the poverty threshold be reevaluated every ten years.

Through the years, discussions of the poverty line have been colored by ideological and political debates. Did the Great Society work, as liberals assert, or was it wasteful and ineffective, as conservatives insist? Liberals often use raw data to defend their views. In 1960, 22.2 percent of Americans would have fallen below the poverty line; in 1964, the year Johnson announced the War on Poverty, 19 percent were poor. By 1969, however, that figure had fallen to 12.1 percent. Conservatives generally credit the drop to favorable changes in the economy and assert that the rate would have been even lower without government interference. That logic runs afoul of the rise in poverty rates when social programs are slashed. During the recession of the early 1980s, for instance, President Ronald Reagan instituted massive tax cuts accompanied by cuts in social spending. Poverty rates jumped from 13 percent in 1980 to 15.2 percent by 1983, before dropping. In 1990 the rate was 13.5 percent under Reagan's successor George H. W. Bush. During the presidency of Bill Clinton, however, more attention was paid to the poor, and the rate dropped to 11.8 percent by 2000. The incoming conservative administration of George W. Bush revitalized Reagan's strategy of tax cuts and decreased social spending strategy, and poverty again rose. By 2004 approximately 37 million Americans fell below the poverty line, about 12.7 percent of the population. It also appears that certain age groups have been impacted differently by tax cuts; in the 1980s just 13 percent of Americans between the ages of forty and fifty spent at least one year of their lives below the poverty line; by the 1990s, about 36 percent did so.

Liberals, however, are equally at a loss to explain why the poverty rate has been relatively stable since the War on Poverty ended in the 1970s. It spikes during periods of high **unemployment** but drops when the economy recovers. In general, the rate has remained close to the 1969 figure. They are also at a loss to explain the persistence of long-term poverty or the existence of what analysts call "extreme poverty," those living at income levels of less than half the poverty line. Moreover, by focusing on raw data, liberals can only demonstrate a correlation between poverty reduction and social programs, not a causative link. The latter would require qualitative research and long-term program-by-program studies.

Scholars doing careful studies of antipoverty programs generally reveal a mixed record, with certain programs—including **Job Corps** and **Head Start**—appearing to be moderately successful, whereas others have failed to deliver results. Scholars tend to agree that moving individuals above the poverty line quickly is essential because there is a negative correlation between time spent in poverty and the likelihood of achieving self-sufficiency. Researchers also note that African Americans as a group remain disproportionately more prone to poverty than Caucasians. The poverty rate for black children, for instance, is more than twice as high as the rate for white children, and the gap has widened since 1990. Researchers also note that children are often overlooked in politicized debates regarding the poverty line. They are the largest single demographic group in poverty, especially those in **one-parent** households headed by women.

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POVERTY THEORY

See Inequality Theory.


POWDERLY, TERENCE (January 22, 1849–June 24, 1924)

ROBERT E. WEIR

Terence Vincent Powderly headed the **Knights of Labor** (KOL) from 1879 to 1893 and also served both as commissioner of labor and as an official in the Depart-

ment of Labor. Powderly was one of America's first labor leaders to attract national attention; hence, his views on a variety of subjects, including social class, helped shape broader public opinion.

Powderly was born in Carbondale, Pennsylvania, a suburb of the city of Scranton over which he presided as mayor from 1878 to 1884. His parents emigrated from Ireland, and like many children of immigrants, Powderly left school at the age of thirteen and went to work in local railroad shops. He obtained expertise as a machinist, but his involvement in youthful labor activism led him to take more interest in politics, Irish nationalism, and labor



Terence Powderly. Courtesy of Eon Images.

unions. By the time he married the former Hannah Dyer in 1872, Powderly was already exhibiting joiner tendencies. In addition to heading the KOL, Powderly was active in the Irish Land League and the temperance movement. In the late 1870s, he got caught up in the Greenback Labor movement, a third-party devoted to monetary and social reform, which enjoyed success into the mid-1880s. Powderly rode the Greenback-Labor ticket to power as Scranton's mayor, but he reverted to support for the Republican Party when the Greenbackers weakened.

Powderly joined the KOL in 1874, when it was in its infancy, and quickly rose through the ranks. When Uriah Stephens stepped down as national leader to pursue a Greenback Labor bid for Congress, Powderly succeeded him. At the time, the KOL was an ultra-secretive organization, a characteristic that led to problems with the Catholic Church, which forbade membership in clandestine, oath-bound orders. Powderly, himself a Catholic, spearheaded the KOL's move toward open business and membership, a task accomplished in 1882.

He also presided over the KOL's greatest achievements, its period of rapid growth, and its decline until late 1893, when he was ousted as president (officially known as General Master Workman) by a coalition of rural radicals, urban **socialists**, and devotees of older ritual practices. At the height of his popularity (roughly 1884 to 1888), Powderly was so popular among some members of the **working class** that his name was appropriated by KOL assemblies, workers' sons, trade goods, and neighborhoods.

Like the organization over which he presided, however, Powderly was complex; his prickly personality, shifting viewpoints, and propensity for backroom deals won him as many enemies as friends. To foes, Powderly was a self-aggrandizer, an opportunist, and ideologically loose. He was accused of quashing **strikes** and of selling out workers for political gain. There is occasional merit to the charges against Powderly, but for the most part, neither the credit nor the blame attached to his name was entirely warranted. Regarding strikes, for instance, the Knights of Labor was officially against such actions as a matter of policy, not personal animus.

Discerning Powderly's views on social class is no less difficult. In his youth, Powderly was associated with the Socialist Labor Party, a moderate group that believed

in evolutionary socialism achieved via the ballot box. As noted, he also joined the Greenback Labor Party. Yet, at times, Powderly's politics seemed conventional. He made constant demands that the KOL remain a nonpartisan organization, sought Republican Party patronage positions, and cautioned to avoid third-party movements. (Powderly violated his own injunction in 1886, when he campaigned for **Henry George**.) After the 1886 Haymarket Square bombing in Chicago, Powderly bitterly denounced **anarchism** and refused to lend his name to clemency pleas for the eight men falsely arrested for Haymarket. That act won the animus of all manner of political radicals, but Powderly returned their scorn.

To label Powderly conservative, however, would be misleading. He was not a deep thinker, but his sympathies definitely lay with the working class. Even as he told journalists that he saw no essential differences between the classes, he bitterly denounced employers for their callous disregard for workers and for pursuing wealth at the expense of human decency, dodging their responsibility for industrial accidents, prodding workers into ill-advised strikes just to break their unions, and behaving as aristocratic tyrants. At times, his passionate embrace of a producercentered ethos was almost **Marxist**, though he professed little truck with revolutionary ideologies. He was not, however, hesitant to tackle anyone who violated his deeply held sense of fair play; clergymen, business leaders, elected officials, and fellow labor leaders all felt the sting of Powderly tongue-lashings. Although some historians have viewed Powderly as cautious and conciliatory, few capitalists found him so.

As he aged, Powderly did come to hold some views that shocked progressives, including an anti-immigrant xenophobia, but he remained a champion of what he perceived to be the best interests of the working class and was never entirely comfortable with the **middle-class** status he eventually attained.

The best way of assessing Powderly's views on social class is to rethink the late nineteenth-century expressions of social class. The capital-labor conflicts of the end of the century intensified debate over social class, but these seldom conformed to simplistic dualities such as **proletariat** versus **bourgeoisie**. Ideologues of many persuasions, ranging from right-wing authoritarians to leftist revolutionaries, vied for supporters, most of whom held positions more fluid than those of the ideologues. The same individual might hold radical views on a topic such as eliminating the wage system, yet be reactionary on an issue such as racial equality. Moreover, a worker on strike might join a socialist movement during a labor conflict, yet vote for a mainstream politician later. If one considers a broad spectrum, Powderly's producerist views would be have to be more radical than those of **Samuel Gompers**, who came to accept capitalism as permanent, but more conservative than those of radicals such as **Eugene Debs**, anarchists, and Marxists.

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Power

ROBERT E. WEIR

Power is a key factor in determining social class, but one of social class's most difficult variables to measure. Most scholars adhere to some variant of a definition originally developed by **Max Weber** in 1922: "the possibility of imposing one's will upon the behavior of others." Scholars also generally agree with Weber that **wealth** correlates with economic, political, and social power and that those living in **poverty** report feeling powerless. They tend to debate most other points, however. As early as 1911, Robert Michels asserted an "iron law of oligarchy" in which small groups dominate politics mostly to protect their self-interests. His ideas, in many ways, anticipated **power elite** theories. Within the United States, power also tends to correlate with gender, race, and ethnicity, with **WASP** males maintaining their historical grip on power. **Critical elite** theorists agree that power is concentrated into the hands of an oligarchy but argue that this benefits society.

Weber saw power as more complex than most **Marxists** of his day. In particular, he separated economic and political power rather than lumping them together. Weber looked at "parties," organized political groups bent on achieving certain goals. Parties frequently shaped status and determined how social classes were constructed, ideas with which few Marxists would take umbrage. Weber, however, rejected the Marxists' reductionist tendency to see all power as coercive. Coercion, he argued, was only one form of power, a sort of institutionalized and organized group dominance (which was later called authority by Talcott Parsons). Moreover, much of this power was "legitimate" and legal. The power of government, for example, is coercive, but can also be legitimate if the government rules by consent. Weber focused on "influence"—voluntary accessions of power—and based his famed leadership studies on this notion. Some individuals, he argued, exercise "traditional" leadership roles that are backed by the force of custom and convention. Weber thought such leaders to be on the wane in favor of "charismatic" and "democratic" leaders, the first of which exercises power through the force of personality and the second through group consensus.

Subsequent scholars have also taken issue with Marx's idea that power was determined by one's relation to the **means of production**. **Ralf Dahrendorf** agreed with Marx that society tends to consist of superordinate and subordinate groups, but argued that modern society bases authority and power on more than just economics. Likewise, scholars postulating the existence of a **corporate class** argue that it is not necessary to own the means of production in order to have power over them. Moreover, modern economies and businesses are complex and contain multiple levels of decision making, each of which might give power to an individual at one moment and subject him to it the next. This muddied view of power factors into theories of **contradictory class location**.

Marxist and other **conflict theorists** have responded to criticisms in numerous ways. Some have evoked Marx's idea of **false consciousness** to counter Weberian notions of "legitimate" power. A subtler reading is given by **hegemony** theorists who note how consent is manufactured through deception and manipulation. Conflict theorists also criticize the tendency to ignore the power of the state and to

discredit economic power. It is, for example, largely a state decision as to how much **poverty** or **unemployment** is "acceptable." Some "gatekeeper" researchers assert that pluralists and bureaucracy analysts are naïve in their beliefs that dispersed power or chains of command flatten hierarchies or prevent power concentration.

They have shown how even the most complex organizations assign disproportionate

amounts of power to just a few individuals.

Still another approach was taken by **Gerhard Lenski**. He argued that individuals are motivated by self-interest and will tend to share economic and political resources to the degree that their own survival depends on it. In economies that produce a surplus, power is key in determining who gets what and how much. Unlike Marx, though, Lenski saw technology and **democracy** as mediating forces that distribute resources on a wider level. Lenski did not postulate utopian equality, but he did argue that societies with more equal distribution of resources do not neatly bifurcate into haves and have-nots. This is also the position of most **pluralist**

Still, few observers would dispute the basic premise that power helps define social class, nor would they contest the idea that the very existence of power creates power *relations* that must be negotiated in some form or another. In this regard, power is more than getting what one wants; it also entails reducing opposition that might stand in the way of obtaining it.

theorists, though they additionally point to the dimension of how power itself is

dispersed on many levels and among numerous competing groups.

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POWER ELITE

KAREN BETTEZ HALNON

The term "power elite" refers to the contention that a single group, rather than a multiplicity of competing groups, makes all the major decisions of importance for the nation, over and above and often against the interests of mass society or the common public.

The expression is most closely associated with American sociologist **C. Wright Mills**, who warned in 1956 during the Eisenhower years that amid a complacent and largely uninformed mass society, "vast concentrations of power had coagulated in America, making a mockery of **democracy**." The power elite, Mills claimed, existed in three domains and as an "interlocking directorate": "the warlords, the corporate chieftains, and the political directorate." Mills further defined the gendered term "power elite" as "men whose positions enable them to transcend the ordinary environments of ordinary men and women"; who "are in positions to make decisions having major consequences" (against resistance); and who "are in command of the major hierarchies and organizations of modern society. They rule the big corporations. They run the machinery of the state and claim its prerogatives.

They direct the military establishment. They occupy the strategic command posts of the social structure, in which are now centered the effective means of the power and the wealth and the celebrity they enjoy." In other words, Mills called attention to three prongs of power that he claimed had emerged in the United States: the nationalization of corporate interests (and with it the obsolescence of local elites and the relative autonomy of regional economies); the establishment of an increasingly autonomous military and a permanent war economy (that is, a war economy established during the **Cold War** and thereafter linked in symbiotic relation with economic and political elites) capable of strategically manipulating public opinion in favor of "an emergency without a foreseeable end"; and the triumph of a political directorate, entailing the transfer of power from the congressional branch to the executive branch, or into the hands of roughly fifty people "now in charge of (virtually all) the executive decisions made in the name of the United States of America."

Focusing his analysis on the inner workings of the corporate elite, sociologist **G.** William Domhoff Jr. provides a contemporary elaboration of how the upper class rules in the United States. Less radical in tone and less focused on the military prong of power than Mills's earlier work (and more inclusive of women's roles in the upper class), Domhoff provides an empirical analysis of the numerous links between the upper class and the "corporate community," such as how "social capital" networking and class-distinguishing "cultural capital" are cultivated and established via prep schools, elite colleges, elite social clubs, debutante balls, and social registers. He elaborates the nuances of how upper-class interests are advanced and how they converge with the corporate community via policy-planning networks such as foundations, think tanks, and policy-discussion groups. Integral to "alliances" between the corporate community and the upper class are interlocking networks of power ("interlocks"), where a confluence of upper-class and corporate-class interests is promoted, for example, via multiple, often coterminous executive board memberships. Domhoff illustrates how the corporate community consolidates its power by making strategic alliances with smaller companies and corporations. Domhoff further delineates the roles of the ruling class in shaping public opinion, how ruling interests influence and delimit the nature of political parties and elections, and how ruling-class interests dominate government decision making. Domhoff discusses the practical limitations to any radical transformation of American politics, critiques what he views as a failed and utopian political left, and invests his energy and optimism in the possibilities of what he sees as more practical and necessary liberal reform.

Anarchist progressive social theorist and activist Noam Chomsky's work also includes discussion of the power elite, making explicit links between the deliberate and strategic uses of propaganda by elites and progressive social theorists, such as Walter Lippmann, to manufacture consent or cultivate political economic spectatorship. He elaborates on how media control aids in quelling public resistance to militaristic and some times genocidal violence in the "advancement" of global capital.

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
YANNICK THORAVAL

Elvis Aaron Presley was an American singer and actor. For his part in popularizing rock music during the late 1950s, Presley is often referred to as "The King of Rock 'n' Roll," or simply, "The King."

Presley's meteoric rise to international stardom is an embodiment of the **American dream**. He was born into a poor, **working-class** family in East Tupelo, Mississippi, in 1935. Living in the poorer section of town, the Presley family was disparagingly referred to as poor **white trash**.

Presley's working-class roots influenced his music. His family belonged to a local interracial Assembly of God Pentecostal church. The predominantly poor congregation that worshiped there practiced gospel music, which mixes prayer with lively harmonies and animated dancing. Elvis would later adapt his experiences with the gospel tradition to his rock and roll performances.

Elvis blurred the social and racial boundaries of mid-1950s America. With African American musical influences such as rhythm and blues and gospel, Elvis introduced



Elvis Presley, 1950s. Courtesy of Photofest.

shades of black music to mainstream America. Registering the racial division of 1950s America, many conservative whites openly condemned Presley's music for resembling black southern "nigger" music.

Elvis's dancing was also a source of controversy. His sexually suggestive hip movements drew criticism from politicians and concerned parents who feared Elvis might corrupt America's youth. Attempts to ban Elvis's performances reflect the social conservatism that largely defined the American experience in the 1950s.

Initially, Elvis appealed mainly to teenage girls. Their consumption of Elvis records and memorabilia helped to establish teenagers as a new and emerging consumer class. However, some working-class and **middle-class** males were also attracted to Elvis as a rebel image. Presley's unprecedented popularity helped him to make a foray into the film industry. He starred in thirty-one motion pictures. These films helped to soften his image and broaden his appeal.

Owing to Elvis's elaborate and flashy costumes and tendency toward material excess, some contend that Elvis embodied the aesthetic of poor white trash. Despite this label, Elvis Presley was one of the world's most popular entertainers by the time of his sudden death in 1977. Today, he is remembered as one of the most influential musicians and most recognizable cultural icons of the twentieth century.

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PRESTIGE

ROBERT E. WEIR

Prestige is a subjective view of one's position in the social hierarchy relative to and conferred by others. Positive prestige generally gains certain perquisites, whereas negative prestige can serve as an obstacle to opportunity and upward **social mobility**. Prestige is customarily viewed as a subset of **status** systems. Status studies look at a person's legal, political, and cultural standing; prestige is concerned mainly with the latter.

Most of the prestige studies have focused on occupational rankings. In 1947, social scientists with the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) used a random sampling method to ask Americans how they ranked ninety occupations on a scale of excellent to poor. The data were then converted into numerical values. This study has been repeated numerous times since 1947, often using scientific polling rather than random sampling. The results have remained quite stable over time. White-collar professions consistently rank at the top of the prestige scale, and unskilled and semiskilled blue-collar jobs at the bottom. Doctors, for example, have scored at or near the top of every poll taken between 1947 and 2004. Those in the sciences—such as chemists, physicists, and geologists—also score very high, as do those in engineering (and computer) fields. Near the bottom are such occupations as garbage collectors, custodians, street vendors, sales clerks, and shoe shiners. Many of the traditional pink-collar jobs, such as librarians, secretaries, and hairdressers, rank in the middle and upper-lower ranks. Overall, there has been consistent correlation between prestige and the amount of education and training required by an occupation.

Since the original NORC studies, scholars have attempted to develop other ways of assessing occupational prestige, the two most popular of which are Duncan's socioeconomic index and Hollingshead's two-factor index of social position. Although these scales give more data—largely by expanding the number of occupations surveyed and by correlating them more directly to education—and are preferred by many sociologists, the results they yield are strikingly similar to those in the NORC findings.

Scholars are divided over the importance of such studies and the methodology used to obtain results. Some functionalist sociologists and **critical elite theorists** see these studies as confirmation of how collective values correlate with the social

644

necessity and usefulness of those at the top of the social hierarchy. Prestige scales are also useful for researchers looking at **subjective methods** of class determination. Critics charge that prestige lists are imprecise measures of desirability that should be minor variables in measuring status. They also note that results vary according to how the polling is done. A 2004 Harris poll, for instance, ranked lawyers among the lowest prestige categories, just ahead of union leaders. It also placed teachers among the higher ranks. Such data tell us little about true status when one considers the relative **wealth** and **power** commanded by lawyers vis-àvis teachers. (The Roper poll ranked only professions, however, and did not juxtapose them against **wage** labor.)

Prestige may well play a far greater role in society than many scholars believe if the concept is extended to patterns of **consumerism**. As **Gerhard Lenski** observed, "status consciousness" often dictates the social choices an individual makes. In the past several decades, American consumers have dramatically altered their consumption patterns, and many families now have a negative monthly income, mostly as a result of credit card debt. **Juliet Schor** argues that traditional patterns of using one's neighbors and peers as the reference group by which one measured prestige and success has been superseded by one in which consumers attempt to emulate the wealthy. In popular culture parlance, "keeping up with the Joneses" has given way to "keeping up with the lifestyles of the rich and famous." Although the patterns Schor observes may be older than she thinks—even **Lowell mill** girls aped the **upper classes**—soaring sales of luxury goods suggest that scholars may need to redirect their gaze at the link between prestige and **conspicuous consumption**.

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PRIMARY (INFORMAL) WORK GROUPS

ROBERT PAUL "GABE" GABRIELSKY

Primary (informal) work groups include workers who work together daily and are in direct contact with one another. The study of primary groups dates from a 1909 book by sociologist Charles H. Cooley entitled *Social Organization*. Cooley defined primary groups as those characterized by "intimate face to face association and cooperation." They are primary, according to Cooley, because of the intimate association and community of purpose of the members. A group, in sociological terms, is not merely a collection of individuals in close proximity and engaged in the same activity, such as a crowd gathered around a cage at a zoo. To be a group, the individuals involved must not only be engaged in a common activity, but also interact with each other.

The systematic study of the work process began in the early twentieth century with the research of industrial engineer Fredrick Winslow Taylor, who called his

work "scientific management." Then, during the late 1920s and early 1930s, a research project at the Hawthorne Works of the Western Electric Company's facilities in Chicago set up a series of controlled experiments designed to study how to increase productivity among assembly-line workers. From those studies it was inadvertently learned that even fairly drastic changes in the physical conditions of work had little effect on productivity. One of the major factors that did seem to affect productivity significantly was the level of spontaneous, organic organization among the workers studied. Thus, the Hawthorne experiments inadvertently discovered the primary (informal) work group.

For the next several decades after the Hawthorne experiments, industrial engineers, industrial psychologists, and sociologists amassed a considerable body of literature on the nature of primary (informal) work groups and their role in the work process, but these studies were virtually all business- and management-oriented. But increasingly in the 1960s and 1970s, labor-oriented scholars and worker-intellectuals began to take a fresh look at these management studies, turning them on their head and examining the same material from the point of view of workers rather than from that of management.

Prominent among worker-oriented studies of primary (informal) work groups was the work of **blue-collar** intellectual and labor educator Stanley L. Weir (1921–2001). Weir viewed primary (informal) work groups as a virtual "family on the job" and, with Cooley, saw them as the basic "us" organization, though in this instance in the work place rather than in the community. Such groups discipline their members through a combination of nurture, recognition, ridicule, and social isolation. Primary (informal) work groups, according to Weir, have a naturally selected leadership, and they make decisions in the immediate work area that can affect the flow of production.

Primary (informal) work groups are inherent in the technology of the work process and the social organization of work and thus inadvertently push workers into socialization with each other by the needs of the production process itself. Because of this, primary (informal) work groups can be found in even the most repressive of political and cultural environments and form a more or less permanent barrier to the consolidation of bureaucratic control from above.

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PRISONS

GABRIEL A. SANTOS

Prisons and social class considered in tandem have constituted one of the most interesting and formidable political and social challenges in the United States since the middle of the twentieth century. Despite representing heavy costs to taxpayers (currently about \$60 billion per year), prisons have become very popular in the past two decades as a crime-control strategy. Indeed, the prison population in the United States has grown tremendously in the past two decades, with a 28 percent prison population increase between 1995 and 2000; the most recent figures specify that the United States has a larger absolute number of persons in prison than any other nation in the world: 2.2 million. This is a ratio of about 700 per each 100,000 individuals.

The advent of the penitentiary as a rehabilitative institution in the early 1800s was promoted along two general lines of argument based on the goals of crime control and rehabilitation. First, the use of prisons promised to ensure social peace through removing offenders from conventional social spaces and as a deterrent to crime. That is, a criminal would be deprived of the rights to speak up in public, purchase goods, buy or rent homes, eat what he or she wished, or simply walk about a city or town, among other things. Such deprivations of conventional and basic rights and privileges, along with the imposition of strict discipline under constant supervision, were considered punitive enough to deter potential criminals from committing offenses. Second, the prison was envisioned as a place to rehabilitate offenders and prepare them for reintegration into social life outside prison. In the United States, the correctional use of prisons has eroded steadily since the 1970s. As liberal "rehabilitation" strategies of incarceration have waned, more conservative penal policies have been considered and adopted. The rising crime rate in the late 1960s is often blamed for this shift, though much of that rise was more perceptual than real (population rises increased crime in volume, but percentage increases were more modest).

The elevation of imprisonment and law-based approaches to the suppression of crime, rather than more community-based treatment programs, has carried significant consequences for different social classes and ethnic groups. From a Marxist perspective on social class, those who serve as workers but do not own tools or the means of production are also those who play a much smaller role in major decisions regarding the criminal justice system. From a more Weber-influenced perspective, those of the **lower classes** have limited influence on the policies or actions of powerful political groups because many from the lower classes lack major political affiliations, status, social honor, and prestige. Yet those with the least political and social wherewithal are also those who are more likely to be arrested for crimes, be the objects of a criminal attack, or reside in neighborhoods impacted by crime. In other words, as the U.S. Department of Justice has reported since 1991, the majority of those who have received correctional sentences committed crimes against the poor or near-poor, not the affluent. This insight demonstrates the core of the plight of lower-class community life, especially in industrialized urban settings—namely, violent criminal acts, very often linked to the drug trade, have prevented the formation of communities built on mutual trust along every generational and social organizational level. Although committed by only a handful of repeat offenders, such acts impinge upon a widespread desire to build a **property**-owning community for long-term prosperity. Criminal offenses committed between members from the same neighborhood—who are often economically or ethnically segregated with others of similar socioeconomic status (SES)—reinforces the popular but deluded notion that **segregation** may actually be socially beneficial.

Further along these lines of social stratification, the extent to which imprisonment is more common among men and women of the lower classes also means that African Americans and **Latinos** constitute a large proportion of the prison population. African Americans represent a disproportionate percentage of the total prison population in the country; they are about 12 percent of the United States' population, but represent 46.5 percent of state prisoners and 40 percent of federal prisoners. The most recent statistics indicate that African Americans are imprisoned at a rate roughly seven times higher than the rate for whites and three times higher than the rate for Hispanics. Many of these cases of imprisonment are the result of drug-related offenses. More specifically, 70 percent of all new admissions into a state penitentiary in 1998 (the most recent year for which data is currently available) were inmates who had been convicted of nonviolent property, drug, or public order offenses.

A recent study further shows that within three years of release, 67 percent of former prisoners are rearrested, and 52 percent are re-incarcerated. This highly unsettling rate of recidivism has spawned a large amount of criticism from both sides of the political spectrum with respect to the effectiveness of the current correctional strategy. The most common criticisms speak to the elevated levels of violence, overcrowding, and poor medical and mental health care in the nation's prisons and jails. One study argues that simple improvements in health care within penal facilities would dramatically reduce recidivism.

The rate of repeat offending, however, relates quite closely to class-related matters outside of prison as well. When an inmate is released back into conventional social living, he or she becomes the target or object of numerous stigmas and social evaluations whereby social honor and financial capacity are undermined. These stigmas entail loss of trustworthiness in the eyes of former friends and the loss of many job and housing opportunities. Imprisonment, then, causes a tremendous loss in social status and initiates downward mobility. Alienation from mainstream social life has been so commonplace that inmates have developed strategies for maintaining cohesion and duty even among expectations of continued lower-class living after release. This is primarily achieved by means of prison gangs that assure a sense of belonging, obligation, and responsibility both within prison and on the street. Despite facing loss of social status and opportunity, inmates who join a gang in prison often seek gang connections outside of prison. These offer support mechanisms, but further estrange offenders from **middle-** and **upper-class** social groups.

The negative relationship between class and *prison* (those in the lower classes are more likely to be imprisoned) is not necessarily identical to the relationship between class and *crime*. Self-report data challenge the notion that minorities are responsible for the overwhelming majority of criminal acts. In surveys administered since the early 1980s, white American juveniles have reported involvement in a variety of crimes at roughly the same rate as minorities. Self-report studies such as that of the National Youth Survey have been inconclusive in demonstrating a clear difference in delinquent or criminal involvement along racial lines. The only gap that seems to have increased is that involving violent crime; African Americans still make up a disproportionate percentage of arrests for violent crimes. Overall, economic status correlates with crime more than any other single factor.

All of this raises questions about arrest patterns and conviction rates within lower-class communities. Many correctional activists assert class and racial discrimination in arrest and sentencing patterns. Studies consistently indicate that the lower one's SES, the more deeply one is likely to penetrate the criminal justice system. To pick but one example, California judges routinely hand down sentences 25 to 50 percent longer for crack cocaine possession or sales than for offenses involving powder cocaine. Crack is more common in poor and minority neighborhoods, powder among more affluent drug users. Moreover, pharmacologists note that powder cocaine is generally more potent and dangerous. Data also reveal that poor offenders are much more likely to go to prison than those with economic resources.

There is, however, general agreement that recidivism rates are too high. Some reformers seek to address this at a community level. They look at the relationship between parolees and fellow community members as well as the effect of crime on the long-term social and economic stability of neighborhoods. Reformers suggest that a more comprehensive approach to corrections is needed and point to the success of outreach and diversion programs that tackle class-related factors at the root level.

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PRIVATE SCHOOLS

See Education; Ivy League.

PRIVATIZATION

STEPHEN E. SUSSMAN

Privatization can be broadly defined as relying more on the private institutions of society and less on government to satisfy people's needs. This is accomplished by transferring government programs to the private sector and contracting with private companies to handle public services. Proponents argue that the private sector performs these functions more efficiently, effectively, and economically than the public sector.

Privatization can mean removing responsibility for a service entirely, through the sale of a public asset to a private company. It can also mean contracting with a private provider for a specific period while government retains ultimate responsibility. This latter definition has come to symbolize privatization with the terms "privatization" and "contracting" often used interchangeably. In general, both the public and private sectors play important roles, and it is increasingly common to refer to "public-private partnerships," a less controversial term than privatization.

The contracting of a public service to private providers takes several forms. A municipality may engage a private company to pick up garbage; to keep city parks clean; to manage its hospitals; to provide ambulance services; to run schools, airports, and prisons; or even to provide police and fire protection. The main argument for privatizing is the accumulating evidence that it usually saves local governments money. Political factors, such as conservative opposition to "big government," and economic factors, such as the need to cut costs and increase efficiency, motivate privatization decisions.

Some argue that government can deliver services that better address social goals if its own employees carry out the services because politicians and civil servants place more weight on these goals than do private contractors. Privately managed prisons, for example, must balance profits against the costs of rehabilitating and educating inmates. Despite the higher cost to government, the public sector's attention to social goals is often the primary goal, whereas the private sector may pay more attention to profits. Indeed, some critics abhor the very idea of making a profit on public services and see such services as fundamental rights of a tax-paying citizenry.

In a public-private partnership, the contractor must be held accountable. This is often done by developing detailed specifications and performance standards, such as the public's right to ask contractors to remove unsatisfactory employees or the requirement that the contractor submit performance reports. A problem that might arise in connection with the use of privatization is that of ensuring service to the poor. A public hospital, for example, may not turn patients away, regardless of the ability to pay. However, if the public hospital is managed by a private, for-profit organization, services that require financing by users or user fees may be a financial hardship. When the state of Michigan, for example, turned over a pubic hospital to a private organization, the state agreed to reimburse the hospital for the costs of treating indigent patients not covered by federal Medicaid.

A classic example of privatization is sanitation service. E. S. Savas, a leading proponent of privatizing the public sector, has argued that the private pickup of solid waste would result in greater efficiency. The traditional argument is that a network of private organizations, in competition with each another, would cause prices to drop. Similarly, the argument over **education** is that privatization through a voucher system would lead to more effective schools because parents with control over the disposition of educational resources could choose from a number of different educational offerings. Schools would then upgrade their educational effectiveness; if they did not, they would fail to establish credibility among parents and would not attract enough students to succeed. In education and sanitation, advocates of privatization see the government as an inefficient and ineffective **monopoly**. Competition is the recommended remedy via privatization. Opponents of privatization, including much of the **labor movement**, argue that contractors often use fewer people to provide services and that hence, those services are inferior. They also frequently pay lower **wages** and offer reduced employee benefits.

As local governments gain experience and familiarity with privatization, they are beginning to reevaluate their role in providing service. Some local municipalities 650

have come to see government's role as one of ensuring that services are provided rather than actually providing services. Proponents of contracting and the privatization of government service delivery suggest that the competition can increase efficiency, reduce cost, and improve service quality. In its many forms, privatization is now seen as a viable alternative to traditional ways of providing public services and can bring substantial benefits to residents.

The practice remains controversial, however, and results have been mixed. The breakup of the government-run Conrail system, for example, did not result in better or cheaper freight service, nor have all for-profit firms taking over public schools delivered on promises of improved education. Likewise, several privately run prison contractors have faced inquiry over their operations. Opponents of privatization argue that the scale of some social needs is such that only an entity as large as government can address them. In 2004 public opposition to a plan by President George W. **Bush** to privatize **Social Security** led to a hiatus in those plans.

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PROGRESSIVE ERA

CHRISTINE W. HEILMAN

The Progressive Era in the United States is an imprecisely dated period that some scholars date anywhere from 1880 to 1929, though some favor 1901 to (roughly) 1917. The post-1901 time frame is favored by those who argue that there is a substantive difference between popular democracy movements of the late nineteenth century and the government-directed reforms enacted after the assassination of President William McKinley in 1901.

Scholars agree, however, that the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw major changes that included the maturation of industry, technological advances, migration, and urbanization. The nation also faced challenges such as unhealthy and overcrowded cities; labor strife; political corruption; monopolistic business practices; **poverty**; ethnic, gender, and racial tension; and a general sense that society was in need of reform. Awareness was raised by **muckraking** journalists, and society underwent a shift in which some problems were deemed social in nature, thereby partially supplanting the **Social Darwinism** of late Victorian elites. The period is usually dubbed "progressive" because it was the first time since **Reconstruction** that the federal government took an active role in economic, social, and political reform.

Progressives enacted myriad reforms that included efforts to control business **monopolies**, curtail **child labor**, end municipal corruption, enact conservation

policies, reform the nation's banking system, regulate commerce, control the spread of disease, ensure the safety of consumer products, and alleviate social tensions. Landmark legislation such as the Pure Food and Drug Act, the enactment of a federal **income tax**, the Federal Reserve Act, the Clayton Anti-Trust Act, and women's suffrage emerged from the period. The public face of Progressivism was often national politicians such as **Theodore Roosevelt** and Woodrow Wilson or crusading mayors such as Toledo's Samuel "Golden Rule" Jones or Cleveland's Tom Johnson. In truth, it was a much more diverse movement that also involved journalists, artists, photographers, social workers, college professors, women's suffragists, efficiency experts, ministers of the **Social Gospel**, and others.

Some researchers argue that most Progressives were middle-class organizers, but neo-Progressive historians of the 1980s and 1990s assert that the urban working class influenced the Progressive agenda by direct action such as strikes and ballot-box politics. Workers were agents in constructing a new urban politics of reform, not merely constituents of beneficiaries. In fact, although the American Federation of Labor (AFL) avoided partisan alignment, other factions of the labor movement were deeply engaged in local politics. For example, the streetcar strikes of 1895 to 1919 meshed struggles in the workplace with municipal reform. Class conflict generated a political energy for reform, and working-class activists worked within and without the two-party system to serve their reform agenda, as well as fielding radical candidates for local offices. The early twentieth century saw the Socialist Party gain strength and, in some cases, gain power. The intermittent labor conflicts had an impact on local political alignments and the direction of reform. Even the combative Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) stimulated change, even when it served mainly to give credibility to more cautious reform efforts.

Many urban problems were an indirect offshoot of **immigration**. More than sixteen million immigrants entered America between 1881 and 1911, many of whom came from southern and eastern Europe and the bulk of whom settled in urban areas. In addition, during the 1880s, African Americans began to leave the South and migrate to northern cities in search of job opportunities, civil rights, and an escape from rural poverty. Other newcomers, often native-born whites from rural settings, moved to cities seeking work but finding instead housing shortages, irregular work at low **wages**, dangerous employment, and disease-ridden neighborhoods.

Progressives sought to reshape the strained social systems caused by rapid industrialization. They proposed to change the boundaries between public and private, the roles of men and women, the role of government, and the role of decision-makers in deciding public issues. They advocated for the public good in relation to a system that privileged individual rights over collective responsibility. In response to what they saw as a need for Americanization of immigrants, groups of young social activists such as Jane Addams founded settlement houses where immigrants could find English-language classes, job training, civics classes, clubs for boys and girls, and sports. Workers were separated from family, church, and identity at work; but in their neighborhoods, they created ethnic communities with familiar traditions. Progressive Era reformers also tried to meet the needs of native-born migrants from rural areas with the establishment of the Young Men's and

Women's Christian Associations (YMCA, YWCA). Many young women lived by themselves or in boarding houses without the protection of male heads of household. The women experienced poverty because they earned less than men did, which was seen as justified because women were expected to live in households headed by the male wage earners.

Progressives imagined a change in gender roles inside and outside the home, with women having a wider public role. Women needed to vote to protect the home and counter the consequences of industrial capitalism such as bad housing, contaminated food, child labor, epidemics, and prostitution. Women reformers named the conditions and organized to counter them. The settlement house movement was created to help immigrant families.

Progressive education reform's spokesman was John Dewey, who advocated learning by doing instead of memorizing lessons. **Democracy** required cultivation of citizens with the responsibility to identify and meet the needs of the community. In the Progressive Era, voluntary associations were created to serve society such as the Associated Charities, forerunner of the United Way, and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (**NAACP**).

Progressives sought to arouse public opinion of the need for more democracy, though there was a decided top-down approach to many reforms. Specialists, experts, and professional associations were often presumed to be better guardians of community interests than citizen groups. Control and regulation often undermined democracy during the Progressive Era. Moralists enacted blue laws, attempted to close down working-class saloons, sought to regulate children's playgrounds, supported anti-vice squads, and persecuted birth-control advocate Margaret Sanger. Likewise, laws regulating child labor, free speech, and consumer fraud were frequently struck down by courts that were more interested in the free flow of commerce than in protecting public welfare. Nor were Progressive efforts toward alleviating racism stellar.

The Progressive record on the relationship between workers and management is typical of its promise and its limits. Other than the IWW, which was heavily persecuted, few Progressive Era social movements challenged the status quo with the vigor or imagination of **Gilded Age** groups such as the **Knights of Labor** or the **Populists**. The AFL under **Samuel Gompers** rejected the radicalism of the IWW and the socialism of **Eugene Debs**, accepted the permanence of **wage**-labor system, and worked toward higher wages and the abolition of child labor. Like many other Progressive groups, the AFL was dominated by white males; it even shied from extensive organizing of unskilled and semiskilled laborers.

The period did see some gains for labor, especially in areas such as mine safety, protection of seamen, railroad regulation, and the recognition that labor unions were not illegal conspiracies. Yet the period also saw the brutal—and often extralegal—suppression of strikes, the passage of anti–free speech ordinances aimed at suppressing IWW speakers (and, later, antiwar socialists), the birth of anti-union "open shop" movements, the enactment of discriminatory laws regulating female employment, and horrible industrial accidents such as the infamous 1911 Triangle Shirtwaist fire. Even Gompers and the AFL seemed too radical for some; in 1911 he was sentenced to prison for advocating a boycott against the Buck's Stove Company. The sentence was later reversed, but its effect dealt a blow to labor organizing.

U.S. involvement in World War I in 1917 greatly slowed the pace of reform, and the notion of broad government involvement in social and economic life cooled in the 1920s. Reforming zeal returned during the **Great Depression**, and scholars often credit the Progressive Era with making **New Deal** experiments imaginable.

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PROGRESSIVE/REGRESSIVE TAXATION

W. LAWRENCE NEUMAN

Taxes are a controversial topic. No one likes to pay them, and they entail mandatory transfers of **income** and **wealth** from individuals, families, or businesses to the government. The government may or may not provide benefits or services in return, and social classes may receive a disproportionate number of benefits from the taxes they pay. Taxes are complex because there are numerous types, and each has complicated rules and exceptions. A basic feature of taxes is whether they are progressive or regressive.

The idea behind progressive taxes is that the tax burden, or tax rate, should vary by ability to pay. Progressive taxes take a larger percent from the rich than from the poor. Members of the **lower class** pay a smaller share of the tax burden because of the theory that any amount paid by low-income individuals affects their lifestyle more severely than a higher rate paid by wealthy individuals. For example, imagine two families of four, one with an annual income of \$25,000 and another with an income of \$250,000. If each paid 10 percent in taxes, they would pay \$2,500 and \$25,000, respectively. The first family would be left with \$22,500 to meet its needs, whereas the second would still possess \$225,000. Because the lower-income family is struggling to make ends meet and has no cushion before paying taxes, dropping to \$22,500 could lead to a severe decline in the family's quality of life and perhaps even force cuts in necessities. By contrast, \$225,000 would still provide for substantial luxuries, given that such an income is many times the median family income. Under a progressive taxation system, as a family's income or wealth increases, so too does its tax rate.

In most progressive tax systems, the overall income is usually not taxed at a higher rate; instead, one's "marginal income" is progressively taxed. In practice, everyone pays 5 percent on the first \$20,000 of income, even if that is one's total income. The taxes on the amounts over \$20,000 are at a different rate. For example, a family with an income of \$80,000 may be taxed 5 percent on the first \$20,000, 15 percent on the amount between \$20,000 and \$60,000, and 20 percent on the amount over \$60,000.

Regressive taxes are the opposite of progressive taxes. The lower classes and poor pay a bigger share of the tax burden than those in the **middle class** or **upper**

class, even when they pay the same rate. Although progressive taxes are based in the moral principle of narrowing the gap in people's living standards, no such guidelines govern regressive taxes. When regressive taxes are not entirely hidden, some economists and theorists seek to justify regressive taxes by saying that the wealthy use their excess wealth to create opportunities for all. In theory, consumption is limited; there are practical caps on the number of **luxury goods** even the wealthiest individual can purchase. Proponents of the **trickle-down theory** argue that it makes sense to allow the wealthy to retain more income because they will use it to make investments that will boost the economy and benefit all, especially those most in need of employment. Some even argue that progressive taxation increases **poverty**. In this line of reasoning, high tax rates are a disincentive to invest and cause potential employers to limit the size of their businesses rather than expand them and pay exorbitant taxes.

Taxes can be progressive or regressive in three ways: in the written tax code, in what taxes cover, and in the total effect of all taxes combined. The easiest place to see progressive versus regressive taxation is the official income tax code. Many Americans complain about the tax code, though it is often the least relevant tax system for people's actual experience. The tax code shows a tax rate or the percent of tax paid at each of several income levels. In 2005, the federal rate on personal income varied from a low of 10 percent for household heads in families making less than \$10,400 to 35 percent for those with income above \$326,450. The majority of American households pay a rate of around 25 percent. But the rate has varied tremendously through history; during World War II, for instance, the top rate was 94 percent!

An important way to look at progressive and regressive taxation is tax coverage, that is, those things upon which people must pay taxes. Consumption is often taxed, most commonly as a sales tax. Most general consumption taxes are regressive because lower-income families must spend a high percentage of their total income buying necessities. By contrast, upper-class families have substantial surplus income to invest or use for discretionary spending. Beyond general consumption taxes, governments often tax specific products and services, such as cigarettes, airline tickets, gasoline, and hotel rooms. These taxes are levied equally for all, regardless of ability to pay.

Another aspect of tax coverage involves the various ways that people receive money, with each taxed in different ways or at different rates. Most middle-class and working-class people are familiar with paying taxes on earnings from wages or salary. The upper middle and upper classes often receive much of their earnings as a return on investments or from buying and selling property such as buildings, businesses, land, or stocks. An important aspect of tax coverage is what is excluded or exempted from coverage. Sometimes the lowest levels of income may be excluded from taxation, and in many states, food is exempt from sales taxes. These exclusions benefit the poor, but not to the same extent as exemptions governing alimony payments, oil-drilling allowances, capital gains, and other tax "loopholes" that help the wealthy.

Closely related to the issue of coverage is that of visibility. Some taxes are easy to see, such as when a sales tax is charged, whereas other taxes are invisible, such as excise taxes built into the price of car tires or surcharges on phone and cable bills.

In Canada, Europe, and many other nations, an invisible tax on general consumption is the value-added tax (VAT). This is like a sales tax, but a retail store pays it to a manufacturer or wholesaler. The store then passes the tax on to consumers in the form of a higher price for goods. Although it is not yet a feature of the U.S. tax system, VAT advocates abound because a VAT increases revenue for government and allows businesses who are not the final consumers of the goods they produce to recoup some of their tax burden.

Tax coverage in the form of a general consumption tax is almost always regressive. However, tax coverage could be progressive if certain types of purchases and sources of income were taxed at higher rates. Some tax reformers advocate higher sales taxes for luxury goods, first-class airline tickets, energy-inefficient products, and other items that benefit primarily the wealthy. They also favor higher taxes for stock market gains and high-end capital gains. Many favor lowering or eliminating rates for purchases such as groceries and further reducing the income tax rate for low-income Americans.

The most relevant way to consider progressive or regressive taxation is to look at the "effective tax rate." This includes all taxes paid and takes into account all purchases, all exemptions, and all forms of income from every social class. Income sources that are only relevant to certain classes—estate inheritances, for example—or purchases that are made primarily by lower classes are taken into account. An effective tax rate recognizes that a millionaire buying a fur coat and a poor person shopping at a thrift store have different spending patterns. To measure the effective tax rate, one compares the income and wealth each class had before and after taxes. From this, one could measure more accurately the total effect of taxes on people in the lower, working, middle, or upper classes. In theory, a more equitable tax system could be designed.

There are many proposals to make taxes more progressive or regressive. Various "tax-the-rich" schemes have been floated to make taxes progressive, although many are more political bluster than serious, and quite a few are short on the details of implementation. Some progressive taxation supporters have suggested a "negative income tax" program. In such a scheme, a threshold level is established, and one pays taxes only on amounts above that level. Those below would receive a payout for the difference between actual income and the threshold. It would mean that all of those in the middle and upper classes would pay taxes, but that most low-income earners would pay nothing. The negative income is opposed by many conservatives because it would remove some deductions for the more affluent.

Some reformers advocate a "flat tax" program to simplify taxes. Many people like the idea of a flat tax in which everyone pays the same rate, because of its simplicity and apparent fairness. Its appeal for most lies in its contrast to the current complicated tax code. However, most flat tax programs, if implemented, would make effective tax rates more regressive. This occurs because such programs eliminate exemptions that often benefit working-class families, such as tax reductions for larger families and the elderly, and they tax both high-income and low-income families at the same rate. High-income people tend to have many diverse ways of receiving money from property or investments that can escape most flat tax proposals. Recent studies suggest that income tax reforms under President George W. **Bush** have resulted in a de facto flat tax. In 2005 those Americans earning over

\$1 million paid a rate of just 22 percent, the same rate as those making between \$500,000 and \$1 million, whereas those earning \$100,000 to \$200,000 paid 20.6 percent. Those in the \$30,000–\$40,000 range paid 13.6 percent, leading some to say that the curve between levels is now "flat."

It should be noted that most proposals for income tax reform are highly charged politically. The federal income tax came into being when the Sixteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution was adopted in 1913. Its original goal was to create a progressive taxation program that could fund government programs, contribute to the public good, and close the exaggerated wealth gap that had widened during the Gilded Age. Since 1913, few have been happy with the way the system works. In general, liberals wish income tax policy to be more progressive than it is, and conservatives favor drastic reduction of rates. Those rates have fluctuated through history; during the **New Deal**, for instance, the top tax rate once rose to 79 percent. As late as 1980, the top rate was nearly 70 percent. President Ronald Reagan, an economic conservative, slashed this in half, and subsequent presidents have supported cutting it further. Liberals complain, not without evidence, that there has been very little evidence to support contentions that lowering rates for the rich increases opportunity for the poor. Instead they charge that it leaves local, state, and federal governments short of revenue to support public spending programs and to deliver aid to the poor.

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PROHIBITION

MARK NOON

When the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution was ratified on January 16, 1919—prohibiting the manufacture or sale of alcohol within the boundaries of the United States—many considered it "class legislation." While prohibitionists celebrated, opponents of the new law pointed out that the change to the Constitution would not go into effect until January 17, 1920. Wealthy and upper middle-class Americans were given an entire year to stockpile their favorite adult beverages while the working poor, who would often purchase drinks on "tick" (or credit) from the local saloonkeeper, could only count the minutes until their neighborhood tavern closed. This was only the latest dispute in a long struggle over alcohol that had raged through much of the nation's history. The boundaries in the battle over prohibition were generally drawn along class lines.

The total prohibition of alcohol was impractical in the Colonial period. With drinking water often suspected as a carrier of disease, beverages such as rum, whiskey, cider, and beer were virtually essential to daily life and were used as anesthetic and analgesic. Excessive drinking was recognized as a problem, however, and as early as the seventeenth century, laws against drunkenness were on the books. In



H. G. Bauer and officers of the Internal Revenue Service pose with the largest still ever taken, ca. 1922. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

the early Republic, increasing concern over social problems stemming from a steady rise in alcohol consumption led to the formation of temperance organizations. With a groundswell of popular religion in antebellum America, the temperance movement grew into one of the nation's first national crusades as predominantly evangelical Christian organizations joined the cause. They labeled alcohol a weapon of Satan and argued that it was a major cause of a host of social problems such as crime, poverty, gambling, domestic violence, prostitution, and insanity. Reformers no longer sought moderation in public consumption of alcohol. Their goal was to ban it entirely.

Prohibitionists were typically **WASPs** who adhered to the Protestant **work ethic** set in motion by their **Puritan** antecedents. Drinking alcohol was alien to their ascetic of sobriety, hard work, self-control, discipline, and frugality. **Saloons** and places like them stifled upward mobility, threatened traditional values, and weakened the social fabric. Generally respected in their communities, supporters of prohibition were often well educated and were leaders in business and commerce. In some cases, business owners wielded considerable control in **company towns** and villages, and they had enough power to prohibit the sale of alcohol in the community. In the anthracite coal region of Pennsylvania, for example, coal operators, often in response to pressure from the wives of miners, shut down saloons and banned beer wagons from mining villages. In these cases, thirsty coal miners were known to walk miles from their "dry" mining villages to ones that remained "wet." For the most part, those who pressed for prohibition were motivated by a sincere concern about the impact of alcohol on society. This was not always the case, however.



Pouring whiskey into a sewer during Prohibition, ca. 1909–32. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

The prohibition movement was marked by an undercurrent of ethnic and religious hostility. Some prohibitionists used the alcohol issue as a tool to spread nativism, racism, anti-Catholicism, and anti-**Semitism**. They were quick to label the number of "foreigners" as both the leading suppliers and the leading consumers of alcohol. Even before the Civil War, Irish immigrants came under fire for frequenting saloons, and a major stereotype of the nineteenth century, the drunken Irishman, emerged. For German immigrants, beer was essential to their daily lives, and they shocked contemporaries with their practice of Sunday afternoon parties in their beer gardens. Later, prohibitionists criticized immigrants from eastern Europe and the Balkans for a lack of sobriety. Slavic immigrants had drinking traditions in

their homeland and brought them to the United States. The Anglo-Saxon establishment was particularly critical of a lack of drinking moderation among Slavs during holidays and religious celebrations. **Working-class** African Americans were also denounced for their behavior while under the influence of alcohol. Significantly, a major organization that supported the prohibition movement was the **Ku Klux Klan**, and the first state to ratify the Eighteenth Amendment was Mississippi. A basic argument among prohibitionists was that too much of a worker's paycheck was being spent in saloons, and as a result, women and children at home were harmed. With this point as part of their arsenal, those favoring prohibition scored a number of legislative victories at the state level.

The first state to pass a law banning the sale and consumption of alcohol was Maine in 1851. By the time the Eighteenth Amendment went into effect in 1920, alcoholic beverages were outlawed in thirteen states, and twenty-six others had strong anti-alcohol legislation on the books. In part, this was because of the efforts of the Prohibition Party, which was founded in 1869; however, the two organizations that were crucial to the eventual passage of the Eighteenth Amendment were the Women's Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) and the Anti-Saloon League of America. Founded in 1873, the WCTU emphasized moral, family-related, and religious arguments against alcohol. Although it attracted a number of prominent women and socialites, the organization drew women from middle- and workingclass backgrounds as well. The WCTU, with its hymn-singing saloon visits, was very successful at keeping the temperance issue before the public. The Anti-Saloon League was organized in 1893 and placed greater emphasis on political activity and lobbying to bring about reform. The organization skillfully worked with the political party in power and gained significant support from the nation's leading barons of business who felt that a dry workforce would reduce industrial accidents, curb absenteeism, and increase worker efficiency. The Anti-Saloon League also saw an opportunity when America entered World War I. It brought national prohibition closer to reality by using anti-German sentiment to attack German-American dominance of the brewing industry.

When Prohibition went into effect, it quickly turned into anarchy, largely because of the federal government's inability to enforce the law. Alcohol was still available thanks to the efforts of bootleggers, moonshiners, run-runners, and speakeasy operators. The working class was most affected as their saloons closed, and it was often the poor who suffered most from the "seller's market" spurred by Prohibition. Newspapers reported that people were dying from the questionable ingredients in beverages produced by bootleggers. Iodine, industrial alcohol, antifreeze, and gasoline were used to give drinks their "kick." Even middle-class and wealthy drinkers, who paid more for illegal liquor, were delivered inferior or even dangerous products.

The upper class took the lead in pressing for the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment. Even before Prohibition went into effect, elite business leaders were concerned that the law was giving too much power to the federal government and formed the Association Against the Prohibition Amendment. Efforts to end Prohibition intensified in the late 1920s as more people recognized the problems of organized crime and violence spawned by the legislation. Women of high social status organized the Women's Organization for National Prohibition Reform (WONPR) in 1929. The WONPR engaged in grassroots activities and pressured political candidates and office holders to press for repeal. The organization played a key role in bringing about change. Eventually, the intensification of the **Great Depression** provided the opportunity for total repeal. Thousands of jobs would be created with the return of the brewing and liquor industries. In addition, the government would benefit from the tax revenues created by the sale of alcoholic beverages. The Twenty-First Amendment, striking down the Eighteenth Amendment, was ratified in December of 1933. It was the only time that an amendment had been repealed.

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PROLETARIAN LITERATURE

HOLLY ALLEN

Proletarian literature refers to works of fiction that first appeared in the 1930s and spotlighted the lives of working-class Americans.

Working-class life has often been the subject of American literature. Yet only in the **Great Depression** did workers' struggles form the basis of a thriving literary culture. Proletarian literature emerged under the auspices of the **communist** movement in the late 1920s, gaining momentum after the stock market crash of 1929. As Joseph Freeman noted in 1934, Depression-era literature could no longer

hold itself apart from the inescapable themes of **poverty**, **unemployment**, and industrial strife. He held out hope that contemporary art would be class-based and rooted in politics and would possess revolutionary potential. Ideally, as *The New Masses* editorialized as early as 1926, the producers of such poetry would be workers themselves. Particularly under the editorship of **Mike Gold**, the *New Masses* gave ordinary workers a forum in which to publish fiction, poetry, and journalistic accounts of their daily struggles. Other magazines sympathetic to communism, such as *Blast*, *Partisan Review*, and *The Anvil*, also featured literature about rural life, the factory, the city streets, and other locales of working-class struggle.

Questions of authorship and authenticity plagued proletarian literature from the outset. Although some writers were authentically proletarian (Jack Conroy, **Richard Wright**, and Tillie Olson, for example), others were middle-class radicals (such as Nelson Algren and Josephine Herbst). By 1934, as **Communist Party** strategy shifted from the hard-line Third Period to the more mainstream Popular Front, proletarian publishers compromised their commitment to gritty, working-class authenticity in favor of more polished, leftist writings that they thought would appeal to **white-collar** workers. True proletarian talents such as Richard Wright and Tillie Olson continued to publish, but ordinary longshoremen, miners, and millworkers became less visible.

Notwithstanding shifts in tone and subject matter that corresponded to changes in Communist Party politics, proletarian literature is a tremendous resource for understanding Depression-era life and culture. In a decade largely preoccupied by the specter of social revolution, proletarian writers embraced and celebrated the humane and democratizing potential of collective protest. Their writings vividly depict acute hardship across a range of locales, from farming communities, to mining settlements, to urban factory and packinghouse districts. Although some proletarian literature is formulaic, writers such as Olson and Hughes depicted working-class experience with great lyricism. Other notable contributors to proletarian literature included Mike Gold, Agnes Smedley, Jack Conroy, Robert Cantwell, Myra Page, and Clifford Odets.

A compelling feature of proletarian literature is the tension writers often portray between class-based experience, on the one hand, and **gender** and racial experience, on the other. Despite postwar critics' claims that proletarian writers uniformly touted the Communist Party line, considerable dissonance is evident in works such as Meridel LeSueur's *Salute to Spring* and Tillie Olson's *Yonnondio*, both of which deviate from proletarian literary conventions in privileging women's specific challenges and contributions to working-class struggle. Likewise, Richard Wright's *Native Son* combines working-class themes with the specificity of African American experience.

Certainly, direct exposure to a range of proletarian writings from the 1930s belies politically motivated claims of "bad art" often levied against proletarian fiction by its Cold War critics. Though most would dispute Mike Gold's claim that proletarian literature constituted a "second American Renaissance," Michael Denning and others have asserted that it helped transform American modernism. In its thematic preoccupation with defining Americanism, interrogating injustice, and representing the strength and dignity of ordinary people, proletarian literature inspired a broader cultural ferment ranging from the novels of John Steinbeck to the new journalism and Black Arts Movement of the 1960s.

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PROLETARIANIZATION

PETER BRATSIS

Proletarianization refers to the propensity of **capitalism** to reduce many traditional occupations and forms of labor into **wage** labor. Karl **Marx** and Friedrich Engels, in the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, famously noted this tendency. In contemporary American society, we see that many occupations formerly not working-class have increasingly become transformed into wage labor.

Some of the first examples of proletarianization include the transformation of artisans and small independent contractors into workers. First, under what is known as the "putting out" system of production, the production process was reduced to its most basic parts, and each step in the production process was contracted out to independent laborers. This served to "de-skill" artisans, take away control of the finished product from those who produced it, and establish the capitalist as necessary to the production process. The second step in turning these traditional laborers into workers was taking away their autonomy in terms of hours and pace of work by subjecting them to factory discipline and paying by the hour. Said workers lost control of the products of their labor, and they also had little, if any, power to regulate their working day.

Within the United States, and in addition to the transformation of artisans into factory workers, many once-independent farmers became wageworkers for agribusiness (see **Agrarianism**). Similarly, small shops and businesses such as corner groceries, small pharmacies, bakeries, and butcher shops have virtually disappeared from the American landscape. Today, most meat processing is done in large factories, and the meat is sold in supermarkets; pharmacists tend be employees of large chain stores; and Wal-Mart and similar stores have replaced hundreds of thousands of local independent merchants. Even doctors and lawyers have increasingly become salaried employees of profit-making corporations, losing their autonomy and becoming reduced to members of the proletariat (even if their salaries may be substantially higher than those working in the fields and in retail).

Many independent occupations from previous generations have become subsumed by capitalism. It should be noted, however, that, although many of these traditional segments of the **petit bourgeoisie** have eroded in recent years, capitalism has also produced many new petite bourgeois positions. The latter category includes the many corporate managers, public employees and bureaucrats, and skilled independent workers in occupations such as computer programming and design, engineering, and **higher education**. Contemporary autonomist-Marxists such as Antonio Negri and Paulo Virno argue that the decline of **blue-collar** labor, factory production, and autocratic management has altered the process of

proletarianization as Marxists once viewed it. They even allow that individual workers today often play more active and creative roles in production processes. As post-Fordist thought has advanced within many spheres of production, the creativity of individual workers and their inclusion within the "general intellect" are now key to their value as workers. Paradoxically, these waged and salaried laborers shed their identity as **proletarians** and have been characterized by Negri as "social workers" and, more recently, as the "multitude."

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PROLETARIAT

JOHN A. GRONBECK-TEDESCO

The proletariat is the class of exploited workers whose livelihoods depend on the value of their manual labor.

The term derives from a Latin word referring to a lower-class Roman citizen. It was popularized by Karl **Marx** and Friedrich Engels, who employed it to signify **working-class** industrial wage earners who use their labor to produce capital for the **bourgeoisie**, the class of capitalists who control the **means of production** and wage labor. According to this model, the proletariat, having no control over the means of production, would eventually rise up against the bourgeoisie in revolution, thereby replacing **capitalism** with a **communist** state in which the proletariat controls property and production. Just as the bourgeoisie was responsible for overthrowing feudalism, the proletariat would assume state control after the destruction of capitalism, a necessary step to a classless society.

The proletariat in America has consisted of rural and industrial workers, many of whom have been minorities or **immigrants**. They have been central to the political programs of **Socialist** and **Communist** parties since the late nineteenth century. The term took on cultural significance during the 1930s among radical circles, as works of art and literature became part of proletarian culture. Here literary and artistic aesthetics took on working-class significance, with work produced for, by, or on behalf of the proletariat.

Today the notion of a global proletariat still thrives. It is used in reference to first-world economies that employ the labor of third-world populations, whereby workers in the third world scarcely meet minimum requirements of subsistence while those in the first world continue to accumulate wealth.

Suggested Reading

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PROPERTY RIGHTS

CHRISTINE W. HEILMAN

Property rights are the socially approved and exclusive authority to determine how a property is used, whether it is owned by individuals or by the government. These rights create a peaceful competition for the use of economic resources. Classical property rights theory is based on the work of John Locke. According to Locke's labor theory of property, individuals have the right to the fruits of their labor. Giving up ownership of the fruits of one's labor, a key component of **wage** labor, is a major factor that creates inequality in society. In his chapter on property in *Two Treatises of Government*, Locke argues that property holding is a natural right that supersedes human laws. Although in advanced industrial societies, social policies have attempted to address economic and social inequality, property, which is viewed as a valuable and desirable good, remains in the hands of those few whose positions or occupations within the division of labor are unequally rewarded. In a capitalist society, nearly all goods are private property, so earning a living is imperative for poor and **working-class** people.

According to Karl Marx, capitalism requires that nonproducers live off the surplus of others. As material goods increase in value, human endeavors decrease in worth, and workers become alienated from the products of their labor. Workers toil for others, who keep the surplus of their labor. Under capitalism, structures and institutions reward owners and controllers who use the surplus value of labor both for their own consumption and for investment. In fact, those who accumulate capital win out economically over those who only consume and fail to accumulate capital. Elites own the labor of others, as well as the real property that others rent from them.

In keeping with historical patterns, contemporary poor and working-class individuals are less likely to own their own homes and more likely to rent housing. Class conflict often centers on disputes between landlords and tenants. Their relationship is one of unequal power; owners can delegate, rent, or sell any portion of their property rights at whatever prices they determine and the market will bear. Local governments sometimes create rent-controlled housing that keeps rates below the free-market value, but such ordinances can have the unintended effect of reducing tenant mobility. Moreover, rent control is generally an unpopular notion in the United States because it violates a central tenet of free market capitalism. The city of Boston abolished rent control in 1994, and others have followed suit. In practice, the only extensive tracts of price-regulated rental property are taxsupported public housing projects. Such state and federally subsidized property is generally rented to those of lower socioeconomic status (SES) and is not generally considered desirable. In fact, many such units are located in **ghettos** marred by poverty, high crime, and other social problems. Nonetheless, 12.9 percent of all rentals in the United States are subsidized, a figure that falls well short of actual need. In 2000, for example, more than 8.5 million families were eligible for subsidized low-income housing, but only 6.7 million units were available.

Rent and private sales of property normally reflect social taste and what society thinks is the most valuable use of a property. On occasion, owner rights are secondary, as, for example, in the case of eminent domain when a local, state, or federal government forces the sale of private property to undertake a project deemed beneficial or necessary. For the most part, however, owner property rights supersede those of tenants. **Gentrification** poses challenges to low- and middle-income renters. Many find that their rents skyrocket when a once undesirable location becomes trendy; still others are forced to move when their rentals are sold for condominium development. According to the National Coalition for the Homeless, between 1973 and 1993 alone, 2.2 million low-rent units disappeared from the housing market. These low-rent units were abandoned, demolished, converted into condominiums or expensive apartments, or increased so much in cost that they were unaffordable. Trends since 1993 have been discouraging. Another 900,000 affordable rental units had disappeared by 1995, and the state of Pennsylvania estimated that it lost 17 percent of all of its affordable housing stock between 1992 and 2004. It apparently is not alone; cities such as Dallas, Minneapolis, and Seattle report similar losses.

Property ownership is an American dream, but the reality for many Americans is that merely providing shelter has become burdensome. Ideally, a family should spend under 30 percent of its income on housing. This is true for just one-third of all families, renters and mortgagees alike, and about one-quarter pay more than 50 percent of their income for housing. The situation is more acute for renters than for buyers, especially low-income families, 56 percent of which spend more than 50 percent of their income on rent. By 2006, by federal government calculations, those seeking to rent a two-bedroom unit would need to earn \$15.37 per hour to afford it, yet the national average was just \$14 per hour, and a quarter of all wage earners were making less than \$10 per hour. High rents and low wages are the two major factors fueling recent surges in homelessness.

Some renters have formed tenants unions that advocate for safe, affordable, decent housing. Advocates for homeless people have also lobbied the federal government to provide more affordable housing, and a few towns and cities, such as Washington, D.C., and Santa Monica and West Hollywood, California, have bucked national trends and enacted rent-control laws. However, affordable housing continues its downward slide, and rent control has proven counterproductive in many areas because owners have simply exercised their property rights and placed rental units for sale on the open market.

Nor has the federal government been encouraging. Many conservatives dislike the notion of subsidized housing on the grounds that it discourages **self-reliance** and that subsidized rent undermines the free market. In 2004 President George W. **Bush** slashed \$600 million from the Housing and Urban Development (HUD) budget, much of it from programs designed to help low-income people, the elderly, people with disabilities, and community-development block grants.

Bush's draconian cuts did lead to reaction in the House of Representatives on the part of legislators who believe the government should assist **minimum-wage** and low-income earners and the homeless by expanding federal resources for affordable housing. The Bringing America Home Act (H.R. 4347) was reintroduced in 2005 and again in 2006. It would finance permanent housing, require

Health and Human Services to fund supportive services connected to permanent housing, and increase funding for the McKinney-Vento program, a homeless assistance act passed in 1986.

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PROTECTIONISM

See Free Trade.

PROTESTANT WORK ETHIC

See Work Ethic.

Public Schools

See Education.

PUNK AND GRUNGE CULTURE

MICHELLE DAGNINO

Punk rock is an antiestablishment rock music movement that began around 1974 and was made popular by such bands as the Ramones, the Sex Pistols, and The Clash. Many bands since then have also been identified as "punk," although there has not been a concerted, popular mass movement of punk rock music since the early 1980s. Punk is sometimes used to describe music scenes that share the characteristics of the original bands that made it popular—a **working-class** ideology and a youthful attitude that defies authority and establishment "norms."

Punk culture comes from punk music and refers to a shared understanding of style and ideology. Punk's popularity came not only because of the appealing music, but also because of its engagement with issues such as class, ethnicity, sexuality, and gender identity. Punk lyrics introduced a prevocational openness of social and political expression that had not been heard in music for decades.

Songs like The Clash's "Career Opportunities" and "London's Burning" dealt with **unemployment**, boredom, and other unhappy realities of urban life; some were openly disparaging of governments and monarchies, as in The Sex Pistols'



Kurt Cobain of Nirvana. Courtesy of Photofest.

"God Save the Queen" and "Anarchy in the UK." Punk music created a subculture of intellectual discussion that engaged in radical social criticism and political activism and that was explicitly anti-racist and gender inclusive, although punk culture is still largely white and male, especially in Europe and North America. To this day, many political movements bear the characteristics of punk activism, such as grassroots organizing, confrontation, and do-it-yourself ("DIY") styling.

Although the entire genre has a workingclass sensibility, there is also a specific subgenre of punk rock called street punk that describes punk rockers who are working class or from the **inner city**. Most street punk rockers identify with a particular type of fashion, including studded leather

jackets, jeans, bondage trousers, bullet belts, spiked or Mohawk hairstyles, and piercings.

Another offshoot of punk is the "indie" music scene, which includes alternative rock and "indietronica." Although the sounds of indie music are very diverse, at its core is the DIY ethic, such as producing one's own music, creating independent labels, promoting regionally based sounds, and developing local fan bases. The most prime example of the strength of the indie music scene was the rapid popularity of the Seattle grunge scene that developed in the late 1980s.

Grunge music is a genre of alternative rock inspired by punk, heavy metal, and indie rock and characterized by strong riffs and heavy drumming. It became commercially successful in the late 1980s and early 1990s and peaked in popularity in the mid-1990s. The most popular band of this era was Nirvana, which became as popular for its image as it did its music. Nirvana's image of youthful members with a working-class background and indie ethics quickly made it the most popular band of Generation X.

And although punk and grunge have passed the peak of their popularity, strong communities of fans still exist. Local punk and grunge scenes exist around the world, many of which combine the principles of do-it-yourself music with political activism. For example, squatting, which is the act of taking over an unoccupied space without paying any compensation, plays a major role in the punk community in providing shelter and other forms of support for touring bands and community members. These houses are usually found in low-income urban areas in or around skid row and even include some punk communes, such as the Dial House, a sixteenth-century farm cottage in the countryside surrounding Epping Forest in Essex, England. Dial House came to prominence in the late 1970s, when the punk rock band Crass lived there. Crass embodied the punk manifesto of "anyone can do it" and combined the use of song, film, graphics, and political criticism to launch a

sustained and original manifesto against a society that they felt promoted war, violence, and rampant consumerism. Because of the influence of bands such as Crass, Sonic Youth, and the Dead Kennedys, punk music has come to embody more than just a sound; it has come to embody a lifestyle as well.

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PURITANS

ROBERT E. WEIR

The term "Puritan" refers to a religiously strict Calvinist faction within the Church of England (C of E) that felt that efforts of the English Reformation had not gone far enough in cleansing the church of its Roman Catholic vestiges. Although the Puritans did not leave the C of E like the Separatists who founded Plymouth Colony, they were sufficiently troublesome as to invite persecution during the sixteenth century.

In 1630 a group of about one thousand Puritans left England bound for America, where they hoped to establish a colony near that of Separatist Plymouth. Although the Massachusetts Bay Company was founded by a group of investors, the Puritans, led by John Winthrop (1588–1649), rejected the very idea that Massachusetts Bay would become a for-profit enterprise. At some point during the voyage to Massachusetts, Winthrop laid out a vision for "New" England that departed radically from the ways of "old" England. In a sermon titled "A Model of Christian Charity," Winthrop rejected the hierarchical social structure of England, especially its aristocracy of birth and its wealth gap. Instead, Winthrop challenged his Puritan brethren to establish a unified Christian commonwealth that would become a "city on a hill" example for Christians everywhere.

Winthrop believed that extremes of **wealth** and **poverty** were among those influences corrupting English society. Massachusetts was to be a colony without such economic disparity. He opened "Christian Charity" with a reminder that Christians were often called upon to give—sometimes all they had—in order to help others. He challenged Puritans to "rejoice together, mourn together, labor and suffer together" and told them, "We must be willing to abridge ourselves of our superfluities, for the supply of others' necessities." His was a collectivist vision of society, one in which self-interest was considered sinful. **Individualism** was deeply distrusted because the colony's purpose was the glorification of God, not worldly success.

It is important to note that the Puritans were not proto-**communists**. Their conception of a commonwealth was one in which the interests of community took precedence over those of individuals, but that did not preclude individuals from owning land and other personal goods. Puritans nonetheless had a problematic relationship with mercantilism and proto-**capitalism**. Merchant trade and other



The Puritan, by Augustus St. Gaudens. © Art Resource, NY.

business enterprises developed early on, but the overall economy was highly regulated, and there were periodic reassessments of commercial activity to make certain that community interests were being served. Dishonest shopkeepers, for example, were sometimes banished.

The Puritans did not believe in **democracy** either. Like most people of their day, they equated democracy with anarchy and misrule. Rather than accept English-style aristocracies of birth, however, Puritans opted for an organic model of society in which the social structure was likened to the human body. In this worldview, rulers were equated with the head, artisans with the hands, and farmers with the feet. In theory, no part of the body was viewed as more essential than another; in Winthrop's words, Massachusetts was to be a "community as members of the same body."

The Puritan vision was noble in many respects, but it proved hard to implement. The same ideals that bound the colony were also the basis of the theocracy that governed it. Puritan government proved inflexible and easily challenged. Just five years after settlement, Roger Williams was banished from the colony, officially for his unorthodox religious beliefs, but

also because his view that church and state should be separate threatened the very foundation upon which the colony rested.

Just three years later, Anne Hutchinson was tried for practicing Antinomianism, a belief strain that places emphasis on an individual's interpretation of Scripture and his or her personal relationship with God. Both views threatened the Massachusetts Bay theocracy. Hutchinson was banished, but the social breakdown of the controversy reveals how far the colony had already strayed from its vision. Only men could hold land or vote in Massachusetts Bay; church membership was also required to hold office or vote. Of the 361 men of voting age, just 54 were simultaneously office holders, property owners, and church members. By contrast, nearly half (172) held none of those statuses. Even more revealing, many of the colony's richest members supported Hutchinson. This was especially true of rich merchants, who supported her by a margin of twenty-two to five. By contrast, society's humblest and poorest members opposed her.

Puritanism struggled with such class tensions for the rest of the time it officially controlled Massachusetts Bay. As late as 1692, the Rev. Samuel Parris warned of the corrupting influence of merchant trade and money, a charge he leveled as the Salem witch trials convulsed his village. With the reorganization of New England that took place after the Glorious Revolution of 1688, Puritanism as a governing system began to wane and was a spent force by 1700. Nonetheless, it is tempting to view several of its struggles as emblematic of the American experience. There has been and remains a fundamental tension between public good, community ethos, and commonwealth economics on one hand and private wealth, individualism, and self-interest on the other. This shows up in issues seemingly far removed from the Puritans, including debates over taxes, privacy battles, and community spending.

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PYGMALION STUDIES

See Self-fulfilling Prophecy.

PYRAMID SCHEME

ROBERT E. WEIR

Pyramid scheme refers to any number of illegal and legal get-rich-quick plans predicated on drawing large numbers of people into the system. They are called pyramid schemes because they rest on a structure in which those at the top—either administrators or early entrants into the plan—rake in money from large numbers of participants laboring or investing at the bottom. Ultimately, even legal plans are unsustainable because they require too many new investors to be practical (or even possible).

Capitalism places such emphases on profit and materialism that temptations lurk to bypass socially accepted means of obtaining rewards normally achieved by patience, hard work, or both. Pyramid schemes are, in essence, unethical or illegal paths to enrichment that involve taking advantage of other people. Although some people are lured by desire to increase existing wealth, members of the lower middle and lower classes are often recruited into pyramid schemes in hope of alleviating their economic vulnerability.

Pyramid programs are sometimes called "Ponzi Schemes," a term that refers to a postal reply coupon scam run by Bostonian Charles Ponzi in 1919 and 1920. The international postal reply coupon was devised to allow immigrant families to stay in touch with their relatives; the sent letter included a coupon that could be redeemed for return postage, but that could also be cashed in. Ponzi devised an elaborate international trade stratagem that, in theory, quadrupled the value of these coupons. Ponzi acted as middleman and lured "investors" by promising he would double their money in three months. Early investors did indeed make profits, but Ponzi used much of the money he brought in to indulge in a luxurious

lifestyle and make personal investments elsewhere. As in the case of all pyramid schemes, he soon had more investors than he could pay. At his height, he was collecting over \$250,000 per day, but on paper, he was losing money even faster. He was eventually convicted of both federal and state fraud charges and spent more than a decade in prison.

Although Ponzi's name is associated with the pyramid scheme, he did not invent it. History is replete with examples, including a seventeenth-century tulip mania that bankrupted scores of Dutch and English investors and the eighteenth-century "South Sea Bubble" involving commodities and land that brought down several English banks and aristocrats. In the United States, the railroad-building boom after the Civil War occasionally led to unscrupulous investment schemes, and stock trading and land deals during the supercharged economy of the 1920s often entailed practices akin to pyramid schemes. Prior to the creation of the Securities and Exchange Commission during the New Deal, a common form of stock market pyramid scheme involved printing stock whose paper values exceeded what a company was actually worth. More recently, some critics charge that the high-tech boom of the 1980s and the **day-trading** craze of the early twenty-first century were pyramid schemes, both of which were perpetuated by high-pressured salesmen whose pitches were better tuned than their business plans. As the **dot-com** collapse showed, however, the line between fraud and legitimate risk is sometimes hard to discern. (Some Marxists and other anticapitalists argue that all stock market activity is, by nature, a pyramid scheme because it is predicated on speculation, and there is no physical product involved.)

Stock market and commodities deals usually involve the rich and powerful, and thus, the collapse of such schemes attracts great notice. In many ways, though, the saddest pyramid schemes are those that bilk the lower classes. Chain-letter hoaxes, gifting clubs, and straight-line matrix schemes tend to prey on more vulnerable Americans. The first simply involves sending letters, with money, to several people already on the chain. In turn, one places their own name on the chain and solicits new investors. It can yield profits at first, assuming the chain is not broken, but eventually, it runs its course, and the vast majority of participants lose whatever they put in. The gifting club works much the same way, except investors buy "membership" in a "club," lured by promises that they will be given "gifts" of money that are not taxable by the Internal Revenue Service. In the straight-line matrix hoax, people are invited to "buy" a product at a fraction of its value, assuming they get others to do the same. Those at the top of the pyramid may actually get said item, but by then, the amount taken in by organizers exceeds the original value.

Most pyramid schemes are illegal, but there are some socially sanctioned forms. **Lotteries**, for example, are state-run pyramid schemes that differ very little from an organized-crime numbers racket. Many social critics find lotteries troubling and claim that the poor spend greater proportions of their income on lotteries than members of other classes. Legalized **gambling** is another pyramid scheme that some claim exacerbates **poverty**.

Still another form of legalized pyramid schemes involves multilevel marketing (MLM) organizations such as Mary Kay cosmetics and Amway Corporation. The structure of these is quite similar to pyramid schemes in that both rely on constant recruitment of new investors in order to maximize profits. The biggest difference

between MLMs and illegal pyramids is that MLMs involve an actual product that has some intrinsic value, and the businesses usually seek time investments rather than large monetary outlays. Nonetheless, MLMs rest on the same assumptions of an ever-expanding recruitment network as illegal plans, and like the illegal plans, those at the top profit while those at the bottom do not. Amway founders Rich Devos and Jay Van Andel are among the richest men in the world, but recent studies indicate that the average Amway sales representative takes in less than \$65 per month, and many actually lose money if the money spent on fuel, telephone, auto repair, and motivational seminar fees is considered.

In recent years, the rise of the Internet has increased participation in pyramid schemes, both legal and fraudulent.

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Q

QUOTAS

ROBERT E. WEIR

Quotas are specified percentages (or absolute numbers) of a demographic group that one seeks to incorporate into a business, school, or social institution. They may exist either as mandates or as target goals. Quotas typically address entrance and hiring criteria as well as placement and promotion after acceptance. Race, gender, and **socioeconomic status** (SES) are the most commonly used social categories for which quotas apply.

Defenders of quotas see them as a mechanism for achieving affirmative action goals. They see them as necessary (and temporary) steps needed to correct past injustices. From this perspective, past patterns of racism, classism, or gender stratification have been so severe as to institutionalize discrimination. Society, therefore, must take positive steps to level the playing field by giving historically disadvantaged groups special consideration. Such actions can take various forms. In education, for example, a college might reserve a percentage of its admissions for African American students, create special scholarships for low-income applicants, or grant tenure to more female professors. In business, quotas could be used to hire and advance women and minorities.

Affirmative action as a concept and term first surfaced during debates that established the 1935 National Labor Relations Act, but contemporary applications of it usually derive from Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Title VII and the subsequent passage of the **Economic Opportunity Act** were integral to President Lyndon Johnson's **War on Poverty**. Attention was given to advancing health, education, and employment of the poor, especially women and racial minorities. These actions sometimes took the form of quotas, with federal agencies and educational institutions receiving federal money and businesses competing for public monies being mandated to implement affirmative action plans.

Affirmative action proved controversial. Some critics charged that it was a form of reverse discrimination against white males, whereas others complained that it forced schools and employers to accept unqualified or less-qualified individuals. There was even discontent from within minority communities. Since the 1970s, for example, **Asian Americans** as a group have outscored Caucasians on most standard college-entrance tests. Some claimed that set-aside racial quotas were so low that they *excluded* qualified Asian American students. Other minorities charged that quotas begat tokenism, and a few black conservatives such as Stephen L. Carter and Clarence Thomas have argued that most affirmative action programs retard the development of black achievement.

The 1978 Supreme Court decision *Regents of the University of California v. Bakke* changed the landscape of the debate over quotas and affirmative action when it declared unconstitutional strict quotas for college admission. The ambiguous wording of the decision led to more challenges. The court ruled that race or minority status can be considered, but cannot be the sole criterion for admission. It did not, however, clarify the degree to which it can be or must be considered. In general, though, the courts continued to strike down most quota systems, a trend dramatized by a 2003 Supreme Court ruling that struck down a University of Michigan points plan designed to help the school meet minority admission goals. Most schools and businesses now speak of affirmative action "targets" rather than quotas, though critics continue to insist that this is merely new packaging of reverse discrimination policies.

It is important to note that quotas and affirmative action are not synonymous. Defenders of affirmative action point to the gains of programs such as **Head Start** or **Job Corps**, which help disadvantaged youth catch up to those who have had access to quality education and training. They also point to the successes of workplace sensitivity training, leadership-preparation programs, and social and educational campaigns that have increased public awareness of inequality.

The future of quotas in any form is problematic. A 2005 Newsweek poll revealed that nearly three-quarters of the American public disapprove of quotas based on race or ethnicity. The fact that over 40 percent of whites continue to believe that quotas are mandates rather than goals is also troubling and gives some credence to those who charge that quota plans ultimately divide Americans rather than promote social justice.

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R

RACE, RACISM, AND RACIAL STRATIFICATION

GABRIEL A. SANTOS

These interrelated concepts, respectively, point toward the definition, treatment, and structuring of relationships with another group on the basis of some agreed upon set of bio-genetic traits. **Race** is a concept with a troubled and troublesome history. Until the late twentieth century, "race" was viewed predominantly as a group of persons who share a set of biological characteristics, physical features, and mental proclivities. In the popular mind, race has been associated with skin color and other observable features of the body, speech, and intellectual skill. Furthermore, one's race is usually considered an ascribed status conferred at birth and imposed involuntarily. Race, in these terms, is not a matter of choice. This simple assumption carries important implications for the study of life in a class-based society.

Given that capitalist **means of production** underpin social stratification and, hence, economic and social inequalities, it is not surprising that race has figured prominently in popular linkages between **wealth**, lifestyle, and intelligence. Class distinctions, in other words, have frequently been rooted in racism insofar as **status attainment** has been presumed to depend on traits, behaviors, and values that seem to arise from biology. This implies that if one is a member of a family with a history of **lower-class** position, then he or she may not possess the inherited competencies to succeed in the United States.

The link between social class and race is not direct; rather, **stereotypes** and discrimination represent the actual beliefs and practices that perpetuate many class distinctions. Racial stereotypes associated with African Americans, for example, have posited that members of this "race" do not possess the capacity for advanced abstract reasoning, technical understanding, or refined taste and literary ability. These stereotypes have promoted the unequal treatment of many minorities and women, including forms of **slavery**, servitude, and government-sanctioned **segregation**. People deemed "old" will not be hired for some menial work, women are considered unfit to perform many jobs, and people will not rent to blacks or Hispanics

because (many believe) they ruin apartments. With a far-reaching set of generalizations and propositions that are meant to apply to all members of a group, various practices are created that become **self-fulfilling prophecies**. By banning the Irish from adequate study, for instance, the British *made* them uneducated and ignorant. When this is the case, the possibility of deeply entrenched and seemingly irremediable class distinctions can be transmitted over many generations, as was the case in the United States until the Civil Rights Movement affirmed the possibility of alternative notions of race and racial relations.

Altering deeply entrenched racism requires sustained and organized efforts. This is because popular forms of exploitation and unequal treatment generate a sense of "naturalness" to a social class arrangement based on race. It is precisely this sense of regularity or normality that makes racial stratification both possible and difficult to challenge. The large proportion of African Americans and Hispanics who live in **working-class** or impoverished **ghettos** and seem locked into a certain income bracket is, in this settled view, the *expected* outcome of a racially based understanding of ability, **prestige**, and wealth.

The class paradigm of race, as an approach to the study of racism and racial formation in the United States, focuses on inequality in exchange relationships. According to this paradigm, to focus on class means to focus chiefly on the economic processes, that is, on the construction and use of material resources. Research that emphasizes these factors points to how a **split labor market** designates certain racial groups to a particular location in the status order. Most important in this regard is the identification of class stratification within the same racial group. The extremely successful **television** sitcom of the 1980s and early 1990s, The Cosby Show, represents one aspect of the problem of income disparity within the same racial group. In this sitcom, an African American couple pursued professional careers in law and medicine. This scenario was, from the perspective of many Americans, both exceptional and feasible. Some members of the majority concluded that African Americans had finally defeated racism and were on equal economic ground with white Americans. Other, more politically conscious observers concluded that African Americans were stratified into a relatively small privileged class and a large black underclass. In fact, the upward mobility of many African Americans has instigated suspicions of "cultural infidelity," whereby financially well-off African Americans are viewed as severing ties with the impoverished mass of "their people" in order to enjoy a **bourgeois** lifestyle. The ascendant neighbor, it is charged, wishes to forget his or her roots and the historical struggles of their ancestors and instead take up the cause of "the oppressor." This sort of suspicion is also evident among white Americans, particularly among those who reside in the South. It is not uncommon for residents of a small Kentucky town in Appalachia, for example, to deride a local who wishes to leave and begin a career in Washington, D.C., as "gettin' above his raisin'," and to view their neighbor as a social **climber**. This highlights both the enduring sense of inferiority and pride that many in the **lower class** carry as a result of the negative evaluations and symbols tied to their position in the class system.

Some researchers, such as **William J. Wilson**, have further pointed out that the emergence of blacks in the middle class is heavily indebted to their work in government agencies, educational institutions, and other service sector jobs that are

involved in the management, marketing, and servicing of the black community as a whole. Others hold **middle-class** incomes and **status** because of educational and job opportunities that stem from the concerted political action of the African American majority. Consequently, any prolonged diminution of **welfare** disbursements and underfunding of **public schools** would lead to massive losses to the African American in both the lower and middle classes.

A complementary perspective on racism and racial stratification in the United States directs the bulk of attention to class conflicts in the labor market. In this view, labor market segmentation is most responsible for the perpetuation of racial inequalities. Labor control in the United States, especially in the early twentieth century, produced (whether intentionally or not) a lack of unity in the working class; that is, even the working class and poor are divided along racial lines. Lack of cohesion has not provided, hence, the leverage needed over employers to secure better wages, working hours, or health benefits.

Economic factors, ultimately, do not provide all that is most important in racial inequality. Subjective experience and social-historical processes are equally critical factors by which racial categories are created, transformed, and destroyed. This perspective, known as "racial formation," sheds light on how individuals actively participate in understanding their racial identity and join with others who similarly wish to represent their racial status as a political force. Hispanics and Latinos, for instance, are deeply divided as to whether their ethnicity is also a racial category; some selfidentify as Caucasian, some as Latino, and still others feel neither category is adequate. Thus, a host of things determine what race means in a given social context and in classifying persons. This helps us understand patterns of residential segregation, racial stratification in the labor market, and different forms of political action. For example, some political thinkers have argued for a view of race that is faithful to the objectives of the Civil Rights Movement, which they claim would entail obliterating race as a determiner of the distribution of goods or differential treatment. In other words, we ought to act in a "color-blind" fashion and avoid conferring any status according to race. This is, as Omi and Winant have shown, a particular view of race that is common to "neoconservativism." Other constructions of race are possible and therein lies the promise of racial formation: the astute observer may compare the different interpretations of race as advanced by legislative groups, actual members of minority groups, and even individual organizations, such as the NAACP. It is also important to note that research biologists and social scientists alike agree that the scientific basis upon which most racial distinctions rest is tenuous at best; race is more a matter of social construction than biological imperative. A more comprehensive and multifaceted analysis of the assumptions that underlie notions of race holds the key to greater understanding of the persistence of racism in more insidious forms and of racial stratification as well.

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RAP

YANNICK THORAVAL

Rap is a style of music that combines lyrical poetry and wordplay with an exaggerated emphasis on beats, rhythm, and timing. Although the terms *rap* and *hip hop* are often used interchangeably, rap typically refers specifically to the lyrics or spoken verse in a given piece of hip hop music.

Rap music originated in the 1970s and developed slowly over the course of that decade by various artists who came together from different New York boroughs, particularly the Bronx, Brooklyn, and Harlem. The first rap artists drew inspiration from disco, rhythm and blues, and soul music. They designed their rap music to accompany urban street parties in African American neighborhoods in urban areas of New York.

In this way, rap music also developed as an expression of the African American urban experience. As the musical style developed further, rap artists also began to comment on the social, cultural, and economic conditions that attended the production of their music. Gang violence, drug culture, **poverty**, and material deprivation were themes that were eventually explored in early rap music and were expressed in one of the most important and influential rap songs in the history of the genre, "The Message," by Grandmaster Flash and the Furious Five.

"The Message" helped to guide early rap music as a form of social protest that marked the political reawakening of African American resistance to racial oppression after the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s. The cultural practices of graffiti art and break dancing that are associated with the origins of rap music also helped politicize the nascent musical style.

Issues of **race** and class are often entwined in the politics of rap music. Rap music was more than an expression of the black urban experience. As a cultural phenomenon, rap music quickly saturated mainstream culture. Rap music seemed to cross boundaries and appealed to groups ostensibly separated by class, **gender**, economics, and geography. Specifically, rap music appealed to white, suburban teenagers who quickly became the greatest consumers of rap music and culture during the late 1980s and 1990s.

The popularity of rap music in predominantly white communities has sparked controversy from both sides of the racial divide. Some critics suggest that the lyrics of rap music offer white audiences a form of **cultural tourism**, an entertaining peek inside black ghetto culture from a distance offered whites by their race and social standing. Others suggest that much of the anger and energy in some rap music simply appeals to teenage angst. Regardless, the huge commercial success of rap music is often held responsible for depoliticizing the genre. As a result, the early 1990s are generally considered the golden age of rap music.

Some of the earliest and most influential rap artists include The Sugar Hill Gang, Grand Master Flash and the Furious Five, RUN-D.M.C., Public Enemy, and NWA.

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REAGAN, RONALD (February 6, 1911–June 5, 2004)

ROBERT E. WEIR

Ronald Wilson Reagan was a former actor and governor of California, who served as the fortieth President of the United States from 1981 to 1989. His was, at once, one of the most beloved and most controversial presidencies of the twentieth century and was marked by complexities that belied the outward simplicity the avuncular Reagan exuded. Reagan, for example, championed the "family values" and faith positions of veterans of the **culture wars**, but is the only divorced president in U.S. history and seldom attended religious services; he was conservative, championed combat soldiers, and was a former labor union president, even though he was once a **New Deal** liberal, never served in combat, and weakened the **labor movement** as president.

Reagan was born into a working-class Irish Catholic family in Tampico, Illinois, and obtained a BA from Eureka College (Eureka, Illinois) in economics in 1932, where he also demonstrated a flair for acting. He worked for several Iowa radio stations, including a stint in which he recreated baseball play-by-play action from a ticker tape feed, before heading to Hollywood in 1937 to become a film actor. Reagan appeared in more than one hundred movies but was considered a B-list performer by the studios. His most memorable roles were as George Gipp in Knute Rockne: All American (1940), as an amputee in King's Row (1942), and playing second fiddle to a chimpanzee in Bedtime for Bonzo (1951). The first of these films earned him the nickname "The Gipper," the second is considered his best performance, and the third provided satiric ammunition for later political enemies. He also met and married actress Jane Wyman in 1940; the couple had a daughter, adopted a son, and lost a second daughter at birth before divorcing in 1948. He served in the Army reserve from 1941 to 1945, but a vision flaw disqualified him from combat duty during World War II, though he did help create training, morale-building, and propaganda films. He married Nancy Davis in 1952 and the couple had two children.

Reagan's biggest acting and political breaks came from **television**. As a young man Reagan supported President **Franklin Roosevelt** and the state activism of his New Deal programs. Reagan even assumed the presidency of the Screen Actors Guild (SAG) in 1947 and served until 1952, and again in 1959–60. He stirred controversy as a "friendly witness" during the postwar **Red Scare** investigations into alleged Hollywood **communist** subversion and became a Republican, actions that caught the attention of conservative investors and advertisers in the nascent television industry. Reagan befriended corporate figures within GE, whose *General Electric Theater* he hosted from 1954 to 1962, and used his pull within SAG to broker an agreement that allowed the Music Corporation of America to use film actors on television. He also became a corporate spokesman for GE and honed an increasingly conservative and pro-business political message. From 1964 to 1966 Reagan

hosted *Death Valley Days*, sponsored by soap manufacturer Borax. These shows made Reagan a wealthy man.

Reagan was energized by Barry Goldwater's (losing) 1964 presidential bid and entered the political fray in his own right. Armed with business contacts, money, and staunch conservative values, Reagan became California governor from 1967 to 1975. Although Reagan authorized tax increases to balance the state budget, for the most part his actions were solidly conservative. Reagan disapproved of the radicalism of the **New Left**, the practices of the counterculture, and the protests against the Vietnam War. In a famed outburst against students at the University of California at Berkeley in 1969, Reagan threatened to break up demonstrations and use Borax to clean up the blood. He sent National Guard troops onto the campus twice. He scuttled several proposed federal projects in the state, worked to tighten California's **welfare** requirements, dismantled many of the state-run psychiatric hospitals, and lobbied for a return of California's death penalty.

Reagan came very close to derailing incumbent Gerald Ford for the Republican presidential nomination in 1976. (He considered running for president in 1968 but started too late to challenge eventual nominee Richard Nixon.) When Ford lost the general election to Jimmy Carter, Reagan quickly became the choice of conservatives for the 1980 election. Reagan parlayed an economy ravaged by stagflation and a perceived loss of prestige abroad occasioned by a hostage crisis in Iran and a treaty that relinquished American control over the Panama Canal into a surprisingly easy victory over Carter.

In his two terms in office—Reagan swamped Walter Mondale in 1984—Reagan did much to change the perception that America had grown timid as a world leader. Reagan is sometimes seen as the last president of the Cold War and he maintained a belligerent stance against communist governments in the Soviet Union, North Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Cuba; against a Cuba-backed insurgency in Angola; and against the leftist leadership of Nicaragua; but not against communist China. Reagan ordered dramatic increases in military spending, which peaked at nearly \$457 billion in 1987. His programs included a controversial missile defense system—dubbed "Star Wars" by critics—that some policy analysts felt heightened world tensions. Reagan also ordered troops into Lebanon in 1982 and to Grenada in 1983, the latter of which toppled a left-wing government. He also offered support for an authoritarian regime in El Salvador and ordered the bombing of Libya in 1986 and Iran in 1988. More controversially, the Reagan administration helped fund the mujahideen and Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan and was involved in the illegal and complex Iran-Contra scheme, which involved arms-for-hostages exchanges and conduits through third parties to supply money to groups seeking to overthrow the government of Nicaragua. The latter escapade weakened Reagan's second term and damaged his reputation, though he remained too popular for impeachment discussions to gain steam.

Reagan's defenders and admirers often overlook the Iran-Contra affair and credit Reagan's aggressive foreign policy with "winning the Cold War"; by the time he left office, numerous Eastern European nations had begun to turn aside communist governments. Critics counter that Reagan engaged in dangerous brinksmanship, and the judgment of the scholarly community is that the collapse of Euro-communism took place for many reasons and that Reagan's policies were of

secondary importance. Reagan eventually moderated his stand on several issues, including the Soviet Union; most famously he agreed with Soviet leaders to dismantle some nuclear weapons.

Reagan's domestic policies were even more controversial and had profound implications for social class in America. Paradoxically, Reagan's massive expenditures on the military coincided with the largest tax cuts in federal history. The latter came at the behest of administration figures who adhered to modified beliefs in the **trickle-down theory of economics**, and they dovetailed with Reagan's own devotion to the private sector and the belief that state activism during the New Deal and the **Great Society** led governments to assume roles it had no business taking on and did not perform well. He expressed the opinion that a deregulated private sector would be more efficient and that giving tax breaks to wealthy individuals and large corporations would give them incentive to invest in America, which would, in turn, create jobs and improve the U.S. economy. Reagan also espoused the old-fashioned value of **self-reliance** and argued that many misguided federal programs designed to help individuals actually fostered dependency, destroyed incentive, and sustained a permanent **underclass**.

To pay for increased military spending and tax cuts, Reagan also ordered deep cuts in social spending. This total economic package was popularly known as "Reaganomics," and was deeply criticized. First, the books never balanced and Reaganomics was sustained only by accumulating the largest debt in U.S. history to that point; by 1989 debt consumed 41 percent of the gross domestic product. Second, Reagan's strategy of giving more to wealthy individuals and corporations at a time when welfare and antipoverty programs, school budgets, federal aid to state and local governments, and a host of social agencies were being sliced struck many as callous and cruel. Third, Reaganomics appeared to work better than it actually did. Few of those who benefited most from tax cuts reinvested in the economy. In fact, deregulation and tax cuts often made it easier to cut jobs or move capital. The Reagan years also saw a dramatic leap in **deindustrialization** and capital flight, with many firms leaving the United States to set up operations in low-wage nations. **Unemployment** improvements were equally deceptive; joblessness stood at 7.5 percent when Reagan took office, climbed to 10.8 percent in 1982, and dropped steadily to about 5.3 percent by the time he left office. The latter figure, however, looks good only in comparison with the worst years of the 1970s' stagflation and with 1982, not when compared with the mid-1960s, a period Reagan deplored.

Reagan's immense personal charm helped him weather situations that might have consumed a less charismatic individual and helps explain odd polling numbers from the 1980s, in which many Americans professed simultaneously to deplore Reagan policies but like the president. He had very high popularity ratings among blue-collar workers, even though he resisted all calls to raise the minimum wage, oversaw the decline of manufacturing, and opposed labor unions, most famously in smashing a strike by air traffic controllers in 1981 by firing them. Less publicly, Reagan packed the National Labor Relations Board with pro-business members and generally supported aggressive management efforts to decertify unions and force workers to grant wage and benefit concessions. Still, wage workers were a key constituency in what were dubbed Reagan Democrats, traditional Democratic voters who switched to the GOP.

Reagan's use of culture war issues helps explain the appeal. By 1980 many Americans had come to feel that entitlement programs, civil rights, and political activism were rewarding minorities while penalizing the majority. Reagan's adversarial stance against abortion, the Equal Rights Amendment, and feminism played well with Catholics and male voters, and his tough talk on crime, his reluctance to advance civil rights legislation, and his use of phrases seen by some as **racist** played well among **suburban** white voters. Likewise his early reluctance to take the AIDS crisis seriously was decried by **homosexuals** and health officials but attracted **evangelical** supporters.

Reagan remained popular throughout his presidency, which helped his vice president, George H. **Bush**, win the presidency in 1988. Many continue to draw upon Reagan's legacy and he is generally seen as the template for modern conservatives. For them, Ronald Reagan holds a place analogous to how liberals often view Franklin Roosevelt. National Airport in Washington, D.C., was renamed for Reagan, as was the International Trade Center. Proposals have been floated to place Reagan's likeness on U.S. currency or perhaps add it to Mount Rushmore. Reagan spent his post-presidential years suffering from Alzheimer's disease and was treated with deference; hence it may be too soon to write his final legacy. But whether one agrees with his many admirers or with his equally vociferous critics, there is general agreement that Reagan's presidency was one of the most significant of the twentieth century.

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REAGAN DEMOCRATS

ROBERT E. WEIR

Reagan Democrats is the term often used to describe the shift of longtime Democratic constituencies—especially **working-class** voters and those in the South—to the Republican Party. The effect of this electoral transference was seen dramatically when **Ronald Reagan** was elected president in 1980. Reagan's 1984 landslide reelection prompted a study by Stan Greenberg of a **blue-collar** Detroit suburb in which two of every three voters in traditionally Democratic Macomb County cast a ballot for Reagan. Greenberg's use of the term "Reagan Democrats" caught on with the media, though it's unclear whether he coined it.

The term is at once descriptive and deceptive. During the 1930s, President Franklin Roosevelt crafted what came to be known as the "New Deal Coalition," a voting bloc that helped Democrats dominate politics for much of the next five decades. It consisted of longtime Democratic groups, such as Southern farmers

and Irish Catholics, plus urban blue-collar voters, naturalized immigrants, African Americans, and Jewish Americans. Roosevelt rode this coalition to victory four times and his successor, Harry Truman, served until 1953 before a Republican, Dwight Eisenhower, served two terms (1953–71). Eisenhower was followed by two Democrats, John F. Kennedy (1961–63) and Lyndon Johnson 1963–69). Since then, however, only two Democrats have held the Oval Office, Jimmy Carter (1977–81) and William Clinton (1993–2001). The Democrats controlled Congress for much of the period between 1932 and 1994, as well as more statehouses. From 1994 to 2007, however, the Republican Party was in control.

The phrase "Reagan Democrats" oversimplifies a complex set of political processes. As early as 1948, some Southern whites expressed unease with the New Deal Coalition. A group labeled the "Dixiecrats"—many of whom were motivated by racism—supported Strom Thurmond's third-party run for the presidency in 1948. As the Civil Rights Movement emerged in the 1950s and 1960s and Supreme Court decisions and Democratic legislation furthered the social and political agenda of African Americans, increasing numbers of white Southerners shifted their party allegiance. Some Dixiecrats did not support Kennedy in 1960 and, although Lyndon Johnson won an easy victory in 1964, his Republican opponent Barry Goldwater cracked the "Solid South" by winning five states in the region. In 1968 five Southern states supported George Wallace's **segregationist** third party and the Democratic candidate, Hubert Humphrey, won only Texas in the South. Republican policymakers such as Lee Atwater and Karl Rove became adroit at developing code words to play on the racial fears of white voters without sounding overtly racist. Opposition to school busing to achieve racial balance proved a powerful "wedge" issue to win Southern and suburban middle-class voters. Equally potent was the charge that Affirmative Action quotas unfairly discriminated against whites and that welfare programs undermined the work ethic by forcing those who worked to support laziness-induced **poverty**. By the 1980s, the Republicans had become dominant in the South and many congresspersons changed party affiliation.

Some blue-collar workers were also uncomfortable with the Democratic Party's perceived coddling of the **New Left**. They saw opposition to the Vietnam War as unpatriotic and were troubled by the values and conduct of the counterculture. In 1970 several hundred New York City construction workers clashed with antiwar demonstrators. To some observers, the "Hard-Hat Riot" presaged a coming blue-collar exodus from the Democratic Party. Other social issues proved equally divisive, especially the 1973 *Roe v. Wade* decision legalizing abortion. For the first time, more Catholics voted Republican in 1994, a key shift in making the GOP the majority party in Congress. In 2004 George W. **Bush** won 52 percent of the Catholic vote, though his opponent, John Kerry, was Catholic.

Analysts dispute the long-term significance of recent voting trends. Even during Reagan's forty-nine-state victory in 1984, only about 30 percent of Democrats switched their loyalty. The next year the Democratic Leadership Council (DLC) was set up to try to win back these voters, though many analysts accuse the DLC of evolving bland policy and of abandoning core Democratic values. They see the DLC as the cause of subsequent ballot box failures, not a collapse of the New Deal coalition. Still others blame circumstances rather than change-of-values for

684

Democratic electoral woes. Reagan's election, for example, was seen as a response to late 1970s stagflation, the 1994 GOP capture of Congress as backlash against President Clinton's sexual peccadilloes, and Bush's 2004 margin of victory as due to his exploitation of terrorism fears.

It is also unclear whether blue-collar voters actually have become Reagan Democrats. Some argue that Greenberg's data have been extrapolated without being tested and that families involved in the **labor movement** have continued to cast Democratic votes. Also hotly debated is whether cultural issues help or harm the Republican electoral strategy. Americans continue to rank economic and security issues as their primary concerns and even some GOP strategists worry that the party caters too much to **evangelical** voters who are highly motivated to vote but do not represent majority opinion. Whether Democrats can redirect elections away from culture and back toward class remains to be seen.

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REAL INCOME/REAL WAGES

ROBERT E. WEIR

Real income, or real wages, is the actual purchasing power available to an individual or family after adjustments for inflation and deductions for one's tax burdens. It is an accurate indicator of economic vitality and also is helpful to scholars comparing historical time periods. For example, the income of a worker earning \$2,500 in 1880 is equivalent to more than \$49,500 in 2005 dollars, an income that would place that individual above the median *family* income in contemporary society.

Politicians generally prefer to quote raw wage and salary data because trends in real income since the 1970s have been discouraging. This is especially the case in debates over the **minimum wage**. In the early 1960s the federal minimum wage was just \$1.25 per hour; in 2006 it was \$5.15. When adjusted for inflation, however, the 1960s wage is the equivalent of \$7.92. This means that the purchasing power of a person earning the minimum wage has, in real income terms, declined by more than one-third since the 1960s.

