The Arab American Mirror  http://www.alif.com/mirror

Iraq, Cuba, And The Opposition's Credibility Crises

SAN FRANCISCO  (AAM) -- Ever since the Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista was ousted by Fidel Castro in 1959, the exiled Cuban community in the US have relentlessly applied political pressure on respective US administrations to impose and sustain a backbreaking embargo against their Cuban motherland. No US presidential hopeful vying for Florida's support in an election year could ignore the pull of the Cuban American community. Years later, the embargo is in full force against Cuba. The Cuban people continue to suffer, but, Castro's hold on power does not seem to weaken a bit. But the Cuban opposition in the US believes there is a light at the end of the tunnel, a light no one else seems able to see.

Many once respected voices of the Iraqi opposition are calling for the continuation of the US embargo against Iraq as the possibility of removing the sanctions edges nearer. They are convinced that the US-led embargo will eventually undermine the Iraqi government's grip on power and strengthens the opposition on the ground in Iraq. Historically and from a practical point of view, there is no reason to believe this scenario is likely to succeed.

Cuba has been subjected to a crushing embargo but there is little sign the tiny nation is buckling soon. If Cuba seems more open today than before it is due to the global shift towards more openness and freer markets. There is little proof that the US embargo is influencing policy in Cuba except in strengthening national solidarity with the Cuban regime. Iraq will not be any different.

The Iraqi opposition's cry for sustaining the embargo is rather disturbing. With no real looser but Iraqi civilians and no winners but few ambitious figures within the Iraqi opposition, the credibility and motives of the opposition has come under fire. Is this a battle between the oppressed and the oppressor, or is it the struggle for power between oppressor and the next generation of oppressors. A closer look at US-installed regimes in Latin and South America during the cold war clearly illustrates the sort of alternatives the US has in mind for Iraq: another brutal dictatorship but one where the White House pulls the strings. Sounds familiar?

This may explain why the Cubans have been content to hold on to their Castro. The US-backed Batista was not a popular leader and Cubans do not wish to see a repetition of his reign. The Cubans, and the Iraqis, have made a simple choice between two evil alternatives, a homegrown nationalist dictatorship or a US-installed one. The Cuban American callous backing of the US embargo on Cuba only strengthens native Cubans' resolve not to trade their nationalist regime with a class of Cubans traditionally aligned with the brutal Batista and big American business interests often to the detriment of Cuba's national interests.

Repeating the Cuban opposition's blunder, the remarkably overt association between the CIA, the bogeyman of the Third World, and the Iraqi opposition is absurd. The traditional American politicians' flare for self-promotion and credit-grabbing is guaranteed to hamper any effort at secrecy considered necessary to launch and sustain an Iraqi opposition which can publicly distance itself from any foreign powers.

By the same token, the various Iraqi opposition figures' rat-race to win the US's political and financial backing under the spotlight of mass media coverage also weakens their acceptance in Iraq. Simply stated, no Iraqi political figure who is closely allied with the US, or other foreign powers, stands a chance of political, or physical, survival in Iraq. And there is a precedent to that.

After World War II, the British and the French decided, with mixed success, to install client regimes in the Arab World. They turned to the Hashimite's of Arabia who were evicted by the Saudi dynasty from the Arabian Peninsula. The Hashimites allied themselves closely with the British during World War II and helped expel the Ottomans from the Eastern Arab World. Later on, Britain and France imposed a violent occupation on the Arab World that lasted a long time. As a reward for Hashimite loyalty to the British, they were installed as rulers of a number of Arab states including Iraq. But the Hashimites' close alliance with the ruthless British proved too costly. In 1958, King Faisal II of Iraq was assassinated, hence quickly putting an end to Western-sponsored rule in Iraq.

With America perceived by many local Iraqis as an extension to the British experience, any US-backed opposition would not last too long in power for it will be considered tainted.

To complicate matters, most Iraqis don't really see the Iraqi regime to be better or worse than other regimes in the region. Regime illegitimacy applies across the board in the Middle East with some exceptions. To single out the Iraqi regime for its poor human rights record while ignoring other regimes with a comparable record simply does not fly with most Iraqis who have no confusion as to the source of their pain, the US.

As for the Iraqi regime's political and military failures in Gulf War I and II, other regimes in the region suffered worse setbacks but are still in power today. Let us not forget that Iraq's territorial integrity is still intact. We can't argue the same for some Arab countries none of which ever recovered lost territories and all have a human rights record not considered too flattering buy any civilized standard.

The issue of territorial integrity remains of paramount concern to Iraqis as well as the Arab and Muslim world. The specter of territorial hemorrhage in Iraq and the possible spill-over of the ensuing violence and refugees to neighboring countries is a scenario all of Iraq's neighbors don't relish. Only the US and the Iraqi opposition in its haste to topple the Iraqi regime and grab power are willing to risk the territorial integrity of Iraq.

The unresolved ethnic and religious power-sharing formula of the Iraqi opposition spells doom for Iraqis. The Balkanization of Iraq is a likely scenario. Even intra-ethnic fighting is highly likely if and when the present Iraqi opposition topples the Iraqi regime. Let us not forget the Kurdish infighting in Iraq and their inability to close ranks even when considering their common cause and enemies. The potential for bloody civil war in Iraq is real if the present regime falls to the US-backed opposition.

The dilemma of the Iraqi opposition is real and of their own making. By aligning themselves too closely and openly with the US, they have proven themselves too shortsighted and lacking in both tactics and strategy. Most Iraqis, a very proud people, reject categorically the hegemony of a Western-installed regime, and violently too as their history demonstrates. To most Iraqis, their regime, as tyrannical and incompetent as it may, is not any better or worse than other regional regimes.

A better alternative to a US-installed regime in Iraq, is an inside power shift within the Iraqi regime. After all, the US war with Iraq seem to have devolved into a personal vendetta against the Iraqi President. With President Saddam voluntarily or involuntarily relinquishing control to one of his generals or political allies, Iraq can avert the risk of a showdown with a politically desperate and shortsighted US determined to undermine the present Iraqi regime regardless of the destructive and bloody ramifications to Iraq's people, its territory, and its neighbors. The best alternative is a democratic republic of Iraq. But this is a decision for Iraqis who have Iraq's best interest in mind to undertake without outside intervention.

For the Iraqi opposition to regain its credibility, they must distance themselves from the US and call for the immediate lifting of the sanctions. Only then would the Iraqi street rally around a patriotic opposition. Sadly, this seems an unlikely scenario for the Iraqi opposition to adopt. And the Iraqis, like their Cuban counterparts, will see an opposition more power hungry and self-interested and will continue to rally around the Iraqi regime.

The prospects for the Iraqi people do not seem promising for the near future given the mediocre alternatives they are faced with. Iraqis have to choose between a homegrown secular ultra-nationalist and violently despotic regime but maintain Iraq's territorial integrity, or opt for a client regime that is either ethnocentric or religious in its agenda. The second option is almost guaranteed to result in greater and more violent civil unrest and lead to Iraq's breakup along ethnic and religious lines.

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