Federal Complaint for Police Unlawful Entry, Excessive Force

Michael R. Mitchell
State Bar No. 48348
200 N. Larchmont Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90004-3707

Phone (323) 469-0809
Attorney for Plaintiff

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Comes now plaintiff JOHN LOUIS LALONDE and alleges as follows upon information and belief, excepting paragraphs 5, 11, 19, and 22 which are alleged upon knowledge:

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANTS DOE MOQUIN AND DOE HORTON FOR VIOLATING THE SECURITY OF PLAINTIFF'S HOUSE (FOURTH AENDMENT) 1. This action arises under Title 42 U.S. Code Sections 1983 and 1988 and the United States Constitution. The jurisdiction of this court is invoked under 28 U.S. Code Sections 1331 and 1343. The supplemental jurisdiction of this court is also invoked.

2.Venue is proper in the Central District of California because all of the acts and omissions complained of occurred within said District, to wit, within the State of California, County of Riverside.3.

3. The true names and capacities, whether individual, corporate, associate, or otherwise, of the defendants designated herein as DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, are presently unknown to plaintiff who therefore sues said defendants by such fictitious names. Plaintiff is informed and believes and on such ground alleges that each of the defendants designated herein as "DOE" is legally responsible in some manner for the events and happenings hereinafter described, and proximately caused or contributed to the injuries and damages hereinafter alleged. Plaintiff will seek leave to amend this complaint to show their true names and capacities when the same have been ascertained.

4. At all times mentioned herein, each of the defendants was an agent and/or employee of the other defendants and was acting within the course and scope of said agency and/or employment.

5. On or about July 22, 1996, at about 1:00 a.m., plaintiff and his room mate, Monica Jones, were lawfully in possession of their apartment at 43670 C Street, Apartment A in Hemet, California.

6. Then and there, in the course and scope of their employment as Riverside County Deputy Sheriffs, defendant deputies Doe Moquin and Doe Horton, wearing uniforms and badges and armed with pistols, without a warrant and without probable cause, unlawfully entered the apartment in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, to wit, the right of the people to be secure in their . . . houses . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures.

6. At all times herein mentioned, all defendants were acting under color of law.

7. The actions of Moquin and Horton were reckless and grossly negligent and legally caused plaintiff damages according to proof at trial.

8. The actions of Moquin and Horton were motivated by evil motive or intent and involved reckless and callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others entitling plaintiff to punitive damages.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DOE MOQUIN AND DOE HORTON FOR USE OF EXCESSIVE FORCE (FOURTH AMENDMENT) 9. Plaintiff restates and reiterates all of the foregoing paragraphs of this complaint as if set forth in full at this point.

10. Defendant deputies thereupon assaulted, battered, and used excessive force on Plaintiff. In addition, Deputy Moquin sprayed plaintiff in the face and eyes with a chemical spray and handcuffed plaintiff.

11. The foregoing violated plaintiff's right under the Fourth Amendment to be secure in his person from unreasonable seizures.

12. As a direct and legal result of the foregoing, plaintiff was hurt and injured in his health, strength, and activity, sustaining injury to his body and shock and injury to his nervous system and person, which have caused, and will continue to cause, plaintiff great physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, all to his general damage in a sum which will be proven at trial.

13. As a direct and legal result of the foregoing, plaintiff was required to, and did, and will in the future, employ health care practitioners to examine, treat, and care for him, and did, and will in the future, incur medical and incidental expenses, including prejudgment interest. The exact amount of such expenses is presently unknown to plaintiff, and plaintiff will seek leave to amend this complaint to set forth the exact amount thereof when the same has been ascertained.

14. As a direct and legal result of the foregoing, plaintiff has been and will continue to be prevented from attending to his usual occupation, or any occupation, to his further damage in a sum that he is presently unable to ascertain. Plaintiff will seek leave to amend this complaint to set forth the exact amount thereof when the same has been ascertained.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DOE MOQUIN AND DOE HORTON FOR UNLAWFUL ARREST (FOURTH AMENDMENT) 15. Plaintiff restates and reiterates all of the foregoing paragraphs of this complaint as if set forth in full at this point.

16. Doe Moquin and Doe Horton, without a warrant and without probable cause, arrested plaintiff in violation of plaintiff's Fourth Amendment right to be secure in his person from unreasonable seizure and his Fourteenth Amendment right not to be deprived of his liberty without due process of law.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DOE MOQUIN AND DOE HORTON AND DOES 1 THROUGH 20 FOR MALICIOUS PROSECUTION (FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT) 17. Plaintiff restates and reiterates all of the foregoing paragraphs of this complaint as if set forth in full at this point.

18. On or about September 12, 1966 and again on or about October 4, 1996, plaintiff requested the Riverside County Sheriff to provide him with "copies of each and every report (including but not limited to police reports, investigative reports, complaint reports, witness statements, tape recordings, and photographs) which evidence, reflect or allude to their encounter with Deputy Sheriffs Moquin and Horton at about 1 am on July 22, 1996 at 43670 C Street, Apartment A, Hemet, CA 92544."