During the post–World War II boom period from 1947 to 1970, family real income increased dramatically. Median income more than doubled, but real income soared by 106 percent. The period was marked by low **unemployment**, unprecedented **consumerism**, high savings levels, and a growing **middle class**. (It is important to note that minority families were often excluded from this boom.) By 1970, however, the boom began to fizzle. Some analysts blame the high cost of entitlement programs associated with the **Great Society**, but spending on **Cold War** conflicts,

such as the Vietnam War, also played a significant—if not larger—role. The U.S. economy also fell prey to structural changes globally: the revival of the postwar European economy, manufacturing competition from low-wage nations, and rising energy costs. Boycotts and production cuts by oil-producing nations touched off a wave of hyper-inflation during the 1970s. Energy costs tripled in some cases, and wages and prices across society rose accordingly. Family income rose after 1970, but when converted to real income, purchasing power was stagnant.

Since 1970 real income has not risen in a significant way and, in several years, has actually fallen. The median family income in 2004 was \$44,389; in 1970 dollars this is the equivalent of just \$9,049. Moreover, the minuscule growth that has occurred in raw family income is often due to a single source: the addition of wage-earners to the family, especially women. Although women have always worked outside the home, unprecedented numbers began to enter the workforce during the 1960s and, for a majority of families, dual wage-earning is now the norm. Since 1970 many families have stopped saving and have sustained consumer spending by incurring debt. The middle class has shrunk in objective terms, even though most Americans perceive themselves to be members of it. The situation is especially acute for racial and ethnic minorities, whose median income levels are lower on average than those of white families. It has been problematic for all families in the early twenty-first century; real income fell for all but the richest 5 percent in most years between 2001 and 2006.

Debate over stagnating real income often breaks down along ideological grounds. Conservatives often argue that the United States needs to cut wasteful social spending, empower the private sector, reduce regulations, and take other steps to make the United States more competitive. They also tout tax cuts as the economic driver that will lead to growth. Liberals, by contrast, often evoke the spirit of **John Maynard Keynes** and call on the government to stimulate growth. They also point to the failure of **trickle-down** economics; tax cuts under **Ronald Reagan** and George W. **Bush** have not led to job growth or real income rise for most Americans. The tax cuts have not even resulted in a lessening of taxes: although federal income taxes have been reduced, state, local, sales, and user taxes have risen to compensate for loss of federal monies. Leaders within the **labor movement** often correlate falling real wages with declines in labor unions and call for reform of labor laws to stimulate collective bargaining.

Most analysts agree that **deindustrialization** and **globalization** of the economy have played key roles in slowing American economic growth. Manufacturing provided 26 percent of all jobs in 1960; now it is about 10 percent. Analysts also tend to agree that the service sector—retail now provides one-quarter of all new jobs—has not created real income opportunity for most Americans. Nearly all economists also express alarm at declining savings rates and climbing consumer debt loads.

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RECONSTRUCTION

MARY WAALKES

Reconstruction is the term used to describe efforts to rebuild the nation after the **Civil War** and to deal with the fate of newly freed **slaves**.

By 1863 Northern victories in the Civil War encouraged President Lincoln and Congress to consider how to bring Southern states back into the Union. Because Lincoln wanted a more lenient plan than did Congress, no plan had been agreed on by the time of Lincoln's assassination in 1865. Andrew Johnson, a Tennessee Democrat who replaced Lincoln as president, tried to implement a plan similar to Lincoln's with the additional requirement that Confederate officials and planters who owned more than \$20,000 in property apply to him personally for a pardon in order to regain political rights. This pleased radical Republicans who blamed a planter class **slavocracy** for secession and who thought that power in the hands of non-elite whites and blacks would result in a more egalitarian society. However, Johnson's reasons for instituting this policy were not those of the Republicans. Although a slave owner prior to the war, he was not of the planter class and resented the power they held in Tennessee. Before the end of 1865, Johnson had apparently decided he needed Southern planter support for reelection and therefore gave out pardons with astonishing liberality.

Clearly there were significant differences of opinion on how reconstruction of the South should proceed. Southern whites generally hoped to recreate a society that looked much like the antebellum South, with freedom for blacks more nominal than real. Planters badly needed a stable labor force and viewed control over a black labor force as a means of maintaining social and political dominance over blacks. With Johnson's apparent approval, Southern legislatures in 1865 passed Black Codes that granted some rights to freedmen, but also limited them to field labor, prohibited them from leaving the plantation without approval, and taxed urban black artisans. These codes appeared to re-enslave blacks and deepened Republican suspicions that Johnson's reconstruction plan was ineffective in creating real change.

Added to these suspicions were the 1866 race riots in Memphis and New Orleans that left many black people dead, and black churches, homes, and businesses ruined. The failure of white law enforcement to protect black communities pointed to the need for stricter federal oversight in Southern reconstruction. The attempt by former leading Confederates, including Confederate Vice President Alexander Stephens, to take seats in Congress convinced Republicans that Congress needed to take control of the process.

Johnson and Congress clashed repeatedly through the rest of his term in office, with the president vetoing civil rights bills and extensions of the Freedmen's Bureau, an agency established to assist ex-slaves and displaced whites. Johnson also appointed pro-Southern governors to administer reconstruction policies and fought Congress over the Tenure of Office Act, which prohibited Johnson from removing Radical Republican Edwin Stanton from his Cabinet position as Secretary of War. The showdown came in 1868 when the House of Representatives impeached Johnson, who escaped conviction by one vote in the Senate.

The 1866 congressional elections brought a solid Republican majority with moderates joining Radical Republicans in wresting leadership on reconstruction from Johnson. Radical Reconstruction divided the South into five military districts with federal troops deployed until each state submitted a new constitution that included adoption of the newly crafted Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution, allowing black men the vote. Republicans hoped that suffrage would arm blacks with sufficient local power to protect their civil rights. Furthermore, Republicans viewed freedmen as loyal to their party and hoped their swelling numbers could break the Democratic Party's hold on the South. State constitutional conventions were staffed with local Republicans, former white Unionists, and loyal blacks, who wrote progressive state constitutions that, among other things, promoted free public **education**.

There was also an economic element to Republican plans for the South. Radical Republicans, in particular, wanted land for freedmen. In 1862 the Union's Confiscation Act allowed for the seizure of Confederate lands. General William T. Sherman in January 1865 transferred 400,000 acres of Sea Island land off South Carolina and Georgia to about 40,000 freedmen. Sherman, an ardent abolitionist, rationalized this as a means of providing for freedmen who followed the army, but in the summer of 1865 General Rufus Saxton pursued land division as a means of creating a new society of independent farmers. Saxton headed the Freedmen's Bureau work in this region, and his policies gave rise to the freedmen's strongly held conviction throughout the South that the federal government would provide "forty acres and a mule" to black families. By the end of the summer of 1865, however, President Andrew Johnson rescinded Sherman's order and ordered federal troops to wrest land from reluctant freedmen. The Freedmen's Bureau instead promoted labor contracts between freedmen and landowners, but power conflicts ensued between Bureau agents and white Southerners, who had very different ideas as to how much control to use over black workers. Eventually, freedmen and landowners developed sharecropping as a means of working the land without returning to the most onerous forms of antebellum labor.

Whereas freedmen had greater civil rights in theory, these rights were often denied them in practice. Extralegal violence by groups such as the **Ku Klux Klan** or by local political factions intimidated white and black Southern Republicans. Congress responded in 1870 and 1871 with the Force Bills to suppress the Klan, especially in parts of South Carolina where blacks hid in the woods at night to escape the Klan. In 1874 President Grant sent troops to Louisiana to put down an armed rebellion against elected Republican officials, but he refused to intervene in Mississippi, where Republican Governor Adelbert Ames was forced to resign his position in 1875. Democrats defended their actions claiming that Republican governments were rife with corruption.

Reconstruction clearly was in retreat by the mid-1870s and officially ended in 1877, after Republican Rutherford B. Hayes claimed the presidency in a disputed election. The price for Democratic acquiescence was agreeing to remove remaining federal troops from the South and tacitly accepting "home rule" in the South. In the end, Reconstruction stands as a great American tragedy, a time in which improved race relations and the rights of individuals ultimately lost out to customary social relations and the sanctity of **property rights. Racism**, **segregation**, and

institutionalized discrimination against African Americans followed in the wake of Reconstruction, ushering in associated social problems with which Americans continue to grapple.

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RED DIAPER BABIES

ROBERT E. WEIR

Red Diaper Babies is the name given to children whose parents were members of the Communist Party (CPUSA) in the 1930s and 1940s. It is sometimes loosely applied to children born to left-wing radicals of all persuasions. A disproportionate number of Red Diaper Babies came from Jewish American families in cities such as New York and Chicago, as these were centers of CPUSA activity and Jewish Americans were deeply involved in the labor movement. Although very few labor unions were controlled by the CPUSA, the economic chaos of the Great Depression proved a fertile environment for fostering radical thought and many communists became labor organizers.

Numerous children of CPUSA members and those sympathetic to it grew up in a veritable "Red" subculture. Communist youth organizations, summer camps, and debate societies proliferated. Hootenannies mixed folk music with political education, and at home, dinner tables buzzed with discussions of the political economy.

It is often claimed that these children of the "Old Left" were the movers and shakers of the **New Left** in the 1960s. The Old Left was decimated by the post–World War II **Red Scare**. The CPUSA found itself the target of **McCarthyism** and many of its members lost jobs, were blacklisted, or went to jail in the 1950s. Thus, when radical politics reemerged in the 1960s, some of the children of Red Scare victims took up their parents' radical mantle. **Marxist** study groups and organizations were commonplace in the 1960s, especially on college campuses, and many academic disciplines—including the **new social history**—employed Marxist analytical tools. Some journals, such as *Studies on the Left* and *Ramparts*, were also overtly leftist in perspective.

These left-wing activities became a bête noire for conservatives and for scholars such as David Horowitz and Ronald Radosh, who later repudiated parts of their youthful radicalism. Many observers on both the left and the right overestimate the influence of Red Diaper Babies and of communism on 1960s youth, however. Although it is true that student movements in places such as Ann Arbor, Michigan, and Berkeley, California, contained large numbers of ideologues, the New Left was never as coherent or as unified as Horowitz asserts. Even the political left was split into old-style communists, **Maoists**, and **Trotskyists**, groups with which most **socialist** organizations refused to associate. Moreover, Soviet leader Nikita

Khrushchev's 1956 denunciation of Stalinism served to make many Red Diaper Babies suspicious of communism. Although many New Left activists were highly critical of U.S. Cold War policy, far fewer viewed the Soviet Union through the romantic, utopian eyes of Old Left radicals. Many of the founders of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) felt that both capitalism and communism were untenable, though debates over political doctrine later tore SDS asunder.

The history of social movements is too often told from the perspective of leaders and/or ex-participants. Although Red Diaper Babies played an important role in shaping New Left thought and movements, healthy skepticism is warranted when assessing their overall influence. Seventy million individuals entered their teens in the 1960s and many of those who became politically active took their cue from social protest music, the Civil Rights Movement, anti-Vietnam War rallies, affinity groups, and other sources. Liberals and the political left often view ideological radicals through a lens of romanticism, whereas conservatives and the right create strawman demons in order to rationalize their own ideological assumptions. The experiences of Red Diaper Babies parallel the 1960s in that both were complex, varied, and a messy amalgam of myth and reality.

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RED SCARE

W. LAWRENCE NEUMAN

Red Scare is the term given to repression against political radicals and other non-conformists following World War I. It is also associated with similar actions after World War II and is occasionally used as a generic descriptor for crackdowns against radicals.

America hosts diverse political beliefs, but at times government officials initiated campaigns to attack people holding certain beliefs. The attacked beliefs were primarily on the political left, especially "Reds," that is, **communists** or **socialists**. Officials intensified public fear—hence the term *Scare*—and they portrayed their opponents as dangerous, unpatriotic, and disloyal.

Red Scares were largely ideological movements and did not neatly align people based on social class alone. Nonetheless, the people attacked were generally **middle-class** intellectuals, low-income **immigrants**, racial minorities, and **working-class** labor activists who opposed concentrated corporate power, unlimited property rights, traditional cultural values, rigid religious beliefs, and socioeconomic inequality. They favored greater creative artistic expressiveness, intellectual openness, and free expression. In some cases these individuals *were* communists, but more often individuals were singled out for unpopular views, not concrete actions.

Their attackers controlled government police power and used tactics such as blacklists, secret files, break-ins, fines, imprisonment, beatings, deportation, and even execution. Red Scare leaders were generally ideological conservatives and traditionalists. Their ranks were drawn from upper-middle-class corporate managers, medium-sized business owners, and people with accumulated personal or family wealth. Their political success depended on a combination of coercion and the broad-based support of the lower middle class and small business owners. Red Scares generally lasted for several years, but their effects altered the wider political climate. In many cases, they resulted in new laws, outbursts of intolerance, and perceptions of their targets that lingered more than a decade after the intensive attacks had ended.

Red Scares feed on perception as much as reality. For example, Pennsylvania officials parlayed disorder in anthracite coal regions during the 1870s into a conspiracy of anarchist **Molly Maguires**. Long after order was restored in remote sections of Pennsylvania, employers across the nation evoked "Molly Maguirism" to oppose the **labor movement**.

Another early version of the Red Scare occurred after the Chicago Haymarket Riot of May 4, 1886. It began when unions were fighting for an eight-hour workday to supplant the current norm of ten to twelve hours per day, six days a week. A bomb was hurled during a meeting held to protest police brutality the previous day in which the police killed two workers on **strike** against the McCormick Corporation. The explosion and subsequent gunfire left eight police and four workers dead and many others wounded. Police arrested scores of people who held socialist or **anarchist** political beliefs. Eventually, eight men were tried, four of whom eventually hanged. The event ushered in a general repression of radical movements.

The first event to be dubbed "the Red Scare" occurred between 1917 and 1920, and was a direct outgrowth of American involvement in World War I. During the war, government officials narrowly redefined patriotism and suppressed dissent. Shortly after the war, conservative advocacy groups used the 1917 Russian Revolution to incite public fear. The 1917 Espionage Act was extended with the Sedition Act in 1918, which made it illegal to speak out against the U.S. government or in any way impede the war effort. These acts gave official sanction to ongoing vigilante and quasi-legal attacks on groups such as the Industrial Workers of the World. Popular socialist leader Eugene Debs was imprisoned because of his opposition to the war, and anarchist Emma Goldman would soon be deported. A postwar economic recession, race riots, large labor strikes, and a wave of anarchist bombings in 1919 led federal officials to believe they were under a coordinated communist-inspired attack. In September 1920, a massive bomb exploded on Wall Street, killing forty and injuring three hundred. Fear generated an intense hatred of communists, anarchists, and foreign radicals. During a yearlong campaign orchestrated by Attorney General Mitchell Palmer, police and federal investigators raided homes and offices, withheld mail, closed newspapers, stopped speeches, and deported foreigners (many of whom were innocent). In a climate of intense fear and anti-foreign prejudice, law enforcement officials and local vigilante groups went beyond tracking down the actual bombers. They detained, arrested, and imprisoned thousands of people whose primary "crime" had been to engage in prounion activities or advocate pro-socialist ideas.

The Red Scare had a major political effect. Up to this period, the Socialist Party had been growing in popularity. Membership increased from 75,000 members in 1918 to 108,000 in 1919. After the attacks, membership dropped to 26,000 in 1920, and by 1928 only 8,000 remained. The Communist Party declined from 27,000 in October 1919 to just 8,200 by April 1920. The Scare stimulated an organized, powerful "open shop" movement of business owners bent on destroying labor unions, efforts that often enjoyed broad public support. Employers used labor spies and fired union activists to roll back gains made by labor unions.

A general distrust of foreigners, liberal reformers, and unions lingered throughout the 1920s. During this period, Congress enacted harsh anti-immigrant legislation. The **Ku Klux Klan**, which opposed communists and foreigners as well as nonwhite racial groups, reached its membership peak and held huge national marches in Washington, D.C. Many scholars attribute the Red Scare to the arrest of the Italian immigrants and anarchists Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti, who were electrocuted in 1927 after a trial many legal scholars assert was woefully flawed.

During the **Great Depression** some radical movements—including the Communist Party—revitalized, but a general animus against radicals remained. Some labor groups, especially the **Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO)**, did have communists among their members. Although the United States allied with the Soviet Union during World War II, there were already rumblings in Congress of what would erupt into a new Red Scare.

The second Red Scare—from 1947 until the early 1960s—erupted during the **Cold War**. It is often associated with Senator Joseph McCarthy, but it was much larger than one individual. In 1947 President Harry Truman adopted a strong anticommunist foreign policy and introduced a Federal Employee Loyalty Program. The latter program caused hundreds of federal workers to be fired and thousands of others to resign because they had been sympathetic to leftist ideas.

The second Red Scare was a merger of a conservative backlash against domestic **New Deal** policies and growing Cold War fear of international communism. A group of right-wing politicians opposed progressive domestic programs in the 1930s and feared growing labor union strength but lacked political power. Their fortunes shifted in the 1946 elections when Republicans gained control of Congress and launched a campaign to purge leftist ideas from the country. Labor union power was greatly curtailed by the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act, which was enacted when Congress overrode President Truman's veto. Moreover, a series of international events created a sense that communism was spreading and that **democracy** was imperiled: the Soviet Union's Iron Curtain dominance of Central Europe, the 1949 communist revolution in China, the Soviet Union's successful test of an atomic bomb in 1949, and the 1950 invasion by communist North Korea of noncommunist South Korea.

Red Scare leaders claimed that the federal government had communist spies working within who were actively aiding communist China and the Soviet Union and purposefully weakening the United States. Officials uncovered a few actual cases of espionage, most notably atomic spy Klaus Fuchs, but more serious than the handful of spies apprehended was the national climate of fear than ensued.

Inflamed public fear led many to believe there was a massive conspiracy among federal employees. The colorful leader of the Red Scare campaign, Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, said that the Roosevelt and Truman administrations amounted to "twenty years of treason." In 1950 he claimed to have a list of State Department employees who were loyal to the Soviet Union. In fact, McCarthy never unearthed a single communist. Despite an absence of evidence, his publicity and boisterous threats gained him a large public following. Very few people were convicted of crimes during the second Red Scare, yet thousands of government employees, teachers, scholars, and middle-class people in the mass media lost their jobs. A court trial and legal evidence were not necessary. A person could lose a job based on rumors or the suspicion of insufficient patriotism. If a person had unorthodox friends or if he or she refused to cooperate fully with Red Scare officials, he or she became a suspect.

The Red Scare spread a general climate of apprehension. Many beliefs and opinions that had wide public acceptance in the 1930s and 1940s became taboo once the Red Scare began. Politicians, scholars, entertainers, publishers, and media people were afraid to say anything that Red Scare leaders might see as being "red." If a person complained about the Red Scare or expressed dissent, it was treated as evidence of support for communism. Any perceived sympathy for communism or related ideas was deemed equal to subversion and disloyalty. The CIO expelled nearly 20 percent of its membership rather than defend the actions of radical unionists, but the very taint of communism doomed the federation's efforts to organize the non-union South. Senator McCarthy's official power as a politician ended in 1954, but many aspects of the Red Scare continued for years afterward. The singer **Pete Seeger**, for instance, did not clear his name until 1962. Although seldom discussed, Congressional hearings on internal subversion continued through the 1960s, though they failed to excite the passion they generated in the 1950s.

In the early twenty-first century, some observers fear that the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York and Washington have touched off a latter-day variant of the Red Scare. "Homeland security" laws, most notably the USA PATRIOT Act, allow for government violation of civil rights in some cases. Also ominous have been attacks on Muslims and foreign-born individuals.

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REGIONALISM

CHRISTINE W. HEILMAN

Regionalism is based on the interaction between people and their location; it brings adjacent state, interstate, and sub-state areas together as a result of immediate and specific common interests. Regions are defined as locations bound by the similar cultural and economic backgrounds of those who have settled in the area. Urban planners have dubbed "regionalism" as a "movement," a tide of metropolitan thinking and policy solutions that seek to address the conditions of metropolitan regions.

Political scientists and economists have also studied the expression of social, economic, and political differences using geographic lines; for them regionalism denotes political and economic competition between two or more geographic regions. Historically, social, economic, and political systems were organized in response to particular regional problems and opportunities. In addition, regions have shared long-term common interests and political cultural orientations; but they may also have shared animosities. Modern scholars have found that place of residence and political attitudes are still strongly associated, so regions commonly share cultural beliefs and attitudes.

Questions of equity related to social class have placed the concept of regionalism at the center of debates regarding regional land use and transportation, environmental restoration and preservation, economic and employment development, housing, and community development. For example, where to locate a local landfill may create a political debate about equity in land use and environmental preservation. Poor people are less likely to keep the landfill out of their neighborhoods. Whether to create a light-rail system that serves urban more than **suburban** customers may create a debate about the use of public funds for transportation that serves the needs of everyone in the region. Regions may also compete for state and federal funding of highways, which commonly results in economic growth and jobs for the area. Some regions may need more funding for cleanup of toxic waste dumps. However, equity in economic development and employment most affects members of the poor and working class, who rely on income from jobs to survive and rely on public **education** for their children. In addition, urban regions may debate whether to place new public housing in particular neighborhoods. Community development may rely on regional clout to pull in federal or state money. Political clout is often linked to economic power, however. Thus, while the overall poverty in sections of Appalachia or Harlem might warrant large expenditures, there is less political will to deliver such funds than to projects that benefit more affluent regions.

Regionalism also relates directly to school funding; regions with a higher tax base can fund public schools more adequately, providing better teaching resources and facilities. Although education is seen as the great equalizer in society because of its potential to overcome differences in income and opportunity, educational theorist Jean Anyon warns that public schools can be used to maintain levels of inequality and social division. In particular, school funding creates differences in teaching resources and facilities. Nevertheless, Anyon points out that the underlying assumptions regarding the kind of work students will do as adults affects the way teachers teach and schools are run and can hinder the idea of **social mobility**. For example, in a working-class school, students are taught to follow the steps of a procedure without being told why the work is being assigned, how it connects to other work, or what ideas are behind the procedure. In a **middle-class** school, work is getting the right answer by using the textbook, while in the affluent school, work is a creative activity carried out independently.

Low school funding negatively affects the public school graduation rates, as well as the possibility of the poor and working-class entering institutions of higher education. When public schooling as an institution began, moneyed interests controlled the curriculum and methods, fixing the working class in their place. Industry leaders struggled for more control of public schooling and establishment of separate vocational

education or **vo-tech schools**. Education and labor stood in solidarity, with both seeing public schools as a path for the working class out of **unemployment** and low-paying jobs. However, the secondary school system became the traditional preserve of the rich, and the more prestigious colleges are still located in the Northeast region of the country, where rich industrialists developed the urban areas. Well-off students with poor academic records are more likely to attend college than poor or working-class students with strong academic records. Working-class students are more likely to be funneled into two-year public colleges and **community colleges** than into four-year colleges. In addition, state legislatures have ceased to provide funding for developmental courses needed by poor and working-class students. Within the past decade, immigration of Spanish-speaking people has taken place in the Southeast and South-west, particularly in Florida and California. School funding has been affected, and a debate about teaching students in their native language of Spanish has erupted. Nevertheless, regionalism may have created a political base for Spanish speakers, who are able to advocate for the needs of their local schools.

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RELIGION

MATTHEW PEHL

Karl Marx once famously described religion as the "opiate of the masses," and interpretations of the relationship between religion and social class have been tinged with elements of Marx's view ever since. According to Marx, religion constituted one of the principle cultural tools **capitalists** employed to trap workers within a "**false consciousness**"; the "true" Marxist consciousness of class could thus be obtained only by breaking through the fog of religious superstition and the chains of institutional churches.

Nearly fifty years after Marx, the influential German sociologist **Max Weber** modified this line of thought but retained a central tension between religious belief and economic culture. Weber identified a "Protestant ethic" fueling the development of industrial capitalism and modern, institutional society. Rooted in the ascetic Calvinist notion of a "calling," Weber's vision of Protestantism provided the internal logic to modern society and its attendant social divisions, even if it did not go so far as to accuse religion of fostering a "false consciousness."

This legacy of **Marxist** and Weberian analysis has deeply impacted the study of religion and class in America from the colonial era through the twentieth century. Given Weber's attentiveness to Calvinism, the early **Puritan** settlers of New England

offered an obvious opportunity to explore the utility of the "Protestant ethic." The towns of colonial New England were populated by a Puritan faithful torn between the "worldly" and the "godly." Famous Puritan churchmen such as Increase and Cotton Mather warned against the dangers of pursuing riches and neglecting religious responsibilities; yet, as Weber predicted, other important Puritan pronouncements, such as the necessity of toil and the virtues of frugality, ultimately laid the groundwork for economic success. Indeed, scholars have increasingly come to understand the extent to which the process of town-building and settlement was linked explicitly to the economic goals of Puritan elites (including religious leaders). Of course, the financial success of some provoked the inequalities attendant with wealth's uneven distribution. And, in cloaking economic success in the robes of religious piety and moral probity, Puritans laid a precedent by which economic failings could be explained by a simple lack of faith and moral diligence—and hence to the sins of individuals rather than shortcomings of society.

However, some historians have also noted the ways in which Protestantism opened the door to protest some of the very inequalities that a Calvinist ethic may have facilitated. For example, the First Great Awakening—a series of religious revivals that spread throughout the colonies between 1730 and 1760—criticized established clerics and bespoke a more egalitarian faith available to all. In Boston, artisans and the poor were in the vanguard of this religious movement. By the 1750s, Presbyterians and Baptists in Virginia had deeply shaken the deferential and hierarchal nature of that Chesapeake colony and laid part of the intellectual groundwork of the **American Revolution**. The Awakening revealed tensions—between elite and "popular" religion, between learned clerics and untutored exhorters, and between the religion of social stability and the religion of protest (and perhaps revolution)—that would recur throughout American history.

The first half of the nineteenth century witnessed a "market revolution" during which capitalism and its attendant labor systems became permanently grounded in America's political economy. Continuing to follow Max Weber's lead, many scholars have concluded that the expansion of the American middle class in this era had much to do with religious ideals and prescriptions. Throughout the 1820s and 1830s, shopkeepers, merchants, and master artisans enjoyed the prosperity that capitalism opened to them, and they increasingly came to view their middle class as a class; the optimistic culture of antebellum Protestantism—crystallized in the religious revivals of the Second Great Awakening—went a long way toward creating those shared bonds. For both men and women, the ideals of virtue, character, and piety collaborated with a liberal theological spirit and a culture encrusted with sentiment to produce the type of Protestantism usually identified as "American." However, middle-class Protestantism did not solely produce self-satisfied individualists. Many of the most important reform movements in American history grew out of antebellum Americans' religious culture, including temperance, abolitionism, and women's rights. By the dawn of the **Progressive Era**, this religious legacy assumed theological shape as the **Social Gospel** movement and informed the worldview of Progressives such as Jane Addams and Walter Rauschenbusch, who addressed **poverty** and worker rights in addition to traditional "moral" issues.

Whereas religion has thus proved vital to the history of America's middle class, its place in the lives of American workers has proved more ambiguous. Some historians

have noted the importance of Protestant rhetoric for the nineteenth-century labor movement. The first strikers in New England's textile mills, for example, complained that harsh work regimens took time away from family and church obligations. The **Knights of Labor**, in the 1870s and 1880s, utilized a language of Christian republicanism long familiar to American workers. Even America's **Socialist Party**, embodied in the person of **Eugene Debs**, owed as large an intellectual debt to Christian ethics as it did to Marxist economics.

Yet, for all it may reveal about the middle class and parts of the **working class**, a Protestant-centric focus may be partially to blame for limiting our understanding of working-class religion. Diversity has always characterized the American working class, and so it should come as no surprise to find many competing religious traditions within working-class history. For instance, Catholicism plays a far larger role in pockets of the working class than generally acknowledged. Since the first major waves of Irish and German Catholic immigrants in the 1830s, those and subsequent generations of Catholics, of many ethnicities, have formed a major demographic component of blue-collar life. As late as the 1940s and 1950s, Catholics consistently had a lower-class status than Protestants. Jews, although more successful in achieving social mobility, nevertheless formed an essential part of America's working class from the 1880s through the 1930s. Not only did numerous Jews become leaders in America's labor movement, but many Jewish immigrants also brought the most radical and sophisticated European class analyses with them. And, in at least some instances, Jewish radicals explicitly connected the Judaic religion with labor agitation. Likewise, religion has long been recognized as a vital element in African American history. Given the central place of the black working class within America's class structure, African American variations on Protestantism need to be considered before assuming that Protestantism was solely the province of the white middle class.

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RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM

See Fundamentalism.

RENT STRIKES

ROBERT E. WEIR

Rent strikes are actions taken by tenants in which they withhold payment to landlords to protest perceived unfair conditions. Although rent strikes have not been as common in the United States as in England and Scotland, they are occasionally important ways for those living in **poverty** or suffering from economic dislocation to lash out against their conditions. They are usually localized protests, but occasionally they take on wider significance.

Rent strikes are a product of the urban industrial age. As **immigrants** began arriving en masse during the nineteenth century, many settled in crowded urban **ghettos**. Housing stock was frequently substandard, but landlords had few incentives to improve conditions as demand for housing was high and few laws existed to compel them to upgrade their properties. Rent strikes were one method used by tenants to try to coerce landlords into making improvements. This was a risky proposition, however, as most municipal codes favored landlords. Rent strikes were, thus, sporadic until the twentieth century, when organized groups coordinated efforts.

Hundreds of New York's Lower East Side tenants engaged in a rent strike in 1904 and refused to pay massive rent increases. Because many of the **Jewish** residents were also affiliated with the **labor movement** and with the **Socialist Party**, landlords found it harder to break the strike, though they eventually succeeded. A 1908 rent strike also ended in failure, but periodic rent strikes continued to take place until the post–World War I **Red Scare** made such actions untenable.

The Communist Party (CPUSA) proved more successful in organizing rent strikes. An attempt to mobilize black Harlem residents in 1928 fell short of its goal of organizing the entire area, but it did empower residents. The onset of the Great Depression further fueled rent strikes because many individuals were unemployed and still others could no longer meet their rents in an age of falling wages. A CPUSA-led rent strike in 1932 ended in defeat after a dramatic clash between tenants and police, but the CPUSA created tenants' organizations throughout New York City and continued to call rent strikes. A moderate rent control law was enacted in 1939, the model for stronger laws later. (New York remains known for sections of the city governed by rent control laws.) New York City also saw rent strikes and rent control agitation during the 1940s. In Harlem, the Reverend Adam Clayton Powell Jr. helped residents organize tenants' rights groups, an action also supported by Congressman Vito Marcantonio.

Chicago was the scene of a violent rent strike in 1931, precipitated by the eviction of a seventy-four-year-old widow from her Dearborn Street home. Some 2,000 black Chicagoans protested and withheld rents. An ensuing riot led to three deaths. The riot was blamed on the CPUSA, which had been active in organizing rent strikers.

In the post–World War II period tenants' rights groups got more organized. Civil rights activists formed neighborhood associations, and groups such as the Congress for Racial Equality mobilized citizens and lobbied for enactment of laws to protect renters and leasers from substandard housing, arbitrary evictions, and unreasonable rent hikes. **Students for a Democratic Society** also organized tenant groups. There were high-profile rent strikes, such as that in New York's Morningside Heights in 1968, but tenant movements have made their greatest impact in pressuring municipalities to enact and enforce housing codes. By the 1980s many cities had tenants' unions; in 1983 the movement was widespread enough to inspire the release of a record album, *We Won't Move: Songs of the Tenants' Movement* (Folkways Records). In 1988 the Illinois Tenants' Union formed, and each year it handles some 8,000 complaints.

Tenant groups often use rent strikes to try to force landlords to improve properties, especially in decaying **inner city** areas where absentee landlords use agents to collect rents. Rent strikes have moderate success on occasion as it is generally hard to evict tenants and advocacy groups employ legal maneuvers to assist renters. Nonetheless, rent strikes and tenant rights movements are not very powerful in most places. American law has historically upheld the sanctity of property ownership above other principles, a doctrine that remains in place.

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REPUTATIONAL METHOD

ROBERT E. WEIR

The reputational method is a **class definition** that ranks individuals based on how others see them. Sociologists using this method generally ask longtime residents of a community to assess the reputations of others within the community. It is also used by scholars seeking to mediate inherent problems within the **subjective method** in which individuals rank themselves.

The reputational method was among the tools **W. Lloyd Warner** used in his classic *Yankee City* studies. Warner conducted his research in the 1930s, when his subject location, Newburyport, Massachusetts, was a small, close-knit community. The reputational method works best in villages and small towns that adhere to traditional patterns marked by close interpersonal relationships. Cities and transitional areas whose demographics are more fluid do not lend themselves well to reputational studies. In fact, most scholars now feel that society is too complex for the reputational method to yield solid data on its own. In the course of a day, the bulk of modern social relationships are businesslike, bureaucratic, and impersonal. Moreover, because many people now work, reside, and recreate in different locations, the intertwined fabric of traditional community has frayed. Pessimists forecast the disappearance of community, but even optimists agree that individuals now form intentional associations that frequently function more as exclusive in-groups than as extensions of the overall community. As such, most scholars see the reputational method as having limited value.

One area where the reputational method is still quite useful is in measuring **prestige**, especially occupational prestige. Only those scholars adhering to rigid **objective methods** downplay the role of prestige as a determiner of social class, but there are few ways to measure it. One time-tested method is to survey public opinion on the relative prestige of various occupations. Based on survey results it becomes possible to rank the relative prestige of a doctor vis-à-vis a bartender. Such studies have yielded surprisingly stable data over many decades, with **white-collar**

jobs routinely being viewed as more prestigious than **blue-collar** work, especially if the latter involves more brawn than brain. The data also correlate roughly to **wealth** and stratification, with jobs in which the **lower class** cluster tending toward the bottom. Likewise, **middle-class** positions, such as teaching, nursing, and office work, tend to gain middling rankings, just as those that command high salaries attain high rankings.

Like all attempts to define social class, the reputational method is best used in conjunction with multiple measures.

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REUTHER, WALTER P. (September 1, 1907–May 10, 1970)

BILL BARRY

Both exceptional and controversial, Reuther was one of the most important individuals in the twentieth-century labor movement. Like **Eugene Debs**, for whom his younger brother was named, Reuther's life encompassed an entire era of workers' movements, moving from **socialist** agitation in the 1920s through the turbulence of the **sit-down strikes** of the 1930s to anti**communism** and **middle-class** status in the 1960s.

Born to a socialist father in Wheeling, West Virginia, Reuther quit school at age 16 and worked as an apprentice tool-and-die maker. He migrated to Detroit in 1927, worked briefly for auto industry supplier Briggs Manufacturing, and then moved on to Ford Motor Company. Soon his two brothers, Roy and Victor, also moved up from Wheeling, creating a family triumvirate that provided leadership to the United Auto Workers (UAW) until Roy's death in 1967.

After campaigning for Socialist Party presidential candidate **Norman Thomas** in 1932, Reuther quit—or was fired by—Ford and set off with his brothers in January 1933 for a three-year trip around Europe, passing through Germany as the Nazis were rising, and ending at the enormous Gorky Auto Works, a new auto production plant in the Soviet Union (USSR), where they worked until the summer of 1935. Victor's enthusiastic letter to friends in Michigan praising **proletarian** democracy in the USSR was circulated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in 1940 as "proof" that the Reuthers were communist sympathizers.

The Reuthers returned to Detroit in early 1935 and became active in unionizing the auto industry. Walter joined a small local associated with auto parts supplier Ternstedt and was its delegate at the UAW founding convention in 1936. He organized shops around Detroit and was a participant—though not as important as UAW mythology maintains—in the sit-down strikes in Flint that brought industrial unionism to General Motors and touched off further efforts across the country.

He was elected as vice-president of the UAW and head of the union's GM division in 1940.

Reuther was a victim in a famous episode called "The Battle of the Overpass" on May 26, 1937. Reuther and three other UAW organizers were leafleting Ford workers at the River Rouge plant when they were brutally attacked by company thugs. The pictures of this assault became so famous that photographer James Fitzgerald of *The Detroit News* won the Pulitzer Prize.

World War II provided Reuther an opportunity to demonstrate his social vision, and the organization within the UAW supported his personal ambitions to become president both of the union and the **Congress of Industrial Organizations** (CIO). In 1940 Reuther offered his "500 planes a day" plan to consolidate production facilities and workers from competing auto companies into a vast production system to provide airplanes to be sold to Great Britain. The plan was met with hostility by the leaders of all industries, especially GM President Charles Wilson.

Reuther also manipulated anticommunist sentiments to his advantage, preparing the UAW and its members to participate in the postwar **Red Scare**, which damaged the union movement. He separated himself from the communists in 1940 when he endorsed the reelection of **Franklin Roosevelt** and blasted a pact made between Adolf Hitler and Josef Stalin. He also criticized opponents within the UAW and **John L. Lewis**, who resigned as CIO president when the federation endorsed Roosevelt; Lewis eventually supported Republican candidate Wendell Willkie.

The postwar period provided greater opportunities for the UAW and for Reuther's personal ambitions. In the UAW-GM negotiations in the fall of 1945, Reuther proposed a 30 percent wage increase for the workers with no increase in auto prices, a proposal supported by his demand that GM "open the books" to the union. GM executives not only wanted a cheap contract but also resented Reuther's attack on management prerogatives. George Romney, head of the Automobile Manufacturers Association, famously dubbed Reuther "the most dangerous man in Detroit" and accused him of harboring revolutionary ideals. An auto strike began on November 21, 1945, and lasted for 113 days, even though Reuther's critics, including CIO president Phillip Murray, claimed that the strike's major motive was to enhance Reuther's candidacy for the UAW presidency. As other major unions in steel and electrical manufacturing struck, more than three million workers were on the street. Complicated negotiations ensued and other unions settled in advance of the UAW.

Nonetheless, Reuther was elected UAW President on March 27, 1946, two weeks after the end of the GM strike. His opponents controlled the UAW executive board, however, and Reuther again capitalized on anticommunism and Redbaiting to enhance his power. The 1946 Congressional elections coincided with a rising Red Scare, and conservatives in Congress passed the anti-union Taft-Hartley Act over President Harry Truman's veto in 1947. Its anticommunist provisions also served Reuther, though other aspects of the bill hurt labor unions.

By 1947 Reuther supporters swept all of the executive positions, despite an inflammatory pamphlet circulated against him titled *The Bosses' Boy*. The Reuther machine, called "The Administrative Caucus," consolidated control of the UAW and expanded the "servicing," or top-down model of unionism. He boasted of his

success in a February 1948 article in *Colliers Magazine*, "How to Beat the Communists," and he worked to wreck union support for progressive Henry Wallace's 1948 presidential campaign.

Reuther was almost killed by a shotgun blast fired through his kitchen window on April 20, 1948. Reuther endured a long convalescence, and in May 1949 a similar blast nearly killed his brother, Victor. No one was ever arrested for the attempted assassinations.

By the early 1950s, both the UAW and Reuther appeared to personify "middle-class" values. Reuther became president of the CIO in 1952 and helped arrange the merger in 1955 with the **American Federation of Labor**, which was led by **George Meany**. Meany was on record as saying that union members were becoming middle class. Some scholars accuse Reuther and Meany of aiding efforts to obliterate the distinctiveness of the **working class**, thereby contributing to the myth of the United States as a uniformly middle-class society.

As the Civil Rights Movement grew in the 1950s, Reuther was confronted with demands for black staff members and officers, whereas Southern UAW locals, including one in Memphis, wanted to construct a new segregated union hall. Reuther identified himself with civil rights leaders and was pictured marching with **Martin Luther King Jr.** Reuther spoke at the March on Washington in August 1963, calling for "full employment and full production." At the same time, however, UAW leadership was challenged from within the union by organizations of black auto workers, such as DRUM (Dodge Revolutionary Workers Union).

Reuther was so clearly identified with the officials of the Democratic Party that he played the intermediary role at the 1964 convention, refusing to support the delegates from the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party who wanted to replace the segregationist delegates from their state. Yet the same man was an early supporter of Cesar Chavez and the United Farm Workers union.

As the war in Vietnam intensified, Reuther—who had often spoken about the need for world peace—supported the Johnson administration, provoking bitter arguments with his own daughter, who charged that he ignored the war's immorality and had sold out to **capitalism**.

Reuther was killed in an airplane crash on May 9, 1970, shortly after removing the UAW from the AFL–CIO and forging a controversial alliance between the UAW and the Teamsters, which was then noted for both its conservatism and its corruption. Reuther's effectiveness as a labor leader continues to engender controversy among scholars and activists. His detractors picture him as a young radical gone conservative over the period of 40 years. Defenders point out that during his tenure UAW workers enjoyed wages and benefits that were the envy of American workers. In many ways, Reuther embodies an ongoing debate over whether unions gain maximum benefits through bureaucratic businesslike practices or through grassroots activism.

Suggested Reading

Elizabeth Reuther Dickmeyer, Reuther: A Daughter Strikes, 1989; Nelson Lichtenstein, Walter Reuther: The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit, 1997; Walter Reuther, Selected Papers, ed. Henry M. Christman, 1964.

RIFKIN, JEREMY (1943-)

ROBERT E. WEIR

Jeremy Rifkin is the president and founder of the Foundation on Economic Trends, a nonprofit think tank based in Washington, D.C., that analyzes emerging scientific and economic patterns. Since 1994 he has also been a fellow at the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School's Executive Education Program. Rifkin holds a degree in economics from the Wharton School and one in international relations from Tufts University. He authored seventeen books between 1973 and 2004 and scores of journal and newspaper articles, and he has advised leaders around the globe on economic and technological matters, including Romano Prodi, the former president of the European Economic Commission (EEC).

Many have hailed Rifkin as an economic prophet and have urged governments to heed his advice. To his detractors, Rifkin is an alarmist, a professional agitator, a technophobe, and a dabbler in "junk science." He has been controversial, in part, because of his insistence that traditional notions of market and public sector **capitalism** are outmoded. In particular, he argues that new technology emerging in computers, biotechnology, genetic engineering, and hydrogen research will continue to displace workers. Unless economies and nation-states adopt new ways of viewing society, the net result will be impoverishment of the masses across the globe, including the United States and Western Europe. In essence, a two-tiered class system will emerge with wealthy **elites** at one end of the spectrum and the unemployed, rootless, disenfranchised, and potentially dangerous masses at the other.

Although some of Rifkin's extrapolations are subject to debate, there is much in his research that warrants the intense debates he has provoked. One argument in his 1995 *The End of Work* was that economic elites would be faced with choices of either providing new forms of work or of incarcerating more people. In 1980 the adult prison population in the United States was around one-half million; by 2000 it had soared to over two million. Rifkin blames much of this on the creation of classes that are permanently **unemployed** or **underemployed**. Rifkin has argued that **blue-collar** work is a dying pursuit and that by 2050 just 5 percent of the global population will be needed to produce the world's industrial goods. Much as technology led to an agrarian revolution that eliminated the need for millions of farmers, so too will factories become obsolete. But he also points out that automation even threatens the service sector, and he ponders the fate of human beings cut off from meaningful work and the likelihood of material comfort and economic security. He is particularly pessimistic about the implications for African Americans, given the fact that there is a racial divide in technological access.

Equally controversial is Rifkin's assertion that the **middle class** is shrinking, despite political rhetoric of its ubiquity. He points to an explosion in personal bankruptcy, the decline in **real income**, and the artificial manner in which middle-class status has been propped up by adding income earners, especially women, to the total family income. Rifkin's unsettling comments about the middle class have engendered outrage among some, especially conservatives, as have his comments that the EEC is better poised to address changes in the global economy than the United States and is likely to surpass it in economic clout and strategic importance.

Nor have Rifkin's suggestions for warding off decline won friends in the business community or among conservative economic thinkers. Rifkin argues that a shorter work week is an essential first step in stabilizing workforces and stemming the inexorable rise in unemployment levels. At a time when the work day is increasing in many countries, Rifkin advocates strict caps on the work week so that more people can be brought into the productive and service sectors. He also champions revamping **tax** policy to provide credits for job creation, shifting expenditures out of the defense sector, and adopting a value-added tax similar to that of many EEC nations, in order to fund what he calls the "third sector" of the economy.

Rifkin believes that investing in the third sector—community-based volunteering and independent activity—is ultimately the best solution to deal with the loss of traditional work. This, he admits, would entail rewriting the **social contract** in a way that elevates "community bonds" and public service over market relationships. Rifkin is cognizant of the obstacles that must be overcome—such as labor unions, partisan politics, and greed—but argues that such a restructuring of society is both necessary and healthy. Rifkin envisions a future in which individuals will work on environmental projects, deliver supplemental health care, serve as educational aides, and expand upon a whole range of activities currently done by volunteers. He even champions the creation of a "social wage" to reimburse those working in the third sector.

Whether or not one agrees with Rifkin's gloomy assessment of the future of work, shares his optimism for renewal, or likes his left-of-center politics may be beside the point. Rifkin is assuredly correct to point out that the future of work is unlikely to look like that of the past. He also calls attention to the fact that whatever shifts take place, those who will be most profoundly impacted are those at the lower end of the socioeconomic scale. If he is correct that the middle will also be affected, a reinterpretation of the social contract may be, as he puts it, society's "last, best hope" of warding off a Malthusian nightmare.

Suggested Reading


Jeremy Rifkin, The Age of Access: How the Shift from Ownership to Access Is Transforming Modern Life, 2000; Rifkin, The End of Work: Technology, Jobs and Your Future, 2004; Rifkin, The European Dream: How Europe's Vision of the Future Is Quietly Eclipsing the American Dream, 2004.

RIIS, JACOB (May 3, 1849–March 26, 1914)

ROBERT E. WEIR

Jacob August Riis was a journalist and photographer. In the latter capacity he is considered a pioneer in the documentary style, which became an important tool in increasing public awareness of **poverty**.

Riis was born in Ribe, Denmark, and immigrated to the United States in 1870. His first years in American were marked by poverty. In 1877 Riis became a police



Jacob Riis. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

reporter for the New York Evening Sun, ironic given that he was **homeless** when he first arrived and often slept in police station lodging houses. The Sun job sent him into the city's many slums, where he began photographing conditions as well as writing about them. By the 1880s Riis had become interested in ameliorating the poverty and crime he encountered, and his writing shifted from reportage to investigative journalism that presaged the early twentieth-century muckraking tradition. This work culminated in the pathbreaking How the Other Half Lives, which appeared first in truncated form in Scribner's Magazine and then as a controversial book in 1890.

At the time Riis's sensational book appeared, the prevailing view of poverty in America among the **middle classes** conformed to the precepts of **Social Darwinism**. Poverty was thus seen as a personal and individual failing instead of one resulting from social conditions. Views were changing, however. Some American clerics were involved with the **Social Gospel** movement, labor groups such as the **Knights of Labor** lambasted the hypocrisy

of **robber barons**, and a handful of social reformers challenged the simplicity of individualist interpretations of poverty. Notable among the latter group was **Charles Loring Brace**, whose *The Dangerous Classes in New York and Twenty Years' Work among Them* (1872) created a sensation.

Riis's book was one of the first to use photography rather than illustrations to show poverty in stark and disturbing images. In fact, *How the Other Half Lives* is mostly remembered as a photographic collection; its language—following the fashion of the **Gilded Age** middle classes—is often **racist** and condescending to modern ears, though it was considered sympathetic in its day. Like most muckraking, Riis's work inspired both shock and outrage. Some audience members were said to have fainted when viewing magic lantern slides of Riis's photos of the poor. Opponents accused Riis of fabrication, though the photographs made his remarks hard to refute. Others seized upon Riis's work to demand reforms, and New York City Police Commissioner **Theodore Roosevelt** allegedly ordered changes in the force based on Riis's book. Riis himself took up the reformer's zeal and produced a dozen books before his death, including *Children of the Poor* (1892), *The Battle with the Slum* (1902), and *Children of the Tenement* (1903).

Although his subsequent work was influential and was often cited by reformers, none had the impact of *How the Other Half Lives*. In that book Riis took

readers and viewers inside slums that were dirty, disease-ridden, overcrowded, and desperate. They were also dangerous, havens for pickpockets, bandits' roosts, and street gangs. The book drew attention to a world ignored by most middle-class New Yorkers and shocked the consciences of those bold enough to admit to its reality.

By the early twentieth century, documenting poverty and social problems through images as well as words and statistics had become the norm. Muckraking journals and social work publications, such as *The Survey*, routinely published photos. Riis's work anticipated the output of others who surpassed him in the documentary style, including Lewis Hine, Walker Evans, and Dorothea Lange. The



Jacob Riis, "Lodgers in a Crowded Bayard Street Tenement—'Five Cents a Spot.'" Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

latter two worked on behalf of **New Deal** agencies during the **Great Depression** and produced enduring images that highlighted the plight of America's downtrodden.

Suggested Reading

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RISE OF SILAS LAPHAM, THE

ROBERT E. WEIR

The Rise of Silas Lapham is a novel by William Dean Howells that was published in 1885. It is an indictment of **social climbing**, **elite** society, **Victorian** cultural values, and materialism during the **Gilded Age**.

The book's eponymous protagonist is a self-made member of the **nouveau riche** whose fortune comes from paint manufacturing. In an attempt to hobnob with social elites and engage in **conspicuous consumption**, Lapham moves his family from rural Massachusetts to Boston. Conscious of his lack of **status** and **prestige**, Lapham begins construction of a mansion in the fashionable Back Bay district and attempts to ingratiate himself with the **Brahmin** class. He remains blissfully unaware that local elites find him boorish and crude, his wife a country bumpkin, his tastes garish, and his mercantile ways distasteful. Lapham's boastfulness and heavy drinking endanger his daughter's impending marriage to a son of the very Brahmin families he openly courts while privately scorning.

Hubris strikes when Lapham's uninsured house burns, his business fails, and his fortune is lost. Howells's title is ironic; Lapham's "rise" begins when he repudiates his social climbing, abandons Boston, and returns to his rural roots. In an odd twist, his plainer daughter Penelope marries the Brahmin Tom Corey. They too abandon Boston and move to Mexico.

Like Mark Twain and Charles Dudley Warner's *The Gilded Age* (1873), the countryside is imbued with simple virtue, whereas cities are repositories of cutthroat **capitalism**, crass materialism, and stultifying social conventions. The novel is often cited by those seeking metaphors for the misplaced values systems of upwardly **mobile** members of the upper **middle class**.

Suggested Reading

William Dean Howells, The Rise of Silas Lapham, 1885.

ROBBER BARONS

ROBERT E. WEIR

Robber barons is a derisive term that was applied to a group of industrial capitalists in the latter half of the nineteenth century that was known for its monopolistic business practices, its mistreatment of the **working class**, and its inordinate financial and political clout. To their detractors the robber barons represent the very worst excesses of ruthless **capitalism**; to their defenders, many in this group were "captains of industry" whose business acumen has been badly besmirched due to the actions of a relatively small number of individuals.

It should be noted that the term was not in widespread use in the nineteenth century; it derives largely from historian Matthew Josephson's use of the label in an influential 1934 book. Workers wishing to condemn the group later called "robber barons" often made similar comparisons, however, by using phrases such as "purse-proud aristocrats" or by drawing similarities to the czar of Russia. Josephson evoked feudalism in his use of the term. It originally referred to the ways in which land-rich lords extorted money from merchants wishing to cross their lands or ply adjacent waters. The region along the Rhine River was particularly notorious, with local barons going so far as to build unneeded bridges just to exact tolls.

In nineteenth-century America, robber baron mentality appeared in a new group whose fortunes surpassed the wildest imagination of most citizens. Before the Civil War, the United States probably produced as few as two billionaires, banking magnate Jay Cooke and land speculator and financier William Astor, who increased holdings inherited from his father, fur merchant **John Jacob Astor**. The rapid expansion of industry after 1870 led to new fortunes, driven in a large part by railroads. In just thirty years the United States advanced from being a second-tier nation to a world industrial and military leader.

Alas, many of the new industrialists demonstrated little sense of civic responsibility or humanity. Many were swayed by **Social Darwinist** views and were

ruthless to both workers and competitors. Railroad magnate William Vanderbilt claimed that his railroads were meant to benefit his stockholders not passengers and added, "the public be damned." Fellow robber baron Jay Gould openly bragged, "I can hire one half of the working class to kill the other half." By the 1890s, a handful of individuals exerted monopolistic control over key enterprises. James Duke, for example, dominated the tobacco trade, John Rockefeller the oil industry, Andrew Carnegie steel and iron production, and Philip Armour and Gustavus Swift meatpacking. Other prominent entrepreneurs often labeled robber barons include financiers Jay Cooke, James Fisk, and J. P. Morgan; steamship magnate John Roach; retailer Marshall Field; and railroad barons Daniel Drew, Edward Harriman, James Hill, Collis Huntington, and Leland Stanford.

They were indeed an elite group; by 1900 there were just twenty-two billionaires and it was estimated that the richest 1 percent of the population controlled as much as 45 percent of the nation's total wealth. Nor can there be any doubt about their economic and political power. The 1873 collapse of Jay Cooke's banking empire plunged the nation into a four-year depression; during a similar panic between 1893 and 1897, the federal government borrowed money from J. P. Morgan. Workers averaging around \$400 per annum charged that industrial capitalists controlled politicians, courts, and the media, complaints that had much truth attached to them. Labor unions, such as the **Knights of Labor** and the **American Federation of Labor**, called for controls on monopolistic business practices, laws to protect working people, and the passage of a federal income tax law that would take some robber baron profits for the public good.

Some of the worst abuses of the robber barons were corrected during the Progressive Era, in part due to the efforts of **muckraking** journalists who exposed abuses. **Upton Sinclair** tackled unsanitary practices among meatpackers and Ida Tarbell lambasted the practices of Standard Oil; both were inspired by Henry Demarest Lloyd's 1894 exposé *Wealth Against Commonwealth*. During the first decade-and-a-half of the twentieth century numerous laws were passed regulating trusts, workplace safety, monetary reform, and consumer safety. Unions got preliminary protection under the 1914 Clayton Act. But there were still plenty of problems remaining when **Thorstein Veblen** wrote *Absentee Ownership* in 1923.

By the 1920s, however, enough had changed that the decade actually saw a shift in perceptions of entrepreneurs. Some, such as Henry Ford, briefly emerged as folk heroes. The public again lost confidence in business during the **Great Depression** of the 1930s, and the **New Deal** advanced notions of a regulated economy that emerged in the Progressive Era. Many entrepreneurs and conservatives now think that the pendulum has swung too far in the other direction and want to eliminate government regulations.

Many conservatives argue that the robber baron era was as much myth as reality. According to Burton Folsom Jr., a former associate of the **Free Enterprise Institute**, only a handful of "political entrepreneurs" deserve scorn, whereas "market entrepreneurs" such as Rockefeller and Carnegie lowered consumer costs, made the economy more efficient, and used part of their great wealth to advance **philanthropy**.

Among historians, however, the defense of robber barons remains a minority view. Some social scientists have asserted that robber barony persists, with latter-day practitioners keeping a lower profile than their nineteenth-century counterparts. What has also changed is how large fortunes are made: in 1900, 40 percent of all billionaires came from a railroad background, whereas by 1996, 31 percent inherited their wealth. The **nouveau riche** executives from the **Microsoft Corporation**—especially founder **Bill Gates**—sometimes invite nineteenth-century comparisons, though Bill Gates also garners praise for innovation and philanthropy.

Suggested Reading

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ROBERTSON, PAT (March 22, 1930-)

GABRIEL A. SANTOS

Pat Robertson is a politically active televangelist (although he prefers to be called a "religious broadcaster") who has founded numerous organizations, including the American Center for Law and Justice, the Christian Coalition, the Christian Broadcasting Network (CBN), Regent University, and various charity organizations. Robertson received a BA in history from Washington and Lee University, a bachelor of legal letters degree from Yale University Law School in 1955, and a master's of divinity from New York Theological Seminary in 1959. Robertson, a member of the **Southern Baptist** Convention, is well known as the originator and host of *The 700 Club*, a Christian television program seen in 200 countries and broadcast in 70 languages.

Equipped with tremendous financial and broadcast resources, as well as experience in the Marine Corps and considerable religious zeal, Robertson has not flinched from joining a multitude of political debates concerning domestic and international matters. He has, for example, continually spoken against homosexuality, abortion, feminism, and political liberalism, while staunchly endorsing Zionism and Charles Taylor, the former President of Liberia (1997–2003) who operated as a warlord during the Liberian civil war. Many of his remarks have been highly controversial, including comments that the 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States were caused by feminists, homosexuals, and assorted liberals. He also frequently lambastes non-Christian religions. Recently he engendered controversy for his support for **Creationism**, for suggesting that the State Department should be "nuked," and for calling for the assassination of Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez.

Robertson sought the Republican nomination during the 1988 U.S. presidential election. Despite substantial financial support and a resolution to attack "immorality" and the "tolerance of oppression in other countries," he concluded his campaign before the primaries had ended. His bid was almost marred by a libel suit

filed by an opponent. From the perspective of class in America, Robertson subscribed to a number of aggressive reform measures. These included a complete ban on pornography, extensive reforms to the educational system, the elimination of Conrail and Amtrak, and support for a constitutional amendment demanding a balanced federal budget. Many of his proposals would have harmed those in the **lower classes**.

Robertson has dealt with class-related inequalities primarily through humanitarian aid and other **philanthropic** pursuits, both in the United States and abroad, although many of these are filtered through ideological biases. Robertson thinks social problems within American society are linked to humanism and secularism within American government and rooted in some combination of failed **education**, morality, and faith. Faith and morality, furthermore, are the core concepts of his political perspective. For example, in 1985 Robertson claimed that problems of illiteracy in the Bedford-Stuyvesant area of Brooklyn could be partially attributed to lack "of restraint" and a "lack of vision of God." Extreme forms of misbehavior were also linked to Supreme Court decisions forbidding the posting of the Ten Commandments in public schools and prohibitions against prayer and Bible reading.

Robertson's message resonates most deeply with members of the middle class, especially small business owners. A breakdown of Robertson contributors in his various political campaigns and TV shows refutes the class **stereotype** that the poor and working classes are more prone to religious fundamentalism. Indeed, Robertson and the Christian Right provide a vivid case of wealthy elites who vigorously apply the privileges of their class position in order to enter the public arena with an explicitly religious program. Specifically, Robertson has attempted to translate evangelical Christian ethical standards into a legislative agenda, while also upholding his views of the religious roots of America's founding. In 1985 Robertson delivered a speech to members of Concerned Women for America, quoting James Madison and declaring that "the foundation of this nation" is aptly summarized thus: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men, all women, are created in the image of God . . . we're joint heirs with God . . . not some tool of the state." In 2000 Robertson argued for a return to our country's foundation in Jeffersonian ideals and for "recommitment to these God-given liberties," an ahistorical reading of the religious beliefs of many of America's Founding Fathers.

Pat Robertson exemplifies the American charismatic figure—critics would say demagogue—whose shrewd business investments created various niches for public involvement. He is, at once, a businessman, "media pioneer," and spiritual teacher. Robertson's theological and moralistic political perspective, however, sets him apart from most contemporary statesmen and has made him either the target of fierce rage or the object of praise.

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Rob Boston, The Most Dangerous Man in America?: Pat Robertson and the Rise of the Christian Coalition, 1996; Pat Robertson, The New World Order, 1992; Robertson, The Ten Offenses, 2003; Robertson, Courting Disaster: How the Supreme Court Is Usurping the Power of Congress and the People, 2004.

ROCK 'N' ROLL

MICHAEL T. BERTRAND

The years between 1945 and 1960 represented the American South's greatest period of upheaval in the twentieth century. It was an age of regional instability and transition, when a rural world of **poverty**, **status**, and racial segregation hesitantly yielded to one of industrialization, urbanization, affluence, and integration. In the cultural sphere, this time of transformation helped produce what popular music observers identify as the "rock 'n' roll revolution." The music emerged at the same time and in the same space as the Civil Rights Movement. It likewise coincided with the region's peak period of upward economic and **social mobility**.

Although the rock 'n' roll of the postwar era was not necessarily restricted to the South, its connection to the region was considerable and unmistakable. Most first-generation artists who performed in the genre hailed from below the Mason-Dixon Line or were the children of those who had migrated to Northern and Western cities. Such black and white migrants, in moving to Chicago, California, Detroit, or New York, retained (over generations) aspects of their regional culture. The cultural baggage they brought with them and imparted to others included music. Consequently, both for those who remained and those who departed, music played a major role in how they worked, played, worshipped, loved, laughed, cried, celebrated, mourned, lived, and died. This was particularly true for black and white members of the **working class**.

The complex relationship between class and race in Dixie was nowhere more evident than in the region's musical history. In a land legendary for racial and economic oppression, Southern vernacular music claimed a mixed West African and British ancestry that flowed from **proletarian** sources. As such, the first generation of rock 'n' roll performers consisted primarily of black and white truck drivers, dishwashers, tenant farmers, **sharecroppers**, and sundry **blue-collar** laborers. They emerged from the same audiences they entertained. This organic connection exemplified how the region's working classes, despite lacking **power**, **status**, and affluence, created a space that indulged self-expression, psychological release, creative sustenance, and personal satisfaction.

Rock 'n' roll's emergence indeed symbolized the culmination of a centuries-long dialogue between two **underclass** groups that the Southern **elite** lumped together as lazy, dependent, and biologically inferior. Although pejorative, the **upper-class** inclination to minimize racial distinctions among working-class natives is revealing. Law, etiquette, and custom may have kept blacks and whites legally and physically apart, but they could not keep them culturally separate. Because of their historically low position within the socioeconomic structure and their traditional emphasis on preindustrial nonmarket values (masculinity and personal style, for instance), working-class Southerners of both races were predisposed to the merging of black and white along cultural lines. To be sure, the merger was not a welcome one, particularly among marginalized working whites whose social and economic impotence openly challenged the logic of white supremacy. Indeed, no group worked harder to escape or prevent interaction with their African American counterparts.

Rock 'n' roll arose out of a working-class biracial culture fraught with animosity. This is not to deny a postwar college-based vogue for rhythm and blues, but lower-, middle-, and upper-class connections to the music were different. Deemphasizing or ignoring these class distinctions ultimately removes the music from its original working-class environment, thus reconfiguring rock 'n' roll into little more than a trivial pursuit "experienced" by Southern "slummers." Yet the music was far from trivial. A popular biracial working-class phenomenon, rock 'n' roll, in drawing extensively upon and overlapping different social categories, muddled many of the boundaries that its society worked so hard to keep intact.

Arguably the two most important rock 'n' roll recording centers were New Orleans and Memphis, each of which developed a characteristic sound and style. In New Orleans, the studio of Cosimo Matassa produced such luminaries as Fats Domino, Little Richard, and Lloyd Price, all of whom had rhythm and blues hits that crossed into the pop market as rock 'n' roll. In Memphis, Sam Phillips, known for recording rhythm and blues artists, realized that racial segregation precluded their attaining broad commercial success. In searching for a white man who could perform with the same feeling as black vocalists, Phillips hoped to exploit the popularity of rhythm and blues with a mainstream audience.

Phillips found Elvis. And although it is true that **Elvis Presley** did not invent rock 'n' roll, his success as a white country artist performing rhythm and blues credibly nevertheless helped the music attain national and international acclaim. In bringing the black music that he loved to a larger white audience, Presley served as an important agent of change within the segregated society in which he lived. Presley symbolized a post–World War II generation in search of itself. Like countless others seeking an identity in a changing South, young Elvis turned toward popular culture. In immersing himself in black music and style, he embarked on what was for working-class white Southerners a short cultural journey traditionally fraught with antipathy. Still, he sought, as did others of his background, to realize the postwar middle-class dream of upward mobility and material acquisition. The passage would not be easy. Historically marginalized, many working-class Southerners had not internalized conventional **middle-class** values or decorum. Despite having achieved relative affluence, their distinctive behavior, dialects, tastes, and dispositions would ensure a continued alienation from the mainstream.

As a figure that thoroughly encompassed within his celebrity the volatile issues of class, race, and age that shook the postwar South, Presley embodied the conflicts and tensions indicative of a Southern world in transition. The complexity of this transformation reveals itself when one considers that the singer's eventual attempts to shed his working-class attributes simultaneously led to the minimizing of what many perceived to be his "black" characteristics. Such an assessment can also be applied to the evolution of rock 'n' roll in the late 1950s and early 1960s. As the music developed into an acceptable middle-class form of entertainment, it seemed to rely less on a style and spirit that many attributed to its African American origins. In the end, it is indeed the relationship between class and race that made rock 'n' roll, as well as the Southern culture that produced it, so interesting and enigmatic.

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ROCKEFELLER FAMILY

RAMI KHALAF SR.

The Rockefellers are among the wealthiest and most philanthropic families in America's history. Their fortune was founded by two brothers, John Davidson Rockefeller and William Rockefeller, who headed an industrial family that made its fortunes in the oil business through their company, Standard Oil.

The family is of German descent. The original family name was *Roggenfelde*, meaning "the field of Rye," and it can be traced to Goddard Rockenfeller, who was born in 1590 in the Rhine Valley and was a direct ancestor of John D. and his brother William.

John Davidson Rockefeller was born in Richford on July 8, 1839, in Upstate New York to William Avery Rockefeller, a traveling peddler of novelties, and Eliza Davidson Rockefeller, a devout Baptist. William Avery Rockefeller Jr. was born on May 31, 1841. In 1849 and following allegations of rape, their father, Bill Rockefeller, moved his family to Owego, New York, close to the Pennsylvania border and then, in 1853, to Strongsville, Ohio, a suburb of Cleveland, where Bill Rockefeller's sister and brother-in-law lived.

Under pressure from his father in 1855, John D. Rockefeller dropped out of high school to enter a professional school, where he studied bookkeeping, banking, and commercial law. At age 16 Rockefeller got his first job, working for Hewitt & Tuttle, commission merchants and produce shippers. In 1863, and as a result of the discovery of oil in Pennsylvania and the rising demands for it because of the **Civil War**, the twenty-four-year-old Rockefeller went into the oil business with partners Maurice Clark and Samuel Andrews. Andrews, Clark & Company built a refinery in Cleveland, which was soon linked to the East Coast hubs by railroad.

On September 8, 1864, Rockefeller married Laura Celestia, and the couple eventually had four daughters and a son, John Jr. The eldest daughter, Bessie (1866–1906) married Charles Strong, a philosopher; Alice (1869–70) died in infancy; Alta (1871–1962) married lawyer E. Parmalee Prentice; and Edith (1872–1932) married Harold Fowler McCormick, the son of Cyrus McCormick, inventor of the mechanical harvesting reaper. His only son, John Davidson Rockefeller Jr. (1874–1960), married Abigail "Abby" Greene Aldrich, the daughter of Nelson Wilmarth Aldrich, a powerful leader in the U.S. Senate, and eventually inherited much of the family fortune and continued his father's philanthropic work.

By 1865 John D. Rockefeller was so deeply involved in the oil business and confident of its future growth that he sold his share of the commission business, applied the proceeds toward a significant investment in another refinery, and formed the

partnership of Rockefeller & Andrew, Cleveland's largest refinery. His brother William also entered the oil business and started a refinery in 1865, which was absorbed by John's firm in 1867, the year Henry M. Flagler joined the partnership, forming Rockefeller, Andrews & Flagler. In 1870 the company became Standard Oil of Ohio with \$1 million in capital, the largest corporation in the country. It controlled 10 percent of all U.S. petroleum refining and John D. Rockefeller served as its president.

In 1873, as a result of the crash of the stock exchange, Standard Oil took advantage of the depression and the economic downturn to absorb refineries in Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, New York, and Pennsylvania's oil region. By 1877 Standard Oil controlled 90 percent of the nation's refined oil. Standard Oil also took advantage of fierce railroad competition and agreed to support the South Improvement Company cartel if given preferential treatment as a high volume shipper. This deal included steep rebates for Standard Oil products, kickbacks of rebates for shipments of competing products, and an announcement of sharply increased freight charges. This touched off a firestorm of protest on the part of competitors, but John D. Rockefeller had merely to show them his books so they could see what they were up against. Most quickly accepted his buyout offer as he did not hesitate to force intransigents into bankruptcy and buy their assets at auction.

In 1881 Atlantic Monthly published Henry Demarest Lloyd's exposé, "Story of the Great Monopoly." The article's critical view of Standard Oil struck a chord with readers and Rockefeller was often demonized as the quintessential **robber baron**. Lloyd's book-length study of Standard Oil, Wealth Against Commonwealth, appeared in 1894 and was followed by Ida Tarbell's The History of the Standard Oil Company. These and other **muckrakers** prompted a backlash against the company and demands to limit **monopolies**.

Rockefeller, despite his ruthless business practices, could also be a very generous and giving man. As his wealth grew, so did his **philanthropy**. From his early years, Rockefeller tithed ten percent to the Baptist church. He also gave to educational institutions, public health causes, science, and the arts. In 1884 he provided major funding for a college in Atlanta for black women that became Spelman College, named after the Rockefeller's in-laws, who were ardent abolitionists before the Civil War. He also gave \$80 million to the University of Chicago, turning a small Baptist college into a world-class institution by 1900. He later called it "the best investment I ever made." His General Education Board, founded in 1902, promoted education at all levels everywhere in the country. Rockefeller also became one of the first great benefactors of medical science. In 1901 he founded the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research in New York City, which changed its name to Rockefeller University in 1965, after expanding its mission to include graduate education. He also gave \$250 million to the Rockefeller Foundation, which he founded, whose main mission was to fight disease in the South among blacks and the poor.

Rockefeller had a long career as a philanthropist, but his image was continuously controversial because of his business tactics, which left many in ruins or copted those who themselves became wealthy. Neither John nor William was a friend of the **labor movement**, however, and they crushed several **Gilded Age** organizing efforts and **strikes**.

The Rockefeller family's philanthropy was distributed through a system of **foundations** and trusts. Family money was also used to fund political aspirations throughout the twentieth century. Political involvement first surfaced in a \$250,000 donation to Republican William McKinley's presidential campaign for his successful 1896 run against Democrat William Jennings Bryan, a supporter of antitrust legislation. Future family members such as John D. Jr., John D. III, David, and Laurence Rockefeller also dabbled in politics. On a more charitable note, the Rockefellers donated large sums of money toward the rebuilding efforts of France after World War I. They have also been lauded for their conservation efforts through the National Audubon Society.

Perhaps the best-known family members directly involved in politics are Nelson Rockefeller (1908–79), who was the governor of New York and Vice President of the United States from 1974 to 1977; West Virginia Senator John D. "Jay" Rockefeller IV (1937–); Winthrop Rockefeller (1912–73), who served as governor of Arkansas; and the latter's son, Winthrop Paul Rockefeller (1948–2004), who was also prominent in Arkansas politics. In addition, David Rockefeller Sr. (1915–) serves as a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, vice chair of the National Parks Foundation, and former chair of the Alaska Conservation Foundation.

The Rockefellers remain a powerful and wealthy family in America and are now considered a mainstay of the **upper class**. John D. Rockefeller was worth more than \$1 billion upon his death in 1937, and his brother William left several hundred millions upon his passing in 1922.

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ROOSEVELT, ELEANOR (October 11, 1884–November 7, 1962)

STACEY INGRUM RANDALL

Eleanor Roosevelt was First Lady of the United States from 1933 to 1945, a diplomat for the United Nations, and a humanitarian throughout her life. She was known as one of the most widely admired and powerful women of her time.

Anna Eleanor Roosevelt was born in New York City to Elliott Roosevelt and Anna Hall Roosevelt. She was the niece of Theodore Roosevelt, the twenty-sixth President of the United States. Her family was wealthy and Roosevelt grew up living a life that attached great value to community service, a quality that would show up repeatedly in her life as an activist. Both of her parents and one brother died before she reached the age of ten, and she was raised by her relatives with her remaining brother. Eleanor attended Allenswood, a boarding school for girls near London, where her interest in travel and her intellectual curiosity were nourished.

In 1902 she returned to New York for her coming out into society and devoted herself to community service, which included teaching in a **settlement house** on Manhattan's Lower East Side.

On March 17, 1905, Eleanor married Franklin Delano Roosevelt, her distant cousin. They were not much alike in temperament—she very serious and intellectual and he fun-loving and spontaneous. Between 1906 and 1916, Eleanor gave birth to six children, one of whom died as an infant. In 1911 Franklin won election as a New York state senator and the family moved to Albany, where Eleanor performed the duties that were expected of a political wife. However, her desire to help others and her love of voluntarism would soon express itself. During Word War I, Eleanor visited wounded soldiers and worked for the Navy-Marine Corps Work



Eleanor Roosevelt listening to Carile Tart sing folk songs at the opening of the Washington labor canteen, sponsored by the United Federal Workers of America, Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), ca. 1944. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

Relief Society and in a Red Cross canteen. This was the work that truly made her proud; she developed a sense of self-worth by doing and giving as much as she could to those around her. Her family had instilled this ethic at an early age and it clearly stuck with her throughout her life.

When her husband decided to run for vice president in 1920 (unsuccessfully), Eleanor began to acquaint herself with the workings of the federal political machine. She studied the *Congressional Record* and began to learn about voting patterns and other political issues. At this time, she also became a member of the Legislative Affairs Committee of the League of Women Voters and of the Women's Trade Union League. Her political work increased when Franklin was afflicted with poliomyelitis in 1921. This entry into politics allowed her to help her husband and his career as well as devote herself to causes she believed were of great importance.

After Franklin's election to the presidency in 1932, Eleanor used her role as First Lady to a degree not before seen in this country. She was not only the president's eyes and ears but she also advocated for liberal causes in a way that made her quite controversial for her time. She created regular White House press conferences for women correspondents. She traveled frequently to places where the president himself was unable to go and brought back information about the people's opinions, conditions in the country, and other vital decision-making information. The American people generally responded positively to her genuine warmth and affection for them. They believed the First Lady was someone who truly understood their problems and would work to change their situation. Mrs. Roosevelt was particularly interested in issues of child welfare, **poverty**, housing reform, and equal rights for women and minorities. Her defense of the rights of African Americans, youth, and the poor helped to bring these groups into government discussion in a way that had never before occurred. Scholars generally agree that Mrs. Roosevelt was more

liberal than her husband and that she played a major role in advancing **New Deal** programs that sought to alleviate problems facing women, minorities, farmers, and the **working class**.

After the President's death in 1945, Mrs. Roosevelt was appointed by President Truman to be a delegate to the United Nations, where she served as chair of the Commission on Human Rights (1946–51). She played a vital role in the adoption of the Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. She continued to play an important role in U.S. politics as an avid Democrat campaigning for Democratic presidential nominee Adlai Stevenson in the 1952 and 1956 elections. In 1961 President Kennedy appointed her to chair his Commission on the Status of Women, a position that she held until shortly before her death. Her initial stance on the Equal Rights Amendment was negative because she feared that it would take away women's right to protective legislation, but she eventually came to understand and support the goal of equal rights.

Eleanor Roosevelt died in 1962 of a rare form of tuberculosis, and she is buried at Hyde Park in New York. Her legacy was not just that of a woman of rare energy and compassion—she changed the role of the First Lady from a political wife to someone who could wield power for the good of all people.

Suggested Reading

Blanche Wiesen Cook, *Eleanor Roosevelt*, 2 volumes, 1992–99; Joseph P. Lash, *Eleanor and Franklin*, 1971; Lash, *Eleanor: The Years Alone*, 1972; Eleanor Roosevelt, *The Autobiography of Eleanor Roosevelt*, 1961.

ROOSEVELT, FRANKLIN D. (January 30, 1882–April 14, 1945)

MURNEY GERLACH

Franklin Delano Roosevelt was the president who led the United States through the **Great Depression** and World War II. Many presidential historians consider Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) to be the foremost reformer and wartime leader in American history. He is best remembered for his **New Deal** policies, which sought to help Americans cope with economic collapse. Roosevelt is the only president to serve four terms of office (1933–45). He also pioneered, through his moral, personal, and transformational leadership, an unwavering commitment to **democracy** and improving the quality of life for citizens worldwide.

Roosevelt was born at Springwood, a family estate on the east bank of the Hudson River, close to Hyde Park, New York. His **upper-class** family was descended from seventeenth-century Dutch and English settlers to America and young Franklin grew up amid **wealth**, **status**, class privilege, and high expectations. At Hyde Park, his family was surrounded by high-powered neighbors bearing names such as **Astor**, **Rockefeller**, and **Vanderbilt**. After graduating from Groton School, Harvard, and Columbia University Law School, he practiced law briefly. But Roosevelt craved a more public life and went into New York's Democratic Party politics. This was a bit of a departure as his cousin, former President **Theodore Roosevelt**, was a Republi-

can. Theodore introduced FDR to Anna Eleanor Roosevelt, his niece and FDR's fifth cousin once removed. **Eleanor Roosevelt**, whose reformist zeal in ways surpassed Franklin's, was a remarkable and compassionate individual and supporter of women's rights. The two were married on March 17, 1905, in an **Episcopalian** service, and they eventually had six children.

FDR's rise to Democratic leadership was swift. Between 1910 and 1928 he occupied a seat in the New York State legislature, served as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and was candidate James Cox's vice-presidential running mate in 1920. In 1928 FDR was elected governor of New York. By then he was coping with physical challenges that threatened to short circuit his ambitions. In 1921, with little advance warning, the thirty-nine-year-old Roosevelt was diagnosed with polio. He struggled with polio for the rest of his life, a physical battle that inspired many.

FDR developed a personal heroic style that encouraged others to look beyond their physical frailties. The "Roosevelt grin" became a trademark and he honed oratorical and charismatic qualities that added to his appeal. He became governor of New York just as the nation was about to lapse into the Great Depression. In a short time he established himself as a strong leader, first in tackling entrenched Tammany Hall power within his own party and then in taking an active lead in implementing programs designed to assist economically distressed New Yorkers. In 1932 he was chosen to challenge Republican incumbent Herbert Hoover for the presidency.

FDR easily defeated Hoover and he was inaugurated as President of the United States on March 4, 1933. He addressed a bewildered and dispirited American people with the determination to be a catalytic agent for change and told them, "To accomplish anything worthwhile, it is necessary to compromise between the ideal and the practical." He immediately took action to shore up the banking system. After a radio broadcast "fireside chat" on March 12, Roosevelt announced his intention to address other challenges with similar aggression. During the next one hundred days his administration enacted a dizzying array of reforms designed to provide a "New Deal" for Americans. These fell roughly into three categories: relief efforts to give immediate assistance to those in need, recovery programs designed to restore ailing business and institutions, and reform initiatives to alter those conditions that led to the Depression.

Work relief and farm stimulus programs were assailed by critics as inefficient and ineffective. It was true that New Deal initiatives such as the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, the Works Progress Administration, and the National Recovery Administration had shortcomings. They did not fully restart industry, expand employment, or benefit small farmers. These programs were, nonetheless, popular among the public, and both FDR and Eleanor were perceived as champions of the underdog and unafraid to stand up to the rich and powerful. FDR was easily reelected in 1936 by a **New Deal** coalition of farmers, members of the **labor movement**, **Jews**, African Americans, and **Catholics**, which supplemented traditional Democratic constituencies such as urbanites, immigrants, and liberals.

During his second administration FDR was accused of fomenting class conflict. Conservative groups such as the Liberty League, the National Association of Manufacturers, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce saw Roosevelt as a dangerous radical, perhaps even a closet **communist**. Several New Deal programs were struck

down as unconstitutional, which led an angry FDR into an ill-advised "court-packing" plan in 1937 in which he sought to revamp the Supreme Court. That plan failed, but Roosevelt quickly replaced many of the fallen programs with those that passed constitutional muster.

What is often called the "Second New Deal" (1936–38) was more radical than the first, perhaps because FDR faced thunder on the political left as well as the right, though some historians credit Eleanor's zeal as a key factor. Among FDR's critics were Senator Huey Long of Louisiana, who wanted to redistribute wealth; Dr. Francis Townsend, whose old-age pension scheme was viewed as radical; and the Rev. Charles E. Coughlin, a Catholic priest who felt FDR's programs were timid. He also faced challenges from a wave of strike activity and critiques from both the Communist Party and the Socialist Party. FDR responded to accusations that he abandoned the poor, blue-collar workers, minorities, cities, and farmers with programs such as the Social Security Act (SSA), the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The SSA established the basis of both the current social security system and the welfare system, whereas the FLSA set up the first federally mandated minimum wage. The NLRA was pathbreaking in its recognition of labor unions and worker rights.

Roosevelt won a third term in 1940, when fascism was on the march in Europe and the world was on the cusp of World War II. His "Four Freedoms" speech to Congress is widely hailed as one of the great orations of American history. Roosevelt rallied the nation when Japan bombed Pearl Harbor on the infamous day, December 7, 1941, and the United States entered the war. He put a global spin on the four freedoms: freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want, and freedom from fear. Ironically, wartime production accomplished what the New Deal had not: full employment and an end to the Depression.

Roosevelt took an active role in directing the war and in planning for the postwar world. All of this took a toll on him. He traveled extensively between 1941 and 1945, fought a hard and successful campaign against Republican Thomas Dewey to win a fourth term in 1944, and attended the Yalta Conference in February 1945, where he met with Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin to plot the final days of World War II and contemplate the peace. He was ill at Yalta and never regained his strength. He died from a cerebral hemorrhage on April 12, 1945, while visiting Warm Springs, Georgia.

Franklin Roosevelt believed in the tradition of American **democracy** and did an extraordinary job of negotiating between pulls from both the right and the left during one of the most difficult periods in American history. Critics of FDR have exaggerated his radicalism just as admirers have overstated his virtues. The New Deal did not end the Great Depression, but it did give aid and hope to millions who might have been neglected without it. Nor did the New Deal go far enough in addressing problems of **race** and **gender** inequities. It is also hyperbolic to claim, as some scholars have, that FDR saved capitalism and staved off totalitarianism in America. But FDR believed in economic opportunity and did much to make the American **working class** feel as if it had a chance at obtaining the **American dream**.

A prominent California rabbi recalled that Roosevelt's great strength lay in his moral assertions that hunger and deprivation were wrong and that his legacy was reminding the rich and powerful they "had to contend with a federal government that consistently intervened on the side of the people." He also "inspired the common man of the world with tremendous hope in the future." The New Deal continues to be relevant. To conservatives and advocates of small government it is a model of what government should *not* do and some seek to dismantle existing New Deal programs. For liberals and subsequent reformers, FDR's New Deal is a model. It was invoked during Harry S Truman's "Fair Deal," John F. Kennedy's "New Frontier," and Lyndon B. Johnson's "**Great Society**."

Suggested Reading

Wilbur J. Cohen, ed., The Roosevelt New Deal: A Program Assessment Fifty Years After, 1986; Kenneth S. Davis, FDR, The Beckoning of Destiny, 1972; Davis, FDR: The New York Years, 1985; Davis, FDR, The New Deal Years, 1986; Davis, FDR: Into the Storm, 1993; Davis, FDR: The War President, 2000; Patrick J. Maney, The Roosevelt Presence: The Life and Legacy of FDR, 1992; Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., The Crisis of the Old Order: The Age of Roosevelt, 2002.

ROOSEVELT, THEODORE (October 27, 1858–January 6, 1919)

ARTHUR HOLST

Theodore Roosevelt was the twenty-sixth President of the United States. He was born in New York City and was the second of four children to Theodore Roosevelt Sr. and Martha Bulloch. Although his family was wealthy, Theodore's childhood was marked by ill health. He was asthmatic and sickly and frequently suffered from multiple ailments at once. Determined to not let his frailty thwart his life goals, Roosevelt was tutored intensively by exclusive teachers to ensure his acceptance to Harvard University. As a freshman in 1876, Roosevelt excelled in science, philosophy, and rhetoric but did poorly in classical languages. He also was editor of the student newspaper, vice-president of the Natural History Club, and founder of the Finance Club among other things. After graduating Phi Beta Kappa and magna cum laude in 1880, "Teddy" entered Columbia Law School. He quickly grew bored with the idea of being a corporate lawyer. In 1881, when he was offered the chance to be a New York Assemblyman, Theodore quit law school and entered politics. A year later, his first book was published: *The Naval War of 1812*.

In the Assembly, Roosevelt was very active; he wrote more bills than any other New York state legislator and drew his inspiration from the local poor and disadvantaged communities around him. His political triumphs were shattered in 1884, when both his mother and his wife, Alice, died on the same day. Roosevelt abruptly left the legislature and moved to the Badlands of the Dakota Territory to live as a cattle rancher and lawman. The intense blizzard of 1886–87 wiped out his entire cattle herd, however, and Roosevelt was forced to return to the East Coast. Back in New York City, he ran for mayor in 1886 and finished third behind Abram Hewitt and **Henry George**. He then married his childhood sweetheart, Edith Kermit Carow.



Theodore Roosevelt standing on a table outdoors and making a speech to men seated around him. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

Roosevelt's political interest in civil rights began when he was appointed to the U.S. Civil Service Commission by President Benjamin Harrison in 1888. He served until 1895 and then returned to New York City to head the Board of Police Commissioners. In 1897 President William McKinley appointed Roosevelt Assistant Secretary of the Navy, a post he held only briefly. When the United States declared war on Spain in 1898, Roosevelt resigned from the Navy and helped organize the First U.S. National Calvary, which later became known as the "Rough Riders." He fought in Cuba and then parlayed his military glory into electoral victory as New York governor. In 1900 President William McKinley chose Roosevelt as his vicepresidential running mate. When McKinley was assassinated in 1901, Roosevelt was thrust into the presidency determined to change America for the better.

Roosevelt is often viewed as the first president of the **Progressive Era**, which saw an intense shift from laissez faire government to an activist state. Roosevelt and other Progressives sought to curtail the unregulated growth of big businesses, which had led to abuses, and to narrow the

ever-widening gap between the rich and the poor in American society. Roosevelt shocked many business leaders by siding with the United Mine Workers of America during the anthracite coal strike of 1902. Although he was hardly an unqualified friend of the **labor movement**, Roosevelt's "Square Deal" policies spoke to attending the needs of the **working class** rather than protecting the privileges of the **upper class**. His administration (1901–09) saw the enactment of laws to regulate **monopolies**, ensure the purity of food and pharmaceuticals, regulate interstate commerce, and improve working conditions. He was also an ardent conservationist.

Progressive leaders were also concerned with the civil liberties of American citizens, including racial minorities and women. When he invited Booker T. Washington to the White House in 1901, Roosevelt became the first president to so honor an African American. He also spoke on the need to pass laws to regulate women's work and curtail child labor. He supported the 1903 formation of the Women's Trade Union League. Roosevelt was popular among workers. In a speech given by Roosevelt in 1910 after he left the White House, he recognized the need for our "government, National and State, to be freed from the sinister influence or control of special interests." And by stating in the same speech that "No man can

be a good citizen unless he has a wage more than sufficient to cover the bare cost of living, and hours of labor short enough so that after his day's work is done he will have time and energy to bear his share in the management of the community," Roosevelt inspired many to stand up against big business tyrannies. Many of Roosevelt's actions were applauded by reform ministers involved in the **Social Gospel** movement. His aggressive foreign policy also won him admirers in the military and he is generally credited with modernizing the U.S. Navy.

Roosevelt left office in 1910 and went on an African safari. He grew disenchanted with his Republican successor, William Howard Taft, and challenged him for his party's presidential nomination in 1912. When the GOP stuck with the incumbent, Roosevelt launched a third-party bid as a Progressive Party nominee and became the last third-party candidate to date who bested a major party nominee, though he finished second to Woodrow Wilson. After the election he went to South America. Roosevelt foresaw the coming of World War I and lambasted what he saw as President Wilson's weakness and lack of preparedness. When the war broke out, he requested a military commission, which President Wilson declined. His youngest son, Quentin, died during the war. Roosevelt himself passed away in 1919, his body weakened by disease contracted during his safaris.

Theodore Roosevelt is generally viewed as a reform-minded president who had sympathy with society's lower orders and was willing to tackle the abuses of the upper classes. His fifth cousin, **Franklin Roosevelt**, sometimes credited Theodore with inspiring some of his own **New Deal** reforms. There are, however, some historians who assert that Roosevelt's reformist zeal was exaggerated and that he attacked only egregious abuses in order to protect **capitalists** from themselves.

Suggested Reading

James MacGregor Burns and Susan Dunn, *The Three Roosevelts: Patrician Leaders Who Transformed America*, 2001; Kathleen Dalton, *A Strenuous Life*, 2002; Edmund Morris, *Theodore Rex*, 2001.

RULING CLASS

MAURO STAMPACCHIA

In every society it is possible to identify a ruling class, a defined and separated group that wields **power**, be it economic, political, social, cultural, or military. This group, therefore, rules, or directs, the society as a whole. A ruling class is, in one form or another, always present, except in small tribal and religion-based communities. But ruling classes differ from one another in many aspects. The first distinction regards the means through which power is exercised, and one can draw a line between ruling classes that use power in a mere domination mode, based on authoritarian and forceful patterns, and ruling classes that exercise power in a **hegemony** mode. The latter strive to acquire large and unchallenged consent without resorting to coercion. In essence, a hegemonic ruling class seeks ways to convince the **masses** that

the prevailing power structure is a good thing. In such a case a majority of individuals pay spontaneous obedience to orders and prescriptions from the ruling class.

A second distinction is the way the ruling class legitimizes itself, that is, the religious, philosophical, and political basis upon which it affirms its right to govern. Among the historical **legitimation** models are the following: rule by divine right, which places monarchy before constitutionalism; rule through descent, which normally involves a bloodline aristocracy; appeals to popular voting, as in a mass **democracy**; or simply asserting it as the spoil of revolutionary upheaval. Sovietstyle **communism** asserted legitimacy based on social class. In theory, the Russian Revolution created a **proletarian** society.

A third distinction of ruling classes is the composition of the ruling class. Is it homogenous and monolithic, or is it a collection of ruling classes bound to merge into one? Contemporary society tends to produce separate economic, political, cultural, mass media, and technocratic sectors, each with its own **elite** to control business and ruling functions. Do they conflict or do they cooperate? Or is one of them the core of the ruling class and other elites have a subsidiary and dependent role?

Marxism, which asserts that the history of mankind has been and will be a series of class struggles, considers each stage of human history as characterized by a mode of production that determines the ruling class. In capitalist societies, the ruling class is inevitably the one that dominates capital itself and thus owns and controls the means of production. It emerged in full force in the nineteenth-century economic systems, with the richest capitalists gaining control of land and of the industrial apparatus, through which they were able to influence (or control) government, state bureaucracy, and the state apparatuses such as the military and police.

Whereas the form of production is the essential foundation of society—which Marx called the substructure—all other aspects of society, including politics, culture, art, and government, are "superstructures" that are dependent on the substructure. Any major change, such as a shift from capitalism to **socialism** axiomatically entails a change from one ruling class to another. In the preceding example, the capitalistic **bourgeoisie** would give way to a **working-class** proletariat. Marxism as a whole makes the question of the ruling class a central one, though it also frustrates attempts to describe ruling classes empirically or appreciate fractions within the ruling class or its interrelations with other classes.

In the nineteenth century, political systems had a very narrow social basis, and seats in Congress or Parliament were often taken by the same persons who were part of the ruling class, the landowners and the capitalists. In the twentieth century, political systems gained a larger social basis and representatives of classes not part of the ruling class won positions of power in the government. Likewise, more complex political and social systems needed professional, specialized personnel that were often recruited outside the ranks of the ruling class. As superstructures grew more complex, society also developed quasi-political groups—such as lobbyists and pressure groups—which likewise sought to influence decision making. Some theorists argue that these forces of **pluralism** negate the possibility of a united ruling class.

Still other theorists dispute the optimism of pluralists and assert that ruling classes continue to exist, though more in hegemonic than dominant forms. In

essence, the ruling class has become less obvious; the **upper class** of yore whose power was based in land, birth, and **status** has been replaced by a ruling class whose control over economic activity is inextricably interconnected with political power. This group is variously referred to as the **power elite**, the **military-industrial complex**, or the **corporate class**.

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RUSTIN, BAYARD (March 17, 1912–August 24, 1987)

CARMELITA N. PICKETT

Bayard Rustin was a civil rights activist and pacifist who organized the largest civil rights demonstration in the United States, the 1963 March on Washington. Rustin was born in West Chester, Pennsylvania, and raised by his grandparents, Janifer and Julia Davis Rustin. Julia Rustin instilled Quaker values in Rustin, providing the foundation for his social and political activism.

Rustin was educated at Gay Street Elementary and West Chester Junior High School. He excelled in academics and athletics, and he became involved in social protests while attending West Chester Senior High. One such protest saw Rustin lead his African American classmates into segregated facilities to protest the Jim Crow laws that prevented African Americans from realizing full citizenship. Although Rustin did well in school, his family did not have money to send him to college. Bishop Wright of the African Methodist Episcopal Church in Philadelphia worked diligently and secured a music scholarship for Rustin at Wilberforce University.

Wilberforce was a predominantly white university, but Rustin adjusted well. During his second year there, he organized a strike to protest the poor quality of campus food. He was asked to leave the university and forfeit his music scholarship. He transferred to Cheyney Teachers College but left before earning a degree. With the onset of the **Great Depression**, Rustin relocated to **Harlem**, New York, with a relative. Although jobs were few, he was able find work while taking free classes at the City College of New York.

During the late 1930s the City College was a hotbed of political activity. The Communist Party was the most outspoken political organization on campus. Rustin was drawn to party activity during student activities on behalf of the Scottsboro Boys, nine young African American men and boys who were arrested on March 25, 1931, for the alleged rape of two white women. After witnessing rallies for the Scottsboro Boys—whom history has exonerated—Rustin became a member the Young Communist League (YCL). The YCL was organized for students who believed in Soviet-style communism. Unlike capitalism, communism is a doctrine that gives the state power to control the production of goods to



Bayard Rustin at a news briefing on the Civil Rights March on Washington in the Statler Hotel, ca. 1963. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

ensure the even distribution of **wealth** among all citizens, a view that appealed to Rustin's egalitarianism.

Rustin's activities in YCL included establishing chapters throughout the City University system and leading the Committee Against Discrimination in the Armed Forces (CADAF). This committee worked with labor organizations such as the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). During his work with the CIO, he met A. Philip Randolph, president of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters. Although Rustin was a communist and Randolph a socialist, they both worked toward civil rights. Rustin later left City College and YCL after being asked to dissolve the CADAF.

Randolph campaigned to make sure African American workers gained access to defense industry jobs during World War II. He proposed a March on Washington in 1941, and solicited the assistance of Rustin for his organizational and motivational skills. The March on Washington was abandoned when President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 8802, banning discrimination in defense industry jobs. More than twenty years later, when the 1963 March on Washington occurred, Rustin

was called upon by Randolph to coordinate the march that brought together prominent civil rights leaders across the nation.

Rustin campaigned for human rights worldwide but his most notable contributions were in civil rights. He worked with the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR) and later helped formed another civil rights organization, the Committee on Racial Equality (CORE). In 1957 he was one of the founding members of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). He was an advisor to Martin Luther King Jr. during his leadership of SCLC, although the relationship was troubled. Members of SCLC objected to Rustin's participation because he was a homosexual and a former communist. These challenges did not deter Rustin from his commitment to civil rights and human rights. He continued working with Randolph, and in 1965 Rustin was appointed executive director of the A. Philip Randolph Institute (APRI). This institute advised civil rights leaders, sponsored voter registration drives, and supported political candidates.

During the mid-1970s Rustin founded the Black Americans to Support Israel Committee, and a year before his death he created Project South Africa, a committee that promoted **democracy** in South Africa. Rustin made many sacrifices, from

being imprisoned for refusing to join the armed forces during World War II to serving time on a chain gang in North Carolina for his participation in the Journey of Reconciliation. His lifelong work demonstrated his commitment to civil and human rights.

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S

SALARY

See Wages.

SALES TAX

See Progressive/Regressive Taxation.

SALOONS AND BARS

MARK NOON

Occasionally referred to as the "Poor Man's Club," the neighborhood saloon, or bar, played an important role in American **working-class** history. Its development is closely tied to social changes wrought by industrialization and **immigration**.

The saloon replaced the Colonial tavern as the center for social and civil activities, and it evolved as the nation shifted from an agricultural to industrial economy. In preindustrial America, drinking and socializing at work was the norm. The slower pace of craft occupations allowed workers to enjoy, in moderation, whiskey, rum, cider, ale, or beer while on the job. At the onset of the **Industrial Revolution**, it was still not unusual to find alcohol in the factory setting. Beer, for example, was not considered an intoxicant in the nineteenth century, and brewers made regular deliveries to factories to help quench the thirst of laborers. This liberal position regarding alcohol in the workplace changed, however, as entrepreneurs invested more money into equipment for their mines, mills, and plants. Tolerance for workplace drinking was not something that could be afforded. Gradually, in response to tightening workplace discipline, shorter work days, and increases in working-class

incomes, the consumption of alcoholic beverages became more commercial and public.

The "saloon period" in American bar history began in the 1870s as technological advances in the production and transportation of beer resulted in larger, national breweries. With the days of regional breweries fading and competition in the industry intensifying, brewers had to work harder to attract and maintain customers. One method was to control retail outlets where beer was sold. Working in what was known as the tied-house system, brewers purchased properties—often a street-corner location with heavy pedestrian traffic—and then found a saloon-keeper to rent or manage the business. Of course, the only brand of beer sold at that location was the one made by the brewer who controlled the property. Controlling the sale of products through direct ownership of the property proved to be extremely profitable. By the early twentieth century, brewers controlled approximately 85 percent of the drinking establishments in the United States.

Saloons varied considerably in size and character. Some catered to **middle-** and **upper-class** professionals and businessmen and were very well appointed with intricately carved mahogany bars, brass foot- and handrails, large plate-glass mirrors, murals, and even newspaper reading rooms. In contrast, some drinking establishments could more accurately be described as "kitchen barrooms" that were actually part of the proprietor's home. Even worse were the "stale-beer dives," photographed by **Jacob Riis**, where thieves and tramps gathered in dark hovels and drank among empty beer barrels and broken crates. In general, however, the typical working-class saloon provided a warm, friendly atmosphere for people in the neighborhood who often worked in the same occupation and shared the same ethnic background.

The main attraction of the saloon was, of course, alcoholic beverages; however, for many **immigrants** it provided many basic necessities. In extreme weather conditions the saloon served as a surrogate home, providing a cool ceiling fan during the intense heat of summer and a warm stove in the depth of winter. For new arrivals unfamiliar with English, an interpreter or translator was available. If the illiterate needed a letter written, someone at the saloon was willing to provide the service. Food was also used as a bait to bring customers into the local saloon. Saloonkeepers offered the famous "free lunch," stocking counters with plenty of bread, meat, vegetables, cheeses, and frankfurters. According to one account, the "free lunch" offered by saloons in Chicago fed more working-class poor than all the charities in the city combined. The saloon was also utilized as a hiring hall by employers seeking cheap, unskilled labor. For immigrant laborers intimidated by the local bank, check-cashing practices were also common at the local saloon. Often bankrolled by the local brewer, the activities at the saloon on paydays earned the drinking establishment the reputation as the "poor man's bank."

In addition to serving individual needs, the local taproom also proved useful to such organized groups as unions, fraternal organizations, political parties, and religious and charitable organizations. For example, before they were able to build their own union halls, labor organizations used the more spacious saloons to conduct organizing and recruiting drives. Saloonkeepers often welcomed the rank and file of labor unions, well aware that many workers enjoyed alcoholic beverages before, during, and after meetings. Eventually, the relationship between the saloon and the organized **labor movement** became strained. While union members

certainly favored the saloon and feared temperance and prohibition, union leaders worried about the effects of alcohol on the image of labor. Some labor leaders even worked actively in favor of prohibition. A chief example is the leader of the **Knights of Labor**, **Terence V. Powderly** (1849–1924). A teetotaler, Powderly openly spoke in opposition to the saloons and encouraged members of the Knights to avoid them. Powderly worked to form an alliance between the Knights and the Women's Christian Temperance Union (WCTU). Eventually, the campaigns by the WCTU and what would become the nation's most powerful temperance organization—the Anti-Saloon League—would bring an end to the saloon era.

Members of temperance organizations—generally native-born, aristocratic Protestants—viewed the saloon as the root of a host of social ills such as **poverty**, domestic violence, crime, prostitution, and pauperism. Frequenting saloons caused men to neglect home and family, and too much of a worker's pay ended up in the cash register behind the bar. The popularity of the saloon among immigrants was also a factor in its demise. The drinking customs brought to America by immigrant groups and perpetuated at the local saloon were considered immoral. Immigrant workers and their drinking posed a threat to morality, and they needed to be reformed. Temperance groups—who made the saloon their chief target—also found support among many of the nation's business leaders. Owners of mines, mills, and factories came to believe that sobriety increased productivity. Workers who drank were considered sluggish and unreliable. They were also more prone to illness and absenteeism. Sobriety also became equated with workplace safety: workers who consumed alcohol were considered a danger to other workers. Business leaders such as Henry Ford, Andrew Carnegie, Gustavus Swift, and Cyrus McCormick became convinced that a dry workforce was not a bad idea. They joined hands with prohibitionists to bring change through legislative action. The ultimate result was the passage and ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution—National Prohibition.

Of course, the consumption of alcoholic beverages did not end when National Prohibition went into effect at 12:01 a.m. on January 17, 1920. As saloons closed, illegal "speakeasies" flourished. By 1933 the "noble experiment" was viewed as a disastrous failure, but when repeal brought alcohol back, lawmakers made provisions to ensure that the old saloon system operated by brewers would not come back. In fact, prohibitionists were so successful at tarnishing the saloon with a negative image that the term itself never really came back into vogue after the Eighteenth Amendment was repealed. The local drinking establishment became more commonly known as the "bar," or "tavern."

Despite the increasing popularity of sports bars, topless bars, and bars in restaurant chains in recent years, the number of small, privately owned drinking establishments has dropped steadily since the 1930s partly because of a decline in industrialization and a dwindling customer base. Advances in the packaging of beer (e.g., the development of canned beer) and the mass production of electrical refrigeration beginning in the 1940s meant that consumers were no longer limited to enjoying beer in draft form at the local tavern. In addition, thanks to efforts by advocates of responsible drinking, strict penalties for drinking and driving and underage drinking have emerged in the United States since the 1970s, giving more people a reason to enjoy alcoholic beverages at home.

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SANDERS, BERNARD (September 8, 1941–)

ROBERT E. WEIR

Bernard Sanders is an openly socialist politician who counts **Eugene Debs** among his political heroes. Sanders served as Vermont's sole legislator in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1991 to 2007, making him the longest-serving independent in Congressional history. He gave up his House seat to make a bid for the U.S. Senate and in 2007 became the first avowedly socialist U.S. senator.

Sanders is the son of Jewish-Polish **immigrant** parents. He was born in Brooklyn, where his father worked as a paint salesman and his mother as a homemaker. Sanders attended high school in Brooklyn and attended Brooklyn College for a year, but transferred to the University of Chicago, from which he received his BA in 1964. In that same year Sanders and his first wife moved to Vermont. In 1971 Sanders joined Vermont's newly formed Liberty Union Party, a democratic non-revolutionary socialist party with loose ties to the **Socialist Party** USA. Like most Liberty Union members, Sanders was an outspoken opponent of the Vietnam War. He ran for the U.S. Senate twice and the governorship twice, but never garnered more than 6 percent of the vote. Sanders quit the Liberty Union Party in 1977, after concluding that its uncompromising nature reduced its effectiveness. For years thereafter, there was rancor between Sanders and L.U. secretary Peter Diamondstone.

In 1980 Sanders was persuaded to run for mayor of Burlington against Gordon Paquette, an entrenched Democratic machine politician. In a stunning upset Sanders won the election by twelve votes. More poignantly, the leftist Sanders took office the same year that conservative Republican Ronald Reagan became president. Alarmists predicted that Sanders would convert Vermont's largest city into the "People's Republic of Burlington," but Sanders's version of municipal socialism proved to be moderate and fiscally sound. He broke up many of the city's "Old Boy" networks and placed numerous city services out for competitive bid, a maneuver that enhanced city coffers and allowed him to spend more on youth and arts programming. His second wife, Jane O'Meara Sanders, was once Burlington's Director of Youth Services. The Sanders administration also oversaw the rehabilitation of the city's downtown commercial district, the passage of tenants' rights laws, an expansion of low-income housing, the building of a new sewage plant, and the creation of the nation's first city-funded community land-trust housing association.

Sanders's most controversial moves involved battles with the local cable company over taxation, and with planners seeking to develop the city's Lake Champlain

waterfront. Sanders forced the cable company to lower its fees and also charged all privately owned utilities a franchise fee. This was part of an overall plan to shift the tax burden away from property owners. To that end, the Sanders administration also negotiated rooms and meal taxes. He also took on the Vermont Central Railroad and private developers over lakeshore property. In a series of hardball political maneuvers Sanders was able to secure public use of the waterfront, where a community boathouse was built for sailing enthusiasts and where a bike trail now connects several city playgrounds, parks, and camping areas.

Sanders's enormous personal charisma attracted idealists and, in 1982, the Progressive Coalition was formed. It has become an effective third party in much of Vermont. Coalition members routinely run for Burlington City Council and, on occasion, field statewide candidates. Sanders served as Burlington mayor for eight years, and his Progressive Coalition successor, Peter Clavelle, has held the mayor's chair for much of the time since 1989.

Sanders made unsuccessful bids for the governorship in 1988 and the House of Representatives in 1990, and was elected to the latter in 1992. He has been very popular among Vermonters and was reelected six times. Sanders was officially an independent, but he normally caucused with Democrats in the House. As a representative, Sanders was careful to support issues that Vermonters supported, including dairy farm price supports, low-income heating assistance, veterans' benefits, and—in a move that angered some liberals and leftists—gun owners' rights. He has also been a proponent of allowing Americans to buy cheaper prescription drugs from Canada.

Sanders has been controversial. True to his socialist background, he is a vocal critic of media consolidation, the undue influence of the military-industrial complex, corporate tax benefits, and free trade. Although Sanders claims to be an internationalist, he has called for the repeal of the North American Free Trade Act, which he says has cost tens of thousands of jobs. Like Ralph Nader, Sanders decries corporate influence in America and has called for a shift in priorities to give breaks to the working class and lower middle class rather than tax cuts for the wealthy. He also supports free universal health care, legislation that would prevent corporations from raiding employee pension funds, a curb on media mergers, windfall profits taxes on big business, anti-sweatshop legislation, and an end to ATM fees. Sanders opposed the war against Iraq, and has been openly contemptuous of the George W. Bush administration. He views the Patriot Act as an assault on privacy and civil liberties and has supported changes to it. Sanders also opposed Bush's plans to revamp Social Security as well as its prescription drug program for senior citizens.

Sanders's many critics see him as an obstructionist, an ideologue, and an extremist. Sanders, however, dismisses such charges and points to public opinion polls that place his views with the majority. His political success has been inspirational to those seeking to break the Republican/Democratic stranglehold on American politics, but thus far the Vermont model has not been widely transplanted. Sanders is, however, one of the few American politicians to place social class at the fore of political discourse. The American Federation of Labor–Congress of Industrial Organizations gives Sanders a 100 percent mark for his support of working Americans.

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SANGER, MARGARET (September 14, 1879–September 6, 1966)

SHERI BARTLETT BROWNE

tion to the military during World War I.

Sanger, born Margaret Louisa Higgins in Corning, New York, grew up in an Irish Catholic family with a gregarious but hapless father drawn to radical politics, and a careworn mother whose tuberculosis and constant childbearing led to her early death at age fifty. Margaret participated in a rigorous nursing program at a local hospital, becoming exposed to the plight of women whose relentless maternal miseries touched her heart and moved her to anger. While there, she met and married her first husband, William Sanger. After moving to New York City in 1911, the Sangers participated in the political and intellectual milieu created by **socialists**, feminists, and radicals involved with the **Industrial Workers of the World** (IWW). Introduced to the indomitable **Emma Goldman**, Sanger began writing

articles on hygiene and sexuality for the *New York Call*. An essay on venereal disease, "What Every Girl Should Know" (November 1912), which the Post Office banned as obscene, was later reproduced by the federal government for distribu-

Margaret Louisa Sanger was a famed and controversial advocate of **birth control**.

Sanger established *The Woman Rebel* in 1914, a journal which promulgated ideas about women's sexual liberation and fertility control. Influenced heavily by the IWW's militancy, *The Woman Rebel* was fiery in its rhetoric and attacked **capitalism** and sexism. Sanger's political views evolved during a 1913 trip to Europe, where she discovered that Europeans discussed family limitation openly and with general approval; upon her return she distanced herself from socialists and championed reproductive rights as her only cause. Sanger first coined the phrase "birth control" and saw it as a revolutionary demand for all women, but especially **working-class** women for whom large families were often a sentence for lifelong **poverty**.

Sanger and her husband were indicted for distributing *The Woman Rebel* and *Family Limitation*, a pamphlet that described a variety of birth-control devices and how to use them effectively. Their trials garnered support on the political Left and resulted in a flood of letters from desperate women wanting more information about how to control the size of their families. In 1916 Sanger and her sister Ethel Byrne, who was also a nurse, opened a clinic in Brownsville, New York, a primarily working-class neighborhood. Hopeful women crowded into the facility, although Sanger's staff could dispense no more than basic contraceptive information. After their arrest for local and federal obscenity charges, Sanger and her colleagues engaged in hunger strikes to increase support for their cause. The tactics worked, convincing Sanger to launch the New York Birth Control League, which evolved into the American Birth Control League (ABCL) in 1921.

Sanger is controversial for her alliance with the **eugenics** movement in the 1920s. Using racist and anti-immigrant rhetoric, Sanger promoted sterilization for certain groups of **immigrants** and the poor, whom she considered troublesome or unworthy; concurrently she lauded the positive aspects of birth control for native-born **middle-class** women whom she believed were in need of more sexual freedom. Like many eugenicists, Sanger accepted the notion that people's characteristics were hereditary and not shaped by environment.

While Sanger was participating in conferences with prominent eugenicists, she realized that her involvement with eugenics might alienate doctors from the birth-control movement. Sanger had long held the view that physicians were the appropriate persons to dispense contraceptive devices in her clinics, and while the alliance with eugenicists might have been philosophically and politically intriguing to her, it was not pragmatic. A liberal reading of the obscenity laws by the courts compelled Sanger and her ABCL to work diligently to extend doctors' rights to prescribe contraception for a broad range of



Margaret Sanger. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

women's physiological disorders. Thus she continued to view birth control and its access as a medical "problem" to be treated by licensed physicians. In keeping with Sanger's philosophy, the ABCL created a host of state legislative bills to establish clinics where "doctors only" could prescribe contraception.

Although Sanger's legislative efforts were for naught in the 1920s, the movement gained momentum throughout the subsequent decades. Despite virulent attacks by the Catholic Church and criticism by Mary Ware Dennett's Voluntary Parenthood League, which campaigned legislation to remove contraception from medical settings entirely and make it available to anyone anywhere, Sanger persisted as an effective organizer and fundraiser. Despite her protest in 1942 the ABCL changed its name to the Planned Parenthood Federation of America, partly to make its aims more palatable in an increasingly conservative climate. As Sanger matured, she and her cause diverged from the radical roots and the feminism she originally espoused. Arguably liberating for many white, middle-class women of the twentieth century, birth control often has been used as a weapon against women of the **underclass**. As reformers, birth control activists did not use Sanger's ABCL and its clinics to empower women but as patronizing goodwill agencies, thus dividing women across class lines instead of uniting them in common cause. Sanger's legacy is complex and controversial and deeply embedded in class, race, and gender politics.

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SCHOOL TRACKING

TINA BRAXTON

School tracking is the practice of providing different curricula for different categories of students. School guidance counselors select a "track," or placement level, for each student, based on scores on standardized tests, usually administered in eighth grade. Tracks fall into three categories—academic, vocational, and general. Academic tracks prepare children for a four-year college. Vocational tracks prepare children for skilled jobs, providing training in specific skills. A general track is prescribed for students expected to work at unskilled jobs. The justification offered is that tracking accommodates the students' differing abilities, needs, interests, and future careers. Critics point out that the track system is proportioned according to available funding and labor market predictions. Thus, tracking merely channels students into a career path tailored by outside interests and not necessarily appropriate to their potential. Tracking also encourages focusing resources at the top, thus denying the advantages of enrichment and quality teaching to the students who most need them. Inflexibility is another problem. The lower tracks do not develop students' special abilities, as levels of rigor or lack of it are fairly constant within each track. Changing tracks is difficult or impossible, since the gap between tracks increases each year a student is in the program.

Tracking is often a form of **social reproduction**. Children from affluent homes are usually tracked into academic programs or given a choice between academic and vocational tracks, while children from poor, African American, and **Hispanic** families are over-represented in the lower tracks. Some even charge that the general track is a form of **segregation** within schools that otherwise seem racially integrated. In school districts with inadequate funding, even the academic track might lack sufficient course offerings to prepare students for high-ranking colleges and professions. Tracking is universally considered inappropriate at any level before high school, but unequal funding among school districts creates a de facto tracking at every age level.

Tracking originated early in the twentieth century, as more children began attending high school. At the time, high intelligence was commonly considered a hereditary or racial trait, mainly restricted to persons of northern European ancestry. Some educators believed, however, that other children could benefit from practical training in vocational skills and scientific homemaking. Few children graduated from high school; in 1920 only about one-third of the appropriate age group even enrolled and about half of that number finished. But it was presumed that those who did attend would derive benefit and increase their usefulness as citizens.

The general track was devised later. During the **Great Depression**, families were encouraged to keep their children in school rather than putting them in the labor market, where they would depress wages. In 1940 the graduation rate reached 50 percent. By the end of World War II, some educators came to believe a sufficient number of skilled jobs would never be available for most people, so a track was devised to provide students with a useful course of study that did not focus on either academic or job training. A major aim of the general track was to resign these young people to their fate of low-wage, low-status work. The general track concentrated on consumer education, childrearing, personal health, and citizenship.

So-called life adjustment education was resented by outraged parents and teachers and was replaced by general survey, practical, or remedial classes. But this was not much of an improvement. An opportunity to replace the general track with intensive instruction, cultural enrichment, and high-quality teaching, as most industrialized countries have since done, arrived with the Space Age; however, that opportunity was quickly discarded.

Postwar prosperity, suburban expansion, and the rising enrollments of the 1950s made a revamping of American education inevitable. During the **Cold War**, the Soviet Union's entry into space convinced the federal government to provide the funding necessary to make quality education available to every child. National security demanded the fullest development of academic talent. The National Defense Education Act of 1958 and its extensions provided funding to build new, modern schools, design new curricula, train new teachers and professors, and assist low-income students who wished to attend college.

The next target was **poverty**. Social scientists came to understand that poverty and discrimination—not heredity—inhibited scholastic achievement, and that these problems could be solved. The 1960s **War on Poverty** seemed to promise the uplift that would enable more poor children to succeed. But funding for antipoverty programs evaporated as the war in Vietnam escalated, while a backlash against campus activism curtailed the expansion of educational opportunity. By the end of the 1960s tracking was back, in the guise of career education. Defunding of poverty programs and public education, which continues to this day, created a kind of systemic tracking—severe economic disparity.

Many families that could afford it have since fled the **public schools** for **private schools**. Recent closures of low-cost urban **Catholic** schools have eliminated the private alternative for many **working-class** families. Meanwhile, decades of budget cuts in public schools are felt at all levels. Some public and private schools provide a good education to college-bound children as well as those interested in vocational training, but poorer school districts rarely provide well for either group. In addition to this general, economic form of tracking, many school districts still use formal tracking.

Academic tracks consist of classes in advanced mathematics, laboratory science, history, English composition, literature, foreign language, and fine arts. Many classes are taught in interesting formats by the most experienced and qualified teachers. Poorly funded schools have fewer course options, poorer facilities, and less-qualified teachers. Fees are often charged for lab science, foreign language, or fine arts courses, making them less accessible. Thus, in poor schools even the better students are tracked downward.

With rapid technological change, business and vocational courses no longer provide adequate preparation for most students to enter skilled jobs immediately after graduation. Many vocational students take a general track, followed by technical training or **community college** after graduation, or after obtaining a General Equivalency Degree (GED). Students experiencing academic difficulty might be encouraged to drop out of school altogether and, perhaps, pursue a GED in the future.

Most teachers consider tracking unfair, but few favor abandoning it, because there are problems inherent in alternative systems. One replacement is heterogeneous grouping, which places students of differing abilities in the same class. These classes are difficult to teach and require special training for many teachers. They also eliminate "honors" and "advanced placement" courses, and the special diplomas often awarded for the advanced track. Parents of advanced-track students often object to this, because they value the advantage their children receive from such classes. Teachers also object to eliminating these classes, since they enjoy teaching them.

Another alternative is ability grouping, which uses scores from achievement tests and teacher recommendations to determine the correct placement for each student in classes on different subjects. Under a system of ability grouping, the student can be placed in classes for different ability levels in different subjects. While ability grouping is generally considered the best alternative to tracking, it is expensive and difficult to implement. For it to be effective, similar or identical courses must be available in several sessions per day, for different ability levels. For most districts, many classes would be too small to be practical or cost-effective. Budgetary constraints would lead to cuts that effectively restored the track system.

Despite widespread criticism, tracking has not only remained in place, but expanded to a systemic form of organization. It continues to prepare the children of wealthy families for the best futures, while confining the poorest children to the most limited futures.

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SCHOOL VOUCHERS

BRENDA K. BRETZ

School vouchers are, in essence, credits designed to assist parents in sending their children to schools other than local tax-supported institutions. Public schools in America are funded by a combination of state and local taxes. Each state commits a certain dollar amount for every child to attend public school, generally within the child's local geographic area, and pays this amount directly to the public school

system. The majority of students attend public school in their neighborhood. Those students attending a private school typically come from more affluent families that can afford the high tuition of private **education**, or from families with strong religious convictions who value the religious-based study even if it causes financial sacrifice for the family.

With a voucher plan, parents who choose not to send their child to the local public school receive assistance to subsidize private school tuition. Several proposals being debated would exempt these families from paying local school taxes. Another plan would be to give the money that has already been allocated to educate their student in the public school system directly to the family to use to offset the cost of tuition at the private school.

Proponents of the second plan argue they should receive a state subsidy because they are still paying local taxes to the public system even though their child is not attending that school. An argument for either plan is that families who remove their child from the public school system are benefiting the public schools and those who remain there by reducing the overcrowding that plagues many public schools in the United States. In addition, they believe that, by giving families a choice where to send their students and the money that has been allocated for students' education, revitalization of the public schools will result. Since schools will be forced to compete to hold on to students who might now have financial means to go elsewhere, they will be motivated to improve the quality of the education, thus benefiting all students, including those who don't use the school voucher for private school education. The availability of vouchers would allow families to choose schools with the expectation that the better schools would receive the most students and the state money that accompanies those students.

Opponents of the voucher system include teachers' unions, public-school officials, and some representatives of low-income and minority groups who argue that the public school system is the foundation of American education. Vouchers, they say, will benefit middle- and upper-class students by subsidizing payments for those who are already committed to spending the money for private school. In addition, the migration of students, particularly middle- and upper-class students, from public schools would reduce the much-needed funding for those schools, resulting in lower quality of education. They also believe that families who are dissatisfied with the quality of the education for their children currently fight to make the schools better. With school choice and vouchers, families can simply remove their children from the system and go elsewhere, leaving behind those students whose families cannot or will not assert themselves to effect the necessary changes to improve the quality of the program. Opponents also charge that school choice would create a **segregated**, class-based system of education with lower-income students in public schools and middle- and upper-class students in private schools. As a result, the one institution that serves to bring the disparate groups of society together, providing children with a unifying common experience and helping to shape American culture, would be lost.

The popularity of vouchers rose in the early 1980s and was a favored ideal of the **Reagan** administration. The concept had dwindled by the mid-1990s, and courts routinely struck down the implementation of voucher programs for parochial and other religious-based schools under the legal standard of separation

of church and state. In 2006, however, the Republican Party announced a \$100 million voucher plan to assist private education. That plan had little chance of passing and was widely viewed as an attempt by conservatives to shore up their political base. Since the 1990s charter schools have become more popular. The latter are semi-independent schools that are not accountable to local school boards. They are organized by sponsors—ranging from educators and parents to private corporations—and contracted for a set period. There are currently more than 3,600 charter schools, but results have been mixed and they too have proved controversial.

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SCHOR, JULIET (November 9, 1955–)

ROBERT E. WEIR

Juliet B. Schor is an economist, sociologist, and activist whose research on work, leisure, and **consumerism** has challenged conventional wisdom and stimulated public debate. She is currently a professor of sociology at Boston College.

Schor received her BA from Wesleyan University in 1955, and a PhD in economics from the University of Massachusetts at Amherst in 1992. She taught at Williams College, Columbia, and Harvard before joining the faculty at Boston College in 2001. She is a highly lauded scholar who has been a Brookings Institute fellow, a Guggenheim recipient, the director of Harvard's women's studies program, and the holder of a chair at Tilburg University (The Netherlands). She has been an advisor to a host of national and international organizations, including the United Nations, the World Institute for Development Economics Research, the International Labour Organization, and the Economic Policy Institute. Schor is also an activist who has been involved with the Democratic Socialists of America Party. She is the founder of South End Press, and the cofounder of the Center for the New American Dream. Schor is married to economist Prasannan Parthasarathi, and the couple has two children. Much of Schor's commentary appears in popular media outlets.

Schor's work often challenges assumptions about **capitalism**, consumer patterns, and the nature of work. During the 1980s, for example, numerous employers claimed that American workers were less productive than those in competitor nations. They used the mantra of needing to be "more competitive" to slash wages, increase work weeks, and battle the **labor movement**. In *The Overworked American* (1992), Schor demonstrated that American workers were, in fact, working many

more hours than those in Europe or Japan and that their output was greater. She also assessed the social costs of a work week that averaged 39 hours in the mid-1970s but soared to about 47 by the 1990s: higher levels of stress, declining amounts of time spent with families, and an overall decline in leisure. Moreover, a decline in **real income** required that employers work harder and that more family members join the labor market in order to maintain consumer levels associated with a quality lifestyle. Even when they obtain goods, however, many Americans suffer from "time poverty."

In works such as The Overspent American (1998) and Do Americans Shop Too Much? (2000), Schor is critical of advertisers, credit lenders, and the media for promoting consumer ideals that encourage Americans to overconsume and take on debt. She argues that a new consumer peer group has been manufactured by television and movie executives, by slick advertisers, and even by politicians seeking to stimulate consumer spending as a way to artificially prop up the national economy. For much of the twentieth century, Americans measured their relative affluence vis-à-vis their immediate neighbors, coworkers, and close associates. In the past few decades, however, Americans have been encouraged to compare themselves to the glitzy images that appear in the media; in essence, the standard is now a glamorized external fantasy. In the "new consumerism," Americans purchase many things they do not need, throw away tons of useful items, buy goods for their status value rather than usefulness, and engage in patterns of conspicuous consumption that millions can afford only by incurring debt. She notes that Americans now own and consume twice as much as they did in 1948, yet they have less time to enjoy it and they often cannot afford the things they purchase. In Born to Buy (2004), Schor extends her critique to marketing and advertising schemes directed at children. In her analysis, commercial interests are socializing children to be unreflective, brandconscious consumers before many of them have even entered school.

Schor also connects time poverty and overconsumption to a decline in civic life, community, and social consciousness; thus, Americans have less time to do volunteer work or socialize. And because Americans now carry such heavy debt loads, they are more likely to oppose tax increases, social spending, and other **welfare** programs designed to alleviate economic **poverty**. They have less money to give to charities and are more likely to view the world myopically, that is, through the eyes of their own family and themselves rather than considering broader community, national, or global perspectives. She links rising levels of poverty and bankruptcy to increased consumerism.

Schor's work has been controversial. Some accuse her of holding a puritanical view of consumer goods that denies the pleasures inherent in them. She has raised ire by likening credit card companies to drug pushers and by accusing politicians of placing corporate welfare above the needs of social welfare. Still others see her as a hopeless romantic, and some of her solutions leave her open to such a charge. This is especially the case for her call for voluntary lifestyle downsizing and her suggestions that white-collar workers be compensated for overtime and that employers reduce the work week. Schor's call for the federal government to assume a greater economic regulatory role also bucks current trends. To Schor's many champions, however, she has opened a national dialogue on issues long ignored, and even some of her critics concede that current debt-driven consumerism is unsustainable in the

long term. Schor also wins kudos for refocusing attention on the costs—social as well as economic—to the toll that long hours and high debt exact on the **working** class and the middle class alike.

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SEEGER, PETE (May 3, 1919–)

RON BRILEY

Pete Seeger is one of America's best-known proponents of folk music, renowned for his arrangements of "Where Have All the Flowers Gone," "If I Had a Hammer," and "Turn, Turn, Turn." In addition to his music, Seeger forged a career noted for his commitment to civil rights, the **labor movement**, and freedom of expression.

Seeger was born in New York City. Both parents were on the faculty of the Juilliard School of Music. His mother, Constance Edson Seeger, was a violin teacher, and his father, Charles Louis Seeger, was a renowned ethnomusicologist who was active in progressive politics. Following in the family musical tradition, Seeger learned to play the banjo and guitar by his teens. Seeger enrolled at Harvard in 1936, but he dropped out two years later to devote his energies to his passion for collecting folk music. While working with folk archivist Alan Lomax, Seeger was able to meet and record folk artists **Woody Guthrie** and Huddie Ledbetter (Leadbelly).

In 1940 Seeger formed the Almanac Singers along with Guthrie, Lee Hays, and Millard Lampell. The singing group supported the reelection of Franklin D. Roosevelt as well as the organizing efforts of John L. Lewis and the Congress of Industrial Organizations. However, the Almanac Singers opposed American intervention in World War II until after the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. This made it appear to conservative critics that the musicians were supporting the Communist Party (CPUSA) line. With American entrance into the war, the Almanac Singers embraced the international struggle against fascism. The Almanac Singers disbanded during the war, with Guthrie joining the Merchant Marine and Seeger serving in the Pacific and entertaining the troops with folk songs.

Seeger opposed the emergence of the **Cold War**, lending his voice to the Progressive Party candidacy of former Vice President Henry Wallace. FBI harassment of Seeger's national network of folk music, called People's Songs, Incorporated, contributed to the bankruptcy of the organization in 1949. The remnants of

People's Songs morphed into *Sing Out! Magazine* in 1951, now the nation's oldest publication devoted to folk music, much of it in the social protest tradition.

Seeger rebounded in 1948 by joining with Lee Hays, Ronnie Gilbert, and Fred Hellerman to form The Weavers. This folk group enjoyed considerable musical success with the song "Good Night Irene," which sold over 2 million copies and reached number one on the pop charts in 1950. The Weavers followed this initial success with such hits as "So Long It's Been Good to Know You" and "Kisses Sweeter Than Wine." The leftist political slant of The Weavers, however, led to the group's losing concert dates and being blacklisted. The Weavers disbanded in 1952 and Seeger became a solo artist. He



Pete Seeger leading the crowd in "When We March into Berlin" at the opening of the Washington labor canteen, sponsored by the United Federal Workers of America and the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), 1944. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

is sometimes credited with helping develop the college concert, as campuses generally faced fewer blacklist pressures than municipal venues. In 1955 The Weavers held a triumphant reunion tour in the wake of Senator Joseph **McCarthy**'s censure. Seeger left The Weavers in 1958.

McCarthy's fall notwithstanding, Seeger continued to face persecution for his political views. Although he had supposedly left the CPUSA in 1950, Seeger was called before the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) in 1955. Refusing to cooperate with HUAC, Seeger was found guilty on ten counts of contempt of Congress. His conviction was overturned on appeal, but not until 1962.

The folk musical revival of the late 1950s and early 1960s resurrected Seeger's career. His version of "Where Have All the Flowers Gone" became a Top 40 hit in 1962. That same year Peter, Paul, and Mary covered Seeger's "If I Had a Hammer," and in 1966, The Byrds achieved a number one hit with their version of the folksinger's "Turn, Turn, Turn." The folk resurgence, nevertheless, came to a symbolic halt in 1965 at the Newport Folk Festival, when folk icon Bob Dylan amplified his performance for a sound more like **rock 'n' roll**. Legend holds that an outraged Seeger, who considered electrical rock music to lack authenticity, attempted to pull the plug on Dylan's performance. (In fact, he only mused over doing so.)

Although disappointed with Dylan, Seeger continued to campaign for civil rights and against the war in Vietnam. He popularized the civil rights anthem "We Shall Overcome," and he provoked national controversy in 1967 when he attempted to perform his anti-authority ballad "Deep in the Big Muddy" on the *Smothers Brothers Comedy Hour*: When CBS censors cut the segment, the network was deluged with protests, including those of Tom and Dick Smothers. Seeger performed the song in 1968, just weeks before the Tet offensive eroded public support for the Vietnam War.

In the 1970s Seeger's politics turned to more local and environmental issues. He founded the organization Clearwater, focusing on the restoration of the Hudson River. He also did a series of highly acclaimed tours with Woody Guthrie's son, Arlo, which brought awareness of folk music to a new generation. Seeger has lent his name and talents to virtually every progressive cause of the past four decades. In 1994 Bill Clinton awarded Seeger a Presidential Medal of the Arts. He was inducted into the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame in 1996 and won a Grammy Award in 1997. Today Seeger rarely performs his music publicly. Nevertheless, the continuing political relevance of Seeger is evident in the 2006 **Bruce Springsteen** release *We Shall Overcome: The Seeger Sessions*.

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SEGREGATION


LAURA HERNÁNDEZ-EHRISMAN

Segregation refers to a physical separation of categories of individuals, usually on the basis of gender, **race**, religion, or class. In the United States, this term usually refers to racial segregation of African Americans, though this has affected other racialized groups as well. Segregation can be de jure or de facto—sanctioned by law or by custom. Segregation is usually an involuntary system for those singled out, though in a few instances voluntary segregation has existed in American history as well. Segregation affects both public and private space.

In the era before the **Civil War**, the most segregated spaces were in the North and in Southern cities. In the North de facto segregation against African Americans flourished in schools, restaurants, and other public spaces. In some cities African Americans responded by creating separate churches, schools, and fraternal orders. Northern populations endorsed a system of racial exclusion under the custom of "separate but equal."

Legalized segregation arose in the South after the Civil War. Slavery was abolished by the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution. New forms of controlling and inhibiting the mobility of African Americans emerged quickly, however, in the postwar South. White southerners created Black Codes, which drastically restricted the freedom of ex-slaves. Southern legislatures, dominated by Democrats, passed these codes in a blatant attempt to continue the economic system of slavery, if not its official status. These codes factored into almost all aspects of life, and were designed to guarantee that ex-slaves would continue to serve as agricultural laborers. Codes regulated civil and legal rights, from marriage to the right to hold and sell property. Laws differed from state to state, but most compelled freedmen to work, regulated hours of labor, and dictated the types of occupations by requiring specific licenses for work outside of agricultural or domestic fields.

Many of these codes were abolished during the Reconstruction era (1866 to 1877). Radical Republicans pushed civil and voting rights in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and the Civil Rights Act of 1875. However, the Black Codes set a precedent for the subsequent Jim Crow laws that emerged in the late nineteenth century. As Democrats returned to power in most Southern states, restrictions on African Americans returned. The temporary freedom that they had found under Reconstruction, including voting rights, education, and political power, quickly eroded when Republican-enforced federal



Drinking fountain on the county courthouse lawn, North Carolina, 1938. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

Reconstruction ended. In 1896 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the right of states to pass discriminatory legislation and legalized the separate-but-equal doctrine. Segregation continued until the mid-twentieth century, when the court reversed its earlier decision, starting with its 1954 *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka* ruling on public schools. African Americans generally attract the most scholarly attention, but other racial and ethnic groups have been segregated from whites as well. For example in Texas, Mexican Americans were often segregated in public spaces through the use of restrictive housing covenants, and people of Japanese descent were placed in internment camps during World War II. **Jewish Americans** have also found their choices restricted by law and custom.

Segregation characterized almost all aspects of public space, including restaurants, transportation, and parks. For example, whites and African Americans would often be required to eat separately, use separate public toilets, and sit on separate park benches. Racial segregation was pervasive in the railroad industry, with racespecific passenger cars and divisions. Segregation also affected the housing market. State constitutions had clauses giving local jurisdictions the right to regulate where members of certain races could own or rent homes or apartments. White landowners often included restrictive covenants in deeds to prevent nonwhites from purchasing the property. In the 1948 case of Shelley v. Kraemer, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that such covenants were unenforceable in a court of law, but social custom prevailed for decades thereafter. "Miscegenation" laws prohibited people of different races from marrying. For example, Utah's marriage law had an antimiscegenation component that was passed in 1899 and was not repealed until 1963. African Americans and Asians serving in the armed forces served in segregated units during World War I and II. Most professional and scholastic sports teams were segregated by race as well.

Pressure to end racial segregation in the government grew among African Americans and progressives after the end of World War II. In 1948 President Truman signed Executive Order 9981, ending segregation in the armed forces. Other federal efforts to end segregation quickly followed in a series of Supreme Court decisions. In 1954 *Brown v. Board of Education* held that separate facilities were

inherently unequal in the area of public schools, effectively overturning 1896 *Plessy v. Ferguson* that had enshrined the separate-but-equal doctrine. These decisions slowly dismantled the state-sponsored segregation imposed by Jim Crow laws. Institutionalized racial segregation was also ended as an official practice through the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the 1965 Voting Rights Act.

However, much of the work against local ordinances and the social custom of segregation came as the result of acts of civil disobedience. Activists such as the Rev. **Martin Luther King Jr.** and Rosa Parks, and organizations such as the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, were crucial in overturning the daily practices of segregation. Some have argued that in spite of the legal changes since the 1960s, the United States remains a deeply segregated society in terms of residential patterns, schooling, and employment opportunities.

Since the 1960s, in fact, de jure segregation has quietly given way to de facto patterns. Schools of the early twenty-first century are more segregated than they were at the time of the *Brown* decision, simply because whites have fled the **inner cities** and have relocated in **suburbia**, where residents are overwhelmingly white. In some rare cases—such as African American **fraternities** and **sororities**, college residence halls, or social clubs—members of minority groups sometimes choose self-segregation for cultural or social reasons. For the most part, though, patterns of de facto segregation are an ugly reminder that America's racist and nativist past lingers.

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SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY

ROBERT E. WEIR

Self-fulfilling prophecy refers to the tendency for predictions, expectations, or labels to cause the action, outcomes, or behaviors they project. This "you-get-what-you-expect" concept was dubbed the "self-fulfilling prophecy" by sociologist Robert K. Merton in 1957. It is also sometimes called the Pygmalion Effect, a reference to the Greek myth in which a sculptor falls in love with a statue of a nonexistent woman who becomes real. The central idea behind the self-fulfilling prophecy is that individuals form (at least part of) their self-concept based on how others see them and what others expect of them. The concept is of utmost importance in criminology, educational psychology, and social work.

Merton simply labeled a phenomenon of which social scientists had long been aware. Charles Horton Cooley, for example, coined the phrase the "looking-glass"

self" in 1902 to describe the way in which individuals based their sense of self in how they thought other people saw them. Even his critics, including George Henry Meade, agreed that self-perception was a factor in one's overall socialization patterns.

The self-fulfilling prophecy took on gravitas in the 1960s and 1970s as new educational, criminal justice, and **poverty** studies emerged. In 1968 Robert Rosenthal and Lenore Jacobson did a path-breaking study with elementary school children. Teachers were told that a small group of "intellectual bloomers" tested as having extraordinary ability. In fact, these students tested in the average range for IQ. Their teachers began to interact with the "bloomers" as if they were gifted, and the students, in turn, increased their achievement levels and their IQ test scores. Rosenthal and Jacobson concluded that encouragement and positive labeling were the most important factors in explaining student improvement. Rosenthal repeated this experiment with a group of Harvard psychology students in 1971, telling one group that the rats they were training were "maze bright" and another that their rodents were "maze dull." Even though there was no difference in the two sets, the "maze bright" rats dramatically outperformed the "maze dull" animals.

The Rosenthal/Jacobson model is now standard in educational psychology. Although schools in **suburbia** have long featured positive reinforcement models, those in the **inner cities** often stress social control over self-actualization. Moreover, minority students and those from the **lower class** often carry negative labels imposed by society. This has led some educators to emphasize the urgency of instilling positive self-esteem among students from troubled neighborhoods and backgrounds. **Head Start** is one of several programs that tries to build self-esteem. Other innovative programs include Boston's Algebra Project, the brainchild of former civil rights activist Robert Moses. Moses uses high expectations and positive reinforcement with African American high school students involved in high-level mathematic computation.

Deviance and criminal theory also stresses the power of the self-fulfilling prophecy. In now-classic sociological studies, Howard Becker and Irving Goffman demonstrated the perniciousness of labels. Becker demonstrated that being labeled a "delinquent" or a "criminal" was the major *cause* of deviant behavior in some cases, while Goffman argued that the "stigma" attached to such labels had a long-term negative effect on those who bore them. Other scholars noted that how one is perceived often predetermines the social contacts individuals make, their **work ethic**, their attitudes toward **authority**, and their overall integration into society. In *Tally's Corner* (1967), Elliot Liebow showed that self-fulfilling prophecy could even be a two-way street. White contractors assumed that black construction workers would steal materials and paid them lower **wages**. In order to supplement low wages, some black construction workers were *compelled* to steal.

Self-fulfilling prophecy theory is also of importance to social theorists and social workers. Members of the lower class routinely report low self-esteem and a sense of powerlessness. Very often these feelings are reinforced by the social agencies with which they interact. Impersonal bureaucracies are a culprit, but so too are well-meaning programs designed to foster **self-reliance**. Several **Great Society** programs faltered because their top-down approach to clients did little to empower them. African Americans frequently complain of the paternalism implicit in programs

in which decision making resides at the top and those receiving services are expected to be grateful recipients but not planners.

A small group of thinkers, politicians, and commentators feel that attention to self-fulfilling prophecy is a form of coddling that discourages personal responsibility. Within the criminal justice community there has been a renewed emphasis on shaming, in essence using a negative label to induce positive behavior. For the most part, though, Americans agree that high expectations correlate with better results; disagreement rages over how to set and measure expectations and what to do when they are not met.

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SELF-RELIANCE

ROBERT E. WEIR

Self-reliance is the notion that autonomous and free individuals should be responsible for their own social well-being. In the United States self-reliance is closely related to theories of **individualism**. Some observers go so far as to assert that self-reliance is a component of the American character. It becomes controversial, however, when it is evoked as a nostrum to address social problems.

Historians have noted an essential tension between individualism and collectivism from the onset of English settlement in North America. The Puritans, for example, saw society as organic and integrated, a vision often at odds with the individualistic ethos of merchant activity. Colonists frequently debated competing visions of society. The first saw government as the agent of a collective commonwealth in which community needs took top priority, while proponents of an opposing view argued that government's proper role was to guarantee liberty so that individuals could rise of their own accord. By the era of the American Revolution many of the Founding Fathers adhered to views of self-reliance. Benjamin Franklin remarked that "God helps them that help themselves," an aphorism so often quoted that many Americans mistakenly think it is from the Bible. Thomas Jefferson spoke for many when he remarked, "I predict future happiness for Americans if they can prevent government from wasting the labors of the people under the pretense of taking care of them." Probably the most famous expression of self-reliance comes from the eponymous 1841 essay by Ralph Waldo Emerson, who saw society as "in conspiracy against the manhood of every one of its members." Emerson counseled a life of nonconformity and individual uniqueness, and he connected political independence to self-reliance.

Remarks such as these have, however, often been stripped of their context. Franklin linked self-reliance to a rigorous practice of virtues designed to bring the individual to a state of moral perfection, while Jefferson equated self-reliance with

agrarianism and economic self-sufficiency. Emerson is even more misunderstood. It is doubtful that many contemporary conservatives who evoke him would be comfortable with his attacks on organized religion, whose tenets were among the forces he saw as antithetical to self-reliance. He, like the writer Nathaniel Hawthorne and proponents of transcendentalism, also encouraged individuals to reject social convention, take their cues from nature, and follow the yearnings of their souls.

A generalized belief in the virtue of self-reliance became prevalent among the **upper** and **middle classes** of the **Gilded Age**. Many nineteenth-century homes contained tomes of *Self-Help*, published by Samuel Smiles in 1859. Smiles had once been active in the Chartist movement, a British reform movement aimed at empowering the British **working class**. By the 1840s, however, he had abandoned collectivist goals in favor of individual self-improvement. Smiles never abandoned the idea of charity, but his seeming emphasis on self-determination resonated with American notions of **Social Darwinism**. So too did the rags-to-riches novels of **Horatio Alger** (1832–1899), the Muscular Christianity movement, and the real-life drama of individuals such as **Andrew Carnegie** and **Theodore Roosevelt**, who respectively overcame **poverty** and personal tragedy using their wit and determination. Stories from the American frontier also reinforced the presumed virtues of self-reliance.

By the late nineteenth century, however, the **labor movement**, social workers, reformers, and ministers involved with the **Social Gospel** movement called into question the ability of individuals to take care of their own needs in the face of **robber barons**, economic instability, inherited wealth, and other obstacles. Many pointed to the widespread poverty of factory workers, **immigrants**, and to the horrific disease-ridden **ghettos** into which they were crowded as evidence that individuals suffered from problems they did not author and were powerless to change. **Settlement houses** arose to assist the urban poor and social work emerged as a profession. By the twentieth century there was increased awareness of the existence of social problems, those misfortunes that were caused partly (if not mostly) by the economy, social conditions such as discrimination, and political **disenfranchisement** rather than by individual failings. Many **Progressive Era** reforms placed government in the role of directing reform efforts.

During the **Great Depression**, many **New Deal** programs were rooted in the economic theories of **John Maynard Keynes** and assigned the government an even greater role in alleviating poverty and regulating the economy. The New Deal touched off a debate that was re-fired during the **Great Society** programs of the 1960s and resonates to the present day. To their supporters, government job creation programs, **welfare** benefits, affirmative action initiatives, economic regulations, and social spending are needed (even though often inadequate) to address structural unfairness within the American economic and social systems. To their detractors, such efforts damage self-reliance, foster dangerous dependency on the government, stifle individual initiative, and coddle a permanent **underclass**.

Liberals and conservatives spar over how self-reliance can best be promoted. Liberals generally call for greater social spending to remove social disadvantages facing the poor, minorities, and women. They argue that "leveling the playing field" is a necessary precursor to self-reliance. Conservatives counter that deregulation and tax cuts will empower the private sector, create a **trickle-down** economic

effect, and create opportunities for all who wish to seize them. Some even argue that such opportunity already exists, but that "social engineering" and emphasis on identity politics has replaced the idea of self-reliance with a self-pitying therapeutic model of society. Many counsel that individuals should "pull themselves up by their own bootstraps." (Ironically, one of the earliest known uses of that phrase was from V. I. Lenin, who doubted it could be done under capitalism.) Proponents of radical self-reliance cite everything from the economic theories of John Kenneth Galbraith to the group therapy mentality of the "Oprah Winfrey Show" as causes of America's eroding self-reliance ideals.

The current debate, like its historical antecedents, is rooted as much in passion as in information. It often artificially positions self-reliance and collectivism as polar opposites rather than points on a continuum. Self-reliance also gets presented as a method rather than a goal. Most Americans would agree that self-reliance is desirable. Whether it is always possible is a point of contention.

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SENECA FALLS CONVENTION

JENIFER ELMORE

The Seneca Falls Convention, held July 19–20, 1848, in Seneca Falls, New York, was the first large-scale meeting ever convened for the purpose of defining and advancing the cause of women's rights. Of an estimated 300 people in attendance, 100 signed the convention's crowning achievement, the Declaration of Sentiments, which has been studied and emulated ever since as one of the foundational documents in the history of women's rights.

The convention was the brainchild of Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Lucretia Mott, two American women who first met while attending the World Anti-Slavery Convention in England in 1840. On its first day the Anti-Slavery Convention voted not to seat any women delegates, though many accomplished and committed female antislavery activists had traveled long distances with the expectation of attending and participating in the proceedings. The irony that so many of the world's leading antislavery activists denied women's participation in the convention using arguments similar to those that pro-slavery advocates habitually used to deny rights to slaves was not lost on Stanton and Mott, who decided to organize a women's rights convention in the United States after they returned home from England. The mundane cares of life intervened, however. In addition to her antislavery work, Mott was already a busy Quaker minister in Philadelphia and the mother of six children before she met Stanton. Stanton had just married the abolitionist

and lawyer Henry Brewster Stanton before the trip to England, and the couple started their large family (they eventually had seven children) shortly after returning to America. Eight years passed before the two women finally accomplished their goal.

Stanton, Mott, and three sympathetic women friends met near Seneca Falls on July 13, 1848, with no clear plans either to write a women's rights manifesto or hold a convention. Their mutual concern about women's economic and political subjugation energized them, however, and they quickly resolved to hold a convention just six days later. With the Declaration of Independence as an ideological and rhetorical template, and with input and encouragement from the four other organizers, Stanton composed the Declaration of Sentiments between July 13 and the first day of the convention on July 19. With only a few minor revisions, the document was adopted by the convention and signed by thirty-two men and sixty-eight women. Of all the rights and reforms demanded in the document, only one did not pass the convention unanimously: Stanton's call for women's suffrage passed by only a slim margin.

The signatories of the Declaration of Sentiments, most of whom lived within a fifty-mile radius of Seneca Falls and many of whom were Quakers, had been prepared to support women's rights by their experience with other public debates and reform movements: abolition, above all, but also African American men's suffrage, the long controversy over the proposed Married Women's Property Act in the state of New York, the Free Soil movement, and lesser issues related to equality within the Quaker community.

Public reaction to the convention and the declaration was more sarcasm and ridicule than outrage or engagement. Because of their long involvement in the antislavery movement, Stanton and Mott found some sympathy for the women's rights cause among abolitionists. Still, abolitionist leader and former slave Frederick Douglass was among the few men of influence who publicly supported the ideas expressed in the declaration. More often than not, however, men and women abolitionists considered the women's rights issue to be, at best, an unnecessary distraction from the more urgent causes of African American male suffrage in the North and, ultimately, universal emancipation. Failing to form a strong alliance between the fledgling women's movement and the abolitionist establishment before the Civil War, Stanton again attempted to form alliances with various reform movements under the umbrella of universal rights during Reconstruction. These efforts also largely failed, however, and Stanton briefly stooped to employing racist and nativist rhetoric in her public lectures and tracts in an attempt to frighten opponents of women's suffrage into supporting it as a way of counteracting the potential voting power of newly enfranchised African American and immigrant men.

From the perspective of social class, the most important contribution of the Seneca Falls Convention is that it established a theoretical framework, firmly grounded in the highest ideals of the American Revolution, for women to act as a separate class in demanding equal rights. Previous struggles had involved social and economic classes, racial differences, and ethnic differences, but a political struggle based on gender was new. The convention and the Declaration, as well as the women's movement that grew out of them, had other class-based

dimensions and ramifications as well. The early women's movement quickly split into moderate and more radical branches: the moderates were more interested in legal and economic reforms that would ameliorate the living and working conditions of women, while the radicals insisted on obtaining the vote. Most of the former were well-to-do, white, mainstream Protestants while the latter included more working-class women and members of "dissenting" sects such as the Quakers. Although it is easy to idealize the women's rights movement that was sparked by the Seneca Falls Convention, closer study of the movement reveals as much about class-based behavior as it does about gender-based behavior. Rather than uniting under the broad banner of their common gender, those women who had the most to lose socially and economically by associating themselves with the movement were the least likely to do so and those who had the most to gain by securing rights to property, fair wages, and access to education and jobs were those who embraced it. These competing interests among women, the competing interests of other groups that were seeking full civil rights, and the interruptions of the Civil War and World War I all combined to slow the growth and momentum of the women's movement, but after the Seneca Falls Convention the movement was never in serious danger of dissipating altogether. Eventually, nearly two decades after the death of Elizabeth Cady Stanton, the Nineteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States was passed, establishing voting rights for women.

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SENNETT, RICHARD (January 1, 1943–)

JACQUI SHINE

Richard Sennett is an urban sociologist who teaches at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the London School of Economics. He founded the New York Institute of the Humanities at New York University, led a United Nations commission on urban development, and served as the president of the American Council on Work. Sennett holds a BA from the University of Chicago and a PhD from Harvard University; he was also trained as a cellist at Julliard. A finalist for the 2005 Balzan Prize for humanitarian achievement, Sennett has written ten academic/nonfiction books and three novels.

His work is centered on the modern city, but within that broad rubric he considers class, **social mobility**, labor, and **inequality**; public culture and public performance; and urban design and architecture. In Sennett's work, experiences of

modern **capitalism** are intimately connected to the evolution of the modern **inner city**.

Sennett argues that **working-class** people are embedded in a social structure that equates personal dignity with upward mobility. This makes institutional life seem deeply personal and the pressures of the larger system appear intimately individual. In such a world, **wealth** accumulation becomes representative of character and social success. The apparent equality of opportunity becomes grounds on which to evaluate economic failures as personal weaknesses. His 1972 book *The Hidden Injuries of Class*, written with Jonathan Cobb, examines these deleterious personal effects through interviews and ethnographies with working-class white men in Boston. The book suggests that subjects were deeply aware of their class **status** and the ways in which they internalized and personalized their social positions. For their subjects, shame and anxiety about social class are countered by a redeeming commitment to, and belief in, upward mobility—even as they also acknowledge that their dignity ought not to be tied to economic achievement.

But the conclusions Sennett drew about class experiences in this early research were also situated within a post–World War II economy that allowed workers to spend their careers in one industry, or even with one employer, and to expect mutually beneficial loyalty and support from that employer. In the wake of global economic recession, dramatic shifts in the patterns of modern capitalism reshaped the nature of work and career into a postindustrial era of "flexible capitalism."

These changes became evident to Sennett in the early 1990s, when he encountered Rico, the son of Enrico, who had been a subject of *The Hidden Injuries of Class*. Their encounter laid the groundwork for Sennett's *The Corrosion of Character: Personal Consequences of Work in the New Capitalism* (1998). The book engages in an extended comparison of the lives of Enrico and Rico to explore the changes capitalism has wrought, both in terms of economic productivity and individual character. If *The Hidden Injuries of Class* argues that work shapes identity, *The Corrosion of Character* extends the argument to assert that instability in work can lead to instability in identity—that work and labor have the capacity to more broadly alienate and isolate us.

Sennett continued to explore the themes of character and identity as shaped by work and labor in *Respect in a World of Inequality* (2003). The book's considerations are again framed by personal histories, including Sennett's memories of childhood in Chicago's Cabrini-Green housing project. Respect for the self and from others comes from honing one's talents, self-sufficiency, and charitable acts. Sennett implies all are tied closely to economic productivity and work. Ultimately, Sennett argues that social interactions—from government policy to daily conversation—should be undergirded with mutual respect, even as they are also pressured by race and class, and even as they are shaped by patterns of work and production.

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SERVANT CLASS

MARY WAALKES

Servants in America during the colonial era often fulfilled contracts or indentures that bound them to four to seven years of work. Indentured servants bartered their freedom for a chance at land and a competency, or independent livelihood based on land ownership. This was especially true in the Tidewater area of Virginia and Maryland, where individuals who paid the transportation costs for servants received a headright, or 50 to 100 acres of land, along with their servant's labor as an incentive to settle the land. The introduction of tobacco as a cash crop encouraged this process and, until indentured servants were replaced by slaves, thousands of indentured servants came to America. The resulting pressure on the land created class tensions with landless former indentured servants locked out of purchasing or settling on the most profitable lands.

In New England, servants also signed indentures, but their contracts often followed a traditional European pattern of learning a trade. Families bound their children over to various trades until the children reached the age of twenty-one. New England servants experienced better conditions of servitude than did Southern servants, possibly because the New England economy was less sharply competitive than that of the Tidewater region.

By the early national period, views of servants changed for at least two reasons. In the North, discussions of liberty and equality made servants unwilling to be called such, preferring the term "help." The indentured servant who worked on a farm became instead the hired hand, and the servant class became increasingly dominated by women. Visitors to America commented on the lack of deference paid by servants to their employers. In the South, this was less visible, but the servant class was altered by the institution of **slavery**. The work that slaves did, especially regarding caring for white people's physical needs, was considered beneath the dignity of whites. Long after the **Civil War**, jobs such as cooking, housecleaning, barbering, and laundering continued to carry racial connotations.

The **Industrial Revolution** in America increased the size of the **middle class**, who, by the late nineteenth century, hired their servants from among recently arrived **immigrants**. Employers emphasized class distinctions by reemphasizing **deference**, which they did by dressing their servants in livery, or uniforms, and by placing spatial distance between themselves and their servants. Outside entrances for servants, attic rooms, and separate staircases were means of reinforcing class distinctions.

Ethnicity also played a role in servants' experiences in nineteenth-century America. Irish maids and cooks, often generically named "Biddy," were believed to be larcenous, lazy, and sluttish in their behavior. As they were cheap, they were nonetheless employed. German or Scandinavian servants were viewed as a cut above the Irish, though their social status still fell below that of women who worked as millworkers. However, immigrants themselves might have had a very different perspective, viewing domestic service as honest work that trained a young woman to eventually run her own home.

After the Civil War, African American women continued until the 1940s to work in domestic service in large numbers. **Racism** closed entry to other occupations so

that an African American woman with a college degree might well discover that her only option for employment was to work in a white person's home as a cook or maid. Whereas white women generally worked in domestic service prior to marriage, or when widowed, black women worked as servants even after marriage if their husbands were similarly relegated to low-wage work.

Servants were not protected by early **New Deal** legislation, gaining **Social Security** protection only in 1951 and the **minimum wage** in 1974. Today, a smaller percentage of Americans employ domestic workers, and they often pay their servants under the table. (This is especially true of the untold numbers of illegal aliens employed as servants.) Wages range from very good to below minimum wage, and immigrants and African Americans continue to make up a larger number of servants than do native whites. Although historically not represented by unions, the United Domestic Workers of America in 1979 formed in California to advocate for domestic workers. Home care workers who assist disabled and elderly individuals, and who are supervised by the county but paid by the state of California, have successfully achieved improvements in **wages**, working conditions, and benefits. However, many domestic workers, often immigrants, continue to work in exploitive conditions that may include low wages, no benefits, insecure work hours, and sexual exploitation.

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SETTLEMENT HOUSES

LAURA TUENNERMAN-KAPLAN

Settlement houses were a type of nonprofit agency, particularly popular in the early decades of the twentieth century, that addressed the conditions and needs of immigrants or urban poor. The name "settlement house" came from the idea that reformers, often well-educated and wealthy individuals, "settled," or resided, in the area they served, in the house or agency building itself.

Settlement houses, as centers of social reform, usually focused less on giving aid or meeting the needs of individuals than on identifying neighborhood and societal problems and working to eliminate them. The organizing ideals of settlements were often described as the "three Rs": residence, research, and reform. Residence clearly related to the idea of settlement workers actually living in the neighborhoods they served. Research and reform related to the mission of the settlements where workers looked into the problems in their neighborhoods and crafted solutions, sometimes in the form of programs and sometimes in the form of reform legislation, to address them. Settlement workers were thus generally viewed as reformers: men and women who aimed to improve the living and working conditions,



King Philip Settlement House in Fall River, Massachusetts, 1916. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

and at times even prevent the problems of urban centers.

Toynbee Hall, founded in East London, England, in 1884, is generally identified as the first settlement house. Americans who visited this agency and often trained there quickly brought the idea to the United States. The first U.S. settlement was founded on New York's Lower East Side in 1886, and a handful more were founded before 1890. In the next decade the number of settlements in the United States grew to 100; by 1910 there were at least 400 settlements, with most urban centers supporting several. Settlement houses were primarily urban agencies founded near the populations they served. Often

they focused on helping particular immigrant groups, though many also served African Americans, especially during the Great Migration.

Settlements were founded and run by educated elites, often recent university graduates who were looking for a way to engage in charitable work. By their design, settlements offered these individuals, often women with limited career prospects, the opportunity to live in poor neighborhoods, to gain a better understanding of the problems there, and to develop programs and proposals to address those needs. Many settlement workers were inspired by religion, but most settlements also took a "scientific approach" to their work. Social work was a relatively new profession; hence, many newly trained social workers used urban neighborhoods as their laboratories. Notably, many settlement house workers went on to become influential **Progressive Era** and **New Deal** reformers. As such, settlements can be viewed as training grounds for future reformers, influencing social welfare policy well outside the bounds of the institutions themselves.

Settlement houses offered the neighborhoods they served a wide variety of services. Most offered kindergartens, nurseries, and day care centers to improve the conditions for the children of **working-class** women. Many also provided leisure activities that were popular with their clients and their children, such as men's clubs, arts and crafts classes, libraries, gymnasiums, and a variety of cultural programming. Other programs, such as milk wells and nursing services, focused on improving health. Settlements also offered services to help "improve," or Americanize, immigrants, such as English classes, penny savings banks, employment agencies, and parenting classes.

The National Federation of Settlements, a national organizing body founded in 1911, encouraged a degree of standardization among settlements. Though settlements often shared a common approach, there was also a great deal of variety among them. For example, Hull House, the Chicago establishment operated by **Jane Addams** that is the best-known settlement, opened its doors to labor union meetings and publicly criticized business interests. Many other settlements, however, were founded and funded by industrialists and aimed specifically at helping

recent immigrants and rural migrants become better industrial workers. Similarly, while some settlements focused on "Americanization" and showed little interest in the cultures of those they served, others such as the Playhouse Settlement, which served the African American community in Cleveland, worked to develop and promote its clientele's heritage and culture, in this case through the opening of Karamu Theater.

Many early twentieth-century settlements continued to serve their neighborhoods even as the populations around them changed in composition over many decades. Numerous settlement houses persisted throughout the twentieth century, though they often evolved in organization and purpose. Many became community centers and most lost the idea of residency as a key part of their mission.

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SEVEN SISTERS

NEDA MAGHBOULEH

The Seven Sisters are seven independent, nonprofit undergraduate colleges established in the late 1800s for the exclusive education of women. Formally recognized as the "Seven College Conference" in 1926, the informal moniker draws from a prominent star cluster in the Northern Hemisphere as well as the Pleiades, seven sisters from Greek mythology. Located in the northeastern United States, member institutions are Mount Holyoke (founded as a seminary in 1837), Vassar (1861), Smith (1871), Wellesley (1875), Radcliffe (1879), Bryn Mawr (1885), and Barnard (1889). Exceptional for their rigorous admission criteria and emphasis on the liberal arts, the Sisters are among the nation's most monetarily **wealthy** and well-resourced institutions of higher learning.

Both individually and collectively, the Seven Sisters were consciously shaped as a response to **elite** male institutions like those of the **Ivy League**. The founders of Mount Holyoke, Smith, and Wellesley—imbued with an urgent sense of Christian duty and service—originally hoped to draw a large proportion of students from **working-class**, New England farming backgrounds. The other Sisters, however, actively courted benefactors and applicants from the more cosmopolitan, secular pockets of American society. Bryn Mawr, in particular, gained notoriety for its German-trained faculty, Tiffany stained-glass windows, and a prohibition against the household chores expected of students at the other Sister schools. Thus, by the 1890s Bryn Mawr had set the expected standards for elite women's education in the United States, and the other Sisters shifted their efforts accordingly. By recruiting an Ivy-trained faculty, affiliating with leading names in industry and politics, and

showcasing masterworks of architecture and horticulture on their campuses, each Sister college ultimately catered to the erudite young women of the **upper** and upper-**middle class** throughout much of the twentieth century.

Each institution was founded with the intent of providing women with educational opportunities equal to those traditionally reserved for men. Though ostensibly committed to broader social reform, each Sister's strict focus on gender parity nonetheless obscured the ways in which these educational opportunities were fundamentally denied to or complicated for women from nonwhite or low-income backgrounds. For example, in the early 1900s several Sisters were thought to hold restrictive quotas against ethnic minorities and came under scrutiny from the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People in an investigation led by W. E. B. Du Bois. Similarly, with the exception of Wellesley and Smith, students of color were initially forbidden to live on campus and intentionally isolated from the many social events that marked life at an elite women's college. That said, the first students of color who attended Sister schools were still not particularly representative of American society. Though less privileged than their white classmates, they nonetheless hailed from prestigious urban institutions and neighborhoods in which they were members of an elite social stratum based on appearance, wealth, and education.

As the Sisters' endowments grew, the civil rights and feminist movements brought issues of social inequity into greater focus once more. Hundreds of student groups have formed on each campus since the 1960s, debating issues of class, gender, race, and sexual orientation. Even the Sisters' mission to provide exclusive, elite education to women was suddenly up for debate among students and trustee members. To that end, Vassar became coeducational in 1969, and Radcliffe was absorbed by Harvard in the late twentieth century. Barnard, though governed as an independent women's college, is affiliated with and located within Columbia University. The other Sisters remain wholly independent and exclusively female.

Most recently, each Sister has been recognized for the economic diversity of its student body and the relative proportion of college endowment spent on student financial aid. According to a 2002 study published in the *Journal of Blacks in Higher Education*, the Sisters lead the nation's highest-ranked liberal arts colleges in enrolling large numbers of students from low-income families. In addition, Mount Holyoke, Smith, and Wellesley regularly enroll a substantial number of "nontraditional" aged students: older women who have had an interruption in their studies (often due to marriage/childbirth, military service, or financial limitations).

The Seven Sisters are still a cultural signifier for the best in U.S. higher education, as referenced in a 2003 episode of the *Simpsons*, in which brainy Lisa Simpson is offered a scholarship to the Sister of her choice. Although many coeducational liberal arts colleges now enjoy a similar prestige, the Sisters' liberal social atmosphere and commitment to educational access have ensured their relevance into the twenty-first century.

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Beginnings to the 1930s, 1984; "Women and the Academy," Barnard College History Department, Higher Learning in America Project (http://beatl.barnard.columbia.edu/learn/timelines/women.htm).

SEXUALITY

HOWELL WILLIAMS

Sexuality is one of many factors influencing social class. Theorist Michel Foucault concluded sexuality "induces specific class effects." Specifically, **bourgeois** society investigates and controls discourses associated with sexuality. The historical, political, economic, and social relationships between sexuality and **class struggle** continue to be controversial topics as scholars debate the historical concept of sexuality.

Because of the changing nature of historical and cultural understandings of sexual behavior and sexual identity, human sexuality is rarely defined, but rather described. For example, sexual identity—or a modern person self-consciously identifying as a heterosexual, homosexual, gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, intersex, queer, or a combination of the above—is a relatively recent phenomenon and one undergoing constant modification.

In eighteenth- and nineteenth-century America, Christian understandings of morality and purity influenced Euro-American understandings of sexuality. For example, ministers taught that the purpose of monogamous marriage was procreation. An understanding of distinct races also contributed to purity laws, such as those barring interracial sex and marriage. Although each of the thirteen colonies made interracial marriage illegal, there were many instances of sexual liaisons between white male slave owners and enslaved females. Masters usually refused to recognize children born out of such liaisons and the children were generally bound to **slavery** like their mothers. Marriages to "heathen" **Native Americans** were also forbidden. While European colonizers attempted to "civilize" Indians through cultural **assimilation**, education, labor, wealth, and religion, they did not allow for miscegenation that compromised the "purity of whiteness."

For the most part, studies of nineteenth-century gender and sexuality have been limited to the sexual conduct in **upper-class** Victorian society. Nonetheless, scholars agree that the nineteenth century created new discourses about sexuality at the same time sexual patterns were changing. People began talking about sexuality in more public ways, and the gap between private passions and public discussion narrowed.

The **industrial revolution** and triumph of **capitalism** in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries also created complex relationships between sexuality and class, not to mention race and gender. The legalization of contraception disturbed the prior link between sexuality and marriage. While wealthier women had more access to safer birth-control methods, poor women had few options. Sexuality was also a subject that became increasingly interesting to the privileged medical sector, who pathologized "non-normal" sexuality as opposed to "normal" sexuality.

Sexologists began to explore male and female same-sex relationships, thus developing the terms heterosexual, homosexual, lesbian, and gay. Some people accepted such labels, and others experimented with their identities. In large cities people attracted to the same sex met in bars, social clubs, literary societies, and YMCAs. However, such institutions segregated according to class, gender, and racial specifics. Homosexual men could more easily financially support themselves and have the freedom to pursue relationships, while women, especially working-class women, had little leisure time or financial support to pursue intimate same-sex relationships. Thus, historians have suggested that the emerging twentieth-century modern gay identity was dependent on a relationship with capitalism.

A homosexual subculture began to emerge in the 1920s and 1930s, but it was not until during and after World War II, when millions of men and women displaced from their homes worked in same-sex environments, congregated in port cities, and met people with similar sexual predilections, that an organized gay subculture emerged. People began to self-identify according to sexual orientations and behaviors, and secret groups formed to discuss strategies for lessening discrimination against homosexuals. The Mattachine Society, a club of **socialist**-leaning, intellectual, white, gay men in southern California, and the Daughters of Bilitis, a secret social club of white, lesbian women who wanted an alternative social outlet to bar culture, worked with psychiatrists, psychologists, and lawyers to educate themselves and the public on understandings of same-sex love. Other gays and lesbians took a more liberatory path toward changing society's conceptions of sexuality.

The Stonewall Riot in New York City in 1969 galvanized a gay liberation movement. However, as the movement has changed over the last few decades, so has discourse about gay liberation and class struggle. Does liberation mean promoting the ideals of classlessness and equal opportunities through assimilating ideologies such as gay marriage and participating in mainstream culture, or do class politics complicate such aspirations? Others argue that gay liberation must pay attention to class inequalities and politics.

Some scholars argue that politics based on sexual identity are problematic. Some activists and marketers group gays, lesbians, bisexuals, and transgendered people as a homogenous social group that is characteristically stereotyped by wealth, art, decor, fashion, and **high culture**—in other words, a consumer subculture with a potentially lucrative market value. A 1991 *Wall Street Journal* article called gays "a dream market" whose household income surpassed that of the national average. Marketers likewise pursue gays and lesbians as producers and consumers. There is a connection between social **status** and consumption; however, critics argue that all such surveys are flawed in that they homogenize a diverse community. Consider the politics of "coming out" or the political strategy to increase the visibility of a gay or lesbian identity. The process of coming out was and is dependent on class privilege. Not all working-class gays and lesbians have had the material means of independence, community support, or the resources to combat homophobia.

The historical narrative of sexuality in the United States has not been a linear, progressive story, but one of complex power relations. Historians are currently

working to nuance understandings of how class, ethnicity, and race complicate and construct sexuality in culture and history.

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SHARECROPPERS AND TENANT FARMERS

MARY WAALKES

After the Civil War, Southerners faced a labor problem. Former slaves wanted land but had no funds to pay for it, while landowners needed the freedmen's labor but had little cash on hand to supply wages. The negotiated response resulted in sharecropping and tenant farming. Tenant farmers entered an agreement with landowners whereby the tenants rented the land, using a portion of the crop, often around a third, to pay their rent. Tenants generally had some means with which to prove their suitability as renters, owning their own mules and tools, for example. Sharecroppers, on the other hand, generally needed to be outfitted by the landowner and therefore had less leverage to bring to the contract. Sharecroppers provided their labor and in return were given as much land as the cropper's family could farm, usually less than fifty acres. The landowner also provided a house to live in, a mule and plow, seed, farm tools, and a credit line at the local store. In return, the sharecropper turned the entire crop over to the landowner, receiving back the proceeds from half of it, minus what was owed to the store. As landowners were sometimes also local merchants, their economic interests were furthered by this system, especially as interest rates on debts owed the store could run as high as 25 percent.

Sharecropping and tenant farming occurred throughout the nation but was especially important in the South, where it became linked to cash crop farming, most notably with cotton production. While providing some individuals with means of eventually saving and buying their own farm, or with moving from sharecropper status to that of a tenant farmer, by the turn of the century the numbers of sharecroppers and tenant farmers outpaced that of farm owners. The South increasingly saw its economy become one in which a large peasant class was kept more or less in **poverty** relative to fluctuations in market prices for cash crops.

Although African Americans found sharecropping and tenant farming to be an improvement over **slavery**, the standard of living on the whole for tenants and sharecroppers declined in the decades following the Civil War. By the 1880s low cotton prices depressed farm economies, rendering it more difficult for people to pay their store debts at the end of the harvest. Many families owed more at the end of the year than they had earned. State laws protected the landlords more than tenant



African American sharecropper and his wife in Mississippi, ca. 1937. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

farmers or sharecroppers, who were deemed more transitory as workers and perceived to have less of an economic interest in the land. Lien laws ensured that landowners received their portion of the crop and that merchants were paid out of the remaining portion before the sharecropper or tenant farmer received any recompense for a year's work. Laws also required discharge of debts before tenants or sharecroppers could move on. For thousands of African Americans, debt peonage became a new form of slavery.

Unhappiness with recurring debt led to farm movements through which some tenant farmers hoped to find relief. The Patrons of Husbandry, or the Grange, formed in 1867. Although the Grange focused its attention more on farm owners,

it did press for changes in crop lien laws that would ease tenant indebtedness, assist tenants in saving to purchase their own farms, and develop cooperatives to lower farm costs. The Farmers' Alliance in the 1880s borrowed concepts from the Grange, also trying cooperatives as a means of increasing farm incomes, though most failed due to lack of adequate financial backing and to poor organization. The Alliances in the South and the Midwest attacked class interests represented by the banks, railroads, and grain merchants, who were perceived as taking more than their fair share to provide their various services. Christian and class rhetoric coexisted in Alliance meetings, reflecting a melding of tradition with a new sense of identity forged in opposition to **capitalists** who controlled the prices farmers received for their products. The Southern Farmers' Alliance recognized that its grievances were also shared by black tenant farmers and sharecroppers. The Colored Farmers' Alliance worked alongside white organizations, but members were at greater risk of physical harm because of racial antagonism in the South and the proliferation of supremacist groups such as the **Ku Klux Klan**.

From the 1870s overproduction of farm goods led to serious declines in prices. While farmers directed their ire toward banks, railroads, and merchants, their unseen foe was simply the increasing number of players in a world market, resulting in overproduction of products such as cotton on an international scale. Farmers were less successful in curbing their own tendency to overproduction, but they did receive a hand from the federal government in the 1930s with President Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal program.

The Agricultural Adjustment Act paid farmers to reduce their acreage in production at a time when farm prices were abysmally low. Farm owners gladly accepted the checks, generally did not share with their tenants, and later used the cash in hand to purchase farm machinery and remove tenants from the land. The resulting hardships to sharecroppers and tenant farmers can be seen in the 1930s farm protest movements of the **Southern Tenant Farmers' Union** and



Sharecroppers being moved from the roadside to an area between the levee and the Mississippi River, Missouri, 1939. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

the Share Croppers' Union. The first of these organizations was fostered by the Socialist Party, the second by the **Communist Party**; however, both organizations operated at a grassroots level without a strong loyalty to either the Socialist or Communist Party. Although attaining significant numbers, both groups were small but vocal. The organizations were biracial, and they incurred violence from farm owners who felt threatened by demands for better wages or a share in government crop reduction payments, especially when those demands were couched in rhetoric that was both racially provocative and that carried Marxist overtones.

A strong economy following World War II, along with mechanization reducing the need for farm labor, resulted in a further decline in tenancy as many people left the farms for industrial work, or were able to find their way to purchasing their own farms. Today, tenant farming and sharecropping still exists in parts of the nation, though not as commonly as prior to World War II. Ironically, sharecropping is more prominent in parts of the Midwest, where equipment costs are so high that it benefits landowners to split costs and profits with individuals who own the equipment but not the land.

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SHAYS'S REBELLION

ROBERT E. WEIR

Shays's Rebellion was an armed uprising of western Massachusetts farmers and working people in 1786 and 1787. It is named after its most prominent leader, Daniel Shays. Historians often link Shays's Rebellion and other rural uprisings to the calls for a stronger federal government that culminated in the creation of the U.S. Constitution.

The Shaysites, also known as "Regulators," were emblematic of the problems facing many rural dwellers in the days following the **American Revolution**. Daniel Shays was a farmer from Pelham, a hill town north of Amherst. He fought in the Revolutionary War, entering as an enlisted man and rising to the rank of captain. Shays won the praise of both George Washington and the Marquis de Lafayette, the latter of whom presented Shays with a ceremonial sword. Like many farmers, Shays hoped that the split from Britain would improve his financial lot; many, especially in western Massachusetts, were soon disappointed.

The Massachusetts economy was unsettled even before the war began. The merchant-driven economy of its eastern seaboard and of select market towns was increasingly characterized by monetary exchanges, whereas the more rural western and northern tiers were cash-poor. There, customary exchange, credit, and barter were commonplace before the Revolution and remained so afterward. Moreover, soldiers such as Shays were often paid in greenback scrip that was of little value in the immediate aftermath of the war. Like most states, however, Massachusetts needed to retire its war debt as well as fund government. To do so it enacted a series of taxes, many of which were **regressive** and several of which were similar to British taxes against which colonists had balked. The tax burden coincided with the tightening of credit in a cash-strapped society in which farmers and consumers were expected to pay hard currency for supplies and goods they could not themselves produce. The upshot was that many western Massachusetts farmers fell into debt and were forced to sell their land and personal items, often at cut-rate prices. Shays was forced to pawn Lafayette's sword as his debts mounted. In Massachusetts, landlessness had several other consequences. First, landlessness meant that males could not vote. Even more dire was the possibility of being hurled into debtors' prison.

To many commoners, Governor James Bowdoin seemed the aristocratic representative of a wealthy **upper class**. Much as before the revolution, meetings of disgruntled citizens led to organized agitation and demand for change. In several Massachusetts towns angry mobs refused to allow debtors' courts to convene, and several jails were breached and their prisoners set free. In the summer of 1786, Shays and others such as Luke Day and Eli Parsons formed militia groups. As anger simmered, Regulator ranks grew. Most were farmers, but there were also small businessmen, clergymen, and artisans among the Shaysites. Quite a few were veterans of the American Revolution.

The Regulator protests frightened Bowdoin and wealthy Bostonians. Under the Articles of Confederation, though, Governor Bowdoin could expect no help from the federal government. Likewise, the Massachusetts legislature—its representatives no doubt fearing reprisal—refused to authorize force against the Regulators. To

meet the rising challenge, Bowdoin raised a mercenary force led by General Benjamin Lincoln, with funds borrowed from bankers and wealthy merchants.

There had been surprisingly little violence until Bowdoin raised a private army. This act led Shays's group to march on the federal arsenal in Springfield in hopes of securing weapons. The uncoordinated attack of 400 Shaysites was met by a force of some 1,200 soldiers commanded by General William Shepherd. The Regulators were routed, and four were killed, the first deaths associated with the uprising. As Shays and his followers fled, they were pursued by Lincoln and more than 4,400 troops. The rebels were defeated in a raging snowstorm at Petersham on February 3, 1787. Shays escaped to Vermont, where he was harbored by Ethan Allen and President/Governor Thomas Chittenden. (There was no extradition provision under the Articles of Confederation and Vermont was, technically, an independent republic until 1791.)

Shays's Rebellion fizzled out, but not without attacks on wealthy landowners, several violent skirmishes, the hanging of two rebels, and a shakeup in Massachusetts government. The new governor, John Hancock, eventually pardoned Shays, who lived out his days in New York State. Several former rebels were even elected to state office in the years to come.

Shays's Rebellion has broader significance on several levels. First, it calls into question the importance of the American Revolution for non-elites. Many commoners were akin to the Regulators; that is, their immediate lot did not improve after separation from Great Britain. It also highlights the fear that many of the Founding Fathers had of the masses. Historians have debated the impact that Shays's Rebellion had on the decision to revise (then scrap) the Articles of Confederation, but they agree that it was on the minds of several of the leaders—including Washington and Hamilton—who most supported the passage of a new constitution. Some of the provisions of the U.S. Constitution—such as legislative appointment of U.S. senators, the creation of the Electoral College, and the power to raise a militia—have been viewed by some historians as examples of the class-based nature of the original U.S. Constitution. They also contrast the crisis surrounding Shays's Rebellion with the decisive and overwhelming force used to quash the Whiskey Rebellion in 1794. Most historians agree that mass democracy did not flow automatically from the American Revolution; rather it emerged from the bottom-up pressure applied by individuals such as the Regulators.

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SHOPPING

KAREN BETTEZ HALNON

In contemporary America, what one buys and where one shops is not always driven by necessity; it is also shaped by perceptions of social class. The relationship between **consumption** and class status is asserted in a number of sociological studies, such as **W. Lloyd Warner's** ethnographies, including *The Status System of a Modern Community* (1942), that describe how having the "right" house or furniture, and being able to afford living in the "right" neighborhood were the most important indicators of class status in a small community. Vance Packard's less scholarly yet astute and witty 1950s account of postwar consumption patterns in *The Status Seekers* (1961) describes how "snob appeal" aided middle-class consumers in their attempts to create middle-class distinction. Written in a similarly humorous yet elegant fashion is David Brooks's study of **bourgeois** bohemians, the new upper class, (or "bobos"), an educated class born in the fifties, anxious over its prosperity, and set on consuming material things *without* becoming "insufferable snob(s)." In *Bobos in Paradise* (2000), Brooks describes the educated elite **bobo** of the 1990s as a consumer who prizes **individualism** and freedom, and expresses these values through the consumption of what is deemed rustic, organic, authentic, natural, warm, craftsman-like, sensible, and sincere.

Perhaps the most enduring and reliable predictor of class status vis-à-vis consumer activity is the acquisition of property, whether conveyed through (lowerclass, "white trash") trailer park living or through the experience of living in enormous and ostentatious "cribs" (upper class, celebrity nouveau riche). The prototypical medium by which the middle class has expressed its class status through the consumption of property is **gentrification**, or the investment in, invasion of, and transformation of lower-class communities proximate to the city into middle-class ones, with the corollary effect of displacing (or pricing out and pushing out) the pre-existing inhabitants. Stated otherwise, gentrification is a classspecific means of acquiring property through the (victorious) application of what Pierre Bourdieu called cultural capital (taste, knowledge, aesthetic sensibility). In Distinction, a seminal work on the various ways middle-class distinction is expressed in French society and beyond, Bourdieu illustrated how the application of cultural capital is a value-laden transubstantiation of the profane, mundane, functional, or necessary. In the case of gentrification, the application of cultural capital involves the refurbishment, renovation, cultural "upgrading," or aesthetic transformation from lower-class distinction to middle-class distinction, a highly visible community transformation to anyone who has witnessed or experienced the gentrification process. According to Halnon (2006), in recent years this process applies to transformations of "symbolic communities" in popular consumer culture, such as those of muscles, motorcycles, and tattoos.

Visibility as a modality of expressing class status is becoming increasingly important in consumer society. According to **Juliet Schor** in *The Overspent American*, since the 1990s "visible lifestyle" has expanded dramatically to encompass many previously invisible expenditures (e.g., underwear, T-shirts, water, a cup of coffee, sneakers), and transforming these previously relatively class-neutral purchases into indicators of class status via **designer** logos (e.g., Hilfiger, Prada, Converse, Kenneth Cole, Timberland). Elaborating on branding in a "new branded world," in *No Logo*, Naomi Klein argues that a society saturated with **advertising**, commodities, and branded lifestyle consumption activity has produced consumers desirous of authenticity, which they seek in an array of alternative products from Fiji water and independently produced music to Apple "Think Different" computers to Che Guevara Revolution Soda. Thus, in this case (as in numerous others) class conscious-

ness is submerged by consumer consciousness, a deliberate and strategic outcome cultivated by the public relations arms of the culture industry, according to Stewart Ewen in *Captains of Consciousness*.

Whether in past or contemporary contexts, what is absolutely pertinent to class-distinguishing consumption activities is possessing the economic means to select class-appropriate consumer items, and having a facility with cultural capital (or class-specific taste, style, and sense of aesthetic sensibility) to make the appropriate consumer choices. However, given the context of a consumer society in which commodities proliferate and saturate the sociocultural landscape, alongside credit-aided consumption that pervades the class status system, today there exist a plethora of possible shopping modes and choices for demonstrating class status. As such, discerning the class to which one belongs via shopping habits becomes highly complex, especially when lower class statuses themselves—in fads and fashions such as "Ghetto Fabulous," "White Trash Chic," and "Poor Chic"—are now available to the masses across popular consumer culture. This shows up in things such as expensive designer pink flamingo jewelry, Von Dutch hats, Kenneth Cole bowling shoes, and (now fashionable) Dickies work clothes.

One of the central theoretical issues at hand in the present historical period, where **conspicuous consumption** pervades across social classes, is whether consumer habits can be reduced to anything more than simply matters of individual taste, self-expression, and self-stylization. Writers such as Mike Featherstone (2000) have challenged the postmodernist view, which answers this question negatively. He argues, rather, that consumer habits and tastes can still be "read," recognized, and mapped onto class structure, and that taste continues to define individuals. However, in recent years, many, if not the majority of, writers inside and outside academe have favored the postmodernist view that class status, as well as social statuses such as race, ethnicity, and gender, can no longer be read in consumer behavior. This perspective is often expressed in colloquial acclamations such as "it's just a style," as in the case of a wealthy suburban Caucasian youth adopting hip-hop trappings, while claiming that such a consumer preference has no relation to race or status. Echoing Featherstone's critical assessment of the lifestyle perspective, writers such as Collins, Halnon, and Schor argue that various culture industry products not only reflect class statuses, but also are implicated in the strategic reconstruction of class statuses (as well as class inequalities) across popular consumer culture.

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SILICON VALLEY

JESSICA LIVINGSTON

Silicon Valley refers to the area south of San Francisco, California, in the Santa Clara Valley. Silicon Valley, the site of silicon chip innovation and manufacturing, has been hailed with terms such as the "Epicenter of the Information Age" and the "Birthplace of Digital Age." As some of this manufacturing has now moved to other areas of the country, the term Silicon Valley also refers more generally to the concentration of high-tech businesses in a region. Successful companies headquartered in Silicon Valley include Hewlett-Packard, Apple Computer, eBay, and Google. **Wage** rates in the Valley are about 60 percent above the national average. Silicon Valley is particularly known for the legends of individuals becoming rich on stock options, and it is home to more millionaires per capita than anywhere else in the United States.

Although often portrayed as the site of the modern American dream, the enormous wealth generated in Silicon Valley depends upon the exploitation of workers. Gender and racial inequality figure significantly in the distribution of power in Silicon Valley industries. In the 1990s Silicon Valley employers claimed an alleged labor shortage, which justified their recruiting of immigrant professionals from Asia on H1-B visas. These professionals worked on six-year indenture-style company contracts at pay levels that were typically 15 to 20 percent less than non-immigrant workers. These imported workers were used to drive down the market value of technology skills and to replace higher-priced workers. The manufacturing and assembly jobs, which are the lowest-paid and most hazardous, primarily employ women, and female Asian and Latino immigrants make up more than 70 percent of the production workforce. Silicon Valley also has the most temporary workers per capita, and the workforce is non-unionized.

Although a major public relations campaign promoted Silicon Valley industries as "the clean industry," in actuality it is one of the most toxic. While making the necessary components needed for computers—microchips, printed wire and circuit boards, printers, cables, and other components of the electronics hardware—workers are regularly exposed to more than 700 different chemicals. Since the mid-1970s, studies have reported high rates of occupational illness among production workers, including birth defects, miscarriages, cancer, respiratory ailments, and unexplained fatal illnesses. Immigrants and people of color are not only concentrated in the most hazardous occupations but also in the most polluted neighborhoods. Silicon Valley has the most groundwater contamination and the highest density of federally designated toxic Superfund sites anywhere in the United States. ("Superfund" is the popular name for legislation passed in 1980 that allows state and local governments to apply for federal money to clean up contaminated sites if the liable party cannot meet those obligations.)

In addition to pollution, Silicon Valley has other urban problems including dense traffic, urban sprawl, and unaffordable housing. A lack of affordable housing means low-wage workers are forced to commute distances sometimes as far as 100 miles. Some workers are actually **homeless** and commute to work from shelters. Nonetheless, Silicon Valley's industrial habitat has been copied nationally and

internationally. It has been the model for postindustrial high-tech development with replicas such as Silicon Hills and Silicon Prairie (Texas), Silicon Desert (Arizona), Silicon Mountain (Colorado), Silicon Glen (Scotland), Silicon Saxony (Germany), Silicon Wadi (Israel), and Silicon Plateau (India).

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SILVER

See Gold.

SIMMEL, GEORG (March 1, 1858–September 28, 1918)

JACQUI SHINE

Georg Simmel was a German historian, philosopher, and social theorist who wrote about the interactions between individuals, larger society, and social institutions. His work mapped the ways in which social changes, like industrialization and urbanization, introduced a new tension between individual freedom and alienation. Along with his contemporaries Karl Marx and Max Weber, Simmel is one of the founders of modern sociology in Germany. The author of twenty books and many articles, Simmel's work on urban life and culture and economic exchange remains seminal.

Born in Berlin, where he would spend most of his life, Simmel received a doctorate from the University of Berlin in 1881. Though a charismatic and popular lecturer, Simmel was long relegated to a marginal position in the university community, working for many years as a *privatdozent*, an unpaid instructor reliant on student fees. Although he was finally awarded a full professorship by the University of Strasbourg in 1914, the outbreak of World War I soon cleared classrooms across the country. He died of liver cancer in 1918.

In Simmel's work, society is best understood by examining the interactions and relationships between and among people and institutions. These interactions, Simmel argued, are not just symptomatic of society, but they are, in fact, society. By extension, Simmel theorized that social identities derive not from static human conditions, but from specific patterns of social interaction.

In writing about the types of social roles that emerge through these contacts, Simmel was particularly interested in the status and category of the "poor," a social identity he saw as separate and distinct from economic **poverty**. He wrote, "It is only from the moment that [the poor] are assisted . . . that they become part of a group characterized by poverty. This group does not remain united by interaction

among its members, but by the collective attitude which society as a whole adopts toward it." Poverty, then, is socially assigned, "not determined by . . . fate and condition, but rather by the fact that others . . . attempt to correct this condition."

In "The Philosophy of Money" (1900), Simmel considered money as a social symbol. He argued that a transition from a barter-based economy to a money-based economy radically impacted economic exchange and, by extension, the relationships that support it. Money, he says, brought precision and rationality to economic exchange. Where the barter system, whose object-based exchanges could not be assigned precise values, relied on feelings and on relationships, a system of monetary exchange relies heavily on calculation. While this shift brought greater individual and geographic independence by introducing a common economic language, Simmel argued that this economic framework of rational calculation was also transposed to human relationships, bringing a similar non-emotive calculation to personal interactions.

Simmel also applied these theories of social interaction to better understand urban culture and economic exchange. One of his most famous works, "The Metropolis and Mental Life" (1903), explored the ways in which individuality and social identity were transformed by accelerating industrialization and urban life. If, as he argued, social life is built by interactions and relationships, the widening social circles wrought by urban life would bring less direct contact with other people in one's community, and thus less engagement in the life of that community. As urban dwellers developed a broader network of relationships with greater social attachments, individual identity would be an amalgam of those contacts, rather than a product of limited group identities and commitments. Yet individuals also have fewer close relationships, fewer of the cultural moorings that can ease the navigation of social life.

In such a system, Simmel argues that **consumerism** becomes a shorthand for identity: "Life is composed more and more of these impersonal contents and offerings which tend to displace the genuine personal colorations and incomparabilities. This results in the individual's summoning the utmost in uniqueness and particularization, in order to preserve his most personal core."

One might argue, based on Simmel's work, that class distinctions, though socially generated, become identity formations to cling to, providing codes of behavior and visible signs of group identifications with which to navigate an increasingly impersonal urban culture. As relationships moved closer to a rational economic model, it became easier to regard "the poor" as an indistinguishable, depersonalized group in need of social intervention—to both beneficial and deleterious ends.

Though his work was central to the early analysis of urban culture and had a broad influence on other thinkers, including Walter Benjamin, Simmel's legacy to the development of sociology is often overlooked. **Lewis Coser** argues that this oversight stems from the fact that he did not develop a "school" of adherents in the same way that his contemporaries did.

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SINCLAIR, UPTON (September 20, 1878–November 25, 1968)

RON BRILEY

Upton Sinclair was a prolific novelist noted for his social conscience and commitment to **socialism**. He is best known for *The Jungle* (1905), in which Sinclair exposed the horrendous health and working conditions in Chicago's meat-packing plants. It has been said that Sinclair aimed for the hearts of Americans and hoped to advance the cause of socialism, but instead hit his fellow citizens in their stomachs. *The Jungle* did not usher in the social millennium, but it did contribute to such **Progressive Era** reforms as the Pure Food and Drug Act and the Meat Inspection Act.


Sinclair was born in Baltimore, Maryland. His father was a liquor salesman with a drinking problem and Sinclair was primarily raised by his mother. The family moved to New York City, where Sinclair attended public school and graduated from City College in 1897. After attempting graduate school at Columbia University, Sinclair decided to devote his life to writing as a means through which to address the inequalities of industrial America.

His first novels, *King Midas* (1901) and *The Journal of Arthur Sterling* (1903), were poorly received. Rejecting the Christian **capitalism** in which he was raised, Sinclair opted for secular socialism and joined the **Socialist Party** in 1902. Following a poor reception for his **Civil War** book *Manassas: A Novel of the War* (1904), Sinclair wrote for the socialist weekly *Appeal to Reason*. After observing the working conditions of Chicago slaughterhouses, Sinclair produced *The Jungle*, which earned critical acclaim and financial success for the author. Sinclair used his fame and fortune to establish the Intercollegiate Socialist Society (later called the League for Industrial Democracy) and Helicon Hall Colony, a New Jersey commune that was destroyed by fire.

His novels following *The Jungle* continued to raise themes of class and politics, but these works were not as well received. *The Industrial Republic* (1907) envisioned America's conversion to socialism under the direction of President William Randolph **Hearst**, while *The Moneychangers* (1908) castigated a financier based upon **J. P. Morgan**.

Still active politically, Sinclair picketed the New York City offices of **John D. Rockefeller**, whom he blamed for the bloody suppression of the Ludlow, Colorado, coal strike in 1914 and denounced in the **muckraking** novel *King Coal* (1914). The novelist, however, broke with the Socialist Party over its opposition to American intervention in the First World War. Sinclair supported the war effort, though he was critical of President Woodrow Wilson's record on civil liberties and the president's opposition to the Russian Revolution.

During the 1920s the prolific Sinclair published seventeen books. In his so-called Dead Hand series, Sinclair produced a half-dozen nonfiction polemical works depicting how capitalism was undermining American democracy. The author also continued to address social issues in his fiction: Oil! (1927) focused upon the California petroleum industry and the Teapot Dome scandal, and Boston (1928) told the stories of Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti, the Italian anarchists convicted and executed for a robbery and murder in Braintree, Massachusetts. Sinclair interviewed Vanzetti for the novel and deemed the **immigrants** victims of capitalistic injustice.



Upton Sinclair. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

Sinclair responded to the onset of the **Great Depression** by composing *I, Governor of California, and How I Ended Poverty*. This political volume became the basis for the novelist's unsuccessful 1934 Democratic gubernatorial campaign, asserting that unemployment should be addressed through state ownership of industry. Sinclair's candidacy raised the ire of conservative Hollywood producers, who commissioned footage of an army of unemployed invading California if Sinclair were elected.

During the 1940s and early 1950s, the author published the Lanny Budd series of eleven novels. This series, based upon considerable personal research by Sinclair, was an ambitious effort to trace the history of the United States from 1913 into the Cold War through the eyes of the fictional Budd, an anticommunist with socialist sympathies. The Lanny Budd novels were popular, and many Americans learned their national history in the more than 7,000 pages of the series. *Dragon's Teeth*, the third book of the series, won a Pulitzer Prize in 1943.

Sinclair's productivity declined during the last years of his life, and he published his autobiogra-

phy in 1962. He died six years later at a nursing home near Bound Brook, New Jersey. Sinclair's writing failed to usher in a socialist America; however, his work contributed to a greater understanding of the gap between rich and poor in twentieth-century America.

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SINGLE-PARENT FAMILIES

See One-Parent Families.

SINGLE TAX

ROBERT E. WEIR

The single tax was an idea developed by nineteenth-century progressive **Henry George**, who proposed that all of society's existing taxes be abolished in favor of just one on what he called the "unearned increment" of land. George's ideas were

outlined in his 1879 book, *Progress and Poverty*, which won a worldwide audience and elevated George to a position of unparalleled prestige among members of the industrial **working class**.

When George wrote *Progress and Poverty*, there was no tax on personal income, little acceptance of the idea that social problems existed independently of individual character, and few checks on **Social Darwinian** views and practices. George sought a way to fund needed public projects, social services, and government programs. He was also alarmed by the rampant speculation of his time, especially the hoarding of land by investors, corporations, and realtors who had little plan of ever residing on their holdings. George noted that society measured wealth through land, labor, and capital. Income from land was derived in the form of rent, from labor as wages, and from capital as interest. In George's view, taxing labor or interest penalized human effort. Instead, one should tax benefits that accrue to individuals from nature or government actions, not their own efforts. The value of real estate, for example, tends to increase whether or not a person improves the land, those increases coming from infrastructure improvements, population increases, or building booms that have nothing to do with the owner's endeavors.

George's straightforward plan was to impose a 100 percent tax on the unearned increment on land. If a person improved the land, operated a business, or constructed a dwelling, those items would be tax-exempt, as these involved labors and hence would be "earned." But the value of land itself, he insisted, was determined by nature and society, and thus an individual had no right to profit from its sale. George believed that a properly enacted land tax would indeed be a "single tax," that is, the only revenue generator needed to fund government and social services. George also supported government seizure and regulation of what he called "natural monopolies," such as fisheries, mines, communications, and transportation.

In the latter part of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the single tax attracted numerous and ardent supporters, especially in the United States, Australia, Ireland, and New Zealand. George's ideas especially resonated with those contemptuous of landlords and high rents. There were even single-tax communities formed in which city services were funded by yearly assessments based on the value of land. Arden, Delaware, created in 1896, is probably the best-known of these communities. This suburban Wilmington community spawned two spin-offs, Ardentown (1922) and Ardencroft (1950).

The single tax became the basis for many land tax schemes around the world, though seldom exactly as George envisioned. It should be noted that George developed the single-tax idea at a point in history in which land-for-settlers was a prevailing ideal, and land itself determined **wealth** to a greater degree than later transpired. Eventually many thinkers and most governments came to support **income taxes**, as the direct correlation between land and wealth blurred. They also construed property more broadly than George and placed taxes on buildings and businesses that George would have exempted.

At least tangentially, most real estate taxes derive in part from the single-tax agitations of the late nineteenth century. Some communities, in fact, still set tax rates based on a percentage that exempts part of the property's value, a theoretical nod to "improvements." More common, though, is to tax properties at a set percentage of their assessed values.

The single-tax ideal lives on, with some advocates continuing to assert that it is a more-equitable and socially responsible way to generate tax revenues. In 1999, for example, the Canadian province of Alberta enacted a modified single-tax that lowered the property taxes for many Albertans. It also holds appeal across North America for many communities seeking to fund public services, schools, and social welfare programs in an age of shrinking state and federal subsidies. The International Single-Tax Association continues to advocate George's original vision.

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SIT-DOWN STRIKES/SIT-INS

ROBERT E. WEIR

Sit-down strikes and sit-ins are forms of protest in which activists occupy a job site, business, or administrative building instead of picketing from the outside. Sit-down strikes are job actions, whereas sit-ins are generally a form of civil disobedience. A 1939 Supreme Court ruling rendered sit-down strikes illegal, but they still occur, usually as spontaneous strike actions against employers. (The Court ruling makes it unlikely a labor union will sanction a sit-down strike, as it would be liable for damages.) Sit-ins are usually considered a type of criminal trespass, but federal statutes apply only if U.S. government property is involved.

Historians generally credit the **Industrial Workers of the World's** (IWW) 1906 strike against General Electric in Schenectady, New York, as the nation's first sit-down strike. In formal terms this may be so, but there were numerous previous incidents in which workers shut down machines and sat by their workspaces to protest conditions. The IWW strike did not capture the popular imagination, however, and sit-down strikes were sporadic thereafter. A 1933 strike in Austin, Minnesota, saw Hormel workers sit down for three days, and there were scattered sit-downs elsewhere, but the most famous example of a sit-down strike was one against General Motors (GM). During the winter of 1936–37, members of the United Auto Workers of America (UAW), an affiliate of the **Congress of Industrial Organizations** (CIO) occupied a GM plant in Flint, Michigan, for forty-four days. At its height 112,000 of GM's 150,000 workers were on strike. Most historians credit this successful UAW action as the strike that gave credibility to the nascent CIO.

The UAW's victory inspired the American **working class**, and a rash of sit-down strikes took place between 1937 and 1939. One estimate places a 485,000 figure for the number of sit-downers striking against employers between the UAW settlement and the spring of 1939. In addition to autoworkers, there were sit-downs involving occupations as diverse as hospital laundry workers, journalists, Woolworth clerks, rubber workers, and movie projectionists.

The Supreme Court's ruling that sit-down strikes were illegal removed a very powerful weapon from the **labor movement**'s arsenal and many militants have argued that unions were wrong to acquiesce to the court's ruling. They trace the decline of the labor movement to an overall decline in militancy. At the end of World War II, roughly 35 percent of nonagricultural workers belonged to unions; by the early twenty-first century, that figure had dipped to around 12.5 percent. Strikes against large employers have also dipped; in 1950 there were 424 strikes against firms with more than 1,000 employees; in 2002, just 14.

What labor pioneered proved a successful tactic for civil rights, antiwar, and other activists. Rosa Parks essentially used the sit-down tactic when she refused to yield her bus seat to a white passenger in Montgomery, Alabama, in 1955. Civil rights groups had used sit-in tactics since the 1940s, but Parks and a 1960 incident in Greensboro, North Carolina, inspired wider use of sit-downs and sit-ins. In the latter case, four African American students sat down at a **segregated** Woolworth's lunch counter. The Greensboro action spread elsewhere, many of which were coordinated by the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee. The Congress of Racial Equality sponsored the Freedom Rides throughout 1961, in which civil rights workers and supporters toured the Deep South and sat in at various segregated facilities. They encountered great violence from hate groups such as the **Ku Klux Klan**, but their actions helped spur the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which outlawed public segregation.

Student protesters also found the sit-in a powerful weapon. In 1964 students occupied an administration building at the University of California at Berkeley to protest campus restrictions on free speech. Members of **Students for a Democratic Society** organized numerous campus sit-ins through the 1960s. In 1969 Columbia University was the center of a dramatic sit-in that grew out of anti-Vietnam War protests plus the university's perceived **racism** in its dealings with an adjacent **ghetto**. Numerous campuses saw sit-ins in 1970 in protest of the U.S. government's illegal bombings of Cambodia and in reaction to the killing of protesting college students at Kent State and Jackson State.

Since the early 1970s sit-downs and sit-ins have generally gotten less media attention than previously, but they are still used by citizens to redress grievances. In 1986 the University of Massachusetts at Amherst was the scene of a sit-in to protest U.S. policy in Nicaragua. In a dramatic trial the next year, those arrested successfully used a "necessity defense" and argued that the Central Intelligence Agency was engaged in illegal activity.

Student, social justice, and labor groups continue to use sit-in tactics. The United Farm Workers of America has held sit-ins to protest the spraying of pesticides on agricultural workers and against Congressional figures it holds compliant with industry abuses. Likewise environmental and anticorporate groups held numerous sit-ins in Seattle in 1999 during meetings of the World Trade Organization. Student groups periodically use sit-ins to emphasize their views on issues ranging from sweatshop labor to U.S. foreign policy. For the most part, colleges are reluctant to prosecute student sit-ins, as such actions tend to increase campus tensions and lead to bigger protests. Many respond to student concerns by sponsoring teach-ins as an alternative. In 2006, for example, college campuses were generally quiet during mass protests against proposed changes in

U.S. immigration policy. Whereas **Hispanics and Latinos** engaged in sit-ins in several U.S. cities, most college campus protests took place within an official rubric. Although not as well-publicized, each year there are sit-ins at social service agencies, **homeless** shelters, and **welfare** offices. The sit-in remains a tactic through which those who lack social, political, and economic power can draw attention to their causes.

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SKULL & BONES

LISA L. HEUVEL

Skull & Bones refers to the oldest and arguably the most prestigious of seven secret senior societies at Yale University. Founded in 1832 by William Huntington Russell and Alphonso Taft (both Yale 1833), Skull & Bones is known far beyond the Yale campus for the elite status of its members and the shroud of secrecy surrounding its rituals and traditions.

Russell, Taft, and fourteen other students in the Yale class of 1833 constituted the first cohort of "Bonesmen," as members are now called. According to some media reports and published accounts, Russell was inspired while studying in Germany from 1831 to 1832 to create a chapter of a German student corps when he returned to Yale for his senior year. An early description of Skull & Bones, Lyman Bagg's *Four Years at Yale* (1871), noted that it was modeled after the original Phi Beta Kappa secret honor society.

Also popularly known by names such as The Eulogian Club and Lodge 322, the society's public corporate name is the Russell Trust Association. Its fiscal year 1999 assets were recorded as \$4,133,246, and its 1999 income was \$759,061. Bonesmen past and present are a "Who's Who" of American society, business, and government, including three United States presidents: George H. W. Bush, his son George W. Bush, and William H. Taft, son of Alphonso Taft. Among the well-known members of modern times are William F. Buckley, Senators John Chafee and the late Robert Taft, McGeorge Bundy, Henry Luce, and Archibald MacLeish. According to Yale graduate Alexandra Robbins, the fifteen Yale juniors tapped annually add to a pool of approximately 800 living Skull & Bones members at any one time. They are reported to go through intensive ceremonies associated with sexuality and mortality intended to bond them for life to one another and the society.

Beyond rituals attributed to Skull & Bones members during meetings and initiations in the "Tomb," as its windowless stone campus headquarters is known, there are widespread popular beliefs and conspiracy theories related to the influence of

its membership in America, notably in business, politics, and the Central Intelligence Agency. It is considered a major **power** enclave because of the impressive number of past and present military leaders, congressmen, and justices who have been members. Skull & Bones is known for its Eastern Establishment, with some initiates connected to the society through generations of membership, as is George W. Bush. Despite some reported internal controversy, it has diversified to tap female and multicultural Yale juniors who meet its traditional requirement of outstanding extracurricular achievements.

Skull & Bones is considered to be both a high achievement for a rising Yale senior and also the pathway to a successful and financially remunerative future, with connections to both Bonesmen alumni and the organizations they lead. Since 1832 the business world has been well connected to Skull & Bones, including **Rockefellers**, **Vanderbilts**, Whitneys, and other elite American dynasties.

Both rumors and documented information about the society and its membership have been featured in recent books and the media, including TV segments on "60 Minutes" and on MSNBC. The Skull & Bones initiation rites were secretly filmed in 2001 by the *New York Observer* and its writer-columnist Ron Rosenbaum using high-tech night-vision video equipment. It was also the subject of some notoriety because of the movie thriller "The Skulls" (2000), and its sequels "The Skulls II" (2002), and "The Skulls III" (2003), about a powerful secret society at an **Ivy League** school. The 2004 Presidential campaign was politically and culturally significant as a contest between Bonesmen George W. Bush and John F. Kerry for the position of Commander-in-Chief.

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SLAVERY

MARY WAALKES

Although human bondage has ancient roots, enslaving Africans to work cash crops started with the Portuguese in the late 1400s, marking a transition from domestic slavery to plantation slavery. Numbers of slaves grew into the thousands and, eventually, millions as sugar plantations spread from the Atlantic islands to the West Indies and as colonists in America gradually determined that slaves were more profitable than **indentured servants**.

Slavery in Africa enabled some slaves to achieve positions of relative importance as artisans, soldiers, or government officials, occasionally accruing **wealth** and **power**. In contrast, American slaves might become artisans, but the link between



African American men, women, and children being auctioned off in front of a crowd of men, taken from an original sketch by Theodore R. Davis, ca. 1861. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

race and slavery ensured that very few would attain high **status**, **authority**, or liberty. Historians are uncertain when slavery became racialized, but by the late 1600s most English colonies were biracial, as opposed to the multiracial societies of Spanish, Portuguese, and French colonies.

Although slaves brought to colonial North America originally represented less than a tenth of all slaves transferred to the New World, their physical environment, living, and work conditions were more amenable to survival and reproduction. Prior to the **American Revolution** slavery was also common in both South and North, with slaves in some areas exceeding 20 percent of the population. Because

of the South's concentration on cash crops such as tobacco, rice, and cotton, however, slave labor became more prevalent than in the North. Soon commerce, agriculture, and slavery became intertwined in the South, whereas the more diversified economy of the North was not dependent upon plantation production. Slavery was already fading in the North by the end of the colonial era.

Plantation slavery stamped Southern society with characteristics that persisted beyond the **Civil War**, such as the influence of planters in politics and a presumption of racial hierarchy. A pyramidal civilization developed with slaves at the bottom of society and the wealthiest planters at the top. Non-slaveholding whites, who were most numerous in the back country, viewed with suspicion the political and economic aspirations of the planter **elite**, but planters occasionally staved off discontent through the judicious use of patronage and **racism**. They encouraged non-elite whites to identify racially with the planters and effected social codes that linked whiteness to social and legal privileges.

Long before the American Revolution, the rhetoric of liberty that developed in the South consciously opposed the freedoms of whites against the slavery of blacks. Samuel Johnson's famous question, "How is it that we hear the loudest yelps for liberty among the drivers of negroes?" posed no conundrum for Southern whites, who, without irony, interpreted British encroachments on American rights as a precursor to the eventual enslavement of white colonists. However, in the mideighteenth century a critique of slavery developed in America, with a small number of individuals, primarily Quakers, arguing slavery's immorality, while still others worried about the institution's effect on white society. Fears of slavery's demoralizing effect on white labor were more convincing in the upper South, where tobacco's decline as a cash crop produced a falloff in the demand for slave labor everywhere except South Carolina and Georgia.

A spate of emancipation proceeded from the Revolutionary War, as patriots in the North and the South applied republican principles to the holding of slaves. Northern states began passing laws prohibiting slavery, though not granting full equality to African Americans. Thomas Jefferson, who owned slaves but viewed the institution as at best a "necessary evil," wrote into the Northwest Ordinance a prohibition of slavery in this new territory. While some Virginians such as Jefferson and George Washington hoped for the gradual abolition of slavery, such sentiments eluded South Carolinians and Georgians, who threatened to walk out of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 should the international slave trade end at that time. Representatives from these two states argued that upper South states that had a surplus of slaves stood to profit from the end of the international slave trade because their excess slaves would accrue greater value in Georgia and South Carolina markets. There, planters could hardly get



Slave quarters at the Hermitage Plantation outside of Savannah, Georgia, ca. 1900. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

enough slaves, and they illegally smuggled slaves from Africa and the Caribbean long after the international slave trade was abolished in 1808.

A combination of factors created the "Cotton Kingdom" in the South, a broad swath across the Deep South where cotton planting flourished. The cotton gin improved the speed of processing the plant; British textile industries bought large quantities of cotton; the early **Industrial Revolution** stimulated an American textile industry; and cheaply made cloth found ready markets on both sides of the Atlantic. While not as labor intensive as rice or sugar, cotton provided a steady and profitable cash crop that fed the demand for slaves. More readily than rice or sugar, cotton production moved inland and westward, with succeeding generations looking for more land on which to plant cotton.

The Missouri Compromise of 1820 indicated increasing divisions between the North and South regarding slavery. The compromise devised by Henry Clay of Kentucky brought Missouri into the Union as a slave state and Maine in as a free state, thereby keeping a balance between the regions in the Senate. The southern border of Missouri became the dividing line between the North and South in the large chunk of real estate purchased from France in 1803. North of this line, slavery was forbidden.

By the 1830s, however, some abolitionists were calling for the immediate emancipation of slaves, and events such as a slave revolt in Haiti and Nat Turner's bloody rebellion in Virginia caused panic among Southern whites. Slavery also became entangled with free labor issues, with some Northerners arguing that slave labor posed unfair competition to wage labor. Another major land acquisition following the Mexican-American War of 1846 brought these issues to the fore. Northerners moving west did not want to compete with Southern slave labor, while Southerners resented attempts to curb their expansion westward. The two interests eventually sharply collided in Kansas.

Free soil activists argued that opportunity based on available land allowed ambitious farmers to achieve prosperity and maintain an independence that neither wage workers nor slaves could ever achieve. In contrast, slave labor debased honest



The Underground Railroad, from a reproduction of a painting by Charles T. Webber, ca.1893. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

labor and put white workers at an economic disadvantage. This, to Northerners, was antithetical to **democracy**, in which equal opportunity was central to success.

In return, many Southerners used the mudsill theory to defend slavery, arguing that all sound republican governments existed on the labor of people who were less than free in one way or another, and whose labor allowed the elite the luxury of governance. The substantive difference between the South's enslaved mudsill class and the wage workers in the North, according to Southern apologists, was that Southern slaves were better cared for than Northern wage workers.

Kansas became the first battleground between opposing camps, with violent scuffles between pro- and antislavery advocates during the 1850s foreshadowing the larger war soon to follow. During the Civil War, class tensions erupted in the South over perceived draft inequities wherein Southern planters who held more than twenty slaves were exempt and laws allowed those who could afford it to employ substitutes and avoid military service. There were also draft riots in the North involving members of the working class who likewise resented exemptions for the wealthy. Many workers were also racist and disagreed with President Lincoln's attempt to redefine the war as one to end slavery rather than preserve the Union.

Class tensions between planters and non-slaveholding whites in some parts of the South erupted in attacks on planters. However, following the Civil War, planters were only temporarily unseated from political power. By the end of the nineteenth century most had regained status and political dominance, and powerful families held onto it well into the modern era. That reassertion of power usually entailed the **disenfranchisement** of ex-slaves and a curtailing of basic civil rights. In the North, class tensions erupted with renewed vigor after the war, and the modern **labor movement** was born. The Northern **masses** inexorably set aside concern for **Reconstruction** and elevated the interests of the white **working classes** over those of freedmen. Although African Americans were generally treated better in the North than in the South, in both regions former slaves largely remained an oppressed class of workers. In the South, many were relegated to **sharecropping** and domestic work; in the North, they were viewed as threats to the wage structure. Slavery's end ushered in systematic racism.