19. Plaintiff is informed and believes and on such ground alleges that deputies Horton and Moquin and Does 1 through 10 recklessly and/or intentionally prepared incomplete and falsified accounts and reports of the encounter with plaintiff and his room mate.

20. Plaintiff is informed and believes and on such ground alleges that deputies Horton and Moquin and Does 1 through 15, well-knowing that the accounts and reports were incomplete and false, together conspired and agreed not to supply such accounts and reports to plaintiff.

21. No such account or report was supplied to plaintiff, despite his requests therefor and entitlement thereto, until April 7, 1997.

22. Plaintiff is informed and believes and on such grounds alleges that deputies Moquin and Horton and Does 1 through 20, knowing such accounts and reports were incomplete and false, nevertheless conspired together and agreed to supply and did in fact supply them to a criminal prosecutor. Defendants lacked reasonable or probable cause in that they did not honestly or reasonably believe in the truth of the criminal charges they made to the criminal prosecutor.

23. The criminal prosecutor, in reliance upon the incomplete and false accounts and reports, filed criminal charges of violation of California Penal Code Sections 148 (resisting arrest) and 415 (disturbing the peace) against plaintiff in People v. John Louis LaLonde, in the Municipal Court of Mount San Jacinto Judicial District, County of Riverside, State of California, Hemet, Case No. H962707A. Defendants acted with the malicious intent to discourage and prevent plaintiff from suing for deprivation of his civil rights as recited in this complaint.

24. If complete and true accounts and reports had been supplied to the criminal prosecutor, no criminal charges would have been filed against plaintiff.

25. Defendants, conspiring together and agreeing, and in concert with the criminal prosecutor, have recommended and pressured plaintiff to plead guilty to any number of lessor offenses in an effort to preclude plaintiff from recovering for deprivation of his civil rights as recited in this complaint. Notwithstanding the foregoing, on or about April 7, 1997, the court dismissed the foregoing criminal charges against plaintiff.

26. In addition to the damages recited above, plaintiff is entitled to and demands reimbursement for legal fees and indemnification for legal fees expended or owed in defending the criminal action.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS FOR INVASION OF PRIVACY (FIRST AMENDMENT) 27. Plaintiff restates and reiterates all of the foregoing paragraphs of this complaint as if set forth in full at this point.

28. On or about July 23, 1996, defendants reported to a local newspaper, The Hemet News, that Plaintiff and his room mate, using their true names, had been arrested "on suspicion of disturbing the peace, battery of a peace officer, and resisting a peace officer."

29. By supplying such information to the newspaper, defendants knew and intended that such information would be published to the Hemet community.

30. The newspaper published the report on July 24, 1996.

31. The foregoing violated plaintiff's First Amendment right to privacy.

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS FOR FAILURE TO PROTECT PLAINTIFF 32. Plaintiff restates and reiterates all of the foregoing paragraphs of this complaint as if set forth in full at this point.

33. Defendants or some of them placed plaintiff in positions of danger, to wit, having his apartment invaded without probable cause and without a warrant, subjecting him to excessive force, falsely arresting him, maliciously prosecuting him, and invading his privacy.

34. Defendants and others of them had the then present ability to protect plaintiff from harm.

35. Horton had the ability to prevent Moquin from entering the apartment but recklessly and with gross negligence, failed to do so.

36. Moquin had the ability to prevent Horton from entering the apartment but recklessly and with gross negligence, failed to do so.

37. Horton had the ability to prevent Moquin from assaulting, battering and using excessive force upon plaintiff, but recklessly and with gross negligence, failed to do so.

38. Moquin had the ability to prevent Horton from assaulting, battering and using excessive force upon plaintiff, but recklessly and with gross negligence, failed to do so.

39. Horton had the ability to prevent Moquin from unlawfully arresting plaintiff, but recklessly and with gross negligence, failed to do so.

40. Moquin had the ability to prevent Horton from unlawfully arresting plaintiff, but recklessly and with gross negligence, failed to do so.

41. Horton and the Doe defendants had the ability to prevent Moquin from making incomplete and false reports and accounts of the encounter with plaintiff, but recklessly and with gross negligence, failed to do so.

42. Moquin and the Doe defendants had the ability to prevent Horton from making incomplete and false reports and accounts of the encounter with plaintiff, but recklessly and with gross negligence, failed to do so.

43. All defendants had the ability to prevent the false and incomplete reports and accounts from being supplied to a criminal prosecutor, but recklessly and with gross negligence, failed to do so.

44. All defendants had the ability to provide plaintiff and the criminal prosecutor with true and complete reports and accounts of the encounter with plaintiff, but recklessly and with gross negligence, failed and continue, willfully and in violation of the Constitution, the law and their oaths of office, to fail to do so.

45. All defendants had the ability to prevent transmission of information and misinformation about plaintiff to the local newspaper, but recklessly and with gross negligence, failed to do so.