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SLAVOCRACY

ROBERT E. WEIR

Slavocracy is a controversial reference to the notion that the antebellum South was dominated by a slaveholding elite that led it inexorably into the **Civil War**. The term is contentious because it was applied mostly by Northerners, especially the abolitionist community. It is, however, a useful term in calling attention to the impact of social class on antebellum society and in highlighting the fact that the majority of Southerners held no slaves.

The decision to continue the Colonial institution of **slavery** after the **American Revolution** was so politically charged that the **Founding Fathers** avoided the term altogether when drafting the U.S. Constitution. Even some Southern slave owners privately hoped that slavery would fade away. By 1800 that appeared a possibility: soils in the tobacco lands of the Upper South were becoming depleted and world demand for products such as indigo dropped. Most Southerners made little attempt to justify the morality of slavery, seeing it at best as a necessary evil. In the North, slavery did wither away in most places and legislatures abolished it elsewhere.

Several factors conspired to change this, especially Western expansion, the rise of cotton production, and the emergence of the Northern factory system. The Louisiana Purchase of 1803 nearly doubled the size of the United States. Whether or not slavery would be allowed into these new territories began to generate great passion, especially when Missouri applied for statehood as a slave state, though it was north of the Mason-Dixon Line. The 1820 Missouri Compromise attempted to soothe tensions by also creating a new free state, Maine, to keep free and slave states in balance. A theoretical northern boundary line to address future expansion quickly proved ineffective, however.

The move to annex Texas and the Mexican War removed the illusion that slavery could be ignored. The battle for Texas coincides with the beginning of widespread Northern use of the term "slavocracy." Southerners began moving into Mexican-owned Texas after a U.S. economic depression in 1819. In 1824, however, Mexico abolished slavery. Despite this, numerous settlers brought their slaves with them. In 1835-36 Texan settlers took advantage of turmoil within the Mexican government and won independence. The newly formed Republic of Texas almost immediately petitioned for annexation by the United States. This caused such consternation among Northerners that it was not until 1845 that annexation was accomplished, and even then many Northerners spoke of a conspiratorial slavocracy at work. These concerns turned into howls of protest when the Mexican War of 1846-48 led to the annexation of nearly one-third of Mexico. The war was extremely unpopular in the North, especially among Northern Whigs, and Congressman John Quincy Adams denounced it as an attempt to expand slavery. The 1846 Wilmot Proviso attempted to forbid slavery in any lands secured from the war. It was defeated, but tensions between North and South began to rise and supporters of the Proviso warned that Southern planters desired perpetual warfare to secure lands suitable for slavery.

The Mexican War hardened positions over slavery. By the 1850s Northern manufacturing was well established, and many within the region spoke of the

virtues of its "free labor" system. Abolitionists and some manufacturers also warned that free labor was endangered by Southern slave labor. The South, by contrast, produced two-thirds of the world's cotton, and many of its agrarian planters began to speak of slavery as a "positive good" rather than a necessary evil. Apologists such as John C. Calhoun and Fitzhugh Lee even asserted that slaves were better treated than Northern factory workers. Northern abolitionists, though never a majority, parlayed Southern rhetoric into increased support and often whipped up the specter of a Southern slavocracy. From 1850 on, slavery was hotly debated, compromises proved ephemeral, and proposals to settle disputes mostly generated new arguments.

It should be noted that the overwhelming majority of whites in both the North and the South were profoundly racist; this was true even of many abolitionists. Yet citizens in both sections came to believe there was a conspiracy against them, while those in the emerging West felt ignored altogether. Southerners generally clung to notions of "states' rights" out of fear that Northerners wished to impoverish them, empower slaves, and reduce Southern whites to second-class citizenship, while Northerners recoiled at the thought of an aristocratic slavocracy. The passage of the hated Fugitive Slave Act in 1850, the publication of *Uncle Tom's Cabin* in 1852, and the shocking Dred Scott Supreme Court decision of 1857 only served to intensify Northern fears.

Northerners were correct to view Southern society as dominated by planter elites, though they often conveniently ignored the hierarchical nature of their own society. It is uncertain how many Southerners actually owned slaves. The 1860 census noted that 31 percent of Southern families owned slaves, which would mean that roughly 16 percent of adults held slaves. Most historians place the figure at between 20 percent and 25 percent. Within this minority, however, there existed a smaller group whose wealth and political power was akin to that of Northern elites. More than half of all slaves were on plantations of twenty or more fellow slaves. Of approximately 8 million Southern whites in 1860, just 11,000 (less than 1 percent) owned more than fifty slaves and fewer than 2,400 owned as many as one hundred.

This relatively low number of large slave owners is often cited as evidence that there was no slavocracy. In fact, the statistics suggest the opposite. By 1860 the South had one of the world's highest per capita incomes. Much of the South's wealth rested on cotton revenue, and those holding large plantations worked by slaves commanded resources that artificially drove up the per capita income. Sixty percent of the richest Americans resided in the South, and most of them were slave holders, though the vast majority of Southerners were of modest means and a substantial number of white families were poor. The assessment of one Georgia recruit that the Civil War was a "rich man's war and a poor man's fight" rings true. In both the North and the South, rich individuals paid exemptions or hired substitutes to avoid battle. The government of the Confederate States of America was drawn disproportionately from the ranks of the slaveholding gentry class.

Scholars are deeply divided as to whether the slavocracy led the Southern masses blindly to war, or whether those masses upheld slave ownership as a marker of a status to which they aspired. Debates over the causes of the Civil War invariably dissolve over issues of regional pride, historical romanticism, and ideology. Did a slavocracy exist? The correlation between wealth and political behavior

among the antebellum Southern planter elite suggests that it did. This same group tried to reassert itself in the days immediately following Southern surrender and before the imposition of Reconstruction. It is equally true that Northern elites controlled the economic, social, and political agenda of that region. Scholars rightly focus on race and regionalism when discussing the Civil War, but social class also played a major role.

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SLUMMING

KAREN BETTEZ HALNON

The critical expression "slumming" refers to social practices, mainly in the United States and Europe, involving individuals of higher socioeconomic classes frequenting places, ordinarily recreational ones, populated by **lower-class** individuals or others well beneath their own socioeconomic standing.

This is not a new phenomenon. For example, entry of **upper-class** men into the drinking and sexual establishments of the lower classes was common practice in Victorian England. A more recent North American slumming example is the 1920s "white slumming party," where wealthy Caucasian tourists ventured into the **Harlem** Renaissance jazz scene, returning at the end of the evening or weekend to the comforts of their own upscale communities. Slumming became more widely fashionable in popular culture during the 1980s in the United States when **Yuppies**, who out of boredom, curiosity, and rebellion against the stuffiness, pretentiousness, limitations, or contradictions of their own upper- and upper-**middle-class** statuses, sought something more exciting and "authentic" as marginal patrons of nightclub "dives" and restaurant diners in lower-class urban areas.

More generally, the practice of slumming takes place whenever a person of higher socioeconomic standing recreates (or "vacations") among people or amid settings typical of those of the lower classes. As implied in the foregoing, the practice of slumming is motivated by a sense of adventure, exotica, freedom, and authenticity. Thus, the practice carries with it the stereotypical and exploitive notion that there is something freer, more authentic, or less repressed in the lives of the poor; and also that these qualities may be gleaned at one's discretion and with minimal commitment and social cost. The slummer, then, is a socioeconomic stranger to the slum and to lower-class living.

Beyond the actual social practice, slumming exists in popular culture as a set of media representations. For example, in **film** a portrayal of slumming can be found in the film *Arthur* (1981), which involves a philandering multimillionaire consorting

with a lower-class girl who ultimately accepts his inheritance and departs in his chauffeured limousine. In *Dirty Dancing* (1987), lead character Baby (Jennifer Gray) escapes the contradictions of upper-middle-class liberalism through her surreptitious entry into the attractively "forbidden"—and, from her parents' view, also immoral—night erotica of the working class to learn a kind of primitive mating ritual. At the end of the week, she departs from the plush vacationing resort with her wealthy parents. This portrayal is similar to the description of slumming in the film Good Will Hunting (1997) when the lead character refers to sexual relationships between rich, educated girls and poorer boys. Joining class and race, as is sometimes the case with slumming, the film Bulworth (1998) involves a wealthy U.S. senator (Warren Beatty) entering the world of the racially segregated inner city **ghetto**, as a rapper speaking as and for the **underclass**. Replicated in popular culture in the first decade of the twenty-first century are fads and fashions referred to informally by college students as "slumming for the summer" and "my ghetto boyfriend," two related practices involving upscale young college women capturing the romantic or sexual attention of poor Caucasian or poor African American males, respectively, and then breaking off ties before returning to college at the end of the summer. Of course men have long used the expression "slumming" when going to bars populated by lower-class women, in search of ostensibly more accessible and ultimately non-committal erotica.

Slumming is also used as a pejorative term by media to criticize a variety of situations, such as when in 2006 the Discovery Channel was accused of slumming in supermarket tabloid land with "The World's Strangest UFO Stories"; when Prince Harry of Wales was criticized in 2006 for carousing in a lap-dance club; and when Oscar winner actors or actresses are said to "slum" in films deemed far below those of their stature. Critics of slumming may find these and related activities objectionable because of disapproval of feared socioeconomic pollution (an elitist criticism), or because slumming is viewed as exploitive because of lack of commitment, the tourist gaze, and discretionary or thoughtless ease of entry and departure.

Slumming should be distinguished from impersonating down ladders of social stratification, such as drag, blackface, playing Indian, and various **poverty** impersonations. Examples of the latter include the early 2000s fad, "Favela Chic," a practice involving dining in Parisian restaurants that replicate living and eating as the poor do in the favelas (ghettos) of Rio; or the Comedy Central television show, *Blue Collar Television*, which involves a variety of "white trash" impersonations. Slumming is also distinct from the related phenomenon "Poor Chic" and its subtypes "Ghetto Chic," "White Trash Chic," and "Blue Collar Chic," which are an array of fads and fashions in popular culture that make stylish and recreational, and often expensive, "fun" of traditional symbols of lower-class **statuses**. Unlike slumming, Poor Chic does not involve actually going to the slums or to poor people, but transforming traditional symbolic indicators of poverty (e.g., muscles, motorcycles, tattoos, construction boots, army trucks, trucker hats, flea market shopping) into socially distanced and socially sanitized commodities, largely for middle- and upper-middle-class consumption.

As a social phenomenon, slumming should be understood as a continuation of the quintessentially American practice of vacationing in otherness, and of establishing dominant American identity as that-which-one-is-not: for example, not Native American, not African American, not poor, not woman, and not gay or lesbian. In a materialistic and capitalistic culture, to recreate in poverty, or to mock it, is perhaps the ultimate audacity of class privilege.

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SLUMS

AMY DAHLBERG CHU

The word "slum" was first used during the early nineteenth century as a British slang term to refer to a room, especially a back room. By mid-century, concerned **middle-** and **upper-class** Britons and Americans began to use the term "slums" to refer to crowded urban areas inhabited by the poor and characterized by unsatisfactory housing and living conditions, filth, disease, crime, and immorality.

The first American slums arose during the 1830s as millions of **immigrants** from Ireland, Germany, and other European countries began to arrive in the United States. In large cities such as Boston, New York, and Chicago, areas where immigrants congregated became crowded, filthy, and disease-ridden. In New York City, where the influx of immigrants was greatest, the "slum problem" was especially severe. For urban reformers, its Five Points district, notorious for its high crime rate, became a potent symbol of slums and their social threat.

Slums were one manifestation of urban settlement patterns caused by the **Industrial Revolution**, housing shortages, and the development of an unskilled workforce made up mostly of immigrants. Immigrant families settled in districts close to their jobs in the shipping, mercantile, and wholesale trades because of long working hours and unstable employment. In response, middle- and upper-class families who had lived in single-family homes in those districts moved to other neighborhoods. Developers converted the abandoned homes into multi-family dwellings, known as tenements, that initially housed three or four families and later more. Where public gardens and other open spaces had existed, they built new houses to accommodate the rising population and increase profits. Population densities consequently soared. By 1864, for example, about 480,400 of New York City's population of 700,000 inhabitants lived in only 15,300 tenements, each with an average of 32 occupants.

During the 1840s middle-class Americans became alarmed by slum conditions that threatened to spread to their own neighborhoods. In 1843 founders of the New York Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor initiated New York City's campaign to rehabilitate slums and their inhabitants. Reform efforts were initially stimulated by public health officials' linkage of poor housing with epidemic diseases and high mortality. Urban reformers, however, also associated slums and



African American children playing in a North Carolina slum while high-rise buildings can be seen in the background, ca. 1964–68. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

their overpopulated tenements with pauperism, **crime**, and other problems that they believed burdened the community economically and sowed the seeds of class conflict and social unrest.

While reformers castigated tenement owners for encouraging the appalling lifestyles of slum inhabitants and fostering such behaviors as petty theft, prostitution, and alcoholism, they simultaneously blamed immigrants and poor Americans for their lots. Critics labeled slum dwellers as lazy, unclean, and immoral, and therefore unworthy of help. Immigrants, moreover, were viewed as inherently predisposed to squalid, unhealthy, and immoral living. The activities of many charitable organizations revolved around the behavioral reform and Americanization of slum families.

Tenements, identified as the structural cause of the slum's social evils, became the focus of reform efforts during the latter half of the **Gilded Age**. The Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor claimed that tenement owners enabled the poor to continue living like "brutes" and promoted the vices reformers decried. Activists called attention to crowding, poor ventilation, primitive plumbing, and neglect of fire prevention and safety as problems that needed to be alleviated before reformers could effectively rehabilitate slum dwellers themselves. They campaigned for reductions in the ratio of individuals to living space while also encouraging immigrants to move to the country.

During the 1860s and 1870s, public health campaigns expanded in response to epidemic diseases that officials had come to associate with slum living. During this period, housing reform laws were enacted to combat unhealthful conditions.

New York's State Tenement House Law of 1867, the first comprehensive housing law in the United States, set rules for tenement owners, making mandatory the installation of fire escapes, measures for better ventilation, the availability of one water closet or privy for every twenty inhabitants, and the connection of those facilities to sewers. Although this law set the precedent that communities could place limits on the authority of landlords and developers, the standards it set were minimal and poorly enforced.

In the private sector, charitable organizations sponsored "model tenement" competitions in which developers were called upon to design cost-effective housing that elevated living standards among the work-



Homes of poorer classes in Chattanooga, Tennessee, ca. 1899. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

ing classes. Reformers hoped that developers would renovate or build urban housing that improved conditions even if it meant a loss in profits—that the opportunity to help the poor would make up for lost income. However, model tenement competitions quickly degenerated into attempts to design housing that not only improved living conditions but also maximized profits. Tenements that promised the latter results more often than not won the competitions, which ultimately served to maintain overcrowding and inadequate living standards.

Model tenement companies began to spring up in American cities in the 1870s. In Boston, H. P. Bowditch established the Boston Cooperative Building Company in 1871. The company, which limited its dividends to 7 percent, constructed small one-family tenements with running water. Such companies, however, increasingly stressed the importance of disallowing the poor to receive "something for nothing," which they believed promoted immorality and laziness. Alfred T. White of Brooklyn, for instance, argued that housing reformers should treat their projects as business ventures rather than as charitable work.

During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, progressive reformers placed renewed emphasis upon the slum problem. They expressed growing concerns about class and ethnic tensions, as well as fears of the breakdown of family life and American ways of living. In 1890 the publication of New York journalist **Jacob Riis**'s *How the Other Half Lives* sensationalized the plight of slum families. Riis's dramatic portrayal of the wretched living conditions of tenement occupants in lower Manhattan greatly influenced the Tenement House Law of 1901, which drastically altered building codes in New York State. The law required landlords to provide better lighting and fireproofing and install indoor toilets connected to city sewers.

During the early twentieth century, state and federal legislatures placed greater attention on housing problems. During the early twentieth century, reformers designed public developments aimed at creating open space for working-class families. For instance, Edith Elmer Wood of New York called for low-income public housing that would replace slum dwellings. Such proposals called for extensive

slum clearance, an issue explored by several state legislatures during the 1920s and brought to the national stage during the **New Deal**. A provision within the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 created the Housing Division of the Public Works Administration (PWA) and authorized the appropriation of federal dollars for the construction of low-cost housing. The Wagner Public Housing Act of 1937 sanctioned large-scale slum clearance by the federal government and allowed the construction of additional publicly funded low-income housing. Between 1933 and 1937, however, the PWA erected only 58 housing complexes with a total of 25,000 housing units.

Slum clearance became especially controversial with the advent of the federal government's Urban Renewal Program, which spanned the mid-1950s to the early-1970s. The program gave cities federal funding to clear slums, sell the land to commercial developers, and provide displaced residents with adequate housing. Critics questioned how the government demarcated slum areas and decried its unbalanced condemnation of minority residences. Slum clearance and building closures evicted poor families, and low-income housing developments grew segregated, suffered from neglect, and degenerated into crime hubs. In some cases, federal funding also replaced slum dwellings with commercial or high-income housing.

In 1961 Jane Jacobs's *Death and Life of Great American Cities*, a powerfully influential critique of the Urban Renewal Program, argued that the "Federal Bulldozer" broke up lively, diverse communities and replaced them with sterile, artificial developments. By the mid-1960s the federal government discontinued large-scale slum clearance and turned its attention to rehabilitating depressed urban areas, but **poverty** and overcrowding persisted in American cities. As of the 1980s nonprofit and government agencies owned only 3 percent of the nation's housing.

During the 1960s the word "slum," due to its negative connotation, was effectively dropped from the vocabulary of housing policy, much as the word "tenement" was abandoned in the 1920s and replaced by the terms "apartment" or "multiple dwelling." However, the late twentieth century witnessed the revival of the word "slum" in its new reference to federal housing projects that had been built to supplant the original slums.

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SMALL BUSINESS/SMALL FARMS

ROBERT E. WEIR

Americans have long been enamored with the idea of **self-reliance**. Benjamin Franklin spoke for many of the **Founding Fathers** when he linked political independence with the economic self-sufficiency of individuals. Franklin viewed working

for **wages** as a form of dangerous dependency. His contemporary, Thomas Jefferson, held **agrarian** ideals that connected independent yeomanry with views of a good society. Hence, it is not surprising to find that Americans prize the idea of small businesses and "family" farms.

By the nineteenth century **capitalism** had begun to transform the nature and scale of the American economy and working for wages eventually became the economic reality for many workers. More Americans made their living by nonagricultural pursuits for the first time in 1870. The upheavals associated with the **Industrial Revolution** notwithstanding, Americans have held ambivalent feelings about corporations, especially those operated by absentee stockholders. Groups such as the **Knights of Labor** and the **Populists** sought to replace such enterprises with cooperative concerns owned and operated by the **working class** and by farmers. Although such experiments had limited success, American corporations have never entirely gained the confidence of American workers. Individual proprietorship is and has been the goal of countless Americans; barring outright ownership, many Americans prefer small businesses, which are perceived as being more caring, personal, and humane.

Just what constitutes a small business is a matter of some contention. According the Small Business Administration (SBA)—a federal agency created in 1953 to assist such enterprises—a "small" business is any that employs fewer than 500 workers. By this definition, over 99 percent of all American economic concerns are small businesses. In 2004 there were just 17,000 businesses—from a total of nearly 25 million—that had more than 500 employees. Some analysts argue that it makes little sense to lump a firm with several hundred workers into the same category as an individual proprietorship. Overall employment figures give credence to this critique; although "large" firms are under 0.5 percent of the total number of businesses, they employ about 47 percent of all U.S. workers. Moreover, the SBA figures often do not adequately separate franchise owners from their larger corporate parents. Many gas stations and fast food stores, for example, are owner-operated, but under the umbrella of multinational corporations.

Few would dispute, however, the assertion that small businesses generate more new jobs than giant corporations. Over the past several decades, small businesses have been responsible for roughly three-quarters of all new jobs. This statistic raises serious questions about the gap between how politicians praise small business and actual policy toward them. Most federal projects require that about 35 percent of all contract work go to small businesses, a figure that overly favors large corporations, though they do not create as many jobs. Even more contentious is tax policy. During the administration of Ronald Reagan, the top 100 largest corporations in American received nearly 75 percent of all the savings from tax cuts, yet were responsible for just 0.5 percent of the new jobs created in the 1980s. Rather than practice **trickle-down economics**, most large firms passed on savings to stockholders or used cash infusions for mergers and acquisitions. Nearly 80 percent of the top Fortune 500 "new" corporations of the 1980s were, in fact, merged firms. Controversy surrounds the tax cuts of George W. Bush as well. His proposals could potentially deprive the U.S. Treasury of more than \$860 billion, with the bulk of tax savings accruing to large corporations, many of whom have exported more jobs in the past decade than they have created.

Economists and politicians who support these tax cuts note that small businesses, though ubiquitous, are less stable than large firms. Each year more than 500,000 new businesses open in the United States, but just slightly fewer fail. An average of more than 35,000 small businesses declare bankruptcy each year, and just 44 percent survive as long as four years. In recent years, failure rates were especially high in the wake of the **dot-com bubble** of 1997 to 2001.

With roughly one-third of start-up firms going under in the first year, the reality of small business is considerably riskier than its romance. Nonetheless, small businesses remain the backbone of the U.S. economy. They also provide opportunities for minorities. In 2002 women owned about one-quarter of all small businesses, African Americans nearly 7 percent, **Hispanics** 5.2 percent, and **Asian Americans** nearly 5 percent. In all, women and minorities owned nearly half of all small firms. The dominance of small businesses within the U.S. economy does not, however, in itself refute theorists who charge that a **power elite** or a **corporate class** dominates economic decision making. In fact, the disproportionate number of benefits these groups receive in relation to their contributions to the overall economy could be seen as validation of such positions.

Small business is fraught with challenges, but its overall position within the U.S. economy is robust when compared with that of small farms. There is great romance attached to so-called "family farms," and in some sections of the United States, small-scale dairy concerns and specialty farms manage to resist agribusiness. Specialty farms producing such diverse goods as organic food, goat cheese, llama wool, and buffalo meat have actually multiplied in number during the past few decades. Overall, though, American farming has declined steadily since the 1930s. There are over 2.1 million farms in the United States, but they provide employment for just 1.9 percent of the total workforce. This figure also represents a drop of more than 600,000 farms since 1999. This comes on the heels of a 6.6 percent decline in agricultural employment between 1990 and 2000.

According to the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), about 40 percent of all farm goods come from "small" farms. The USDA does not use acreage to classify farms as large or small; rather it and the National Commission on Small Farms use an annual receipt figure of \$250,000 per year as a cut-off. In addition, a farmer must also work at least as many hours as hired help to be considered a small farmer. By such determiners, fewer than 1 percent of American farms are owned by non-family corporations. Moreover, such definitions do not take into account the economic web that farmers must negotiate. Most dairy farmers in the Northeast, for example, have little choice as to where they will sell their milk. Some have tried to set up independent networks or farmers' cooperatives, but most have resorted to the political process to try to prop up milk prices. Farm state politicians frequently push price support mechanisms and "compacts" between states to regulate the volume of milk crossing state borders. The latter, however, have engendered as much controversy as support. The locally popular Northeast Dairy Compact, for example, was discontinued in 2001 on the grounds of constraining free trade. Supporters counter that imported milk increases supply, drives down prices, and imperils small farmers.

The number of farms continues to decline and the size of farms is declining. In 1990 the average farm contained 460 acres; in 2004 it was down to 443. (The latter

represents a slight increase from 1999, when the average was just 432 acres.) There were 32,000 fewer farmers in 2004 than in 1990, and over 50,000 farms ceased operations. Even "heartland" farm states such as Iowa have seen decline in farming activity. More than 8 percent of Iowa's farms ceased operation between 1987 and 1996, and similar drops occurred in the next ten years. Just 5.9 percent of Iowans now reside on farms.

These figures are indicative of trends elsewhere. According to the *Agricultural Fact Book*, about one-fifth of Americans live in rural areas. Yet in seven of eight rural counties nationwide, the primary economic activity is dominated by nonagricultural production and employment. Many one-time farmers now find their lands are more valuable for their real estate development potential than for raising animals or crops. Specialty products and truck farming offer some solace amid the story of agricultural decline, but there are few current trends that would suggest a farming revival.

Suggested Reading

David Birch, *The Job Generation Process*, 1979; Small Business Administration (http://www.sba.gov/); U.S. Census Bureau Statistics about Business Size (http://www.census.gov/epcd/www/smallbus.html); United States Department of Agriculture Agricultural Fact Book (http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal).

SOCIAL CLIMBER

MICHELLE DAGNINO

Social climber is usually a negative term used to refer to a person who, through aggressive and fawning behavior, seeks social prominence. Past television shows like Dallas and Dynasty, teen movies like Cruel Intentions and She's All That, and more recent reality shows like MTV's My Super Sweet 16 have elevated social climbing to a form of entertainment. Characters (both fictional and real) on these shows are often seen as conniving, manipulative, and outrageous, and regardless of how much success they may achieve or how far they will climb on the social ladder, they will never gain the respect of the people they most want to be like—the ruling class.

Social climbing is hardly a new phenomenon. In William Makepeace Thackeray's 1848 novel *Vanity Fair*, the heroine of the novel, Becky Sharp, an orphan turned governess, spends the entire novel trying to climb the steep social ladder in early nineteenth-century England. She is smart, beautiful, and feisty—traits that endear her to men but serve to keep her estranged from the wealthy women she aspires to be like. Her scheming attempts at grabbing money and social standing destroy every relationship she has, and her single-mindedness blinds her to the possibilities that love, motherhood, and friendship could hold for her.

More recent books on the subject have included Adele Lang's *Confessions of a Sociopathic Social Climber: The Katya Livingston Chronicles*, a best seller about a vain, nasty, shallow advertising copywriter who gets a job producing a gossip column for a London tabloid. The protagonist of the novel, Katya Livingston, is cruel to her friends,

vindictive toward her bosses, and will only speak to men who have a net worth that she deems high enough. Her character, who is at almost all times evil, selfish, and irresponsible, will stop at nothing to climb her way into London's high society.

During the **Gilded Age** social climbing was seen as the gauche behavior of **nouveau riche** members of the **middle class**. To established members of the **upper class**, social climbers were trying to buy what they lacked in breeding, culture, and family connections. *The Rise of Silas Lapham* was William Dean Howells's fictional look at an all-too-common social phenomenon.

Since World War II the American upper class has been defined more by money than by traditional factors. Nonetheless social climbing continues to carry a negative connotation because it implies that said person is disingenuous. Self-styled **socialites** are often lampooned. Some sociologists suggest that we dislike social climbers because they do not "know their place." Social climbing stands very explicitly for the fact that we are a society divided by class and that many people, particularly the wealthy **elites**, resent any person of a lower class who tries to aspire to a higher standing in society.

Suggested Reading

Alan Bryman, "Urgent Dreams: Climbing, Rationalization, and Ambivalence," in *McDonaldization: The Reader*, ed. George Ritzer, 2003, pp. 54–63; David B. Grusky, ed., *Social Stratification: Class, Race, and Gender*, 1994.

SOCIAL CLOSURE

ROBERT E. WEIR

Social closure is a concept originally developed by **Max Weber** that posits ways in which social inequality is maintained through a series of inclusions and exclusions. It is closely aligned with Weber's understanding of **status** and **life chances**.

Weber rejected **Marxist** views of class, especially the notion that class was defined by one's relationship to the **means of production**. He did, however, agree that society was marked by **inequality**. Weber noted that those who held **wealth** and property used their social and political influence to maximize the life chances of their own kind and construct barriers that excluded outsiders. Variants of this idea are important in **social reproduction** theory. In essence **elites** evolved ways of legitimizing their own **power**.

Since Weber, other scholars have analyzed the various factors that determine who is included and who is excluded. **Education** has served as one of the gatekeepers. **Ivy League** universities, for examples, have historically been the preserve of the **upper class** and upper **middle class**. As recently as 2006, just 17 percent of Princeton students, 16 percent of Harvard undergrads, and 15 percent of Yale enrollees came from families earning less than \$60,000 per year. The profile for private preparatory schools is similar.

Race and ethnicity have also been excluding factors and, until after World War II, so too was religious affiliation. Elites tended to be WASPs who excluded

Catholics and Jews as well as African Americans, Hispanics, Asian Americans, and most recent immigrants. Gender also played a significant role, with women often being excluded from the highest levels. Although most analysts agree that progress has been made, few would argue that any of the historical barriers have disappeared entirely.

Social closure theory also rests on assumptions of inclusion. That is to say, those associated with privilege have various advantages available to them that ease their entrance into society's upper echelon. These include such mechanisms as **legacy** college admission, access to **family trust** funds, and contacts through various **social networks**. The latter also serve as conduits that facilitate placements in everything from schools and jobs to **country clubs** and prestigious residences. In many ways social closure is a rewards-punishment system operated on the social level, the rewards being the special privileges given to a small group and the punishment being the opportunities denied to the **masses**.

Many of the same criticisms are leveled against social closure theory as are identified with **power elite** or **corporate class** theories. **Pluralists** generally doubt that the scope of social closure networks is as broad as assumed, while other scholars reject the reductionist assumption that the motives and values of the upper class are homogeneous and conspiratorial. (To be fair, most social closure scholars see custom as playing a large role as well as intent.) Nonetheless, very few researchers would argue that American society is completely open or that all groups have equal opportunity to rise. Social closure is another reminder that actual American **social mobility** patterns are more constricted than popular myth holds.

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Raymond Murphy, Social Closure: The Theory of Monopolization and Exclusion, 1988; Frank Parkin, Marxism and Class Theory, 1979; Max Weber, Basic Concepts in Sociology, 2000.

SOCIAL DARWINISM

ROBERT E. WEIR

Social Darwinism is an ideology developed during the **Gilded Age** that was popular among the **upper** and **middle classes**. It sought to justify the wealth of those classes through a perversion of Charles Darwin's theory of natural selection. Social Darwinists drew parallels between Darwin's work on biological evolution and the contemporary social and economic order. They were particularly enamored of the phrase "**survival of the fittest**" and argued that society was organic and operated in accordance with natural selection. Those who held great **wealth**, **power**, and **prestige** were viewed as holding special traits that made them more adaptable to change and gave them natural advantages. Social Darwinism also mixed freely with certain strains of Protestantism and often justified wealth as both the workings of nature and God's will.

In many ways Social Darwinism reworked residual **Puritan** values, especially in the emphasis placed on **individualism**. In both world views sin and personal weaknesses explained failure; there was no concept of what is today dubbed "social problems." The three early articulators of Social Darwinism were English thinkers Herbert Spencer and Walter Bagehot and American economist William Graham Sumner. By the 1870s their views on society were hegemonic among the upper and middle class, and they held special attraction to industrialists, investors, and **robber barons**. Some of the latter tried to deflect attention from their exploitation of the **working class** by arguing that worker **poverty** resulted from the profligate and undisciplined bad habits of workers.

Social Darwinism also meshed well with the laissez-faire beliefs held by nineteenth-century **capitalists**. If, as they argued, business operated according to natural laws such as supply and demand, government regulation of business could only disrupt efficiency. John **Rockefeller** and **Andrew Carnegie** were among the many industrialists who touted the virtues of Social Darwinism. Employers were not consistent in this regard, however, as they did not hesitate to request government and legal intervention against labor unions during **strikes**.

There were numerous strikes during the Gilded Age, many of which were quite violent. Many workers felt that Social Darwinism was nonsense, pointing out that many great fortunes were inherited rather than earned, that some were the result of corruption, and that there was little that was natural or moral about forcing workers to toil long hours for starvation-level wages. Groups such as the **Knights of Labor** wrote blistering attacks on Social Darwinism, as did various **anarchists**, **communists**, and **socialists**. Many cited economic theories from thinkers such as David Ricardo, **Henry George**, Karl **Marx**, and **Victor Drury** to refute Social Darwinian assumptions.

The upheavals of the Gilded Age eventually fractured Social Darwinism. Some churches began to reassess flagrant identification with the rich, and some came to identify with the **Social Gospel** movement. Other groups, such as Catholics and Jews, were not active Social Darwinists and, as their congregations grew because of immigration, served as countervailing influences in American religion.

In the main, though, it was the doubts raised by members of the middle class that weakened Social Darwinism. The cataclysmic strikes and social unrest of the period led many to question society's assumptions, and middle-class readers devoured **Edward Bellamy**'s utopian novel, *Looking Backward*. By the early twentieth century, many in the middle class were ready to embrace and lead reforms during the **Progressive Era**.

Social Darwinism lost its hegemonic grip on elites and passed out of existence as an active term, but it never entirely disappeared. Much modern conservative thought retains elements of Social Darwinism, particularly in regard to issues such as **self-reliance**, **property ownership**, and antipathy toward **taxation**.

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Peter Dickens, Social Darwinism: Linking Evolutionary Thought to Social Theory, 2000; Richard Hofstader, Social Darwinism in American Thought, 1955; Robert McCloskey, American Conservatism in the Age of Enterprise 1865–1910, 1951.

SOCIAL GOSPEL

MARK NOON

Social Gospel was a movement within late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Protestantism that placed pastoral emphasis on social reform. It was largely a response to the formation of large corporations and the accompanying class antagonism. The Social Gospel (also referred to as "social Christianity" or "Christian Socialism") derived from an intellectual shift within American Protestantism. Prior to the Civil War, many mainstream denominations of evangelical Protestants supported an individualistic social ethic and laissez-faire economic policies. The impact of industrial expansion, urbanization, and immigration in the Gilded Age, however, prompted several influential members of the clergy to place less emphasis on creeds, doctrine, and the private, individual salvation of the soul and more emphasis on true charity to address the nation's growing social problems. In part the Social Gospel was an effort to enhance the appeal of Protestantism in large cities where the **Catholic** Church was popular among the growing immigrant population. The movement also addressed the emerging labor movement and was a response to accusations that religious organizations were more sympathetic to capital than to labor.

The Social Gospel was intellectual in its origins as liberal church leaders brought the teachings of Jesus to the social and economic questions of the day. The **poverty** resulting from the Panic of 1873 and the violent **strikes** during 1877 concerned church people; however, most still viewed trade unions with suspicion and feared state interference in the economy. A moderate approach to change was largely espoused in the book *Working Men and Their Employer* (1876), written by Washington Gladden (1836–1918), a minister who was the first major figure in the Social Gospel movement. He called on workers to unify under Christianity and originally believed that the application of the Golden Rule could bridge the growing divide between capital and labor.

Gladden would eventually advocate state-regulated capitalism, and he would be joined by several dynamic clerical and lay figures who would make the Social Gospel a national movement. Key figures include Josiah Strong, whose book Our Country: Its Possible Future and Present Crisis (1885) encouraged Protestants to participate in missionary work to the nation's **inner cities** and in the American West. The economics profession became part of the Social Gospel movement with the publication of Professor Richard Ely's The Labor Movement in America in 1886. Ely was a strong advocate of the right of workers to organize and founded an organization in 1885 rooted in the ideals of the Social Gospel—the American Economic Association. Several Social Gospel advocates toured the nation and lectured extensively on labor and social reform, most notably George Herron and William Dwight Porter Bliss. Herron gained fame for a sermon titled "The Message of Jesus for Men of Wealth" (1890). This sermon vilified the acquisition of wealth in the United States. Eventually Herron completely lost confidence in industrial capitalism and established The Kingdom Movement, a brand of social Christianity aimed at establishing "the Kingdom of God" on earth. Bliss, who supported the Knights of Labor, was among the many clergymen influenced by the Nationalist

movement spurred by Edward **Bellamy**'s utopian novel *Looking Backward*, 2000–1887 (1888). He founded the Society of Christian Socialists and served as the editor of its publication *The Dawn*. The issues addressed in the teachings and writings of Social Gospel supporters were the abolition of **child labor**, higher **wages**, a shorter workweek, a **living wage**, and prison reform.

The Social Gospel fit well with the spirit of the Progressive Era, and its ideas were often reinforced by the exposés of corporate America and the urban slum by the muckraking journalists of the period. In the 1890s, however, the movement began to weaken. The Depression of 1893 led to more radical strains in the Social Gospel movement, and social Christians became more circumspect as labor violence intensified. But before the Social Gospel became passé, its strongest voice would be heard—Walter Rauschenbusch. A Baptist minister who worked to ease the suffering in New York's Hell's Kitchen, Rauschenbusch eventually gained a reputation as one of America's greatest theologians. His major work, Christianity and the Social Crisis (1907), sought to define the role of the church in American society and took the social implications of Christianity to a higher level. Among the ideas advocated by Rauschenbusch were public ownership of utilities and transportation and redistribution of land to improve housing conditions for workers. Rauschenbusch's ideas brought about renewed interest in the Social Gospel and prompted most mainline Protestant churches to adopt the Social Creed of the Churches in 1908. This document committed the churches to work in support of a wide range of reforms on behalf of the working class. The Social Gospel declined as the curtain fell on the Progressive Era and with the passing of Rauschenbusch and Gladden in 1918; however the spirit of the movement lived on in the twentieth century in the work of many social reformers.

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Susan Curtis, A Consuming Faith: The Social Gospel and Modern American Culture, 2001; Charles Howard Hopkins, The Rise of the Social Gospel in American Protestantism, 1865–1915, 1940; Donald K. Gorrell, The Age of Social Responsibility: The Social Gospel in the Progressive Era, 1900–1920, 1988.

SOCIAL MOBILITY

ROBERT E. WEIR

Social mobility refers to upward, downward, or horizontal movement within the social **stratification** system. Upward mobility is the attribute of an individual who rises beyond the social class of his or her birth, and is the antithesis of downward mobility. Scholars also refer to generational mobility to measure an individual's life achievements vis-à-vis those of his or her parents. Although upward mobility is a key component of the **American dream** and belief in it is central to the way many Americans view their nation, it is not as common as popular myth would suppose. Those who experience social mobility in America are most likely to fall in the category of horizontal mobility, a lateral rather than vertical move. For example, the

daughter of an elementary school teacher might rise to become principal of an elementary school, a **status** change unlikely to move her out of the **middle class**.

In theory, American **capitalism** creates a **meritocracy** whose open social system stands in marked contrast to societies whose hierarchies are determined by **caste**. In practice there have been periods, including the present, in which upward mobility has been exceedingly difficult to achieve. Several observers have drawn parallels between early twenty-first century American society and that during the **Gilded Age**. In both periods the **wealth** gap widened dramatically and **poverty** rose; both periods also saw impassioned defenses of the **upper classes** and of the culture of capital accumulation. During the nineteenth century writers such as **Horatio Alger** advanced the notion that hard work and **self-reliance** were the pathways to success, and the real-life rags-to-riches sagas of millionaires such as **Andrew Carnegie** served to strengthen such views. In contemporary society conservative **think tanks** such as the Heritage Foundation often dispute inequality studies. Though most conservatives accept the existence of inequality, they argue that those at the top have risen by merit, and assert the belief that **trickle-down economics** will raise the economic and social status of all Americans.

Those who dispute the notion that an unregulated economy is the best route to upward mobility point to reform during the **Progressive Era**, the **New Deal**, and the **Great Society**, and note that inequality shrank during periods of government regulation, **Keynesian** economics, and social engineering. Claudia Goldin and Robert Margo coined the term the "Great Compression" to describe how during the 1930s and 1940s **income** disparities were lessened through a combination of **progressive taxation**, regulating corporate behavior, and ensuring that the **labor movement** was strong enough to act as a countervailing economic power. Likewise, although many Great Society programs were as inefficient as their critics charged, poverty contracted and upward mobility increased during the latter part of the 1960s. The retreat from Great Society principles correlates with a marked decrease in upward mobility.

According the Economic Policy Institute, during the 1970s roughly 20 percent of those born in the second-lowest social quintile stayed there for their entire lives and about half those at the very bottom never rose. After the Reagan tax cuts of the 1980s, the figure for the second quintile climbed to 32 percent, and it jumped to more than 36 percent by the late 1990s. A study by Thomas Hertz of American University also takes aim at assertions made during the administration of George H. W. Bush that more Americans were joining the upper class. His work gives credence to those who assert that the **middle class** is shrinking. According to Hertz, a child born in the middle quintile (\$42,000 to \$54,300) has a slightly higher chance of moving down the social ladder rather than moving up. Studies of **income** underscore the widening gaps. According to figures from the Congressional Budget Office from 1973 to 2000 the real income for the bottom 90 percent of American taxpayers declined by 7 percent—some studies indicate a small increase—whereas that of the top 1 percent soared by 148 percent, and that of the richest 0.01 percent rose a whopping 343 percent. A recent study by Business Week confirms how rare the Horatio Alger/Andrew Carnegie narrative has become; in 1978 about 23 percent of adult males born in the poorest quarter by income managed to rise to the top quarter. By 2003 just 10 percent managed to do so. Moving into elite ranks is

extremely rare; even those among the middle quintile have a slim 1.8 percent chance of attaining such wealth.

Studies confirm that most Americans remain in the social class of their birth and that horizontal or downward mobility is more likely than an upward move. They also indicate that the situation is more acute for African Americans and other persons of color. Nearly half of all poor children remain poor as adults, but among African Americans that figure is 63 percent. Those who rise at all are most likely to move up a single quintile rather than experiencing an Alger-like leap to the top. But with family income stagnant for most Americans, any upward mobility has grown problematic. Among democratic nations, only Great Britain has a lower rate of upward generational mobility than the United States.

Mobility studies by scholars such as **Peter Blau**, **John Goldthorpe**, David Lockwood, **Kingsley Davis**, **G. William Domhoff**, and neo-**Marxists** such as Erik Olin Wright have yielded controversial and contradictory findings that fuel the social mobility debate, but most scholars agree that within contemporary America **higher education**, **race**, **ethnicity**, parental status, and occupation greatly influence one's chances at upward mobility. To the harshest critics of American stratification the poor quality of **inner city** public schools, the high costs of attending elite colleges, proposals to end estate taxes, ongoing tax cuts that benefit the rich, the exportation of American jobs, attempts to scuttle affirmative action, cutbacks in health and **welfare** programs, and a decreased federal role in education and state and local aid are de facto attempts to enact an economic caste system.

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Claudia Goldin and Robert Margo, "The Great Compression: The Wage-Structure of the United States at Mid-century" (http://ideas.repec.org/a/tpr/qjecon/v107y1992i1p1–34.html); Thomas Hertz, "Understanding Mobility in America" (http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2006/04/b1579981.html); The New York Times, *Class Matters*, 2006.

Social Networks

GABRIEL A. SANTOS

Social networks are loosely knit relations between persons that transcend group boundaries but often serve to reinforce social class. The individual actors that make up a social network belong to a wide variety of social groups yet are linked by some crucial relation such as kinship, club affiliation, a client/patron role, or interactions (e.g., exchange of advice). As such, networks are not synonymous with a social group per se. The primary metaphor for understanding a network is that of a chain. Network analysis reveals how persons (or even organizations) occupy certain positions within a web of social linkages, including all positions that a given individual or organization could potentially occupy from the center to the margins. In measuring a person's location in the network, it is possible to determine how much influence

he or she exerts on other members of the network and, in turn, gain an understanding of dependence and **authority** in a class-based society.

Class society in America and social networks are mutually significant because of two commonalities associated with social networks: homogeneity and propinquity. In terms of similarity it is the norm that those individuals interacting in a given social network are people who resemble each other along various lines of social categorization—race, gender, religion, or class. Propinquity refers to spatial nearness. Persons sharing similar ethnic, class, or economic backgrounds tend literally to live near one another, and this helps insulate them from those of a differing socioeconomic status. Hence it is not difficult to deduce at least one reason that class position appears so intractable; propinquity encourages endogamous marriage, which in turn encourages social reproduction.

Horizontal social networks form within classes in order to reinforce the social norms and practices of the group or promote the fulfillment of fundamental needs that may not be met by means of formal organizations or social service agencies. For example **lower-class** African Americans are known for creating adaptive social network linkages known as "fictive kin." As the term implies, a particular person may be viewed, for example, as "Uncle Joey" not because of genetic connections, but because that individual fulfills a familial role in the midst of the fragmented relations in inner city **ghettos**. The need for a stable set of trustworthy, dependable, or financially secure companions invites the labeling of helpful and reliable neighbors using the terms of kinship. Some scholars trace this practice to **slavery**, wherein African Americans formed intentional kinship relations to substitute for families broken by the sale of blood relatives.

Social networks sometimes link persons separated by considerable social distance or class boundaries. For example many youth sports leagues (such as the Amateur Athletic Union) connect youth from the impoverished and **working classes** with **middle-class** youth and their parents. More importantly the parents of these children may develop relationships that can evolve into a variety of employment opportunities, partnerships, or other relations.

The capacity of social networks to cross class boundaries does not, however, assure relations of trust, reciprocity, or deep engagement between individuals. Usually the vertical social networks that connect the middle class and the poor are highly formal, such as that between a doctor and a patient. Cross-class pacts are thus normally frail and temporary. Class relations in America, in many contexts, have been tainted to such a degree that vertical networks linking unequal agents are frowned upon because of the perceived threat of exploitation or paternalism. Mutual distrust and lack of cooperation are especially challenging to lower-class members of social movements seeking **welfare** reform, who must put forth extraordinary efforts to secure support from the middle or upper classes.

Forming social networks among urban populations is a considerably more daunting task than creating rural networks. In **inner city** neighborhoods populations, especially those with high turnover rates, many individuals pass their days without any extensive engagement with those from differing class backgrounds. In rural societies, however, smaller and less densely distributed populations facilitate social overlap. A neighbor may be kin, coworker, employer, or long-time friend. Sociability, moreover, becomes more focused on family as an individual gets older,

regardless of class position. Those seeking to build rural networks therefore often concentrate on building cross-class alliances among adolescents.

Overall, though, horizontal social networks are more common and more successful. Particularly among the **upper class** and upper middle class, the social networking that occurs in **country clubs**, **private schools**, exclusive resorts, and a variety of other socially segregated settings is central to constructing the social distance and **class consciousness** that sets them apart. These networks, in turn, give individuals special access to privilege that reinforces social and economic inequality in America.

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Alain Degenne and Michel Forsé, *Introducing Social Networks*, 1999; Alan Zuckerman, *The Social Logic of Politics: Personal Networks as Contexts for Political Behavior*, 2005.

SOCIAL REGISTER

RONALD DALE KARR

The *Social Register* is a social index of wealthy, **upper-class** families compiled in various locales.

In 1887 society journalist Louis Keller launched the *Social Register*, an annual listing of New York City's most socially prominent residents. New York's upper class had grown enormously in the nineteenth century, along with the rest of the city, to include thousands of wealthy individuals not descended from the old Dutch Knickerbocker **elite**. Who now should be included in polite society? Keller's guide was not the first, but unlike its predecessors it became an instant and lasting success. Its alphabetical listing of elite couples and their adolescent or adult children, including addresses, maiden and previous marriage names, club memberships, and colleges (and eventually telephone numbers), was valued not just by the fortunate listees and hostesses but also by membership committees, vendors, professionals, and hotel and resort owners who sought their lucrative business.

By 1890 a Boston edition had appeared, and more cities followed. Keller formed the Social Register Association to manage these editions, and by 1925 *Registers* were being issued for twenty-one American cities. These were reduced to a dozen by 1936 (the **Great Depression** having made the publication in secondary cities not economical). The cities listed are Baltimore, Boston, Buffalo, Chicago, Cincinnati-Dayton, Cleveland, New York, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, St. Louis, and San Francisco. Because of the increasingly national scope of the upper class, Keller began publishing the *Social Register Locator* in 1907, an index to all persons listed in the various regional editions. Later a summer edition appeared listing vacation addresses. Since 1977 all of the regional editions have been combined into a single national register.

Although the *Social Register* is but one of a number of directories and blue books purporting to list elite families, it remains the best known. It does not, however, come close to being a comprehensive guide to the upper class, because it arbitrarily

drops individuals, including those who fail to apply for listing, and it only covers a dozen metropolitan areas. It also rarely has included **Catholics** or **Jews** (and, at least in the past, never African Americans), even those of unquestionably upperclass status, such as members of the **Kennedy** family. On the other hand studies by sociologists such as Harvey Zorbaugh, **E. Digby Baltzell**, and **G. William Domhoff** Jr. have shown that individuals listed in the *Register* are quite likely to be members of the upper class, however it is defined, and that members of that class themselves use it to define their circle. For social scientists and historians, therefore, the *Register* provides a useful directory to a portion of the upper class that can be used to identify upper-class neighborhoods and institutions as well as to measure upper-class participation and control.

What role the *Social Register* plays today is unclear. The demise of traditional society columns since the 1960s has coincided with an increasingly private upper class, except for a few bona fide celebrities and politicians. Contemporary sociologists almost entirely ignore the American upper class, making it difficult to know whether the persons listed in the *Register* today are as influential as their better studied predecessors or whether the *Register* remains a guide limited to the **WASP** (white Anglo-Saxon Protestant) branch of the upper class, whose relative influence is often said (without hard evidence) to be waning.

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SOCIAL REPRODUCTION

SHANNON J. TELENKO

Social reproduction describes the way in which certain groups of people are reared for particular roles in society. Schooling, discipline within the home and at work, and other social activities are the agents for social reproduction. Karl Marx (1818–83) introduced the idea of "simple reproduction" as part of the circulation of capital in which capitalists accumulate land, machinery, and labor power, and workers sell their labor through wages. In Das Kapital (1867) Marx writes, "When [a society is] viewed, therefore, as a connected whole, and as flowing on with incessant renewal, every social process of production is, at the same time, a process of reproduction." Workers need to be replaced and therefore reproduced biologically and through the handing down of accumulated skills of previous generations.

Some social scientists use the notion of social reproduction to describe the historical conditions of the roles within **working-class** families. Housewives take care of the worker and bear, and eventually discipline, boys who will later be schooled to enter into the same working-class labor pool as their fathers. Girls are socialized and schooled to become future housewives for their male counterparts. In this way

the working class is socially reproduced for the benefit of a capitalist society and its beneficiaries, such as industrial capitalists and the middle class. Housewives in upper levels of capitalist society also contribute to the social reproduction of their children as well, by preparing them for rigorous schooling and proper cultural experiences.

For **Pierre Bourdieu** (1930–2002), social reproduction described the way in which French education ensured that the working and middle classes were schooled within cultural constraints for society's purposes. Social reproduction is a seemingly automatic process for society. Despite Bourdieu's intended application for social reproduction, American social scientists use social reproduction to describe the U.S. educational systems. The factors common to France and the United States are **capitalism** and **democracy**.

Bourdieu wrote in the preface to the 1990 edition of *Reproduction in Education*, *Society and Culture* that America, like European countries, has elite and lower-class forms of education, which create a structure for securing power for only some citizens. Wealthier children's families have the choice of sending them to expensive private schools, whereas poorer children's families have limited choices for education. In addition public schools can only do so much with their resources, which rely on a tax base. Poorer neighborhoods and districts are already at a disadvantage compared to their well-to-do counterparts. Therefore schooling in America also reproduces inequality, and the notions of merit and equality only serve to cloak this system as democratic. Bourdieu was arguing that America points its finger at others for problems it still has not successfully handled.

Social reproduction is a theory that some critics of capitalism use to show that education does not simply solve the problem of inequality. Education, despite being labeled as an equalizer and granter of opportunity, can still be a tool to recreate society as a means to secure power for only certain kinds of individuals. Some might point out that social reproduction does not apply to American society, but as Bourdieu argued and as others continue to argue, there is evidence to support that it does.

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SOCIAL SECURITY

JOHN F. LYONS

Social Security is a program designed to protect citizens against the economic effects of disability, illness, old age, **poverty**, and **unemployment**. In the United States there has been a stronger belief than in many countries that the government should play a minimal role in providing social security. In recent years, however, many have become increasingly reliant on the government for economic security.

The first impetus for Social Security came from the ideas of the Enlightenment and the social problems created by the **Industrial Revolution**. The first government-run social insurance program paying retirement and disability benefits was introduced in Germany in the 1880s. The scheme was funded by payroll taxes paid by the employer and employee and by contributions from the government. Subsequently most developed countries have initiated some from of social security system partly based on the German model.

In the early decades of the twentieth century, most U.S. states provided compensation for injured workers, many major cities afforded relief for the unemployed, and veterans received pensions from the federal government, but most workers were dependent on private means to provide social security. Individuals joined ethnic mutual aid societies that supplied life insurance and sickness benefits to their members. Some companies promoted "welfare capitalism" in which employers pledged to look after their employees by offering them health and safety insurance and pensions. Many others borrowed from family members or relied on charities in times of distress.

The inadequacy of the U.S. system of social security was exposed during the **Great Depression** of the 1930s. Approximately a fourth of the working population was unemployed, and thousands of companies went out of business. Municipal authorities, charities, and families could no longer afford to provide relief. Some states responded to the widespread suffering by establishing pension schemes and other programs, but they often had few resources to fund them. Finally **Franklin Roosevelt**, who became President in March 1933, responded to calls for reform by introducing Social Security as part of his **New Deal**.

The U.S. Social Security Act of 1935 was the most far-reaching social security program in U.S. history. The act provided pensions for workers over the age of sixty-five paid for from employee and employer contributions. The act also gave federal funds to states for unemployment compensation, aid to families with dependent children, and other health and welfare programs. In 1939 benefits for dependents and survivors of workers who died before retirement were added to the program, and in 1956 benefits to disabled workers were included. The Social Security Act was intended to supplement private schemes, and therefore benefits were set at a low level. Hence it was not until 1950 that Congress introduced a cost-of-living increase in benefits. The initial Social Security Act excluded many people, including public-sector workers, farm workers, domestic workers, the self-employed, and those working in small companies, but most of these were included in a 1950 amendment to the Act. In 1983 Congress added civilian federal employees to the program, but many local and state employees continued with alternative schemes.

After World War II other countries introduced government-funded health programs, but because of opposition from private insurance companies and the medical profession, health remained a private concern in the United States. Corporations offering health insurance and pensions to employees proliferated. In 1965, however, Congress introduced limited government health care. The Medicare program was established to provide federally funded health care for the elderly and disabled, while Medicaid was created to allocate federal funds to the states to pay the medical expenses of the poor.

Compared to other industrialized countries, Social Security benefits in the United States are neither generous nor extensive. Unemployment insurance covers shorter time periods than is common in many other Western countries. In other countries, the government also funds maternity leave and health care. In recent years Social Security and Medicare have increasingly become the primary or sole pension package and health insurance for retired workers, while corporations have cut employee pension plans and medical insurance in the name of **competitiveness**. Employers assert that **globalization** puts American firms at a price disadvantage vis-à-vis foreign companies that are not burdened with these costs.

The government has increasingly become concerned about the finances available to pay for Social Security. In 1996 President Bill Clinton ended entitlement to aid to families with dependent children by implementing limits on how long recipients could claim the benefits. Increasing health costs and an aging population have increased the pressure on the government to find more money to fund Medicare and pensions. Furthermore the government has often been left to pay for the pension and health programs jettisoned by corporations. In 2005 the administration of President George W. **Bush** proposed partial privatization so that citizens could invest some of their contributions in the **stock market**. With many lacking faith in the private sector's commitment or ability to fund health care and pensions, the future of Social Security remains one of the most pressing political issues in the United States.

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SOCIALISM

Mauro Stampacchia

Socialism is the general rubric for politically conscious working-class movements from the early days of the **Industrial Revolution** to the present. It is also used to qualify economic and social systems characterized by partial or general collective ownership of the **means of production**, factories, land, and corporations. Socialism thus stands as an opposite to **capitalism**, both in the political and economic fields. Although there are many varieties of socialism, most advocate working-class solidarity and egalitarianism, as well the adoption of political and economic systems that serve the **masses** rather than the favored few.

Socialist doctrines had been already circulating in nineteenth-century Europe when Karl Marx's Communist Manifesto was published in 1847. The Manifesto was itself a critique of particular versions of socialism, mainly of the "utopian socialism" espoused by thinkers such as the Comte de Saint Simon, Charles Fourier, Robert Owen, and Jean-Claude Leonard Simonde de Sismondi, which depicted a

model society that would only emerge in the undetermined future. Marx asserted that the future society would spring from the internal contradictions of the capitalistic society, mainly in what he called the "structural" sphere, the economic core in which the **bourgeoisie** and **proletariat** would face one another, and which Marx analyzed in such later works as *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy* (1867). Socialism and capitalism were, in Marx's view, the polarizing principles of industrial capitalistic society. He viewed the two classes as struggling in the social and political arena as well.

During Marx's life, however, the main challenge to his theory came not from utopian socialism, but from **anarchism**. The First International—officially the International Workingmen's Association, a congress of socialist organizations founded in 1864—was barely under the control of Marx and his close comrade Friedrich Engels. The followers of Michael Bakunin, who opposed any established state, political, or economic power, were able to stage a long internal factional debate and force Marxists to define more clearly their doctrine in opposition to the anarchist and libertarian forces. Eventually the First International dissolved, possibly as a side effect of the backlash after the violent overthrow of the Paris Commune, in which Parisians declared themselves an independent socialist enclave. There were, however, also other deep internal divisions.

Between 1889 (the year of the founding of the Second International) and the outbreak of World War I, socialism entered an entirely new stage. The previous sectarian organizations were replaced in many European countries by mass national parties, flanked by growing labor movements that participated, as suffrage grew larger, in general elections. The Second International faced problems arising from the growth of party structures and growing numbers of party officials elected to parliaments, local councils, and in the United States, to municipal and state offices. As socialist parties gained legitimacy, their behavior and rhetoric often shifted. The elderly Engels was among those to remark that legal channels offered new chances for once subversive and revolutionary politicians and trade unionists. The collapse of capitalism was not at hand, and many within the working classes had a chance of bettering their working and living conditions. Although each national socialist party reflected the particular condition of the country in which it was rooted and international contacts between them were relatively loose, European socialism shared common values and ideas, though it was frequently torn asunder by debates and divisions. When German social democrat Eduard Bernstein provocatively suggested (first in 1889) that socialism could best be achieved through a legal, gradual path to power, revolutionary socialists accused him of revisionism. His "reformist" approach—eventually dubbed "evolutionary socialism"—sparked fierce theoretical debate, and the doctrinaire Karl Kautsky (dubbed "the socialist pope") insisted upon an orthodox interpretation of Marxism that postulated that only social and political opposition and revolutionary upheaval could topple capitalism. But economic growth and the everyday achievements of labor unions and working-class parties tended to blunt insurrectionist and revolutionary attitudes. Colonialism, migrations, and economic growth conspired to give a social basis (some called it a "proletarian aristocracy") to reformist attitudes and politics. Emigration to the United States was also helpful in easing social tensions in the Old World and

even offered new ideals and icons: in the United States Marx was discussed within a greater dialogue regarding the meaning of liberty, which drew upon ideals emanating from the **American Revolution** and the writings of individuals such as Thomas Paine and Thomas Jefferson. The New World's rapidly growing economy triggered social conflicts such as **strikes** that paved the way for both intellectual and militant socialism. In 1901 **Eugene Debs** founded the **Socialist Party** of America, which competed with an older Socialist Workers Party. Both, however, tended to support evolutionary rather than revolutionary socialism. The latter was represented mainly by the more radical **Industrial Workers of the World**, although its militant syndicalism was also a uniquely American hybrid.

The outbreak of World War I was another turning point in socialism. The Second International had solemnly advocated peace and disregarded war as both a tragedy for proletarians and a collateral effect of clashing imperialisms, but when war broke out in August of 1914, the vast majority of socialist parties in each nation stood with their bourgeoisie, including the authoritative German Social Democratic Party. Antiwar socialists were initially clandestine, but as the war intensified so too did opposition. In the United States leading socialists such as Debs were jailed for opposing the war. The war ushered in a new revolutionary model. In October 1917 the Russian czar was overthrown, and power was eventually seized by the Bolshevik Party, a faction of the Russian Social Democrats led by Vladimir I. Lenin, which held a majority in the Workers and Peasants Councils (Soviets). Some doctrinaire Marxists judged the move as premature, as Russia was scarcely industrialized and, by Western European standards, backward. But the new revolutionary government took hold in a nation torn apart by civil war, and the Russian Revolution turned into a myth for future European proletarian and anticolonialist movements. Bolsheviks and their followers outside Russia established a new vehicle for international revolution in the 1919 Third International, which was highly critical of the "reformist" and "revisionist" tendencies in socialism. They called themselves communists to differentiate their movement from other socialist and social democratic tendencies, and to return to the name favored by Marx. The working classes and socialists were deeply divided between evolutionary reformists and those who supported Russian-style communism. Adherence to Soviet models was further complicated by the sharp decline of revolutionary zeal in postwar Europe and by Lenin's death in 1924. Russia's new revolutionary elite in power asked itself whether socialism could be built in a single nation—the view of Josef Stalin—or whether the success of socialism depended on ongoing international revolutionary movements, the position espoused by Leon Trotsky. Trotsky's expulsion from the Communist Party in 1927, exile from the Soviet Union in 1928, and assassination by Stalinist agents in 1940 signaled to many socialists that communism had become authoritarian and elitist. By the 1930s the animus between socialists and communists often exceeded that which either group held toward capitalists.

Cooperation between communists and socialists during the Popular Front era of the middle and late 1930s was an anti-fascist and anti-Nazi alliance, not a merger. The brief Hitler–Stalin alliance of 1939 and their mutual dismantling of Poland disgusted many socialists, although many rallied to the Soviet side when Germany

invaded the USSR in 1940. In the post–World War II era, however, socialists and communists once again parted ways. The **Cold War** further polarized the political Left, with most communists supporting the USSR, while socialists of all kinds, with few exceptions, declared themselves loyal to the Western Alliance. As the British Labour Party's postwar government experience showed, socialists did not abandon radical politics. The "popular democracy" experience in Eastern Europe, on the other hand, proved fatal to the socialist allies of the communist parties in those countries.

The stalemate between socialism and communism in Europe and North America was not universal. In the Far East and in developing nations, the Third International (after 1943 renamed the Cominform) inspired numerous political and military struggles aimed at emancipating nations formerly or presently under Western colonial and imperialist domination. China's 1949 revolution led by Mao Zedong's communists was a model for the Third World and the communist world as well, as it broke from the strict control of communist Russia. In the 1960s gathering conflict between the Soviet Union and China took on ideological implications, with Maoists accusing Soviets of "revisionism," that is, disregard for Marxist principles and renunciation of revolution on a worldwide basis. This conflict echoed in Western countries, where young generations and new working classes were in search of political revolutionary models. By mid-decade the political Left of the United States and much of the West included a vast array of anarchist, socialist, communist, Trotskyist, and Maoist doctrines. In the United States most socialist groups hewed to evolutionary lines and operated within the political mainstream. Few, however, enjoyed electoral success.

The dramatic collapse of communist regimes in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe in the 1980s and early 1990s closed a historic cycle opened in 1917 and reshaped the ideological profiles of doctrines relating both to the working classes and to egalitarian political projects. Within much of Western society socialism is now viewed as utopian as it was before Marx. Nonetheless the heritage of various varieties of socialism has been of a great influence to many political contexts. Socialism continues to have at least rhetorical force in various European and Australian labor parties, and elements of it can be found in the Islamic world, including Baathist socialism. Within the United States socialist ideals occasionally influence public policy and have been made manifest in New Deal programs such as the Social Security Act, in various Great Society initiatives such as the War on **Poverty**, and in present-day calls for universal health care coverage. Doctrinaire Marxists are few within the United States, but more moderate political actors use socialism to voice left and center-left political views. Within the developing world socialism remains a potent critique of capitalistic imperialism, globalization, and post-colonialist thought.

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SOCIALIST PARTY

ROBERT PAUL "GABE" GABRIELSKY

The Socialist Party of America was organized after labor leader **Eugene Debs** won nearly 100,000 votes on the Social Democratic ticket in the 1900 presidential race. The Social Democratic Party was itself a remnant of the American Railroad Union (ARU), an early effort at industrial unionism that Debs led. Debs's relatively strong showing encouraged a merger between the Social Democratic Party and a significant faction of the older Socialist Labor Party, which came together to form the Socialist Party of America (SP) in 1901. This merger in turn attracted other movements of social reform, some dating to the **middle-class** reform movements of a century before.

In 1904 the Socialist Party chose Debs as its standard bearer and won more than a four-fold increase over the presidential totals of the Social Democratic Party four years before. The diverse social composition of the early Socialist Party included militant native-born workers from the mining regions of the Rocky Mountains and the industrial Midwest, middle-class urban reformers, and new **working-class** immigrants from southern and eastern Europe.


The party had strong membership-based local organizations in cities throughout the northern United States, organizations that elected more than 1,000 local and state officials. These local Socialist Party organizations were typically led by middle-class good-government advocates and conservative local craft union leaders advocating and implementing comprehensive programs of municipal reform that included increased availability of public recreation and parks, increased access to public education for working-class youth, municipal ownership of local public transportation and public utilities, and the encouragement of labor unions. There were also hundreds of locally and nationally based mass circulation socialist weeklies as well as daily socialist papers in larger cities, socialist labor schools, Sunday schools, athletic clubs, rooming houses, party headquarters, gathering places where middle-class radical lawyers and industrial workers could meet on equal terms, and other manifestations of what constituted a rich alternative culture, despite the fact that the efforts of the municipally based socialist organizations were often criticized by the Socialist Party's left wing as mere palliatives to capitalism and were derisively labeled "sewer" or "lemon" socialism.

However the tension between the reform and militant wings of the party did lead to a wholesale expulsion of party militants in 1912. Cast adrift, the party's now independent left wing, rooted particularly within sectors of the industrial working class and its intellectual allies, became the basis for the organization of the American **Communist Party** in 1919. Meanwhile concerted attacks on the Socialist Party by the older established parties fatally weakened most of its local organizations, and from 1920 on it went into a decades-long period of change and decline.

During World War I the Party was the main center for organized opposition to the war, but as a consequence it also became the focus of increased government scrutiny and repression. Many of its leaders, including the aging Debs, were imprisoned for their antiwar activity, and much of the socialist press atrophied when socialist papers lost second-class mailing privileges for expressing antiwar views. However, the party also lost much of the support it had enjoyed from local conservative trade union leaders because of its antiwar stance.

In 1924 a weakened party seeking broader support endorsed the independent Progressive Party presidential candidacy of Wisconsin Senator Robert M. Lafollette, who also had the reluctant support of the **labor movement**. Lafollette received nearly 17 percent of the popular vote, and because he ran on the socialist line in states where the Socialist Party had ballot status, the party's official standing was assured in many states for another four years.

The party enjoyed a brief and small resurgence in the early years of the **Great Depression**, but by that time its local infrastructure was in such decay that it was



Election poster for Eugene V. Debs, Socialist Party candidate for president, 1904. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

unable to take full advantage of the renewed interest in socialist ideas. Also, with Debs's death in 1926, leadership of the party shifted to **Norman Thomas**, who, unlike Debs, was not a militant labor leader, but a middle-class, ethically motivated former Presbyterian minister. For many the social distinction between Debs and Thomas reflected the fact that the party had lost much of its working-class social base.

By the late 1930s and into the 1940s, the party's ever dwindling membership was less inclined to see the party as a viable political alternative on its own terms. Rather, members began to envision a much broader national movement for a labor party or some broader democratic party of the Left in whose formation the Socialist Party would play a key role.

Meanwhile the party maintained several local organizations of sufficient strength to control the mayor's seats and local governments of a few Northern cities well into the 1950s. However as more general support for independent political action on the Left and labor party sentiments within the labor movement itself began to dwindle in the 1950s, the still shrinking Socialist Party began to reevaluate its perspective once again. While many members continued to call for independent political action and for a labor party, Norman Thomas and other prominent party leaders began to advocate a strategy characterized as "realignment" or "coalitionism," which envisioned working to reform the Democratic Party by ridding it of Southern Dixiecrats and the corrupt political machines of the urban North, thus transforming the Democratic Party into a social democratic party.

In the 1960s conflict over the Vietnam War ultimately divided the party yet again, and it split three ways. Supporters of the war and the conservative wing of the labor movement formed Social Democrats USA in 1973. The more moderate wing of the party advocated working within the Democratic Party. Members of this wing opposed the war and forged close ties to the liberal wing of the labor movement. Under the leadership of writer and social critic **Michael Harrington** they formed the Democratic Socialist Organizing Committee (DSOC) that same year. In 1981 DSOC merged with a **New Left** grouping, the New America Movement (NAM), to form the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA). A third faction

reconstituted the Socialist Party itself and continues to exist as a small propaganda group advocating independent political action in support of socialist ideas.

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SOCIALITE

ROBERT E. WEIR

Socialite is a colloquial term for a person who spends much of his or her time attending parties amid a fashionable set. Socialites were once dominated by **upper-class** members of the *Social Register*, but in more recent years the term has become linked with popular culture celebrity. **Prestige** was once automatically conferred upon socialites, but some modern socialites, such as Paris Hilton or Nicole Richie, are considered by some to be gauche and frivolous.

The term was not common until the 1920s, and it appears to have evolved from the term "society" as used in reference to prominent families, especially those active in organizing **charity balls** and **philanthropy**. Those acts often entailed active social schedules that placed individuals in the public light. As such their fashion choices, consumption patterns, and leisure activities were also on public display and sometimes became models by which "taste" could be defined and measured. Although the term is not innately gendered, women more than men have been considered socialites. In some social circles, **debutantes** were considered socialites-intraining. The characteristics of well-considered socialites include grace, poise, charity, charisma, and the ability to socialize at parties.

Historical antecedents of socialites would certainly include European court culture, but the American model is mostly an offshoot of the **Gilded Age** upper class, especially in the sense of being trendsetters. In fact, upper-class Victorian women often complained that **working-class** women aped their clothing and hat styles. Some Gilded Age women, however, broke away from class biases and rejected the popular **Social Darwinism** associated with elites. The Victorian upper class had long been patrons of and donors to **museums**, the **opera**, **symphony orchestras**, and other such pursuits, but several prominent individuals engaged in philanthropic acts aimed at those beneath them on the social scale. One such role model was Alva Belmont (1853–1933), who became active in the women's suffrage movement and, in the early twentieth century, also supported the **labor movement**. For the most part, however, the upper class carefully guarded its borders, and attempts of the **nouveau riche** to penetrate them often ended badly, a theme explored in novels such as Theodore Dreiser's *Sister Carrie* and William Dean Howells's *The Rise of Silas Lapham*.

By the 1920s the composition of the upper class and social conventions had both begun to change. The advent of movies changed the way Americans viewed fashion, style, and glamour, and families who were once considered parvenus, such as the Vanderbilts and Rockefellers, were now viewed as long-standing members of an aristocracy of wealth. "Society" and socialites became inexorably tied to possession of wealth and conspicuous consumption rather than to breeding and manners. Some historians argue that by the 1920s "personality" had begun to supplant older notions of "character." By the 1930s it was often hard to distinguish between society and celebrity, a task made even more difficult by the tendency of the two groups to intermingle. The industrialist Howard Hughes, for example, spent millions on Hollywood movies and dated glamorous starlets (including Katharine Hepburn, whose Connecticut parents carefully cultivated patrician bearing). The vacuity and scandalous personal lives of some members of the American upper class became literary fodder for novelists such as Louis Auchincloss, Edith Wharton, and F. Scott Fitzgerald.

The mixing of money, celebrity, culture, and consumption makes it hard to determine just who and what a socialite is. The philanthropic activities and cultural patterns of families such as the **Kennedys**, Folgers, **Roosevelts**, Rockefellers, and Whitneys are more in accord with nineteenth-century views of society life. Yet even within prominent families one sees the competing pulls of character and personality. Gloria Vanderbilt, for example, is known more for high-end conspicuous consumption of **luxury goods** than for acts of charity, just as Patty Randolph **Hearst** shocked her social peers by first joining the radical group that kidnapped her in 1974, and then marrying her bodyguard. Paris Hilton is often viewed as a social gadfly and party girl rather than a person of breeding and refinement.

Hilton also exemplifies the way that the term socialite has entered popular culture to reference someone who is as notorious as famous. Ironically today many Americans associate socialites with excess, overconsumption, and troubled lives. Their wealth is admired and envied, but not the individuals themselves. They are thus the perfect foil for romance writers such as Danielle Steele and Nancy Martin. Such associations, of course, make members of the *Social Register* and Junior League recoil. In popular cultural usage the term socialite gives credence to **subjective methods** of class determination, as these individuals possess great wealth and social power, but far less **authority**, **prestige**, and political influence. The dual understandings of the term socialite—one refined and positive, the other crass and negative—suggest that the future will see the first group disassociate itself from the term.

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SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS (SES)

ROBERT E. WEIR

Socioeconomic status (SES) is a class and social position descriptor first used in Great Britain in 1911. It takes into account the **income**, occupation, **education**, **social networks**, friendships, residency patterns, and **wealth** of individuals and

families, and locates them relative to others within a society. As the term suggests, it measures both economic and social factors. **Status** is viewed through the lens of where an individual is ranked within society. Many SES models are multigenerational in that children are ranked according to their parents' status, but the status of the parents' own family of origin is also considered. SES has passed into popular jargon and is now used as shorthand for the success (or lack thereof) of individuals, families, and social groups. In common parlance it is frequently used as a synonym for social class, as in "a person of low SES."

SES research has been contentious because it is, by nature, a mix of empirical and **subjective** data. Some of the earliest research was done by University of Chicago social scientists in the 1920s and 1930s, based mostly on residential patterns of urban dwellers. Perhaps the most famous studies were those of **W. Lloyd Warner**, who used a **reputational method** to help him devise his models of social class. Most modern scholarship uses a variety of measures. Scales such as the Gini coefficient or the Survey of Income and Program Participation are used to measure income. These are often combined with occupational **prestige** and wealth measurements. There are also several composite indices. Not surprisingly scholars divide over which data sets (if any) yield the best results.

Academic disagreements notwithstanding, there is general agreement that one's SES is important and that distinct SES categories exist within American society. Studies generally reveal that many of the same factors—such as **gender**, **race**, ethnicity, and family background—that have historically shaped **life chances** in America continue to operate to some extent. Religion seems to be less of a factor than in the past, though long-term studies of the impact of global terrorism on the **social mobility** of American Muslims have yet to be completed.

To date educational and public health researchers have made the greatest use of SES data. Educational research reveals that the long-held assumption that high SES correlates with academic success is largely true, though not unqualifiedly so. High SES parents generally do a better job of preparing their children for school, mostly because they have greater access to the resources and information necessary to help their offspring. For many reformers this information underscores the need for compensatory programs such as **Head Start** and for greater public awareness campaigns directed at lower income parents. But high SES and school achievement are not a given. Studies by Sharon and Craig Ramey highlight an emerging problem among upper-income parents: expanding work schedules and increased levels of stress mean that some high SES parents no longer invest the necessary time in preparing their children for school.

Public health researchers have long linked wellness to SES. Studies reveal high correlations between low SES and higher rates of health problems such as cancer, diabetes, heart disease, obesity, and sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS). Stroke studies show that higher survival rates for victims correspond dramatically with high SES. This is true also for quality-of-life issues surrounding diseases whose contraction rates do not correspond neatly with SES, most notably for how patients survive and cope with maladies such as HIV and chronic fatigue syndrome. Some public health officials use SES data to make the case for better delivery of services and financial support for patients living in **poverty**, and some advocates of universal health care have evoked the same data. On a more controversial note, insurance

carriers also use the data to assess risk factors; those in lower SES categories are more likely to be assessed higher premiums or be denied coverage.

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SOMBART, WERNER (January 19, 1863–May 19, 1941)

DIETER BÖGENHOLD

Werner Sombart was a prominent member of the German Historical School, which is regarded as one of the foundation stones of a body of analysis known as institutionalism. Sombart's work has been influential for American scholars for two reasons. First, his use of "capitalism"—which Karl Marx seldom used as a stand-alone term—came to be orthodox Marxist usage. Second, Sombart's explanation of why socialism failed to take root in the United States continues to frame debate on the subject. He was born into a wealthy family in Ermsleben, Germany, and studied economics and law at schools in Germany and Italy before obtaining his PhD in economics from Berlin University in 1888. By the early twentieth century Sombart established himself as an economist of international renown. After holding professorships at other schools, Sombart took over the economics chair at Berlin in 1917, where he replaced his former mentor, Gustav von Schmoller. Sombart remained in that position until he retired in 1931.

Sombart's oeuvre was wide and varied. From a contemporary perspective, one can say that he oscillated between economics, sociology, and cultural studies. In a famous article titled "Economy" in an encyclopedia of sociology (1931), Sombart averred that economics and economic life are based upon communication, which belongs primarily to the academic competency of sociology. Consequently economics should be interpreted as a subfield of economic sociology. He argued that no "economy in abstracto" exists. Rather a specific economy within specific institutions must be explored in order to understand the interplay between economy and society within an institutional framework.

Sombart investigated the economic mentalities of people, classes, and societies. In Europe Sombart's most famous book was *The Modern Capitalism*, which appeared in 1902 in several volumes. At the time Sombart was indebted to a Marxian framework, and this work is often considered as a classic in probing Marx's *Kapital*. It remains influential in many European universities, especially in France. Many credit Sombart with adding clarity to Marx's critique of capitalism. Sombart distinguished between three periods of capitalism in economic history leading to modern capitalism: early capitalism, developed capitalism, and late capitalism. This seemingly simple distinction did much to encourage scholars to move beyond

simple nostrums and analyze the inner workings of capitalism within a shifting historical framework. His work was historical and universal, discussing different economic sectors and their branches. He concluded that the rise of modern capitalism is connected to the rise of large corporations but that these companies were found only in some branches of an economy, while in others a majority of small and medium-sized enterprises continued to dominate. His work added greatly to the understanding of how economies of scale operate (or fail to do so). Many of his insights became basic knowledge in the fields of business administration and industrial economics, including the idea that there are limits to growth even within unregulated economies. Sombart was also one of the earliest scholars to study the scientific management systems of Frederick Winslow Taylor. At the time alarmists on the political left saw Taylorism as an inherently exploitative component of assembly-line production (often dubbed "Fordism"). Sombart insisted that much of that discussion was misleading.

For American scholars his 1906 work Why Is There No Socialism in the United States? continues to provoke great debate. Sombart articulated one of the most comprehensive looks at what came to be called American exceptionalism. This work was in keeping with Sombart's insistence that economics is linked to mentalities and cultural practices. He argued that America's lack of a feudal past, its early expansion of suffrage and democracy, and its relative prosperity divorced it from the historical antecedents that fostered European socialism. The boldness of Sombart's thesis and the rhetorical flourish with which it was written continue to inspire both admirers and detractors. Some labor historians, for example, have ridiculed florid assertions that the potential socialism of American workers was "shipwrecked upon shoals of roast beef," and have argued that Sombart focused too much on culture and not enough on state-sanctioned systems of oppression.

Sombart's later career also spawned controversy. He became increasingly nationalistic, and works such as Jews and Modern Capitalism (1911) and Traders and Heroes (1915) are viewed by some critics as proto-fascist. Scholars continue to debate Sombart's political views as his work in the late 1930s was simultaneously anti-Nazi yet suggestive of anti-Semitism. Sombart's defenders assert that he was not an anti-Semite and that his critics have misread his dense prose. They also point out that he was placed under house arrest by the Nazis. Sombart's works were out of fashion for a time in the 1950s, but they were revived by American scholars pioneering in the new social history from the 1960s on. Many of these scholars wanted to look at the history of social groups such as workers, women, and African Americans, interpretive schemes that put them at odds with the institutionalists who dominated academia at the time. Attacks on institutional history led them back to scholars such as Sombart who articulated that approach. The same scholars often looked at grassroots radical movements, a focus that also led them to engage Sombart.

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SOUP KITCHENS

AMY DAHLBERG CHU

Soup kitchens are facilities in which food is cooked and distributed daily to the poor for free or for a small fee. The earliest soup kitchens known to have existed in the United States were set up during the Civil War. Other social emergencies such as the economic depressions of 1873–79 and 1893–97 prompted the establishment of food kitchens. Soup kitchens, however, burgeoned particularly during the **Great Depression** of the 1930s and operated alongside other community relief efforts such as **welfare** cafeterias, penny restaurants, and milk lines for school children. Nearly every city and town in the United States had a soup kitchen during the Depression, and people from rural areas often traveled to the cities to procure food. For needy individuals and families, frequenting soup kitchens was a more attractive alternative to picking through garbage dumps and restaurant refuse piles, eating weeds, or begging for food.

The first soup kitchens established in response to the Great Depression were opened in 1929, but they increased in number particularly after 1932, when **unemployment** peaked at 25 percent. State and federal governments began operating some soup kitchens by the mid-1930s, but most were run by churches, benevolent societies, and other private charities.

Soup kitchens supplemented the meager daily meals of individuals and families. For individuals and childless married couples, who were ineligible for most local, state, and federal aid, the food they received at soup kitchens was often their only sustenance. Men, women, and children arrived at soup kitchens at dawn, buckets in hand, and formed long queues popularly known as "breadlines." Breadlines routinely spanned several blocks. Individuals often waited in vain, learning hours later that the kitchen had run out of food. Although soup kitchens sometimes offered their patrons bread, coffee, or sandwiches, soup was the food of choice because it was economical, easy to make, and could be watered down to accommodate an increased clientele. The soup often consisted only of broth, and individuals frequently requested that the server dip the ladle deeper into the pot to retrieve some meat or vegetables.

Many Americans took pains to hide their hunger during the Depression. Some adults made excuses for their visits to soup kitchens, claiming, for instance, that they had come to meet a friend, not to receive soup. Many mothers sent their children to retrieve the pail of soup to avert public embarrassment. The proliferation of soup kitchens during the 1930s was largely necessitated by President Herbert Hoover's refusal to provide federal assistance to impoverished Americans. Hoover repeatedly insisted as late as December 1931 that "no one has starved," as thousands begged, scavenged, and even rioted for food. Characteristically in December 1930, President Hoover signed a bill that granted \$45 million to Arkansas farmers to feed their starving livestock but refused to appropriate another \$25 million to feed the farmers and their families. Hoover's staunch belief in **self-reliance** as the principal mark of moral character reinforced his decision to withhold federal food assistance.

One of the earliest soup kitchens of the Depression era was Detroit's Capuchin Soup Kitchen, opened by the city's Franciscan monks in November 1929. The

Capuchin Soup Kitchen was supported by lay volunteers and received donations from area farmers and food retailers. The kitchen fed hundreds of men, women, and children each day. Not everyone who opened food kitchens, however, had magnanimous intentions. Some collected more monetary donations than they spent on food. Others used soup kitchens for publicity. William Randolph **Hearst** opened a soup kitchen at each end of Times Square in New York City. Workers served sandwiches from trucks covered with advertisements for his newspaper chain's charitable activities. Gangster Al Capone, anxious to brighten his blackened image, fed thousands of Chicagoans at his popular "Free Lunch" restaurant following the 1929 stock market crash.

Many Depression-era soup kitchens remained in operation well after the 1930s, but it was not until the late 1960s that soup kitchen numbers again began to climb. In 1967 the problems of hunger and malnutrition became a major political issue. Although federal food stamp and surplus distribution programs were initiated in 1939, it was found that only 20 percent of Americans living beneath the **poverty line** were receiving such assistance, and neither program was sufficient to provide American families an adequate diet. Privately run soup kitchens, like **food banks**, often seek to fill the gap between government assistance and a healthy diet.

The number of soup kitchens in the United States rose particularly during the 1970s and 1980s. Soup kitchens became not only distributors of food but valuable centers for social interaction among the poor, who often experienced isolation from the rest of society. The resurgence of soup kitchens during these decades has been attributed to the de-institutionalization of psychiatric hospitals, decreases in federal spending on the poor, and the economic recession of the early 1980s.

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SOUTHERN BAPTISTS

HOWELL WILLIAMS

Southern Baptists are part of the Southern Baptist Convention (SBC), which is not only the largest denomination in the South but also the largest Protestant denomination in the nation, claiming more than 16 million members and 42,000 churches in the United States.

The religious culture of Baptists developed out of an eighteenth-century tradition of revivalism. Evangelists, revivalists, and preachers defined sin as personal, emphasized self-discipline, and exhorted self-conscious denial. Baptist ministers, often living on the edge of society as uneducated farmers, preached a conversion message that resonated with what Baptist historian Walter Shurden calls "plain folks." Early Baptists represented agricultural and manual laborers who were attracted to the democratic message of soul and social equality.

In the late 1700s Baptists rejected the style and worship of the planter **elite**, rebelling against their proper, vain, and cultured society. For example early Baptists initially opposed **slavery**, as it was associated with aristocratic culture. Instead they formed autonomous churches, made up largely of the **poor** and uneducated, but with a close fellowship and community of believers in which social rank and class privileges mattered little compared to one's inner spirituality and fellowship with others. However Baptists became more institutionalized, organized, and urbanized; therefore by the end of the Civil War, prominent members had left their humble origins behind, claiming **status** and respectability. Baptists, once known as a poor and illiterate sect, would produce one of the wealthiest men on earth, **John D. Rockefeller**. In fact not all Baptists came from humble beginnings or the lower social strata of society, but the historical impression of Baptists as being poor has been affected by the large numbers of Baptists in the rural South.

Baptists became more diverse depending on region as each church was autonomous and self-governing. In the early nineteenth century the South was isolated, had a different geography and economy from the rest of the country, and generally held a proslavery opinion. In the 1830s and the 1840s, amid growing abolitionist fervor, Baptist mission societies confronted the question of whether slaveholders could be appointed as missionaries. Dissenting Baptists separated from the American Baptist Home Mission Society in 1845, upholding their pro-slavery opinion as biblically sanctioned, and subsequently founding the SBC. In 1845 the 350,000-plus SBC members included 130,000 African Americans who left shortly after the Civil War.

The SBC created a sense of unity and identity among Baptist churches through their Sunday school literature and emphasis on missionary work. Southern Baptists contributed to the late nineteenth-century benevolent empire by funding and sending out thousands of national and international missionaries. Developing into an establishment, the SBC founded seminaries for educational training, ran publishing houses, and built impressive sanctuaries.

In the twentieth century, Southern Baptists emphasized evangelism, missions, and church growth. By 1900 the SBC reported a membership of 1.6 million, and by 1950 those numbers had increased more than sevenfold. With tens of thousands of churches constructed by mid-twentieth century, Southern Baptists in the average Southern town could be members of the First Baptist, Second Baptist, or even the Third Baptist church. Often the First Baptist church was the most prominent, wealthy, and formal Southern Baptist church in town, while the Second Baptist church was not only the second to be built, but also the second in economic and social status and education. It would be common for members of second and third Southern Baptist churches in town to work for the members of First Baptist.

In the second half of the twentieth century, Southern Baptists struggled over issues of racial justice, women's leadership roles, and theological interpretations. In 1979 SBC fundamentalist leaders began to transform the relatively theologically and socially diverse denomination into a more homogenous, conservative organization. Two decades later the results were successful as fundamentalists gained control of mission agencies and seminary trustee boards. Moderate and progressive Baptists disassociated with the SBC.

Today there are many shades of Southern Baptists, from those who attend First Baptist churches to members of Third Baptist churches and Baptists who represent every social class in between. Yet the members are predominately white, conservative, and formally governed by male leadership. Sociologists have determined that people enjoy being with church members who are like themselves, and one can find various Southern Baptist churches that represent different theological emphases, formality of worship styles, and music. Although no religious group is class-exclusive, one may notice a homogenous social class at the local level, and a homogeneity of vehicles in the church parking lot.

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SOUTHERN TENANT FARMERS' UNION (STFU)

MARY A. WAALKES

The Southern Tenant Farmers' Union (STFU) was formed in 1934 in Tyronza, Arkansas, by a coalition of white and black small farmers, tenant farmers, and **sharecroppers** as a response to dire economic conditions that began during the **Great Depression** and worsened through government intervention. The STFU's interracial makeup and its attacks on economic privilege provoked Southern white landholders to occasional violence. The STFU used cooperatives, court fights, congressional lobbying, and **strikes** to protect members from evictions, improve daily **wages** for farm laborers, and seek a fair share of crop reduction payments from the government. In most cases the STFU failed in its objectives, but it was successful in drawing the nation's attention to the plight of impoverished Southern farmers.

Throughout the South tenant farmers and sharecroppers struggled to produce a profit as, by the early 1930s, the price of crops such as cotton had hit rock bottom. The **New Deal**'s Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA) attempted to pull commodity prices up by paying farmers to plow under or not farm a portion of their acreage. Although crop reduction contracts under the Agricultural Adjustment Act directed farm owners to make strong efforts to keep tenants on the land and to split the crop reduction payments with them, few landowners complied, and many landowners evicted tenants as it became more profitable to hire them as day laborers.

Norman Thomas, a leading member of the Socialist Party and by 1932 twice a candidate for the presidency, visited Tyronza in 1934 and was appalled by the poverty he witnessed. He urged impoverished farmers in Arkansas to form a union to address these problems. Thomas had been invited by local Socialist Party members Harry Leland Mitchell and Clay East, who with Howard Kester joined black preachers E. B. McKinney and Owen Whitfield in leading a multipronged attack on an inequitable agricultural system. They petitioned New Dealers and other

Washington liberals to put teeth in AAA contracts on behalf of tenant farmers and sharecroppers. The STFU took Arkansas plantation owner Hiram Norcross to court for evicting tenants in violation of AAA policies. The power of entrenched landowning interests prevailed over the STFU, which lost its case. Although Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace sympathized with the STFU, he knew that the success of **Franklin Roosevelt**'s New Deal required the compliance of Southern Democrats, some of whom were themselves large landowners. Wallace fired Jerome Frank, who acted as general counsel to the AAA, and a number of New Dealers who also supported the STFU.

Liberals instead responded with the Farm Security Administration in 1936, which set up loans to small farmers. The federal government's lack of full commitment to the lowest class of farm workers was evident in that the money allocated was clearly not equal to the task. Although helpful to a small percentage of farmers, the FSA did not restore farms to evicted tenant farmers or assist farm laborers whose daily pay was abysmally low. Although the STFU successfully prodded the federal government to take note of Southern rural poverty, the STFU ran up against hostile large landholding interests represented by people such as Arkansas landowner and Congressman Joseph Robinson.

Many sharecroppers were removed from the land and became day laborers working for pitifully low wages. The STFU used strikes with some success to force landowners to raise daily wages for workers. STFU members won their cotton strike in 1935 for a wage increase, and as a result saw membership numbers climb to around 25,000 in six Southern states by the following year. However, conflict between STFU members and landowners was often violent, and led to the deaths of a few members.

The STFU avoided the **communist**-dominated Share Croppers Union, which formed in Alabama and which also met with violence, but did align itself in 1937 with the **Congress of Industrial Organizations** (CIO). The STFU worked with the CIO affiliate the United Cannery, Agricultural, Packing, and Allied Workers of America (UCAPAWA), another farm worker–based union, until a fallout over ideological differences in 1939. When the STFU split from UCAPAWA, it lost some of the support of black union members, who preferred to remain linked to UCAPAWA and who by then questioned the white leadership's commitment to interracial cooperation.

The Southern Tenant Farmers' Union continued to battle on behalf of small farmers, sharecroppers, and day laborers, although the organization's focus shifted following the 1940s. As more farms turned to mechanization, the STFU increasingly advocated for migrant workers. The organization turned its attention to agricultural conditions in California, appropriately changing its name after World War II to the National Farm Labor Union.

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SPECIAL INTERESTS

STEPHEN E. SUSSMAN

Special interests are organized groups sharing common objectives who actively attempt to influence government The First Amendment to the Constitution gives every citizen the right to assemble and petition the government for the resolution of grievances. Alexis de Tocqueville wrote in 1834, "In no country of the world has the principle of association been more successfully used or applied to a greater multitude of objectives than in America." He was amazed at the degree to which Americans formed groups to solve social and political issues and suggested that the ease with which Americans formed organizations was a reflection of a strong democratic culture.

James Madison viewed interest groups, which he called "factions," as a necessary evil and argued that they not only conflict with each other but also with the common good. However Madison thought that abolishing interest groups would destroy liberty, a remedy "worse than the disease." In *Federalist Papers No. 10*, published in 1787, he noted that in a large republic such as the United States, there will be many different factions held together by regional or local special interests, but that no single faction would dominate national politics.

Membership in interest groups is linked to **socioeconomic status** and is greatest among professional, college-educated, and high-income persons. Those who are the most disadvantaged economically cannot afford to join interest groups, and many may not have the time or expertise to find out which groups represent them. Even a small contribution to an interest group is a luxury they cannot afford. Nor do they have the time, money, or expertise to be interest group entrepreneurs by creating and marketing their own special interest.

Use of the term "special interest" implies that the group does not operate in the public interest. Many scholars dislike the term because it can carry a negative implication and can be used demagogically. When politicians want support from constituents, they may refer to their opposition as being "friendly to special interests," and infer that the latter are antithetical to the public interest. Hence, groups such as Common Cause, Public Citizen, and the Consumer Federation of America see themselves as *public interest* groups, interested in the public welfare and not in the objectives of business organizations, trade associations, unions, or other "special interests." They urge government to take a largely regulatory role. As a result, public interest groups are popular with environmental and civil rights groups, both of which *are* special interests. In reality most interest groups serve some special interest.

Government growth and regulation over the last few decades account for a good portion of the proliferation of special interests. The more areas in which the federal and state governments have become involved, the more special interests have developed to attempt to influence policy. Veterans' benefits create veterans' groups; professional license requirements have given rise to groups such as the American Medical Association, the American Bar Association, and other groups that **lobby** government for their own special interests. Interest groups have also increased over the last few decades as government becomes more active in civil rights, social **welfare**, and consumer rights.

There are thousands of interest groups seeking to influence government to benefit their constituencies. They include business and trade organizations, professional associations, the **labor movement**, women's organizations, religious groups, single-issue groups, and environmental organizations, among others.

Business and trade organizations include groups such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers. Professional associations include groups such as the American Bar Association and the American Medical Association. The Teamsters and the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) are examples of organized labor. Women's organizations date to before the Civil War, when women were active in the antislavery campaigns. In the early twentieth century women's organizations were active in the suffrage movement. Today the largest feminist organization is the National Organization for Women. Religious groups have a long history of involvement in politics. The Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) took an active role lobbying for the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Other politically active groups include the Christian Coalition and the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith. Single-issue groups, such as the National Rifle Association or Mothers Against Drunk Driving, attract support from people with a strong commitment to a single cause. Groups such as the National Wildlife Federation, the Sierra Club, and the National Audubon Society lobby to protect the environment.

James Madison's solution to the problems posed by interest groups was to create a wide-open system in which many groups would be able to participate, allowing groups with opposing interests to counterbalance one another. He succeeded in his efforts. Some scholars argue today that the increase in interest group representation has resulted in less power for interest groups and in better **democracy**.

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SPLIT LABOR MARKET

ROBERT E. WEIR

The split labor market is also known as the dual labor market, the segmented labor market, or as labor market segmentation. The term refers to the way in which labor as a commodity in and of itself is negotiated differently by those "buying" labor. In simplest terms it means that some groups and individuals are valued more than others even though their work does not differ radically from those who are less highly valued. Historically **race**, **gender**, ethnicity, and educational attainment have been factors in determining where individuals are placed in the labor market and how much they are compensated for their work. Split labor market studies refute the notion that work and opportunity are available to everyone in equal

measure within the U.S. economy. They also show that there is no such thing as a single market for labor. The question becomes one of how employers choose to invest in human capital.

Split labor markets are a direct offshoot of the division of labor within an economy and grew more pronounced in the United States with the advent of the **Indus**trial Revolution. Theories of the split labor market largely derive from work done in the late nineteenth century by British economist Alfred Marshall, though the practices Marshall and others described had long been a feature of capitalism. One of the central tenets of split labor market research is that the labor market is bifurcated into primary and secondary markets, which are in turn split into internal and external labor markets. The primary sector consists of high-paying, high-status, stable jobs in which workers have a high degree of autonomy, whereas jobs in the secondary market generally pay less, give workers less discretionary authority, and are marked by greater unemployment and underemployment. Access to the primary market is usually more difficult and requires educational attainment, prior experience, social networking, or specialized training. Within each market some positions are filled by those already within the system through concrete, bureaucratic, and predictable channels ("internal"), such as promotion or transfer. "External" posts are more competitive, as they are open to outsiders.

For the most part, jobs in the primary market are preferable to those in the secondary market, the latter being more subject to workers' alienation and high turnover. But because the primary market is more restricted and some of its positions are highly competitive, even for those who possess the qualifications to enter it, it is extremely difficult for workers in the secondary market to move up. In effect the economic system creates a permanent subclass of workers. Marxist theorists postulate that advanced capitalism is even more insidious. They argue that an "industrial reserve army" exists to drive down the wages of workers within the secondary market; that is, high unemployment assures that there will always be an excess of workers to take the jobs of those who protest their conditions or go on strike for higher pay. (In Marx's time, women, children, and recent immigrants made up the reserve.)

The work of recent economists and neo-Marxist theorists suggests that the picture is even more complex. One of the markers of both blue-collar and whitecollar labor has been increasing segmentation of work tasks, the move from generalization to specialization. In industrial terms, assembly lines break down work into single, repetitive functions that make workers as interchangeable as the parts they assemble. Retail and fast food industries apply the same principles within the service sector. Complex bureaucracies, however, do much the same with administrative and nonmanual labor. Some theorists speculate, therefore, that hierarchy exists even within each labor market, sometimes expressed as "core" versus "peripheral" firms. The top firms become standard-setters for similar enterprises, but they also set artificial ceilings for wages and benefits. Smaller firms must be competitive but cannot match them, hence the top firms stabilize their workforces and payrolls; workers know that they cannot "do better" elsewhere. Worker compensation, therefore, is not based on value or skill, but on what the market—which core firms create—will bear. Employers can even evolve strategies that pit workers against each other—such as bonus pay, piece-work rates, and merit pay—rather than

against management. Ironically the **labor movement** is likely to be more successful in primary labor markets, as employers there may view it as a method of normalizing wage negotiations.

Split labor markets have profound implications for the American class system. The primary sector gets to "cherry-pick" top talent and restrict access to its ranks. In effect those in the **upper class** and upper **middle class** have made the primary market a semiclosed domain, an economic form of **social reproduction**. The **working poor**, by contrast, have limited opportunity for upward **social mobility**. This makes the **Horatio Alger** myth exactly that, a fanciful rags-to-riches story that is out of synch with forces that conspire to create an **underclass**.

Split labor market theory presumes aspects of planning and overt control that many economists and social theorists deny. Critics of the theory argue that the competitive nature of capitalism makes it unlikely that even top firms would agree to set standards or control the labor market. They also note that innovation and technological change make it impossible to exercise long-term control over labor markets. Split labor market scholars often counter that the existence of trusts and pools are evidence that collusion does take place, and several scholars have demonstrated how split market ideals have operated across long time spans.

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SPORTS

ROBERT E. WEIR

The role of sports in American culture is complex; some sports have challenged the prevailing social structure, whereas others have reinforced it. A few general patterns have prevailed, but even these do not universally apply. In general, the higher one's **SES**, the more likely one is to participate in an individual sport, whereas those of lower socioeconomic standing tend to play team sports. High **income** correlates with increased attendance at spectator sports, as one needs disposable income to attend most professional sporting events.

There can be little doubt that many links exist between money and sports. Pursuits such as maintaining horses, **yachting**, polo, and skiing at top resorts are so prohibitively expensive that they are dominated by members of the **upper class** and upper **middle class**. These activities increase the **cultural capital** of those who can afford them and serve to distance them socially from the **masses**. Likewise, although professional sports are avidly followed by members of the **working class**, the lower middle class, and the **lower class**, these groups attend games

sporadically if at all because of the cost. In 2003 the average cost for a family of four to attend a professional game—calculated by ticket prices, parking, and projected concessions—was \$290 for the National Football League (NFL), \$255 for the National Basketball Association (NBA), \$240 for the National Hockey League (NHL), and \$145 for Major League Baseball (MLB). In some markets the cost is much higher. The cost to see the New York Yankees averaged \$194 in 2005, a figure surpassed by the Chicago Cubs (\$210) and the Boston Red Sox. The latter price is the most expensive in MLB, one that averaged \$276 in 2005. The cost of a season ticket for the Red Sox averaged around \$11,000. The high cost of attending sporting events means there is often a disconnection between the SES of spectators and die-hard fans. This is true even of sporting events customarily associated with a lower SES, such as NASCAR auto racing or high-profile boxing matches. Some scholars have referenced Pierre Bourdieu's work on distinction to help explain this phenomenon. From this perspective, televised sports function much as Roman circuses once did: as a way to pacify the masses through diversionary entertainment. On the opposite end of the scale, those with money can enhance their **prestige** by being seen at high-profile events. For such individuals, spectatorship is a form of conspicuous consumption that reinforces their cultural superiority.

Some scholars have questioned the appropriateness of applying Bourdieu to sports. Pure faddishness may explain some patterns of high SES spectatorship. For example, until the 1990s NASCAR events were not popular with many highincome Americans and attending a race would have been viewed by many as **slum**ming. In the 1990s, however, NASCAR embarked on an advertising blitz, secured a lucrative television contrast, and broadened its audience. Thus, one could link upper-class attendance at NASCAR to cultural capital theory, but one could just as easily see it as an impact of popular culture on their consumption patterns. A few scholars use the phrase "cultural omnivore" to describe the tendency of some upper-income individuals to seek **prestige** by appearing to embrace eclectic tastes. Historically, though, the upper classes have identified more with Formula One auto racing than with stock cars, largely because such races have been held near luxurious retreats in Monaco, Milan, and San Marino. Many observers doubt that NASCAR will sustain an upper-strata following as the values and lifestyles associated with it are not consonant with what is considered "refined" taste, and they see cultural omnivores as a temporary aberration.

One must also acknowledge that though the media has served to lower divisions between the classes, there are still activities that remain as associated with middle to lower SES as yachting is to the upper classes. **Bowling**, for example, retains its **blue-collar** image. So too do body building, motorcycle racing, cheerleading, tractor pulls, "monster truck" rallies, arena football, and sport/theater hybrids such as professional wrestling and roller derby. The NFL has a much bigger following among those of lower SES than among those at the top, just as the NBA has a huge following among **inner city** residents of limited means.

The question of whether sports will continue to reinforce class or serve further to flatten distinctions is complicated by its historical patterns of breaking down some barriers while strengthening others. Baseball is a prime example of this. Scholars have shown how baseball evolved from the lower orders and attracted more affluent followers. As the game evolved from its lower-class origins and was professionalized, an odd split occurred. Wealthy industrialists and investors owned teams, yet players and fans were concentrated among the lower classes. Early MLB contained large numbers of **Irish Americans**, second-generation German Americans, and others from a recent **immigrant** background. In the late nineteenth century, owners attempted to tame crowds and attract a "better" clientele of middle-class spectators, but the working class remained attracted to the game, and owners were forced to relent on programs such as bans on alcohol sales and Sunday games. MLB, in fact, was often as close to the mythical "melting pot" as American society got. Patrons of various economic backgrounds sat in the same ballpark to watch players of diverse backgrounds. **Jews** played MLB long before they were accepted in other social circles, and Jackie Robinson's 1947 debut broke the color barrier in MLB a full seven years before the *Brown v. the Board of Education of Topeka* Supreme Court decision mandated an end to **segregation** in public schools.

Sports have often served as the conduit for marginal adaptation for minorities and those who grew up in **poverty**. In the 1930s, for instance, African Americans followed the boxing glories of Joe Louis and vicariously reveled in his triumphs over white opponents. In 1950 the NBA signed its first black players; now around 80 percent of all professional basketball players are black. Some children see basketball careers as their ticket out of the **ghetto** and parlay playground and high school expertise into college scholarships or pro contracts. Sports have even served to break down racial and class barriers in individual sports once associated primarily with wealthier individuals. The success of black tennis players such as Althea Gibson in the 1950s and Arthur Ashe during the 1960s and 1970s led many African American children to take up the sport, just as the golfing success of the multiracial Tiger Woods has led to more black and **Asian American** golfers. Asian Americans have similarly viewed figures such as basketball's Yao Ming, ice skater Michelle Kwan, MLB star Ichiro Suzuki, and golfer Se Ri Pak as role models.

Sports have also played a role in challenging **gender stratification**. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 proved a boon for girls' and women's sports, especially as strengthened by Title IX, added in 1972. The success of high-profile athletes has also proved inspirational. Tennis star Martina Navratilova helped popularize strengthening exercises for women. The international success of the U.S. women's soccer team has led to an explosion of girls taking up the sport, and high-profile college basketball programs sparked the creation of the Women's National Basketball Association in 1996. Some women, such as golfer Annika Sorenstam, have proven they can compete with men on their own terms.

The flip side to the integrative and social leveling potentials of sports is the persistence of prejudice and the capital required to own sports franchises or sponsor tournaments. Both of these tend to concentrate **power** among white, wealthy males. Although 80 percent of NBA players are black, only one African American owns a franchise and only two have ever owned an MLB team. Race continues to be a factor even at middle and lower management levels. The majority of NBA head coaches are white, just seven NFL head coaches were African American in 2006, and MLB began the 2006 season with just five managers who are black,

Hispanic, or Latino. MLB's low number of Latino managers and general managers is surprising given the large influx of Latino players into MLB in the past several decades. Critics of professional sports argue that owners and events sponsors are concerned with equality only insofar as entertainment value corresponds with their own economic interests and values. There have been high-profile battles over issues such as cities being shaken down for tax benefits to build stadiums, the gender segregation of the **country club** where the Masters' golf tournament is played, and the skyrocketing ticket prices to attend sporting events.

An even more disturbing set of data concerns college athletics, with critics charging that low-income youth are being exploited for the entertainment of well-heeled spectators. A 2006 study by the National Collegiate Athletic Association showed that just 36 percent of the top-ranked athletic programs graduated as much as 70 percent of their student-athletes and that schools averaged a large gap between white and black graduates. Men's college football and basketball programs are viewed by many as revolving doors through which interchangeable athletes enter and exit, approximately 40 percent of whom never complete their education. In this regard athletics offer a false hope for those aspiring to a professional career in sports or business.

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Springsteen, Bruce (September 23, 1949–)

KRISTIN SOLLI

Bruce Frederick Joseph Springsteen is an American singer, songwriter, and guitar player. The son of a bus driver and a legal secretary, Springsteen was born and raised in New Jersey and started playing music at thirteen. In his teens and early twenties he played in numerous local and regional rock bands. He landed a record deal in 1972 and has since released over twenty albums. After *Greetings from Asbury Park*, NJ (1973) and *The Wild*, the Innocent, and the E Street Shuffle (1973), two albums that won critical acclaim but did not garner much attention from a larger audience, Springsteen won mainstream fame and made the cover of *Time* and Newsweek with Born to Run in 1975. About a decade later Born in the U.S.A. (1984), a record that scored seven top-ten hits in the United States and sold over 20 million copies worldwide, made him a global megastar. Although his subsequent albums have not reached similar sales figures, he remains one of the giants of international rock music.

Springsteen is an eloquent and sensitive chronicler of the everyday life of working-class American men and (to a lesser degree) women. Throughout his

career, Springsteen has championed blue**collar** workers by singing about the lives of firemen, police officers, factory workers, farmers, and truck drivers. Springsteen's characters often struggle with coming to terms with the discrepancy between the promises of the American **dream** and the realities of working-class American life. The social commentary of these lyrics places him in the tradition of Woody Guthrie and Bob Dylan as an advocate of ordinary people in their encounters with overpowering political and economic forces. Like Dylan and Guthrie, Springsteen celebrates the American people, but is often critical of American political leaders. When "Born in the U.S.A." (a song that paints a grim picture of the United States from the perspective of a Vietnam War veteran) was appropriated as a patriotic anthem for Ronald Reagan's reelection campaign in 1984, Springsteen's response was less than enthusiastic (for example, he declined an invitation to appear with Reagan in pub-



Bruce Springsteen, 1980s. Courtesy of Photofest.

lic). In the 2004 presidential election campaign Springsteen played for the Vote for Change tour in support of Democratic candidate John Kerry, explicitly establishing his political affiliations.

Musically, Springsteen encompasses a variety of styles of American vernacular musics, including folk, **blues**, **country**, and **rock 'n' roll**. His collaborations with the E-Street Band, a lineup of musicians who have followed him on tour and in the studio throughout his career, produced the massive rock 'n' roll sound that can be heard on *Born to Run*, *Darkness on the Edge of Town* (1978), and *The River* (1980). The sparse acoustic arrangements on *Nebraska* (1982) and *The Ghost of Tom Joad* (1995), however, show Springsteen as a subdued storyteller following in the folk tradition of Guthrie and Dylan.

In 1999 Springsteen was inducted into the Rock 'n' Roll Hall of Fame, a modest indication of his stature compared to the legacy of the large catalog of classic rock 'n' roll songs that have put an indelible stamp on the history of popular music. In 2006 Springsteen announced plans to release a tribute album to **Pete Seeger**, a political and musical role model.

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STATUS

ROBERT E. WEIR

Status is a position that one holds in society. Individuals in complex societies like the United States hold numerous statuses at once. Each status comes with one or more roles that govern the way one holding a particular status is expected to behave within a given status. It should be noted that status, in academic terms, is not the same as **prestige**, although many in society at large confuse the two. The confusion derives in part from inconsistency within the academic community itself; even scholars such as **Max Weber** sometimes conflated status and prestige. It is possible, however, for a person like **Donald Trump** to hold high status and low prestige simultaneously.

Individuals attain status in one of two ways. Achieved status is conferred when one earns a specific position and is, in theory, the animating force of societies such as the United States that pride themselves on being **meritocracies**. Nonetheless, many statuses are also ascribed, some by nature—such as gender, race, and ethnicity—and others by special social advantages or disadvantages, such as the wealth or poverty of one's birth family. Ascribed statuses are the ones that most concern students of social stratification. Because individuals operate in the larger collective called society, ascribed statuses play an inordinate role in determining master and subordinate statuses in social interactions. Women, youth, and ethnic minorities are often relegated to subordinate statuses and assigned roles regardless of their aspirations, competency, education, or knowledge. The opposite is also true; those born into rich and powerful families frequently assume master statuses though they may possess minimal ability.

Status has a neutral meaning when used simply to designate certain positions in society that are purely descriptive, such as father, student, or office worker. When used in defining class, however, it is more potent. There is so much correlation between position, life chances, and economic achievement within the United States that the term *socioeconomic status* is routinely used as shorthand to mean both status and class. Numerous scholars, among them Peter Blau and those associated with the Wisconsin Model, have studied extensively the ways that status is attained in America, the social interplay between achieved and ascribed statuses, and the reasons for upward and downward social mobility. Conflict theorists tend to be highly critical of the way modern statuses function and charge that more are accorded than achieved. In general, conflict theorists see more correlation between high status based on the allocation of property and resources than on individual effort or competence. They also point to institutional and structural dimensions within society that favor certain individuals and groups over others.

Scholars debate the creation and meaning of status, but nearly all agree that it is an important component in defining class, explaining the mechanisms through which class is asserted, and in assessing the likelihood of social mobility. They also note the pressures that occur when an individual's status is in jeopardy (status anxiety) or when multiple statuses thrust individuals into situations in which they simultaneously hold some high statuses and some low ones (status inconsistency).

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STATUS ATTAINMENT

GABRIEL A. SANTOS

Status attainment at its most basic level refers to acquiring a social position. These social positions are found in the family, economy, government, and other institutions. In Max Weber's view status attainment referred to the securing of a desired level of social esteem or honor on the strength of some positive or negative privilege. Status is often mistaken for, or confused with, class. There are two major differences between the two. First, attaining a status usually depends on the ability to make a claim to some privilege or set of privileges so as to exclude others. So when an **elite** male club prohibits women from obtaining membership, they are in effect promoting and protecting a particular status—in this case, the social honor that comes with being a male member of a high-prestige club that transmits exclusive ways of communicating, consuming, and building social networks. Second, Weber claimed that a person can attain a certain status in various ways that do not necessarily depend on class. For example one might attain high status simply by consuming designer goods, entering an Ivy League university, or having some link to a well-known family. Indeed, a young girl could attain status by attending Harvard University, even if she is there on a minority scholarship after having spent her entire life in a low-income, **one-parent** household. Class situation, therefore, does not totally determine a person's ability to secure a particular level of social prestige or status.

Although class does not predetermine status, it greatly influences it through increased or decreased **life chances**. A wealthy financier of the property classes is afforded many occasions to become a member of a popular **country club**, an antique car collectors' association, or a host of other social groups with focused tastes and expectations that uphold certain privileges. He might, however, decline to assert these privileges. Inversely, status does not determine class but may significantly influence it. A young man may be a low-salary, entry-level worker for Microsoft Corporation but have frequent associations with middle-management executives with the **power** to advance him in a way that would move him from the **working class** into the **middle class** or above. The young man already enjoys relatively high status in terms of social honor, yet is not necessarily in the middle class in terms of **income** and **wealth**. In each case status and class may be viewed both as independent from one another and mutually linked.

Status symbols play a crucial role in individual efforts geared toward achieving a higher status. Medals, diplomas, merit badges, and gold pins may be used to convey the privileged statuses of members of certain classes. Status symbols do not have to be material objects. Sitting in the front row at a national memorial service or at the head of a table during a banquet also communicates distinction, as well as being able to

afford to take one's date to a trendy night spot. Consumption of certain products carries implications for class relations. For instance a number of social service employees in downtown Miami have noticed that many young recipients of **welfare** assistance spend a disproportionate amount of their financial allocation on relatively expensive brand-name clothing, such as Tommy Hilfiger and Ralph Lauren. As a result they struggle to pay for rent and utilities. The possession of brand-name clothes enables the welfare recipient to possess a "token" of the social honor found in **upper-class** lifestyles. Despite being confined to the grueling challenges of lower-class living, such as poor-quality housing, diminished financial opportunity, and limited social respect, these recipients still strive to buy into, and hence endorse, a set of highly coveted symbols from another class. Situations of this sort point to an essential observation about the manner in which free market **capitalism** and the fashion industry affect contemporary class life in America: the acquisition of culturally meaningful status symbols linked to an individual's self-worth must, often times, be purchased. To a certain extent, therefore, status attainment, or its *appearance*, can be bought and sold.

Ultimately, status involves rating. If a person can obtain a particular group of material items, titles, or a spot within a physical space that carries positive and high-ranking associations, then rewards are forthcoming. Most forms of status attainment are centered on the reality that high status commands respect from others. Alternatively low status is correlated with social marginalization, which is reinforced in daily social interactions. Hence we rate others and we are in turn rated by others according to a set of understandings about what is valuable in social life and what is not, what belongs in a particular class and what does not.

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STATUS INCONSISTENCY

ROBERT E. WEIR

Status inconsistency occurs when an individual occupies conflicting statuses or when there is a gap between how a person feels he or she *is* received and *should* be treated. It is the opposite of what social scientist **Gerhard Lenski** dubbed "status crystallization." Following the lead of **Max Weber**, Lenski argued that in an ideal situation differing statuses would converge and integrate. Status inconsistency can create great stress tension on both the individual and societal levels.

Status involves numerous factors in American society, among them occupation, age, race, education, gender, and ethnicity. Status inconsistency studies call attention to the fact that **prestige** rankings alone can be deceptive. If there is inconsistency

between status determiners, then a person can occupy a high and low status at the same time. A senior mechanical engineer, for example, is viewed as a high-status position for which advanced education and extensive experience are necessary prerequisites. Yet a female African American engineer may be viewed less favorably on a building site than the white, high school–educated male contractor with whom she is working. Workers may even treat the latter with **deference** but be disrespectful to the black engineer. In this example status inconsistency occurs because of the social gap between the high-status occupational role of the engineer and socially constructed **racism** and **gender stratification**.

Status inconsistency also occurs when there is a gulf between how a society perceives an individual and the nature of that individual's reality. Prestige studies consistently rate college professors and nurses favorably. The general public routinely associates high **wages** with high prestige, but this is not always the case. A college professor working at a small private college may earn far less than a plumber, or that professor may be an adjunct whose pay is less than that of a retail worker. Similarly nursing has historically been a poorly compensated field given the amount of training required, the enormous responsibility nurses shoulder, and the number of hours they work.

Status inconsistency complicates the way social class is construed, especially in terms of **class consciousness**. The differences between the rewards one deserves and those he or she actually gets can lead to cognitive dissonance. Status inconsistency is linked to high levels of stress and frustration, and individuals may actually identify with those of a lower class; in fact, studies reveal that such individuals are more likely to challenge the **status quo** than individuals from a low **SES**. They are also more likely to support liberal, even radical, causes.

Some European theorists have suggested that looking at the degree to which statuses crystallize (or do not) would be a more accurate way of deriving **class definitions**.

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STATUS SYMBOLS

ROBERT E. WEIR

Status symbol is a term that refers to items or adornments that infer a certain social ranking for those holding them. Although the term is usually associated with **prestige**, possession of certain items is often associated with lower socioeconomic status (**SES**) levels. A dirt bike or pick-up truck, for example, would more likely be seen as an item that a **working-class** or **lower-class** family might possess, even though it might be highly prized among such groups.

In general, the amount of prestige any possession confers is linked to its rarity and its price. Jewels, gold, **designer goods**, **luxury goods**, large homes, original

art, lavish furnishings, and expensive modes of **transportation** are among the usual status symbols. There are also more subtle symbols that link those who possess them to exclusive groups, such as **fraternity** pins, a framed degree from an **Ivy League** university, **country club** membership, and Phi Beta Kappa keys.

The association between symbols and status is as old as human society. Ancient and tribal cultures alike conferred status through such things as restricted items, jewelry, tattoos, and ritual scarification. Likewise both **Native Americans** and the Europeans who settled North America held certain items in higher regard than others. Colonial access to some status symbols was regulated by sumptuary laws. Among the original English settlers of Virginia, for example, only those of noble lineage could wear the color purple or carry a sword.

The term "status symbol" came into popular usage in the United States in the 1950s as a way to describe behavior that had long been part of the American sociological landscape. Although many of the **Founding Fathers** rejected many of the trappings of European aristocracy, the quality of their personal possessions, furniture, and homes marked them as more prestigious than their more humble countrymen. Property, in fact, has historically been a status symbol. Among Southerners in the antebellum period, the number of **slaves** one owned conferred status.

The way Americans think of status symbols today had its genesis in the **Gilded Age**. Many of the **nouveau riche** from the **Industrial Revolution** made ostentatious displays of their wealth, adorning themselves in furs, diamonds, and the latest fashions. They often built opulent homes and engaged in numerous acts of **conspicuous consumption** that inspired both disgust and envy.

Vance Packard and others have argued that the post–World War II period was marked by the rise of "status seekers." In most historical time periods there have been those from lower groups who have sought to emulate those above them on the social scale. This has been especially true for members of the **middle class**, many of whom openly embraced the taste of the **upper class** and aped them when they could. In the post–World War II economic boom, however, the myth of America as a middle-class society emerged in full force. As the borders between social classes blurred, pressure mounted to link one's social status to **consumerism**. At first one's immediate peers were the reference group by which individuals measured success, but as **Juliet Schor** argues, increasing numbers of Americans were attracted to **advertising** and media glamour images. These forces helped shift the reference group from one's peers to a generalized—perhaps romanticized—set of images associated with the rich and powerful.

These trends accelerated in the 1980s. The **yuppies**, though much exaggerated and much maligned, nonetheless embodied the hyperconsumerism that has marked American society in the past quarter century. Many items are consciously marketed as status symbols, especially designer fashion, shoes, handbags, perfume, jewelry, household electronics, and automobiles. Many of these items—thanks to product placement in movies and popular television shows—have moved into the mainstream. Some observers hail this as a democratization of the marketplace, while others—such as Schor and **Ralph Nader**—decry it as mindless materialism, a waste of resources, and a consumption pattern that has led to declining savings and spiraling debt.

The desire for status symbols does, however, seem to be deeply integrated into American society. David Brooks argues that even those who tangentially embrace counterculture values have become affected and coined the phrase "Bobo" to describe a new bourgeois-bohemian hybrid.

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STEFFENS, LINCOLN (April 6, 1886–August 6, 1936)

VICTORIA GRIEVE

Lincoln Steffens was a famed investigative journalist and muckraker.

Steffens was born in San Francisco. His father was a **middle-class** businessman, and Steffens grew up amid comfort. Upon earning a history degree from the University of California, Berkeley, Steffens traveled to Berlin, where he studied philosophy, art history, and economics. In 1891 he secretly married Josephine Bontecou, an American student, and the following year the couple moved to New York, where Steffens became a reporter with the *New York Evening Post*.

In 1894 a friend of Steffens died, leaving Steffens the bulk of his estate. This financial security enabled Steffens to leave the *Post* and become the city editor for the *New York Commercial Advertiser*; where he saw firsthand evidence of city politics and corruption. He, with reporter **Jacob Riis** and Police Commissioner **Theodore Roosevelt**, joined the burgeoning reform movement to expose corruption and educate the public through the press. In 1901 Steffens became managing editor of *McClure's* magazine, the first mass-circulation magazine with a popular audience. This national readership established Steffens's reputation as a muckraker, and with Roosevelt in the White House, reform became a national movement.

Steffens's first muckraking article, "Tweed Days in St. Louis," was published in 1902 and co-written by Claude H. Wetmore. In 1903 his exposé of corruption in Minneapolis appeared in *McClure's* with articles by muckraking journalists Ida Tarbell and Ray Stannard Baker. Over the next decade Steffens was at the forefront of reform journalism, concentrating on exposing corruption in government. His articles were collected in three books, *Shame of the Cities* (1904), *The Struggle for Self-Government* (1906), and *The Upbuilders* (1909).

In 1906 Steffens left *McClure's* to become the co-owner of *American Magazine*, but fearing his ownership might compromise his reporting, he sold his interest within a year. Steffens continued to write freelance articles and in 1907 joined the editorial board of *Everybody's Magazine*.

After Steffens's wife died suddenly in 1911, he moved to Greenwich Village and became part of its bohemian world of social and political radicals. As he moved further



Lincoln Steffens. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

to the political left, Steffens became disillusioned with Progressive Era reform and less acceptable to his middle-class readership. Steffens traveled widely in Mexico, Europe, and Russia, where he reported on the revolutions in Mexico and Russia, and wrote articles supporting the revolutionary forces. Impressed with what he thought was the true democracy of the Russian Revolution, Steffens lectured widely throughout the United States and was appointed as a member of a delegation sent to negotiate a post-World War I peace settlement with the Bolsheviks. Returning to Paris Steffens made his famous comment, "I have seen the future, and it works," but his hopes were dashed at the Versailles Peace Conference.

While in Europe Steffens met Ella Winter, whom he married in 1924 when their son, Pete Stanley, was born. Throughout the 1920s Steffens's radicalism, and especially his enthusiasm for communist Russia, undermined his reputation in the United States. The couple lived mainly in Italy until they moved to Carmel, California, in 1927. Not until the anxious days of the Great Depression in the 1930s did the public regain interest in

Steffens with the publication of *The Autobiography of Lincoln Steffens* in 1931.

Steffens enjoyed his renewed popularity, traveling the country on lecture tours until he suffered a heart attack in 1933. He died on August 6, 1936, at his home in Carmel and was buried in San Francisco.

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STEREOTYPES

MICHAEL T. BERTRAND

The term "stereotype" originated in the world of printing. It referred to a metal plate, or stamp, cast from a mold on a raised surface that, when inked and pressed on paper, left an indelible mark. In his book *Public Opinion*, published in 1922, the

journalist Walter Lippmann first used the term to describe the way that society characterizes unfamiliar people or things—"stamping" them with a set of selective and easy-to-imagine characteristics. He defined stereotypes as "pictures in our head" that are discerned from a recognizable "kernel of truth." Yet such mental portraits, while indeed drawn from factual fragments, nevertheless exaggerate particular details and transform subconscious descriptions of idiosyncrasies into conscious overstatements of difference. Stereotypes historically have applied a rudimentary set of attributes or qualities visible in the few to an entire group. Some of the more prevalent examples of stereotypical depictions have been associated with the categories of **race**, **gender**, **ethnicity**, sexual preference, age, religion, region, and nationality.

Class-based stereotypes, however, have possessed the power to underwrite, intersect, and at times override several of the categories listed above. This provides for a problematic phenomenon. In exaggerating cultural characteristics, class-based stereotypes have tended to obscure the economic foundations of American society. Many, if not most Americans, for instance, refuse to acknowledge the existence, past or present, of a distinct class structure in the United States. There especially has been an aversion to appreciating **working-class** traditions. This does not mean that Americans have avoided work. They actually have worked very hard. Yet the notion of people behaving and acting collectively because of their labor seems to go against the perceived American experience of **individual-ism** and **American exceptionalism**. Informed greatly by stereotypes Americans believe that they possess an atypical past that has provided them with a unique perspective on their present.

For example, unlike their European counterparts, inhabitants of the United States avoided a prolonged struggle against landed nobility; though there is little doubt that a native aristocracy did emerge, it has been one theoretically premised on money, not blood or family connections. The nation's early immersion in the capitalist experiment, therefore, put great emphasis on individual accumulation of wealth. Combined with the availability of free or cheap land, fluid economic mobility, a participatory political process (at least for white men), and the existence of chattel slavery, the early American experience reiterated a credo that esteemed bourgeois values while it simultaneously devalued working-class identities. As a consequence, many native-born inhabitants and immigrants alike have viewed their working-class status merely as an obligatory yet temporary segment of their larger journey. It is but a required rung on their ladder to success. And success invariably has depended upon one's ascension into an ill-defined, yet all-encompassing middle class.

Bordering on mythology, this national ideology, although disputed during times of economic upheaval and crisis, has nevertheless remained intact into the twenty-first century. Assisted greatly by **Cold War** rhetoric, periodic bursts of economic growth, and a chimerical **consumerism** that seemingly grants every wish, Americans of the modern era have consistently viewed their history as devoid of class strife. A stereotype in itself, this self-portrait of the United States as a classless "land of opportunity" (where the vast majority resides in a vague middle class) undoubtedly has thrived and in turn has enthralled countless numbers of observers at home and abroad. The success of such a benign image, however, has depended

upon the marginalization of those Americans whose dissonant realities have challenged such harmonious portrayals. Accordingly stereotypes have been utilized both to confirm the main egalitarian narrative (real-life though rare rags-to-riches tales, for instance) as well as to demean those whose stories have not corresponded to the American success saga (for example, the highly insensitive use of the term "underclass"). Indeed stereotypes constitute the arsenal of a classless society waging "class conflict."

The traditional definition of class as posed by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels generally focused on the dynamics and disparities between those who did and those who did not own and control the means of production. Accumulated economic capital, and the ability to generate it, necessarily separated members of society. Max Weber, E. P. Thompson, Herbert Gutman, Pierre Bourdieu, and later scholars, however, have expanded their original definition so that it recognizes how cultural capital likewise divides people. Cultural capital, or "possessions," such as behavioral tendencies, speech patterns, schooling, residence, leisure habits, attitudes, tastes, and lifestyles, for instance, works in tandem with economic capital in the formation of social stratification. One's status in the community, in other words, emanates as much from what one does, thinks, or consumes as from what one earns or owns. And what—or more important, how—one does, thinks, or consumes derives from one's class origins.

It is within the realm of culture, therefore, that the struggles over class stereotypes usually are waged. Not surprisingly the standard by which all are measured refers to a middle-class model established early in the nation's history. From the **Puritans** and Benjamin Franklin to **Horatio Alger** and Henry Ford, middle-class attainment springs from adherence to the **Protestant work ethic**. Working hard, practicing thrift, delaying gratification, and behaving in a moral and responsible manner promises the material prosperity that marks one as a member of the middle class. Distilling Calvinist doctrines into worldly values, Americans long embraced the notion that attaining affluence not only demonstrated God's future favor in the heavenly kingdom, it also validated on earth the ethic that made such affluence possible. Indeed while the religious underpinnings of this creed may have eroded over time, the secular foundations have survived to provide the prism through which demographic distinctions in American society have been evaluated.

For those who have succeeded (the vintage and idealized image of a white family with two cars, two kids, a **white-collar** dad and stay-at-home mom living in **suburbia**), their rise has been attributed to an objective **meritocracy** that rewards conformity, despite the fact that fewer than one in three Americans move beyond their social origins. For those people who do not succeed, their failure is ascribed to lifestyles that openly flout middle-class notions of work, accumulation, and social discipline. They are the undeserving poor who, for various reasons, do not or cannot conform to the dominant culture. Viewed as shiftless, immoral, depraved, and backward, they are transformed into stereotypes such as "white trash," "hillbillies," "rednecks," "hicks," "crackers," "country bumpkins," and "trailer trash." Stigmatized as culturally inferior, they comprise a category of people set apart as "the Other," the nightmarish flipside of the **American dream**. Ironically, because they are routinely viewed as caricatures and stereotypes, their presence rarely challenges a national ideology that continues to celebrate the United States as a land of unlimited opportunity.

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STIFFED

ROBERT E. WEIR

"Stiffed" is a colloquial term that means cheated, deceived, or tricked. It is also the name of a book by Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist Susan Faludi that deals with what she sees as a "betrayal" of men in the post-World War II generation. Faludi, an outspoken feminist, raised controversy with this 1999 best seller as, to her critics, it appeared to rationalize socially unacceptable male behaviors ranging from displays of machismo to acts of domestic violence.

Stiffed is a sprawling work that touches upon a variety of subjects, and Faludi's evidence is often more anecdotal than sociological. For students of social class, however, her sections on **blue-collar** work are of particular interest and serve as an update to earlier works dealing with the festering anger of many manual laborers. According to Faludi, men from the World War II generation were sold an implicit **social contract** that defined male roles. Men were to be bread winners, protectors, family heads, and socially dominant, promises they dutifully passed on to their own sons. In truth emergent postwar economic and social adjustments made these "promises" suspect from the start. Corporate mergers, runaway capital, and globalism doomed blue-collar life; it was simply no longer possible for most blue-collar workers to support their families on a single wage. Moreover the expansion of white-collar labor, the service economy, and new technology also combined to reduce the number of blue-collar jobs available and diminish their importance in American society. This caused a crisis for men, who were taught to define themselves by their labor and their ability to provide. **Unemployment** and **underemployment** often create psychic crises for men.

Faludi cites a host of popular culture and sports images that she believes exacerbate the psychic crises of men, most of which reinforce traditional male imagery and thus further frustrate struggling males. She also notes the ways in which feminism can be misconstrued by frustrated men, but she adds that the very appearance of dual-income families is a blow to male **prestige**, whether or not feminist ideology is associated with female labor. So too is the decline of labor unions a source of lost male power. Modern workers are often at the absolute mercy of a corporate entity with which they cannot even associate a face. Stripped of the countervailing power of unions, male workers are mere pawns in a game operated by **elites**. The male crisis was particularly acute during the recessionary pressures of the 1970s, but Faludi argues that male psyches did not recover as the economy did, largely because the broken promises remain. She suggests that lingering anger partly helps explain why many **working-class** men have shifted their political allegiance to

conservative political candidates as well as why a renewed emphasis on "manliness" has emerged in American society.

Stiffed remains a much debated work, with many feminists feeling betrayed by Faludi. Scholars seeking to make a case from Faludi's book would do well to supplement her anecdotes with hard data. As a portrait of working-class and lower-middle-class anxiety, however, Stiffed is a useful starting point.

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STOCK MARKET

ROBERT E. WEIR

Stock market is the general term used to refer to the trading of shares, bonds, mutual funds, and securities. It refers to both physical exchanges where stocks are bought and sold in a manner akin to an auction, and virtual exchanges done electronically. The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) are the best-known examples of physical stock markets; the National Association of Securities Dealers Automatic Quotations (NASDAQ) is the primary network for virtual exchanges. (AMEX and NASDAQ merged in 1998.)

The stock market is an avenue through which investors hope to make a profit. Joint-stock companies are those owned by outside investors, as opposed to individual proprietors or families; once a company "goes public," its value can vary in accordance with both its actual profitability and its perceived worth. Investors look for patterns that suggest long-term growth and profitability; hence many buy and sell stocks on a regular basis. During trading hours the price of any stock or other security will fluctuate. The end results of the day's trading are factored into indices such as the Dow Jones Industrial Average and the NASDAQ Index. These are often used as barometers of the health of the overall economy. Businesses often make employment and investment decisions based on these indicators; thus the stock market's performance is important even to workers who own no stocks.

Both the NYSE and the AMEX date to Colonial times, although the NYSE has always been the larger of the two. Like most exchanges, brokerages must be members of the NYSE to conduct trade, and there are hefty fees involved in buying membership, even though it is technically a nonprofit organization. (In 2005 the cost of membership reached \$4 million.) Trade was conducted on New York City's Wall Street even before the NYSE was organized in 1792. The modern stock market, though, is largely a product of the **Industrial Revolution**, a phenomenon whose sheer scale led to the formation of more publicly traded corporations and a relative decline of proprietorships. (Corporations benefit from limited liability laws, which make them more attractive to most buyers.) December 15, 1886, marked the first time in which 1 million shares changed hands in a single day on

the NYSE. In 1929 the 10 million–share mark was breached, just weeks before the market crashed and ushered in the **Great Depression**.

The stock market has been volatile at numerous times in American history. Selling panics in 1837, 1857, 1869, 1873, 1893, and 1907 touched off economic slumps long before the famed Wall Street Crash of 1929. In each case, market panic led to rises in **unemployment** and other ripple effects in the economy. Reforms emanating from the **New Deal**, especially the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, curtailed some of the more reckless trading patterns and stabilized the market, but the market by its nature is subject to ups and downs. Analysts use the term "bull market" to refer to periods of expansion in which demand for stocks and their prices are high and "bear market" for times when more stocks are being sold and their price drops.

The bear market of 1929–41 was revived by U.S. preparation for and involvement in World War II. In 1949 the market embarked on its longest bull run in history, expanding without contraction into 1957. The latter downturn was short-lived, and the market continued to grow into the 1970s, when surging energy prices, stagnating wages, and hyperinflation induced a bear market. Since then the stock market has had numerous peaks and valleys. The Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) closed at 1000 for the first time in 1972 and doubled by 1987, but there were also two recessions sandwiched between the upsurges. By 2000 the DJIA had risen to over 11,000, in part helped by President Bill Clinton's balancing of the federal budget, but it also saw both its largest single-day gain in history (nearly 500 points) and its largest drop (over 617 points) within four weeks of each other. Much of the decline came from the collapse of the **dot-com bubble**.

President George W. **Bush** has touted stock ownership as the centerpiece of an emerging **ownership society**. Proponents of the ownership society point out that more than 100 million Americans—about 52 percent—now own stock, and that by 2005 as many as three billion shares were changing hands each trading day. By contrast, in 1935 just 11 percent of Americans owned stock, and as recently as 1983 just 19 percent did so. Enthusiasts see this as evidence that **capitalism** has democratized, and George W. Bush went so far as to propose privatizing part of the **Social Security** fund to allow workers to invest some of the money in the stock market.

By 2006, however, shifting Social Security to the stock market was put on hold as many politicians and economists argued that the stock market was too volatile to allow such a gamble. Some based their conclusions on revelations that loosened regulations to facilitate **day trading** had resulted in reckless losses, but the very notion of an ownership society mostly ran afoul of basic sociology. The number of Americans holding stock is exceedingly deceptive; most hold it indirectly in the form of mutual funds, Individual Retirement Accounts, and 401(k) plans. In such investments—many of which are made by employers rather than employees—funds are invested on behalf of the holder, who usually has few or no choices about those investments.

Even more poignant is the ongoing relationship between **wealth** and stock ownership. The richest 1 percent of Americans own nearly 50 percent of all stock, and the top 5 percent own almost 75 percent. If one takes the top quintile of wealth, that 20 percent owns 96 percent of all stock. The idea of an ownership society is predicated on assumptions of investment, yet the Commerce Department figures for 1992 through 2000 indicate that disposable income rose, on average, by 47 percent

but spending increased by 61 percent. The reality for many American families is a negative monthly income, not greater amounts of money to invest in the stock market. Until these figures reverse the American stock market is likely to remain what it has always been: the domain of the **upper class** and the upper **middle class**.

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STOKES, ROSE PASTOR (July 18, 1879–June 20, 1933)

ROBERT E. WEIR

Rose Pastor Stokes was a prominent radical associated with both the **Socialist Party** (SP) and the **Communist Party of the United States** (CPUSA). She was also active in the **labor movement**, the battle to secure birth control rights, and other social reforms.

Rose Pastor was born in Augustow, a town in Poland, which was then controlled by Russia. Her family immigrated to England, where she spent much of her childhood, before coming to Cleveland in 1890. Family **poverty** interrupted her formal education, and she worked in cigar and clothing factories to help support her family. While working in the cigar factory she began writing articles for the *Jewish Daily News and Jewish Gazette*. In 1903 she was offered a position with the paper, moved to New York City, and became an activist. Her interview with millionaire **settlement house** worker James Graham Phelps Stokes led to romance and in 1905 they married.

Rose Pastor Stokes became so active in factory reform that she was dubbed the "Cinderella of the Sweatshops." She and her husband joined the SP in 1906, and she served as president of the Intercollegiate Socialist Society from 1907 to 1917. Her social circle included many other reformers, including **Jane Addams**, **Upton Sinclair**, **Jack London**, and Clarence Darrow. In the period before World War I Stokes took part in numerous **strikes** and in birth control pamphleteering. She also wrote newspaper articles, poetry, and plays, one of the latter of which dealt with the differing sexual standards expected of women.

World War I proved a turning point for Stokes. She resigned from the SP because she disapproved of its support for U.S. entry into the war. Although her husband also quit the party, he supported the war effort. Friction developed between them, and they divorced in 1925. Rose Pastor Stokes made a speech condemning war profiteers in 1918 and was arrested under the Espionage Act for impeding the war effort. For this she received a ten-year jail sentence, though it was overturned in 1921.

Stokes's legal woes served only to radicalize her further. In 1919 she became one of the founding members of the CPUSA. She was arrested for her activities several times during the **Red Scare** of the 1920s, but she remained a fervent champion of

African American civil rights, labor unions, women's rights, and the Soviet Union (USSR). She went to the USSR in 1922, an experience that led her to reject feminism in favor of a **class struggle** ideology that placed the exploitation of women within the greater problems faced by the **working class**.

In 1927 she married Issac Romaine, a fellow CPUSA member. Remarriage did little to temper Stokes. In 1929 she was clubbed by police during a protest against U.S. imperialism in the Caribbean. Stokes was in poor health until her death from breast cancer four years later.



Rose Pastor Stokes. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

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STONE, I. F. (December 24, 1907–July 17, 1989)

ROBERT P. GABRIELSKY

I. F. (Isidor Feinstein, "Izzy") Stone was a progressive journalist who independently produced a unique, pioneering, and widely respected small weekly or biweekly (frequency of publication depending on the state of his health) newsletter during the 1950s and 1960s titled *I. F. Stone's Weekly* (or *Bi-Weekly*).

In his newsletter Stone wrote comprehensively on current foreign and domestic affairs. He had virtually no "inside" contacts, either in the halls of Congress or in any of the administrative branches of government, nor did he seek to develop any. Indeed a significant aspect of his appeal as a journalist was that he was not beholden to any interest group nor was he, in this period, identified with any particular organization. A pioneer of what would come to be known as investigative reporting, he based all of his articles on material synthesized from publicly available sources, often a careful reading of government documents. Through this technique Stone was able to uncover stories often ignored or missed by the mainstream press. Another important aspect of Stone's journalistic independence in this period was the newsletter's total lack of advertising. Its only source of revenue was subscription sales.

Stone was born Isidor Feinstein in Philadelphia of Russian **Jewish immigrant** parents and raised in the small southern New Jersey town of Haddonfield, about four miles east of Camden, New Jersey, and across the Delaware River from

Philadelphia. There his parents owned and operated a small store. The town had been settled by Quakers and Calvinists, and evidence of that tradition is still evident in the community. Thus Stone's earliest influences were his own Jewish heritage, the small-town Quaker/Calvinist atmosphere of his youth, and the burgeoning **socialist** and **Progressive** movements of his formative years.

While still in grade school Stone wrote and published his first newspaper, the New Jersey Progressive. After graduating from high school Stone briefly attended the University of Pennsylvania but dropped out to work full time for the Camden Courier newspaper and then for the Philadelphia Inquirer. Stone relocated to New York and from 1933 until 1939 worked for the New York Post, after which he became an associate editor of The Nation magazine. During this period he was close to Popular Front left-wing fusion groups in the orbit of the Communist Party. As he was later to candidly admit, he was an apologist for Stalin and Stalinism. In 1940 Stone became a columnist for the short-lived independent progressive daily PM. After PM ceased publication Stone worked for two other short-lived progressive New York dailies, the New York Star and the New York Daily Compass, separated by another brief stint at the Post.

After the Compass ceased publication in 1952 Stone found himself without employment but with both a substantial following and an accompanying mailing list. Stone used that list to launch his Weekly, and it was through the publication of his newsletter that he established a national reputation as a crusading journalist. The Weekly began with a modest circulation of 5,300, which eventually grew to 73,000 by the time it ceased publication nineteen years later. His trenchant writing included critiques of McCarthyism and American foreign policy, in-depth analyses of the Cold War, the rise of the Civil Rights Movement, and the movement against the war in Vietnam, as well as critiques of the Communist world, of which he was becoming increasingly critical (e.g., he vocally opposed Russian suppression of the worker-led Hungarian Revolution in 1956 and the Czechoslovak reform movement in 1968). However he seldom commented on the labor movement. In his later years Stone also became a regular contributor to the New York Review of Books. By 1971, his health deteriorating, Stone retired from publishing his newsletter, though he continued to contribute to the New York Review of Books and other journals, as well as writing a book length heterodox analysis of the trial of Socrates, with Socrates as a reactionary villain. Stone completed that work shortly before his death in 1989.

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Robert C. Cottrell, *Izzy: a Biography of I. F. Stone*, 1992; I. F. Stone, *The Haunted Fifties*, 1969; Stone, *I. F. Stone's Weekly Reader*, 1973; Stone, *The Trial of Socrates*, 1988.

STRATIFICATION THEORY

See Conflict Theory; Continuous/Discontinuous Views of Class; Corporate Class; Functional Elite Theory; Gender Stratification; Inequality Theory; Lower Class; Managerial Class; Marxism/Marxists; Middle Class; Objective Method; Poverty;

Power Elite; Prestige; Race, Racism, and Racial Stratification; Reputational Method; Status Inconsistency; Subjective Method; Underclass; Upper Class; Working Class.

STRIKES

ROBERT E. WEIR

Strikes occur when workers decide to withhold their labor. If an employer refuses to allow workers to enter a workplace, this is a "lockout" rather than a strike. Strikes are usually a tactic to force an employer to raise wages, increase benefits, recognize a bargaining unit, improve working conditions, or correct some perceived injustice. This type of strike is often referred to as an economic strike. There are several other types, most of which are now rare in the United States. Sit-down strikes were common in the mid-1930s but are now illegal and take place as unsanctioned actions. Workers sometimes hold brief memorial strikes in honor of dead comrades. These are generally held in the wake of some disaster, though they may also take place as a planned tribute. There are also *sympathy strikes*, in which laborers not directly involved in a dispute cease work in solidarity with those striking another employer. Perhaps the most dramatic of all strikes is a general strike, in which workers from various occupations walk off their jobs and seek to disrupt the entire economy of a region. This type of strike was advocated by the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) and is mostly associated with political radicalism. Among the historical strikes that could be considered general strikes are the railway strikes of 1877, an 1886 strike for the eight-hour day, a 1919 action in Seattle, and another in San Francisco in 1934.

Strikes are usually called and authorized by a labor union; those called by disgruntled workers without the permission of their unions are called *wildcat strikes*. There have also been numerous spontaneous strikes without any sort of union involvement, but these are quite risky as they take place outside the auspices of formal collective bargaining law. Most strikes involve picket lines through which strikers seek to advertise their grievances, build solidarity in their ranks, and persuade the general public to support their cause. Among most workers it is considered exceedingly dishonorable to cross a picket line; the epithet "scab" is used to describe a worker who continues to work while others are on strike.

Strikes have been commonplace in U.S. history, with the first known strike taking place among Philadelphia printers in 1786. Strikes became more frequent with onset of the **Industrial Revolution**, as the latter accelerated changes in the economy that converted local and regional markets to national and international ones. With that transformation came the expansion of corporations and decline of artisan labor and paternal labor relations. Industrialization also concretized the existence of a permanent **working class** that worked for **wages**. This severely altered traditional aspiration patterns wherein wage labor was seen as temporary until one could either buy a farm or rise to the status of a master artisan or proprietor. During the antebellum period there were numerous strikes held in support of union recognition, a risky venture as many states considered unions to be illegal criminal

conspiracies. Strikes became more frequent as industrialization advanced in post–Civil War society, but did so in a manner that often involved exploitation of labor. The enormous wealth gap during the Gilded Age and the general boombust nature of the economy also contributed to the outbreak of strikes. More than 22,700 strikes took place between 1875 and 1900.

By the 1880s strikes were common in America; whether they were effective was and is a matter of great debate. The **Knights of Labor** (KOL) opposed strikes in all but the most extreme situations, and its leader, **Terence Powderly**, argued that strikes seldom compensated workers or their employers for the money and good will lost during a work stoppage. He called for mandatory arbitration laws to settle disputes. By contrast **Samuel Gompers** of the **American Federation of Labor** (AFL) saw strikes as organized labor's strongest weapon to compel employers to act justly toward workers. With the decline of the KOL in the 1890s, most in **labor movement** agreed with Gompers, though the IWW felt that the ultimate purpose of a strike was to undermine **capitalism**. Economic strikes mushroomed during the **Great Depression**, and the **Congress of Industrial Organizations** (CIO) made effective use of sit-downs until a 1939 Supreme Court ruling outlawed them. Strikes occurred periodically in the United States into the mid-1970s, when **deindustrialization**, **globalization**, and recession led to a steep decline in **blue-collar** occupations that had nurtured labor union strength.

The effectiveness of strikes needs to be evaluated in the light of American politics. An absolute right to collective bargaining was not federal law until the 1914 Clayton Act, and it was not an unfettered right until the 1937 National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), the latter of which created the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to oversee union organizing drives. Prior to these developments, union movements had to contend with various state and local ordinances and court rulings; most unions relied on their own perceived strength to overcome disadvantages. Obstacles were considerable—courts routinely sided with employers, and federal laws such as the 1890 Sherman Anti-Trust Act were applied to unions. American labor history has also been bloody. By the 1890s an average of two workers were killed by police, the National Guard, or federal troops each time a strike occurred, and approximately 140 workers were injured. Military or paramilitary force was used against workers more than 160 times between 1877 and 1968, a period that also saw more than 700 workers die in labor disputes.

The NLRA served to lessen some of the worst abuses, but subsequent labor law—including the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act and the 1959 Landrum-Griffin Act—curtailed many of the gains made under the NLRA. Labor unions generally held enough strength into the 1970s to act as a countervailing force to organized capital, but the steep decline of organized labor since then has led some labor analysts to conclude that Powderly may have been right about the futility of strikes. Organized capital launched a counter-offensive against labor starting in the 1970s, and conservatives generally find the very idea of unions as antithetical to the interests of business. The administrations of **Ronald Reagan** (1981–89), George H. **Bush** (1989–93), and George W. Bush (2001–09) were openly hostile to unions. Of more significance were structural changes that made strikes harder to sustain. Conservatives have been able to pack the NLRB with representatives favorable to business, and courts have ruled that the hiring of "temporary" replacement workers during an economic strike

is legal. Effectively the latter action makes strikes hard to win, as employers simply drag out the legal processes involved in determining an unfair labor action to the point at which union resources are strained and individual workers have moved on.

Globalization has also played a big role; some employers simply close and move their operations when an organizing drive threatens. By the 1980s the number of mass strikes involving more than a thousand employees dwindled from more than 400 in 1975 to fewer than fifty; by the 1990s the number was around twenty-five. Likewise the composition of strikers changed. Public employees, teachers, and white-collar workers are now better positioned to strike than blue-collar employees.

The immediate future of strike effectiveness is not bright. Many labor activists currently argue that any strike that is not won within ten days will be lost, and unions are generally loath to call them. It is, however, unlikely that they will disappear altogether unless political and legal actions are taken to resolve labor disputes in some other fashion such as binding arbitration.

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STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (SDS)

RON BRILEY

Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) was the campus manifestation of the **New Left** during the 1960s. Inspired by the Civil Rights Movement and opposition to the Vietnam War, SDS grew from a small group of approximately 300 students in 1962 to an organization with 350 campus chapters and as many as 100,000 members by 1968. Internal divisions in 1969, however, rapidly diluted the influence of SDS on campuses and in national politics.

SDS grew out of the Student League for Industrial Democracy (SLID), which traced its origins to the **labor movement** struggles of the 1930s. SLID members at the University of Michigan challenged **segregation** in Ann Arbor, Michigan. Establishing themselves under the new name of SDS, a student group led by Tom Hayden and Al Haber, hosted a conference of forty-three students at a United Automobile Workers retreat center in Port Huron, Michigan. The result of this meeting was the Port Huron Statement, a political manifesto in which SDS denounced racial and economic inequality in the United States. Convinced that entrenched bureaucracy hindered meaningful social change, the Port Huron Statement called for a participatory **democracy** in which "the individual shares in those social decisions that determine the quality and direction of his life." Eschewing "Old Left" **communism**, the SDS and New Left drew much of their inspiration from the writings of sociologist **C. Wright Mills**. In his influential *The Power Elite* (1956), Mills argued that the United States was governed by interlocking

bureaucracies representing the interests of the military, big business, and political **elites** rather than what was best for the **working class**.

Building upon the work of Mills, SDS proposed a loose structure in which each campus chapter would be relatively independent, with most decisions made by consensus and leadership positions rotating annually. Also reflecting its admiration for the community relations fostered by the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), SDS initially focused upon domestic issues. The Economic Research and Action Project (ERAP) in 1963 encouraged participatory democracy by organizing the poor in Northern cities. Although most of the projects were short-lived, the ERAP projects in Newark and Chicago lasted until 1967.

SDS efforts to alleviate urban **poverty** were soon superseded by growing opposition to the Vietnam War. In April 1965 SDS planned a Washington, D. C., protest march to denounce the American bombing campaign in North Vietnam. Hoping to draw 2000 participants, SDS leadership was impressed when approximately 20,000 protesters gathered. As the American presence in Vietnam escalated, SDS membership increased, reaching 25,000 students by 1966.

By 1967 SDS was addressing draft resistance and urging opposition to the war. The organization also challenged the university's role in the **military-industrial complex**, questioning such campus activities as Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC), war-related research, and recruitment by corporations such as the Dow Chemical Company, which produced weapons for the military. An increasingly radical SDS leadership perceived liberals as responsible for the war, and saw "**bourgeois** reform" as no longer a viable option.

By 1968 SDS and American society were moving in more radical and violent directions. That spring the SDS chapter at Columbia University, under the leadership of Mark Rudd, occupied several administration buildings, effectively shutting down the campus. University officials responded by dispatching police to forcibly end the **sit-in**. In the ensuing chaos many bystanders were injured, and the entire campus was radicalized. Violence was also a by-product of antiwar demonstrations at the 1968 Chicago Democratic National Convention as police appeared to indiscriminately club protesters and bystanders.

Radical factions within SDS believed that more militant tactics were needed, and criticized SDS veterans such as Hayden for endorsing the Chicago protests. SDS membership increasingly identified themselves as "revolutionaries." Although the loose structure of the organization made accurate accounting difficult, it is estimated that SDS membership crested at approximately 100,000 in 1969. SDS, however, imploded at the 1969 annual convention as rival factions battled for control. The Maoist Progressive Labor coalition (PL) followed Mao Zedong's brand of Chinese communism and advocated an alliance between workers and students. The more extreme Radical Youth Movement (RYM), represented by Bernadine Dohrn, asserted that revolutionary violence was necessary to overthrow capitalism in the United States and identified themselves with radical groups and nationalist movements around the world fighting American imperialism. RYM, calling themselves "Weathermen" from a line in Bob Dylan's song, "Subterranean Homesick Blues," gained control of SDS and expelled their opponents from the organization. Many local chapters disavowed this action and split from the national organization, which ceased to be a mass political movement.

Meanwhile the Weathermen prepared for what they termed the "Days of Rage" in Chicago, a planned series of demonstrations to confront the authorities and provoke a violent reaction. The Weathermen had expected tens of thousands of protesters. Instead only about 700 youth gathered in Chicago between October 8 and 11, 1969, but the radicals still engaged in four days of battle with police on the streets of the city. When their allies on the antiwar Left denounced their tactics, the Weathermen moved underground and conducted a bombing campaign against "political" targets associated with the war and with suppression by the military-industrial complex, both domestically and abroad. The bombings, however, failed to ignite a revolutionary movement among the oppressed working class. Bombing as a tactic was abandoned following a March 1970 explosion in a New York City Greenwich Village townhouse that killed three members of the Weathermen. The faction remained underground until the 1980s, when most Weathermen resurfaced to serve prison terms that were fairly brief (much of the evidence against them having been illegally obtained).

Although SDS deteriorated into factionalism, the history of the organization indicates the possibility that a student movement could provide a focus for reforming and changing the face of capitalism. On the other hand the SDS experience demonstrates the difficulties of forging an alliance between students and the working class.

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STYLE

See Lifestyle.

SUBJECTIVE METHOD

ROBERT E. WEIR

The subjective method is a method of locating individuals within the social hierarchy by asking them to rank themselves. It differs from the **reputational method**, as the latter asks peers and others within a community to rank individuals rather than relying on their own assessments.

The subjective method is the most controversial and problematic method of determining social class. By its very nature the subjective method relies on non-empirical determinants. The attitudes of those surveyed color the results, and as in all survey research, how one frames the question can radically alter the result. As early as 1949, for instance, Richard Centers conducted a subjective method survey

in which 79 percent of respondents claimed they belonged to the **middle class**. Only three choices were given, however, and when he added a **working-class** category, 51 percent of those surveyed chose it, and just 43 percent identified with the middle class. Studies done in the 1950s revealed more problems embedded in the survey method; in essence results changed each time a category was added or deleted. In one 1953 survey, a plurality of Americans expressed the belief there were *no* social classes in America.

These results point to a major problem with the subjective method: the results are skewed by socially constructed images of class. It is no longer fashionable to use the category of working class; hence few people will claim to belong to it even though social scientists argue that between 40 and 70 percent (depending on the study) would be considered working class by using the **objective method** of class determination. In fact the percentage of Americans who currently self-identify as middle class is roughly equal to that of Centers's first study. A 2005 study by the Tax Foundation registered 80 percent of Americans saying they were middle class, a survey of 2200 Americans conducted by *Parade Magazine* in 2006 put the rate at 84 percent, and several other polls have yielded figures of over 90 percent.

The numbers are absurdities. The official **poverty** rate has been approximately 12 percent for the past decade, and most scholars say that about 20 percent of Americans are economically distressed. Even the most optimistic economists argue that no more than 60 percent of Americans are, objectively, middle class, and most analysts put the figure at below 50 percent. Theorists speculate that many people choose to call themselves middle class because they associate the **lower class** with shame, the **upper class** with snobbery, and the working class with the organized **labor movement**.

The subjective method, for all its shortcomings, still has value. Several studies reveal that even though people often misclassify themselves, they are nonetheless aware of the importance of the same factors used by objective method scholars: occupation, **wealth**, education, income, and so on. They successfully correlate these factors with social class ranking even as they exaggerate their own place in the hierarchy.

The subjective method also calls into question long-held assumptions of other methodologies. **Marxists**, for example, perhaps overestimate the importance of material factors in how individuals form **class consciousness**. Indeed subjective class studies suggest that the entire debate between **continuous** and **discontinuous views of class** may be too rigidly constructed. Apparently many individuals rely on a host of factors to construct their own identities. It is possible that they neither see the gradations within social categories that proponents of discontinuity assert, nor the sharp distinctions between classes held by supporters of discontinuity. Subjective studies may also be valuable in predicting how people will behave and could be valuable to those planning political or public policy initiatives. There is evidence, for example, that presidential candidate Al Gore misjudged how the public would respond to his appeals to the working class during the 2000 election campaign season.

Scholars of **gender stratification** argue that attention should be paid to subjective factors. Historically, married women's attitudes toward class have been assumed

to mirror those of their spouses, but this may not be true. Inconclusive studies suggest that women as a group are more politically liberal than men, more favorably disposed toward labor unions, and more likely to support government spending on social programs. Overall subjective studies—though dubious empirically—provide valuable insights into how Americans see themselves, their place in society, define their values, and formulate their social views.

Suggested Reading

Richard Centers, *The Psychology of Social Classes*, 1949; Nancy Davis and Robert Robinson, "Class Identification of Men and Women in the 1970s and 1980s," *American Sociological Review* 53 (1988), pp. 103–112; William Form, "Self-Employed Manual Workers: Petty Bourgeois or Working Class?" *Social Forces* 60 (1982), pp. 1050–1069; Harold Kerbo, *Social Stratification and Inequality*, 1996.

SUBURBIA

Andrew Reynolds

Suburbia is often mistakenly assumed to be a product of the 1950s, a manifestation of the postwar **American dream**. In fact, the modern suburb's first appearance in North America occurred sometime much nearer the 1850s. Suburbia, understood simply as the less developed zone on the outskirts of a city, can actually be traced back to the ancient civilizations of Mesopotamia, Greece, and Rome, though it held a very different position culturally and economically up until the nineteenth century. The modern Anglo American suburb is distinct from all predecessors in several respects. It is the product of a spatial revolution through which the urban periphery became the newly privileged site for certain forms of investment, development, and population growth.

Why did this revolution happen? According to some accounts, technological innovations—particularly in transportation—have dictated the physical form of cities. Inventions such as the horse-drawn trolley, the railroad, and the automobile undoubtedly allowed urban populations to move further out from city centers and make an easier daily commute. Those who could afford to escape the smoke and squalor of the modern industrial city fled to more pastoral, amicable, quieter surroundings. This explanation tends to assume that people place greater value on nature and privacy than on urban amenities and culture.

Yet many countries did not produce the same type of suburbs as England and the United States in the mid-nineteenth century. Paris, for instance, was designed by Baron Haussmann in such a way as to ensure the attractiveness of city life to the **bourgeoisie**, while compelling the **working class** and industry to relocate to the periphery. The Parisian suburbs somewhat fit the traditional pattern of urban development, in that the most economically valuable and socially desirable space remains located near the center. However, these suburbs share in common with their Anglo American cousins a distinctly modern segregation of classes and functions. In both instances the bourgeoisie created a space that isolated their residences



Housing subdivision near Union, Kentucky, a suburb of Cincinnati, Ohio. Photo by Derek Jensen/Wikipedia.

and families from the world of work and proletarian society. These observations suggest a more nuanced and complex answer to the question of why the spatial revolution occurred when and where it did.

Whereas technology was instrumental in facilitating urban deconcentration and segregation, the particular path that each nation took was determined by a wide range of nontechnological factors. Traditional cities were perceived as fast becoming unstable during the nineteenth century because of high population growth, which raised fears about escalating disease, crime, poverty, and class conflict, especially in the minds of the entrenched bourgeoisie. At the same time that this group was being pushed by such concerns, they were pulled by new desires for proper domesticity, social distinction, and individual expression. Haussmann's rebuilt city and the American bourgeois suburb both respond to these class-based fears and desires, though in very different ways.

Cultural preferences helped determine who went out to the suburbs. Americans have longstanding ideological predispositions toward nature, **private property**, and racial **segregation**, which have led people of all classes to prefer the borderlands. Undoubtedly another contributing cause was the manner in which each nation planned, financed, and carried out urban development. Haussmann was able to receive government sponsorship on a scale rarely achieved in the United States, where independent capitalists largely determined the trajectory. Other considerations

that influenced the typical American decision to push outward include the availability of plentiful, cheap land and building materials.

The result of this spatial revolution was a new landscape that has become uniquely American over time, both in the sense that the United States has spearheaded suburban innovations since the turn of the nineteenth century (e.g., the prefabricated bungalow, the tract development, and the gated community) and in the sense that suburbia has come to dominate the U.S. landscape, at least in terms of population if not in sheer acreage. Throughout this history suburbanization has played a decisive role in shaping the American socioeconomic class structure, just as class has largely determined the path of suburbanization. Since the mid-nineteenth century, class and **status** have become keyed to place of residence. As people move up or down, they tend to move out or in; the social homogeneity of most suburbs allows for precise distinctions and gradations. Although American suburbia began as a predominantly bourgeois space, after WWII mass production and government subsidies made it the cheapest housing option for many working-class families, creating the illusion of a new "classless" society. Nonetheless suburbanization often reinforces and deepens class divisions; government intervention, uneven development, and other institutionalized inequities allow those who move there to further separate themselves economically and socially from those considered beneath them.

Suggested Reading

Robert Fishman, Bourgeois Utopias: The Rise and Fall of Suburbia, 1987; Dolores Hayden, Building Suburbia: Green Fields and Urban Growth, 1820–2000, 2003; Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States, 1985.

SUPPLY SIDE ECONOMICS

See Trickle-Down Theory.

SURVIVAL OF THE FITTEST

See Social Darwinism.

SYMPHONY ORCHESTRAS

See High Culture.

Τ

TALLY'S CORNER

BRENDA K. BRETZ

Tally's Corner (1967) is an important book written by white ethnographer Elliott Liebow. Liebow did an in-depth study of two dozen black men who congregated in a store and on the street corner of a predominantly African American community in Washington, D.C. Liebow conducted his study between January 1962 and July 1963. Social scientists and college professors continue to use it today as an example of a well-conducted research paradigm. The study was unique in its time for both the subject matter chosen and the methodology employed.

It was part of a project looking at child-rearing practices of low-income families in the District of Columbia and was sponsored by the Health and Welfare Council of the National Capitol under a grant from the National Institute of Mental Health. Liebow was asked to focus his research and study on the black men who drifted into and out of family units. Urban, poor, African American families have been traditionally defined as containing only women and children. The male was assumed to be absent from the household and was therefore missing from previous studies on these families. Therefore, focusing on males was unusual for the time. Liebow's decision to concentrate on a particular street corner in that particular area of the city was serendipitous and occurred as a result of a chance encounter and extensive conversation with one of the street-corner men.

Liebow intentionally entered into the study without a hypothesis or predetermined research design. He was instructed to become a participant-observer in this community over the eighteen months he spent with them and to use the relationships he forged with the men to gain access to the details of their daily lives. Through this he hoped to gain insight into their self-identity as well as the way they saw themselves in relation to their socially assigned roles. Although Liebow asserted that his research was not intended to represent all adult black males, he concluded that those he observed were not atypical. In fact, he observed similar groups and behaviors on other street corners in the same section of town and came

to suspect that Tally's Corner was representative of urban **poverty** involving high concentrations of black men.

Liebow's book did much to counter **racist** psycho-babble about the alleged pathologies of black males, as well as those rooted in untested cultural assumptions of armchair social science. He argued that a black male's self-identity and behavior were not results of membership in an independent subculture requiring behaviors and attitudes in opposition to the dominant culture, but rather a reaction to his inability to achieve success or attain the goals defined by that dominant culture. For example, Liebow took on the stereotype that black men steal from their employers and linked it to a **self-fulfilling prophecy**. Following racist stereotypes, many white building contractors assumed black employees would steal; hence they paid them substandard **wages**. Black employees, in reaction, were *compelled* to steal in order to get by financially.

Liebow similarly challenged long-held assumptions about the absence of black fathers in urban communities. Although female-headed **one-parent families** proliferated around Tally's Corner and a sexist code of macho manliness prevailed on the street, men were not as invisible as assumed. Many moved in and out of homes with their families as their financial resources, local housing rules, and social caseworkers permitted. Nor were black men shiftless; what they often lacked was steady employment.

By placing black men within a context of economic, political, and social welfare systems rather than viewing them as within a stand-alone deviant subculture, Liebow challenged the status quo. Given this insight, readers, policymakers, and subsequent researchers had better frameworks from which to attack the problem of poverty among urban black families. Liebow's work provided inspiration for other scholars to tackle urban poverty and was widely quoted during the **War on Poverty**. Liebow also produced an influential study of **homeless** women titled *Tell Them Who I Am* in 1993.

Suggested Reading

Elliott Liebow, Tally's Corner: A Study of Negro Streetcorner Men, 1967; Liebow, Tell Them Who I Am: The Lives of Homeless Women, 1993; Jay MacLeod, Ain't No Makin' It: Aspirations and Attainment in a Low-Income Neighborhood, 1987; Carol Stack, All Our Kin: Strategies for Survival in a Black Community, 1974; Piri Thomas, Down These Mean Streets, 1967.

TAXATION

See Progressive/Regressive Taxation

TELEVISION

NEDA MAGHBOULEH

Television—an inherently visual and intensely popular medium in the United States—conveys an enormous amount of information about our social world to viewers on multiple, interconnected levels. Network heads, executive producers,

and screenwriters determine whose experiences and lives are portrayed on a wide variety of television programs, including sitcoms, dramas, talk shows, and the many "reality" hybrids. In addition, television is as much a vehicle for advertising as it is a medium for storytelling; consumer goods, political agendas, on-air personalities, and aesthetic sensibilities are all hocked in television's marketplace of ideas. In the tradition of cultural studies, communications researchers and social scientists have interrogated television's portrayals of U.S. **consumerism**, **race** relations, violence, and gender roles for several decades. And yet representations of social class remain largely overlooked in the existing literature and research on television media.

Various television genres have, over time, specialized in depictions of particular U.S. class strata. For example, the situational comedy or sitcom is thought to persistently represent **middle-class** and upper-middle-class experiences. Drama programs often feature professional or hyper-wealthy lifestyles, and daytime talk shows feature "ordinary" or **working-class** people. And although reality programs showcase various class strata with equal frequency, exaggerations and rehabilitations of class figure heavily in the premises of these shows.

A study of television programs, published by the Department of Health and Human Services, confirms this notion: working-class families are grossly and consistently underrepresented on domestic sitcoms, with respect to their proportion in the general U.S. population. Out of the 262 network domestic sitcoms aired between 1946 and 1990, a scant 11 portrayed working-class characters and experiences. Additionally, in the years 1955 to 1971, not a single new working-class domestic sitcom appeared on television. These data, while informative, are also very dated, indicating a need for more quantitative analyses of contemporary television programming.

Sitcoms most often portray the middle class and habitually employ such tropes as the breadwinning, competent, and responsible husband/father and his cheekily cute, scene-stealing (but ultimately obedient) children. The middle- to upper-middle-class wife/mother is usually dippy, as was Lucy Ricardo in *I Love Lucy* (1951–57), or compliant, as was June Cleaver in *Leave It to Beaver* (1957–63). This idealized middle-class family exists in direct contrast to portrayals of working-class fathers as flawed, childlike, and emasculated by their wives; of tyrannical, crass, or authoritative mothers; and of children as glib miniature adults who pull stunts over their parents' heads. A contemporary version of the working-class set-up is *King of Queens* (1998–present), which featured an income-earning (hence threatening) wife and an ever-flustered husband, with his quirky, demanding father-in-law standing in for the glib children found on other working-class shows. Developed over decades, these sitcom-specific tropes code class anxieties and issues as problems of gender.

Though the adorable Tanner daughters of *Full House* (1987–95) had three equally loving, middle-class father figures (a middling challenge to the usual "nuclear family" reflected in sitcoms) and the *Cosby Show* (1984–92) featured a **white-collar** African American family, both of these seemingly progressive sitcoms portrayed the unquestioned, upscale class reality established by *Leave It to Beaver* decades earlier. Conversely, *All in the Family* (1971–79), the animated *The Simpsons* (1989–present), and *Roseanne* (1988–97) are among the few sitcoms about working-class families. *Roseanne*, in particular, unapologetically cast light on **unemployment**, workplace

discrimination, past-due bills, and barriers to higher education that face many Americans. And yet, with today's working class largely forced into part-time, low-wage service work, even these depictions of **blue-collar** laborers are somewhat obsolete.

Sitcoms depict characters engaged in upward **social mobility** when they adhere to an ethic of **individualism**, self-sacrifice, and **self-reliance**. In addition, ethnic minorities, whose opportunities for social mobility are more systemically constrained than those of whites in U.S. society, often portray these hard-working characters. They are rewarded with better life circumstances and a heightened moral worth for their unquestioned, unencumbered pursuit of economic success. *The Jeffersons* (1975–85), for example, offers a glimpse into issues of ethnic stratification when its African American family moves into a "deluxe apartment in the sky," bringing issues of racial inequality into sharp focus.

On that note, upper-class or hyper-wealthy realities are rarely represented on sitcoms, but when they are, the framework of race once again stands in for what might be a commentary on social class. The Fresh Prince of Bel-Air (1990–96) presents Will Smith as a fish out of water ("West Philadelphia born and raised" along-side working-poor African Americans) now living with his extended family in a tony section of West Los Angeles. And although Smith has lighter skin than several members of the "Banks" family, the Bankses are unmistakably upper class (read: respectable and "white"-acting) and Smith is hopelessly "ghetto." Although The Fresh Prince of Bel-Air does an entertaining job of inverting stereotypes about African Americans in a highly stratified United States, the show does not depict Will's less privileged—and presumably less hilarious—reality in West Philadelphia. It chooses to focus on the classic model of a prosperous, two-parent family and casts Will's character as a childlike emissary from the streets, exposing supposed hypocrisies of blackness in America rather than existing class inequalities.

Stories about the upper class or hyper-wealthy are more often told through the medium of the hour-long drama. Intricate stories of deceit and adultery span multiple seasons, conveying a moral message to audiences: excess breeds unhappiness or, at the very least, begets a moral comeuppance. Working- and middle-class audiences are perhaps drawn to these programs for the voyeuristic glimpse they provide into how the "other half" lives. Examples of these morally didactic, yet addictive, programs include daytime soap operas such as *The Young and the Restless* (1973–present), nighttime soaps such as *Dallas* (1978–91), and more recent shows such as *Beverly Hills 90210* (1990–2000), *The O.C.* (2003–2007), and *Desperate Housewives* (2004–present), which blend drama and comedy to appeal to a younger audience. And yet the expensive wardrobes, mansions, boardrooms, and lifestyles of these characters still promote a particular kind of material consumption that is reinforced by the commercial advertisements for **luxury goods** that air during these broadcasts.

A trend in the hour-long drama is an increase in representations of the "professional" class. Immensely popular dramas such as *E.R.* (1994–present), *Ally McBeal* (1997–2002), *24* (2001–present), and *Grey's Anatomy* (2005–present) feature lawyers, government agents, and doctors—revealing, as some cultural critics argue, the overwhelmingly upper-class backgrounds of the producers and screenwriters who bring these shows to life. Just as these image-makers control the production of

ideas in U.S. culture, their shows depict the small percentage of elite in U.S. society whose jobs influence and impact everyone else.

And while a commercially successful drama might portray the life of a professional or upper-class character for several seasons, daytime talk shows allot mere minutes to each working-class guest. Purportedly depicting the experiences of and relationships among everyday people in a live audience format, daytime talk shows utilize an interactional method of representation in contrast to the observational method of sit-coms and dramas. And contrary to the lack of working-class characters on sitcoms and dramas, daytime talk shows almost exclusively feature members of the **lower class** or working class, however contrived, unflattering, or bogus these portrayals may be. Popular shows, many of which still air on syndicated channels nationwide, include *Sally Jessy Raphael* (1985–2002), *Geraldo* (1987–98), and *Jerry Springer* (1991–present). At the height of their popularity in the mid-1990s, over twenty daytime talk shows were on TV, with only slight differences in target audience or daily topic.

A typical daytime talk show episode follows a standardized format that facilitates the reunions, confrontations, and confessions of featured guests. Every episode thrives on the interchange between its major players: the host, the guests, "experts," audience members, producers, and security guards. Class is revealed through the use of language, physical appearance, and most of all, the behavior of these various actors. Social scientists have long considered the management and policing of emotion to be a phenomenon of the middle and upper classes; the dramatic performances of daytime talk show guests thusly defy those norms and position the guests as less appropriate or tasteful than the middle class. For example, daytime talk show guests typically enact socially transgressive displays of emotion (crying, fighting, cursing, the removal of clothing) orchestrated well in advance of the show's taping. The largely working- or lower-middle-class studio audience (made up of tourists, the unemployed, and paid temporary workers) demonstrate their opinions of the guests with boos and hisses. The behaviors of the guests and the studio audience, elicited by a bevy of producers backstage and in the wings, stand in contrast to the distanced, seemingly rational performances of the host and "experts."

A subgroup within the daytime talk show is the courtroom program, in which down-and-out litigants bring their relatives, lovers, or associates before a judge, who takes roughly ten minutes to insult and scold both parties before laying down a verdict. Popular daytime court shows include *The People's Court* (1981–present), *Judge Judy* (1996–present), and *Divorce Court* (1999–present). The commercials commonly aired alongside these programs are meant to appeal to the working class: certification programs for aspiring medical/legal assistants, quick-fix diet pills, dubious insurance firms, loan sharks, and accident lawyers.

But unlike the sitcom, drama, or talk show, there is no one class stratum favored by reality television. The reality show comes in several formats, among them cinéma vérité, game show, and dating shows. *The Real World* (1992–present) is a seminal program placing seven young people of varied racial, sexual, and class identities together in a shared living space. The producers record the participants' emergent friendships and conflicts via hidden camera; participants' overdubbed "confessional" narration is later mapped onto each episode. Reality shows are notable for placing ordinary people in extraordinary situations, bringing into question the "reality" of what is presented in the first place.

Though the discourse of class is left unexplained on most reality shows, it is actually at the heart of most plot devices and dramatic tensions. Some programs aim to remake the appearances and lives of the working class (*Extreme Makeover: Home Edition*, 2003–present; *What Not To Wear*, 2003–present), whereas others simply present sneak attacks upon working-class people in dire circumstances (*COPS*, 1989–present; *Cheaters*, 2000–present). Reality shows about the middle class tend to focus on romantic or domestic issues, with a strong emphasis on rehabilitating or policing family life (*Wife Swap*, 2003–present; *Nanny 911*, 2004–present; *Brat Camp*, 2005–present). Ostensibly, reality shows about the upper class reveal the follies of privilege (*The Simple Life*, 2003–present, *Rich Girls*, 2003), yet these shows actually lack the correctives to appearance or behavior that are foundational to reality shows about the working and middle classes. A slightly desirous (but mostly idle) sentiment pervades both the production and consumption of reality shows about the upper class.

Ultimately, much of the best discourse around TV and social class is found on the Internet. A host of blogs and Web sites recapping serialized television programs use irony or hyperbole to get at issues of misrepresentation and under/over-representation of particular class strata. Although this critical discourse is mostly overlooked in more traditional forums, it indicates that television audiences are working to understand television—like many other forms of cultural production—beyond the level of pure consumption.

Suggested Reading

Laura Grindstaff, *The Money Shot: Trash, Class, and The Making of TV Talk Shows*, 2002; Carol Stabile, ed., *Prime-Time Animation: Television Animation and American Culture*, 2003; Ella Taylor, *Prime-Time Families: Television Culture in Post-War America*, 1991.

TERKEL, STUDS (May 16, 1912–)


ROBERT E. WEIR

Louis "Studs" Terkel is an author, radio host, playwright, actor, columnist, activist, and raconteur based in Chicago. He has been associated with various left-wing and progressive causes and is considered a pioneer in the field of oral history. His numerous oral history collections are famed for giving voice to people often ignored in conventional scholarship: workers, the homeless, social outcasts, musicians, actors, social workers, con artists, activists, and so on.

He was born in New York City to Russian **Jewish** parents. His father, Samuel, was a tailor and his mother, Anna (Finkel), a seamstress. When he was ten, his family, which included three brothers as well as Studs, moved to Chicago, where his parents opened a boarding house on the city's West Side. In 1926, they opened the Wells-Grand Hotel, a hotel frequented by immigrants, which they operated until 1936. Terkel often credits the social diversity of his childhood for his eclectic tastes.

Terkel graduated from high school in 1928 and obtained a law degree from the University of Chicago in 1934. As a young man during the **Great Depression** he saw firsthand the effects of **unemployment**, **poverty**, and despair. He worked briefly

as a civil servant before securing a job creating radio shows for the Federal Writers Project, a New Deal program that supported the arts. This launched his lifelong involvement in radio production. In the 1930s, he did everything from advertising to sportscasting. He also began to use the name "Studs," taking his inspiration from writer James Farrell and his Studs Lonigan novels. Terkel also acted with the Chicago Repertory Theatre, which opened another career line; Terkel acted in numerous plays, movies, television shows, and radio dramas and has written plays of his own. In keeping with his penchant for progressive politics he has been partial to the work of left-wing playwrights such as Bertold Brecht, Clifford Odets, and early John Steinbeck. In 1939 Terkel married Ida Goldberg, with whom he had a son.



Studs Terkel, 1980. © CBC-TV. Courtesy of CBC-TV/Photofest.

Terkel admires **Eugene Debs** and holds political views that could be labeled as democratic **socialism**, though in the 1930s he associated with many individuals involved with the Popular Front, a mix of progressives, socialists, and **communists**. He was rejected for combat duty in World War II because of a perforated eardrum and joined the Red Cross but was not posted abroad because of his radical political views. After the war Terkel returned to radio, but in 1949 he also had a television show, *Studs' Place*, a sitcom. This show ended abruptly in 1953, when Terkel was called before the House Un-American Activities Committee and questioned about his radical views; he refused to name other activists and was blacklisted. He worked as a columnist and actor to survive during **McCarthyism**'s height; in 1958 he secured a daily radio show on WFMT, *The Studs Terkel Show*, which still airs.

Terkel's talk-radio shows provided the format for his subsequent oral history collections; they are wide-ranging conversations with everyone from public intellectuals to street thugs, though he has a special fondness for theater people and jazz musicians. Terkel's first book, in fact, was *Giants of Jazz* (1956). His first oral history collection was *Division Street: America* (1967), which looked at the fissures of race, ethnicity, and social class in inner city Chicago. His subjects came from all walks of life: the upper class, lower-class street hustlers, Native Americans, the middle class, civil rights activists, and others.

In 1970 Terkel won acclaim for *Hard Times: An Oral History of the Great Depression*, which many felt was the best look at common people during the 1930s since Steinbeck's *The Grapes of Wrath*. He won even more praise for *Working* (1974), his intimate look at life among the **working class** interspersed with accounts from professionals, sports stars, and corporate heads. His 1984 oral history of World War II, *The Good War*, was awarded a Pulitzer Prize in 1985. Like most of Terkel's work, the latter was iconoclastic and presented war as horror, fear, and divisiveness

rather than Hollywood-style glory and unwavering courage. *The Good War* was heralded by critics and veterans alike for its realistic look at combat experiences and how war simultaneously unites and divides society.

After a collection probing city life, *Chicago* (1986), Terkel challenged American myth again in *The Great Divide: Second Thoughts on the American Dream* (1988), a work that highlighted the gap between assertions of American prosperity and the everyday reality for legions of Americans who have yet to taste it. His 1992 *Race: What Blacks and Whites Think and Feel about the American Obsession* did much the same with notions that America had somehow "solved" its racial problems. Terkel's subsequent collections have surveyed twentieth-century history, probed the mystery of death, investigated faith, and explored the lives and work of artists, actors, and playwrights. His 1997 *My American Century* is a sample of previous works. In 1998 the Chicago Historical Society named Terkel its first Distinguished Artist-in-Residence.

Terkel underwent successful open-heart surgery at age 93, making him one of the oldest patients to recover from such a procedure. In 2006 he joined with others to challenge the National Security Agency's right to secure customer telephone records.

Suggested Reading

Studs Terkel (www.studsterkel.org/); Terkel, *Hard Times*, 1970; Terkel, *Working*, 1974; Terkel, *Race: What Blacks and Whites Think and Feel About the American Obsession*, 1992; Terkel, *Talking to Myself: A Memoir of My Times*, 1995; Terkel, *My American Century*, 1997.

THERNSTROM, ABIGAIL (September 14, 1936–) and **STEPHAN** (November 5, 1934–)

SAMANTHA MAZIARZ

Abigail and Stephan Thernstrom are authors, scholars, and policy consultants.

Abigail Mann Thernstrom, a political scientist, was born September 14, 1936, to businessman Ferdinand and Helen (Robison) Mann in New York City. She married Stephan Albert Thernstrom January 3, 1959, and they raised two children: Melanie Rachel and Samuel. She received her BA from Barnard College in 1958 and a PhD from Harvard University in 1975.

Stephan Thernstrom, a history professor, was born November 5, 1934, in Port Huron, Michigan, to Albert George, a railroad executive, and Bernadene (Robbins) Thernstrom. He received his BS from Northwestern University in 1956, and his PhD from Harvard University in 1962.

The recipients of numerous fellowships, prizes, and awards, the Thernstroms have been prolific writers with dozens of published works. They are perhaps best known for their research and views in the arena of race relations and civil rights issues, for which they have also been widely recognized. Abigail received the Anisfield-Wolf Book Award in Race Relations from The Cleveland Foundation in 1987, served as a consultant to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights from 1985 to 1986 and was director of a project on minority voting rights from 1980 to 1987. Stephan's graduate

thesis and published works focus on the **wealth** gap and **social mobility** in America, as well as analyses of **capitalism**, **socialism**, and **racism** in America. His findings have largely concentrated on the idea that in America, there is a huge disparity in class income and privilege, and the **upper classes** are afforded major socioeconomic advantages, but the poor are afforded great opportunities for advancement as well.

More recently, the Thernstroms have been chided for what some have termed their "conservative" standpoints, but it is a label at which they both bristle, as they believe it to have negative connotations. Abigail made headlines in 1997 when, during a panel discussion on race relations, she became the only one present who disagreed with Bill Clinton on the matter of affirmative action. She maintained that affording minorities special privileges through quotas and other affirmative action methods was not in keeping with the wishes of the majority of American citizens, white or black, and that the idea of undeserving minority candidates for employment or university acceptance being chosen over more qualified whites or Asian Americans only strained race relations further. She also said that the lowering of standards for blacks and Latinos that affirmative action entailed only hurt the academic, business, and social progress of minorities and was detrimental to the American nation as a whole. She and Stephan encourage educational reforms as an alternative. Clinton became increasingly agitated and passionate during their debate (some say he acted like a bully), raising his voice and sharply undercutting Abigail in her attempts to retort. He later apologized to Thernstrom for trying to silence her opinion during their discussion.

The Thernstroms' recent works and opinions have met with similar controversy, as they are said to blame black attitudes and affirmative action for the continuing racial strife in America today. These trends are especially notable in what is probably their most well-known work, *America in Black and White*.

Suggested Reading

Abigail Thernstrom, Minorities: Community and Identity, Charles Fried, ed. 1983; Thernstrom, Whose Votes Count?: Affirmative Action and Minority Voting Rights, 1987; Thernstrom with Diane Ravitch, The Democracy Reader: Classic and Modern Speeches, Essays, Poems, Declarations, and Documents on Freedom and Human Rights Worldwide, 1992; Stephan Thernstrom, The Other Bostonians: Poverty and Progress in the American Metropolis, 1880–1970, 1999; Thernstrom with Richard T. Gill, Nathan Glazer, et. al., Our Changing Population, 1992; Thernstrom and Thernstrom, Beyond the Color Line: New Perspectives on Race and Ethnicity, 2000; Thernstrom and Thernstrom, No Excuses: Closing the Racial Gap in Learning, 2004.

THINK TANKS

STEPHEN E. SUSSMAN

Think tank is a phrase used to describe a wide range of private, nonprofit research organizations that engage in public policy analysis and research. Some are strictly nonpartisan, researching policy issues without regard to political outcomes,

whereas others see one of their main functions as that of providing support to policymakers. A think tank provides advice, information, and evaluation on any aspect of public policy, planning, and strategy. The term was originally used in reference to organizations that offered military advice, most notably the RAND Corporation, formed in 1945.

Think tanks in the United States play an important role in forming both foreign and domestic policy. Organizations such as the Council on Foreign Relations, the American Enterprise Institute, the Heritage Foundation, and the Brookings Institution are influential in a wide range of policy areas, whereas the Urban Institute and the Center for Budget and Policy Priorities are examples of think tanks that specialize in a specific policy field. Think tanks bring together the leaders of the corporate and financial sectors, the media, academia, and government, and they try to reach consensus on problem solving.

Until the 1970s there were relatively few think tanks, most of which offered nonpartisan policy and military advice to the U.S. government. Government growth and expanding regulatory power has led to the proliferation of think tanks. Their proliferation represented an expectation that lawmaking might become better informed and more effective because of these expert contributions.

Think tanks in the United States generally receive funding from private donors and foundations. As a result, privately run think tanks may feel freer to propose and debate controversial ideas than people within government. Advocates of think tanks suggest that these research organizations provide expert but neutral information to policymakers, write articles for the op-ed pages of newspapers, and appear as expert commentators on television. Critics of think tanks counter that private funding yields biased conclusions that promote the interest of donors and ensure future funding. Some critics also assert that think tanks are propaganda tools for promoting the ideological arguments of sponsoring groups. They exist for **lobbying** purposes, promoting the **special interests** of the group.

Many think tanks are guided by a particular ideological or economic theory that betrays policy biases. Some think tanks are clearly aligned with conservative or promarket approaches to the economy, whereas others, especially those with an emphasis on social **welfare**, social equity, or environmental outcomes, are viewed as more liberal. The Heritage Foundation is an influential public policy research institute whose stated mission is to "formulate and promote conservative public policies based on the principles of free enterprise, limited government, individual freedom, traditional American values, and a strong national defense." On the other side of the political spectrum are liberal-oriented think tanks, such as the Institute for Policy Studies, the Progressive Policy Institute, and the Center for American Progress. The Economic Policy Institute is a prominent progressive think tank whose research emphasizes interests of low-income and middle-income workers. There are also centrist and nonpartisan think tanks such as the Brookings Institution, which claims to be nonpartisan and conducts research "to inform the public debate, not advance a political agenda."

Government think tanks are also important in the United States, particularly in the security and defense field. These include the Institute for National Strategic Studies, the Institute for Homeland Security Studies, and the Center for Technology and National Security Policy at the National Defense University; the Center for Naval Warfare Studies at the Naval War College; and the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College.

Many universities have policy or research centers that produce policy studies and evaluations on national, state, and local issues. Occasionally, university researchers are under contract to a government agency and/or participate in issue networks comprising many researchers and other interested parties and produce studies of direct value to policy-makers.

In theory, thinks tanks provide expert but neutral information to policymakers, unlike special interests, who promote their own agenda. However, many think tanks now have strong liberal, conservative, or libertarian leanings, and their expertise has been used for ideological causes rather than for balanced or objective information. In the end, this may hurt the reputation of think tanks as sources of neutral expertise.

Suggested Reading

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THOMAS, NORMAN (November 20, 1884–December 19, 1968)

ROBERT E. WEIR

Norman Mattoon Thomas was the most prominent American **socialist** between the death of **Eugene Debs** and the emergence of **Michael Harrington**. Thomas was a six-time candidate for president of the United States on the **Socialist Party** of America (SP) ticket. He was also a pacifist and civil libertarian.

Thomas was born in Marion, Ohio, the son of a Presbyterian minister who was involved with the **Social Gospel** movement. Upon graduation from Marion High School he entered Princeton University and obtained his BA in 1905. Ironically, at Princeton he took political science from Woodrow Wilson. After college, Thomas moved to New York City and was a social worker before entering Union Theological Seminary. In 1911 he followed his father's footsteps and was ordained as a Presbyterian minister. He studied Christian socialism at Union and carried those principles with him to his first pulpit in a heavily Italian section of **Harlem**.

Thomas was adamantly opposed to President Wilson's decision to involve the United States in World War I and viewed the conflict as an imperialist venture. In 1915 he and other prominent pacifists, such as A. J. Muste and Scott Nearing, cofounded the Fellowship of Reconciliation, an interfaith and interdenominational organization that remains at the fore of the struggle for social justice and global peace. Between 1916 and 1920, Thomas worked with individuals such as Roger Baldwin, Jane Addams, Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, and Upton Sinclair



Norman Thomas. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

in efforts that culminated in the founding of the American Civil Liberties Union.

Thomas was a committed democratic socialist who tried to use his writing and the ballot box to supplant capitalism. He was an associate editor of The Nation in 1921 and 1922, the co-director of the League for Industrial Democracy (LID) from 1922 to 1937, and contributed essays to the latter's newspaper. The LID served as the educational wing of the socialist movement and recruited on college campuses. In 1962 it inspired the creation of **Stu**dents for a Democratic Society. During the 1920s he made unsuccessful Socialist Party bids for governor of New York, New York City mayor, and the U.S. presidency. He was also an outspoken opponent of Republican administrations in the 1920s, including that of former Marion, Ohio, resident Warren G. Harding, whose newspaper he had delivered as a boy.

The SP gained members during the **Great Depression** and Thomas ran against **Franklin Roosevelt** between 1932 and 1944, though he came to have grudging respect for the president. He did, however, vehemently oppose Roosevelt's preparations for war

in Europe. In 1940 he joined the America First Committee (AFC) and entered an odd partnership with conservative figures such as Charles Lindbergh, Gerald Nye, and Burton Wheeler. Four days after Pearl Harbor was bombed he helped dissolve the AFC and supported the U.S. war effort, though he spoke out against the internment of Japanese Americans. He made his final presidential bid in 1948.

After the war Thomas returned to his pacifist roots. In 1957 he was a cofounder of the Committee for a SANE Nuclear Policy (SANE), an organization into which he poured much of his energy after resigning leadership posts with the SP in 1955. Thomas was an ardent critic of **Cold War** policy in the 1950s and an early supporter of the civil rights movement. His denunciations of **poverty** amidst prosperity inspired the work of **Michael Harrington**. In his remaining years he also spoke favorably of the emerging **New Left** and against the Vietnam War.

Thomas was fiercely anti-communist and labored hard to articulate the differences between his democratic and evolutionary views of socialism and the autocracy, bureaucracy, and totalitarianism he associated with **communism**. Although his socialist economic visions did not unfold in America during his lifetime, Thomas inspired many through his humanitarianism.

Suggested Reading

Robert Hyfler, Prophets on the Left: American Socialist Thought in the Twentieth Century, 1984; W. A. Swanburg, Norman Thomas: The Last Idealist, 1976; Norman Thomas, Socialism Re-examined, 1963.

Thurow, Lester (May 7, 1938–)

ROBERT E. WEIR

Lester Thurow is an economist who is known for making economic concepts and trends accessible to the American public. He is also a renowned scholar, the former dean of the Sloan School of Management at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), and currently holds an endowed chair in management and economics at MIT.

Thurow hails from Livingston, Montana. He obtained his BA in political economy from Williams College in 1960, an MA from Balliol College Oxford in 1962, and a PhD in economics from Harvard in 1964. He was a Rhodes scholar, has been awarded numerous honorary degrees, has served on several presidential advisory boards, and was a contributing editor for *Newsweek* from 1981 to 1983. Many Americans have encountered Thurow through his work with public television, his frequent network media commentaries, and his voluminous writing, much of which has appeared in mainstream press outlets such as the *Boston Globe*, *The New York Times*, and *USA Today*. He has published more than a dozen books and scores of articles.

Thurow often positions himself as an iconoclast. He does not believe, for example, that America is a thoroughly **middle-class** society or that trends are moving in that direction. Instead, he argues that, since the 1970s, jobs paying mid-level wages have been in decline and growth has taken place in low-paying service sector employment and in higher-paying jobs in the technology sector. Thus, one saw an expansion of the **lower classes** and some growth in the upper middle and lower upper class, though the upper end has also contracted due to outsourcing, budget deficits, trade imbalances, and unwise governmental monetary policy. Thurow was a critic of President Ronald Reagan's deficit spending and of cuts made to welfare and other social programs, the latter coming at a time in which **poverty** was growing. He has been critical of President George W. Bush for many of the same reasons. Thurow has argued that President Bush failed to apply monetary pressure to stabilize the U.S. dollar because his foreign policy objectives required political cooperation that would hard to maintain if economic pressure was applied. Thus, he did not press China to stabilize the yuan vis-à-vis the dollar because he wished China's leverage in U.S. disputes with North Korea.

Thurow is dubious of many aspects of **globalization**. He doubts that economic standards of developing nations will improve dramatically in the near future, but he is certain that U.S.-based corporations are shortsighted if they see investment and production outside of the United States as anything other than a short-term way to save labor costs. At some point, global wage rates will go up; if U.S. rates stay flat or continue to decline, this will jeopardize domestic living standards. Like **Jeremy Rifkin**, he bemoans the loss of jobs in the United States and advocates policies that run counter to current trends. Rather than constant cost cutting, wage slashing, downsizing, ruthless competition, and assaults on organized labor, Thurow endorses more investment in education, training, and job creation for those in the bottom half of the **socio-economic** scale. Only by raising standards at the bottom can the United States hope to regain its lost competitive edge, retain

its status as a world economic leader, and maintain it in the future. Beating down labor serves only to compromise the very worker loyalty and high productivity necessary to be competitive. He is also among the very few scholars who note the ripple effect in rural America that results from job loss and the downward spiral of wages. He is equally gloomy in his assessment of the impact of changing employment markets for older workers and doubts that many of those over the age of 55 who lose jobs will ever obtain comparable situations.

Thurow also questions the ultimate wisdom of deregulation and argues that the United States already has less government interference than most advanced **capitalist** nations. He is, however, a realist who cautions against simplistic panaceas. In recent years he has warned that an **investor society** is mythic and that small investors cannot hope to compete with huge investment firms. Nor should the general public look to government to curtail all corporate scandals so long as the pressure remains to deliver high yields to institutional investment houses. He is nonetheless optimistic that the United States can orchestrate global economic patterns and advance the U.S. standard of living.

Suggested Reading

Lester Thurow, The Zero-Sum Solution: Building a World Class American Economy, 1985; Thurow, The Future of Capitalism: How Today's Economic Forces Shape Tomorrow's World, 1996; Thurow, Building Wealth: New Rules for Nations, Companies, and Individuals in a Knowledge-Based Economy, 1999.

TOKENISM

See Institutional Discrimination.

TRANSPORTATION

MICHELLE DAGNINO

Although advances in transportation have helped bring prosperity and modernization to many countries around the world during the twentieth century, transportation now threatens to impair the quality of life in the twenty-first century. Oil is becoming an increasingly scarce resource, and the mass use of other fuels as a viable alternative are still in the development stages. In the United States, transportation vehicles are responsible for one-third of the nation's energy use and carbon dioxide emissions.

Aside from the environmental problems raised from our dependence on cars, access to transportation is increasingly being addressed as an issue of **race** and class discrimination. Chronic inequality in public transportation has become firmly and nationally entrenched. Access to reliable public transportation eludes many people, the majority of them poor people and people of color. Frequent and dependable transportation is an important lifeline for many people—access to transportation,

be it public, such as publicly run buses, subways, rapid transit lines, or private, such as cars, determines one's access to work, school, shopping, and other social, economic, and civil activities. Exclusion from transportation networks can lead to drastically reduced **life chances**. People who are unable to rely on transportation to get to work may end up having to take lower paying jobs that are closer to where they live, may end up having a longer commute, which will lower the amount of time they get to spend with their family or enjoying leisure time, and can reduce their access to essential services, such as school, childcare and health care.

For many, reduced, limited, or no access to transportation is merely a continuation of the **segregation** that was supposed to end with the Montgomery Bus Boycotts. Activists such as Ella Baker and Rosa Parks identified transportation as an important avenue to equality, and in a posthumously published essay, Martin Luther King Jr. wrote that the availability of transit is directly linked to one's ability to gain employment. Even the type of public transit system available in different neighborhoods demonstrates the priority given to richer neighborhoods in accessing public transit. For example, Pittsburgh's planners have given Pittsburgh's predominantly white southern **suburbs** a clean, quiet light rail system, but the poorer, predominantly black and Latino East End has a louder, more polluting busway system—even though East Enders are more likely to use public transit. In Macon, Georgia, the small bus system was stretched to the maximum when city officials decided to focus public transit investment in **suburbia**. As a result, in a city in which 14 percent of the households do not have cars, bus service stops running by the early evening, leaving people who work night shifts with no access to a public bus system.

Even for those who have cars, transportation is still a stressful consideration. Families earning less than \$14,000 per year after taxes spend 40 percent of their take-home pay on transportation, as opposed to 13 percent for families earning over \$72,000. The change in personal transportation budgets from the last century to the twenty-first is astounding. In 1935, when there was much less access to private cars and public transportation, families spent 10 percent of their budgets on transportation. Today, they spend more than 20 percent—perhaps explaining why so many people feel financially stressed. Moreover, investment in highway infrastructure that caters to those who own cars overlooks the negative externalities, such as the effects of these highways on city neighborhoods. People who do not have cars and are unable to use them still absorb all of the air and noise pollution, yet have none of the benefits.

The struggle over access to a safe, consistent public transportation system has lead to various grassroots efforts by public transit riders that advocate for the rights of riders. One of the most well-known groups is the Bus Riders Union, a multiracial, working-class based membership organization based in Los Angeles. Since late 1996, the Bus Riders Union has acted as the court-appointed class representative in the civil rights Consent Decree settlement won in October 1996 in the case of Labor/Community Strategy Center and Bus Riders Union et al. v. Los Angeles County MTA. The Bus Riders Union charged the MTA with violating Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act by establishing a discriminatory, separate, and unequal transportation system with public funds, specifically, a rail system for a predominantly white, suburban ridership (only 26,000 daily riders with per passenger ride subsidies of

\$30) and a "third class bus system for Third World people" (the 350,000 bus riders who are 81 percent people of color receiving per passenger ride subsidies of less than \$1). Their objective was to force a massive transfer of funds from rail to bus within the MTA budget to double the bus fleet, reduce bus fares, and dramatically increase bus ridership.

Campaigns such as those of the Bus Riders Union address the underlying issue about urban planning that is often ignored: arguments over suburban sprawl and access to transportation are really debates about race and class. When new roads are built to accommodate larger and larger cars, but similar increases in transit routes never materialize, we are essentially ignoring the carless poor, elderly, and disabled, and claiming their employment and civic life as less important than those with immediate access to transportation.

Suggested Reading

Robert D. Bullard and Glenn S. Johnson, eds., *Just Transportation: Dismantling Race and Class Barriers to Mobility*, 1997; Bullard, Johnson, and Angel Torres, eds., *Highway Robbery: Transportation Racism and New Routes to Equity*, 2004.

TRICKLE-DOWN THEORY

ROBERT E. WEIR

The trickle-down theory is the idea that allowing the rich and corporate interests to keep more of their **wealth** rather than subjecting it to **progressive taxation** will ultimately benefit the poor as well. In theory, if society's wealthiest sectors receive tax relief they will invest part of their savings in the economy, thereby creating new jobs and opportunities that will accrue benefits across all social classes.

The trickle-down theory is closely related to (and often confused with) supply-side economics, although the two have merged in popular discourse. Supply-side economics is the antithesis of principles espoused by individuals such as **John Maynard Keynes** or **John Kenneth Galbraith**, both of whom focused on the demand side of the economic ledger. Whereas demand-side economists emphasize the role of government in stimulating the economy—even to the degree of doling out direct subsidies to individuals—supply-side economists argue that unregulated markets work better than controlled ones. The term "supply-side economics" apparently originated with *Wall Street Journal* reporter Jude Wanniski in 1975, but it is a much older concept. Adam Smith, for example, argued that **capitalism** required a relatively unfettered environment to maximize its potential. Taxation, by its nature, removes resources from the economy and reduces investment opportunities that create goods, capital, and employment.

In the early days of the American **Industrial Revolution** the laissez-faire principles espoused by Adam Smith held sway and neither corporate nor personal wealth was subject to substantial taxation. A tax on corporations was attached to a personal income tax during the **Civil War** but quickly passed from fashion after the war. During the **Gilded Age** there were state and municipal levies but few

federal taxes. Hegemonic **Social Darwinian** views of the time saw the accumulation of great fortune as the workings of **meritocracy** and viewed those who possessed it as the creators of social as well as individual wealth. An attempt to tax businesses, the Revenue Act of 1894, was deemed unconstitutional and there was no federal levy on corporations until 1909. A federal personal income tax came into effect with the enactment of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913.

During World War I, the **Great Depression**, and World War II, high taxes were assessed on upper-bracket incomes. The monies collected helped pay for Keynesian demand-side schemes, but these practices outraged the **upper class** and the business community. Nonetheless, taxes on wealthy individuals and interests remained high, reaching 91% for the top bracket during World War II, and remained there until the Revenue Act of 1964 lowered the top rate to 70%. Since then the top rates have steadily declined. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 lowered the rate to 50% and the Tax Reform Act of 1986, a pet project of President **Ronald Reagan**, slashed it to 28%. The top rate rose to nearly 40% under presidents George H. **Bush** and Bill Clinton, but dipped again to 35% under President George W. Bush's Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001. These cuts were extended to 2010.

Supply-side economics were the centerpiece of President Reagan's conservative economic policies, which became so widely discussed that they became intertwined with the notion of the trickle-down theory. The latter is easily lampooned and many have done so. Galbraith coined a comparison repeated by President Lyndon Johnson that likened helping the poor by cutting taxes for the rich to feeding the birds by giving more oats to the horse. As Thomas Sowell and other writers have noted, no credible economist of the past two centuries has put forth an absolute trickle-down theory. (A tax-free and unregulated society would be more in keeping with anarchists or libertarians, not serious economists.) Rather, debate rages over *how much* tax individuals and businesses should pay.

Reagan assumed the presidency after a period of prolonged stagflation and high unemployment. Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker and David Stockman, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, advocated tax cuts as a way to stimulate the economy. Arthur Laffer, a member of Reagan's Economic Advisory Board, developed the "Laffer Curve," a graph that linked federal revenue to the tax rate. Laffer argued that overly high taxes reduced federal revenue just as surely as overly low taxes. This became the centerpiece of the Reagan-Stockman tax cuts, and the improvement of the economy after 1983 seemed to confirm that supply-side principles worked. For many conservatives supply-side economics and a modified belief in the trickle-down theory—sometimes expressed simply as "a rising tide lifts all boats"—became an article of faith. Its central tenet—that the rich (not government) will create opportunities for the poor and the middle class—continues to guide calls for further tax cuts.

Trickle-down and supply-side critics charge that the supposed benefits of tax cuts are illusory, a position that even David Stockman came to endorse. Many of the growth claims made for supply-side economics compare Reagan-era data to that of the worst years of the late-1970s recession, not to periods of economic expansion. When Reagan took office in January 1981, **unemployment** stood at 7.5 percent. It rose to 10.8 percent in November of 1983, and then steadily declined to 6.6 percent

when he left office in January 1987. At best, the effects of trickle-down precepts were modest for those at the bottom, but even the slight decline in unemployment compares unfavorably with an unemployment rate of just 4.9 percent in December 1973, before the recession began, or the rate of 4.2 percent in January 2001, when President Clinton left office after *raising* the top income-tax bracket.

There is little objective evidence that trickle-down or supply-side economics have substantial benefits for any but top income earners. In post–World War II society the highest rates of economic growth correspond to periods in which the top tax bracket was 91 percent. Nor is there conclusive evidence that tax cuts lead to income or wage increases. By contrast, evidence is strong that most new job creation took place among **small businesses**, not the top corporate ranks that raked in the biggest tax savings. There is little dispute that those at the bottom do not receive much direct benefit from tax cuts. Under current law, for example, those earning between \$20,000 and \$30,000 will save an average of \$10 per year on federal income taxes, whereas those earning over \$1 million will save approximately \$42,700. This has led the harshest opponents of supply-side principles to charge that the **War on Poverty** has been abandoned in favor of a war on the poor.

Suggested Reading

Mehrun Etebari, "Trickle-Down Economics: Four Reasons Why It Just Doesn't Work" (http://www.faireconomy.org/research/TrickleDown.html); Clara Jefery, "Poor Losers: How the Poor Get Dinged at Every Turn," *Mother Jones* (July/August 2006), pp. 20–21; Thomas Sowell, *Basic Economics: A Citizen's Guide to the Economy*, 2003; Jude Wanniski, *The Way the World Works*, 1989.

TROPHY WIVES

ROBERT E. WEIR

Trophy wife is a term of derision that refers to the practice of older, powerful men marrying younger women for the glamour they exude. These marriages are often viewed as acts of egoism and **conspicuous consumption** on the part of **status**-seeking males of the **upper class** and upper **middle class**.

Trophy wives play the role of hostess for rich men and are charged with reflecting the power of their husbands. Sometimes derided as "eye candy," these women are seen at the arm of their spouses at fundraisers, parties, and public functions. Some are former fashion models or actresses and/or have had their appearance surgically enhanced, especially their breasts. It is not uncommon for a trophy wife to have begun her liaison with her husband as a mistress. Needless to say, trophy wife marriages raise the ire of feminists, who accuse rich men of objectifying women. Social critics and reformers often point to the trophy wife phenomenon as another example of the excesses in American life, especially among powerful **CEO**s and politicians. Those with trophy lives often live opulent lifestyles that highlight the vast gap between rich and poor in American society.

Business mogul **Donald Trump** is often cited as one who collects trophy wives. Trump was born in 1946, and his first wife was a former Moravian fashion model Ivana Zelnickova, who was just three years his junior. They were married in 1977 and divorced in 1992, after having three children together. Before the divorce Trump was involved with Marla Maples, a former actress. They married in 1993, when Trump was 47 and Maples just 30. They had one child together before divorcing in 1999. In 2005 the 59-year-old Trump married a third time. His bride was Slovenian supermodel Melania Knauss, known for her racy photos in *GQ*; Knauss was just 31.

Trophy wives have also been fodder for novelists wishing to portray the ruling classes as corrupt and decadent.

Suggested Reading

Kelly Lange, Trophy Wife, 1996; Tom Wolfe, A Man in Full, 1999.

TROTSKYISTS

GREG BROWN

Trotskyists are adherents to the **Marxist** theory of permanent revolution as developed by Soviet leader Leon Trotsky. Trotskyists were considered to be on the left of the Marxist political spectrum during the twentieth century—they supported democratic rights in the USSR, opposed the political deals with the imperialist powers, and advocated a spreading of the revolution throughout Europe and the East. After Trotsky's murder in 1940, Trotskyism became a generic term and catchall phrase for various Marxist revolutionary doctrines that opposed Stalin's form of state **communism**. Rival communist and social democratic theorists also used the term to critically denote any of various political currents claiming a tradition of Marxist opposition to both Stalinism and **capitalism**.

Trotsky maintained that a vanguard party of activists was necessary to drive **proletarian** uprisings and that a Marxist revolution in one country depends on revolutions in other countries because **globalization** and the laws of the world market drive national economic development. In particular, Trotsky believed that a new socialist state would not be able to hold out against the pressures of a hostile capitalist world unless socialist revolutions quickly took hold in other countries as well. This theory was accepted by Lenin and the Bolshevik party and guided their conception of the Russian Revolution as part of the world revolution. However, Trotsky's prescription for communist success put him at odds with Joseph Stalin's "**socialism** in one country" model and resulted in Trotsky's exile from the USSR in 1929.

When Trotsky lost his struggle against Stalin, small bands of followers rose to support his cause from within Western nations. These Trotskyists continued to attack Stalin's bureaucracy as a degenerate system, anti-Leninist, and a "Bonapartist" dictatorship. The largest group of Trotsky's supporters emerged in America, though even this number never grew to more than a couple of thousand firm supporters.

Based on a complex mix of values and theories, committed Trotskyists in the United States concentrated their efforts in the 1930s and 1940s on organizing at the local level for unionization, racial integration, and basic civil rights. However, their constantly changing stance on both domestic and foreign policy questions undercut their efforts to gain mass appeal and created tensions with other left-wing activists. For example, Trotskyist criticism of **Franklin D. Roosevelt** and of the **New Deal** alienated the established unions in the **labor movement** and egalitarians who supported Roosevelt.

Trotskyist chaos symbolized the failed communist effort in the United States during a time of perceived opportunity for the American Left—the **Great Depression**, and the history of Trotskyism is a record of struggles over doctrines, contentious internecine clashes, and conflicting ambitions. Trotskyists formed the Communist League of America in opposition to the **Communist Party** when it was clear they could not "purify" it from within. When that effort was abandoned in 1934, Trotsky's American disciples attempted to fuse with other likeminded socialist groups, such as the American Workers Party, eventually evolving into the **Socialist Party** of America. But by 1934 Trotskyists provoked their own expulsion from the Socialist Party and created their own Socialist Workers Party (SWP).

The same sectarianism that marked efforts at fusion poisoned the atmosphere of the new SWP, and several of the most dynamic members of the group were forced out by Trotsky's chief strategists who insisted on the purge in the interest of doctrinal purity and his own position of power. Trotskyism persists to this day, though it plays only a minor role in most anti-war and anti-globalization demonstrations in the United States and abroad.

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George Breitman et al., *Trotskyism in the United States: Historical Essays & Reconsiderations*, 1996; James P. Cannon, *The History of American Trotskyism*, 1995; Constance Ashton Meyers, *The Prophet's Army: Trotskyists in America*, 1928–1941, 1977.

Trump, Donald (June 14, 1942–)

ROBERT E. WEIR

Donald John Trump is an eccentric billionaire, venture **capitalist**, popular culture icon, and **chief executive officer**. Trump is neither America's richest individual nor its most savvy businessman, but his freewheeling, publicity-driven lifestyle and persona are an example of how traditional notions of the American **upper class** have been altered in recent years.

Like many rich individuals, Trump was born into **wealth**. He was born in New York City, one of the four children of Fred and Mary (MacLeod) Trump. Trump's German **immigrant** grandfather, Friederich, amassed a fortune operating a saloon and brothel during the Klondike gold rush. Trump's father was a real estate broker and developer who took advantage of **New Deal** housing programs and founded

the Trump Organization. Trump briefly attended a military academy as a youth, began his college career at Fordham, and transferred to The **Wharton School** of Finance at the University of Pennsylvania, from which he obtained a BA in economics in 1968. He returned to New York and began working in his father's firm.

Fred Trump specialized in middleclass rental properties, but Donald branched into hotels, luxury apartments, and business real estate. His first major project was to transform the Commodore Hotel into the Grand Hyatt, which opened in 1980. Three years later he opened the first of numerous Trump Towers, this one in New York. He also invested heavily in airlines, casinos, holding companies, and real estate in Palm Beach, Florida, Tampa, and New York. When the economy soured in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Trump was overleveraged. By 1994 he had over \$900 million of personal debt and more than \$3.5 billion worth of business arrearage. Several Trump enterprises went into bankruptcy, but he was able to refinance and restructure his way back to solvency. He also benefited from his father's death in 1999; inheritance increased his liquidity.