46. Each defendant had the ability to stop the criminal prosecution of plaintiff, but recklessly and with gross negligence, failed, willfully and in violation of the Constitution, the law and their oaths of office, to do so.

SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DOE MOQUIN, DOE HORTON AND COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE FOR TRESPASS 47. Plaintiff restates and reiterates all of the foregoing paragraphs of this complaint as if set forth in full at this point.

48. On or about July 22, 1996, plaintiff and his room mate were the lessees of the premises at 43670 C Street, Apartment A, Hemet, California and were entitled to exclusive possession thereof.

49. At said time and place, without a warrant and without probable cause or invitation, Doe Moquin and Doe Horton entered into and onto said premises, thereby committing trespass.

50. Doe Moquin and Doe Horton were guilty of oppression, fraud, and malice, entitling plaintiff to recover, in addition to actual damages, damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing defendants.

51. On or about January 15, 1997, plaintiff filed a claim under the California Government Code with the County of Riverside setting forth this and the following claims. On or about February 14, 1997, the County of Riverside rejected the claims.

EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DOE MOQUIN, DOE HORTON AND COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE FOR BATTERY 52. Plaintiff restates and reiterates all of the foregoing paragraphs of this complaint as if set forth in full at this point.

53. On or about July 22, 1996 at about 1 a.m., at 43670 C Street, Apartment A, Hemet, California, Doe Moquin and Doe Horton touched, beat, crushed, and manhandled plaintiff without plaintiff's consent. In addition, Doe Moquin sprayed plaintiff in the face and eyes with a chemical spray and handcuffed plaintiff.

54. As a direct and legal result of the foregoing, plaintiff was hurt and injured in his health, strength, and activity, sustaining injury to his body and shock and injury to his nervous system and person, which have caused, and will continue to cause, plaintiff great physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, all to his general damage in a sum which will be proven at trial.

55. As a direct and legal result of the foregoing, plaintiff was required to, and did, and will in the future, employ health care practitioners to examine, treat, and care for him, and did, and will in the future, incur medical and incidental expenses, including prejudgment interest. The exact amount of such expenses is presently unknown to plaintiff, and plaintiff will seek leave to amend this complaint to set forth the exact amount thereof when the same has been ascertained.

56. As a direct and legal result of the foregoing, plaintiff has been and will continue to be prevented from attending to his usual occupation, or any occupation, to his further damage in a sum that he is presently unable to ascertain. Plaintiff will seek leave to amend this complaint to set forth the exact amount thereof when the same has been ascertained.

NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANTS DOE MOQUIN, DOE HORTON AND COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE FOR FALSE ARREST 57. Plaintiff restates and reiterates all of the foregoing paragraphs of this complaint as if set forth in full at this point.

58. At the above said time and place, Doe Moquin and Doe Horton, without a warrant and without probable cause, falsely arrested plaintiff.

TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS FOR LIBEL 59. Plaintiff restates and reiterates all of the foregoing paragraphs of this complaint as if set forth in full at this point.

60. At or about 1:45 am on July 22, 1996, at the apartment described above, County of Riverside Sgt. Pike told plaintiff that he was not under arrest.

61. On or about July 23, 1996, defendants reported to a local newspaper, The Hemet News, that plaintiff, using his true name, had been arrested "on suspicion of disturbing the peace, battery of a peace officer, and resisting a peace officer."

62. By supplying such information to the newspaper, defendants knew and intended that such information would be published to the Hemet community.

63. The newspaper published the report on July 24, 1996.

64. The report was false in that, if Sgt. Pike spoke the truth, plaintiff had not been arrested.

65. The report implied that plaintiff had committed three crimes.

ATTORNEY'S FEES

66. If plaintiff prevails in this action, by settlement or otherwise, plaintiff is entitled to and hereby demands attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. Section 1988. The contract between plaintiff and his attorney in this case provides, inter alia, "Client agrees to and hereby does irrevocably assign and transfer to Attorney all of Client's rights and powers, whether contingent or vested or both, (a) to waive 'prevailing party' status, (b) to waive, apply for, obtain judgment upon, collect, and/or receive any attorney's fee award, and (c) to make and/or to accept a 'lump sum, including all attorney's fees' settlement offer. Client acknowledges and agrees that the foregoing assignment and transfer will make it more difficult for Client to settle the case, because Client will not possess the powers or rights to waive 'prevailing party' status or the powers or rights to waive, apply for, obtain judgment upon, collect, and/or receive any attorney's fee award. Client hereby authorizes and directs the court to make any such attorney fee award and judgment thereon in Attorney's name only and not in Client's name."

WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for judgment against defendants, and each of them, jointly and severally, as follows:

1. Special damages according to proof,

2. General damages according to proof,

3. Punitive and exemplary damages according to proof,

4. Costs of suit and reasonable attorneys fees,

5. Such other and further relief as the court deems just and proper

__________________________
MICHAEL R. MITCHELL
Attorney for Plaintiff

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiff demands trial by jury of all issues properly triable by jury herein.

__________________________
MICHAEL R. MITCHELL
Attorney for Plaintiff