Donald Trump. Courtesy of Photofest.

Trump remains heavily involved in real estate and casinos and has expanded his dealings to California, Chicago, the Caribbean, Dubai, Hawaii, Las Vegas, South Korea, and various locations in Florida. He also lends his name to a line of menswear, vodka, a magazine, a mortgage firm, an online travel agency, and even Trump University. Some business critics say that despite a net worth nearing \$3 billion Trump is reckless and that his business acumen is highly overrated. Several of his deals have placed great stress on creditors.

Trump's personal life is even more controversial than his business machinations. He has made himself into one of the most public figures in business history and he is so much in the popular eye that his demeanor, hair style, and bearing are fodder for media commentary and parody. Nicknamed "The Donald" by his first wife, Trump's larger-than-life persona has led legions of detractors to view him as the epitome of excess, boorishness, **conspicuous consumption**, egoism, and amorality. In 1996 he made a bid for the Republican Party's presidential nomination, and then quit the GOP in 1999 to run on the Reform Party ticket in 2000. Neither campaign gained momentum and both spawned jokes at Trump's expense. Trump has also been lampooned for his personal life. He has had three high-profile marriages, each to glamorous women dubbed to be **trophy wives** by critics: Ivana

Zelnickova (1977–92), Marla Maples (1993–99), and Melania Knauss (2005–). He has three children from his first marriage and one each from his second and current marriages.

Trump has played off his image as an overbearing egoist and has made himself into a brand name. Most of his real estate projects bear his name, and he has played himself in various movie cameo roles and on television. In 2004 NBC Television began airing *The Apprentice*, a reality show on which Trump is both host and executive producer. Contestants vie to be selected as high-salaried managers in Trump holdings, with Trump himself acting as judge and executioner. His verdict "You're fired!" has entered the popular culture lexicon; true to form, Trump has copyrighted the phrase.

To some, Trump is a commercial genius; to others he is a pillar of bad taste and senseless extravagance. For students of social class he is an interesting paradox who, like **Bill Gates**, exemplifies that definitions of the upper class have changed. If Trump had lived during the **Gilded Age**, he would have been considered a member of the upper middle class, as he lacks the breeding or emphasis on character that was essential for upper-class membership. Some scholars have argued that the twentieth century, especially since the **Great Depression**, saw a shift in which possession of wealth became the primary determinant of the upper class. Some have even proposed that terms such as **corporate class** or, simply, "the rich" are more accurate ways of describing the ways that money and **power** operate in contemporary society.

Individuals such as Donald Trump are problematic for the ways in which social scientists derive **class definitions**. His wealth and **income** certainly place him among the elites of American society. They have allowed him to accumulate great **cultural capital**, yet he has not parlayed that into **prestige**. Although many Americans envy Donald Trump's wealth and fame, overall he is viewed as gauche and as more notorious than imitable. He also lacks **authority** in the traditional sense; Trump has great power, but it is coercive in nature rather than rooted in custom or **deference**.

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TUXEDO PARK

ROBERT E. WEIR

Tuxedo Park is an exclusive village thirty-eight miles northwest of Manhattan that was founded in 1886. Like **Newport**, Rhode Island, and the **Hamptons** on Long Island, one of its original intentions was to separate the old-money **upper class** from parvenus and the **nouveau riche** rising from the upper **middle class**. Today

it is still an exclusive community and operates much like a rural **gated community**, though it is now a repository for both upper- and middle-class **elites**.

Tuxedo Park was the brainchild of tobacco magnate Pierre Lorillard, who gained control of some five thousand acres of land in the Ramapo Mountains region of Orange County, New York, via a combination of purchase and poker winnings. He hired a prestigious architect, Bruce Price, and engineer, Ernest Bowditch, to build homes, roads, a clubhouse, a police station, and several dams. Some 1800 imported Italian and Slovakian laborers provided the muscle. Tuxedo Park opened in 1886 and soon some of America's richest and most exclusive families built "cottages" there. The original purpose was that of an exclusive sporting club, but Tuxedo Park quickly became a retreat for the summer social season of balls, coming-out parties, riding, hunting, fishing, and horseracing. Lorillard was also involved in yachting and his success on the international circuit helped Newport develop into a center for the sport.

Some of the finest architects of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries worked in Tuxedo Park, including the firms of Donn Barber, William Morris Hunt, William Lescaze, and McKim, Mead, and White. The upper crust residents included heir William Waldorf Astor, financier George F. Baker, railroad magnate Ogden Mills, ambassador Herbert Claiborne Pell, etiquette doyenne Emily Post, and William Henry Poor, the founder of the Standard & Poor's stock market index. By 1915 there were over 250 homes, various retail shops, three churches, a post office, a library, and a train station serving the village's 3,636 people, many of whom were only summer residents. Tuxedo Park spawned imitators, included the area of Atlanta known as Buckhead, which was built on a former estate. In 1911 the "Tuxedo Park Company" constructed an exclusive community for area bankers, attorneys, and CEOs.

Tuxedo Park, New York, was a place of formality and **style** and was where the eponymous dinner jacket made its American debut. One legend credits Griswold Lorillard for debuting it at the 1886 Autumnal Ball in Tuxedo Park, but others give the credit to another resident, James Brown Potter. He, like many members of the upper class, was a devoted **Europhile**, and he and his wife Cora, a Southerner whose beauty created a stir among the social set, attended an English ball with the Prince of Wales (the future Edward VII). Potter allegedly brought a Homburg jacket back to the United States. When he and several others wore the short jacket to a dinner party at **Delmonico's**, it caused a sensation and was dubbed a "tuxedo." Overall, Tuxedo Park residents did their best to insulate themselves from **social climbers**. Many members of the so-called New York Four Hundred, the city's equivalent of Boston's **Brahmin** class, spent time at Tuxedo Park, and it was said to be so exclusive that Newport and the Hamptons were repositories of its rejects. Also prominent in the area was the **Harriman** family, who donated more than 10,000 acres to what eventually became Bear Mountain Harriman State Park.

Like many opulent elite playgrounds, however, Tuxedo Park was devastated by the **Great Depression**. Old money proved even more vulnerable than new money at a time in which rents, real estate, and investments plunged in value and taxes on the rich rose dramatically during the **New Deal**. Many homes were abandoned and several were torched for insurance gain. By World War II, parts of Tuxedo Park were run-down and empty.

In 1952 Tuxedo Park became an incorporated village containing over 2,000 acres and over 300 houses. As in society as a whole, formal covenants regarding generalized wealth fell away, but it is still an extremely exclusive address. The 2000 census counted 3,334 residents, of whom nearly 93 percent were white. The median income of \$70,417 is nearly 60 percent higher than the national average. Real estate listings routinely showcase mansions with eight-figure price tags; in 2005 William Poor's former estate—complete with fountains, carved staircases, paneled halls, and marble fireplaces—was listed for \$9,980,000.

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Two Americas

PAT REEVE

Two Americas is a phrase that refers to the idea that contemporary American society is deeply divided between those who prosper and those who struggle. It was a touchstone theme for Senator John Edwards in 2004 as he campaigned first for the Democratic presidential nomination and then as Senator John Kerry's vice presidential running mate. Edwards invoked the image of two Americas, one for "the privileged and the wealthy," and another for "those who live paycheck to paycheck." According to Edwards, divisions between the haves and have-nots included structural inequities in **life chances**, such as educational opportunities, health care, and **income**.

In August 2005 **Hurricane Katrina** slammed into the U.S. Gulf Coast and exposed the pervasiveness of **poverty** among Louisianans. Edwards lamented that the spectacle of impoverishment was a "harsher example of two Americas" than he imagined in his 2004 stump speeches. Citing increases in poverty among American workers, Edwards contended that national leaders had "missed opportunities" to safeguard the economic security of the citizenry. The hurricane was, Edwards concluded, an "ugly and horrifying wake-up call for America."

Decades earlier, **Michael Harrington** sparked a comparable national debate by depicting U.S. rural and urban poor in his landmark study, *The Other America* (1962). Harrington's polemic, together with the burgeoning civil rights movement, compelled President John F. Kennedy and Congress to combat the origins of economic inequality. It was President Lyndon B. Johnson, who in his 1964 State of the Union address defined the campaign as an "unconditional **War on Poverty** in America." Johnson's **Great Society** programs included antipoverty and civil rights initiatives aimed at promoting individual and community advancement. With these programs came expansion of the federal government. The **Economic Opportunity Act** (1964) established programs such as **Head Start** and Upward Bound, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 buttressed poor Americans' civic status. Commenta-

tors on the left and right still debate the legacy of the War on Poverty for poor Americans, their communities, and the operations of the state and federal governments.

John Edwards's depiction of two Americas has not yet elicited the concerted response to poverty produced by Harrington's call to conscience. Yet Edwards has created the conditions for political action by alerting America to the slippage of U.S. workers into poverty. Recent census data shows that there are 35 million impoverished Americans. Today one in four U.S. workers, many of them full-time workers, earn less than \$8.40 an hour. Women workers are at greater risk of poverty than their male counterparts. In April 2004 the Institute for Women's Policy Research (IWPR) borrowed from Edwards to highlight "two American economies," one for male workers and another for women, who earned more than 25 percent less than men.

Whereas conservatives such as Charles A. Murray attribute poverty to deficiencies of individual character and community dysfunction, liberals explain the impoverishment of working people as the result of structural defects in the U.S. economy. Chief among these are occupational, gender, and race segregation, as well as the outsourcing overseas of America's high-wage jobs. John Edwards and other likeminded policymakers question whether the nation has the political will to tackle the growing problem of social and economic inequality. Without action, Edwards writes, U.S. workers will lose "the opportunity to live the American dream."

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UNDERCLASS

LAURA HERNÁNDEZ-EHRISMAN

Underclass is a term for a specific stratum of the **lower class**. Many attribute the origins of the term to Karl **Marx** and Friedrich Engel's idea of the "lumpenproletariat," defined in *The German Ideology* (1845). This term was expanded upon in Marx's later work, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (1852), where he referred to this class as the "refuse of all classes." Marx had nothing positive to say about lumpenproletarians, referring to them as counter-revolutionary and unproductive elements of society. For contemporary sociologists, this often controversial term has come to represent those who live at the margins of society, people such as the **homeless** and the chronically **unemployed**. They are not productive in the Marxist sense but are dependent upon social services for their daily existence.

Writings about the underclass have frequently combined a concern with **poverty** and unemployment with a concern for moral and social decay. For example, English philosopher Thomas Malthus described the problems of early nineteenth-century lower classes as a problem of over-population and irresponsibility, encouraged lower classes not to breed, and advocated they be taught **self-reliance**. Likewise, during the rise of the **eugenics** movement in the early twentieth century, poverty was seen as a moral problem that could lead to "race suicide." Eugenicists called for restrictions on the population of "inferior" classes.

However, the term *underclass* itself did not become popular until the late 1960s, when some urban analysts began to focus on a growing population of low-income families whose rates of joblessness, welfare dependency, out-of-wedlock births, and serious crime grew through the 1970s and early 1980s. These changes in behavior were markedly different from the general population's and disproportionately affected African Americans and other minorities in **inner cities**.

Conservatives and liberals read these social trends differently. Charles Murray, an American policy writer, researcher, and leading member of the American Enterprise Institute, became most well known for his claims that the rise of female-headed **single-parent families** was a central cause for the underclass and that the lack of male role models encourages crime and drug abuse. He argues that an overly generous welfare system has created the rise in a "counterculture" that devalues work and encourages a "dependency-culture." Murray deplores this as a cycle of unemployment, **crime**, and dependency. In response, Murray calls for taking away welfare benefits.

One of Murray's most vocal critics is **William Julius Wilson**. In contrast to Murray's cultural arguments about poverty, Wilson takes a structuralist approach and sees the rise of the underclass as a problem generated by overall societal changes. Wilson argues that the increase in urban poverty has not been caused by either contemporary racism or a particular value system. Rather it has been the result of economic shifts as manufacturing jobs have been replaced by a decentralized service sector economy. These changes have led to greater economic instability, and fewer families have been able to reverse this cycle of poverty. Instead of cutting welfare benefits, Wilson recommends more job-training programs and improved child-care programs.

Wilson and other sociologists have questioned the usefulness of the term *under-class*. Several liberal writers have seen the term as destructive and misleading, lumping together many different people and problems. They see the term as pejorative and have abandoned it. Wilson himself tried to reformulate it in terms of the failures of the government to create true equality, and he refined the term to refer to the particular groups that were left behind when the African American middle class left inner city neighborhoods. He wanted to straightforwardly address the aberrant behaviors of the ghetto; however, he eventually abandoned the term himself in favor of the term "ghetto poor."

Although the usefulness of the term itself is highly contested, the self-destructive behaviors that initiated the debate continue. Murray's work was rejected by many sociologists but embraced by many policymakers in the **Ronald Reagan** administration. The Urban Institute, a nonpartisan research institution, initiated the Urban Underclass Project in 1982 in order to track the policy changes during and immediately after the Reagan presidency. Whereas the research of the institute demonstrated the government's goals of shrinking government size, cutting entitlements, reducing taxes, and deregulation, the institute also demonstrated slow growth in family incomes, the need for child-care reform, and the persistence of poverty.

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UNDEREMPLOYMENT

ROBERT E. WEIR

Underemployment refers to individuals who are involuntarily working in jobs below their skill levels or who desire full-time employment but cannot attain it. The term is also used by economists to mean that **unemployment** rates have risen beyond those deemed optimal for an economy to function well. It can also refer to periods of reduced productivity. A business might, for example, maintain its entire workforce during a slack period so that it can respond immediately when demand for its products or services increases.

In terms of social class, the most pertinent definitions involve individuals working below their training and those unable to secure full-time work. In a well-run capitalist economy, unemployment levels are low, and work, specialized training, and education are paths to upward mobility. Underemployment both frustrates the individual and undermines the American dream. Underemployment appears to be a growing problem in the United States, even among highly trained professionals. Academia, for example, once offered secure and prestigious jobs for those obtaining doctorates. Now, in many fields, only one-third of new faculty hires go to full-time, tenure-track professors. Many would-be professors involuntarily find themselves working as low-wage adjuncts, usually without fringe benefits or job security.

It is not only educators who suffer from this phenomenon. Companies often cite the competitive pressures of **globalization** as a cause for streamlining their operations and cutting labor costs. Many of the underemployed are former professionals who lose their jobs during restructuring and find themselves working in retail or service sector jobs to pay their bills. This has been especially acute in high-tech industries following the late 1990s **dot-com** slump. Many former programmers, information-technology experts, designers, and Internet entrepreneurs found themselves unemployed and unlikely to find new jobs within their fields of expertise. To survive, they became underemployed. This practice has become so common in the twenty-first century that *CNN/Money* staff writer Leslie Haggin Geary christened such individuals "Duppies": depressed urban professionals forced to abandon their **Yuppie** lifestyles.

Underemployment also followed in the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C. Normal business routines, especially in the transportation and travel industries, were so disrupted that some firms went bankrupt and many others downsized. Once again, a ripple effect took place, with professionals, mid-level managers, office staff, and skilled workers in many businesses being laid off. With too many skilled people chasing too few jobs, some individuals took jobs beneath their levels of training.

The impact of underemployment reaches far beyond the individual level. Those forced to economize consume less, which impacts the entire economy. There is also a rise in psychological maladies, especially among younger workers who tend to cope less well with loss of **prestige**, carry more long-term debt, and have less experience making adaptations to their lifestyles. Underemployment also introduces inefficiencies into the economy in the forms of reduced capacity, disinterested

workers, and structural strains on the social system. Concerning the latter, displaced or frustrated workers are more likely to lack medical insurance; many doctors and hospitals report a surge in the number of indigent patients they treat. Moreover, underemployed workers have fewer savings or pension plans, thereby heightening the likelihood they will further burden social services in the future.

Given the imprecision by which unemployment is measured in the United States it is hardly surprising that underemployment figures are hard to discern. In 2003 the Department of Labor estimated that 4.8 million Americans were unemployed, approximately 3 percent of the workforce. This figure is assuredly too low as it does not take into account those who have taken *any* full-time job and, hence, file no official reports on their employment status. Nor does it take into account contingency workers who have taken temporary jobs or the underground employment of those who have dropped out of the official economy and work in informal "off-the-books" jobs.

The short-term prognosis is that underemployment will become an even bigger problem in the future as new technology, corporate mergers, deeper immersion into the global economy, and pressure to reduce labor costs force more workers from their chosen careers. Those social critics who argue that the **middle class** is shrinking often use underemployment to bolster their claims.

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UNDESERVING POOR

ROBERT E. WEIR

According to some, the undeserving poor are individuals responsible for their own poverty and unworthy of public assistance. The gradations of this belief run the gamut from those who believe that everyone who is poor is complicit in that condition to those who narrowly define the undeserving. In the United States there is a rough consensus that able-bodied individuals without dependents should not be public charges. Public opinion polls also show great support for restricting (or denying) benefits to those who engage in antisocial behaviors such as alcoholism, drug addiction, criminal behavior, and sexual promiscuity.

Identifying the undeserving poor is invariably tied to the ways in which Americans have historically viewed poverty, theories of what causes it, the politics involved in addressing poverty, and perceptions of the overall healthiness of the American economy. Scholars such as Herbert Gans and Michael Katz note that the idea that some poor are undeserving has been around since at least the fourteenth century and that England's 1848 Poor Law used the term "undeserving poor." Judith Shklar adds that Americans in the Colonial and early Republican periods linked citizenship with self-sufficiency and did not accord the poor full social worth.

Scholars nonetheless argue that it was not until the **Industrial Revolution** that, to use Katz's terminology, poverty was defined in "moral terms." This became quite apparent during the **Gilded Age**, when many members of the **upper class** and **middle class** equated poverty with defective individuals. Those adhering to **Social Darwinism** even fused new biological studies from Thomas Malthus and Charles Darwin with how one performed (or failed to perform) within the social and economic structure. It was not until the late nineteenth century that thinkers began to articulate a clear notion that social structures could be separated from individual character.

Most scholars agree, however, that the very idea of "social problems" often runs afoul of popularly held ideals of American **individualism**. The belief in **self-reliance** that permeates the novels of **Horatio Alger** is deeply embedded in the American psyche; hence many Americans continue to view poverty in psychological or psychoanalytic terms rather than sociologically or economically. A 1989 study conducted by Albert Simkus and Peter Robert comparing American attitudes on poverty with those of eight other nations suggests that Americans are more prone to view poverty harshly. For example, just 17.6 percent of Americans supported the idea of a **guaranteed income**, an idea favored by more than twice as many Australians—the next least accepting nation—and 77.8 percent of Hungarians. Likewise, just 28.3 percent of Americans felt the government should play a role in narrowing the gap between rich and poor.

Numerous scholars have weighed in on the causes of poverty and some of their work has had ramifications for the debate over the undeserving poor (usually by accident rather than by design). The anthropologist Oscar Lewis coined the phrase culture of poverty in a 1961 study to describe the ways in which dysfunctional socioeconomic systems perpetuate poverty across generations. It has been seized some would say hijacked—by political conservatives such as Charles Murray who wish to argue that government "handouts" in the form of welfare destroy incentive, make individuals dependent upon the government, and decrease their likelihood of self-reliance. They further argue that working Americans should not have to pay taxes to subsidize such programs. Similarly, the descriptive sociological term underclass to describe the persistence of poverty among some groups has been used to argue that the welfare system has failed. To evoke Lawrence Mead, welfare prepares recipients to be dependent, not to be integrated into society. Katz argues that the belief that many welfare recipients are lazy and abuse the system has gained credence since the 1970s. This notion corresponds with both a decline in the American economy and purposeful political mythmaking. President Ronald Reagan often told vague anecdotes about welfare cheats, and policymakers within his administration generally supported theories of trickle-down economics that linked tax cuts for the wealthy with the creation of jobs for the poor.

It is readily apparent that discussions of the deserving and undeserving poor have become inextricably linked to politics. As Katz puts it, it is a debate between the "liberal **War on Poverty** and the conservative war on welfare." There can be little doubt that conservatives view the **New Deal** programs of the 1930s and those of the **Great Society** in the 1960s with great suspicion. The New Deal laid the foundations of the modern welfare system in the 1935 **Social Security** Act, and the presidencies of John F. **Kennedy** and Lyndon B. Johnson (1961–69) saw a tremendous expansion of

antipoverty initiatives, which supporters claim narrowed the gap between rich and poor and which critics charge were wasteful, inefficient, and inappropriate forms of social engineering.

The liberal response to the conservative critique has been withering. Gans, Richard Cloward, Frances Fox Piven, and William Ryan note that attempts to divide the poor into deserving and undeserving categories and to view poverty as pathology is "blaming the victim." Gans notes that the very terms used—such as undeserving, underclass, one-parent families, and welfare recipient—are elitist and are potentially damaging labels. The terms are reductionist in that they strip the humanity from those to whom they are applied and privilege the values of those using them. William Julius Wilson charges that they are also often masks to disguise racism without directly referencing race. Wilson argues that these terms are used to assert white superiority and to marginalize groups not seen as worthy or beneficial to society. Marxist and conflict theorists add that it is class itself that is being ignored. By viewing the poor as undeserving or damaged, the very structure of the economy and the hierarchy it creates is effectively hidden from analytical view. Still other studies suggest that attacks on the undeserving poor—especially when applied to criminals, African Americans, and Latinos—are cloaked manifestations of the fear felt by middle-class whites living in suburbia as they react to urban culture and lifestyles of which they disapprove.

The debate over the undeserving poor is not likely to abate in the near future. In 1996 President Bill Clinton signed into law the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, popularly known as "welfare reform." It eliminated the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program and replaced it with Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF). As the name suggests, TANF is designed to limit the amount of time any individual or family can receive benefits and—to use popular parlance—replace welfare with workfare. TANF is a direct outgrowth of debates over the undeserving poor, though it is highly doubtful it will be the final word on the subject.

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UNEMPLOYMENT

ROBERT E. WEIR

Unemployment is the state of being jobless. This stark definition obscures the complexity and social impact of unemployment; unemployment and low **wages** are perhaps the major engines driving the American social class system.

There are numerous types of unemployment. *Cyclical unemployment* occurs when the demand for labor drops. It is related to the gross national product (GNP) and

exists in inverse relationship to it. In simplest terms, when the GNP drops, unemployment rises. *Structural unemployment* occurs because of changes in the overall economy that result in a decline in certain types of work. These could be the result of changing technology that makes existing goods obsolete, the introduction of mechanization that displaces labor, declining demand for a particular product, or deepseated economic forces such as **deindustrialization** or unfavorable trade conditions. The demand for numerous types of labor has declined since the 1970s. For example, typists are less in demand now that computers and word processing programs are ubiquitous. Likewise, many **blue collar** industrial jobs have disappeared. Robotic welding machines have replaced human welders on automobile assembly lines; textile factories have relocated outside of the United States; and industries such as steel, rubber, and electronics have lost ground to foreign competitors. According to the U.S. Department of Labor, more than 9.4 million workers were displaced in the period between 1979 and 1990 because of a decline in manufacturing.

Another common form of joblessness is *frictional unemployment*, a temporary state that occurs when an individual has left one job and is looking for another. Another type is *seasonal unemployment*, which occurs in jobs whose demand ebbs and flows at certain points in the calendar. Agricultural work, for example, peaks during planting and harvest seasons, but has low demand during the winter; likewise, according to the National Retail Federation, 27 percent of all retail sales take place in the four-week period between Thanksgiving and Christmas. Other types of joblessness include *voluntary unemployment*, in which an individual chooses not to work, and *bidden unemployment*, which consists of those who have grown discouraged or who have not reported to any official agency to be counted. Many of those who have stopped looking for work are among the *chronically unemployed*, those individuals who are unable to maintain steady employment even when the GNP is healthy and demand for labor is high.

Voluntary and hidden unemployment—especially the latter—underscore the basic unreliability of "official" unemployment figures. Actual unemployment is always higher than stated rates. In 1933, for instance, official unemployment was 24.9 percent during the cruelest year of the **Great Depression**. Historians and economists looking inside the numbers argue that this number understates reality and that closer to 35 percent of workers suffered some sort of economic dislocation during the year. In more recent years, many analysts argue that the true unemployment rate is approximately double the official rate.

Marxist scholars argue that unemployment is a built-in structural flaw of capitalism. Its very competitive nature ensures there will be boom periods and corresponding downswings in the economy. Moreover, since capitalism's goal is to maximize profits for those who own the means of production, employers will seek to increase profits by manipulating variables within their control, one of which is labor. Unemployment serves the interests of capital as it creates a reserve labor pool. Although most modern capitalists would blanch at validating Marx, in moments of candor they might admit that 100 percent employment is undesirable. A call for full employment is seductive political rhetoric but unsound business practice within a capitalist economy. Many investors and economists speak of an "ideal" or "natural" unemployment rate of between 4 and 6 percent. Such a rate, they argue, stabilizes wages and workforces. If unemployment drops below 4 percent,

labor becomes a seller's market, wages rise, and inflationary pressure mounts. Conversely, an unemployment rate of over 6 percent is usually accompanied by a steep drop in the GNP, making it harder to find a market for goods and services. Okun's Law, a formulation developed by economist Arthur Okun in 1962, postulates that for every 1 percent rise in unemployment above its "natural" level, there is a "GNP gap" of approximately 2.5 percent in lost productivity.

What to do about overly high unemployment has sparked debate that breaks down, roughly, between demand-side and supply-side economists (see trickledown theory). Demand-siders often take their cue from economists such as John Maynard Keynes and John Kenneth Galbraith and point to New Deal and Great Society programs as their models. Government takes an active role in job creation and in putting money into the hands of workers in the theory that spending on jobs and people creates consumers who will, in turn, stimulate long-term demand. Supply-siders, such as George Gilder, Milton Friedman, and many economists associated with the Chicago School of Economics stress monetary policy instead, and quite a few argue that tax cuts and deregulation relieve the pressure on business and give them incentive to invest and create new jobs.

The economic debates over unemployment often overlook the human cost. The 1935 Social Security Act set up the mechanisms by which unemployment compensation is given, but the U.S. system is of limited duration and is parsimonious compared to other **democracies**. Work is also tied to personal identity in strong ways within the United States. Several studies sustain work done by social psychologists D. D. and B. M. Braginsky in 1975 that showed that a 1% rise in unemployment sustained for one year led to a 4.3% rise in mental hospital admissions for men (2.3%) for women), a 4.1% rise in suicide attempts, and a 5.7% jump in the murder rate. Other studies link unemployment to feelings of shame, lost self-esteem, rising divorce rates, upswings in the crime rate, and an increase in domestic violence. Overall health also declines, often because displaced workers lose health insurance and cannot afford to seek preventive care. Research also suggests that men as a group deal with unemployment less successfully than women. The historical lens magnifies these assertions. Official unemployment rose to 8.5% in 1975, its highest level since the 1930s, and peaked at 9% in 1982. This was a period of great social stress within the United States; levels of violence and social stress exceeded that of the late 1960s, though the latter are (incorrectly) stereotyped as being more chaotic.

Unemployment figures and debates also frequently sidestep social factors such as **race**, ethnicity, and age. In April 2006 official unemployment stood at 4.7%. When this figure is broken down, however, the rate is just over 4% for Caucasians, 5.4% for **Hispanics and Latinos**, and 9.4% for African Americans. The unemployment rate for teens was 15.5%, a troubling figure as this is also a crime-prone group in American society. Moreover, the official rate tells one very little about the daily struggles of 7.1 million Americans who are monetarily challenged in a society where aspirations, success, and social ranking rest on a foundation of money.

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Unskilled Labor

ROBERT E. WEIR

Unskilled labor is a demeaning term that refers to work that requires little dexterity or thought to accomplish. Because little education, training, or ability is required for such jobs, they have historically been among the lowest paid, although they have often been among the most physically exhausting.

In Colonial society agrarian ideals dominated, and until the **Industrial Revolution**, few made distinctions between skilled and unskilled labor, the latter often being folded into apprenticeship programs in which a novice performed jobs not directly related to product finishing as a prelude to learning a particular craft. A mason's apprentice, for example, might be assigned simple tasks like mixing cement or hauling it from place to place. Wage-earning itself was still viewed as temporary, the goal being either to secure a farm or to master a craft and operate one's own shop.

Mechanization and the factory system altered attitudes toward both wages and skill. In the antebellum period, machines began to displace skilled craft workers in a variety of industries, especially cigar making, shoes, and textiles. Even the rudimentary and temperamental machines of the early industrial period required considerably less skill to operate than fashioning similar articles by hand. As industrialization accelerated after the Civil War, even more skilled jobs fell prey to mechanization. In fact, threats to the centrality of artisanal labor were among the factors that led to the formation of the **American Federation of Labor** (AFL) in 1886. In contrast to the **Knights of Labor**, whose ranks were open to nearly all, the AFL organized only skilled workers. As late as the 1930s, some AFL leaders still referred to unskilled workers as the "garbage" of the labor movement.

The negative image of unskilled workers is the product of three major historical forces. First, skilled workers made significantly more money than factory operatives, even in the same industry. A tool-and-die maker, for example, crafted handmade parts and earned far more than floor workers in steel plants. Some top-level craft workers even made more money than professionals in the lower-middle class, a reality that has prompted some scholars to postulate the existence of an "aristocracy of labor" whose values and material comfort levels were more akin to the middle class than to the rest of the **working class**. Skilled artisans were often job-conscious and viewed their work as endowed with more **prestige** than work requiring less ability.

Second, the perfection of assembly-line techniques led to an overall homogenization of labor and a further deskilling of many tasks. Henry Ford did not invent the concept, but his continuous-flow assembly lines became the norm by the 1920s. By 1926 a Ford car required over 7,700 separate operations to complete, but more than 75 percent of the jobs in Ford factories required less than a week's training to learn. Workers stood behind moving lines that brought parts to them, each laborer



Men applying for work at the office of the Texas State Employment Service, Corpus Christi, Texas. In Corpus Christi during this time, there was a surplus of unskilled labor. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

repetitively completing the same task for his entire shift. With machines setting the pace of work, the autonomy of craft workers was further degraded.

The third force impacting workers was the rise of scientific management. The most famous "efficiency expert," as they came to be called, was Frederick Winslow Taylor, whose 1911 book served as a manual for employers seeking to maximize production. That task was accomplished largely by placing all decision-making under the authority of supervisors who redesigned work stations, instructed workers in the "proper" way of accomplishing their tasks, and used incentive pay and bonuses to reinforce top-down work regimens. The worker's role was reduced to that of an automaton, whether doing something complex such as wiring auto engines or performing brute strength tasks such as unloading freight.

As concept and reality, much was wrong with the notion of unskilled labor. First, there are very few jobs that require no skill whatsoever to accomplish, and thus the very label is as inaccurate as it is demeaning. Jobs can be routine, yet still require attentiveness, dexterity, and skill, as many a food service worker or longshoreman would attest. Many scholars prefer terms such as "semi-skilled" or "manual labor." Second, factory production made the term "skilled labor" equally suspect. By the 1930s many AFL craft unions were convenient fictions rather than an accurate description of what workers were actually doing. The AFL subdivided auto workers into various jobs. For example, those stuffing wires into dashboards were dubbed "electricians," those inserting windshields became "glassworkers," and those wielding torches became "welders." During the 1930s the **Congress of Industrial Organizations** jettisoned such distinctions; its industrial union model identified workers with the product rather than a single job.

More serious still was the fact that most workers simply refused to behave as robots. Both the assembly line and scientific management proved hard to implement as pure models. Rather than blithely accept management decisions, many workers operated according to stints, that is, worker-defined notions of the proper pace of work. Workers who violated stints often suffered the disapproval of their peers. Workers also systematically withheld efficiency, stubbornly guarded production secrets from management, and stood ready to take job actions ranging from sabotage to **strikes** if management pushed too hard. As **Marxists** had long predicted, degraded work also led to **alienation**, and many manufacturers modified work to ameliorate discontent and attempt to improve morale and quality. From the 1960s on, robots and computers began doing some of the most unpleasant production jobs.

The decline of unskilled work is neither complete nor an entirely positive development. Many jobs still have little variety, as evidenced by soaring rates of repetitive strain injury and carpel tunnel syndrome, and polls show that worker dissatisfaction is highest in jobs that discourage workers from making independent decisions. Some have also argued that the contemporary job market contains just as many nonprestigious semi- and unskilled jobs as that of the early twentieth century, the primary difference being that they have shifted from **blue-collar** labor to service sector jobs such as retailing, food service, and human services. There is also disturbing evidence that workers of all sorts are often treated as mere cogs and are assigned dangerous tasks; 76 percent of the more than 6,000 yearly workplace deaths befall members of the working class. New immigrants and African Americans shoulder a disproportionate number of work-related injury and death, suggesting that physically challenging and dangerous jobs now have racial and ethnic implications as well as class bias.

A final social problem that should be noted is that the American economy has not yet found a way to gracefully replace workers whose lack of education, mental acuity, or specialized training makes them unsuitable for the emerging labor market.

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UPPER CLASS

ROBERT E. WEIR

The upper class refers to those whose access to **wealth**, **power**, and **prestige** place them at the very top of the American **social stratification** scale. The upper class is numerically small—usually estimated at around 3 percent of the population—but it dominates political and economic policies. The upper classes are also noted

for their exclusivity and for their lavish lifestyles. Some scholars use the terms upper class and **elite** interchangeably, whereas others argue that the latter is an even more select subgroup (or "overclass") that commands even greater power and wealth.

Identifying the upper class illustrates some of the difficulties in **defining class** in America. If one were to use **objective methods**, such as income data or dividing the population into quintiles, one quickly derives problematic data. In 2003 the median family income in the United States was just under \$56,000. Using strict income or quintile guidelines, a family whose income exceeded this figure by 20 percent would be classified as upper class. Yet it is clearly absurd to group those whose incomes are \$67,200 with billionaires such as **Bill Gates**, Paul Allen, Warren Buffett, Michael Dell, or the Walton family of **Wal-Mart** fame. Moreover, many members of the upper class derive revenue from sources other than wages, such as investments or ownership of businesses and assets that generate money. Studies of income indicate that even Americans taking in between \$100,000 and \$1,000,000 annually depend on their jobs to generate those sums. Some would argue that the ability to live independently of employment is a marker of true upper-class life.

Social scientists generally use factors in addition to income to identify members of the upper class. **G. William Domhoff** cites numerous factors characteristic of the upper class, among them the following: attending prestigious prep schools and colleges, being listed on the **Social Register**, membership in exclusive clubs, participation in activities routinely associated with **high culture**, opulent lifestyles, and recreational pursuits beyond the means of most individuals, such as dress balls, polo, and **yachting**. **C. Wright Mills** argued that another defining trait was an awareness of and access to social and political power. Others have noted a tendency toward endogamous marriage patterns, as well as family stability rates far in excess of the general populace.

Again, however, income complicates the portrait of the upper class. **Nouveau riche** families may command wealth far greater than that of older upper-class families. Bill Gates, for example, is reputed to be the world's wealthiest individual and his fortune dwarfs that of such fabled families as the **Astors**, **Rockefellers**, or **Vanderbilts**. Aside from wealth, however, Gates conforms to very few upper class criteria. For reasons such as this, scholars generally divide the upper class into upper upper and lower upper categories. Only those whose pedigree is several generations long and whose families enjoy great prestige are considered to be in the top echelon; nouveau riches such as Gates are relegated to the lower upper class.

This points to a peculiarity of the American class system. Since the United States lacks a hereditary aristocracy, upper-class membership is more fluid than it has been in Europe and Asia. In Colonial America, the upper class retained links to British aristocracy. The **American Revolution** severed such ties, and the new upper class based itself in such things as land ownership, merchant activity, and investing. The **Industrial Revolution** complicated matters by creating new categories of wealth. Although family names such as Rockefeller and Vanderbilt now command respect, those who founded the family fortunes were often viewed as crass parvenus. The same is true of more recent upper-class families such as the Kennedy and **Bush** clans.

The changing face of the American upper class should not be confused with open **social mobility** however. Relatively few individuals obtain fortunes via hard work; the greatest single source of upper-class wealth is inheritance and the second is return on investments. In addition, there are structural impediments to joining the upper class. As Mills and others have shown, class barriers are erected even at **Ivy League** schools, with membership to highly secretive clubs such as **Skull & Bones** reserved for those with family connections. These, in turn, are often training grounds for the exclusive clubs to which the upper class belong in adult life. Many studies reveal that time-honored and class-honed **social networks** often work as class gatekeepers. Indeed, the upper class tends to be so privacy conscious that Paul Fussell dubbed it the "out-of-sight" class.

What is better known is that the upper classes exert tremendous economic, social, and political influence in America. They control the top industrial, banking, insurance, medical, media, transportation, and utility firms in the nation, make up a disproportionate percentage of ambassadorships and military commanders, and have held over two-thirds of all key presidential Cabinet appointments since the 1930s. They also influence politics through control of Political Action Committees, the hiring of paid lobbyists, and control of **think tanks**. Although political views are not uniform among the upper class, more members tend toward conservativism (at least in economic matters), leading some scholars to argue that upper class wealth exerts undue influence on elections in an age in which expensive media campaigns shape public opinion. The overall power of the upper class led Domhoff to label it, variously, as "the ruling class" and "the governing class;" the term "**corporate class**" is also routinely applied to denote upper-class control of economic decision making.

By nearly any measure the economic clout of the upper classes has increased in recent decades, thereby exacerbating inequality. As recently as 1974, the wealthiest fifth of Americans controlled 41 percent of the nation's total wealth. By 1995, however, the top 1 percent alone controlled 35 percent of the wealth and owned more than the bottom 90 percent combined. Inequality leapt in the 1980s, with the upper classes the beneficiaries of the bulk of tax cuts associated with Reaganomics. President Bill Clinton did little to reverse this and his successor, George W. Bush, added tax breaks of his own that again benefited the upper classes more than the general public. The results of these policies have largely refuted the Kuznets Hypothesis formulated in 1955, which postulated that income and wealth inequality are characteristic of early phases of economic development but decrease over time. Nor have upper-class benefits validated **trickle-down** economic theories; there is, at present, very little correlation between greater wealth and the creation of new economic opportunities for the middle or lower classes. Indeed, some studies assert that the modern upper classes have lost the sense of noblesse oblige that marked their predecessors, upper-class **philanthropy** notwithstanding.

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URBAN RENEWAL

ELVIRA JENSEN-CASADO

Urban renewal is the action conducted by the government or private interests, or a combination of both, of acquiring and redeveloping property mainly for the revitalization of certain urban areas for better **housing**, employment, or social activities, such as parks, libraries, and recreational areas.


The deterioration of many big American cities has to be traced back to **slums** that housed poor European immigrants. These became more acute problems toward the end of the **Gilded Age**, as immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe often lacked the resources of previous immigrant groups. By the beginning of the 1900s, European immigrants were settling into aging housing stocks. At the same time African American migration from the South to the North increased dramatically. African Americans found a strong housing discrimination as they arrived. These two factors initiated racially segregated neighborhoods. Given prevailing prejudices, immigrant and black neighborhoods seldom received adequate improvements.

Urban renewal had its peak from the 1940s through the 1970s, and reshaped the urban landscapes of cities such as New York, Pittsburgh, and Boston. Nevertheless, urban renewal, or urban regeneration, has always been controversial because it often entails the force of law to compel private citizens to sell properties for civic projects. Some of these destabilize or destroy existing communities, as was the case in Boston when an expressway project that began in 1948 bifurcated several neighborhoods and literally isolated them from the rest of the city. In Boston, as elsewhere, such projects more often run roughshod over the **poor** and the **working class**, as these groups cannot marshal the economic resources necessary to oppose the projects. In the past several decades, however, egregious abuses of urban renewal have led to more emphasis on redevelopment, renovation, investment, and large business incentives in existing communities.

Urban renewal is, in large part, an offshoot of the 1934 National Housing Act, which created the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). (Since 1965, the FHA has been part of HUD, the Department of Housing and Urban Development.) The Housing Act sought to improve overall housing conditions, but its main aim was to assist poor residents. It also required that cities place different racial groups in specific neighborhoods. The obvious consequence was a large increase in the racial segregation of American cities.

In 1937 a new Housing Act was passed that created the Low Rent Public Housing program, which was the first public housing program to provide funding to local governments to demolish slums in order to build new public domiciles. The Housing Act of 1949 provided even larger sums for demolition and clearance of urban slums, many of which became highways and industrial zones.

The postwar housing shortage led to even greater involvement by government in reshaping cities. The official federal national goal was "a decent home and suitable living environment" for all Americans, but racial discrimination in housing was still a norm. The 1956 Interstate Highway Act touched off a construction boom, one effect of which was to make living far from urban workplaces a real



Blight often stands side by side with new structures during urban renewal efforts in Cincinnati, Ohio. Note the reflection of the new construction in progress. Photo by Derek Jensen/Wikipedia.

possibility. Thousands of mainly **middle-class** families left the cities, which led to further isolation and decay of many urban neighborhoods. During the next two decades **middle-class** and **upper-class** Americans shifted their focus to the suburbs, sometimes leaving city centers in almost total despair. The removal of affluent residents strained local tax rolls, making it harder to sustain city services or rebuild infrastructure.

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 withdrew racial restrictions, paving the way for racial and class desegregation of some neighborhoods. Barriers were further removed by the Fair Housing Act of 1968. Some of the good intentions of these bills were undermined by continuing white flight to the suburbs, a trend that intensified during urban riots that flared in the mid and late 1960s. Many of these effectively emptied blighted areas, thereby creating unintended urban renewal opportunities. There was an urban renewal component to **Great Society** programs during the mid-1960s and some progress was made. There were, however, boondoggles and failures. High-rise public housing projects designed to replace outmoded housing became veritable warehouses for the poor, places where all manner of social problems festered rather than disappeared. In some places, notably Atlantic City, urban renewal was sometimes used as an attempt to displace African Americans by eliminating their neighborhoods.

In 1968 President Lyndon B. Johnson authorized the Housing and Urban Development Act and implemented his New Community program to address some of the problems associated with urban renewal and to ensure private financing for entrepreneurs who planned and developed new communities. Six years later, in 1974, the Community Development Block Grant program focused on the redevelopment of existing buildings and neighborhoods rather than bulldozing economically depressed neighborhoods.

Today's policies regarding urban renewal are a mixture of selective demolition, commercial development, and tax incentives to revitalize urban neighborhoods. Nonetheless, each neighborhood is different, so each community requires a different revitalization program. Much debate rages among civic leaders, urban planners, residents, and politicians, though all agree that money is lacking to undertake all the projects that are needed. Overall, urban renewal no longer commands the public attention it once did, in part because many cities are disproportionately populated by the economically disadvantaged. Some cities have enjoyed modest success with "urban homesteading," programs that attempt to lure more affluent citizens back to the city through grants and enticements to refurbish dilapidated structures. The overall track record of urban renewal is mixed. It has changed the shape and face of many cities and has brought economic and cultural development—but at a great cost to minorities and low-income communities.

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VACATIONS

ROBERT E. WEIR

Vacations are a hiatus from one's normal work, living, and activity routine. As a mass phenomenon, they are relatively recent; it was not until the 1930s that most Americans could aspire to a vacation and even today a high percentage of Americans do not take them on a regular basis. How much time and money one has, where one vacations, and the activities in which one engages are functions of social class. The very term betrays its class origins; it derives from "vacate," and refers to the practice of wealthy Americans of abandoning their primary residences in the summer in favor of seasonal "cottages." (Europeans generally call such breaks "holidays," a remnant of medieval "holy days.")

Until the nineteenth century, travel and commercial leisure of any sort were rare for all. Although some historians ascribe the dominance of the Protestant work ethic and leisure-averse Puritanism as factors, lack of opportunity, rudimentary transportation, and difficulties in overcoming geographical barriers were bigger factors. Ocean voyages were long, arduous, and dangerous, hence only a handful of elites and diplomats made regular trips to Europe. Trips into the American interior involved encounters with Native Americans and ventures into territories unknown to most whites, hence only a small number of fur traders, adventurers, backwoodsmen, and surveyors went. When Meriwether Lewis and William Clark left St. Charles, Missouri, in 1804, it took their company more than two years to make their way to the Oregon coast and return.

In the decades preceding the Civil War, carriage roads, canals, railroads, and steamships opened new travel opportunities, but these systems remained rudimentary and slow, thus only those individuals with time and money could venture far from home, although luxury steamship lines did begin to carry rich passengers to Europe. In 1840 the first Cunard liner arrived in the United States. Also by the 1840s and 1850s, luxury spas such as Hot Springs, Arkansas; Berkeley Springs, Virginia (later West Virginia); and Saratoga, New York, catered to elite travelers. A

handful of resorts also emerged near major cities—Coney Island's first hotel opened in 1828, and Atlantic City, New Jersey, was connected by rail to Philadelphia in 1854—but these destinations were viewed by some **elites** as a form of **slumming** as they also tended to attract pickpockets, gamblers, and prostitutes. For most Americans, the agrarian-based economy meant they could not travel far or for very long.

Vacations as such are a product of the second half of the nineteenth century and unfolded according to social class. Steam ship travel improved, and in 1867 the first cruise originating in America left San Francisco, Mark Twain being among its passengers. Pleasure voyages were for the wealthy; the bulk of commoners journeying came *from* Europe as immigrants and were packed into steerage. By the early twentieth century, companies such as **J. P. Morgan**'s White Star Line developed "superliners" that featured formal dining, ballrooms, chandeliers, and other amenities aimed at wealthy patrons. For children of elites, a European "Grand Tour" was often considered a rite of passage, with young adults traveling to the Continent to study, to make their rounds in society, and on honeymoon trips.

Railroads similarly courted well-heeled travelers. In 1860 George Pullman made his first sleeping car and, seven years later, began producing private "palace" cars for rich travelers. Wealthy Americans fled the city during the summer to take up residence in enclaves such as the **Hamptons**; **Tuxedo Park**; **Newport**; Cape May, New Jersey; resorts in the Adirondacks; and Tiburon, California. Many also traveled for sightseeing excursions to newly fashionable natural splendors such as Yellowstone and Yosemite, which were made into national parks in 1872 and 1890, respectively.

Members of the upper-middle class, especially the nouveau riche, copied the upper class when they could. Some wealthy industrialists even sent daughters to Europe in hopes they would marry into aristocracy and confer instant prestige upon their families. A thriving industry of published travel journals encouraged travel for those with disposable income.

Less wealthy middle-class families seldom crossed the ocean, but they too began to take vacations. The Chautauqua Institution opened its first center in New York State in 1874, and soon other retreats emerged where middle-class vacationers could attend lectures and entertainments. The Muscular Christianity movement convinced some Americans, including young **Theodore Roosevelt**, of the need to engage in a more strenuous lifestyle, thus the late nineteenth century also saw a boom in camping in the very parks where richer Americans luxuriated in opulent hotels. For most lower-middle class families, though, a vacation meant spending time with relatives who had moved.

For the **working class**, vacations were rare until the 1920s. The battle to secure more leisure time was among the most hotly contested capital/labor disputes of the nineteenth century; a central component of the demand for an eight-hour workday was to give workers more free time. Employers weaned on **Social Darwinian** assumptions often arrogantly argued that free time would only encourage drunken idleness, riot, and profligacy. With the work week averaging five-and-a-half days into the 1920s, and with most workers receiving no paid time off, vacations were out of reach for most wage earners. Instead of vacations, many took one-day "excursions" to amusement parks, beaches, dancehalls, or the countryside. As late as 1930, a mere 10 percent of wage earners enjoyed paid vacations, whereas 80 percent of salaried workers had them.

Automobiles and the **labor movement** brought vacations to ordinary Americans. Prior to Henry Ford's introduction of assembly line production automobiles were expensive, but by the 1920s a new Model-T could be purchased for under \$300. As more Americans could afford cars, highway construction soared, and new destinations opened for vacationers. In 1925 the first motels and motor camps emerged, including Howard Johnson's, which became the first successful roadside restaurant and motel chain to cater to travelers of modest means.

Without free time and paid leave, however, workers could not have taken advantage of automobiles. **Strikes** and organizing efforts by labor groups such as the **American Federation of Labor** and the **Congress of Industrial Organizations** forced employers to reduce hours and give workers more benefits, including vacation leave. The right to collective bargaining and other worker gains were enshrined in several **New Deal** programs. One of the ironies of the **Great Depression** was that vacations became more widespread during the 1930s, despite economic hardship.

By the end of World War II, vacations were part of the American cultural fabric. The development of jet engines during the war dramatically reshaped passenger air service after the war, and today, many Americans of all social classes fly to their vacation destinations. But even if they fly on the same plane, their ultimate experiences are likely to be shaped by social class. For example, Las Vegas, Nevada, is a favored destination. **Gambling** was legalized there in 1931, and resort hotels followed a decade later. High-stakes gamblers are often treated as visiting royalty and stay in plush suites that contrast greatly to slot-machine gamblers lodged in humble rooms. Likewise, wealthy patrons attend parties and expensive floor shows that are beyond the means of many wage earners. Since the 1990s some Las Vegas entrepreneurs have courted lower-middle-class families to their glitzy pop-culture theme hotels.

Where one vacations is also determined by class. Exclusive resorts and international travel remain expensive, elite enclaves continue to insulate the wealthy, and luxury-trade companies arrange private travel for the wealthy. Middle-class vacationers abroad are more likely to book package tours in which they travel with a group or go to a resort structured to accommodate large numbers of travelers. For the working class, international travel is still not customary; a family trip to Disney World is the "dream" vacation for many. (Disney parks are also heavily visited by the lower-middle-class.)

Structural impediments also discourage working- and **lower-class** Americans from vacationing. Americans receive less time off work than most, just ten work days on average. In all of North and South America, only Mexicans average less time off than citizens of the United States. There is no federal law mandating that employers must grant paid vacation, as in the European Union, where member nations must grant at least four weeks.

Polls indicate that many Americans hold vacation ideologies out of accord with reality. For example, in 1975, 19% of Americans aspired to own vacation homes, a figure that had jumped to 43% by 1990. Overall, however, there are only 6 million houses classified as second homes, just 8% of the total number of housing units owned. Many families are finding it harder to get away at all, let alone retreat to a second home. In 1976, 53% of those with children under eight took vacations; by

1997 just 38% did so. Moreover, a 2003 Roper Poll indicates that 46% of Americans travel fewer than seventy-five miles from their home. The same poll indicates that 67% of those earning more than \$75,000 took a vacation, whereas just 31% of those earning under \$25,000 managed to do so.

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VANDERBILT FAMILY

RAMI KHALAF


The Vanderbilt family was one of the wealthiest and most prominent families of nineteenth-century American society. The family originated in the Dutch farming village of Der Bilt several hundred years prior to fame and fortune. Jan Aertszoon (1620–1705), the patriarch of the family, migrated to the Dutch colony of New Netherlands at age thirty as an **indentured servant** and eventually established a modest life in the New World. With the loss of the colony to the English, its name changed to New York and the family's name changed, with the Dutch *van der* (of the) added to Aertszoon's village name to create "van der bilt."

The family achieved fame and fortune with Cornelius Vanderbilt Jr. (1794–1877), who was the fourth of nine children, born on Staten Island to Cornelius Vanderbilt Sr. and Phebe Hand. Cornelius Jr. married his cousin Sophia Johnson (1795–1868), and the couple had thirteen children. As a young boy, Cornelius Vanderbilt Jr. worked on ferries in New York City, quitting school at age eleven. By age sixteen he was operating his own business, ferrying freight and passengers between Staten Island and Manhattan. During the War of 1812 he gained the nickname of "Commodore" because he received a contract from the government to supply and operate sailing schooners around New York City. In 1818 he turned his attention to steamships and soon dominated the trade routes between New York and Philadelphia after breaking a **monopoly** held by rivals. By 1829 Vanderbilt's steamships serviced the Hudson River between Manhattan and Albany, and by the 1840s his more than one hundred steamships serviced the Hudson and into Canada.

Vanderbilt's involvement with railroads began in 1844, when he was elected as director of the Long Island Rail Road. In the 1860s he started withdrawing money from his steamship businesses and reinvesting it in railroads. He purchased the New York and Harlem Railroads in 1862–63, the Hudson River Railroads in 1864, and New York Central Railroad in 1867. In 1869 they were merged into New York Central and Hudson River Railroad. Cornelius went on to build the largest shipping and railroad empire in the United States, eventually making his family one of the wealthiest of the **Gilded Age**. Although his children and other members of the Vanderbilt family built magnificent mansions on **Fifth Avenue**, in the East and Midwest, and in exclusive resort towns such as **Newport**, Rhode Island, Cor-

nelius was a modest man who was concerned with **philanthropy**. He was especially generous in donating to **education** and the arts; shortly before his death, he put aside \$1 million for the establishment of Vanderbilt University in Nashville, Tennessee.

Many of Cornelius Vanderbilt's children and grandchildren became successful entrepreneurs, whereas others achieved prominence in the national and international arena. His son William Henry (1821-85), inherited much of his father's wealth and fame and continued the family business. The third generation of Vanderbilts was headed by Cornelius II (1843–99), William Kissam (1849–1920), Fredrick William (1856–1938), and George Washington (1862-1914). Cornelius II expanded the family's wealth and financial strength. Following the death of his father in 1885, he took charge of the family's various corporations, investments, and philanthropic works. He gave generous sums to Columbia and Yale universities, as well as the New York Metropolitan Museum of Arts, and many other worthy causes that included many religious and charitable organizations.



Cornelius Vanderbilt. Courtesy of Eon Images.

William Kissam Vanderbilt eventually grew weary of business, perhaps because of a bruising battle against the **Knights of Labor** during an 1890 **strike** against the New York Central Railroad. Like most of the Vanderbilts, he was unsympathetic to the **labor movement**, and though he won his battles with the Knights, he suffered a lot of negative publicity. In 1903 he gave the responsibility of managing the railroads and most of the family corporations to an outside firm, while devoting his times and efforts to hobnobbing with wealthy New York **socialites** and in philanthropic work. He gave generously to many New York social institutions—including the New York Metropolitan **Opera**—and invested in racing **yachts**. In 1895 he retained the America's Cup for the United States with a vessel called *The Defender*.

George Washington Vanderbilt was more of a dilettante than a businessman. He constructed Biltmore Estate near Ashville, North Carolina, and carried on scientific experiments in agriculture and farming methods. He gave generously to the New York Public Library, the American Fine Arts Society, and other educational institutes.

Other noted members of the family include financier Cornelius III (1873–1942), the son of Cornelius II; Alfred Gwynne Vanderbilt (1877–1915), a noted horse breeder who perished when German U-boats sank the *Lusitania*; Harold Stirling Vanderbilt (1884–1970), who followed the family tradition by becoming a yachtsman

and won the America's Cup three times; Harold's brother, William K. II, who launched the Vanderbilt Cup for auto racing; and Cornelius Jr. (1898–1974), the son of Cornelius III, an accomplished writer, newspaper publisher, and film producer. Amy Vanderbilt (1908–74), the advice and etiquette columnist, was an indirect descendant, and **designer**-ware mogul Gloria Vanderbilt (1924–) is the offspring of railroad heir Reginald Claypoole Vanderbilt (1880–1925). Gloria Vanderbilt is among the few modern Vanderbilt heirs to do well in business.

The earlier Vanderbilts showed tremendous talent and ruthless business sense, acquiring money and wealth beyond imagination. William Henry Vanderbilt, the son of Cornelius, and his son, Frederick William Vanderbilt, were the richest men in America during their lifetimes. Each redefined what it meant to be wealthy and did much to reduce the importance of breeding in how the **upper class** was defined. The Vanderbilts could be generous and creative in their philanthropy, sometimes foolishly so. They attended opera attired in top hats and tiaras, collected art, and engaged in **conspicuous consumption**. The latter pursuits included ill-considered marriages to bankrupt European nobility that came with titles and encumbering debt, the building of showy mansions on some of the most expensive land in America, and the maintenance of yachts, Arabian horses, and expensive race cars. By the mid-twentieth century the Vanderbilts were as notorious as they were famous; their many marriages, divorces, business activities, philanthropic works, and scandals prompted journalists to joke, "Thank God for the Vanderbilts," to describe the wealth of gossip they generated. Gloria Vanderbilt, for instance, has been married five times and has had numerous other high-profile romances.

In 1973, 120 known members of the Vanderbilt family had a reunion in Vanderbilt University for the first time ever, and none of the descendants of Cornelius and his family was a millionaire. This was, however, before Gloria's clothing empire emerged.

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VEBLEN, THORSTEIN (July 30, 1857–August 3, 1929)

DIETER BÖGENHOLD

Thorstein Veblen was a sociologist and economist most famed for his business studies and his work on the leisure class.

Veblen was born in Cato, Wisconsin, and was christened Tosten Bunde Thorstein by his Norwegian immigrant parents. Veblen obtained his BA from Carleton College and did graduate work at Johns Hopkins under famed philosopher Charles Pierce before obtaining a PhD in economics from Yale University in 1884. Until he started with systematic studies of economic and social life, Veblen pursued philosophy and was keenly interested in Immanuel Kant, Auguste Comte, and Herbert Spencer. He taught economics at the University of Chicago from 1892

to 1906, Stanford from 1906 to 1909, and the University of Missouri from 1911 to 1918. Finally, from 1919 until his retirement in 1926, Veblen taught and did research at the New School for Social Research, New York City, an institution that he cofounded. Veblen died in 1929.

Of Veblen's seven books, *The Theory of the Leisure Class* (1899) is his first and most famous. It is now considered a sociology classic, though its focus was as much economic, anthropological, and psychological as sociological. Veblen is regarded as a pioneer in institutional economics and socioeconomics. The work reads as an extensive satiric essay, makes few references to other academic studies on leisure or the **upper class**, and as such differs from conventional academic works. The book was viewed as so unconventional that his publisher demanded several rewrites before issuing the work.

In the book Veblen coined the term **conspicuous consumption** to describe tendencies of economic activities to be driven by nonutilitarian, even impractical motives that are more akin to tribal and prehistoric behavior than rational economics. According to Veblen, a continuous conflict exists between businessmen and technicians. Focusing on material conditions, a society integrates business people such as bankers, brokers, lawyers, and managers on the one side and technicians, engineers, and other employees on the other. The business class serves in Veblen's framework as the "leisure class," a parasitical social group primarily driven to accumulate money and to highlight its wealth through visible consumption. Veblen's discussion of conspicuous consumption went well beyond possession of material objects. He extended his sociopsychological analyses to religious practices, gender relations, sports, the cultivation of accents, manners, and other factors not widely studied at the time. He was highly critical of the leisure class, including its treatment of women. He anticipated the trophy wife phenomenon of the modern leisure class by noting that marriage was largely another acquisitive activity for men of the leisure class.

Veblen is regarded as one of the fathers of economic institutionalism. He also published papers in established journals such as *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, *The American Journal of Sociology*, and *The Journal of Political Economy*, in which he discussed issues such as economic change and marginal utility theory. One of Veblen's articles, "Why Economics Is Not an Evolutionary Science," is considered seminal in the field of technocracy. Veblen returned to some of the themes from *The Theory of the Leisure Class* in his 1904 work *The Theory of Business Enterprise*. In it he skewered those businessmen often dubbed **robber barons**. Their relentless drive for "pecuniary gain" actually fostered business inefficiency, argued Veblen. He also anticipated the work of **power elite** scholars such as **C. Wright Mills** by arguing that business interests drove politics in America and that military adventurism was driven by profiteers. Although not as famed as his study of the leisure class, *The Theory of Business Enterprise* has been cited by modern critics of contemporary business practices.

Not surprisingly, Veblen's provocative work inflamed critics. Many viewed him as a bleak pessimist, others as a contrarian, and still others as a radical. In some histories of economic thought Veblen is treated as a minor figure. In his 1949 history of economics Joseph Dorfman wrote that Veblen was "halfway out of society." For others, however, Veblen was influential. He maintained a lively correspondence with

German economists such as Gustav Schmoller and Werner Sombart. Sombart and Veblen wrote reciprocal reviews of each other's books, and Max Weber quoted *The Theory of the Leisure Class* in his famous work *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. An international Veblen Society for the History and Philosophy of Economics was founded in 1993 and organizes conferences and workshops. Recently Veblen's work has received renewed attention, especially by scholars involved in social **stratification** research and the sociology of life-styles and **consumerism**.

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VICTORIANISM

See Gilded Age.

VOLUNTARISM

ROBERT E. WEIR

Voluntarism, in social terms, is the act of donating one's time or expertise in the service of the community or needy individuals. (There are also specialized but unrelated definitions of voluntarism in philosophy, theology, economics, and labor organizing. Nor should voluntarism be confused with "volunteerism," which refers to the logistical side of volunteering.) Each year about 84 million Americans volunteer more than 15.5 billion hours of their time; in 2004 the Bureau of Labor Statistics estimated the value of this labor at more than \$272 billion.

Voluntarism is a form of **philanthropy** that is as old as human civilization. In the United States, many religious traditions place a high emphasis on charity and volunteer work, and in the late nineteenth century, many clerics and lay people immersed themselves in the **Social Gospel** movement to address burning economic and social inequities. Since then, most formal religious institutions have maintained affiliated charities that are funded by donations but staffed largely by volunteers. In addition, there have been millions of Americans moved to become volunteers by ideological and/or humanitarian impulses. Volunteer fire departments, for example, have been a staple of **working class** culture since the late eighteenth century.

Few would deny the myriad good deeds done by volunteers, but voluntarism, nonetheless, attracts controversy. Private voluntarism can be used as an excuse for state, local, and federal governments to avoid funding programs that could bring about large-scale social change and economic justice. Most private volunteer programs are limited-budget, piecemeal operations that are too narrow in their scope

to address massive problems. During the **Great Depression** of the 1930s, for example, many private charities collapsed and others found themselves wholly inadequate to cope with a crisis of that magnitude. Only government, many critics argue, has the resources to attack social problems.

Labor unions and workers also find some downsides to voluntarism. The combined volunteer effort of the year 2000 translates to the equivalent of 9.1 million full-time jobs. Put simply, every hour of volunteer work is an hour taken away from a potential wage earner. In the Volunteers in Parks Program, some 120,000 individuals give free time to cleaning and supervising parks each year—positions that many state and municipal workers feel should be paid. There is also an issue of competence. In a time of shrinking budgets, schools and hospitals have turned increasingly to volunteers. Professionals assert that a well-meaning parent volunteer or "candy striper" is no substitute for a trained teacher's aide or nurse. Nor can volunteer fire departments provide skilled emergency medical technicians or professional drivers. Some unions have charged that voluntarism is often the humanitarian mask behind which union busters hide.

Ideology has also caused problems. If governments rely on volunteers, can individuals and their agencies refuse service to those with whom they do not agree? Despite lawsuits and social pressure, there is widespread evidence that religious organizations continue to practice discrimination and proselytizing, especially in regards to controversial issues such as reproductive services and addiction treatment. Likewise, politicians often try to pressure agencies to avoid controversy or to embrace politically expedient policies that may not serve clients well.

Voluntarism programs received a boost in 1964. In response to those who wondered why there was no domestic equivalent to the Peace Corps, the federal government created both **Head Start** and Volunteers in Service To America (VISTA) as parts of the **Economic Opportunity Act of 1964**. VISTA trains volunteers to work in impoverished urban and rural areas on projects ranging from crisis counseling to day care, often placing trainees within one of about 800 nonprofit agencies. About 120,000 volunteers passed through VISTA from 1965 through 2004. In 1993 President William Clinton merged VISTA and several smaller programs into the Corporation for National Service, commonly known as AmeriCorps.

Some conservatives complain that the cost of training AmeriCorps/VISTA workers exceeds the value of their labor, estimating the total costs at as much as \$31,000 per year. Still others opine that giving trainees benefits, such as college vouchers, undermines the entire notion of voluntarism, and some within the business community argue that the government's emphasis on the nobility of volunteer work besmirches the idea of paid labor. Many on the political right simply resent the entire idea of the government funding programs that they feel should be left to private charities.

Voluntarism has declined in recent years. In 1989, for example, more than 54 percent of Americans (over 98 million in total) volunteered; in 2000 that figure sank to 44 percent (83.9 million). Still, even conservatives have found it politically astute to trumpet the glories of voluntarism. President George H. W. **Bush** created the Points of Light Foundation to coordinate volunteer efforts, and in 2002 President George W. Bush set up USA Freedom Corps to give volunteers access to some 50,000 agencies seeking their help. There are also many high-profile private

agencies, perhaps the most famous being the Salvation Army and Habitat for Humanity, the latter a volunteer group that builds homes for low-income Americans that is supported by former president Jimmy Carter. **Soup kitchens**, homeless shelters, crisis centers, and food banks are among the many local agencies routinely staffed through voluntarism.

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Vo-Tech Schools

WILLIAM DEGENARO

Vo-tech schools administer certification programs in various vocational fields such as refrigerator repair, automotive mechanics, and computer maintenance. These career-oriented training sites can be either adult education learning centers or satellites of institutions of secondary education for high school students placed on the vo-tech track.

The growth of vo-tech schools during the late nineteenth century coincided with various trends in the United States, notably the influx of immigrants from southern and eastern Europe, the rise of industrial reforms, and the birth of efficiency movements. As the United States contended with massive waves of **immigration**, many pundits and politicians feared social unrest in urban centers, which were growing crowded with groups speaking different languages and practicing different religions. Education leaders saw vo-tech education as a strategy to teach immigrants (as well as racial minorities and Americans from rural regions) to take part in the economy. Meanwhile, reforms such as **child labor** laws were placing pressure on manufacturing and other industrial sectors. Finally, efficiency movements, influenced by Frederick Winslow Taylor and the logic of the assembly line, sought ways to eliminate wastefulness in virtually every domain of society, including schools. Hence, education leaders sought ways to make learning more practical and more directly valuable to the smooth functioning of society. Vo-tech schools were seen as extensions of such initiatives.

Business interests largely supported legislation that provided for the foundation and subsidy of vo-tech schools, recognizing the new venture as a chance to have public funds underwrite the training of their employees. The **Great Depression** in particular saw numerous expansions of vo-tech schooling, including **New Deal** projects involving the training of unemployed young men. Through most of the twentieth century, vo-tech schools continued to focus on industrial work, foregrounding practical skills at the price of theoretical knowledge. However, a "new vocationalism" movement has emerged in the last fifteen years, stressing "holistic" instruction rooted in both academic work *and* practical job training. Vo-tech schools have also expanded beyond industrial programs, encompassing "**pink-collar**"

trades, such as hairdressing, and high-tech (sometimes high-paying) lines of work, such as information technology support. In the 1990s, for-profit higher education ventures, such as the University of Phoenix, attempted to increase the **prestige** of vocational training by competing with low-prestige institutes of technology.

Vo-tech high school programs, meanwhile, grew out of the comprehensive high school movement during the early twentieth century and have historically catered to **working-class** students—a trend that continues to this day. The comprehensive high school, and the attendant tracking into differentiated programs of study, made high school more accessible to a wider cross section of teens but at the same time created gradations of **prestige**. Based on various aptitude tests, public schools would place students into tracks, usually college preparatory, general education, and vo-tech. The vo-tech track usually meant a combination of "academic courses" such as math and English as well as practical, vocational training. Many school districts have abandoned such tracking, although they continue to offer vo-tech courses. Critics of tracking point out the disproportionate number of working-class students and students of color who end up in vo-tech high school programs.

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VOTING RIGHTS

ROBERT F. WEIR

Voting rights are such basic and essential features of American democracy that many citizens take them for granted. Historically, voting rights have been contested and so they remain. An individual's **gender**, ethnicity, race, and social class often determine access to voting.

In both the Colonial era and the early republic, voting was often restricted to **property** owners. This was a holdover from English political theories that held that only those who held a "vested" interest in society were worthy of exercising full citizenship rights. At the time of the **American Revolution**, prevailing sentiment held that mass **democracy** was synonymous with tumult and anarchy. The Founders appropriated the language of democracy, but were suspicious of it and placed limits on its exercise. U.S. senators, for example, were not elected by popular vote until after the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913. The electoral college is also a remnant of control by elites; one argument in its favor was that it would allow Congress to override the will of the mass electorate if deemed necessary. It should also be noted that the Constitution set up a *representative* democracy, not one in which the general public exercises its will on individual matters.

Women, African American **slaves**, and most **Native Americans** lacked voting rights under the Constitution, but for the most part, the document was silent on voting, which was among those rights reserved to the states for articulation. In practice, most states replicated pre-Revolution practices and required white males to possess property before according suffrage privileges. This remained the norm until after the War of 1812 was concluded; by the mid-1820s, most states had abolished property requirements for voting. In 1848 women gathered in Seneca Falls, New York, and demanded suffrage rights, thereby beginning a movement that was not fully realized until the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920.

Before women obtained the vote, African American males had secured it. The end of the Civil War and the launching of Reconstruction led to the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870, which eliminated race and servitude as disqualifiers. African American men voted in large numbers throughout the South, as long as federal troops remained in the region. They favored the Republican Party, viewing the GOP as the party of emancipation. However, the end of Reconstruction in the wake of the disputed Hayes-Tilden presidential election of 1876 led to a steady erosion of black voting rights. As Reconstruction gave way to Jim Crow systems of discrimination and segregation, a host of schemes evolved with the primary focus of keeping African Americans away from the polls. Poll taxes, questionable "literacy" tests, and residency requirements were among the tactics used to disenfranchise black males, as was the use of intimidation and violence by vigilantes and race-hate groups such as the Ku Klux Klan. By the dawn of the twentieth century, black voting was anemic at best and non-existent in many areas.

There were other shifts in voting patterns in the first half of the twentieth century. Women, who had already gained the right to vote in numerous states, secured federal voting rights protection under the Nineteenth Amendment. There was also a fundamental voting shift according to social standing, especially among workingclass citizens. In the nineteenth century, blue-collar voting patterns were diffuse, with many manual laborers casting votes for third-party movements and the others splitting their votes between the two major parties (Whigs and Democrats before 1854, and Republicans and Democrats after 1856). More affluent voters, especially those in the **upper** and upper **middle class**, began to favor the Republican Party, which was viewed as pro-business. After 1932, working-class voters increasingly cast their lot with the Democratic Party, attracted in no small part by Franklin Roosevelt and his New Deal programs aimed at working Americans. Southern, white farmers also shifted more solidly into the Democratic column. Workingclass support for the Democrats remained strong until 1968 and workers belonging to labor unions continue to prefer the Democratic Party, which is seen as more progressive on social issues.

The African American Civil Rights Movement was among the factors that led to a steady erosion of the Democrats' **New Deal Coalition**. Civil rights agitation coincided with changes in social policy and economic transformations that made many Caucasians feel imperiled. **Great Society** programs, such as school desegregation, support for women's rights, and Affirmative Action, proved especially problematic for some white males, especially in the South where opposition to civil

rights was strongest. Nonetheless, 1965 saw the passage of one of the most important suffrage bills of all time, the Voting Rights Act. It essentially put teeth into the Fifteenth Amendment, abolishing literacy tests and poll taxes, guaranteeing access to polling places, and authorizing the use of federal power to ensure that minorities were not systematically excluded from the polls. Subsequent amendments in 1970, 1975, 1973, and 1982, as well as court rulings, further strengthened the bill. It had a profound impact on black voter registration. In Alabama, for instance, only 19.3 percent of African Americans were registered in 1965; by 1988 the figure stood at 68.4 percent. Figures were even more dramatic in Mississippi, where the percentage soared from just 6.7 percent to 74.2 percent.

Alas, the Voting Rights Act also further polarized the electorate. Some white working-class voters shifted allegiance to candidates who courted their discontent: Barry Goldwater in 1964, George Wallace and Richard Nixon in 1968, and Nixon again in 1972. The latter vote took on a generational character as well. The Twenty-sixth Amendment passed in 1971 gave eighteen-year-olds the right to vote; youth was associated with unseemly anti-Vietnam War protests in the eyes of some voters. Democrats regained Congressional control in 2006, but it remains to be seen whether they can continue to mobilize a less-affluent base.

The hyper-inflation of the 1970s and perceived loss of American global prestige propelled conservative Republican **Ronald Reagan** to the White House in 1980 and 1984. In both elections Reagan won the working-class vote, including that in several union strongholds where labor officials supported his opponent. The emergence of so-called **Reagan Democrats** shifted the political ground and opened new fissures in class voting patterns. In 1980, for example, incumbent President Jimmy Carter won 50 percent of the vote of those earning less than \$10,000 per year, but Reagan took 72 percent of those earning more than \$30,000.

Since 1980 there has been a correlation between affluence and voting for Republican candidates, a trend that allowed the GOP to win the presidency in 1984, 1988, 2000, and 2004, and control Congress after the 1994 mid-term elections. This has proved a problem for Democrats as less-affluent citizens do not vote in proportions as high as wealthier ones, and there are more obstacles put in place to discourage them from voting. For example, polls indicate an ever-growing number of Americans who say they do not vote because they cannot get time off from work to cast ballots.

The presidential elections of 2000 and 2004 highlight the ongoing challenges to secure full voting rights. In 2000 Democrat Al Gore outpolled Republican George **Bush** by over half a million votes, but the issue of disputed tallies from Florida was resolved by the Supreme Court and Bush was declared president. Lost in the drama of hanging chads, voting machine malfunctions, and Florida's counting irregularities were issues that surfaced in other states. In Missouri, for instance, polls closed despite the large numbers of African American voters lined up to vote. Similar allegations resonated elsewhere.

Many Americans also question the legitimacy of Bush's narrow 2004 victory, claiming that poor voters were given false information about where to vote, that African American voters were intimidated, and that tallies were manipulated. Reformers also charge that redistricting plans have been manipulated to negate the possibility of minority candidates winning elected office and to shift political power to affluent voters. Still others charge that the money needed to mount a modern

campaign is a de facto form of disenfranchisement that makes politics the domain of the rich or those that pander to them.

Complicating all of this is the confused class identity of many American voters. One report suggests that one-third of all voters misidentify their own class standing, hence it is likely that future voters are more likely to cast ballots based on factors such as race, religious belief, regional identity, or single-issue topics rather than class interests.

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WAGE GAP

See Equity Pay.

WAGE SLAVERY

ROBERT E. WEIR

Wage slavery is a deliberately provocative and rhetorical term that draws parallels between wage earners and chattel **slavery**. In classic **Marxist** doctrine, wage slavery is viewed as a system of compulsion; workers are forced to toil for wages in order to eke out a subsistence living. Wages are thus viewed as a key component of the class system, used by the **bourgeoisie** to discipline **proletariats** and keep them quiescent.

It is uncertain who first coined the term. Some sources credit the anarcho-socialist Phillipe Buonarroti's 1836 work on the French Revolution, but the term was already current among **Lowell millworkers** by then. It remained current in the United States throughout the nineteenth century and was often evoked by members of the **working class** to call attention to debased labor conditions. Lowell textile workers also used it in ways that today would be dubbed **racist**. Whenever work was deemed too degrading, it was dubbed the sort of task that only a black slave could be expected to do.

Among Marxist theorists, the term was linked to the **alienation** of labor. Karl Marx was acutely aware that wage labor was not perfectly analogous to chattel slavery and that some wage earners eventually became **capitalists**. But he used the term to highlight the rarity of that transformation, to stress the ways the **poverty** could compel one to labor, and to draw attention to the **maldistribution of wealth** throughout society. He also described the way in which labor became one commodity

among many and could thus be bought and sold like any other form of property, including slaves. Neo-Marxists took his ideas further to show how it was possible to manufacture consent for repressive wage systems, how **consumerism** creates **false consciousness** and replicates wage slavery, and how debt creates a fatalistic acceptance of wage slavery. Members of the **Industrial Workers of the World** used the term interchangeably with "wage labor" in general, arguing that capitalist labor was inherently a slave system and that the wage system needed to be dismantled.

The term fell out of favor by the mid-twentieth century, but has resurfaced in the past few years. It is sometimes used ironically as a lighthearted complaint about one's job or more seriously to critique the problems associated with low-wage labor or mind-numbing toil. There is even a *Wage Slave Journal*, which seeks to analyze modern politics from a radical left perspective that draws on Marxism and **anarchism** (though often in a rather blunt fashion). In its modern usage, wage slavery usually refers to the totality of economic and social forces that make workers dependent on paychecks.

Irrespective of usage, the term wage slavery is problematic. Put simply, wage slavery and chattel slavery are not synonyms. Wage earners do not have the legal status of property and cannot be bought and sold as such. Although it is true that economic hardship makes many wage earners *feel* trapped, they retain far more freedom than chattel slaves possessed. Many using the term wage slavery become too enamored with the metaphor. Both involve **power** relationships, but the employer-employee relationship involves negotiated and mediated control. whereas the master-slave relationship is rooted in a paradigm of total control and total compliance. A worker can refuse to labor, a luxury slaves did not have. Moreover, degradation is not imperative in employer-employee relations; if workers receive proper remuneration, they may reject the very notion of being a "slave." For chattels, however, even a slave fond of his master retained awareness of his property status.

The term wage slavery should, thus, be approached with caution. It is a useful reminder of the discontent many workers have felt with their work, and Marx was correct to link it to alienation. Like any rhetorical device, however, it serves best to set the parameters of debate and should not be embraced as literal description.

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WAGES

ROBERT E. WEIR

The term *wages* refers to compensation that workers receive for labor on a perhour basis. It contrasts with salary, a rate that is generally not calculated on an hourly basis. Although both wages and salaries may be set by a formal contract,

wage earners are usually regulated by a time clock and have less flexibility in when they complete their work, less decision-making power, and less control over the pace of their work. Historically, wages have compensated manual labor, and salaries have been attached to jobs deemed "professional" and "managerial." Because of this, receiving wages is often seen as a marker of the **working class**, and salaries a marker of the **middle class**.

Wages and salaries have also played a key role in the development of **class consciousness**. Although salaried workers are, as an aggregate, paid better than wage earners, this is not always the case. For example, social workers and teachers often make less money than construction workers or auto assembly-line workers. Nonetheless, the first two groups are more prone to identify with the middle class than those working with their hands, and they are likely to be granted greater social **prestige**. Conversely, some wage earners see themselves as members of the middle class when, using **objective methods** of class location, they are not. This is often true of retail workers.

Wage labor's dominance makes a good case for considering **subjective** factors when discussing social class in America. The myth of America as a middle-class society is severely challenged by the fact that, in 2006, 59.8 percent of Americans worked for wages, *not* salaries. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the average national wage was \$18.21 per hour (\$37,870 per annum) in 2005. This figure, however, tells us little about the demographics of wages. First of all, more than 2 million of the approximately 74 million wage earners were paid either **minimum wage** or a sub-minimum wage, a compensation rate that placed most of them below the **poverty line**. Moreover, **Latinos' and Hispanics'** wages average 40 percent less than non-Hispanic whites, and African Americans average about 37 percent less. **Gender stratification** also plays a big role; Caucasian women's average wages are nearly 30 percent lower than the wages of white males, and those of Latinas and African American women are even lower.

Wage labor usually comes with fewer benefits than salaried labor, thus making wage-earning families more dependent on paychecks to meet basic needs. Many wage earners have little or no sick leave, for instance, and do not get paid if they do not come to work. Healthcare is a major concern overall. One of every five full-time workers and one of four part-timers have no health insurance, and even those who do have found their costs rising. Between 2001 and 2004, health care costs rose by 49 percent for employers and 59 percent for individuals. Many of the employers who provide health care benefits now require employees to pay part of the premium, and studies reveal that wage earners pay a higher percentage of their premiums than salaried employees.

A current debate over wages and salaries looks at **real income** rather than reported pay increases. Most analysts agree that wage increases have been modest in the past quarter century. In 1982, for instance, wages rose an average of 7.2 percent, but since 1997 have hit 4 percent only twice. Although many observers justify this by saying that wages have outstripped inflation every year from 1993 to 2004, such assertions rest on the controversial way inflation is calculated. Official inflation rates are pegged to the consumer price index (CPI), a complex and weighted set of calculations based on goods and services purchased by urban dwellers. The "core" measurements of the CPI exclude energy and food in the theory that they

fluctuate too rapidly to allow for precise calculations and thus must be weighted differently in determining the CPI. Soaring energy costs in the twenty-first century have led many analysts to conclude that the CPI is of little use in assessing the impact these costs have had on the purchasing power of American families. The CPI is also under attack in some quarters because of a 1996 change in how it is calculated. That action changed the weight given to numerous items and added controversial measures such as "hedonic regression" that allegedly assesses the value of the quality of goods and services.

In real income terms, American wage earners have suffered a decline in the twenty-first century (and some scholars argue this has been a regular occurrence since the 1980s). In 2003 and 2004, for instance, wage increases averaged 2.4 percent, but official inflation tied to the CPI was 2.7 percent. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), however, estimates that real income fell much more sharply and that families lost more than \$1,500 in purchasing power between 2000 and 2004. The problem has been especially acute for black and Latino families, whose lost purchasing power was \$2,045 and \$2,432, respectively. Overall, low-income families have seen a 7.9 percent decrease in buying power.

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WAGNER ACT (1935)

SARAH CROSSLEY

The Wagner Act is the popular name for the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) passed by Congress in 1935. To this day, it is regarded as a milestone in protecting the rights of the **labor movement**, although many of its clauses have been severely altered or supplanted since 1935.

It was introduced into Congress by pro-labor Senator Robert Wagner and enacted amid the **Great Depression**. The NLRA was a cornerstone of what is known as the Second **New Deal**. The Wagner Act, or NLRA, provides that most workers within the private sector have a right to **strike** and engage in collective bargaining as a means of achieving representation. In essence, the act seeks to limit unfair labor practices by employers; it stipulates that employers cannot use threats, coercion, restraint, retaliation, or discrimination to interfere with workers' rights to organize. Fundamental to the Wagner Act is the workers' right to choose union representation through government-supervised elections via the establishment of secret-ballot elections for union recognition; this offered workers an alternative to striking for employer recognition of labor unions.

The Wagner Act, established after its predecessor, the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), was declared unconstitutional, could also be seen as an effort to regain control of the workforce. Often, work stoppages were only part of the overall effects of a strike. Through passage of the act, Congress hoped to defuse potentially volatile situations through making rudimentary concessions to workers, such as the right to organize and form unions. By offering workers official channels to air grievances, the government could potentially repress further blows to business and industry via strikes.

Workers nonetheless saw the passage of the Wagner Act as a major win for labor; it protected workers' rights to organize in terms more concrete than the NIRA. The National Labor Relations Board became the vessel through which workers could lodge complaints or request union representation by way of secret ballot. The NLRA's attempts to mediate between labor and business through such administrative channels had both pros and cons for workers. On one hand, strikes never guaranteed better working conditions; often, workers lost pay, and home life was greatly disrupted by work stoppages. Many workers who had longed for union representation could now gain union representation without the struggle of a long and uncertain strike.

On the other hand, the strike was a powerful weapon of **class struggle** that employers feared. Although the NLRA legalized strikes, they had started to dwindle by the mid-1930s. Some scholars and activists argue that along with the strike's demise went worker militancy and the culture it bred. For instance, prior to the NLRA's enactment, when strikes were prevalent, one of the benefits of joining a union was the camaraderie it offered; union members cultivated a worker identity not found outside the group. Militancy, solidarity, bargaining processes, entertainment through music and plays, a shared sense of injustice, and nascent **class consciousness** characterized many of the strikes of the mid-1930s before the Wagner Act. Others counter that the rise of the mass media, suburbanization, greater prosperity, and the privatization of life after World War II had more to do with the destruction of **working-class** culture and militancy.

The Wagner Act did stabilize labor relations, but employers and conservatives argued that it tilted too favorably in the direction of organized labor. The **Red Scare** following World War II helped conservative Republicans capture Congress in 1946, and they enacted the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act over President Harry Truman's veto. Taft-Hartley weakened many of the provisions of the Wagner Act. In the 1980s President **Ronald Reagan** installed members onto the National Labor Relations Board who the **AFL–CIO** charged were anti-union. Although today it is a watered-down version of its old self, the Wagner Act is still the cornerstone of U.S. labor law and a striking reminder of the considerable influence workers possessed at the middle of the twentieth century.

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Irving Bernstein, Turbulent Years: A History of the American Worker, 1933–1941, 1970; Melvin Dubofsky, The State and Labor in Modern America, 1994; Charles Morris, The Blue Eagle at Work: Reclaiming Democratic Rights in the American Workplace, 2004.

WALD, LILLIAN (March 10, 1867–September 1, 1940)

VICTORIA GRIEVE

Lillian Wald was a social reformer and children's rights advocate. Born to prosperous German immigrants, she grew up in Rochester, New York, was educated in private schools, and traveled widely. She was inspired by the nurse who attended the birth of her sister's child, and she enrolled in the New York Hospital School of Nursing. After graduating in 1891, Wald worked as a nurse at the New York Juvenile Asylum. She grew disillusioned with institutional methods and, in 1892, volunteered to teach a weekly home-nursing class for **immigrant** women on Manhattan's Lower East Side.

Appalled by the **poverty** and desperation of the immigrant poor, Wald, with fellow nurse Mary Brewster, opened the Henry Street **settlement house** in 1895. Her Visiting Nurse Society provided in-home health care and education for the poor and became a model for similar programs around the world. Wald coined the term "public health nurse" for those who worked with the public outside established institutions. Specializing in preventive care, public health nurses worked in poor neighborhoods and charged based on their patients' ability to pay. Wald's activities led to the establishment of the nation's first nursing program at Columbia University in 1910.

Wald's concern for children's health led her to found the Outdoor Recreation League, which lobbied for the creation of parks and playgrounds for urban youth, especially in poor neighborhoods. Also, in 1902 Wald recognized the need for nurses in public schools and persuaded New York City to hire the first public school nurse. In 1908 Wald lobbied for the creation of a school lunch program to provide nutrition for all children in the public school system.

Among her many accomplishments, Wald pushed for the creation of the U.S. Children's Bureau to restrict child labor. With **Jane Addams** and other activists, she formed the Women's Trade Union League in 1903 to protect women workers and challenged major industries to implement health inspections in the workplace. At her urging, Columbia University appointed the first professor of nursing at an American university.

Through a network of female activists, Wald became involved in a variety of progressive causes. To circumvent New York's public **segregation** laws, Wald offered Henry Street Settlement for the 1909 meeting of the National Negro Conference that established the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). She served as honorary vice president of the Women's City Convention for woman suffrage, marched for women's right to vote, and supported Margaret Sanger's birth control campaign.

Wald was an ardent peace activist. At the outbreak of World War I in 1914, she cofounded with Jane Addams and Florence Kelley the American Union Against Militarism (AUAM), which claimed 6,000 members by 1915 and helped avert war with Mexico in 1916. When the United States declared war on Germany on April 6, 1917, Wald led protest marches and struggled to preserve civil liberties in the face of the Espionage and Sedition Acts of 1917–1918. She served as chairman of the Committee on Community Nursing of the American Red Cross during the

war, represented the United States at the International Red Cross, and battled the global influenza epidemic of 1918.

Hoping to influence the postwar settlement, Wald helped to establish the Foreign Policy Association, which advocated American involvement in the League of Nations. She was active in the Women's Peace Party, which in 1921 adopted the name Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF). The WILPF demanded suffrage and equality for women, protested the harsh terms of the Treaty of Versailles toward Germany, and supported the League of Nations.

In the postwar years, Wald was accused of radicalism for continuing her work for peace and other progressive causes. The Henry Street Settlement suffered during the **Great Depression**, as sources of funding diminished while demand for health services increased. Wald supported **Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal**, but after suffering a heart attack and stroke in 1932, she was no longer politically active. Wald died of a cerebral hemorrhage on September 1, 1940.



Lillian D. Wald. Courtesy of Eon Images.

Suggested Reading

Irvin Block, Neighbor to the World: The Story of Lillian Wald, 1969; Clare Coss, ed., Lillian Wald: Progressive Activist, 1989; Beryl Epstein, Lillian Wald: Angel of Henry Street, 1948.

WALL STREET JOURNAL, THE

SAMANTHA MAZIARZ

The Wall Street Journal, founded in 1889, is a financial newspaper published daily in New York City, as well as in Asia and Europe. It has an international paid circulation of 2.7 million copies, 1.8 million of which are in the United States. Dow Jones & Company, a publishing and financial information firm also based in New York City, owns The Wall Street Journal, and it is their flagship publication. It employs more than 600 people and has won several prestigious awards. The paper, named for the center of the American financial district on Wall Street in New York City, reports on business and financial events and trends.

According to *The Journal*, its publication reaches a "demographically desirable" population. In fact, the average household net worth of its readers is \$2.1 million, and their average annual income is \$191,000. Sixty percent of them are considered "top management," meaning they are corporate presidents, vice presidents, and **CEO**s.

The Journal operates as a matter of course under a theory of economic liberalism, which espouses the idea that all economic actions are motivated by self-interest, and therefore, in order for an economy to progress successfully, those participating should be allowed to move freely and without restriction. Generally, the editorial tone and content of the paper is tacitly conservative, and this conservative edge has earned the newspaper controversy and criticism by some, who have claimed that the paper's coverage and op-ed pieces are often insensitive and even offensive to people of color, the poor, the working class, and immigrants, among others.

The Journal states in its fact sheet that its "goal is to help readers around the world succeed by providing essential and relevant information, presented fairly and accurately." However, some feel that the information and jargon in the paper are geared to an **elite** group of financially successful businesspeople, investors, and political leaders and are all but indecipherable to those outside immediate financial circles. Some also feel that the paper leaves many working- and **middle-class** readers shut out, rather than fostering the broader-based financial literacy it claims to seek, and that it has no practical application in the lives of the members of these classes.

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Michael B. Lehmann, *The Irwin Guide to Using* The Wall Street Journal, 2000; *Wall Street Journal* (http://www.wsj.com); R. Foster Winans, *Trading Secrets: An Insider's Account of the Scandal at the Wall Street Journal*, 1986.

WALLERSTEIN, IMMANUEL (September 28, 1930–)

SANJEEV RAO

Immanuel Wallerstein has been a senior research scholar at Yale University since 2000. Wallerstein was distinguished professor of sociology at Binghamton University (SUNY) from 1976 until his retirement in 1999 and was head of the Fernand Braudel Center for the Study of Economies, Historical Systems and Civilization until 2005. Wallerstein holds a BA, an MA, and a PhD from Columbia University.

Wallerstein called for all social sciences to be both historical and systemic in his groundbreaking book *The Modern World-System*, *Vol. I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century*. He called for a complete, full integration of multiple disciplines such as economics, history, political science, and anthropology. With this methodology, social scientists are better equipped to study extensive social changes over greater spans of time.

Wallerstein illustrates this in the first volume of *The Modern World-System* and two subsequent volumes by expounding on his world-system analysis theory to explain the rise of **capitalism** beginning in the sixteenth century. He differentiates between world empires in which there is one political system with hegemony over a large area and a "world economy" in which such a political system does not exist over all areas. He argues that economic factors operate in an area much larger than any political unit can control. Thus, instead of the traditional nation-state analysis, Wallerstein proposes a world-system consisting of linked regions based on the division of labor. The divisions are based not just on job types, but also on geography. According to Wallerstein, the range of economic tasks is not evenly distributed throughout the world-system.

Wallerstein contends that after the crisis of feudalism between 1300 and 1450 (following a period of expansion between 1150 and 1300), western Europe began moving toward a capitalistic world economy to make sure it had continued economic growth. It began its movement toward a worldwide capitalist economy beginning in 1470, which entailed geographical market expansion, the development of different types of labor control, and the formation of strong state institutions within the states of western Europe. The capitalist system could be categorized into geographical regions: core, semi-periphery, and periphery.

The core region benefited the most from a world economy. Wallerstein views most of northwestern Europe (especially England, France, and Holland) as creating the first core region. This core region was characterized by a strong central government, complex bureaucracies, and large mercenary armies.

The periphery regions lacked a strong central government or were controlled by other states. These regions' main purpose was to export raw materials to the core and provide labor. Eastern Europe and Latin America were the main periphery regions.

The semi-periphery region consists of former core regions in decline—such as Portugal and Spain—or areas attempting to improve their position in the world economy. Serving as a buffer between the core and periphery regions, the semi-periphery showed tensions between the central government and a forceful landed class.

The European economy of the sixteenth century underwent stages of expansion and crisis. The varying differences between output and distribution of surplus among the regions were responsible for the periodic crises of overproduction, which led to long waves of growth and decline within the world system. This development of the world capitalist economy has resulted in economic and social inequalities throughout the world. This model still holds today with the consolidation of industrial capitalism as different societies and regions change their regional status according to Wallerstein's typology.

Over time, the basic framework of Wallerstein's theory has spawned several criticisms. Some scholars assert that Wallerstein's models are applicable for much earlier time periods, perhaps upward of five thousand years ago. Others have said that his theory is ambiguous and that he was highly selective in ignoring data that do not fit his analyses.

Despite the criticisms, Wallerstein's theory is a major component of **globalization** studies today and has caused social science to take a larger panoramic view, especially

in disciplines such as history. His call for greater breadth and integration in the social sciences has been heeded by many in different disciplines, thus providing a fresh new perspective on various topics and subjects. For scholars of American society, class, and culture, Wallerstein's work challenges them to place their work in a global perspective before glibly asserting **American exceptionalism**.

Suggested Reading

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WAL-MART

JESSICA LIVINGSTON

Wal-Mart is a discount retail store, the largest corporation in the United States, and a controversial business.

Sam Walton opened the first Wal-Mart in 1962 in Rogers, Arkansas. Walton's business strategy was to open stores in rural areas where there was little competition. The discount retail store incorporated in 1969, and its current headquarters is in Bentonville, Arkansas. In 1988 Wal-Mart began opening Supercenters, which include a full line of groceries as well as regular retail items. Wal-Mart now includes over 3,500 stores, including general stores, Supercenters, Neighborhood Markets, and the membership warehouse chain Sam's Club. More than one million shoppers visit these stores weekly.

Wal-Mart has transformed the retail industry; it is admired in business circles and copied by other retail stores. In 2004 *Fortune* magazine named Wal-Mart its "Most Admired Company." Sam Walton designed his business to operate on the principle of offering the lowest possible price to customers by cutting the business's costs. He began by going directly to the manufacturer to negotiate goods at a lower cost and buy them in bulk. Now that Wal-Mart is the largest retailer and more powerful than manufacturers, it frequently dictates prices, as well as volume, packing, and delivery schedules, to its suppliers. Wal-Mart drives down competitors' and suppliers' prices and pushes manufacturers to offshore production in order to cut labor costs. Wal-Mart estimates that it now imports \$15 billion worth of goods from China annually.

Wal-Mart, which is the largest private employer in the United States, is notorious for its exploitation of labor. Referred to as "associates," employees earn **poverty** wages—typically between \$12,000 and \$17,000 annually for full-time workers—and receive no health insurance. Wal-Mart encourages its employees to apply for public assistance programs; most children of employees qualify for free lunches. In effect, taxpayers subsidize Wal-Mart's profits. Employees at over 100 stores have attempted to unionize, but the corporate retail chain is strongly anti-union. It has been known

to retaliate and fire employees who have attempted to organize a union. Wal-Mart has also broken **immigrant** labor laws. A raid by federal agents in 2003 revealed that Wal-Mart was hiring thousands of undocumented immigrants as janitors, many forced to work seven days a week. These janitors had also been locked in overnight while they cleaned to prevent theft.

Wal-Mart has been a frequent target of lawsuits, including class-action lawsuits for labor abuse practices. Wal-Mart has been accused in class-action lawsuits of breaking federal overtime laws by forcing employees to work off the clock, and it also has been accused of sex discrimination in the largest civil rights class-action suit in



The exterior of a typical Wal-Mart Supercenter in Madison Heights, Virginia. Courtesy of Wikipedia.

history to date: *Dukes v. Wal-Mart*. Although over 70 percent of its employees are women, only one-third of its managers are female. This suit also charges that women are paid thirty-seven cents less per hour than men for identical jobs.

Debates over the opening of Wal-Mart stores, particularly Supercenters, have divided communities. Some residents, often those from the **lower class**, want the jobs and the low prices that a Wal-Mart brings whereas others argue that a Wal-Mart will hurt their community in the long term. Critics of Wal-Mart claim that it will not even bring jobs to the community because it drives local shopkeepers out of business. Wal-Mart has been able to take advantage of the lack of economic regional planning in the United States and to pit towns against each other. When a town opposes the opening of a Wal-Mart store, Wal-Mart threatens to open a store in a neighboring town, which would have the same economic consequences on local businesses without bringing in any tax revenue.

Wal-Mart has recently become a significant lobbyist. It hired its first lobbyist in 1998, but by the 2004 election, Wal-Mart was one of the top twenty political action committee contributors to federal candidates. It has spent money lobbying on labor and health care issues as well as the repeal of the estate tax. The Walton family is currently the richest family in America, and repealing the estate tax would further increase their wealth. The way that Wal-Mart negatively affects labor standards and local economies while accumulating huge profits has begun to generate a major public backlash. Recent documentaries critical of Wal-Mart include PBS's Front-line: Is Wal-Mart Good for America? (2005) and Robert Greenwald's The High Cost of Low Price (2005).

Suggested Reading

Liza Featherstone, Selling Women Short: The Landmark Battle for Workers' Rights at Wal-Mart, 2004; Bob Ortega, In Sam We Trust: The Untold Story of Sam Walton and How Wal-Mart Is Devouring America, 1998; Sandra S. Vance and Roy V. Scott, Wal-Mart: A History of Sam Walton's Retail Phenomenon, 1994.

WAR ON POVERTY

ROBERT E. WEIR

The phrase "War on Poverty" was first spoken by President Lyndon Johnson in his State of the Union address delivered on January 8, 1964. President Johnson announced a five-pronged approach to alleviating **poverty** in America. The phrase came to be a shorthand reference for a plethora of **Great Society** programs designed and administered by the federal government for the express purpose of narrowing the gap between rich and poor.

The centerpiece of federal government action was the passage of the **Economic** Opportunity Act of 1964 (EOA) and the creation of the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) to administer such new programs as **Head Start**, **Job Corps**, Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA), and the Community Action Program (CAP). The first two programs were devoted to helping underprivileged youth— Head Start by providing compensatory preschool educational, nutritional, and family support services to children in disadvantaged areas; and Job Corps by offering employment training in areas of high unemployment and poverty. Job Corps also administered classes to help those who had not finished high school to either finish or obtain a General Education Development (GED) certificate. VISTA, sometimes nicknamed the "domestic Peace Corps" and now part of AmeriCorps, channeled volunteer energies into the War on Poverty. The CAP was the most controversial of War on Poverty programs because it made grants to various local programs, both private and public, designed to administer services to the poor. These grants went both to direct services and toward administrative costs, but were supposed to help poor people become **self-reliant**. Because of their diverse nature and lack of oversight, some CAP projects were inefficient or plagued by corruption.

The War on Poverty was much broader than EOA initiatives and involved an expansion of emergency and temporary **welfare** benefits occasioned by changes in the **Social Security** system, an increase in federal money for **higher education** and student grants, programs designed to alleviate poverty in **Appalachia**, the creation of Medicare, a work-study program, more aid to public housing projects, and numerous other efforts. The overall goal was, in Johnson's words, to strike "at the causes, not just the consequences of poverty." How all of this worked has been a matter of intense political and ideological debate since the early 1970s, when President Richard Nixon dismantled the OEO and several of its programs and transferred the remainder to other federal agencies.

Many conservatives view the War on Poverty as a misguided boondoggle at best, or a total sham at worst. Misuse of CAP funds, the creation of high-rise projects that became high-crime **ghettos**, and a belief that welfare perpetuated a **culture of poverty** are among the criticisms of the War on Poverty. Economists such as Milton Friedman objected to the **Keynesian** nature of spending and argued that the private sphere would be more efficient at alleviating poverty. Several skeptics argue that the War on Poverty had no impact whatsoever and that the **poverty line** had already dropped from 22.4 percent to 19 percent in the five years before Johnson's speech. Likewise, the number of Americans living in poverty today is nearly identical to that of pre–War on Poverty initiatives. Many conservatives take issue with

the very idea that **capitalism** creates permanent poverty, viewing such notions as vulgar **Marxism**, and take Friedman's position that capitalism resolves rather than causes poverty.

Defenders of the War on Poverty counter that the gap between rich and poor narrowed significantly during the War on Poverty's most active phase (1964 to 1968) and that this gap and poverty rates have climbed dramatically since the War on Poverty was curtailed. In 1973 about 11.1 percent of Americans were poor; by 2004 it had risen to 12.7 percent. They also point to the soaring gaps between the pay of CEOs and the pay of employees and to the rising levels of wealth held by less than 1 percent of the richest Americans at the expense of the bottom 90 percent. Liberals often argue that the War on Poverty was being won until resources were squandered on the Vietnam War, a point forcefully made by the Rev. Martin **Luther King Jr.** in 1967. Some advocates charge that the conservative attack on the War on Poverty is motivated by racism and nativism, as well as greed, given that many antipoverty programs serve a disproportionate percentage of people of color and non-Anglo immigrants. Still others note that many of the accomplishments of the War on Poverty are obscured by an overemphasis on the chronic underclass; for example, tens of thousands of working-class children attended college thanks to generous federal educational subsidies and parlayed their education into a rise into the middle class.

The ideological lines drawn in the 1960s and 1970s remain the parameters of contemporary debate, though presidents **Ronald Reagan**, George H. W. **Bush**, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush have enacted, to varying degrees, reforms that have altered or abandoned War on Poverty programs.

Suggested Reading

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WARNER, W. LLOYD (October 26, 1898–May 23, 1970)

ROBERT E. WEIR

William Lloyd Warner was an important social anthropologist and sociologist whose work on social stratification remains a classic.

Born in Redlands, California, Warner majored in anthropology at the University of California at Berkeley and did graduate work at Harvard, from which he obtained his PhD in 1935. Warner taught at both Harvard and Radcliffe until moving on to the University of Chicago, where he taught anthropology and sociology from 1939 to 1959. In 1959 he became a professor of social research at the University of Michigan, and he remained associated with that university until his death in 1970.

Warner's background in social anthropology had a profound impact on his sociological research on stratification. In the early days of the discipline, many scholars, including **Max Weber**, fell under the sway of an **American exceptionalism** thesis that posited that the United States was a relatively classless society. Although Weber and others were cognizant of inequality, they maintained faith in the possibility of upward **social mobility**, which they viewed as a by-product of the relative openness of American society vis-à-vis more tradition-bound European nations.

Marxism competed with the Weberian view of social class. By the twentieth century, Marxist analysis had grown in sophistication, but most adherents retained the rigid economic determinism of Karl Marx, as well as his tendency to view class in dichotomous terms (**bourgeoisie** and **proletariat**).

Advances in the social sciences and the impact of the **Great Depression** served to cast doubt on overly neat models of class, whether they were rooted in ideology or **objective** measures. Warner is considered a pioneer in the use of **reputational** factors of determining class. His anthropological training attuned him to the power of symbols and subjective motivation. Warner saw social class as more complex than most existing studies would have it. His "Yankee City" studies conducted in the 1930s dealt with how objective and **subjective** measures of class came together in a small New England town (Newburyport). Rather than relying solely on objective measures of class, such as wealth, property, or income, Warner also factored in the self-perceptions of his subjects and supplemented them with how others within the community perceived those subjects. This gave Warner insight into how prestige, influence, and esteem factored into class construction. The Yankee City works, published in five volumes and abridged in 1963, formed the basis for one of Warner's enduring contributions to stratification studies. He was among the first scholars to see divisions within a social class, further subdividing upper, middle, and lower classes into upper upper, lower upper, upper middle, lower middle, upper lower, and lower lower classes.

The upper upper class came from old money, was well-entrenched, and enjoyed high prestige, esteem, and social influence. It was they who often controlled the Social Register, attended Ivy League schools, and chaired philanthropies. By contrast, the lower upper often had more actual wealth than the upper upper class, but because they were often **nouveau riche**, they could not compare in prestige or influence, a factor that lessened class esteem. The business elite and professionals who made up the upper middle class also enjoyed great wealth, but Warner identified them as social climbers who were well aware that the very fact that their income was derived from work tainted them in the eyes of their social betters. Ironically, though, this group often aped the values and cultural practices of the upper classes. This was true also of those in the lower middle class, though their more modest professions limited their ability to do so. The lower middle class also valued education, but tended to have a more pragmatic, vocational view of it and were more likely to attend cheaper, but less prestigious schools. Like the upper middle class, those in the lower middle class also suffered from **status** anxiety, a malady rooted in reality for some. Many members of the lower middle class made less money than skilled workers and owned material goods that were mere simulacra of the possessions of those with disposable income.

In fact, Warner placed low-wage white-collar workers in the upper lower class, a group largely synonymous with working-class blue-collar workers. Warner, somewhat simplistically, viewed this group as the respectable poor. They held low-paying manual labor or service jobs, saved little, owned fewer goods (and of lower quality), and were often a few missed paychecks from destitution. The lower lower class was originally viewed pejoratively and in near Victorian terms: unmotivated, lazy, and helpless. Warner modified this somewhat in his 1960 text *Social Class in America*, perhaps because he had come to see this group as constituting 25 percent of the population. (The lower middle and upper lower, by his calculations, made up nearly 63 percent of the population, leaving a mere 12 percent in comfortable circumstances.)

Warner later applied his methodology to communities in the Midwest and South. He spotlighted the inequality gap in works such as *Democracy in Jonesville* (1949) and *American Life: Dream and Reality* (1953). In the latter part of his career, he turned more exclusively to studies of symbolism.

Warner's work on class has been criticized as overly **functionalist**, especially his view that some level of inequality motivates individuals and thus serves society well. Still others see his 1930s and 1940s models as outmoded, his collection methods as unreliable, and his data as questionable. Although there is validity to such charges, Warner should be credited with adding complexity to the understanding of how class works, nuance to how it is defined, and more precision into how categories are constructed.

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WASP

ROBERT E. WEIR

WASP is an acronym that stands for White, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant. Traditionally, those of a WASP background have been socially privileged in American society. Although American pluralism has challenged WASP hegemony, and groups such as Catholics, Mormons, and Jewish Americans no longer suffer the opprobrium of past years, WASPs continue to occupy privileged social space, especially WASP males. In some circles, the term WASP is a slur, but such usage is more of a reaction to the social power of this group than an accurate description of the power they wield in American society.

It is unclear where the term originated, though some have traced its origins to **Irish Americans** wishing to differentiate themselves from those of English background. This may be accurate, but it is much narrower than how the term came to be understood. By the mid-nineteenth century, "Anglo-Saxon" had come to be seen, even by eugenicists, as incorporating more than just those of British and

German descent. Scandinavians and other "Nordics" came under its rubric, as did the Dutch and northern Europeans in general.

"Anglo-Saxon" characteristics also became inextricably tied to constructions of "whiteness." It is sometimes inaccurately claimed that WASP status did not include members of the **working class**. Although it is true that being WASP was a prerequisite for belonging to the nineteenth-century **upper class**, numerous studies indicate that "becoming white" was an important marker of assimilation for **immigrant** groups such as the Irish and Italians. Some abandoned Catholicism as they entered the **middle class**, but most of those whose social class standing remained working class nonetheless came to embrace the alleged superiority of "whiteness." Groups such as Italian Americans and Greek Americans sought to shed their Mediterranean associations and identify with WASP racial constructs. By the **Gilded Age**, a complex ethnic hierarchy had developed that placed whites (broadly interpreted) at the top of the pyramid and relegated Slavs, **Latinos and Hispanics**, the Spanish, Native Americans, and those of Asian or African descent to lower ranks (the Chinese often occupied the bottom).

Religion complicated matters, and it was not until the mid-twentieth century that non-Protestants began to successfully counter historical patterns of religious discrimination. This coincided with a decline in the traditional upper class and an erosion of liberal Protestantism. Until then, a WASP background generally denoted better breeding and higher **status** to those of means and **wealth**. There can be little doubt that it was an instrument of **social reproduction** for the upper class. WASP roots often dictated one's entrance into **Ivy League** schools, tony **country clubs**, listings in the *Social Register*, and other markers of **prestige**. Likewise, wealthy individuals often belonged to liberal Protestant groups, especially Congregationalism, **Episcopalianism**, Presbyterianism, and Lutheranism. (This also meant that the term WASP had more meaning in the North and Midwest than in the South or West.)

The first recorded scholarly use of the term WASP occurred in a 1962 American Journal of Sociology article, but it passed into wide use when it was used by E. Digby Baltzell in his 1964 The Protestant Establishment. Ironically, Baltzell's book was a lamentation on the fading of WASP hegemony; in other words, he increased awareness of a group in decline. The presidential election of the Roman Catholic John F. Kennedy in 1960 is often viewed as death knell for the Protestant requirement for WASP-hood; the Kennedy family met all other requirements for elite status. The success of Jewish Americans in business, finance, medicine, and other prestigious fields similarly challenged Protestantism's hold on social prestige. As early as 1955, Will Herberg's Protestant, Catholic, Jew: An Essay in American Religious Sociology suggested that religion had become subsumed by an "American way" in which culture dissolved doctrinal differences.

It would, however, be a mistake to assume that WASPs no longer staff the **power elite**. By the early twenty-first century, just 52 percent of Americans were Protestant, but 57 percent of students entering Harvard in 2002 were Protestant, and governing boards of most elite schools are overwhelmingly Protestant, as are **CEO**s. Of greater significance is the fact that though Protestantism's grip on social **authority** has loosened, race, ethnicity, and country of origin continue to impact **life chances**. There are many who would argue that the WASP ideal has lost its luster, but few would concur that white Euro-Americans are no longer a privileged group.

Suggested Reading

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WEALTH

See Income and Wealth.

WEALTH AGAINST COMMONWEALTH

ROBERT E. WEIR

Wealth against Commonwealth is the title of a sensational and controversial book penned by **muckraking** journalist Henry Demarest Lloyd in 1894. It is often considered one of the most eloquent attacks on **monopolies** and pleas for Christian **socialism** of the age.

Lloyd (1847–1903) is considered one of the foremost investigative journalists of his day, one whose reputation rivaled that of E. L. Godkin. From 1872 to 1885, he was a writer and editor for the *Chicago Tribune*, and he deeply immersed himself in reformist activity associated with **settlement houses**, the campaign against **child labor**, and the **labor movement**. Among his friends and associates were figures such as **Jane Addams**, **Eugene Debs**, John Dewey, **Henry George**, **Samuel Gompers**, William Dean Howells, and Ida Tarbell.

Wealth against Commonwealth was an outgrowth of attacks on monopoly in two earlier books and in a series of newspaper articles. Lloyd was especially critical of the Standard Oil Company owned by John Rockefeller, a target later taken on also by Tarbell. His book appeared during a severe economic downturn occasioned by the Panic of 1893 and at a time when capitalism, though clearly ascendant, was still questioned by many Americans. Lloyd penned a blistering attack on robber barons and the arrogance of wealth. "Nature is rich," he wrote, "but everywhere man, the heir to nature, is poor." He accused America's captains of industry, investors, monopolists, and power brokers of placing self-interest above public interest. Later he noted that "liberty produces wealth, and wealth destroys liberty." He echoed Thomas Macaulay in asserting that the greatest threat to Western civilization was not a rising of the masses, but rather the internal decay wrought by "barbarians . . . from above." Several of these sentiments were later echoed by Franklin D. Roosevelt in defense of New Deal programs.

Lloyd left the *Tribune* in 1885 to devote his energies to reform movements and to travel. He was a great admirer of social reforms taking place in New Zealand during the 1890s, especially its system to replace **strikes** with mandatory and binding arbitration. He left a considerable fortune when he died of pneumonia in 1903,

and many of his family members, grandchildren, and great-grandchildren continued his reforming zeal. Of particular note have been peace activist Lola Maverick Lloyd (1875–1944), the wife of Henry's son William Bross Lloyd; Henry's granddaughter Jessie Lloyd O'Connor (1904–88), a radical journalist; and Robin Lloyd (1939–), a Vermont-based peace advocate and filmmaker.

Wealth against Commonwealth is seldom read in contemporary America, but its attack on the destructiveness of capitalist acquisition remains pertinent. The book dared to ask the question of how much is enough and to question the values that place the desires of individuals over the needs of the commonwealth.

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WEBER, MAX (April 21, 1864–June 14, 1920)

М. Ј. Вимв

Max Weber was a German sociologist and political economist. He was born in Erfurt, Germany, into a solidly **bourgeois** family. Weber (pronounced *Vaber*) held professorships at the University of Heidelberg and at the University of Munich and is considered one of the founders of modern sociology. He defined sociology as "a science concerning itself with the interpretive understanding of social action and thereby with a causal explanation of its course and consequences."

Weber was primarily concerned with the process of "rationalization" in Western society. In *Economy and Society*, Weber described rationalization as an increasingly specialized process that applied knowledge to achieve specific goals. Institutions of authority, Weber recognized, were regulated more by systematic procedures and impersonal rules than by the dictates of religion or custom. Such regulations then led to bureaucracies where divisions of labor depersonalized work and secularized communities. As a coordinator of human action, bureaucracy is, according to Weber, "capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency, and is in this sense formally the most rational known means of exercising authority over human beings. It is superior to any other form in precision, in stability, in the stringency of its discipline, and in its reliability." This conception of bureaucracy was closely linked to Weber's key contribution to the sociology of politics. In *Politics as a Vocation*, Weber defined the state as "an entity which possesses a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force," an understanding that has informed modern political science ever since.

This concern for "rationalization" and the rise of bureaucracy is expressed most vividly in Weber's most famous work, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (published in 1905). There he argues that Protestant religion, especially Calvinism, and its concept of "predestination" rationalized (unintentionally) the **work ethic** that gave rise to **capitalism**. Predestination—the Calvinist belief that salvation was

preordained—had the ironic effect of associating holiness with dedication to one's duty (or work). Predestination compelled early **Puritans** to labor compulsively (to show their blessedness) and thus encouraged people to acquire **wealth**. For Weber, this "ethic" originated during seventeenth-century Europe, after which the idea of "constant accumulation" sanctioned the unlimited pursuit of economic gain and fostered the rise of capitalism. From ascetic religion to modern-day capitalism, Weber observed,

For when asceticism was carried out of monastic cells into everyday life, and began to dominate worldly morality, it did its part in building the tremendous cosmos of the modern economic order. This order is now bound to the technical and economic conditions of machine production which today determine the lives of all the individuals who are born into this mechanism, not only those directly concerned with economic acquisition, with irresistible force. Perhaps it will so determine them until the last ton of fossilized coal is burnt.

Though Weber (like Karl Marx before him) proposed that economic factors determined our social system, he distinguished that position by emphasizing the constant interaction and interplay between the two. Marx's notion of alienation and Weber's notion of rationalization share similarities, but they did differ fundamentally: Weber saw alienation as a by-product of rationalization, not the consequence of a mode of production. In this respect, Weber asserted that depersonalization (or alienation) was inevitable given (in Weber's cosmology) that modern society all but mandated the modern worker to join a bureaucratic organization. In effect, Weber viewed socialism (in the form of highly bureaucratized government ownership over the economy) as *more* alienating than capitalism, which at the very least was less rationalized.

Nevertheless, Weber's construction of class was consonant with Marx's category, those who "have in common a specific causal component of their life chances in so far as this component is represented exclusively by economic interests in the possession of goods and opportunities for income, and it is represented under the conditions of the commodity or labor market." Weber further refined and stratified classes into "status groups" predicated upon consumption relationships (e.g., lifestyle choices and social esteem) rather than just their position on the economic ladder. In so doing, Weber offered an explanation of why a proletarian revolution never happened in America, where obsessive, pluralistic status groups complicated any simple notion of class. Yet despite his elucidation of rationalized societies infatuated with status, Weber never endorsed such a system—he just observed it to be consistently applicable and successful. For him, the horizon of our sociocultural evolution contained only an "iron cage" of absolute control and rote rules, eventuating in "specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart."

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WELFARE

GINA L. KEEL

Welfare refers broadly to programs and policies that increase social well-being, including assistance for the poor, elderly, disabled, and **unemployed**; health, education, and transportation services; cultural and recreational opportunities; and even **progressive taxation**. Narrowly defined, welfare is synonymous with cash benefit programs for needy individuals and families. The largest contemporary social welfare programs or "entitlements" benefit all economic classes in the United States, yet most people associate the term welfare with "means-tested" programs that require recipients to prove that they are poor enough to receive them. Such recipients qualify by having incomes near the federal **poverty line** and assets of little value.

American colonies addressed the problem of poverty by adopting laws modeled on the English Poor Law (1601) and Settlement Act (1662). **Poverty** and indigence were considered personal, moral flaws, and assistance required permanent residency and work. In Massachusetts Bay Colony, for example, the mentally and physically handicapped were returned to England, their place of "legal settlement." Freedom of movement was restricted, and people wanting to move into a community had to post a bond or prove they would not become dependent. Needy orphans and children were ordered by local authorities to live with a family and learn a vocation. If parents did not teach or provide a trade education, the town could also intervene. Needy elderly were also placed with townspeople who provided for basic needs. The towns paid providers of these early welfare services and funded them through local taxation.

From the later colonial period through most of the nineteenth century, relief was provided through almshouses and poorhouses, and states took a greater role in financing them. "Vagabonds" without property or vocations were clothed, fed, lodged, and put to work in most states, so there were few beggars except in large towns, and they were often foreigners. Americans distrusted and denigrated the poor, and relief was made unpleasant to "discourage" dependency and prevent corruption of others in society. Civil liberties were not guaranteed, and recipients were intentionally stigmatized in some places. Recipients of aid could lose their personal property, right to vote, and right to move and could even be required to wear a "P" on their clothing as a symbol of their status.

Private charity and **philanthropy** became important sources of assistance in the eighteenth century, and they remain so today. Cooperative efforts between philanthropies and local governments provided early public services, including the first public hospital in Philadelphia (1751). The federal government was little involved with social welfare until the twentieth century; most national leaders viewed this as the responsibility of private organizations and state and local governments. A **Civil War** pension program did provide benefits to disabled veterans, veterans' widows, and orphans when the disability or death was "incurred as a direct consequence of . . . military duty." Confederate veterans and their dependents were excluded. The Freedmen's Bureau (1865–72), which provided food, schools, orphanages, employment assistance, and legal aid to newly freed African Americans, is another important exception.

The Preamble to the U.S. Constitution declares that the national government should "promote the general welfare," and education was one of the policy areas that the founders had in mind. Thomas Jefferson argued that education was necessary to maintain democracy. The Northwest Ordinance (1787) enacted by the Confederation Congress encouraged **education** and stipulated that a section of land be reserved for educational facilities in every town of each new state. Horace Mann popularized the idea of free, public elementary schools, but his vision was not realized in many states until the late nineteenth or early twentieth century, particularly in the South. Equal access to quality education was advanced by the Supreme Court's Brown v. Board of Education decision (1954), which forced racial integration of schools, and the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (1965), which provided federal funds to low-income students. The Morrill Acts (1862 and 1890) granted public lands to establish state colleges that would "promote the liberal and practical education of the industrial classes" by teaching "agricultural and mechanical arts." This is the origin of many public universities. But it was the GI Bill (1944) that paid college expenses for veterans and thereby broke the long tradition of higher education reserved for the wealthy. Overall, access to education for Americans of all classes, races, and regions was delayed by federal deference to states in this area of social welfare.

Aside from education, the founding of the American welfare state and the design of many contemporary welfare programs are rooted in the **Social Security** Act of 1935. This act initiated insurance-based programs to maintain income during retirement and periods of **unemployment**; it also provided various assistance programs for the blind, disabled, elderly, and dependent children and grants to the states for health services. This historic shift in national government purpose was a response to the **Stock Market** Crash of 1929 and the **Great Depression** of the 1930s that closed banks and businesses, eliminated life savings, and created millions of unemployed men, hungry families, and malnourished children.

President **Franklin D. Roosevelt** argued that Americans had a right to economic "security against the major hazards and vicissitudes of life" and that the best way to guarantee it was through compulsory insurance programs funded by payroll taxes. The individual would not face risk alone; risk would be shared or socialized. Roosevelt favored long-term insurance programs rather than temporary federal relief programs to "preserve not only the bodies of the unemployed from destitution but also their self-respect, their self-reliance," and a contributory system would be permanent and less subject to political shifts. The new welfare state required the national government to be more active, but the American commitment to **capitalism** and **individualism** was preserved, whereas more radical, **socialist** movements of the 1930s were diffused.

The Social Security Act was amended in the 1950s to include disability insurance for workers and their dependents, amended in the 1960s to include health insurance for the elderly (Medicare), and amended in the 1970s to include supplemental security income (SSI) for the elderly, blind, and disabled poor as well as automatic cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs). The New Deal's temporary food-subsidy program, which boosted agriculture and provided nutritious food to the poor, was transformed into a permanent food stamp program in 1964. The funding and size of the program have waxed and waned with political cycles. Currently, more than 25 million needy households receive benefits.

The American welfare state has most notably expanded when creating programs for the "deserving poor," those who were vulnerable through no fault of their own. The "undeserving poor" were either imposters, committing fraud and "taking advantage" of programs to avoid work, or the morally corrupt. Dominant American culture retained a moralist aspect that distrusted the long-term unemployed and those whose behavior seemed to contribute to their poverty. During the 1950s, many needy children were denied benefits under "suitable home" or "man-in-the-house" policies, and states denied aid payments to the children of unwed mothers and others exhibiting what was labeled immoral behavior, disproportionately targeting African Americans. During the Johnson administration's War on Poverty, federal oversight and rule-making limited states' abilities to discriminate and deny aid, but expansion of this program increased political hostility. Calls for welfare reform began in the late 1960s but culminated in 1996, with legislation targeting the undeserving poor substance abusers, delinquents, immigrants, and nonworking mothers. SSI disability benefits were denied to those whose drug addiction or alcoholism was a major contributor to their disability, were terminated for most noncitizens, and were narrowed for children with behavioral problems. Legal immigrants were denied food stamps, though food stamps were reinstated for long-term residents in 2002.

The greatest backlash against welfare focused on the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program, commonly called "welfare," which entitled poor families (usually headed by single females) to receive cash benefits for as long as minor children lived in the home. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (1996) replaced AFDC with the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program and sought to end welfare dependency and reduce the number of children born out of wedlock. It ended entitlement by implementing time limits (five years lifetime), strict work requirements, and termination of eligibility if the recipient was convicted on drug charges or if children failed to regularly attend school. States were required to move 25 percent of the recipients in their caseloads into work in the first year or face cuts to new federal block grants. Another goal of the reform was to devolve power and responsibility to the states for designing and administering programs. States now have flexibility to determine eligibility and the mix of cash benefits and services they want to provide with TANF funds. The success of TANF is hotly debated. Caseloads were cut in half, and a majority of recipients moved into the workforce, but poverty persists for many welfare leavers because of low-wage jobs with few benefits, scarce and expensive child care and housing, health problems, and transportation challenges. States continue to struggle with the needy who are unable to get or keep jobs, and sanctions reducing or eliminating benefits fall on the weakest recipients. The incomes of the poorest one-fifth of **one-parent families** have continued to fall, and many poor families have become poorer since the 1996 reforms. Roughly one of three who have left TANF rolls since 1996 have done so because they have exhausted their eligibility, not because they have become self-sufficient.

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Westward Expansion

SHERI BARTIETT BROWNE

America's geographic transformation in the nineteenth century was nothing short of phenomenal, with the acquisition of land from the Louisiana Purchase and the Mexican-American War inspiring the exploration journeys of, among others, Meriwether Lewis and William Clark, Zebulon Pike, Stephen H. Long, and John C. Fremont. Expansion raised ugly debates about the existence of **slavery** in acquired territories and the role of new **immigrants** in a growing republic, and it fed a land hunger that would not soon be satiated. Americans moved westward by the thousands after the 1840s in search of homesteads, gold, religious freedom, and political rights.

Social critic and political activist George Henry Evans, editor of the *Working Man's Advocate*, spearheaded a campaign in the 1830s to open western land to settlers at no cost to the occupants. Along with many in the **labor movement**, he argued that eastern laborers should be entitled to tracts of land in order to escape **poverty**. Newspaperman Horace Greeley publicized the concept, which was supported by western Democrats and Republicans. A first homestead bill failed to pass Congress in 1860 because of proslavery Southerners' fears of increasing western dominance. Dixie's subsequent departure from the Union enabled the Republican Party to garner the votes necessary to pass the Homestead Act of 1862. It contained provisions that **working-class** men and women hoped would increase their self-sufficiency in a rapidly industrializing economy: 160-acre grants of surveyed but unoccupied public land; a small fee for recording the tracts; and the right to gain title after five years of occupancy and designated improvements.

Although approximately 1.6 million settlers proved their claims during the late nineteenth century, the failure rate was nearly one half. Unfavorable credit policies resulted in numerous foreclosures, and droughts, grasshopper infestations, and the Panic of 1873 claimed many more would-be farmers in the Midwest and the Great Plains. Despite the optimism of boosters such as Evans and Greeley, many eastern workers never took advantage of the Homestead Act. Homesteading required an investment in farm tools, livestock, household goods and furnishings, and the means to travel. This capital venture proved unrealistic for most laborers, whose wages generally did not permit saving for such an extravagance.

Other factors made land and wealth difficult to obtain for average citizens. Land grabs by speculators, the railroads, and cattle and sheep barons absorbed the most desirable acreage. Large ranchers often engaged in unscrupulous practices to keep small ranchers and cowboys from competing with their successful enterprises, resulting occasionally in armed conflict. The 1892 Johnson County War in

Wyoming was a particularly virulent response by corrupt **cattle kingdom** magnates. More common was intra-class sabotage between the owners of sheep and cattle as they fought over fencing and grazing rights.

The most significant settlers in the West were not individuals but the railroads. The first transcontinental line was completed in 1869, which followed smaller and innovative endeavors such as the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. By 1873 railroads linked the East with the West through several trunk routes, via rapidly developing cities such as Chicago and St. Louis. Railroads influenced the path and the pace of settlement, especially after the Pacific Railroad Act (1862). This legislation provided railroads enormous grants of public lands for each mile of track laid, thus subsidizing the four transcontinentals. Railroads determined the crops to be grown in a particular area, established the rates for transporting goods to market, and frequently refused to sell the most valuable and arable farmland to immigrants. Their practices fueled angry farmers in the Grange and the Farmers' Alliance and ultimately the **Populists**. As empire builders, promoters of growth, occupiers of land, and creators of public policy, railroad companies defined nineteenth-century expansion.

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WHARTON, EDITH (January 24, 1862–August 11, 1937)

VERONICA HENDRICK

Edith Wharton, a novelist famed for her portrayals of the inner life of the upper classes, was born Edith Newbold Jones in New York City and lived amid the affluence about which she later wrote. Wharton's family background was one of wealth and social connections. In 1885, at the age of twenty-three, she married Edward Wharton, but divorced him in 1913. She lived much of her life in France, but maintained her connections to New York society. Wharton's writing focuses on the lives of the ultra wealthy and the myriad problems embedded within this tight-knit, but often fragile, community. Her work is impressive not only for its commentary on high society, but also for its emphasis on women and the restrictive cultural codes dictating female behavior. Although her main characters tend to be wealthy, Wharton's work is highly attuned to class restrictions. She highlights the difficulty of rising above one's original social class and the ease with which one can plummet.

Her first published work was *The Decoration of Houses* (1897), a guidebook very much like a turn-of-the-century Martha Stewart book instructing women on how to modify their homes. This book was in keeping with Wharton's position in society,

but Wharton soon turned to fiction and poetry. One of her most famous novels, The House of Mirth (1905), focuses on the life of Lily Bart. The heroine struggles to find an appropriate marriage in New York Society. Bart is an extremely beautiful woman who does not have enough money to marry the most eligible bachelors, yet her personal morality prevents her from selling herself to the highest bidder. Instead, she trades on her charm, good looks, and social connections to be invited to the correct parties and receive suitors. The novel is a commentary on the role of women because it demonstrates the problems that social pressure creates. One false move can easily compromise a woman's standing in society. For Lily Bart, beauty is also a problem because of the petty jealousies it creates in her competitors. Ultimately, Bart chooses to forgo a life of guaranteed luxury and declines several marriage proposals that would have relieved her increasing poverty. As the heroine experiences downward social mobility, she takes a job to support herself, but despairs over her failure to function in the society into which she was born. The novel closes with her death, often interpreted as a suicide. The novel is an indictment of the false values of society and the oppressive roles women must maintain in order to ensure acceptance.

Wharton's literary success continued with her subsequent writing. In 1913 *The Custom of the Country* appeared. The main character, Undine Spragg, is a **social climber** who uses every trick to advance her career. She undertakes several marriages, each more a business proposition than a love match. The novel focuses on the **class consciousness** and greed that drive members from the lowest rungs of the social structure to the upper echelon.

Wharton continued her social and class commentary in *The Age of Innocence* (1920), which won her a Pulitzer Prize. In this novel, Newland Archer battles the standards of his social class and loses. His attraction to an outrageous married woman brings him to the bitter realization that he cannot forgo his social position for love. He allows his passion to fade and proceeds on the path established by his class affiliation; he marries a suitable woman and lives a respectable, if cheerless, life. The theme of social restrictions based on class allegiance is a constant trope in Wharton's works.

Wharton is also famed for her short novel Ethan Frome (1911), a brutal tale of a marriage gone horribly wrong that does not concentrate on high society. Instead it focuses on an isolated farm community where the title character tends to his ill and shrewish wife. When a young, attractive relative arrives to help him cope with his unhealthy and bitter spouse, a romance ensues. The ending of the novel is horrific. Frome feels constrained to remain in his marriage because of societal conventions, but sees suicide as a viable alternative. He attempts to kill himself and his lover by careening down a cliff side on a sled. Instead, both are severely injured, and the novel closes with Frome attending to two invalid women, his wife being the healthier of the two. By writing this novel, Wharton was emphasizing that oppressive rules of behavior and decorum are not restricted to the upper class. In the twisted logic of social convention, murder and suicide appear as more respectable choices than divorce and abandonment. This work in conjunction with her other writings demonstrates Wharton's social commentary. She covered all classes of people and consistently criticized the oppressive qualities of society and class consciousness.

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WHARTON SCHOOL OF BUSINESS

RAMI KHALAF SR.

The Wharton School of Business is located at the University of Pennsylvania and is recognized as one of most prestigious business education colleges in the world. It was established by Joseph Wharton, a Philadelphia native, industrialist, and a philanthropist, in 1881 in the hope of producing business leaders, innovative teachers, and researchers. The school is known for its emphasis on free-market **capitalism**.

The school's original name was the Wharton School of Finance and Economy, and its symbol (an anvil) reflects Wharton's pioneering work in the metal industry, where he built his fortune through the American Nickel Company. Wharton's innovation reached the publishing sector, and his school published the very first business textbooks for its students. It also established the first MBA program in health care and real estate, developed the first executive education program, and created the first center for entrepreneurship. The school is regarded as one of the finest management and finance academic centers in the world, employing more than 300 professors.

Wharton School academic departments range from accounting to finance, to health care, insurance, and risk management, and to legal studies, statistics, marketing, and real estate, among other fields, and it has twenty-four research centers, the most of any business school in the world. Its MBA programs carry eighteen majors that offer nearly 200 elective courses within eleven academic departments. The school also has a two-year MBA program for **CEO**s in which students can attend school on weekends. Wharton operates this program at both its main campus in Philadelphia and a satellite in San Francisco. It also offers doctorates in numerous fields.

The Wharton School has more than 80,000 alumni scattered around the world, with eighty-two supporting alumni clubs. Its graduates are found in many high-powered fields and include Stanley Goldstein, the founder and CEO of CVS; C. Christopher Gaut, the chief financial officer of Halliburton; Mike Eskew, the CEO and chair of UPS; Warren Buffett, CEO of Berkshire Hathaway; Zeti Aziz, governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia; Passera Corrado, CEO of Italy's Banca Intesa; Serck Joo Hong, president and CEO of Chohung Bank of Korea; U.S. Representative Chaka Fattah; and **Donald Trump**, the founder, president, and CEO of Trump Hotels and Casino Resorts.

The Wharton School's long tradition of educating political, media, financial, and business leaders, many of whom are conservative, has led some observers to associate it with production of the **corporate class**. Wharton's graduates also maintain **social networks** that give aspiring students a competitive advantage.

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WHISKEY REBELLION

THOMAS A. WING

The Whiskey Rebellion was the largest armed confrontation among Americans between the **American Revolution** and the **Civil War**. The origins of the Whiskey Rebellion were deeply rooted in class struggle.

In 1791 Congress approved an excise tax on domestically produced distilled spirits. Alexander Hamilton proposed the tax as a measure to lessen government debt. The federal government had assumed state debts incurred during the Revolutionary War in exchange for moving the capital from Philadelphia to the Maryland-Virginia border. He reasoned an excise tax on goods produced and consumed within the country would not affect foreign trade but would generate needed revenue. Acceptance of the tax varied from support from the larger whiskey producers to complete opposition by smaller producers. The larger producers could absorb the tax of nearly six cents per gallon through making more whiskey. Smaller producers were disadvantaged and felt they had been singled out to carry the burden of the tax. Additionally, because of price, western producers paid double the tax rate of eastern producers.

Many of the smaller producers were of Scots-Irish extraction and grew grain themselves. Cries of "equal taxation and no excise" rang out. Most of the opposition came from western farmers, particularly in Pennsylvania, but westerners from the frontier areas of Maryland, Virginia, North and South Carolina, Georgia, and the entire state of Kentucky also disagreed with the tax. Tensions rose as the brunt of the tax fell upon the poorer sectors of American society. The western farmers also sought government support in settling disputes with the Native Americans and in opening the Mississippi River to navigation.

Westerners found it impossible to support a tax by a government they believed was ignoring their needs. Opposition to internal taxes harkened to the American Revolution. With increasing violence and abuse toward tax collectors, many of whom were wealthy, and increasing nonviolent refusal to pay the tax, President George Washington chose to call in troops to suppress the rebellion after the Supreme Court ruled military force necessary. Washington declared the actions of the citizens "subversive, dangerous, and criminal" and issued a proclamation to explain his actions. Upset farmers tarred and feathered a revenue official and burned the residence of another; shots were exchanged. In 1794 over 12,000 militia soldiers (mostly from New Jersey) marched to Pennsylvania, led personally by Washington himself.

The presence of troops brought an end to the conflict, and the precedent was set for using the military against citizens if the need existed. Hamilton conducted the arrest of more than one hundred leaders of the rebellion, and two were convicted of treason. Although defeated by force, the rebellion led to the founding of the Democrat-Republican party, the rise of Thomas Jefferson, and the eventual repeal of the excise tax in 1802. Jefferson's Democrat-Republican party opposed strong central government and supported greater representation of the common man. The Whiskey Rebellion also involved states rights versus the power of the federal government, an issue that was not decided until the end of the Civil War, and an issue still debated today.

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WHITE BACKLASH

ROBERT E. WEIR

"White backlash" is a contentious term used to describe a phenomenon in which Caucasian Americans allegedly have reacted negatively to civil rights, multiculturalism, **immigration**, and cultural change. Some observers think it describes the behavior of a small number of Americans and is blown out of proportion by the media. Others argue that it is mostly applicable to white males or that the phrase improperly aligns individuals with legitimate concerns about their social **status** with those who support white supremacy groups.

Non-Hispanic whites have declined as a percentage of the U.S. population. In 1980—when the official census pegged the population of the United States at 226,545,805—79.5 percent of the population was white, 11.5 percent African American, 6.4 percent Latino, and 1.5 percent of Asian decent. The 2000 census counted 281,421,906 residents, of whom 69.1 percent were white, 12 percent black, 12.5 percent Latino, and 3.6 percent Asian. By 2004 Latinos had grown to 13 percent of the population, and they are projected to be a quarter of the population by 2050. According to white backlash proponents, many Caucasians feel besieged and have supported reactionary politicians or movements aimed at slowing the development of multiculturalism. Members of the white working class are said to be particularly anxious, though voting trends from the 1970s associate white suburbanites from the middle class with white backlash patterns.

How "whiteness" is defined has been contested throughout American history. European explorers, conquerors, and settlers—whether English, Dutch, French, Spanish, or Swedish—simply assumed racial and cultural superiority over the **Native Americans** they encountered and the Africans brought as **slaves**. Both Colonial and early Republican **elites** enacted various laws—including miscegenation statutes, evidentiary rules, and personal freedom laws—designed to discourage **lower-class** whites from allying themselves with slaves, free blacks, or Natives.

By the early nineteenth century, the **Industrial Revolution** in the North and the rise of cotton production throughout the South served to tie racial identity to class awareness. As slavery became deeply entrenched in the South, manumission was highly regulated, and even poor white farmers came to see themselves as superior to blacks. Some historians argue that a wealthy slavocracy used racial identity as a form of social control. Even if one rejects the slavocracy thesis, there can be little doubt that the emergent northern working class absorbed the popular racism of the day. Lowell millworkers of the 1830s balked at demeaning jobs they deemed "nigger work," and the term "white slavery" referenced unfair labor conditions long before it became a synonym for prostitution. Several scholars argue that workers early on developed a race-based conception of wages that linked high pay to whiteness and viewed people of color as threats to the wage structure. The American working class, as an aggregate, frequently opposed the abolitionist movement, sometimes violently so. After the Civil War, many workers viewed the Chinese with the same sort of contempt with which they viewed black laborers. In the South, the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) found recruits across the classes, but drew heavily from the lower strata of white society.

For much of the nineteenth century, "whiteness" was not readily apparent. In most of the antebellum South, a "one drop" rule prevailed, meaning that any African ancestry made an individual "black." Quite a few "black" slaves appeared "white" by outward appearance. Throughout society, a **WASP** background was necessary for unqualified whiteness, and immigrant groups such as the Irish were often subjected to racial stereotypes and discrimination. During the **Gilded Age**, a complex racial hierarchy linked to **Social Darwinism** and **eugenics** developed. Immigrants from eastern and southern Europe, as well as the Irish, had to struggle to be seen as "white," and those of Latino or Asian origin were viewed as social outcasts and biologically inferior. (Native Americans were ushered onto reservations to remove them from white society.) The prevailing "science" of the day warned WASPs to avoid "race suicide," a term used to promote endogamy and immigration restriction.

Notions of white racial superiority continued into the twentieth century. Some imperialists evoked the "white man's burden" to justify aggressive foreign policy, while throughout the nation Jim Crow **segregation** laws placed African Americans in secondary social roles. When the Ku Klux Klan revived in the early 1920s, it sometimes targeted non-WASP ethnic groups as well as African Americans.

In the 1940s whiteness faced political challenges from individuals such as A. Philip Randolph and Adam Clayton Powell Jr., and figures such as Jackie Robinson, Paul Robeson, and Marian Anderson carved out niches in once racially exclusive cultural spaces. The Supreme Court's 1954 *Brown v. the Board of Education* decision and the rise of the modern Civil Rights Movement sent shock waves through white society. The 1964 Civil Rights Act removed most of the legal barriers preserving white supremacy, and the actions of civil rights activists made certain that abstract principles became social practice.

The advancement of civil rights provoked a decided white backlash. Within the Democratic Party, southern "Dixiecrats" resisted civil rights and often positioned themselves as obstacles to enforcing legal decisions. Although politicians such as Senator Harry Byrd Sr. of Virginia and governors George Wallace of Alabama and

Lester Maddox of Georgia embodied the public face of the white backlash, all were extremely popular with their white constituencies. In 1964 the Republican Barry Goldwater captured five southern states in his losing bid for the presidency, a campaign political scientists now see as pivotal in helping the GOP wrest white southern voters from the Democrats. George Wallace's 1968 presidential bid also tapped into the anger of whites who felt threatened by civil rights, disliked race-based school busing plans, and saw affirmative action programs as unfair. Richard Nixon used racial code words as part of his successful 1968 run for the presidency.

In 1969 Newsweek magazine did a cover story on white backlash. Many blue-collar whites expressed feelings of marginalization and felt that reverse discrimination toward whites was rampant within society. Although many researchers found the Newsweek story simplistic, white backlash manifested itself in subtle ways. For instance, white families reacted to school busing by moving to suburbia; by the 1990s schools were more racially segregated than at the time of the Brown decision. White backlash even spawned a popular culture icon, Archie Bunker, the crusty-but-lovable bigot of television's All in the Family (1971–79).

Southern white flight to the Republican Party was instrumental in **Ronald Reagan**'s 1980 presidential election. Reagan was even more successful than Nixon at using racial code words, and there was a scaling back of racial initiatives in the 1980s. Many whites, particularly in the South, switched their allegiance to the Republican Party in the 1980s, including numerous members of Congress. Reagan's avuncular personality made him popular with the working class throughout the nation, an irony considering that his administration saw wholesale **deindustrialization** that endangered the livelihoods of the same blue-collar voters who embraced him.

This irony is the basis of much of the debate over white backlash. In essence, the question is whether the backlash is about race per se or whether observers have incorrectly assigned a racial reading to the anger of blue-collar Americans reacting to economic and social change. The latter is an interpretation of observers such as **Barbara Ehrenreich** and Susan Faludi. In her book *Stiffed*, Faludi argues that many American males feel that the nation has broken its social contract with them and has denied them access to the **American dream**.

There are, nonetheless, very well-documented cases that link some white back-lash to virulent strains of white supremacy. In 1990 former KKK leader David Duke received 60 percent of the white vote in an almost-successful primary bid to run for the U.S. Senate; two years later he got 55 percent of that vote in a campaign to become Louisiana governor. He remains a powerful figure in Louisiana politics and heads the European-American Unity and Rights Organization, a white supremacy group. It is one of several groups that human rights groups classify as a "hate group"; others include Aryan Nations, the National Alliance and Church of the Creator, Knights of the KKK, and various neo-Nazi skinhead and survivalist groups. In the 1990s, 65 percent of all reported hate crimes were perpetuated by whites against people of color and gays and lesbians. Skinhead groups—supposedly active in forty states—are believed to have committed twenty-five murders against Latinos, **Jewish Americans**, and African Americans in the 1990s. The Simon Wiesenthal Institute reported there were 254 hate crimes in 1998, and the Human Rights Campaign reported another 651 from 1999 through 2002, about 65 percent

of which appear to have been racially motivated. Hate crimes have skyrocketed in the twenty-first century; in 2004 the Federal Bureau of Investigation noted there were 7,642 hate crimes, of which nearly 53 percent were racial.

Perhaps more disturbing than the acts of extremists has been the race-baiting—usually through coded words or appeals to religion—by ultra-conservative figures such as radio host Rush Limbaugh, ministers such as Jerry Falwell and **Pat Robertson**, and politicians such as David Duke and **Pat Buchanan**. Some liberals have charged that Republican Party leaders deliberately cultivate white backlash as a vote-getting technique. Like most single-causation theories, that charge oversimplifies the matter. Thomas Sowell, for example, charges that liberals often overlook their own complicity in excusing antisocial behavior that fuels white backlash.

White backlash is likely a combination of myth, displaced anger, racial hatred, and cynical manipulation. But whether it is rare, widespread, waning, or waxing, discussions of white backlash reveal that American ideals of multiculturalism remain strained and are likely to be debated for some time. They also reveal how racial and class awareness have elided.

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WHITE-COLLAR WORK

ROBERT E. WEIR

White-collar work refers to non-manual labor that is generally paid by salary rather than by wages. White-collar work often pays better than blue-collar labor, and it frequently comes with more prestige attached. This is because most white-collar jobs require more education (or specialized training), tend to be cleaner, come with more decision-making power, and are less physically demanding that manual labor. White-collar jobs are customarily associated with "professional" employment and a middle-class lifestyle.

The term may have its origins in the late nineteenth century, when shirts with detachable collars were fashionable. Troy, New York, was once the center of the detachable collar industry. At a time in which laundry was labor-intensive and most individuals did not own extensive wardrobes, the detachable collar allowed one to wear a shirt longer between washings. Those in the professions usually wore waist-coats or jackets over their shirts, and hence, only the collar and cuffs would be seen (cuffs were also detachable). By the late nineteenth century, many collars were made of celluloid, a forerunner of plastic that was easy to clean but also highly flammable. The Arrow Shirt Company is generally credited with re-popularizing attached-collar shirts in the 1920s.

Detachable collars notwithstanding, white collars were harder to clean than colored collars, such as the blue denim of work shirts. White collars, thus, became associated with clerks, managers, attorneys, doctors, and other professionals. It is not known exactly when the phrase came into common usage, though **Upton Sinclair** sometimes gets credit for the first written use of the term, and he did not use it in a flattering manner. In his 1919 work *Brass Check*, Sinclair lampooned the **social climbing** predilections of office clerks who "because they are allowed to wear a white collar . . . regard themselves as members of the **capitalist** class." Many of the references to white-collar labor in both the United States and Britain were similarly ironic during the 1920s and 1930s.

Over time, however, the white collar came to symbolize entrance into professional and middle-class life, and even many working-class parents aspired to have their children escape manual labor and enter white-collar employment. White-collar employment gained in prestige as changes in the American economy made it more prevalent. It was not until 1910 that more Americans resided in urban areas than in the countryside, and it was a decade later before agrarian workers were outnumbered by those laboring in manufacturing and the service sector. In 1920 the numbers of industrial workers and service workers were roughly equal, but the history of the United States since then has been a steady growth of service-sector jobs visà-vis those in manufacturing. By 1930 more than half of all American workers held trade or service-industry jobs; by 1970 that percentage had risen to nearly 65 percent. White-collar labor began to be associated with professional employment because of the efforts of 1920s advertising firms, but it received its biggest boost from the corporate culture that developed during the Cold War. The white collar became stereotypically synonymous with technocrats, bureaucrats, and administrators and was a symbol of what sociologist William Whyte famously dubbed the "Organization Man" in an eponymous 1956 book. Like Sinclair, Whyte's take on white-collar labor was critical; he saw many white-collar workers as uncreative, unreflective, and conformist.

Nonetheless, by the 1950s white-collar work was widespread and began to shed negative associations. Changing fashions from the late 1960s on even stripped it of its whiteness; the term now generally refers simply to non-manual labor because it is no longer necessary to actually wear a white shirt, and even major corporations allow "casual Fridays" in which some workers dress in attire that is little different from those who work with their hands.

As white-collar work has become ubiquitous, the question has arisen over whether it is still a meaningful **status symbol**. **Deindustrialization** and other factors have led to declines in blue-collar employment; hence, white-collar work is losing the referent that once defined it. Moreover, older paradigms of mental versus physical labor have eroded. Retail workers, for example, often put in long hours and engage in hauling and carrying work that differs little from that of unskilled blue-collar workers. Similarly, many office employees work in "Dilbert cubes"—partitioned and windowless spaces named for a popular comic strip—and engage in cheerless and unchallenging tasks to which little prestige is attached.

Some social observers argue that designations such as blue versus white collars or wages versus salaries are meaningless anachronisms. From the standpoint of compensation, emerging trends suggest compensation flattening. Mid-level managers

and administrators commanded salaries (depending on the position) in the \$30,000 to \$40,000 range in 2002, whereas income for those in traditionally blue-collar jobs was in the \$18,000 to \$25,000 range. The difference is significant, but the gap has narrowed between mid-range professional jobs and blue-collar work, even as the gulf has widened to chasm-like proportions between top earners and the masses. Many white-collar workers are among the most poorly paid Americans; some retail workers, teachers' aids, and hotel clerks earn under \$16,000. Barbara Ehrenreich is among the critics who see the white-collar symbol as an illusory measure of prosperity.

Suggested Reading

Barbara Ehrenreich, *Bait and Switch: The (Futile) Pursuit of the American Dream*, 2005; Job Smart, Average Salary Chart (http://tms.ecol.net/jobs/sc.htm); Jacqueline Jones, *American Work: Four Centuries of Black and White Labor*, 1999.

WHITE TRASH

YANNICK THORAVAL

"White trash," or "poor white trash," is a racial label that is typically used as a personal insult. The term specifically describes poor or low-income Caucasians (usually of European descent) who also exhibit certain manners or behaviors that may be perceived as **lower class**. These may include bad personal hygiene, poor manners, or a limited education.

The term also implies certain political views, such as **racism** and xenophobia. The political beliefs of so-called white trash are stereotypically local, nativist, and antiestablishment. The political connotations of the term white trash closely resemble those conveyed by comparable social labels such as "redneck," "hick," and "hillbilly."

The class associations of the term often extend to a particular style of dwelling. Caucasians who live in low-income housing developments or mobile homes are particularly susceptible to being characterized as white trash. Thus, "white trash" and "trailer trash" are often used interchangeably.

It is likely that the term white trash originated in the context of American slavery during the early part of the nineteenth century. Some sources attribute use of the term to black slaves who may have used white trash as a contemptuous reference to white servants on American plantations in the South. However, the origin of the term is uncertain.

The **eugenics** movement in the United States, especially between 1880 and 1920, informed the modern connotations invoked by the term white trash. Eugenics had a profound influence on the social standing of poor whites. During this period, scientific researchers attempted to demonstrate that poor whites were genetically defective and prone to criminal behavior. Eugenics helped to promote the characterization of poor whites as debased, stupid, and criminally minded, characteristics that persist in the stereotypical portrayal of so-called white trash today.

The character Cletus in the animated television series *The Simpsons* embodies many of the stereotypes that are typically attributed to those described as white trash.

Suggested Reading

Anthony Harkins, *Hillbilly: A Cultural History of an American Icon*, 2004; bell hooks, "Representation of Whiteness in the Black Imagination," in *Black Looks: Race & Representation*, 1992; Matt Wray and Annalee Newitz, eds., *White Trash: Race and Class in America*, 1997.

WILSON, WILLIAM JULIUS (December 20, 1935-)

JAMES PETERSON

William Julius Wilson is one of the foremost social scientists of our era. Born in the wake of the **Great Depression** in Derry Township, Pennsylvania, Wilson was sensitized early on to the challenges of the poor and **working classes** in the United States. Wilson's mother was a maid, and his father was a steelworker. The fact that he is currently a well-known Harvard University professor suggests the striking range of his life experiences.

Wilson did his undergraduate work at Wilberforce University, graduating in 1958 with a BA in sociology. He earned his master's in sociology in 1961 from Bowling Green State University and his PhD in sociology from Washington State University in 1966. From 1966 to 1971, he taught at Amherst College in Massachusetts. His longest tenure at one institution was his stint as professor of sociology at the University of Chicago from 1972 to 1996. During this time, Wilson conducted much of the groundbreaking research upon which his most important books and articles are based. After nearly twenty-five years of teaching and research at the University of Chicago, Wilson was ultimately recruited to join the faculty at Harvard University as the Lewis P. and Linda L. Geyser University Professor and the director of the Joblessness and Urban Poverty Research Program.

Over the course of his career, Wilson has been involved with or has presided over several important social science organizations. He is currently the president emeritus of the American Sociological Association and a trustee of the Century Foundation. He has over forty honorary degrees and is an elected member of the American Academy of the Arts and Sciences and the American Philosophical Society. He was awarded a MacArthur Fellowship (1987–92) and the National Medal of Science in 1998.

Wilson's extraordinary career is predicated on unearthing the structures in our society that continue to oppress the working poor and the **underclass** in the United States. In addition to publishing scores of articles and editing numerous volumes of academic work, he has written three seminal sociological texts that have driven and shaped both the discourse on **poverty** and the policies enacted to confront that poverty.

The Declining Significance of Race: Blacks and Changing American Institutions (1978) explores the relationships among race, institutional **racism**, class, and poverty. It

sparked controversy in the public sphere because of its suggestion that African Americans, government leaders, and policymakers should shift from an overemphasis on race in the poverty discourse toward a more class-based discussion. For some African American scholars, this was an outrageous proposition, especially given that Wilson's own research underscores the disproportionate number of African Americans who make up the working poor and underclass of America. But. Wilson's argument is more nuanced than the book reviews and heated discussions that followed would suggest. His objective was and is to shift the paradigm in the poverty discourse from race to class, a move that could have enormous impact on policymakers' and voters' opinions of the poor. Wilson notes that although the public face of poverty is black and brown (and usually female), the majority (about two-thirds) of those in poverty are white Americans. Second, Wilson wants middle-class African Americans to understand the impact of black flight from troubled areas and how it affects poorer blacks left behind. Thus, for Wilson, racism itself has less of a total impact on the lives of inner city poor African Americans than the fact that, after desegregation and other forms of perceived African American social advancement, we now have superconcentrated communities of poor people. These same communities have previously and historically had *class* diversity. Without this diversity in class, despair, violence, and poverty have increased unchecked in many of America's inner city environments.

The second book in Wilson's major trilogy on race, class, poverty, and policy is *The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy*. In it Wilson furthers his argument that social class and a concentration of poverty are the main contributing factors in creating those he calls the "truly disadvantaged." Wilson deliberately and thoroughly explicates the role of race and racism, yet maintains his earlier thesis that economic policies and lack of class diversity in impoverished inner city neighborhoods are more pronounced factors in the conditions of the poor than race.

The final book in this particular trilogy is titled When Work Disappears: The World of the New Urban Poor (1996). Upon publication, it invited the same levels of controversy as Wilson's earlier tracts on poverty, class, race, and policy, though for somewhat different reasons. Wilson maintained his thesis that to combat poverty in a substantive way, one must acknowledge race but also advance discussions and policies that encompass economics and class. This is crucial, according to Wilson, because society's overemphasis on race tends to divide the middle class from the working and lower classes when a coalition of these groups is required to effect political change that will eradicate the roots of poverty. He developed this argument to explore the erosion of jobs for poor and working-class people. Noting the shifts in our economy away from manufacturing and toward service and ideation economics, Wilson makes revolutionary suggestions for coping with these transformations. For Wilson, work is an integral civil right. His research suggests that the despair and hopelessness that crush the spirit of the poor derive in large part from the simple fact that they do not have jobs. Because human identity is so closely intertwined with occupation, Wilson suggests that the United States reinstate a type of **New Deal** Works Progress Administration program for the **unemployed**. Although his detractors scoff at this type of **welfare** state, Wilson is quick to point out that his suggestion is by no means beyond the scope of the U.S. budget. For example, Congress routinely approves defense budgets in excess of presidential

requests. By Wilson's estimate, a WPA-styled suggested work program could cost as little as twelve billion dollars and provide as many as one million jobs for the unemployed. In essence, Wilson challenges the nation—America has the resources to help the poor, but does it have the will?

Suggested Reading

William Julius Wilson, The Declining Significance of Race: Blacks and Changing American Institutions, 1978; Wilson, The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy, 1987; Wilson, When Work Disappears: The World of the New Urban Poor, 1996.

WINFREY, OPRAH (January 29, 1954–)

YANNICK THORAVAL

Oprah Winfrey is an iconic television personality and successful entrepreneur in the media industry. As an African American woman from humble beginnings, her commercial and financial success has led some to suggest that Oprah helped to shift perceptions of class, race, and gender boundaries in modern America.

Winfrey was born into a poor, **working-class** family in rural Mississippi, her mother a housemaid and her father a military man. Her meteoric rise to international stardom has been embraced as an embodiment of the **American dream**. She overcame the obstacles of her social and cultural origins to obtain unprecedented fame and wealth in the television industry.

Oprah's broadcasting career began in the radio industry in Nashville. At the age of nineteen, she became the youngest and first African American woman to anchor the news at Nashville's WTVF-TV. Her popularity with the audience confirmed her successful transition to television broadcasting and earned her the *Oprah Winfrey Show*, which entered syndication in 1986. The show went on to become the highest-rated talk show in television history. Produced by her own production company, Harpo Productions, the show is watched by an estimated 30 million weekly viewers nationwide.

The success of the *Oprah Winfrey Show* rests partly on its cross-social appeal. Oprah relates personal experiences that endear her to an audience that crosses social boundaries. For example, she has candidly disclosed her own childhood experiences with sexual abuse, relationship difficulties, and struggles with weight. Oprah's autobiographical approach helps narrow the social divide between viewer and performer and lends an air of intimacy and familiarity to the show. Oprah offers her viewers an accessible and familiar human experience. Paradoxically, she presents herself as an extraordinary "everywoman" or, viewed differently, aims to symbolize the potential for the extraordinary in every woman.

Oprah's financial success and substantial cultural influence are often pointed to as a living demonstration of the equal opportunities available to African Americans in post–civil rights era America. But social critics contend that Oprah's success actually highlights discrepancies in **race**, class, and **gender** that persist in contemporary

American society. Some claim that Winfrey's success underlines the fact that most successful African Americans in the United States are employed in the sports and entertainment industries, suggesting that race and class are still linked, despite the advances made since the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s.

The design of the *Oprah Winfrey Show* is also weighted with social and cultural meaning. For example, despite Oprah's sophisticated elocution, her periodic lapses into a colloquial southern drawl can be read as a deliberate linguistic reference to her **working-class** African American roots.

Suggested Reading

Helen S. Garson, Oprah Winfrey: A Biography, 2004; Eva Illouz, Oprah Winfrey and the Glamour of Misery: An Essay on Popular Culture, 2003; Kathleen Rooney, Reading with Oprah: The Book Club That Changed America, 2005.

WINTHROP, JOHN (January 12, 1578/79–March 26, 1649)


JENIFER **E**LMORE

John Winthrop, an English gentleman and devout **Puritan**, was one of the founders of the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1630 and its first governor. Winthrop's public service and his writings made him one of the most famous and influential citizens of colonial New England, and he is still studied in the fields of history, literature, religion, and political science in America and worldwide.

Winthrop was born into the landed gentry class in Groton, England, but had little chance of inheriting land himself. Because his father was a younger son, the estate where Winthrop was raised belonged to his uncle and would pass to his uncle's eldest son under England's primogeniture laws. However, his grandfather was one of relatively few self-made members of the gentry of his time, so Winthrop was no stranger to the concept of upward **social mobility**. This particular situation perhaps predisposed Winthrop to be attracted to many of the concepts that came to be associated with colonial New England, such as the Protestant **work ethic** and ideals of the "self-made man."

Winthrop seems to have been an overachiever by nature as well as nurture. He entered Cambridge University at age fourteen and married the first of his four wives at seventeen. He also had legal training and experience before immigrating to New England, and he criticized the unfairness and corruption of political, economic, and religious institutions in England several years before King Charles I granted the Massachusetts Bay Company a charter to establish a colony in New England in 1629.

The original company members elected Winthrop their first governor before leaving England. Not long after his election, he wrote his most famous composition, the sermon "A Model of Christian Charity," which most scholars believe he delivered in 1630 while on board the ship *Arbella* en route to America. In this sermon, Winthrop made his famous statement that the new Puritan colony in America would be "as a city on a hill," visible to anyone who cared to watch and judge its



John Winthrop. Courtesy of Eon Images.

virtue. This formulation has generally been interpreted as an early articulation of American exceptionalism: the belief that America has been destined, by an omnipotent God or some other historical force, to lead the world. Winthrop's journal, begun on the *Arbella* and continued throughout his multiple terms as governor, records the history of the young colony and also charts the political and religious thought of the Puritans as they struggled to balance Christian ideals such as charity and forgiveness with the necessity of maintaining civil order and the desire to prosper economically.

Winthrop's writings develop several themes relevant to the study of social class in America: the theological "necessity" of the existence of unequal socioeconomic classes; the ethics of relationships between the rich and poor, employer and employee, man and woman, and master and servant; the issue of relations between **Native Americans** and European colonists; and

the theological justification of **capitalism**. Overall, Winthrop's record of colonial leadership and his writings reflect his commitment to reform Protestantism and his idealistic yet paradoxical belief that Massachusetts could be a utopian Christian community. Ideally, Puritans would be bound together by mutual love yet would be willingly subordinate to both earthly and divine authority. Everyone would be equal and equally free in a spiritual sense, despite ongoing and obvious inequities in terms of **wealth**, class, **gender**, and **race**.

Suggested Reading

Francis Bremer, John Winthrop: America's Forgotten Founding Father, 2003; Richard Dunn and Laetitia Yeandle, eds., The Journal of John Winthrop, 1630–1649, 1996; Edmund Morgan, The Puritan Dilemma: The Story of John Winthrop, 1958.

WOMEN'S CLUBS

SHERI BARTLETT BROWNE

Responding to their exclusion from the New York Press Club, white women writers in 1868 formed Sorosis, a women's association devoted to discussion, intellectual enlightenment, and social activism. Simultaneously, Boston women under the leadership of Julia Ward Howe organized the New England Women's Club, which also

sought to engage its members in social welfare causes and informed discourse. Their actions served as the catalyst for the formation of many local and state women's clubs, begun as informal social gatherings, that evolved into a national General Federation of Women's Clubs (GFWC) in 1890. In their early years, many women's clubs' activities focused on cultural pursuits, such as educational lectures, musical recitals, oratory, and book readings; within a short time, however, clubwomen organized more overt political endeavors such as petition drives to raise taxes for public libraries and state campaigns for woman suffrage. Often involved as members and leaders of other reform associations, such as the Woman's Christian Temperance Union (WCTU), women frequently blurred the distinction (intentionally and unintentionally) between social and creative uplift and political and cultural reform.

Although the majority of club members nationwide were white and middle class, women of many ethnicities and from across classes formed clubs to address the needs of their particular constituencies and communities. In 1895 black women responded to a call by Josephine St. Pierre Ruffin of New England to hold a national convention. Building on the success of numerous black WCTUs and Ruffin's own New Era Club, black women gathered in Boston to respond to a newspaper editor's defense of the white South in the wake of Ida Wells Barnett's anti-lynching crusade. The women who met in Boston subsequently organized the National Association of Colored Women (NACW) in 1896. Led by Oberlin graduate and educator Mary Church Terrell for its first five years, the NACW advocated equal access to education, temperance, woman suffrage, and the dismantling of racism. By 1900 the NACW had organized 400 clubs under its umbrella. Similarly, upper-class Jewish American women united in the 1880s to address the religious, educational, and urban needs of eastern European families arriving in the United States as new immigrants. Under the auspices of the Sisterhoods of Personal Service, these women built their own settlement house movement, which fought against poverty and **child labor** and promoted **welfare** services to immigrant women and children. In 1893 the GFWC invited Jewish members of the Chicago Woman's Club to participate in a Jewish Women's Congress at the Chicago World's Fair. This proved to be the stimulus for creating the National Council of Jewish Women.

In the early twentieth century, cross-class alliances between clubwomen and working-class activists enabled women to address industrial reforms, including a shorter workday, better wages, workplace safety, and the eradication of child labor. Spearheaded by social justice activists such as Florence Kelley and **Josephine Shaw** Lowell, the GFWC reached out to working-class women beginning in 1900, with standing committees on "The Industrial Problem as It Affects Women and Children." Kelley used her leadership of the National Consumers' League to encourage clubwomen to educate themselves and mobilize to help working-class women. Consumers' leagues, which called attention to sweatshop conditions and encouraged consumers to buy products at shops where workers were not exploited, originated in many cities as a result of clubwomen's efforts. Kelley's activism resulted in the passage of protective labor legislation for women in twenty-one states by 1919. In turn, working-class women sought to ameliorate the effects of industrialization through the creation of a League of Working Women's Clubs and with their activism in the Women's Trade Union League (WTUL). Organized in 1903 by bookbinder Mary Kenney O'Sullivan and garment worker Leonora O'Reilly, the WTUL drew its

financial support from **upper-class** women reformers with ties to the settlement house movement. Although the WTUL demonstrated the possibilities of cross-class efforts to address workers' needs and concerns, the determined control of elite women on its governing board also demonstrated the limited reform vision of many clubwomen whose class allegiances ultimately did not reside with the working class.

Like many reform initiatives within the club movement, labor activism reflected the values, aspirations, and socioeconomic backgrounds of the movement's largely middle-class members. In the early twentieth century, this middle-class domination of the GFWC both helped it to grow and shaped its agenda for social change. In 1900 the national organization was composed of thirty-six state federations, with over 2600 clubs; in its infancy, more than 155,000 women claimed membership in the GFWC. Growing rapidly, by 1910 the General Federation boasted one million dues-paying participants.

Cultural and political changes within the larger society also contributed to women's desire to organize clubs. With the merger in 1890 of the American Woman Suffrage Association and the National Woman Suffrage Association, reformers breathed new life into the state and federal campaigns to enfranchise women. Drawing on a tradition familiar to clubwomen of embracing female morality, and arguing that women's domestic talents would assist them in "civic housekeeping," suffragists highlighted the benefits of the vote for clubwomen in creating a world in their own image within industrial, urban, overcrowded, unsanitary, modernizing America. Arguments emphasizing the inalienable right of women to vote were less appealing to a generation of women activists who had matured with the politics of the WCTU, and clubwomen generally found opinions that emphasized the franchise based on women's sphere and their inherently better nature more compelling. With this persuasive claim, the GFWC endorsed suffrage in 1914. After ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920, the General Federation continued to lobby Congress through the Women's Joint Congressional Committee. For thirty years, the GFWC had proven itself to be a significant organizer and coordinator of women and their financial and political resources.

Since its inception, the GFWC has functioned as one of the largest local and national service clubs available to women, although it has never lost its largely middle-class constituency. During the twentieth century, the GFWC supported such diverse issues as the Equal Rights Amendment, the formation of the United Nations, and the creation of the National Park Service. Committed to community service, clubwomen have continuously argued for the importance of education, access to the arts, the need for ongoing literacy programs, and the preservation of the environment. With a current budget of \$35 million, the GFWC continues today to work on behalf of women's health and education both nationally and internationally, along with numerous community reform programs that are the legacy of its long history of social activism.

Suggested Reading

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WORK ETHIC

ROBERT E. WEIR

The term *work ethic* refers to a tendency in Western society for individuals to tout the virtues of hard work, be suspicious of idleness, and elevate labor itself over the material rewards it brings. Some imbue toil with spiritual values and refer to either the "Puritan" or "Protestant" work ethic. Many sociologists and foreign observers have noted that the work ethic is more pronounced in the United States than in other advanced economies, though they disagree as to whether or not work is connected to religion.

As an articulated concept, "work ethic" derives from **Max Weber**'s 1905 book *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, though it was a working value long before Weber coined the term. Weber noted an essential tension within Protestantism, especially its Calvinist variants that stressed predestination. The Judeo-Christian tradition has historically held an ambivalent view toward the material world, and the mandate to toil is presented as a biblical injunction resulting from humankind's expulsion from the Garden of Eden. Numerous Old Testament verses, especially in Proverbs, extol work as the antidote to temptation and sin.

Some scholars argue that early Christians fell under the sway of anti-materialist Greek philosophies such as Neo-Platonism, Manichaeism, and Gnosticism despite the efforts of church fathers to relegate these beliefs to heretical status. What is clearer is that the Roman Catholic Church articulated a doctrine of salvation that was based on a combination of faith and good works. The latter part of the doctrine was challenged by Protestants during the Reformation that convulsed Europe beginning in the sixteenth century. Martin Luther and John Calvin both attacked the good works doctrine as an attempt to bribe one's way into heaven. Calvin (1509–64) articulated a theology based on God's absolute sovereignty and insisted on the doctrines of election and predestination in which God preordained who would be saved and who would be damned, hence rendering human effort irrelevant.

When Weber began his studies in the late nineteenth century, he was intrigued by the spread of **capitalism** and wanted to explain why some European nations were more highly developed than others. He noted that capitalism tended to advance in lands most deeply impacted by the Reformation, especially England, The Netherlands, northern Germany, Scotland, and Scandinavia, but was weaker in those areas where the Catholic Counter-Reformation turned back Protestantism, such as Ireland, Italy, Poland, and Spain. The United States, a former English colony, also ranked among the industrial and capitalist powerhouses.

Logic would seem to dictate that places where Calvinism was strongest, such as Puritan New England, Scotland, and Switzerland, would not have developed strong capitalist economies, given Calvin's emphasis on the futility of human effort in determining salvation. Weber postulated, however, that many brands of Protestantism actually produced what he called a "latent function." Because Puritans and others who professed belief in predestination could never be certain as to whether or not they were saved, they lived in a state of perpetual anxiety. Believing strongly in the reality of Hell and equally in God's wrath, Puritans worked exceedingly hard for a variety of reasons. First, they felt God mandated hard work. Second, they believed that the world was not designed for enjoyment. Finally and ironically, because they believed in a God of justice who would not reward sinners, they also thought that a certain level of worldly success might be an indication of God's favor. Thus, Puritans ended up creating a society that, on some level, encouraged the accumulation of the very worldly goods they were supposed to repudiate.

Over time, Weber argued, the idea evolved that God blesses those who work hard and live virtuous lives. Virtue was marked by frugality, which often resulted in excess money that could be reinvested. This, he postulated, was the genesis of modern capitalism. Likewise implanted was the idea that thrift and hard work were the paths to individual success, regardless of whether one held religious views. Indeed, one of Alexis De Tocqueville's observations in *Democracy in America* (1835) was that Americans worked so hard that they often had little joy in their lives, nor the time to appreciate their great wealth and abundance. The nineteenth-century working class held views that human beings were ennobled by toil, and unions such as the Knights of Labor condemned the idle ways of the upper class. The middle class, which was uniformly Protestant for much of the nineteenth century, largely agreed that hard work was virtuous.

Weber's thesis has engendered many critics, and its modern-day relevance is less certain because there is general acceptance of the work ethic and little direct correlation between it and Protestantism. Moreover, materialism is now celebrated in many societies, especially the United States. Some Weber critics argue that he saw causation and correlation in events that were merely coincidental. Many conflict theorists argue that Weber ignored the power structures that compelled hard work. They attribute to class dynamics those things Weber explained through religion.

Nonetheless, it is clear that industrial and postindustrial American society has valued and continues to value hard work. As observers such as **Juliet Schor** note, Americans work longer hours than employees in most other lands, get less free time, take fewer **vacations**, have higher productivity levels, and generally work harder. In the United States, people's identities are often determined by what they do, not their essential character. Hard work is also routinely prescribed as the antidote to **poverty**, and members of the **lower class** are exhorted to develop a strong work ethic rather than depend on **welfare**.

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WORKING CLASS

ROBERT E. WEIR

Working class is a disputed and malleable term whose precise meaning often depends on who uses it. In general it refers to those whose living is derived from manual labor, who are paid an hourly rate, and whose occupations do not require much formal education to obtain (though specialized skills may be involved). Normally, working-class occupations carry less **prestige** and are not as well remunerated as jobs classified as "professional." Many argue that this group is the largest social class in America.

In contemporary society, the term can be used in contexts that connote pride, shame, or snobbery. In the first sense, calling oneself a "working man" (or woman) evokes self-esteem and class solidarity by juxtaposing those who do meaningful work against an implied group of malingerers, bureaucrats, and managers, none of whom do "real" work. This was often the way wage earners, apprentices, and journeymen viewed themselves through the 1960s. In recent years, however, positive identification with the working class has waned, and many Americans now view it as synonymous with the upper strata of the lower class, perhaps even the working poor. Such notions stem from the widespread—though often false—assumption that post–World War II economic expansion transformed the United States into a predominately middle-class society. The working class is also referenced by a smaller number of upper middle-class and upper-class Americans as an affront by which they artificially enhance their own status. In such usage, the working class is viewed as a subordinate servant class of low ability, intellect, or social importance.

Social scientists insist on more rigorous criteria, but they too differ, according to ideology and research focus. Among Marxists, the working class—or proletariat—is a potentially revolutionary body. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels located the working class within the larger economic markets. The working class was marked by having only their labor to sell in order to obtain sustenance and survival. It was, thus, a subordinate group, but it also constituted the masses. Once the working class achieved class consciousness and evolved revolutionary class institutions, it would be poised to overthrow the parasitical bourgeoisie, which lived off the labor, rents, and sales of inflated goods and services squeezed from workers who were denied control over the means of production. Although Marx and Engels foresaw problems in organizing the dispirited and chronically unemployed poor (which they called the *lumpenproletariat*), it was their belief that a future communist society would eliminate all classes except the working class. In utopia, private property would be abolished, and all members of society would engage in productive labor aimed at enhancing the collective good.

Although original Marxist ideas continue to shape the way in which **conflict theorists** view the working class, it is important to note that Marx and Engels wrote during the mid-nineteenth century, when some of the worst abuses of the **Industrial Revolution** were manifest. Although, objectively speaking, the working class predates the Industrial Revolution, it was the factory system that solidified trends in which economies were becoming based in capital rather than land. The factory system also magnified class differences in how **wealth** was generated and

accumulated. In many ways, industrialization created awareness of the very existence of the working class.

Subsequent scholars, among them Max Weber, argued that Marx oversimplified social stratification, and these scholars opted for a multidimensional view of class. Weber argued that the relationship to the means of production was only one of the factors relating to class, status, and **power** that defined the working class. Nor did Weber share Marx's view that class conflict was inevitable within the misdistribution of wealth that marked modern capitalism. Weber's view of class was less ideological, though more pessimistic than Marx's. Weber agreed that the working class was treated unfairly, but because he saw society as more complexly layered than Marx did, he did not view a working-class revolution as likely. Weber's multidimensionality also underscored some of the problems associated with simplistic assumptions of what made a person working class. Skilled machinists, for example, often made more money and had higher standards of living than low-level collegeeducated clerks, though the first would generally be categorized as working class and the latter as bourgeoisie. Questions such as these continue to frame the debates between scholars who use objective class measures and those who use subjective measures. A few theorists—most notably W. Lloyd Warner—did not even use the term working class; Warner distributed manual workers among his categories of lower middle class and upper lower class.

Functionalist theorists tended to see working-class roles as integral to the smooth and consensual workings of society. They viewed the working class in descriptive rather than ideological terms, a view that became dominant in American society after the collapse of social movements during the **Gilded Age** and the suppression of the **Industrial Workers of the World** and other radical groups in the early twentieth century. The working class became associated with non-prestigious and manual **blue-collar work** for which one was paid wages rather than a **salary** and for which less education was required. Such simplification had the ironic effect of encouraging class awareness during the economic turmoil of the **Great Depression**, but even then, working-class upheaval within the United States never approached the revolutionary fervor predicted by Marx. Nonetheless, by World War II, self-identification with the working class was a point of pride for millions of Americans, especially those involved in the **labor movement**.

Working-class pride remained strong well into the 1960s, despite post—World War II rhetoric—often embraced even by labor leaders such as **George Meany**—that America had become an affluent middle-class society. In the 1960s, many members of the **New Left** romanticized the working class, sometimes admiring its authenticity vis-à-vis the perceived shallowness of the middle class or viewing it as a vanguard of social upheaval. In truth, the American working class was less well-off than affluence propagandists claimed, more materialistic (and less enamored of countercultural values) than the New Left held, and more endangered than most Americans realized.

Scholars have long explored the simmering anger among the working class associated with the drudgery of factory regimens and the imposition of work. For example, University of Wisconsin researchers noted how workers resented early twentieth-century scientific management techniques that quickened the pace of

work. By the 1950s, left-wing writers such as Harry Braverman, Irving Howe, and Harvey Swados warned of increasing alienation on the part of American workers. There was a marked increase in the number of unauthorized wildcat strikes during the 1960s, which suggested an upsurge in militancy, but there were also well-publicized clashes between "hard hat" construction workers and youthful protestors, which manifested an undercurrent of conservatism, even authoritarianism according to some studies. Tension further developed as younger workers, women, and people of color entered jobs traditionally dominated by white males. When **Studs Terkel** published *Working* in 1974, a disturbing finding emerged: though workers were proud of the work they did, many of them hated their jobs. Scholars such as Lillian Rubin showed that working-class life was too often marked by economic struggle, fears of unemployment, marital discord, fatalism, resentment, and higher-than-usual incidences of sexism, substance abuse, family violence, and other social problems.

By the 1970s the future of blue-collar work was also in flux. The pressures of **globalization** and **deindustrialization** led to plant closings, surging unemployment, attempts to decertify labor unions, and forced cuts in wages and benefits for workers who kept their jobs. Rather than lash out against capitalism, however, many blue-collar voters cast ballots for **Ronald Reagan** in 1980, thereby reversing a trend that had held since the **New Deal**, a trend in which the working class tended to favor liberal Democrats. Reagan proved to be a foe of the labor movement, but progressives have yet to rebuild working-class support to 1930s levels, and blue-collar voters also gave high tallies to conservative George W. **Bush** in both 2000 and 2004.

Deindustrialization has continued apace; according to the 2000 Census, just 23.4 percent of Americans held blue-collar jobs at the end of the century. The makeup of the twenty-first-century working class depends on the lens through which one views work. How, for example, does one classify the 38.6 percent of workers who are in nonmanagerial service-sector employment? Though such jobs are, technically, **white-collar** (or **pink-collar**) work, they are generally held in low regard and are low-paid wage labor. Writers such as Michael Zweig argue that traditional class categories should be collapsed economically and socially; one is a member of the working class if one works for wages and has a boss. By his reckoning, at least 62 percent of the labor force is working class.

Self-perception complicates matters further. Zweig's data largely echo the data from Andrew Levinson's 1974 study *The Working Class Majority*; in both works, more than 60 percent of Americans called themselves members of the working class. General Social Survey results, however, routinely place such percentages in the mid-forties, and the studies conducted by the National Center for Opinion Research claim that most Americans view themselves as middle class, including roughly three of four who earn less than \$15,000 per year. According to President Clinton's pollster Stanley Greenberg, in the mid-1990s, over 90 percent of Americans believed they were members of the middle class.

Subjective measures of the working class currently cloud more than they illumine, though they suggest that social scientists need to rethink how they define class. Still, those who assert that working class is no longer a credible category of social analysis run afoul of the fact that many wage-earning families earn far

less than the median of \$46,326 per year; that just 24.4 percent of Americans have obtained a four-year college degree; that the bulk of wealth is held by a tiny percentage of American society; and that—to evoke Zweig—most Americans still have a boss. Barbara Ehrenreich is among those investigative journalists who have shown that however one configures class, low-paid workers are more likely to have lives akin to the desperate factory worker of Marx's imagination and the "worlds of pain" described by Lillian Rubin than to enjoy the American dream.

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WORKING POOR

GINA L. KEEL

The working poor are people in the labor force who are working or actively looking for work and whose income falls below federal **poverty** guidelines. According to federal government measures, 7.4 million individuals, or more than 5 percent of the labor force, were classified as working poor in 2003. This official measure of the working poor is arguably understated because of methods of calculation and exclusion of unreported employment, such as domestic help. Federal poverty guidelines are based on imperfect estimates of the cost of basic needs for subsistence living, commonly referred to as food, clothing, and shelter. **Poverty calculations** are weakest for their failure to capture the escalating costs of housing, transportation, utilities, and child care. Recent independent studies estimate that 30 percent of workers earn low wages (near poverty guidelines) and that 17 percent of non-elderly persons live in low-income working families.

The working poor cannot meet the basic requirements for living in a particular geographic place. Social science research suggests that even incomes at 200 percent of the federal **poverty line** are inadequate for decent, minimal standards of living across the United States. Poverty calculations do not include the earned income tax credit, food stamps, housing, child care, or other state and federal government subsidies that may increase income for those who are able to participate in these programs. From this perspective, poverty may be overstated. Yet many families above the poverty line who receive benefits from means-tested programs (proving limited income and assets) still struggle to meet their needs.

Minorities, women, and the young are most likely to be among the working poor. A majority of the working poor have low levels of education—a high school diploma or less—which limits their economic mobility. Children increase expenses greatly, and **one-parent families** suffer the greatest hardships. A significant segment

of the working poor is foreign-born, although this includes temporary residents who send earnings home and who intend to return to a higher standard of living in their native land.

Thirty percent of the working poor have service-sector jobs. The working poor are also found in maintenance, construction, **transportation**, and sales occupations. Full-time workers are less likely to be poor than part-time workers, but full-time employment is no guarantee of avoiding poverty. Three-fifths of the working poor are employed full-time. Structural economic trends of low-wage jobs with few benefits, reductions in public **welfare** benefits, limited access to health care, and anti-unionism threaten to increase the number of working poor. A counter-vailing view of the working poor argues that low wages are temporary for most and focuses on individual behavior and poor choices, including lack of schooling, early and multiple childbirths, substance abuse, and inadequate hygiene, to explain the persistent class of working poor.

Despite a low **unemployment** rate in the country and high demand for lowskilled, entry-level workers, average wages have not risen in the lowest-paid income group. Inflation-adjusted real wages for the bottom 10 percent of earners are lower than they were in the 1970s. The federal minimum wage for nonexempt employees is \$5.15 per hour, and it has not been increased since 1997, though an increase to \$7.25 is slated to go into effect in 2009. Adjusted for inflation, the current minimum wage is 30 percent lower than in 1968. Full-time work at the minimum wage is a poverty wage for most, particularly those with dependents. Some jobs do not pay the minimum wage, notably restaurant servers who receive tips. Tipped workers must be paid \$2.13 an hour in direct wages, and employers are required by law to make up the difference if tips do not meet the minimum wage standard. But a lack of enforcement and uninformed workers may limit this minimum wage guarantee. Several states have minimum wage standards that are higher by 10-30 percent. Some community-based organizations advocate for "living wages," and policy research institutes have estimated living wage budgets that take into account the full range of costs required for families of different sizes to maintain a decent standard of living.

In addition to low wages, the working poor face other market problems, including cyclical unemployment, event-related job loss, involuntary part-time employment, irregular work schedules, and unpaid required work activities. Individuals and families survive by working multiple jobs, going without adequate food or regular meals, living in cars or tenant motels without adequate cooking facilities, overcrowding and sharing beds, and relying on shelters and food banks as well as support from government social welfare programs, family, friends, and charities.

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WRIGHT, ERIK OLIN

See Contradictory Class Location.

WRIGHT, RICHARD (September 4, 1908–November 28, 1960)


JAMES PETERSON

Richard Wright was a pathbreaking African American writer. He was born in Natchez, Mississippi, to a family whose economic status was typical of the oppressive conditions that plagued the southern United States at the dawn of the twentieth century; his family was poor. His grandparents (maternal and paternal) were slaves, and many of his relatives in the subsequent generations were sharecroppers. During his toddler years, his family moved from Mississippi to Memphis, Tennessee. The contrast between the rural underdeveloped region of Natchez and the inner city bustle of Memphis was stark for the Wright family. Wright's father, Nathan, took on work as a night porter, and the family lived in a cramped two-room apartment. By the time Wright was four years old, his father had left home for good, once again revealing to Wright in his formative years that movement and migration produced a transitory life with a tenuous grip on economic stability.

His family slipped deeper into the spiral of **poverty**, and as his mother, Ella Wright, became a cook in a middle-class white household. After the court system failed Ella Wright in her feeble attempt to hold Nathan legally and economically responsible for his children, Richard and his brother were briefly placed in a Memphis orphanage. This situation ingrained in Wright's subconscious the excruciating experience of hunger, an experience that would shape him profoundly as a writer and political thinker. Eventually, his mother returned for her children, and they promptly moved to Jackson, Mississippi, en route to Arkansas. In Jackson, under the care of his maternal grandmother, Wright began to develop disdain for religion. His grandmother, a strict Seventh Day Adventist, forbade Wright to read fiction and reprimanded him physically for his transgressions. Once Wright arrived at his aunt and uncle's home in Elaine, Arkansas, he was so struck by the plentiful servings of food at mealtimes that he could not resist the urge to steal and horde food in his pockets. Although this was not Wright's introduction to prejudice, his time in Arkansas irrevocably shaped Wright's attitudes about race and the oppressive forces of racism. His Uncle Silas was a successful businessman, but was brutally murdered, quite possibly with the aid of law enforcement. The main character in "The Long Black Song" in Wright's inaugural collection of short stories, Uncle Tom's Children (1938), is also named Silas, is a successful businessman, and is shot to death by a jealous white man. Wright's narratives on racism that culminate in violence are by many scholarly accounts the most riveting and vivid lynchings depicted in literature. One need only read "Big Boy Leaves Home" from the same collection to appreciate Wright's ability to render poignantly these unsavory moments in the history of American racism.

After the end of World War I in 1918, Wright's mother had a stroke, and so his wandering continued. Eventually, he returned to the care of his grandmother, where he again experienced hunger and was force-fed indoctrination into Seventh Day Adventism. This included a stint at the local Seventh Day Adventist School, where his aunt, with whom he carried on a tumultuous and at times violent relationship, was the only teacher. Eventually, Wright was granted his wish to attend public school, and for several more years, he struggled to educate himself in the face of an inadequate segregated school system that only promised to educate him through the eighth grade.

In 1925, at the age of seventeen, Wright left home for Memphis, Tennessee. He was forced to either risk violent responses to his "uppity" disposition in an era in which the slightest modicum of disrespect directed toward southern whites could end in murder, or hustle and steal enough money to leave home for good. He chose the latter. Wright spent two years in Memphis, where he worked as an errand-boy in



Richard Wright, 1939. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

an optical establishment. He was anxious to migrate to the North, where he felt he had the potential to be taken seriously as a writer. This proved more correct than he could have ever anticipated.

Reading H. L. Mencken, one of Wright's earliest and most potent literary influences, challenged Wright to engage realism as writer. For Wright this ultimately meant a no-holds-barred portrayal of the black experience in America. But the suffocating oppression and racial violence of the South was only the first course at the table of American racism. After migrating to Chicago with the hopes of broadening his and his family's horizons, Wright was confronted by a city that was more segregated than the South in which he grew up. In 12 Million Black Voices, Wright described the violence awaiting black families seeking to move into all-white neighborhoods, as well as the slumlords who overcharged black families forced to live in horrid segregated tenements. Sometimes whole families would live in one room. The Chicago plagued by segregation, unsavory living conditions, poverty, crime (some organized), and corrupt politicians was later the subject matter of Richard Wright's posthumously published novel Lawd Today!

Between 1938 and 1940 Richard Wright emerged as the premier African American writer of his period. Various incidents, experiences, and publications propelled his emergence. The **Great Depression** was worse in Chicago than in most cities, and the black South Side was hit hardest. Wright felt this directly in the loss of his job

as a postal worker. Despite financial hardships, Wright's desire to write persisted. He garnered one of his first opportunities to do so after an associate directed him to the Chicago John Reed Club. This connection allowed Wright to make various ideological connections to **working class** and poor folk the world over. Through his own racially and economically oppressive experiences, Wright developed genuinely fervent affinities for the **Communist Party**.

In 1938 Wright published *Uncle Tom's Children*, a powerful collection of short stories determined to distance his generation (particularly in its responses to racial and economic oppression) from his grandmother's. Its title is in direct conversation with Harriet Beecher Stowe's famed *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, but Wright replaced themes of sentimentality, Christian charity, and patient endurance with revolutionary organization, race violence, and proud defiance. This work positioned Wright as a courageous voice for the black experience. However, Wright's crowning achievement as a popular writer was the publication of the best-selling *Native Son* in 1940. And although, according to his essay "How Bigger Was Born," Wright desires white fear and despair as a response to this novel, white readers, at least initially, bought this book in droves. (*Native Son* also experienced an extraordinary drop-off in sales between 1940 and 1941, so perhaps Wright's desired effects were achieved after all.)

The relationship between Richard Wright and his protagonist Bigger Thomas figured prominently in all of the critical responses to the novel. Kenneth Kinnamon noted the many similarities between Wright and the fictional Bigger Thomas: both were born in Mississippi; both migrated to Chicago and lived with their mothers in Black Belt **slums**; both were motivated by fear and hatred; and both were rebellious and prone to violence. It is no surprise then that Wright's next major work was the publication of his autobiographical novel *Black Boy* in 1945. This version, with the entire second portion excised by editors, may still be Wright's most potent prose.

Wright eventually left the United States, disillusioned with the ideological and political atmosphere within which his writing was received and critiqued. While in Paris, he continued to travel, write, and publish until his untimely, and by some accounts mysterious, death in Paris in 1960.

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YACHTING

ROBERT E. WEIR

Yachting is among the most class-divided activities in all of American society. As a sport, it depends on the beneficence of wealthy individuals and corporate sponsors; as a leisure activity, it is a form of **conspicuous consumption** available to only a small number of Americans. Technically speaking, racing yachts are light, monohulled, sail-powered boats of relatively modest size. The luxury crafts favored by the **upper class** and used for business and pleasure are, in fact, small "ships" or "cabin cruisers" because they are powered by engines, but the term yacht is now part of the common parlance. Some relatively modest fishing boats are dubbed yachts, but this is more of a marketing ploy than a status accepted by the general public or recognized by those belonging to exclusive yacht clubs.

The word *yacht* derives from the Dutch *jaght*, coined in the sixteenth century to refer to pleasure boats used by royalty and the rich. English yachting dates to King Charles II's exile to Holland; he brought back the practice after Oliver Cromwell's death and his own restoration in 1660. The first British yacht club formed in 1720, and by the nineteenth century, aristocrats and gentry were enjoying yacht races.

American yachting originated in New York when it was a Dutch colony, and the New York Yacht Club formed in 1813, the first such organization in the United States. As in England, yacht racing was a sport of the rich, and nineteenth-century urban newspapers catering to the upper and upper **middle class** carried racing news. The event that became known as America's Cup (now called the World Cup) began in 1851, when the schooner *America*, owned by the New York Yacht Club (NYYC), defeated fifteen British boats off the Isle of Wight. In 1857 the NYYC donated an ornate silver trophy that now symbolizes victory. Cup challenges were largely haphazard events that took place just twenty-five times between 1870 and 1983, first in the waters near New York City and then, after 1930, near **Newport**, Rhode Island. The NYYC won each challenge until 1983,

when a controversial Australian boat using a fiberglass rather than wooden hull and a winged keel won the race. Cup races now take place in waters selected by the defending skippers.

Ironically, the 1983 defeat occasioned an outbreak of nationalism such that ordinary Americans hailed Dennis Conner as a hero when he captained *Stars and Stripes* to victory in 1987 and recaptured the cup. In 1988 Conner entered a catamaran design that won, but this occasioned a court challenge that finally set standards for what constituted a racing yacht. Since 1995, the cup has been won by non-American boats, and mass interest in race results has waned; a 2007 challenge has been scheduled for Valencia, Spain, by the Swiss team that won in 2003.

Again, yachting is such an elite sport—even on the Olympic level, where it has been contested since 1900—that it is hard to explain any popular following without reference to national pride. Although members of the middle class often maintain pleasure crafts and speedboats, and those in the **working class** frequently maintain less elaborate fishing boats, racing yachts are complex and temperamental boats that require crews to operate and fortunes to maintain. Unlike canoes, kayaks, sailfish, and small sailboats, only a person raised in wealth is likely to encounter yachting as a child. Most Americans can aspire to yachting only as an adult crew member.

The luxury boats deemed yachts are large craft, as opposed to racing yachts, which seldom exceed seventy-five feet. Most are close to or exceed 100 feet in length, and a few "mega yachts" are twice as large. Even used yachts of under 100 feet sell for up to four million dollars, and those of over 150 feet can command used prices in the range of thirty-five million dollars. Several yachts have sold for over seventy million dollars.

Corporations and a few individuals maintain yachts as **prestige** symbols, although some consider their very possession crass. Many yachts cost more to purchase and maintain than private jets.

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YUPPIES

ROBERT E. WEIR

Yuppies is a derisive term used to refer to families and individuals whose lifestyles are centered on **conspicuous consumption**. It was originally shorthand for "young, urban professionals," but it has come to shed its association with a particular age group, geographical location, or vocation; although yuppies tend to cluster in upscale urban centers and suburbs, the term is now applied broadly to anyone whose values are based in materialism, outward display of style, and ambition. The term also implies egoism, narcissism, and callousness. Yuppies tend to be members

of the upper **middle class** or those from the lower middle class with **social-climbing** pretensions.

The United States has always had social climbers, but the yuppie phenomenon is a product of the 1980s, with *Newsweek* magazine declaring 1984 the "Year of the Yuppie." Stagflation during the 1970s, precipitated by oil shortages, mired the nation in its worst recession since the **Great Depression** of the 1930s. A shallow economic recovery in the 1980s, buoyed by the sunny optimism of President **Ronald Reagan**, released pent-up consumer demand and changed the social climate. New economic opportunities, especially in the high-tech sector and in finance, attracted younger workers, many of whom also embraced Reagan's political conservatism. Reagan attacked **New Deal** and other social **welfare** programs, which he claimed destroyed **self-reliance**; many yuppies rallied to his homilies on self-help. The yuppie, allegedly, was the successor to the hippies; the term consciously plays off the 1960s "yippie," a member of the countercultural and activist Youth International Party.

Some observers compared the social and economic climate of the early 1980s to that of the "Roaring Twenties." Rising stock prices during Reagan's first term of office appeared to infuse new wealth into the economy. Designer labels, exclusive discotheques, and expensive new restaurants flourished. The term yuppie first surfaced during 1983, when Senator Gary Hart of Colorado contemplated a run for the presidency. Hart's youthful supporters seemed an amalgam of recent historical development; many were politically conservative, like Reagan, but embraced the cultural liberalism of the 1960s. In 1983 journalists began to discuss "yuppies," supposedly individuals between the ages of twenty-three and thirty-eight who lived in cities, worked in white-collar managerial or financial positions, and earned at least \$40,000 per year. They supposedly enjoyed luxury goods, used recreational drugs, frequented dance clubs, lived in upscale apartments, purchased expensive cars, and wore trendy clothing from designers such as Ralph Lauren, Bill Blass, Giorgio Armani, and Gloria Vanderbilt.

The yuppie phenomenon, much like the 1980s recovery or the campaign appeal of Gary Hart (which collapsed in a sexual scandal), was much exaggerated. First of all, a mere 1.5 million Americans could have fit into the categories outlined by *Newsweek* in 1984, and many of them were contemptuous of yuppie values. More seriously, the return to recession during Reagan's second term put a damper on the yuppie dreams of college students flooding business and finance courses. In 1988, just four years after *Newsweek* praised yuppies, it damned them. In the wake of Wall Street scandals involving Ivan Boesky and Michael Milken, commentators began to speak of a "culture of greed," for which the yuppie was a decadent symbol.

As noted earlier, the term has now passed into common usage as a negative label for those thought to embody the excesses, snobbery, and crass materialism evocative of the late 1980s. It is almost always a term applied by others; few would proudly self-identify as a yuppie. By the 1990s, there was even a strain of black humor advocating "yuppicide," the killing of yuppies. It has also spawned new acronyms, such as "dink"—dual-income, no kids—to describe upwardly mobile couples.

Today the use of the term "yuppie" often reflects social class tension and jealousy. During the early twenty-first century, it has been revived to describe a new breed of consumption-conscious professionals whose most visible characteristic is conducting business by cell phone in public. It faces competition from a new word, bobo, coined by commentator David Brooks in 2001. Brooks argues that 1980s yuppie materialism has combined with variants of 1960s hippie-style cultural values to create a new **bourgeois**-bohemian (Bobo) class.

Suggested Reading

Michael Aiakwe, Company Policy: The Rage behind the Mask, 2000; Barbara Ehrenreich, The Worst Years of Our Lives: Irreverent Notes from a Decade of Greed, 1991.

ZINN, HOWARD (August 24, 1922–)

JESSICA LIVINGSTON

Howard Zinn is a historian and activist. In his autobiography, Zinn relates his personal experiences to his political consciousness. He credits growing up poor in Brooklyn and working in a shipyard for developing his **class consciousness**; his experiences as a bomber pilot in World War II for his being an antiwar activist; and his teaching at Spelman College, a historically black women's college in Atlanta, Georgia, for his participation in the Civil Rights Movement. After being fired from Spelman College for his political activity, he taught at Boston University until he retired in 1988. His teaching philosophy emphasized the importance of combining book learning with social action. Zinn was a leading critic of the Vietnam War, and he has spoken out against both invasions of Iraq. As a well-known leftist intellectual, Zinn continues to lecture nationally. He has published more than fifteen books and has contributed numerous articles to magazines such as *The Nation* and *The Progressive*.

Zinn is best known for his book A People's History of the United States, 1492–Present. It is a revisionist history that tells the history of grassroots movements rather than governments. It relates its narrative from the perspective of ordinary people rather than from those in power. For example, it tells of Columbus's "discovery" of America from the point of view of the Arawaks. Rather than portraying Columbus as a hero, Zinn addresses how Columbus enslaved and murdered the Arawaks in pursuit of wealth. He likewise tells of **slavery** from the point of view of slaves and labor conflicts from the point of view of strikers and members of the **working class**. It is a history told from the bottom up, from the perspective of ordinary people. A People's History is critical of American imperialism and **capitalism**. It is about injustice and class bias and a tradition of resistance to it.

Although A People's History of the United States does not pretend to be objective, Zinn has been criticized for his irreverent telling of American history. Some critics also object to A People's History's Marxist interpretation of history, and Zinn has



Howard Zinn reads on stage at the celebrity reading of *Voices of a People's History of the United States*, held at the Japan America Theatre, 2005. © Frazer Harrison/Getty Images.

been furthermore criticized for his pessimistic portrayal of American history. Although Zinn tells of **strikes** and rebellions, these movements are always squashed by the establishment. Even small reformist changes only serve to stabilize the system in his account.

Zinn is important for popularizing the history of class struggle. A People's History of the United States has sold over a million copies, has been adapted for high school teaching, and has been translated into several languages. Voices of A People's History of the United States (2004), a collection he edited with Anthony Arnove, includes underrepresented dissident voices in their own words in the form of published opinion pieces, speeches, poems, and songs as well as journal entries and personal letters. Zinn's recent writings also include the plays Emma and Marx in Soho.

Suggested Reading

Howard Zinn, A People's History of the United States, 1492–Present, 1980; Zinn, You Can't Be Neutral on a Moving Train, 1994; Zinn, The Zinn Reader: Writings on Disobedience and Democracy, 1997.

ZONES OF TRANSITION

ROBERT E. WEIR

"Zones of transition," sometimes called "zones in transition," is an idea that originated with urban sociologist Ernest Burgess in 1925. It was part of his "concentric ring" model of urban development and referred to the area just outside the central business district that was largely populated by minorities and poor individuals. In Burgess's model, as the central business district expanded, **working-class** and **middle-class** individuals tended to move further from the center, the working class to the zone adjacent to the transitional zone and the middle class to more-distant suburbs.

Burgess's concentric model of development proved too neat and was hardly characteristic of the haphazard ways in which actual cities grew. His model was soon supplanted by the work of urban sociologists who defined standard metropolitan statistical areas and megalopolises. He was not wrong, however, in suggesting sector development in cities; that is, various clusters tend to emerge, each defined by economic activity, class, and often race. Burgess also called attention to the organic and dynamic development of cities. Nowhere is this more in evidence than in zones of

transition. Many were once vibrant, even affluent areas whose former grandeurs were diminished by economic change and demographic shifts. For example, the northern Manhattan neighborhood of New York City known as **Harlem** has undergone numerous transitions. Shortly after Dutch settlement in the seventeenth century, Harlem was a farming region. By the early nineteenth century, however, it had become a fashionable neighborhood, and fancy townhouses were built. By the end of the nineteenth century, though, wealthy white families were leaving the area, and it became a vibrant African American neighborhood that was the intellectual and cultural center of black America into the 1930s. Population growth, an influx of Latinos, and declining economic opportunities changed Harlem again until, by the 1960s, Harlem was synonymous with the term **ghetto** in the minds of many.

There are signs of revival in Harlem. This is, in part, because reformers and politicians often seek to revitalize zones in transition. In Burgess's original model, he did foresee that central business districts themselves could become abandoned or decrepit. When this happens, transition zones take on renewed importance because they are seen as integral to revitalizing old "downtowns." Moreover, because zones in transition continue to be repositories for recent immigrants, people of color, workers of modest means, and a handful of urban pioneers bent on gentrification, in many ways the zones are more representative of American diversity than homogenous suburbs.

Zones in transition appear in many towns and cities, often within various sectors of the same city and seldom with the neat regularity envisioned by Burgess. The city of Detroit, for example, steadily shed urban population through the latter half of the twentieth century. In the 1920s, a section near General Motors world headquarters began to be developed and was christened "New Center." As Detroit's urban core deteriorated in the 1950s through the 1970s, local boosters pumped money into New Center. In 1976, however, the focus shifted toward the old downtown, and the elaborate Renaissance Center cluster of hotels and businesses was opened. It did not prove successful, and the old core continued to decline. In 1996, however, General Motors purchased the Renaissance Center and moved its operations there, and the core is now showing hopeful signs of recovery with revamped theaters, new stadiums, and resurgent business activity. New Center, however, has fallen upon hard times and should probably be considered another zone in transition.

Zones in transition often pose problems for urban governments and social reformers, with higher levels of **poverty** and social problems clustering there. Urban-renewal planners often turn their attention to these zones, but their projects often have mixed success. Politicians debate whether public money should go to such areas for revival, or whether the private sector can best provide opportunity. Again, though, the large number of poor and disadvantaged living in these zones seldom allows these zones to develop entirely along the "organic" lines some planners advocate.

More recently, these zones have been rethought under new rubric, such as "empowerment zones," "enterprise zones," "opportunity zones," and "renewal communities." These terms generally come from those advocating a mix of private and public initiatives, including tax credits and low-interest loans for developers, federal block grants, educational incentives, regulatory relief, and modest social service spending. President George W. **Bush** launched such a program in 2004.

Suggested Reading

Donald Bogue, ed., *The Basic Writings of Ernest W. Burgess*, 1974; Randall Fogelman, *Detroit's New Center*, 2004; President Bush Proposes New "Opportunity Zones" (http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/09/).

ZONING

ROBERT E. WEIR

Zoning refers to laws that regulate the residency patterns, economic activity, and development schemes permitted within various sections (zones) of townships and municipalities. In theory, the purpose of zoning laws is to protect the public by assuring that human and economic activities do not negatively impinge upon each other. In practice, zoning laws are often the battleground for class, racial, and ethnic strife.

New York City is credited with writing the first citywide zoning laws in response to a 1916 incident in which the soaring Equitable Building on Broadway cast local residents into perpetual shadow. Other cities copied New York City's model during the late **Progressive Era**, and by the 1920s, many American cities had zoning laws. The idea behind said laws is deceptively simple: restrict like-minded activities to special zones so that, for example, the traffic from a warehouse is not coursing through a residential area.

The conceptual rationality of zoning often runs afoul of politics, social class, custom, and economics. State, local, and federal governments possess the right of eminent domain, by which they can seize private **property** and compensate owners if they deem a development project to be in the public interest. Bribery and corruption sometimes impact decision-making, and politics are almost always involved in zoning matters. Longtime residents can be displaced for projects such as airport expansion, new highways, and industrial parks. Given that members of the **upper class** tend to live apart from the general public, and those in the **middle class** are better positioned to mount legal challenges to such schemes, changes in zoning laws usually impact the poor disproportionately. In the 1950s, for example, the city of Boston constructed Interstate 93 to facilitate the movement of traffic into the city. To do so, it bisected the North End, a largely Italian American enclave of modest- and low-income families.

De facto residential segregation also impacts zoning decisions. Poor people, immigrants, **working-class** families, and minority groups often cluster in areas deemed less desirable by the upper and middle class. Quite often, these areas abut industrial or commercial zones. This not only makes residents more vulnerable to displacement, but also diminishes their quality of life. Recent studies indicate, for example, that poor African Americans are exposed to greater levels of smog, contaminated water, chemical exposure, and other environmental hazards than affluent whites living further away from pollution sources. Moreover, new sewage-treatment facilities, incinerators, landfills, and industrial concerns are more likely to be built in or near zones where they already exist.

In recent years, zoning has also emerged as a tool to maintain social distance. A phenomenon known as NIMBY ("not in my backyard") is one dimension of this.

Well-heeled citizens might agree on the virtue of a new project, but nonetheless use their economic and political clout to make certain that new roads, power plants, or high-rise office buildings are built far from their presence. They often battle projects on aesthetic grounds as well. In 2005, for example, wealthy residents of Martha's Vineyard, Massachusetts, brought suit to stymie plans for an offshore electricity-generating windmill farm, in part because it would ruin their "views" and impact property values.

More often, however, the NIMBY mindset colludes with zoning to exclude individuals and groups deemed undesirable. Plans for public housing complexes, substanceabuse treatment centers, and **homeless** shelters get scuttled when neighborhoods are rezoned for "single-family" dwellings, or when areas adjacent to **gentrified** commercial zones forbid new single-room-occupancy units.

In recent years, even the middle class has begun to feel the inequity with which zoning laws can be applied. Well-maintained homes have been seized by eminent domain to make way for such private development schemes as shopping malls and golf courses. Those fighting this trend have sometimes won reassessment of what constitutes "just" compensation, but very few have avoided losing their property.

It should be noted that zoning per se is not inherently a bad idea. It is the linchpin of urban and rural planning, and very few critics would advocate the complete elimination of zoning laws. On occasion, zoning laws can even be the focal point for community organizing. In 1993 the town of Greenfield, Massachusetts, refused to allow **Wal-Mart** to build a store. Since then, other towns and cities have used zoning laws to stop so-called big-box stores that residents feel would harm a locality's character, quality of life, and economics.

Suggested Reading

Gerald Frug, City Making: Building Communities without Building Walls, 2001; Rutherford Platt, Land Use and Society: Geography, Law, and Public Policy, 2004; James Rogers, "Homelessness, the Poor, and Local Property Regulation" (http://www.reformed.org/webfiles/antithesis/v1n3).

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

Compiling a bibliography for the study of social class in America is akin to fencing water. How does one choose representative works for a phenomenon that many Americans deny exists in the first place? Or for which there is more debate than consensus? Social scientists and historians have done the bulk of the academic work on the subject, but their work is not always easily accessible or comprehensible for the general public.

There are several other issues, the first of which is ideological. Put directly, many works on social class have a political axe to grind. This is not to discount them, rather to say that as such one needs to be familiar with the debate that has produced them in order to assess them. They are, in essence, where one should *continue* one's studies, not where one should *begin*.

A second problem is shelf life. Studies of contemporary class rely heavily on data. Since those data change, so too must analysis. To remain valuable, works of economic, political, or sociological perspective must offer a framework that transcends their data.

There is, finally, the problem of how to limit the bibliography. Class is not a stand-alone reality; it intertwines with other social categories, including ethnicity, gender, and race. Moreover, there are countless angles from which one can view social class, as can easily be seen just from the diversity of entries included in these volumes. A complete reckoning of work done on the topic of class and stratification would, in fact, be longer than the present work.

For all these reasons what follows is an admittedly limited list chosen mainly because these works provide a starting point. For more focused suggestions, please consult the Suggested Readings appended to individual entries.

Classic Works

The modern debate over class is, to a large degree, rooted in the ways in which Karl Marx and Max Weber saw social stratification. Whether or not one agrees with these works, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels's *The Communist Manifesto* (1848) and Marx's *Capital* (1867) must be considered seminal. Of Max Weber's many writings, *Economy and Society* (1920) and *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1905) should be consulted.

It is also hard to discuss any social phenomenon without referencing Emile Durkheim, whose *The Rules of the Sociological Method* (1895) is a good starting point. Scholars likewise continue to invoke models developed by Talcott Parsons, especially *The Social System* (1951) and *Essays in Sociological Theory* (1954). Robert K. Merton's *Social Theory and Social Structure* (1968) is a valuable tool, as is Lewis Coser's *The Functions of Social Conflict* (1956). Two works from C. Wright Mills must be considered classic, if for no other reason than the controversy they engendered: *White Collar* (1951) and *The Power Elite* (1956).

Many analysts continue to break down social class along the lines used by W. Lloyd Warner in his *Yankee City* series, available in a 1963 abridged version.

It would also be advisable to familiarize oneself with more recent writers whose work has framed debate over social class, especially Jean-Pierre Bourdieu, Ralf Dahrendorf, Kingsley Davis, Richard Della Fave, G. William Domhoff, Gerhard Lenski, Wilbert Moore, William Julius Wilson, and Erin Olin Wright, to name just a few.

Historical Works

Labor historians have been at the fore of looking at long-term intersections between class and power. These works are too numerous to list, but there is an extensive bibliography available in Robert Weir and James Hanlan, eds., *The Historical Encyclopedia of American Labor* (2004).

To cite just a few works that deal most directly with class, Herbert Gutman's Work, Culture, and Society in Industrializing America (1976) shows the fluidity of class identity in the nineteenth century; David Montgomery's Beyond Equality: Labor and Radical Republicans 1862–1872 (1981) recounts the failure to construct a class/race alliance following the Civil War; and Martin Burke's The Conundrum of Class: Public Discourse on the Social Order in America (1995) suggests that nineteenth-century Americans were no less conflicted about how to view class than are modern Americans. Daniel Horowitz's The Morality of Spending: Attitudes toward the Consumer Society in America, 1875–1940 (1985) picks up the debate over class and status at about where Burke stops.

Important works dealing with class in the twentieth century include Robert and Helen Lynd's path-breaking Middletown: A Study in Contemporary American Culture (1929) and Middletown in Transition (1937); Kim Moody, An Injury to All: The Decline of American Unionism (1988); Mike Davis, Prisoners of the American Dream (1986); and Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle, eds., Ruling America: A History of Wealth and Power in a Democracy, 2005.

Many excellent works look at the intersection of race and class, including Thomas Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis (1996); William Harris, The Harder We Run: Black Workers since the Civil War (1982); and Bruce Nelson, Divided We Stand (2000). Without doubt, though, the debate over race and the white working class has been shaped by David Roediger's The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class (1991), a controversial work in which the author argues that whiteness and the wage structure were consciously linked. Numerous writers have made similar points regarding the treatment of new immigrants, including Noel Ignatiev, Gwendolyn Mink, and Ronald Takaki.

For a historical look at women in the workplace, consult Ava Baron, Work Engendered (1991); Alice Kessler-Harris, Out to Work: A History of Wage-Earning Women in the United States (1982); and Jacqueline Jones, Labor of Love, Labor of Sorrow: Black Women, Work, and Family from Slavery to the Present (1985).

Historical works dealing with socialism, communism, and other radical movements have dominated the field of social history, and any attempt to winnow from the list would be folly. The best way to pursue any topic dealing with the radical left is to narrow one's focus. *The Encyclopedia of the American Left* (1992), Mari Jo Buhle, Paul Buhle, and Dan Georgakas, eds., is highly recommended. One should also become familiar with theories emanating from the Frankfurt School (which originated at Frankfurt's Institute for Social Research)—especially the ideas of Theodor Ardorno, Herbert Marcuse, Jürgen Habermas, and Max Horkheimer—and of Antonio Gramsci, whose *Selections from the Prison Notebooks* is available in numerous translations. Both the Frankfurt School writers and Gramsci are notoriously difficult to read, but their thought has shaped that of many contemporary scholars from the left.

Seeing and Not Seeing Class

Numerous studies look within a particular social class, and several challenge readers to move beyond. Among the latter is Paul Kingston, whose *The Classless Society* (2000) argues that most modern discussions of class are irrelevant. By contrast, Phyllis Moen, Donna Dempster-McClain, and Henry Walker, eds., *A Nation Divided: Diversity, Inequality, and Community in American Society* (1999) looks at the various fractures within society around which class forms. Likewise, John Dalphin's *The Persistence of Inequality in America* (1987) is outdated, but the author provides clear and concise looks at ways society is stratified.

The modern working class comes in for much analysis, in part because it is no longer in common use among the general public. Mary and Robert Jackman, *Class Awareness in the United States* (1983), took a complex look at how class was constructed without being tied to Marx or Weber to make the point that classes often do not behave according to predictable patterns. Paul Fussell's *Class: A Guide through the American Stratification System* (1983) takes a similarly nuanced look. David Croteau, *Politics and the Class Divide: Working People and the Middle-Class Left* (1995) sees the working class as alienated and apolitical, and argues that modern social movements are largely a middle-class phenomenon.

Not surprisingly, numerous writers have sought to reassert working-class agency. Reeve Vanneman and Lynn Cannon's *The American Perception of Class* (1987) challenges the notion that U.S. workers are not class conscious. More recently Michael Zweig's *The Working Class Majority* (2000) takes dead aim at the idea that America is a middle-class society and that the working class lacks identity.

There are pessimists, though. Stephen McNamee and Robert Miller Jr., in *The Meritocracy Myth* (2004), seek to refute the claim that hard work and persistence are the ticket to American success. An even bleaker view is offered by Robert Perrucci and Early Wysong in *The New Class Society* (1999). They argue that multinational corporations and technology have made the working class into social and economic throwaways, and that the class gap is unlikely to narrow without concerted, possibly radical, action.

One of the most compelling recent works to look at what we see and do not see about class in modern America comes from a collected work from writers at the *New York Times: Class Matters* (2005).

Studies of the modern upper class usually begin with E. Digby Baltzell, whose Philadelphia Gentlemen: The Making of a National Upper Class (1958) and The Protestant Establishment: Aristocracy and Caste in America (1964) remain heavily consulted. G. William Domhoff, The Power Elite and the State: How Policy Is Made in America (1990), looks at the vast social networks through which power is transmitted. Both Paul Ryscavage, Income Inequality in America: An Analysis of Trends (1999), and Lisa Keister, Wealth in America: Trends in Wealth Inequality (2000), look at the economics of upper-class power. One of the more unusual critical elite works is William A. Henry III, In Defense of Elitism (1994), a thought-piece that is equal parts liberal, conservative, and individualist.

The middle class has spawned a vast amount of literature, though much of it is as mushy as the definition of that class. For historic looks at the middle class, Barbara Ehrenreich's Fear of Falling: The Inner Life of the Middle Class (1985) remains a provocative work for capturing class anxieties. A solid general history is Loren Baritz, The Good Life: The Meaning of Success for the American Middle Class (1982). Benjamin DeMott offers provocation of his own in The Imperial Middle: Why Americans Can't Think Straight about Class (1990), and Theda Skocpol worries that the social policies and civic virtues that historically sustained middle-class life are in jeopardy in The Missing Middle: Working Families and the Future of American Social Policy (2000). Elliott Currie turns his attention to the internal-value strains plaguing middle-class families in The Road to Whatever: Middle-Class Culture and the Crisis of Adolescence (2004).

Poverty

Most contemporary looks at poverty will, at some point, evoke Michael Harrington, *The Other America* (1962). They will also engage the lifelong body of work done by Richard Cloward and Frances Fox Piven.

Each year sees the publication of new works on the poor, the homeless, the underclass, and others from society's bottom rung. Alas, the very output is testimony to the persistence of poverty, and over the past forty years the works have a sameness to them that requires little but statistical updating. Eleanor Leacock, The Culture of Poverty: A Critique (1971), lays out parameters of a debate over poverty that remain familiar. Similarly Bradley Schiller, The Economics of Poverty and Discrimination (1995), discusses how the poor are counted, how poverty is calculated, how various groups view poverty, and the social ripple effects associated with deprivation. Herbert Gans's The War against the Poor: The Underclass and Antipoverty Policy (1995) is already a classic work on blaming the victim, the dangers of labeling, and the strategy of attacking the poor rather than the system that creates them. John Tropman, Does America Hate the Poor? The Other American Dilemma: Lessons for the 21st Century from the 1960s and the 1970s (1998), pushes Gans even further and looks at long-standing stereotypes of the poor and elderly. Michael Katz, The Undeserving Poor: From the War on Poverty to the War on Welfare (1989), turns a historian's gaze to these issues, and William Kelso, Poverty and the Underclass: Changing Perceptions of the Poor in America (1994), looks at conservative, liberal, cultural, individual, and structural debates over poverty.

Challenges to Equality: Poverty and Race in America (2001), edited by Chester Hartman, provides a text-like look at inequality. Also worth a look is the older but useful Pamela Roby, ed., *The Poverty Establishment* (1974), a contentious book that looks at how government, social agencies, charities, labor markets, and employers conspire to keep the poor on the bottom rung.

Those looking for a more personal look at the effects of low wages and poverty are urged to consider mass publication works from writers such as Barbara Ehrenreich, Jonathan Kozol, Alex Kotlowitz, and Lillian Rubin. A useful text-like look at questions of poverty is Finis Welch, ed., *The Causes and Consequences of Poverty*, 2001.

Texts

Good texts on social class are more rare than one might suppose. Two by Harold Kerbo are among the best. Though dated, his *Social Stratification and Inequality: Class Conflict in the United States* (1983) works well with high-school students and entering college students. Of greater value is *Social Stratification and Inequality: Class Conflict in Historical, Comparative, and Global Perspective* (2005), a worldwide look at class issues. It is favored by many professors and is periodically updated.

An easier read and thus favored by some instructors is Leonard Beeghley, *The Structure of Social Stratification in the United States* (2004). Another useful text is that of Karen Rosenblum and Toni-Michelle Travis, *The Meaning of Difference: American Constructions of Race, Sex and Gender, Social Class, and Sexual Orientation* (2005), though the coverage of social class is less extensive than that in the Kerbo text.

Race, Class, and Gender: An Anthology (2005), edited and selected by Margaret Anderson and Patricia Hall Collins, excerpts the views of nearly six dozen commentators and scholars and provides varying perspectives. So do Lori Shein, ed., Inequality: Opposing Viewpoints in Social Problems (1998); Donna Kindall's Race, Class, and Gender in a Diverse Society: A Text-Reader (1997); and Susan Feiner's Race and Gender in the American Economy: Views from across the Spectrum (1994). The latter work, as the title suggests, gives class short shrift.

Web Sites

Surfing the Internet is one of the best ways to obtain up-to-date social statistics. All manner of official statistics can be searched through the Web sites of the U.S. Bureau of Census (http://www.census.gov/), the Department of Labor (www.dol.gov/), and the Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics (www.bls.gov/). Anyone looking to do comparative work involving economic data will find GPO Access useful (http://www.gpoaccess.gov/indicators/index.html).

The Public Broadcasting System (PBS) maintains a Web site for its exploration of inequality in America (http://www.pbs.org/now/politics/workingclass.html).

Those seeking a bibliography of works dealing with economics and class should consult the Library of Economics and Liberty (http://www.econlib.org/index.html).

The New York Times has a Web site related to its Class Matters series (http://www.nytimes.com/pages/national/class/index.html), and PBS has a site for its "People Like Us" series that includes material useful for educators dealing with children and teens (http://www.pbs.org/peoplelikeus/).

The Poverty and Race Research Action Council allows access to many of its articles and data that explore the disturbing links between race and economic inequality (http://www.prrac.org/). National and global data on women and inequality can be found at the United Nations' Global Policy Forum Website (http://www.globalpolicy.org/visitctr/about.htm). The National Organization for Women provides similar information and might be easier to search for those seeking information on North American women (http://www.now.org/index.html).

Nearly every advocacy agency imaginable now has a Web site, and one of the best ways to plumb the depths of debate over any economic, social, or cultural issue is to look at position statements, research, and policy drafts from diametrically opposing groups. For example, one might wish to contrast positions on issues as outlined on the Web site with the AFL–CIO (http://www.aflcio.org/issues/) with those of the ultraconservative Heritage Foundation (http://www.heritage.org/), or compare opinions on the proper role of government in the economy between the Sargent Shriver National Center on Poverty Law (http://www.povertylaw.org/) and the conservative American Enterprise Institute (http://www.aei.org/).

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INDEX

Bolded page number indicates primary entry in book for the topic indexed

```
Abbott, Edith and Grace, 1–3
Academia, 3-5, 241, 344, 812, 860, 879.
      See also Education; Higher
      education; Legacies; Ivy League
Accents and language patterns, 5–6, 40, 92,
      244, 245, 899
Achievement and ascription, 7–8, 50,
      230, 347, 390, 395, 567, 674,
      735, 736, 745, 751, 775, 794, 810,
      826
ACORN, 469, 633
Adams family, 8–12, 26, 90, 91, 131, 195,
      198, 227, 276, 277, 397, 398, 476,
      565-567, 601, 779
   Adams, Abigail, 8-9, 227
   Adams, Charles, 10, 26
   Adams, John, 8-9, 131, 195, 198, 276,
      277, 565–567, 601
   Adams, John Quincy, 9-11, 131, 398
   Adams, Henry, 11-12, 91
Addams, Jane, 1, 12–14, 308, 442, 651,
      695, 754, 838, 861, 912, 923
Advertising, 14–15, 21, 22, 108, 114, 163,
      217, 256, 739, 764–765, 789, 822,
      830, 839, 853, 938
Affirmative action, xxxiii, 76, 80, 115, 146,
      228, 236, 240, 243, 313, 376,
      389–390, 420, 447–448, 565–567,
      673-674, 683, 747, 796, 859, 904,
      936. See also Institutional discrimina-
      tion; Ouotas
Affluent Society, The, 290, 343, 598. See
      Galbraith, John Kenneth
```

```
African Americans, 4, 17, 24, 29, 50–51,
      61, 76–80, 85–86, 94, 99, 102, 115,
      118, 144, 146, 184, 207–208, 216,
      221, 227, 229, 236–237, 305, 306,
      308-310, 329, 333, 341-343, 349,
      354, 360, 377, 387–390, 393, 395,
      399, 403, 404, 408, 416, 423, 426,
      431, 438, 452, 454, 460, 461, 464,
      475, 480, 493, 510–511, 523, 525,
      528, 529, 557, 559, 561, 571, 572,
      578, 623-624, 632, 636, 647, 651,
      658, 675–676, 683, 688, 702, 715,
      717, 723, 742–743, 745, 753–754,
      759–760, 765, 776, 778, 788, 791,
      796, 797, 799, 812, 815, 823, 854,
      877, 882, 884, 887, 890–891,
      904-905, 909, 926, 928, 935, 936,
      941–943, 964. See also Black conser-
      vatism; Black power; NAACP; Race
      and racism; Institutional discrimina-
      tion; Racial stratification. See also
      organization name
Agrarianism, 16-18, 162, 247, 310, 376,
      379, 397, 519, 524, 525, 626, 661, 747
Agribusiness, 17, 18, 97, 98, 167, 298, 368,
      375, 525, 594, 595, 626, 661, 788.
      See also Agrarianism
Aid to Families with Dependent Children
      (AFDC), 142, 258, 570, 801, 802,
      882, 928. See also Welfare
Alger, Horatio, 18–20, 24–25, 80, 135, 214,
      222, 262, 296, 466-467, 472, 542,
      611, 747, 795, 796, 821, 834, 881
```

Alienation, 21–22 , 139, 148, 162, 172, 424,	Aronowitz, Stanley, 43–45 , 84, 574, 600,
506, 532, 573, 647, 711, 767, 820,	835
887, 907–908, 925, 951	Art, 11, 12, 45–48 , 60, 86, 103, 122, 179,
Althusser, Louis, 22–23, 162, 573, 630	190, 244–245, 259, 319, 329,
American dream, xxxiv, 15, 19, 23–25, 75,	353–355, 424, 468, 485, 514, 543,
95, 156, 163–164, 192, 230, 232,	545, 547, 553–555, 586, 660, 662,
241, 293, 313, 330, 331, 355, 357,	678, 722, 758, 770, 774, 830, 831,
368–369, 410, 418, 453–454, 459,	898
489, 520, 585, 608, 642, 664, 703,	Ascription, 7, 8. See Achievement and
718, 738, 766, 794, 825, 834, 847,	ascription
858, 875, 879, 936, 939, 942, 952	Asian Americans, 4, 30, 48–51 , 115, 208,
American Enterprise Institute, 284, 860,	369, 447, 511, 674, 788, 791, 823,
878. See also Think tanks	859
American exceptionalism, 25–27 , 134, 136,	Assimilation, 51–52 , 227, 238, 241, 256,
146, 301, 399, 462, 463, 812, 833,	369, 394, 420, 547, 757, 922
908, 916, 920, 944	Astor, John Jacob, 52–53 , 581, 585, 706,
American Federation of Labor (AFL),	716
27–29 , 30–31, 83, 138, 144, 148,	Auchincloss, Louis, 53–54 , 60, 809
158, 194, 236, 283, 300, 310,	Authority, 32–33, 54–55 , 59, 103, 111,
323–325, 329, 344–345, 380, 382,	140, 179, 187–189, 198, 226, 298,
429, 455, 500, 507, 651, 701, 707,	307, 323, 350, 351, 365, 375, 411,
842, 885, 895	489, 496, 497, 524, 555, 601, 609,
American Federation of Labor–Congress	619, 628, 639, 663, 665, 741, 745,
of Industrial Organizations	776, 785, 797, 809, 820, 872, 886,
(AFL–CIO), xxix, 30–31 , 284, 409,	922, 924, 944
731	,, , - , , , , ,
American Indians. See Native Americans	Bacon's Rebellion, 32, 57–59 , 198, 255,
American Revolution, 4, 9, 10, 13, 16,	276, 374
32–34 , 36, 52, 57, 58, 71, 90, 103,	Baltzell, E. Digby, 59–60 , 209, 285
134, 198, 227, 243, 247, 264,	Beacon Hill, 60–61 , 90, 340
276–277, 279, 293, 315, 317, 341,	Begging and busking, 62–63 Pollows Edward 42, 63, 66, 210, 211
367, 373–374, 394, 397, 405–406,	Bellamy, Edward, 42, 63–66 , 219, 311,
437, 464, 466, 479, 527, 553, 565,	380, 792, 794
580, 601, 603, 604, 695, 746, 749,	Berger, Victor, 66–67 , 551
762–763, 776, 779, 804, 888, 903,	Bernstein, Jared, 67–69 , 373
933	Big game hunting. See Sports
Anarchy (and anarchists), 9, 34–35 , 43, 65,	Bilingualism, 69–71 , 228, 465
71, 129–130, 196, 218, 219, 267,	Bill of Rights, 23, 47, 71–73 , 80, 143, 278,
285, 300–301, 310, 320–322, 380,	376, 428, 470
382, 430, 438–439, 451, 528, 566,	Birth control, 73–75 , 242, 250, 320–321,
603–605, 608–610, 619, 638, 641,	605, 617–618, 652, 732–734, 757,
659, 666, 668, 690–691, 792, 796,	838, 912
803, 805, 867, 903	Black conservatism, 76-77
Anglophile. See Europhilia	Black power, 77–79 , 574
Anti-Semitism, 35–37 , 320, 349, 406–407,	Blau, Peter, 79–80 , 135, 796, 826
658, 812	Blue collar, xxx, xxxi, xxxii, xxxiii, 30,
Antitrust laws, 37–39 , 275, 296–297, 309,	81–82 , 84, 95, 101, 200, 222, 230,
440, 516, 540–541, 714	260, 262, 263, 269, 284, 315, 318,
Appalachia, 6, 39–41 , 332, 343, 344, 398,	352, 380, 381, 408, 409, 441, 447,
409, 510, 623, 624, 676, 693, 918	455, 480, 499, 500–502, 507, 508,
Appeal to Reason, 41–42, 551, 769	526, 552, 571, 599, 600, 611,
11	613–615, 643, 645, 661, 681,
Armani, 259, 568, 959 Armories 42–43 , 211	682–684 696 699 702 710 718
ALTHOUGHS 4/-43 / LI	00/-00+ 090 099 /U/ /UU /18

```
782, 820, 822, 835, 836, 842, 843,
                                                      336, 344–345, 356, 361, 375–378,
      854, 883, 887, 904, 921, 936,
                                                      380, 411, 425, 431, 437–438, 449,
      937-939, 950-951
                                                      450, 474, 480, 489, 491–492,
                                                      496-497, 502, 506, 508, 519-520,
Blue-collar unions, 82-84
                                                      531, 540, 542, 546, 550, 555–556,
Blues, 84–86, 172, 405, 642, 678, 711, 712,
      825, 844
                                                      566, 573–574, 578, 586, 588, 604,
                                                      605, 610, 620, 621, 626, 630-631,
Bluestone, Barry, 86-87, 167
                                                      638, 641, 652, 661–663, 667, 669,
Boarding schools. See Education; Ivy
      League
                                                      689, 694–696, 701, 702, 706, 718,
Boards of directors, 87–88, 188, 554
                                                      722–723, 732, 738, 740, 748, 751,
Bobos. See Neiman Marcus; Status
                                                      757–758, 769, 787, 793, 795, 800,
      symbols; Yuppies
                                                      801, 802–803, 806, 811–812, 820,
Body image, 89-90
                                                      821, 828, 837, 842, 844-845, 859,
                                                      862, 864, 866, 869, 883, 900, 915,
Boston Brahmins, 8, 61, 90–91, 418, 476
Bourdieu, Pierre, xxxii, 91-92, 179-180,
                                                      919, 923, 924–925, 927, 932, 944,
      256, 302, 764, 800, 822, 824,
                                                      947, 948, 950-951, 961
                                                Carnegie, Andrew, 1, 24, 111–113, 275,
                                                      513, 541, 542, 544, 556, 575, 585,
Bourgeoisie, 93, 111, 135, 136, 137, 164,
      165, 178, 188, 196, 292, 317, 320,
                                                      707, 714, 729, 747, 792, 795
      451, 458, 459, 489, 491, 496, 499,
                                                Carter, James Earl ("Jimmy"), 86, 200, 222,
      506, 575, 610–612, 630, 638, 661,
                                                      271, 350, 425, 529, 563, 680, 683,
      662, 722, 803, 804, 847, 848, 907,
                                                      902, 905
      920, 949, 950
                                                Casinos, 104, 113–114, 291–292, 932
Bowling, 93–95, 280, 334, 765, 822
                                                Caste, 59–60, 90, 103, 114–115, 255, 457,
                                                      467, 557, 795–796, 923
Brace, Charles Loring, 95-96
Bracero Program, 96–98, 525
                                                Catholics, 36, 116–117, 174, 182–184,
Brown v. the Board of Education of Topeka,
                                                      268, 392–393, 394–395, 418, 420,
      230, 465, 556, 561, 743, 927
                                                      435, 682, 683, 696, 717, 791, 792,
Buchanan, Pat, 98-100, 101, 270, 285,
                                                      799, 921
      330, 502, 625, 937
                                                Cattle Kingdom, 97, 118–119, 930
Buckley, William F. Jr., 6, 245, 490, 774
                                                CEOs, 55, 82, 88, 119-121, 166, 199, 314,
Bush family, xxxi, 6, 39, 98, 99, 100-102,
                                                      389, 448, 542, 868, 873, 914, 919,
      120, 142, 166, 208, 222, 248, 250,
                                                      922, 932
      271, 282, 288, 360, 372, 409, 415,
                                                Chamber of Commerce, 121–122, 280,
      417, 441, 448, 492, 502, 563, 567,
                                                      471, 717, 819
      584, 600, 601, 602, 633, 635, 650,
                                                Charity balls, 122-123, 808
                                                Chavez, Cesar, 49, 444, 525-526, 701
      655, 664, 682–685, 731, 774, 775,
      787, 795, 802, 837, 842, 863, 867,
                                                Cheney, Dick, 120, 529
      888, 889, 901, 905, 919, 951, 963, 964
                                                Chicago School of Economics, 1, 12, 39,
Business aristocracy, xxx, 102-103, 120,
                                                      123-124, 266, 284, 402, 403, 884
                                                Child labor, 2, 13, 19–20, 125–127, 380,
      210, 389
                                                      439, 440, 442, 464, 472, 548, 570,
Business cycle, 103-105
                                                      650, 652, 720, 794, 902, 912, 923, 945
Campaign financing, 107–108
                                                Children and poverty, 2, 13, 19–20, 75,
Capitalism, xxxi, 4, 8, 16, 20, 24, 27, 38,
                                                      95–96, 97, 125–127, 127–129, 133,
      41, 65, 79, 103–104, 109, 109–111,
                                                      142, 145–146, 224, 228–230, 240,
      117, 122, 124, 129, 126, 136–137,
                                                      257–258, 269, 299, 332, 346–347,
      140, 142, 144, 147, 149, 152, 155,
                                                      351, 360–361, 369, 387, 409,
      157, 162, 163, 165, 166, 168, 175,
                                                      432–433, 475, 487, 570, 585,
      176, 178, 179, 188, 199, 201, 204,
                                                      595-596, 607, 633, 636, 704,
      218–219, 231, 234, 251–252, 254,
                                                      734–736, 745–746, 784, 796, 800,
      273-274, 283, 287, 290, 299,
                                                      801, 802, 810, 813-814, 823, 851,
      300–301, 310, 314, 317, 320, 325,
                                                      882, 916, 918, 926–928, 945, 952, 954
```

- INDEX
- Chomsky, Noam, 35, 129–130, 270, 498, 641
- Civil service, 52, **130–132**, 147, 270, 424, 615,720
- Civil War, 11, 17, 19, 36, 42, 46, 48, 61, 73, 90, 91, 118–119, 131, **132–134**, 152, 199, 205, 207, 235, 238, 247, 279, 281, 309, 317, 339, 354, 367, 370, 374, 379, 393, 401, 403, 406, 429, 438, 448, 464, 466, 467, 474, 513, 527, 537, 543, 553, 574, 581, 584, 588, 658, 670, 686–688, 706, 712, 713, 742, 749–750, 752, 759, 769, 776, 778, 779–781, 793, 813, 815, 819, 835, 842, 866, 875, 885, 893, 904, 926, 933-935
- Class consciousness, xxx, xxxi, xxxii, 22, 93, **134–135**, 136, 144, 148, 159, 164, 167, 173–174, 188, 189, 219, 248, 300, 397, 401, 490, 497, 499, 501, 519, 524, 577, 591, 609, 798, 829, 846, 909, 911, 931, 949, 961
- Class definitions. See Conflict theory; Continuous/discontinuous views of class; Corporate class; Functional elite theory; Gender stratification; Inequality theory; Karl Marx; Objective method; Lower class; Managerial class; Middle class; Poverty; Power elite; Prestige; Race and racism; Racial stratification; Reputational method; Status inconsistency; Subjective method; Underclass; Upper class; Working class
- Class formation, 27, **135–136**, 167, 174, 307, 438, 497, 523
- Class struggle, 42, 57–58, 111, 129, 132, 133, 136-137, 141, 147, 150, 157, 164, 195, 263, 345, 378, 391, 462, 472, 491, 496, 497, 524, 535, 574, 660, 757, 758, 772, 839, 911, 933,
- Class subcultures, **138–139**, 163 Classism, **139–140**, 189, 216, 432–433,
- Clinton, William ("Bill"), 39, 99, 101, 290, 343, 350, 359, 512, 535, 539, 563, 633, 635, 683, 684, 742, 802, 837, 859, 867, 868, 882, 889, 901, 919, 951
- Cloward, Richard, 141-142, 293, 616-617, 882, 929

- Cold War, 24, 27, 81, 100, 119, 142-144, 149, 200, 223, 227, 254, 263, 270, 273, 287, 293, 337, 343, 380, 421, 440, 454, 501-502, 507, 509, 521, 526, 528, 566, 641, 660, 680, 684, 689, 691, 735, 740, 748, 770, 805, 833, 840, 862, 938
- Coles, Robert, 145-146, 191 Commons, John R., 26, 146-147
- Communism, 24, 34, 100, 142-144, 148–150, 159, 160, 270, 287, 343, 345, 375, 440, 491, 496, 500–503, 507, 508, 509, 536, 552, 566, 620, 660, 680, 688-692, 699, 700, 722, 723, 804–805, 843, 844, 862, 869
- Communist Party, 136, 147-150, 159, 196, 213, 221, 266–268, 319, 337, 341, 381, 439-440, 491-492, 493, 500, 536, 552, 573, 605, 660, 661–662, 688, 691, 697, 718, 723, 740, 761, 804, 806, 838, 840, 870, 956
- Community colleges, 3, 4, 150–151, 229, 409, 410, 694, 736
- Company town, 152-153, 194, 309, 657 Comparable worth, 154-155, 236, 390 Competitiveness, 84, 120, 155–156, 316, 441, 586, 802
- Conflict theory, 27, 157-158, 164, 166, 187, 189, 209, 216, 221, 229, 285, 286, 384, 385–386, 577, 639, 826, 882, 948-949
- Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), 30-32, 83, 138, 144, 148, **158–160**, 236, 280, 329, 337, 380, 440, 445, 500, 507, 700, 724, 740, 772, 817, 842, 886, 895
- Conspicuous consumption, 24, 120, 122, **160–161**, 162, 203, 209, 293, 297, 308, 349, 482, 486, 505, 519, 543, 568, 574, 575, 581, 584, 588, 644, 705, 739, 765, 809, 822, 830, 868, 871, 898–899, 957, 958
- Consumer Price Index, 535, 591, 634, 909. See also Poverty calculations
- Consumerism, 21, 24, 41, 127, 136, 138, 144, **161–164**, 449, 453, 486, 489, 522, 568, 573, 644, 667, 684, 738–739, 768, 833, 853, 900, 908
- Continuous/discontinuous views of class, 135, 164-165, 207, 840, 846
- Contradictory class location, 165, 490, 496, 518, 630, 639

```
Corporate class, xxvi, 88, 135, 166–167,
                                               Della Fave, Richard, 182
      179, 221–222, 411, 490, 526, 563,
                                               Delmonico's, 202–203, 873
      583, 620, 639, 641, 723, 788, 791,
                                               Democracy, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 23, 25, 60,
      840, 872, 889, 932
                                                      66, 71, 72, 102, 107, 109, 119, 121,
Corporate welfare, 167–168, 200, 205,
                                                      131, 134, 151, 159, 166, 175–179,
      580, 739
                                                      203–205, 208, 210, 222, 271,
Coughlin, Charles, Rev., 36, 474, 625, 718
                                                      276-280, 285-287, 308-310, 343,
Country music, 170–173, 402, 539
                                                      344, 354, 397–399, 413, 431, 448,
Country clubs, 54, 168–169, 331, 581,
                                                      457, 461–462, 471, 475, 478, 489,
      791, 798, 922
                                                      492, 526, 531, 533, 556, 558, 563,
Creationism, 173-174, 184, 228, 708
                                                      565-567, 571, 583-585, 612,
Creative destruction, 175–176
                                                      619–620, 640, 642, 650, 652, 656,
Crime, 12, 65, 75, 80, 114, 142, 176–177,
                                                      668, 691, 699, 716, 718, 722, 724,
                                                      763, 769, 778, 800, 805, 808, 812,
      182, 200, 216–217, 228, 238,
      292-294, 295, 306, 319, 333, 340,
                                                      819, 832, 843–845, 859, 862, 880,
      341, 342, 361, 368, 386, 390, 401,
                                                      903, 921, 927, 948, 962
      408, 421, 432, 445, 457, 462, 536,
                                               Department stores, 162, 205–207
      592-593, 632, 633, 646-648, 657,
                                               Designer goods. See Luxury cars and goods
      659, 663, 670, 682, 690, 692, 704,
                                               Discontinuous views of class. See Continuous/
      729, 783–786, 848, 877–878, 884,
                                                      discontinuous views of class
      918, 936, 937, 955
                                               Disenfranchisement, 76, 207–208, 306,
Critical elite theory, 166, 177-179, 188,
                                                      627, 747, 778, 906
      286, 490, 639, 643
                                               Disney Corporation, 120, 153, 181, 222,
Cultural capital, 92, 179–180, 302, 468,
                                                      259, 355, 503, 895
      479, 641, 764–765, 821, 822, 834,
                                               Domhoff, G. William, Jr. 209-210, 221,
                                                      222, 271, 286, 515, 630, 641, 642,
Cultural tourism, 180-181, 582, 678
                                                      723, 796, 799, 888, 889
Culture of poverty, 181-182, 240, 423,
                                               Douglass, Frederick, 467, 749
      598, 881, 918
                                               Dorr Rebellion, 16, 211-212, 601
Culture wars, 102, 174, 182–185, 539,
                                               Dot-com bubble, 193, 212-213, 788, 837
      568, 574, 628, 679
                                               Dow Jones, 545, 836, 837, 913. See also
                                                      Stock market
Dahrendorf, Ralf, 157, 179, 187-189, 606,
                                               Dreiser, Theodore, 213–215, 254, 467,
                                                      808
Davis-Moore thesis, 164, 189-190, 286,
                                               Drug policy, 215–217
                                               Drury, Victor, 218-219, 792
Davis, Kingsley. See Davis-Moore thesis
                                               Du Bois, W. E. B., xxxiii, 219–221, 341,
Davis-Moore thesis, 189–190
                                                      395, 468, 493, 559, 756
Day, Dorothy, 117, 145, 190-191, 343
                                               Dve, Thomas, 221-222, 889
Day trading, 192-193, 670, 837
                                               Dylan, Bob, 62, 402, 407, 741, 825, 844
Debs, Eugene, 42, 65–67, 194–196, 324,
      381, 382, 439, 528, 535, 551, 592,
                                               Economic Opportunity Act of 1964
      638, 652, 690, 696, 699, 730, 804,
                                                      (EOA), 223-224, 332, 344, 346,
      806, 857, 861, 923
                                                      408, 673, 874, 901, 918
Debutantes, 196-197, 589, 808
                                               Edge city, 224-226
Deference, 162, 197-199, 298, 397, 682,
                                               Education, xxxii, 4, 5, 7, 11, 12, 14, 21, 22,
      752, 829, 872, 927
                                                      36, 43, 49–52, 54, 59, 70, 71, 75–76,
Deficits, 68, 101, 156, 167, 201, 213, 274,
                                                      78, 80, 91, 92, 96, 102, 125, 128,
      284, 316, 370, 425, 526, 863
                                                      138, 140, 143–145, 148, 150, 151,
Deindustrialization, 30, 68, 82, 86, 87, 153,
                                                      155, 158, 174, 177, 179, 180, 183,
                                                      184–185, 190, 199, 205, 208–209,
      176, 199–202, 261, 269, 284, 316,
      335, 381, 388, 441, 508, 537, 629,
                                                      217, 220, 221, 223, 224, 226–230,
      632, 681, 685, 842, 883, 936, 938, 951
                                                      250, 256, 274, 281, 286, 291, 292,
```

Education (continued) False consciousness, 21, 23, 44, 134, 188, 297, 298, 299, 306, 332-333, **251–252**, 351, 501, 533, 639, 694, 342, 346–347, 351, 355–356, 908 369, 371, 388, 389, 390, 393, 394, Falwell, Jerry Rev., 250, 937 395, 398, 399, 405, 406, 407, 408, Family trust, **252–253**, 791 409, 410, 417, 420, 424, 432-433, Farrell, James, 253-255, 857 449, 459, 460-462, 463-465, 466, Fashion, 53, 89, 139, 163, 179, 244, 471, 473, 477, 480, 487, 490, 494, **255–257**, 259, 485, 486, 568, 666, 495, 501, 503, 514, 520-521, 528, 758, 765, 783, 808, 828, 830, 831, 529, 531, 546, 547, 552, 554, 557, 868, 869, 937, 938 559, 560, 561, 566, 567, 585, 591, FEMA (Federal Emergency Management 596, 597, 606, 609, 610, 613, 614, Agency), 415-417 615, 616, 618, 620, 624, 632, 643, FERA (Federal Emergency Relief Administration), 328, 569, 572 649, 650, 652, 661, 665, 673–674, 676, 677, 687, 693–694, 703, 709, Federalist Party. See Founding Fathers 713, 735–738, 743–745, 750, Federalist Society, 257. See also Think tanks 755–756, 757, 790, 796, 800, 806, Feminization of poverty, 257–258, 633 809-810, 815, 819, 820, 823, 824, Fifth Avenue, xxxii, 202, 259-260, 482, 826, 828, 829, 846, 854, 859, 862, 567, 568, 896 863, 874, 879, 885, 887, 897, Film, 24, 89, 95, 118–119, 179, 245, 902-903, 912, 918, 919, 920, 926, **260–263**, 325–327, 329, 339–340, 927, 932, 937, 939, 945, 946, 949, 349-350, 355, 400, 402, 480, 488, 950, 952, 963 498, 537–538, 540, 547, 560, 589, Ehrenreich, Barbara, xxxiii, 230-232, 353, 593, 628, 642, 666, 678, 679, 781, 490, 521, 835, 936, 939, 952, 953, 782, 898, 924 First Families of Virginia, 263–265 Eisenhower, Dwight, 100, 143, 166, 273, Flat tax, **265–266**, 335, 371, 655 526, 533, 640, 683 Floyd, Charles ("Pretty Boy"), 266, 402, Elitism, 73, 179, 196, 330, 331, 483, 589. 403. See also James, Jesse See also Classism Flynn, Elizabeth Gurley, 65, 266-268, Engels, Friedrich, 218, 251, 303, 451, 499, 381, 861 661-662, 803, 834, 878, 949 Food bank, 249, 268-269, 814, 902, 953 Entitlements, 232-234, 601, 878, 926 Foreign policy establishment, 269–271 Environmentalism, 333, 562. See also Zoning Fortune magazine, 272–274, 289, 314, 486, 597, 916 Episcopalians, 59, 103, 184, 234-236, 348, 477, 717, 922 Foundations, 47, 79, 222, **274–276**, 423, Equity pay, 154, 236-237, 615 428, 585, 612, 613, 641, 714, 860 Ethnic enclaves, 51, 151, 237–239, 341, Founding Fathers, 8, 9, 27, 32, 38, 71, 107, 114, 170, 178, 247, 257, **276-278**, 368, 390, 393, 407 Ethnic stratification, 98, 239-241, 385, 317, 341, 357, 367, 376, 379, 397, 476, 518, 566, 601, 709, 746, 763, Eugenics, 74, 229, 242–243, 554, 617, 733, 779, 786, 830 877, 935, 939 Franklin, Benjamin, 4, 16, 32, 226, 247, Europhilia, 6, 202, **243–245**, 354, 355 248, 276, 279, 446, 512, 513, 586, Evangelicalism, 102, 183, 235, 245, 288, 746, 787, 834 392, 458, 657, 682, 684, 709, 793. Fraternalism, 279-280, 430 See also Creationism; Culture wars; Fraternities and sororities, 281–282, Fundamentalism; Homosexuality; Southern Baptists Free trade, 99, 124, 156, 201, 282-285, 304, 314–316, 378, 381, 507, 542, Factory system, 17, 162, 199, 247-248, 600, 665, 731, 788 379, 437, 524, 779, 885, 949 Friedman, Milton. See Chicago School of **Economics** Faith-based charities, 248–250

Functional elite theory, 135, 189, **285-286**, 840 Fundamentalism, 184, 286-288, 709 Galbraith, John Kenneth, 273, 289–290, 343, 598, 748, 866, 867, 874, 884 Gambling, 94, 104, 113–114, 183, 192, **291–292**, 336, 348, 393, 416, 528, 529, 657, 670, 895 Gangs, 139, **292–294**, 374, 402, 403, 647, 705, 814 Gans, Herbert, 182, 880, 882 Gated communities, 294-296, 504, 581, 849, 873 Gates, Bill, xxx, 296–297, 541, 613, 708, 872,888 GED (General Education Development), 408, 494, 736, 918 Gender stratification, 172, 231, 298-300, 312, 313, 322, 360, 389, 539, 614, 673, 823, 829, 846, 909 General strike, 43, 148, 300-301, 381, 841 Gentrification, 301–303, 342, 360, 388, 644, 764-765, 963 George, Henry, 218, 219, 283, 303–305, 380, 439, 551, 638, 719, 770, 772, 792, 923 Ghetto, 36, 77, 216, 217, 238, 241, 293, 303, **305–306**, 319, 320, 341–343, 362, 386, 446, 461, 480, 614, 632, 663, 676, 678, 697, 747, 765, 773, 782, 786, 797, 823, 854, 878, 918, 963 Giddens, Anthony, 135, 306–307 Gilded Age, 1, 11, 18, 20, 54, 63, 65, 73, 116, 123, 160, 162, 166, 182, 196, 202, 203, 206, 227, 235, 244, 259, 268, 287, 303, 304, **308–311**, 340, 368, 376, 380, 438, 439, 441, 500, 537, 542, 554, 580, 581, 584–585, 602, 628, 638, 652, 656, 704, 705–706, 713, 747, 784, 790, 791–792, 793, 795, 808, 830, 842, 866, 872, 874, 881, 890, 896, 922, 935, 950 Gilman, Charlotte Perkins, 42, 311–312, 495 Gingrich, Newt, 529, 684 Glass ceiling, 115, **313–314**, 385, 389, 615 Glazer, Nathan, 52, 241, 859

Globalization, 35, 39, 79, 82, 87, 92, 99,

109, 130, 155, 183, 284–285,

802, 805, 842, 843, 863, 869, 870, 879, 915, 951 Gold, 17, 48, 152, 311, 314, 315, **316–318**, 344, 348, 382, 472, 501, 544, 555, 584–585, 607, 626, 827, 829, 870, 929, 957 Gold, Mike, 319-320, 329, 660 Goldman, Emma, 34–35, 73, 213, **320–322**, 439, 605, 609, 690, 732 Goldthorpe, John, 322-323, 796 Gompers, Samuel, 27, 29, 31, 195, 310, **323–325**, 345, 439, 509, 638, 652, 842, 923 Gore, Albert, 99, 101, 208, 563, 846, 905 Gramsci, Antonio, 22–23, 350–351, 450, 573, 723. See also Althusser, Louis Grant, Madison. See Eugenics Grant, Ulysses, 131, 434, 687 Grapes of Wrath, 261, 325-327, 468, 525, 593, 599, 857 Great Depression, 14, 17, 24, 46, 62, 76, 83, 94, 97, 100, 104, 117, 123, 143, 148, 162, 166, 170, 178, 192, 196, 199, 227, 249, 253, 261, 269, 283, 315, 318, 319, 325–326, **328–330**, 336, 340, 341, 349, 358, 368, 380, 387, 402, 407, 419, 425, 439, 449, 455, 458, 464, 468, 473-474, 483, 500, 507, 513, 520, 534, 536, 552, 569, 572, 581, 593, 598, 653, 659, 688, 691, 697, 705, 707, 716–718, 723, 735, 747, 761, 770, 798, 801, 807, 813–814, 816, 832, 837, 842, 856, 857, 862, 867, 870, 872, 873, 883, 895, 901, 902, 910, 913, 920, 927, 940, 950, 955, 959 Great Gatsby, The, 330-331, 340, 468, 589 Great Society, 41, 76, 141, 223, 249, 250, **332–334**, 344, 346, 376, 408, 421, 422, 428, 447, 468, 480, 502, 508, 562, 601, 635, 681, 684, 719, 745, 747, 795, 805, 874, 881, 884, 891, 904, 918-919 Grunge, 139, 665-666. See also Punk and grunge culture Guaranteed annual income, 334–336, 567, 655 Guthrie, Woody, 327, 336-338, 402, 594,

740, 825

314–316, 317, 378, 381, 388, 441,

442, 451, 506, 508, 620, 632, 685,

```
Hamptons, 54, 339-340, 582, 872, 873, 894
                                                       177, 179, 225, 226, 229, 232, 237,
Harlem, 44, 46, 77, 117, 208, 229, 238,
                                                      241, 253, 256, 258, 265–266, 292,
      259, 291, 306, 341–343, 391, 404,
                                                      303, 305, 334–336, 340, 346, 347,
                                                      355, 356, 359, 362, 369-371,
      493, 552, 678, 693, 697, 723, 781,
      861, 896, 963
                                                      372–373, 376, 384, 385, 388, 425,
Harrington, Michael, 24, 41, 191, 332,
                                                      427, 459, 460, 462, 464, 465, 469,
      343–344, 552, 598
                                                      471, 479, 480, 481, 486, 487–488,
                                                      494, 495, 496, 498, 499, 509, 510,
Hayden, Tom, 294, 533, 573, 843
Haymarket Square bombing, 267, 301, 320,
                                                      512, 518–521, 529, 534, 546, 549,
      322, 431, 439, 603–605, 638, 690
                                                      591, 596, 613, 624, 629, 631–636,
Haywood, "Big Bill," 324, 344-346, 381,
                                                      644, 651, 653–656, 664, 666, 670,
                                                      673, 676, 677, 684–685, 689, 693,
Head Start, 224, 229, 332, 346-347, 487,
                                                      702, 707, 728, 730, 731, 735, 737,
      633, 636
                                                      739, 756, 758, 760, 771, 774, 780,
Health care, 78, 82, 140, 231, 233, 306,
                                                      785, 786, 795–796, 809–810, 818,
      332, 371, 422, 459, 460, 461, 469,
                                                      821, 822, 824, 827, 835, 837, 838,
      471, 509–512, 561, 601, 618, 647,
                                                      846, 851–852, 853, 859, 860,
                                                      866-868, 872, 874, 877, 878, 881,
      703, 731, 801, 802, 805, 810, 865,
      874, 909, 912, 917, 932, 953. See also
                                                      888-889, 892, 894, 902, 909, 910,
      Medical care
                                                      914, 920, 925, 926–928, 939,
Hearst family, 348–350, 583, 769, 809, 814
                                                      952–954, 964, 966
Hegemony theory, 252, 350–351
                                                Income and inheritance taxes, 101, 129, 232,
Heritage Foundation. See Think tanks
                                                      253, 265, 303, 305, 334, 335,
Hidden Injuries of Class, The 351-53, 751,
                                                      369–371, 376, 534, 549, 651, 654,
                                                      655-656, 685, 707, 771, 866-868, 952
High culture, 45, 122, 181, 244–245,
                                                Indentured servitude, 32, 57, 198, 255,
      353–355, 519, 554, 589, 613, 758,
                                                      373–375, 519, 523, 752, 775, 896
      809, 849, 888
                                                Individualism, 7, 20, 25, 60, 64, 65, 76,
Higher education, 4, 5, 7, 150-151, 184,
                                                       118, 119, 136, 162, 182, 320, 328,
      229, 281, 299, 355–356, 395, 410,
                                                      365, 375–377, 399, 402, 411, 423,
      417, 495, 585, 597, 661, 693, 756,
                                                      446, 459, 462, 467, 472, 566, 597,
      796, 824, 854, 903, 918, 927
                                                      601, 619, 667, 669, 746, 764, 792,
Hispanics. See Latinos and Hispanics
                                                      833, 854, 881, 927
Home ownership, 24, 241, 357-359, 362,
                                                Industrial reserve army, 377–378, 820
      601
                                                Industrial Revolution, 17, 38, 40, 82, 116,
Homelessness, 19, 25, 62, 63, 359–361,
                                                       125, 162, 166, 199, 206, 211, 237,
      432, 664, 965
                                                      255, 283, 303, 310, 315, 317, 356,
Homosexuality. See Sexuality
                                                      357, 367, 374, 376, 377, 378–380,
                                                       386, 399, 429, 438, 461, 464, 477,
Housing policy, 358, 361-362, 665, 786
Howe, Irving, 363, 951
                                                      483, 513, 519, 574, 626, 727, 752,
Hutchinson, Anne, 198, 363-365, 376,
                                                      757, 777, 783, 787, 801, 802, 820,
                                                      830, 836, 841, 866, 881, 885, 888,
      580, 668, 755
                                                      935, 949
Immigration, 19, 28, 36, 49, 70, 94, 96, 97,
                                                Industrial Workers of the World, 17, 29, 35,
      98, 102, 116, 126, 184, 238, 240, 242,
                                                      43, 46, 62, 136, 148, 195, 236, 261,
      243, 287, 303, 310, 367–369, 374,
                                                      266, 300, 321, 324, 345, 381–383,
      375, 380, 392–394, 443, 445, 465,
                                                      439, 500, 528, 533, 605, 619, 651,
      525, 553, 611, 632, 651, 694, 727,
                                                      690, 732, 772, 804, 841, 908, 950
      774, 792, 793, 887, 902, 934, 935
                                                Inequality measures. See Poverty
Income, xxxiii, 4, 7, 14, 15, 49, 50, 63, 68,
                                                      calculations
                                                Inequality theory, 181–182, 384–385, 636
      80, 81, 86, 100, 101, 102, 109, 111,
      114, 116, 124, 127, 128, 129, 137,
                                                Inheritance tax. See Income and
```

inheritance taxes

140, 143, 151, 156, 164, 166, 168,

```
Inner cities, 19, 141, 182, 206, 224, 225,
      226, 228, 229, 302, 305, 333, 358,
       360, 361, 362, 386–388, 428, 432,
      445, 446, 511, 666, 698, 744, 745,
      751, 782, 793, 796, 797, 822, 857,
      877, 878, 892, 941–942, 954
Internal Revenue Service, 123, 253, 265,
      274, 657, 670
Institutional discrimination, 140, 239, 258,
      313, 388–390, 488
Invisible Man, 390-392
Irish and Irish Americans, 32, 52, 116, 133,
       173, 183, 236, 237–238, 244,
      253–254, 262, 266, 280, 293,
       303-304, 343, 367, 369, 374,
      392–394, 399, 418, 419, 420, 479,
      527, 535–537, 587, 637, 658, 676,
      679, 683, 696, 732, 752, 823,
      921-923, 933, 935
Ivy League, 4, 5, 6, 50, 59, 87, 88, 190,
      199, 209, 226, 228, 229, 270, 271,
      282, 313, 389, 394–396, 447–448,
      518, 648, 735, 737, 755, 775, 790,
      798, 800, 827, 830, 889, 912, 920,
      922
Jacksonian democracy, 279, 354, 397–399
James, Henry, 53, 363, 399-401, 467
James, Jesse, 206, 266, 401–403
Jazz, 84, 86, 170, 172, 354, 403-405, 457,
      781, 857
Jefferson, Thomas, 4, 9, 11, 16, 32–33, 37,
      53, 72, 131, 198, 205, 244, 247, 264,
      276, 277, 357, 379, 397, 399,
      565–567, 580, 746, 748, 776–777,
      787, 804, 927, 934
Jewish Americans, 369, 405–408, 447, 683,
      688, 743, 921, 922, 936
Job Corps, 223, 332, 408–410, 636, 674,
      918
Job training, 96, 151, 298, 347, 409–410,
      564, 596, 651, 735, 878, 902
Johnson, Lyndon, 76, 191, 332, 334, 408,
      421, 428, 468, 508, 635, 673, 683,
      867, 918
Jungle, The, 400, 410–411, 445–446, 548,
      601, 769
Justice (civil), 412-414
Katrina, xxxi, 102, 269, 415-418, 450, 874
```

Kennedy family, xxxi, 418–423. See also Kennedy, John; Kennedy, Robert;

Kennedy, Edward (Ted)

```
Kennedy, John, 100, 116, 223, 289, 290,
      394, 418–423, 508, 599, 683, 716,
      719, 874, 881, 922
Kennedy, Robert, 421-422, 428, 432
Kennedy, Edward (Ted), 420, 422, 448
Kerbo, Harold, 158, 167, 190, 423-424,
Keynes, John Maynard (also Keynesian),
      86, 104–105, 110, 123, 284, 289,
      318, 424–426, 508, 685, 747, 795,
      866, 867, 884, 918
King, Martin Luther Jr., 24, 77, 98, 334,
      336, 342, 344, 420, 422, 426–428,
      623-625, 701, 724, 744, 865, 919
Knights of Labor, 17, 27, 28, 65, 83, 117,
      159, 218–219, 236, 279, 283, 304,
      310, 324, 380, 428–431, 438, 500,
      551, 604, 636–638, 652, 696, 704,
      707, 729, 787, 792, 793, 842, 885,
      897, 948
Kozol, Jonathan, 146, 228-230, 342, 353,
      361, 431–433, 746
Ku Klux Klan, 36, 116, 261, 279, 308, 340,
      394, 433–435, 658, 687, 691, 760,
      773, 904, 935
Labor movement, 13, 28–31, 38, 41, 67,
      68, 81, 100, 111, 116, 117, 121, 125,
      134, 138–139, 144, 146–148, 154,
      158, 162, 194, 200, 218–219, 236,
      248, 254, 260, 273, 283, 293,
      300-301, 304, 307, 310, 315-317,
      322, 324, 329, 344, 376, 379–380,
      399, 407, 421, 428, 431, 437–442,
      445, 455, 463, 469, 475, 483, 493,
      498–500, 503, 507, 508, 509, 515,
      516, 526, 536, 542, 544, 552, 570,
      571, 592, 604, 605, 609, 610, 619,
      620, 624, 637, 649, 651, 679, 684,
      685, 688, 690, 696, 697, 699, 713,
      717, 720, 728, 738, 740, 747, 773,
      778, 793, 795, 803, 807, 808, 819,
      821, 838, 840, 842, 843, 846, 870,
      885, 895, 897, 910, 923, 929, 950,
      951
Lathrop, Julia, 2, 443
Latinos and Hispanics, 4, 6, 49, 51, 98,
      102, 115, 146, 208, 216, 226, 228,
      229, 237, 329, 342, 368, 375, 389,
      390, 408, 443–445, 460, 465, 480,
      511, 529, 572, 623, 632, 647,
      675-677, 774, 788, 791, 859, 882,
```

884, 909, 922, 934, 936, 963

Law of the jungle, 445–446 , 601	173, 182, 190, 196, 204, 205, 206,
Law schools. See Education; Legacies	216, 217, 220, 234, 242, 244, 255,
Legacies, 50, 145, 389, 446–448, 518, 566,	256, 275, 276, 285, 293, 294,
900	301–303, 326, 327, 333, 353, 360,
Legitimating, 448–450, 722	369, 377, 380, 391, 392, 398, 403,
Lenin,V.I. See Leninism	409, 423, 428, 433, 446, 460, 461,
Leninism, 78, 136, 346, 450–451 ,	472, 479–481 , 514, 518, 529, 534,
491–492, 550, 748, 804, 869	568, 579, 587, 598, 618, 628,
Lenski, Gerhard, xxxiii–iv, 451–453, 640,	646–648, 653, 655, 662, 669–670,
644, 828, 829	675, 676, 696, 699, 709, 745, 764,
Levittown, 81, 358, 387, 453–454, 489	765, 781, 782, 790, 797, 800, 821,
Lewis, John L., 29, 158, 159, 440,	823, 828, 829, 840, 846, 855, 857,
456–457 , 700, 740	863, 877, 889, 895, 917, 920, 921,
Lewis, Sinclair, 196, 254, 457–459 , 522	934, 939, 941, 948, 950
Life chances, 92, 140, 164, 188–189, 217,	Luxury cars and goods, xxv, 15, 243, 259,
239, 323, 360, 384, 386, 389, 432,	481–482 , 486, 505, 568, 588, 644,
459–460 , 465, 480, 488, 509, 578,	654, 655, 809, 829, 854, 959
591, 596, 634, 790, 810, 826, 827,	
	Lynd, Robert Staughton and Helen, 79,
865, 874, 922, 925	285, 482–484 , 521–523
Life expectancy, 126, 460–461 , 509, 510,	NE : 15 47 100 212 475 400
565, 632	Magazines, 15, 46, 190, 212, 467, 480,
Lifestyle 103, 123, 138–139, 245, 255–256,	485–487 , 497, 547–549, 555, 583,
377, 421, 486, 574, 581, 665–666,	597, 660, 961
710, 765, 808, 873, 900	Malcolm X, 77, 342
Limbaugh, Rush, 216, 270, 539, 567, 937	Misdistribution of wealth, 487–488 , 907
Lincoln, Abraham, 11, 76, 107, 207, 220,	Malnutrition, 633, 814
399, 559, 686, 763, 778	Man in the Grey-Flannel Suit, The, 454,
Lipset, Seymour Martin, 26, 27, 79, 103,	488–489
450, 461–463 , 502, 553	Managerial class, xxvi, xxx, 135, 152, 178,
Literacy, 70, 207, 297, 432, 463–465 , 554,	489–491 , 564, 569
582, 585, 632, 709, 904, 905, 914,	Maoism, 491–492
946	Marcantonio, Vito, 493–494 , 551, 697
Literature, 92, 179, 244, 253, 272, 308,	Marcuse, Herbert, 22, 162, 573–574
319, 321, 325, 329, 343, 353, 354,	Marx, Karl, 22, 42, 78, 79, 93, 104, 111,
363, 401, 431, 458, 462, 465–468 ,	135–136, 138, 148, 162, 164, 165,
586, 588, 589, 645, 659–661, 662,	175, 218, 251, 303, 377–378, 448,
735, 815, 853, 943, 954, 956	450, 472, 491, 496–499, 505, 507,
Living wage, 68, 117, 300, 469–470 , 535,	605, 610, 629, 630, 661–662, 663,
794, 907, 953	694, 767, 792, 799, 800, 802, 811,
Lobbyists, 120, 121, 156, 270, 283,	834, 877, 878, 907, 920, 925, 949
470–471 , 526, 619, 722, 889	Marriage, 9, 11, 49, 59, 74, 75, 114–115,
Lockwood, David, 606, 796	144, 169, 300, 311, 322, 330, 349,
London, Jack 42, 62, 349, 458, 467,	358, 407, 421, 452, 478, 489,
471–472 , 838	494–496 , 514, 516, 543, 545, 581,
Long, Huey P., 473-474, 625, 718	596, 705, 742, 743, 753, 756, 757,
Lotteries. See Casinos; Gambling	758, 797, 798, 839, 868–869,
Lowell, Josephine Shaw, 474–476, 945	871–872, 888, 898, 899, 931
Lowell family, xxxi, 90–91, 264, 447,	Marshall, Thurgood, 556, 561
474–475, 476–477 , 945	Marxism/Marxists, xxv, 21, 22–23, 44, 66,
Lowell millworkers, 152, 379, 438,	92, 93, 134–137, 138, 146, 147–148,
478–479 , 644, 907, 935	157–158, 162, 164, 165–166, 175,
Lower class, 2, 8, 15, 36, 38, 47, 55, 94,	178, 179, 187–188, 190, 218, 219,
133 135 138 140 142 164 168	248 251–252 254 274 286 300

```
304, 306, 310, 323, 324, 350–351,
                                                      447–448, 466, 490, 517–518,
      353, 377, 430, 448, 450–451, 484,
                                                      565-567, 606, 795, 834, 867
      489, 491–492, 496–497, 499, 500,
                                                Microsoft, 39, 153, 296–297, 541, 708, 827
      501, 505, 506, 518, 519, 532-533,
                                                Middle class, xxvi, xxx, xxxi, 1, 4, 5, 6, 7,
      550, 551, 573–574, 575, 577, 592,
                                                       12, 15, 18, 24, 26, 29, 30, 31, 38, 42,
      610–611, 619, 621, 629–631, 638,
                                                      46, 47, 50, 54, 55, 59, 61, 64, 65, 74,
      639, 646, 661–662, 670, 688, 694,
                                                      81, 88, 93–94, 96, 101, 107, 111,
      696, 722, 761, 790, 791, 796,
                                                       114, 116, 121, 122, 128, 131, 132,
      803-805, 811, 820, 840, 846, 869,
                                                       134, 136, 138, 139, 140, 143, 144,
      877, 882, 883, 887, 907–908, 919,
                                                       153, 159, 162, 163, 164, 165, 167,
      920, 949, 961
                                                       168, 169, 173, 174, 179, 183, 188,
Mass media, 22, 35, 85, 107, 130, 307, 444,
                                                       190, 192, 193, 199, 201, 202, 204,
      497–498, 572, 692, 722, 911
                                                      205, 216, 217, 222, 225, 226, 231,
                                                      234, 243, 244, 248, 253, 256, 263,
Masses, 6, 9, 21, 24, 34, 40, 54, 71, 73, 157,
      162, 166, 178, 190, 197, 198, 210,
                                                      270, 280, 286, 287, 290, 292, 294,
      243, 251, 256, 276, 278, 285, 286,
                                                      295, 301–303, 304, 310, 313, 316,
      317, 351, 353, 354, 377, 398, 411,
                                                      317, 320, 322, 325, 333, 340, 343,
      425, 430, 439, 464, 473, 474, 482,
                                                      354, 356, 357, 362, 370, 372, 373,
      486, 487, 498–500, 512, 516, 533,
                                                      376, 380, 384, 387, 389, 394, 395,
      550, 554, 566, 576, 577, 584, 625,
                                                      399, 403, 404, 405, 411, 418, 423,
      660, 694, 702, 721, 763, 765, 778,
                                                      429, 435, 438, 439, 440, 442, 444,
                                                      454, 457, 459, 460, 462, 464,
      780, 791, 802, 821, 822, 923, 939,
      949
                                                      471-472, 479, 480, 482-484,
Masses, The (and The New Masses), 46,
                                                      485-486, 487, 488-489, 490, 494,
      319-320, 485, 660
                                                      495, 496, 498, 499, 502, 503, 505,
                                                       508, 515, 516, 518–521, 523, 524,
McCarthyism, 23, 24, 227, 244, 276, 337,
                                                      527, 528, 529, 536, 538, 541, 542,
      397, 484, 493, 500–502, 507, 527,
      556, 607, 688, 690, 692, 840, 857
                                                      547, 548, 552, 564–565, 567–568,
McDonald's, 412–414, 460, 503–504, 505
                                                      574–576, 581, 582, 587, 588, 591,
McMansion, 504-505, 588
                                                      597, 598, 599, 600, 608, 611, 613,
Means of production, 21, 22, 110, 111,
                                                      623, 624, 626, 628, 634, 638, 642,
      134, 135, 136–137, 148, 165, 166,
                                                      651, 653, 654, 656, 659, 660, 676,
      178, 187, 323, 489–490, 496, 499,
                                                      677, 683, 684, 685, 690, 692, 693,
      505–506, 574–575, 630, 639, 646,
                                                      695, 696, 699, 701, 702, 704, 706,
      662, 675, 722, 790, 802, 834, 883,
                                                      709, 711, 731, 733, 740, 747, 752,
      949, 950
                                                      756, 764, 781–782, 783, 790, 791,
Meany, George, 24, 29, 30-31, 144, 440,
                                                      792, 795, 797, 798, 800, 806, 807,
                                                      821, 823, 827, 830, 831-832, 833,
      502, 507–509, 701, 950
Medical care, 12, 74, 78, 82, 140, 144, 231,
                                                      834, 836, 846, 853–855, 856, 857,
      233, 269, 306, 332, 360, 371, 422,
                                                      863, 867, 868, 872, 873, 878, 880,
      459, 460, 461, 469, 471, 509–512,
                                                      881, 882, 885, 891, 894, 895, 904,
      528, 561, 601, 618, 647, 703, 731,
                                                      909, 914, 919, 920, 922, 934,
      801, 802, 805, 810, 865, 874, 909,
                                                      937-938, 941, 945, 946, 948, 949,
      912, 917, 932, 953
                                                      950, 951, 954, 957–959, 962, 964,
Medicare, 232, 332, 344, 510, 601,
                                                      965
      801–802, 918, 927
                                                Middletown, 482-484, 521-523
Mellon family, 512–514
                                                Middling sorts, 248, 519, 523–524
Men's clubs, 259, 406, 514–515, 754
                                                Migrant labor, 98, 126, 375, 524–525
Mergers and acquisitions, 39, 84, 120, 348,
                                                Military-industrial complex, 143, 166, 178,
      497, 515–517, 582–583, 731, 787,
                                                      200, 228, 271, 380, 526, 529, 533,
      835, 880
                                                      723, 731, 844
Meritocracy, xxx, 7, 59, 92, 131, 190, 210,
                                                Military recruiting, 527-529
      221, 277–278, 356, 376, 397,
                                                Mill, John Stuart, 205, 530-532
```

192–193, 836

Mills, C. Wright, 132, 157, 166, 178, 209, Native Americans, 16, 32, 33, 50, 52, 113, 286, **532–533**, 573, 575–576, 597, 118, 146, 227, 276–278, 347, 374, 606, 617, 619, 640, 843, 888, 889 398, 460, 510, 513, **563–555**, 580, Minimum wage, xxix, 68, 76, 101, 117, 623, 757, 830, 857, 893, 904, 922, 124, 126, 269, 421, 422, 440, 449, 933–935, 944 469–470, 510, **534–535**, 557, 570, Natural aristocracy, 277, 565-567 596, 664, 681, 684, 718, 753, 909, Negative income tax. See Guaranteed 953 annual income Neiman Marcus, 89, 567-569 Molly Maguires, 42, 535-537, 690, 774 Monday Night Football, 538-539 New class. See Managerial class New Deal, 14, 17, 40, 43, 46, 65, 76, Monetary system. See Gold Monopoly, 37–39, 53, 179, 273, 291, 297, 77, 101, 131, 141, 147, 236, 380, 445, 450, 497, 516, **540–542**, 249-250, 270, 273, 289, 318, 328, 332–333, 349, 359, 376, 383, 408, 646, 650, 713, 720, 771, 896, 923-924 425, 440, 448–449, 455, 468, 480, Moore, Michael, 263, 600 493, 500, 507, 523, 552, 553, 557, Moore, Wilbert, 164, 189–190, 286 **569–573**, 599, 601, 653, 656, 670, Morgan, J. P., 112, 259, 279, 375, 679, 681–683, 691, 705, 707, **542–545**, 707, 714, 769 716–719, 721, 747, 753, 754, Mormons, 184, 545–547, 921 760, 786, 795, 801, 805, 816–817, Movies. See Film 837, 857, 870, 873, 881, 884, 895, Moynihan, Daniel Patrick, 52, 241, 333 902, 904, 910, 913, 923, 927, 941, Muckraking, 38, 41, 411, 433, 485, 951, 959 **547–549**, 555, 582, 650, 704–705, New Deal coalition, 571–573, 682, 683, 707, 713, 769, 794, 831, 923 717, 904 Mudsill theory, **549–550**, 778 New Left, 147, 150, 163, 254, 484, 490, Multinational corporations, 314, 787. See 491, 502, 508, 552, **573–574**, 680, also Competitiveness; Globalization 683, 688–689, 807, 843, 862, 950 Municipal socialism, 148, 550-563, 730 New middle class, 29–31, 143, 354, 357, Murray, Charles, 182, 229, 240, 243, 878, 496, 519, **574–575** 881-882 New social history, 26, 32, 576-577, 688, Museums, 45–47, 60, 122, 180, 181, 199, 812 209, 259, 354, 519, 537, **553–555**, New York Yankees, 578–580, 822 613, 808, 897 Newport, 24, 211, 339, **580–582**, 741, 872, 873, 894, 896, 957 Mutual funds, 836–837 Myers, Gustavus, 555-556 Newspaper mergers, 348, 497, 582–583 Nixon, Richard, 98, 270, 271, 333, 334, Myrdal, Gunnar, 115, 228, 556-558 425, 502, 563, 680, 905, 918, 936 NAACP, 13, 78, 220–221, 341, 342, 471, Nob Hill, 584-585 556, **559–561**, 652, 677, 912 Nonprofits, 585-586 NAFTA (North American Free Trade Norris, Frank, 310, 467, 587–588 Agreement), 156, 201, 284, 315–316 Nouveau riche, 7, 122, 198, 248, 255, 281, Nader, Ralph, 99, 163, 168, 271, 333, 297, 308, 418, 485, 490, 505, 519, **562–563**, 625, 731, 830 554, 567, 574, 580, 584, **588–589**, National Center for Opinion Research, 705, 708, 764, 790, 808, 830, 872, 521, 951 888, 894, 920 National Institutes of Health, 215, 512, Objective method, 21, 91–92, 135, 164, 354, 372, 506, 517, 518, 523, 553, National Labor Relations Act. See Wagner **591–592**, 634, 685, 698, 846, 888, 909, 920, 950 NASDAQ (National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations), O'Hare, Kate Richards, 592-593

Okies, 63, 593-595

One-parent families, xxxi, 128, 142, 182, 493-494, 503, 510, 513, 534, 217, 257, 360, 487, 511, **595–596**, 547-548, 555, 557, 564, 579, 582, 633, 636, 770, 827, 857, 878, 882, 586, 587, 591–592, 595–596, 928, 952 598-599, 602, 605, 608, 616-617, Organization man, 199, 273, **597**, 844, 938 623–624, **631–636**, 639–640, Other America, The, 48, 191, 322, 343–344, 650–652, 654, 657, 660, 663, 667, **598-599**, 874 670, 673, 678, 681, 683, 693, 695, 697, 703–705, 710, 715, 729, 732, Outlaws, 401–403. See also James, Jesse Outsourcing, 30, 84, 109, 177, 442, 735, 739, 745, 747, 759, 765, **599–600**, 863, 875 767–768, 770–772, 782–783, 786, Ownership society, 454, 601-602, 837 792–793, 795, 800, 805, 810, 814, 816-817, 821, 823, 826, 838, 840, Packard, Vance, 764, 830, 831 844, 846, 848, 852, 856, 859, Parsons, Albert and Lucy, 381, 603-605 862-863, 868, 874-875, 877-878, Parsons, Talcott, 79, 285, 605-606, 639 880-882, 907, 909, 912, 916, Patriotism. See McCarthyism 918-919, 926, 928-929, 931, Pawnbrokers, 607–608 940–941, 945, 948, 952–955, 963 Peace Corps, 224, 422, 901, 918 Poverty calculations, 633–635, 952 Peonage. See Reconstruction Poverty linen, 127–129, 269, 335, 347, Pesotta, Rose, 608-610 469, 480, 564, 596, 598, 631, Petite/petty bourgeoisie, 317, 320, 496, 634–636, 814, 909, 918, 926, 952 575, **610–612**, 630 Poverty theory. See Inequality theory Philanthropy, 1, 20, 54, 122–123, 349, 402, Powderly, Terence, 117, 219, 310, 429, 475, 574, 585, **612–614**, 707–708, 430, **636–638**, 729, 842 713-714, 808, 889, 897-898, 900, Powell, Adam Clayton (Sr. and Jr.), 208, 926 342, 697, 935 Pink-collar workers, 614-615 Power, xxxi, xxiv, 6, 8, 11, 21–23, 26–27, Piven, Frances Fox, 141, 615, 617, 882, 29, 34, 38–39, 44–45, 54–55, 58–60, 65, 71, 72, 74, 77–80, 83, 85–86, 88, Planned Parenthood, 617-618, 773 90-92, 97, 103, 107-111, 115, Pluralism, 4, 178, 188, 241, 252, 286–287, 119-120, 124, 129-132, 134-135, **618–620**, 722, 921 138, 140–141, 143–144, 152–153, Polanyi, Karl, 620-621 156–158, 166, 170, 173–174, Polo, **622–623**, 821 177–180, 188–189, 193–194, 197-199, 204-205, 207-210, 214, Poor People's March, 623-624 Populism, xxxii, 41, 344, 462, 551, 218, 221–222, 231–232, 234–235, 239-240, 242, 251-253, 261, **625–627**, 761 Pornography, 376, 617, **627–629**, 709 263–265, 270–271, 276–278, 280–282, 285–286, 290, 292, Post industrialism. See Deindustrialization Poulantzas, Nicos, 490-491, 629-631 298-301, 305, 307-309, 315, Poverty, xxxi, 1, 2, 3, 12, 19, 20, 23, 24, 31, 318–319, 324, 326, 337, 348, 39-41, 45, 50, 62-64, 67-68, 70, 73, 350–353, 368, 372, 375–381, 384, 389-395, 397-399, 411-412, 80, 89, 95, 114, 116, 122, 125–129, 417-420, 423-425, 428, 430, 135, 136, 141, 146, 157, 161, 170, 176, 181–182, 191, 204, 214, 433-434, 437-440, 448-453, 216-217, 223-224, 233, 237-238, 455-456, 459, 462, 465, 470-472, 240, 249, 254, 257–258, 268–269, 474–475, 477, 479, 484, 489–491, 290, 293, 303–306, 310, 319–320, 495–498, 501, 506, 515–520, 325, 332, 334–335, 341–347, 359, 525-526, 528-529, 532-533, 362, 368, 371, 376, 380, 383, 384, 535–536, 540–545, 549–552, 555-556, 561-564, 567-569, 388–389, 408, 420–423, 427–428, 438, 444–446, 461, 465, 467, 572-574, 576-578, 580, 582, 584, 469-473, 475, 479-481, 483, 587, 591, 597, 601, 606, 609–610,

Power (continued)	Proletariat, 93, 111, 135–137, 164–165,
612, 619–620, 628–630, 632,	188, 251, 450–451, 489, 491, 496,
634, 637, 639–640 , 641, 644, 646,	499, 506, 532, 610, 638, 661–662 ,
651, 657–659, 661, 663, 670,	722, 803, 877, 907, 920, 949
683–687, 689–693, 697–698, 700,	Property rights, 297–298, 371, 449, 488,
707, 709–710, 712, 714, 716–717,	663–664 , 687, 689, 903
719, 721–723, 729–730, 733, 743,	Protectionism. See Free trade
745, 747, 749, 758, 763, 766,	Protestant work ethic. See Work ethic
773–775, 778, 780, 786, 788,	Public schools. See Education
790–791, 795, 799–800, 803–804,	Punk and grunge culture, 138–139, 256,
809, 817, 819, 821, 823, 825–830,	334, 665–667
833, 835, 840, 843, 860, 868–870,	Puritans, 125, 163, 357, 364–365, 418, 580,
872, 887–889, 899, 905, 908–911,	601, 612, 667–669 , 695, 746, 748,
916, 920–923, 928, 932, 934,	834, 925, 944, 948
936–937, 947–948, 950, 956–957,	Pygmalion studies. See Self-fulfilling
961, 963, 965	prophecy
Power elite, xxvi, 103, 119, 129–130, 132,	Pyramid scheme, 669–671
135, 157, 166, 178, 209–210, 221,	1 yrannu seneme, 007–071
271, 395, 532–533, 619–620,	Quotas, 16, 50, 368, 389, 395, 447,
639–641 , 723, 788, 791, 843, 899,	673–674 , 683, 756, 859
922	073-074 , 083, 730, 837
Presley, Elvis, 172, 528, 642–643 , 711	Race and racism, xxxiii, 14, 25, 28, 37, 51,
Prestige, 80, 88, 92, 115, 121–122, 135,	74, 75, 76, 77–78, 84–85, 99, 115,
149, 163–164, 174, 189, 234, 286,	
	135, 136, 138, 140, 157, 158, 159,
298–299, 324, 340, 479–480, 518–521, 523, 546, 575, 581, 591,	177, 182, 208, 216, 220, 221, 226, 228, 230, 234, 239, 242–243, 258,
606, 614, 643–644 , 646, 676, 680,	279, 292, 293, 295, 300, 305, 306,
698, 705, 756, 771, 791, 808–810,	309, 310, 333, 341, 343, 349, 353,
822, 826–829, 835, 841, 872, 879,	358–359, 360, 376, 384–385, 387,
885, 887–888, 894, 903, 905, 909,	388, 390, 391–392, 394, 405, 415,
920, 922, 937–938, 949, 958	417, 419, 420, 421, 428, 431,
Primary (informal) work groups, 644–645	432–433, 438, 439, 454, 457, 459,
Prisons, 177, 397–398, 475, 537, 548,	460, 463, 466–468, 474, 483, 498,
645–649	509, 511, 513, 517, 523, 528, 539,
Private schools. See Education; Ivy League	549, 554, 555–557, 561, 567, 570,
Privatization, 124, 409, 541, 601, 648–650 ,	577, 595, 598, 604, 609, 617, 627,
802, 911	639, 643, 648, 652, 658, 665, 673,
Progressive Era, 2, 17, 38, 65, 116,	674, 675–678 , 686, 687, 688, 690,
120–121, 125, 131, 227, 275, 308,	710, 711, 712, 718, 733, 742–744,
311–312, 361, 376, 380, 383, 410,	751, 752, 756, 757, 759, 765, 773,
439, 448, 540, 547–548, 551, 592,	775–781, 782, 790, 796, 797, 810,
601, 627, 650–653 , 695, 707, 720,	819, 823, 826, 828, 829, 833, 841,
747, 754, 769, 792, 794–795, 832,	853, 854, 857, 858, 859, 864, 866,
964	875, 877–878, 880, 882, 884, 898,
Progressive/regressive taxation, xxxiv, 25,	903, 904, 906, 919, 922, 935–936,
114, 266, 335, 336, 488, 601,	937, 939–943, 944, 945, 954, 955,
653–656 , 727, 795, 852, 866, 926	956, 962
Prohibition, 94, 184, 203, 293, 340,	Racial stratification, 239, 675–678
402–403, 418–419, 618, 656–659 ,	Rap, 86, 355, 403, 678–679
709, 729, 755, 777	Reagan, Ronald, xxix, 20, 24, 30, 38, 84,
Proletarian literature, 253, 319, 325,	99, 100, 101, 102, 120, 132, 142,
659–660	144, 174, 184, 200, 216, 228, 271,
Proletarianization, 478, 661–662	284, 287, 313, 316, 359, 360, 362,

```
372, 432, 441, 502, 529, 562, 572,
                                               Rockefeller family, xxxi, 7, 100, 275, 487,
      574, 600, 601, 635, 656, 679–682,
                                                      712–714, 716, 888
      682–684, 685, 730, 737, 787, 795,
                                               Rockefeller Foundation, 275, 586, 713–714
      802, 825, 842, 867, 878, 881, 905,
                                               Rockefeller, John D., 24, 483, 513, 522,
      911, 919, 936, 951, 959
                                                      544, 575, 707, 712–714, 769, 792,
Reagan Democrats, 101, 681, 682-684,
                                                      815, 923
                                               Rockefeller, Nelson, 100, 714
Real income/real wages, 68, 124, 684–685,
                                               Roosevelt, Eleanor, 159, 714–716, 717
      702, 739, 795, 909–910, 953
                                                Roosevelt, Franklin D., 6, 76, 111, 131,
Reconstruction, 17, 76, 85, 133, 207, 227,
                                                      149, 273, 318, 328, 330, 349, 419,
      308, 309, 380, 401, 434, 464, 560,
                                                      440, 455–457, 468, 493, 500, 513,
                                                      569-573, 627, 651, 679, 683-684,
      604, 608, 627, 650, 686–688, 743,
      749, 760, 765, 778, 781, 904
                                                      692, 700, 714–716, 716–719, 721,
Red Diaper Babies, 688–689
                                                      724, 740, 801–802, 862, 870, 904,
                                                      923, 927, 929
Red Scare, 14, 143, 148–149, 263, 266,
      270, 287, 319–320, 321, 337, 343,
                                               Roosevelt, Theodore, 13, 20, 38, 90, 203,
      383, 420, 439–440, 445, 493, 494,
                                                      305, 371, 410, 455, 548, 704, 716,
      500-503, 528, 536, 552, 679, 688,
                                                      719–721, 747, 831, 894
      689–692, 697, 700, 838, 911
                                               Ruling class, 54, 144, 161, 178, 234, 264,
Regionalism, 692–694, 781
                                                      286, 351, 641, 721–723, 789, 889
Riesman, David, 454
                                               Rustin, Bayard, 723-725
Religion, 11, 21, 22, 33, 34, 36, 55, 59, 60,
      72, 76, 116, 174, 211, 232, 234, 250,
                                               Salary. See Wages
      279, 286, 288, 295, 333, 351, 385,
                                               Sales tax. See Progressive/regressive
      394, 407, 418, 433, 439, 449,
                                                      taxation
      451–453, 458, 462, 467, 483–484,
                                               Saloons and bars, 94, 184, 291, 352, 548,
      522, 548, 657, 694–696, 718, 721,
                                                      652, 657–659, 727–729, 758, 782
      742, 747, 754, 757, 792, 797, 810,
                                               Sanders, Bernard, 67, 168, 494, 551–553,
      833, 922, 924–925, 937, 943–944,
                                                      730-732
      947-948, 954
                                               Sanger, Margaret, 73, 605, 617–618, 652,
Religious fundamentalism. See Fundamen-
                                                      733-734, 912
      talism
                                                School tracking, 230, 734–735
Rent strikes, 148, 439, 696–698
                                               School vouchers, 230, 432, 736-737
Reputational method, 479-480, 520,
                                                Schor, Juliet, 15, 163–164, 459, 486, 644,
      698–699, 810, 845, 919–921
                                                      738–740, 764–765, 830–831, 948
Reuther, Walter P., 30, 160, 441, 507, 508,
                                               Schumpeter, Joseph, 175–176, 179
      699-701
                                               Seeger, Pete, 337, 692, 740-742, 825
                                               Segregation, 76-77, 85, 146, 154, 159, 184,
Ricardo, David, 104, 218, 283, 303, 315,
      531, 792
                                                      208, 221, 227–228, 230, 235, 237,
Rifkin, Jeremy, 284, 378, 388, 702-703,
                                                      295, 306, 308, 404, 420, 426–427,
                                                      434, 449, 452, 464, 503, 556, 559,
Riis, Jacob, 45, 125, 238–239, 308, 368,
                                                      561, 632, 646, 675, 677, 683, 687,
      387, 548, 703–705, 728, 785, 831
                                                      701, 710–711, 734, 742–744, 773,
Rise of Silas Lapham, The, 467, 705–706,
                                                      823–824, 843, 847–848, 865, 875,
      790, 808–809
                                                      890-891, 904, 912, 935, 941, 955, 964
Robber barons, 24, 65, 103, 120, 194, 203,
                                               Self-fulfilling prophecy, 141, 669,
      219, 310, 380, 402, 429, 430, 438,
                                                      744-746, 852
      535, 581, 704, 706–708, 747, 792,
                                               Self-reliance, 16, 20, 77, 118–119, 158,
      899, 923
                                                      162, 224, 234, 309, 333, 375–376,
                                                      418, 445, 466–467, 475, 480, 565,
Robertson, Pat, 250, 708–709, 937
Rock 'n' roll, 86, 139, 172, 297, 355, 539,
                                                      569, 601, 611, 664, 681, 745-748,
      642, 655–657, 710–712, 741, 742,
                                                      786, 792, 795, 813, 854, 877, 881,
      824-825
                                                      927, 959
```

Seneca Falls convention, 748–750 Sennett, Richard, 351, 353, **750–751**, 835 Servant class, 32, 57–58, 98, 161, 169, 198, 247, 255, 373-375, 490, 519, 523, 527, 581, 649, **752–753**, 775, 857, 896, 939, 944, 949 Settlement houses, 249, 475, 747, **753–755**, 923 Seven Sisters, 755–756 Sexuality, 19, 75, 184, 235, 245, 300, 361, 390, 468, 618, 628–629, 665, 708, 732, **757–759**, 774 Sharecroppers and tenant farmers, 17, 146, 261, 374, 571, 593, 627, 710, **759-761**, 816-817, 954 Shays's rebellion, 34, 42, 71, 276, 397, 448-449, 527, 762-763 Shopping, xxxii, 94, 101, 163, 200, 206, 224, 258–259, 387–388, 655, **763–765**, 782, 865, 965 Silicon Valley, 360, 595, **766–767** Silver. See Gold Simmel, Georg, 256, 767-768 Sinclair, Upton, 38, 42, 65, 410–411, 458, 548, 707, **769–770**, 838, 861, 938 Single-parent families. See One-parent families Single tax, 219, 303–305, **770–772** Sit-down strikes/sit-ins, 158, 160, 329, 382, 440, 455, 699, 772-774, 841-842 Skull & Bones, 774-775, 889 Slavery, 10–11, 58, 65, 76, 85, 127, 133, 183, 207, 220, 235, 239, 277, 314–315, 373, 375, 379–380, 398–399, 464, 467–468, 496, 527, 529, 545, 549, 554, 557, 576, 582, 607, 675, 688, 742, 748–749, 752, 757, 759–760, **775–778**, 779–781, 797, 815, 819, 833, 907-908, 929, 935, 939, 961 Slavocracy, 686, 779-781, 935 Slumming, 781–783, 822, 894 Slums, 12, 19, 65, 368, 548, 557, 632, 704–705, **782–786**, 890, 956 Small business/small farms, 39, 102, 111, 116, 224, 248, 283, 314, 371, 389, 496, 516, 523, 524, 534, 610–611, 690, 709, 762, **786–789**, 868 Smith, Adam, 4, 109–111, 127, 128, 155, 283, 531, 866 Social climber, 5, 64, 122, 199, 331, 400, 519, 676, **789–790**, 873, 920, 931,

Social closure, 299, **790–791**

Social Darwinism, 1, 95-96, 235, 249, 275, 376, 445–446, 513, 517, 531, 554, 575, 586, 602, 626, 650, 704, 747, **791–792**, 808, 849, 881, 935 Social Gospel, 96, 235, 249, 268, 308, 376, 438, 445–446, 612, 651, 695, 704, 721, 747, **792–794**, 861, 900 Social mobility, 5, 7-8, 15, 18, 20, 24, 79–80, 115–116, 119, 131, 134–135, 143, 179, 197, 205, 209, 215, 218, 221, 226, 255, 260–262, 286, 298, 313, 322–323, 330, 355, 374, 379, 418, 424, 468, 490, 518, 528, 575, 589, 596, 632, 643, 693, 696, 710, 750, 791, 794–796, 810, 821, 826, 854, 859, 889, 920, 931, 943 Social networks, 7, 60, 80, 92, 101, 121-122, 166, 169, 190, 199, 205, 222, 270, 281, 286, 298–299, 389, 395, 447, 459, 490, 514, 581, 621, 791, **796–798**, 809, 827, 889, 932 Social Register, 59, 209-210, 330, 339, 641, **798–799**, 808–809, 888, 920, 922 Social reproduction, 4, 5, 92, 140, 169, 252, 300, 307, 389, 447, 577, 734, 790, 797, **799–700**, 821, 922 Social Security, 2, 3, 128–129, 232–233, 257, 266, 292, 328, 335, 421, 440, 456, 471, 510, 570, 572, 601–602, 635–636, 650, 718, 731, 753, **800–802**, 805, 837, 881, 884, 918, 927-928 Socialism, 1, 26–27, 41–42, 66–67, 123–124, 135, 148, 175–176, 190, 195, 232, 249, 251, 254, 273, 287, 301, 324, 344–345, 363, 375, 411, 430, 450, 463, 489, 491–492, 496, 502, 531, 550–553, 573, 592–593, 619, 627, 638, 652, 722, 730, 769, 793, **802–808**, 811–812, 839, 857, 859, 861–862, 869, 923, 925 Social Darwinism 445, 472, 586, 791, 849 Socialist Party, 28-29, 41, 46, 66, 67, 147, 159, 195–196, 336, 343–335, 439, 493, 551–552, 592–593, 651, 691, 696–697, 699, 718, 730, 761, 769, 800, 803-804, **806-808**, 816, 838, 861-862, 870 Socialites, 53, 259, 485, 581, 658, 790, **808-809**, 897 Socioeconomic status (SES), 5, 114, 146, 153, 176, 179, 228, 286, 294, 389–390, 464, 466, 486, 494–495,

```
510, 528, 554, 628, 646, 663, 673,
                                               Status symbols, 89, 483, 827–828,
      797, 809–810, 818, 826, 829
                                                     829-831
Sombart, Werner, 26, 550, 605, 811-812,
                                               Steffens, Lincoln, 38, 548, 831-832
      900
                                               Stereotypes, 15, 36, 40, 115, 140, 313,
Soup kitchens, 35, 95, 148, 249, 268, 439,
                                                     341–342, 406, 498, 587, 675,
      813-814, 902
                                                     832–835, 852, 854, 935, 940
Southern Baptists, 184, 245, 708, 814-816
                                               Stiffed, 835-836, 936
Southern Christian Leadership
                                               Stock market, xxxii, 124, 192, 212–213,
                                                     328, 330, 419, 439, 446, 542, 569,
      Conference, 78, 426, 623, 724, 819
Southern Tenant Farmers' Union (STFU),
                                                     601, 655, 659, 670, 802, 814,
                                                     836-838, 873, 927
      760, 816–817
Special interests, 471, 619, 720, 818–819,
                                               Stokes, Rose Pastor, 838–839
      860-861
                                               Stone, I. F., 839-840
Split labor market, 676, 819-821
                                               Stratification theory. See Conflict theory;
Sports, 20, 69, 94–95, 169–170, 224, 228,
                                                     Continuous/discontinuous views of
      244, 291, 305, 354, 389, 394, 520,
                                                     class; Corporate class; Functional
      538–539, 578–580, 623, 628, 651,
                                                     elite theory; Gender stratification;
      729, 743, 797, 821–824, 835, 857,
                                                     Inequality theory; Karl Marx;
      899, 943
                                                     Objective method; Lower class;
                                                     Managerial class; Middle class;
Springsteen, Bruce, 200, 327, 338, 742,
                                                     Poverty; Power elite; Prestige;
      824-825
Status, xxxiii, 5-8, 15-16, 27, 44, 55, 59,
                                                     Race and racism; Racial
                                                     stratification; Reputational
      70, 75, 79–80, 85, 89, 92, 94, 98,
      114–115, 130, 132, 135, 141, 146,
                                                     method; Status inconsistency; Sub-
      153, 157, 160–162, 164, 169–170,
                                                     jective method; Underclass; Upper
      176, 178–180, 187–188, 190–191,
                                                     class
      207, 212, 221, 224, 226, 228,
                                               Strikes, 40–43, 46, 64, 82–83, 99, 112,
      230-231, 235, 237, 239, 243, 245,
                                                     117, 137–138, 148, 152, 159, 191,
      247, 255-256, 261, 263-264,
                                                     266, 293, 300-301, 310, 321, 324,
      274-276, 279, 282, 286, 294-295,
                                                     328–329, 345, 351, 378, 380–383,
      297–299, 319, 323, 332, 352, 359,
                                                     399, 410, 430–431, 438–439,
      364, 384–386, 389–391, 398, 400,
                                                     441-442, 455-456, 478, 525, 578,
      402, 411, 420, 440, 448, 450,
                                                     600, 603–604, 610, 637–638,
                                                     651-652, 690, 696-699, 701, 706,
      458–460, 464–466, 473, 479–481,
      483, 486, 489–490, 494–496, 498,
                                                     713, 732, 772–774, 792–793, 804,
      505, 510, 514-515, 517-519, 523,
                                                     816-817, 838, 841-843, 887, 895,
      528-529, 542, 546, 549-550,
                                                     911, 923-924, 951, 962
      554-555, 557, 564, 586, 588,
                                               Students for a Democratic Society (SDS),
                                                     24, 343, 491, 502, 533, 537, 573,
      595–596, 600, 606, 610, 621,
      626-628, 634, 638-639, 643-644,
                                                     689, 697, 773, 843–844, 862
      646–647, 652, 659, 663, 668,
                                               Student Nonviolent Coordinating
      673-677, 696, 699, 702, 705, 710,
                                                     Committee, 77-78, 744, 844
      716, 723, 735, 739, 742, 751–752,
                                               Style. See Lifestyle
      758–759, 763–765, 767, 774, 776,
                                               Subjective method, 135, 164, 480, 644,
      778, 780–782, 790, 795–797, 799,
                                                     698, 809, 841, 845–847
      807, 809-810, 815, 818, 820,
                                               Suburbia, 143, 294, 302, 313, 361, 387,
      826–827, 828–831, 833–834, 841,
                                                     390, 454, 489, 504, 744–745, 834,
      849, 852, 864, 868, 874, 880, 908,
                                                     847–849, 865, 882, 936
      915, 920, 922, 925–926, 934, 938,
                                               Supply-side economics. See Trickle-down
      947, 949–950, 954, 957
                                                     theory
                                               Survival of the fittest. See Social
Status attainment, 79–80, 675, 827–828
Status inconsistency, 135, 826, 828-829,
                                                     Darwinism
      841
                                               Symphony orchestras. See High culture
```

```
Taft-Hartley Act, 30, 83, 144, 149, 159,
                                                Trickle-down theory, 38, 120, 200, 278,
      440–441, 457, 507, 691, 700, 842, 911
                                                      360, 372, 385, 388, 480, 654, 681,
Tally's Corner, 745, 851–852
                                                      685, 747, 787, 795, 866–868, 881,
                                                      889
TANF (Temporary Assistance to Needy
      Families), 128, 232, 882, 928
                                                Trophy wives, 868–869, 871, 899, 955
Tarbell, Ida, 38, 548, 707, 831, 923
                                                Trotsky, Leon, 804, 869–870
Taxation and taxes, 24, 25, 32–34, 38, 62,
                                                Trotskyists, 148, 254, 273, 343, 363, 492,
      75, 76, 99, 101, 114, 121, 122, 123,
                                                      501, 688, 804, 805, 869–870
      124, 129, 153, 167–168, 200, 207,
                                                Truman, Harry, 289, 456, 493, 501, 528,
      212, 219, 226, 227, 230, 232–233,
                                                      683, 691, 692, 716, 743
      248–250, 253, 265–266, 274–275,
                                                Trump, Donald, xxx, 199, 826, 869–872,
      276, 282, 295, 297, 302, 303–305,
                                                Tuxedo Park, 872-874, 894
      316, 334, 335–336, 360, 369–371,
      372, 376, 381, 384, 388, 399, 420,
                                                Twain, Mark, 20, 203, 308, 311, 349, 706,
      422, 425, 441, 449, 454, 462, 470,
                                                      894
      473, 488, 511, 513, 521, 526, 534,
                                                Two Americas, 874–875
      549, 551, 579, 586, 601–602, 613,
      635, 645, 649, 651, 653–656, 659,
                                                Underclass, 135, 182, 240, 258, 326, 417,
      663, 669, 670, 680–681, 684, 685,
                                                      465, 467, 479–480, 525, 627, 676,
      693, 703, 707, 730, 731, 736–737,
                                                      681, 710, 733, 747, 782, 821,
      739, 747, 762, 770–772, 787–788,
                                                      834–835, 841, 875, 877–878,
      792, 795, 796, 800, 801, 824, 846,
                                                      881-882, 919, 940-942
      865, 866-868, 878, 881, 884, 889,
                                                Underemployment, 820, 835, 879–880
      891, 892, 904, 905, 916, 917,
                                                Undeserving poor, 834, 880–882, 928
      926-927, 933-934, 945, 952, 963.
                                                Unemployment, 40-41, 62, 68, 77, 101,
      See also Progressive/regressive taxa-
                                                      104, 116, 123, 124, 137, 139, 143,
                                                      147, 176, 200, 217, 232, 233, 315,
Taylor, Frederick Winslow, 644, 812,
                                                      334-335, 341, 342, 380, 408, 421,
                                                      425, 432, 440, 449, 469, 480, 493,
      886–887, 902
Television, 14, 24, 98, 107–108, 119, 162,
                                                      517, 526, 534, 557, 565, 569, 586,
      171, 201, 222, 290, 355, 405, 416,
                                                      594, 608, 636, 640, 660, 665, 681,
      477, 480, 497, 498, 538–539, 583,
                                                      684, 694, 703, 770, 800-802, 813,
      676, 679, 708, 739, 782, 789, 822,
                                                      820, 835, 837, 853, 856, 867–868,
      830, 852–856, 857, 860, 863, 872,
                                                      877–878, 879, 880, 882–884, 918,
      936, 940, 942–943
                                                      927, 951, 953
Terkel, Studs, 836, 856-858, 951
                                                Unskilled labor, 29, 116, 323, 377, 438,
Thernstrom, Abigail and Stephan, 524,
                                                      728, 885-886
      558, 858–859
                                                Upper class, xxvi, xxx, 4–6, 7–8, 11, 23, 38,
Think tanks, 68, 210, 222, 269-271, 273,
                                                      45, 48, 51, 54–55, 59–60, 74, 90,
      284, 351, 408, 641, 702, 795,
                                                      100, 103, 107, 116, 122–123, 133,
      859–861, 889
                                                      143, 144, 146, 166, 168, 177, 179,
Thomas, Norman, 343, 699, 807, 816,
                                                      180, 182, 196, 199, 204, 205, 206,
      861-862
                                                      209-210, 216, 221-222, 226, 227,
Thompson, E. P., 147, 576, 662, 834
                                                      229, 235, 252, 256, 259, 261, 268,
                                                      270, 276, 279, 282, 285, 297, 298,
Thurow, Lester, 863–864
Tokenism, 313, 389, 391, 674, 828, See
                                                      302, 316, 317, 326, 330–331, 339,
      Institutional discrimination
                                                      340, 348–349, 353, 354, 355–356,
Transportation, 97, 125, 143, 144, 206,
                                                      384, 387, 389, 390, 400, 410, 418,
                                                      420, 447, 452, 460-461, 464, 485,
      214, 218, 308, 309, 335, 359, 362,
      378, 386, 388, 416, 421, 516, 550,
                                                      487, 489, 505, 514–515, 518, 519,
      627, 693, 728, 743, 752, 771, 794,
                                                      520, 527, 542, 549, 554, 566,
      806, 830, 847, 864–866, 879, 889,
                                                      567-569, 574, 575, 580-581, 584,
      893, 926, 928, 952, 953
                                                      589, 613, 618, 622, 628, 641, 644,
```

647, 654, 655, 659, 710, 711, 714, 716, 720–721, 723, 728, 737, 757, 762, 764, 781, 783, 790, 791, 795, 797–799, 808–809, 821, 822, 828, 830, 838, 840, 846, 854, 855, 856, 857, 859, 863, 867, 868–869, 870–872, 873, 881, **887–889**, 891, 894, 898–899, 920, 922, 930–931, 945, 946, 948, 949, 957–958, 964 Urban renewal, 61, 344, 421, 477, 786, **890–892**, 963

Vacations, 81, 82, 91, 126, 180–181, 209, 781, 782, 798, **893–896**, 948

Vanderbilt family, 42, 54, 581, 716, 775, 809, 888, **896–898**Vanderbilt, Cornelius, 542, 896–898

Vanderbilt, Gloria, 809, 898, 959

Vanderbilt, William, 707, 897

Veblen, Thorstein, 160–161, 162, 505, 588–589, 707, **898–900**Versace, 256, 568

Victorians/Victorianism, 11, 26, 65, 73, 75, 97, 123, 132, 199, 235, 244, 308

Victorians/Victorianism, 11, 26, 65, 73, 75, 97, 123, 132, 199, 235, 244, 308, 311, 353, 458, 522, 628, 650, 705, 757, 781, 783, 808, 921. See also Gilded Age

VISTA (Volunteers in Service to America), 224, 901, 918

Voluntarism/volunteers, 209, 268–269, 347, 393, 462, 527, 613, 703, 715, 739, 814, **900–902**, 912, 918

Vo-tech schools, 223, 408–409, 694, 735, **902–903**

Voting rights, 76, 207–208, 220, 333, 427, 464, 544, 561, 743, 744, 750, 858–859, **903–906**

Wages, wage earners, and wage labor, xxxii, 5, 16, 17, 19, 25, 26, 28, 30, 32–33, 38, 49, 68, 81–82, 84, 95, 97, 98, 104, 108, 109–111, 112, 117–119, 120, 124, 125, 129, 132, 134, 136, 137–138, 141, 144, 146, 153–155, 156–157, 162, 165, 167, 198, 200, 201, 206, 214, 218, 230, 233, 236–237, 247, 248, 257–258, 265, 266, 269, 283, 284, 300, 305, 309, 310, 313, 316, 317, 318, 323, 324–325, 327, 334–335, 352, 360, 370, 372, 374, 377–381, 384, 385–386, 393, 399, 408, 423, 425, 429, 430, 437, 438, 440, 441, 445,

456, 469-470, 472, 478-479, 496, 502, 506, 509, 510, 516, 519–521, 523, 525, 531, **534–535**, 540, 541, 542, 543, 549, 568, 569, 570, 572, 578-579, 581, 582, 594-595, 596, 599, 600, 604, 614–615, 624, 632, 638, 644, 649, 651, 652, 654, 661–662, 663, 664, 677, 681, 684-686, 700, 701, 703, 721, 727, 735, 738, 745, 750, 753, 759, 761, 766, 771, 777, 778, 787, 792, 794, 796, 799, 816, 817, 820, 821, 827, 829, 835, 837, 841, 852, 854, 863–864, 868, 875, 879, 882–884, 885, 888, 894, 895, 901, 908-910, 916, 921, 928, 929, 935, 937, 938, 945, 949, 950, 951, 952–953. See also Guaranteed annual income; Income; Living wage; Minimum wage; Real income/real wages

Wage slavery, **907–908**

Wagner Act (National Labor Relations Act), 83, 158, 329, 438, 440, 456, 570, 572, 673, 718, 842, **910–911**

Wald, Lillian, 912-913

Wall Street, 100, 213, 270, 389, 419, 517, 542, 544, 690, 836–838, 913, 958, 959. See also Stock market

Wall Street Journal, The, 758, 866, 913–914 Wallace, George, 435, 625, 627, 905, 935 Wallace, Henry, 337, 740, 817 Wallerstein, Immanuel, 914–916

Wal-Mart, xxxii, 14, 31, 38, 109, 127, 155, 206, 253, 368, 487, 568, 661, 888, **916–917**, 965

War on Poverty, 191, 223–224, 332, 334, 344, 408, 428, 599, 623, 635–636, 673, 735, 805, 852, 868, 874–875, 881–882, **918–919**, 928

Warner, W. Lloyd, 115, 259, 285, 479, 520, 575, 698–699, 810, **919–921**, 950

Washington, George, 9, 32, 71, 225, 264, 276–277, 279, 476, 601, 762, 777, 897, 933

WASP, 53–54, 59, 243, 447, 639, 799, **921–922**, 935

Wealth, 3, 4, 8, 9, 11, 12, 15, 16, 19, 23, 24, 31, 33, 41, 48, 51, 53, 54, 76, 88, 89, 90, 93, 103, 107, 108, 112, 114, 117, 120, 123, 124, 135–138, 142, 156, 157, 160–162, 164, 166, 178, 183, 197, 198, 203, 204, 205, 209,

Wealth (continued)

```
214, 221, 226, 229, 235, 237, 239,
                                                White-collar work, 49, 52, 81–82, 116,
      241–242, 248, 252, 259, 261, 262,
                                                      136, 177, 193, 256, 302, 307, 352,
      269, 275, 278, 283, 285–287, 299,
                                                      404, 408, 464, 480, 500, 519, 520,
      310, 317, 318, 331, 333, 339–340,
                                                      532–533, 576, 597, 600, 611, 614,
      348, 350, 357, 362, 369, 371,
                                                      615, 630, 660, 698, 739, 834,
                                                      835-836, 843, 853, 921, 937-939,
      372–373, 375, 378, 384, 397, 400,
      411, 425, 428, 438, 444, 449, 459,
                                                      951, 959
      461, 462, 465, 467, 468, 472,
                                                White trash, 480, 642, 643, 764, 765, 782,
      473–474, 477, 479, 481, 486,
                                                      834, 939–940
      487–488, 490, 495, 505, 506, 510,
                                                Wilson, William Julius, 182, 390, 479, 878,
      513, 517–518, 519–520, 523, 542,
                                                      882, 940-942
      550, 555, 556, 564, 566, 568, 575,
                                                Wilson, Woodrow, 54, 195, 324, 651, 721,
      580, 581, 585, 586, 587, 588–589,
                                                      861
      591, 606, 612, 613, 621, 633–634,
                                                Winfrey, Oprah, 20, 25, 486, 748,
      638, 639, 641, 644, 653–656, 662,
                                                      942-943
      667, 669, 675, 676, 690, 699,
                                                Winthrop, John, 364–365, 376, 667–669,
      707-708, 713, 716, 718, 724, 747,
                                                      943-944
      751, 756, 757, 758, 766, 771, 775,
                                                Women's clubs, 944-947
      780, 790, 791–793, 795–796, 809,
                                                Work ethic, 60, 76, 597, 657, 665, 683,
      810, 826, 827, 830, 833, 837, 842,
                                                      745, 834, 893, 924, 943, 947–948
      846, 859, 866–867, 870, 872, 874,
                                                Working class, xxix, xxxi, 4, 6, 7, 8, 12, 17,
      887–889, 897, 898, 899, 907, 917,
                                                      20–21, 23, 24, 27, 29, 42–43, 45, 49,
      919, 920, 922, 925, 929, 930, 942,
                                                      66, 68, 73, 81–82, 84, 93, 94–95, 99,
      944, 948, 949–950, 952, 958, 959,
                                                      101, 102, 111, 114, 116–117, 118,
                                                      119, 125, 132, 133, 134, 136, 138,
      961. See also Income; Maldistribution
                                                      139–140, 144, 146, 148, 150–151,
      of wealth; Poverty
Wealth against Commonwealth, 923-924
                                                      156, 159, 163, 167, 169, 170,
Weber, Max, 55, 92, 115, 178, 187–188,
                                                      171–173, 174, 177, 178, 183, 188,
      239, 322–323, 448, 450, 459, 532,
                                                      190, 196, 199–200, 204, 205, 217,
      605, 639–640, 646, 694, 695–696,
                                                      218-219, 227, 230, 231, 234, 244,
      767, 790–791, 826, 827, 828, 834,
                                                      248, 253, 256, 260–263, 266, 269,
      900, 920, 924–925, 947, 948, 950
                                                      280, 283, 284, 287, 290, 292-294,
Welfare, 24, 63, 75, 114, 128, 140–142, 162,
                                                      298, 299, 300, 301–302, 303–304,
      177, 182, 226, 230, 234, 240, 249,
                                                      308, 313, 315, 317, 319–320, 322,
      250, 252, 258, 275, 292, 326, 328,
                                                      323-325, 329, 338, 340, 344, 351,
      334–335, 360, 369, 372, 376, 388,
                                                      352-353, 354, 355-357, 370, 371,
      408, 421, 425, 446, 449, 454, 455,
                                                      376, 378, 380, 381–383, 384, 387,
                                                      389, 390, 393, 397, 399, 410, 411,
      462, 471, 476, 480, 547, 569–571,
      585, 596, 599, 613, 616-617, 633,
                                                      418, 422, 428-430, 438-440, 442,
      652, 677, 680, 681, 683, 698, 715,
                                                      447, 457, 460, 464, 466, 472, 473,
      718, 739, 747, 754–755, 772, 774,
                                                      475, 478–479, 480, 483, 485, 486,
      796, 797, 801–802, 813, 818, 828,
                                                      489, 490–491, 493, 494–496,
      852, 860, 863, 875, 877, 878,
                                                      498–502, 507–509, 511, 514, 515,
      881–882, 918–919, 926–929, 941,
                                                      516, 519, 520, 524, 528, 531, 535,
      945, 948, 953, 959
                                                      537, 538–539, 541–542, 549–550,
Westward expansion, 553, 929–930
                                                      552, 556, 557, 567, 568–569,
Wharton, Edith, 53, 54, 259, 809,
                                                      572-574, 575-577, 579, 581, 584,
      930-932
                                                      592, 599, 603, 607, 609–610, 613,
Wharton School of Business, 702, 871,
                                                      617, 630, 637, 638, 642, 651–652,
                                                      654, 655, 658, 659–660, 662–663,
      932–933
Whiskey Rebellion, 34, 397, 527, 763,
                                                      665, 666, 676–677, 679, 682, 689,
                                                      693, 694, 696, 701, 706–707, 709,
      933-934
```

White backlash, 934-937

710-711, 716, 718, 720, 722, 727–728, 730, 731, 732, 735, 740, 747, 750–751, 754, 755, 758, 771, 772, 778, 782, 785, 787, 792, 794, 797, 799, 800, 802–808, 821, 823, 824, 825, 827, 829, 833, 835-836, 839, 841, 844-845, 846-847, 849, 853-856, 857, 865, 885, 887, 890, 894, 895, 900, 903, 904–905, 907, 909, 911, 914, 919, 921–922, 929, 934, 935–937, 938, 940–941, 942-943, 945, 946, 948, **949-952**, 956, 958, 961, 962, 964 Working poor, 7, 12, 25, 142, 148, 168, 269, 285, 355, 356, 360, 480, 488, 534, 632, 656, 821, 854, 940–941,

949, 952-953

Works Progress Administration, 328, 569–570, 571–572, 942
Wright, Erik Olin, 135, 165, 481, 497, 612, 796 See also Contradictory class location
Wright, Richard, 660, **954–956**

Yachting, 209, 340, 349, 543, 568, 581, 622, 821, 822, 873, 888, 897, 898, **957–958**YMCA, 20, 250, 287, 652
Yuppies, 89, 98, 163, 568–569, 589, 764, 781, 830, 883, **958–960**YWCA, 250, 652

Zinn, Howard, 276, 278, 529, **961–962** Zone of transition, **962–964** Zoning, 388, 890, **964–966**