This article was published in the Cambridge
Review of International Affairs, Vol. XIII, No 1, Autumn-Winter 1999, pp. 254-270.
From Policy to Regime:
Trends in Euro-Mediterranean Governance
DIMITRIS
K. XENAKIS*
Abstract
The post-Cold War (dis)order has lent great fluidity and instability to
the Euro-Mediterranean international (sub)system, which was not well equipped
in terms of policies, competencies and institutions to transcend complexity.
There are also additional obligations for the rich and stable European North to
apply the norms and rules of ‘good governance’ to the Mediterranean South. The
discipline of International Relations puts great emphasis on international
regimes as institutions for collective problem-solving characterised by the
horizontal co-ordination of the actors involved. In this framework, the
question whether the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) will be capacitated
through mechanisms and institutions to successfully manage Euro-Mediterranean
systemic complexity is central, especially since 1995, when the European Union
(EU) has been more seriously investing in its Mediterranean policy. This
article conceptualises the EMP as an international regime in statu nascendi, and explores the properties and dynamics of
Euro-Mediterranean governance in relation to the prospective
institutionalisation of the Barcelona Process (BP).
1.
Prolegomena to
System Change
Since the end of
the Cold War, the transformation in world politics has led to a state of
unpredictable change and, as often suggested, disorder. Increased perceptions
of instability have resulted from the removal of the bipolar 'overlay' that
provided balance in the international system. The passing to the new era was
marked by the dramatic shift in Soviet strategic perceptions, the failure of
the wider West to press the military and strategic advantage arising from the
Soviet retrenchment, and the absence of a major international war as the
catalyst for change. The above parameters are at the heart of the complexity
that still exists in post-1989 world politics.[1] In an era when
changes transform international politics, the prospects for global order and
governance have become 'transcendent issues’.[2] But despite the
lethal break-up with the past, new structures and ways of establishing a system
of international governance are yet to replace today’s world order with one
founded upon stronger and more efficient institutions.
The
new international order is increasingly shaped by regional dynamics that had
operated all along under the surface of superpower confrontation. Yet, defining
and recognising conditions of stability at both international and regional
levels during the era of the 'deterrence regime' was something comparatively
easy. At a time when international monitors report more than thirty wars daily,[3]
the uniquely observed turbulence the world has experienced over the last decade
demonstrates the difficulties arising from the debris of its Cold War past. Now
that the global threat of the Soviet monolith has been permanently dismantled,
Europe no longer represents a theatre of potential large-scale military
confrontation. Instead, it is frozen strategically, albeit other risks and
crises are emerging in its periphery. Moreover, the East-West and North-South
axes are far from providing a reliable conceptual platform from which to yield
a greater understanding of European systemic change. Predictably, the US role
in the Continent is declining,
following the collapse of pre-existing threats. Less predictably though, the
relative defence spending of 'radical powers' is likely to increase, adding to
the potential for regional instability. At the same time, economics play a
significant role in the general security ambiguity post-Cold War, to which is
added a new dialectic linking political, military and socio-cultural arenas. In
this context, ‘power’ is more evenly distributed as regional economic blocs
expand their geopolitical and market spheres of influence. These trends, along
with new forms of insecurity (proliferation of biological weapons, weapons of
mass destruction, drugs trafficking, illegal immigrations, etc.), will
determine future western responses to global instability through the formation
of comprehensive security regimes and multilateral arrangements.
Embedded
in a polydirectional and venturesome global order, the EU is presented with the
opportunity to secure its territorial integrity, whilst marking its impact on
the international scene by preserving peace and prosperity in its Southern and
Eastern peripheries. The post-1989 explosion of political liberty in Central
and Eastern Europe has paradoxically inflicted upon this transformative
European order signs of regional anarchy of the most traditional type. More
specifically, the end of the Cold War has given way to the disintegration of
multinational states, a painful process of transition to liberal democracy (or
polyarchy) and the market economy, and the resurgence of the suicidal effects
of (ethnic) nationalism. Integration,
disintegration, internationalisation, balance of power, and struggle for power
have all contributed to the formation of a new Pan-European architecture. Realist
prophecies of a new Macht-Politik telos have not yet been fulfilled.
Rather, there are still signs of optimism that the world of the new century can
be a purposive political cosmos where international antiparatheses (or
antagonisms) are resolved through reason, and where prosperity can advance on
the basis of unburdened comparative advantage. In the new Pan-European
landscape, the EU has considerably better chances to project stability and
prosperity in its near abroad through a system of mutual governance.
Acknowledging the importance of regional and world trading-blocks development,
the EU is in a position to consolidate itself as the strongest economic 'union
of states’, not least because of the enduring predominance of economics in
world affairs. As the EU has become the
centre of gravity for both its eastern and southern peripheries, one may
legitimately expect that its leadership potential will face up to its growing
international responsibilities, including the application of 'good governance'
in the management of the Euro-Mediterranean space.[4]
2. On Euro-Mediterranean
Complexity
From the Second
World War until 1989, the Europe served as the primary international theatre
for the East-West confrontation, while developments in other regions were
considered of secondary importance. This tradition has significantly affected
European threat perceptions for more than half a century. However, now that the
once fearsome Soviet threat has actually vanished, this attitude has changed,
post-Cold War Europe is confronted by instability deriving from socio-political
and economic disparities, together with the risk of small interstate and
intrastate conflicts. During the Cold War, the Mediterranean region represented
a crucial area in strategic terms, encompassing many possible seats of conflict
and unresolved disputes with a strong historical background (the Greek-Turkish
dispute over Cyprus and the Arab-Israeli conflict). The fact that the
Mediterranean served as a security chessboard to the strategic policies of the
two dominant military blocks - NATO and the Warsaw Pact - has introduced
fragility in the regional security balance that persists even after the
collapse of the Eastern pole.[5]
Although no longer a feature of the East-West confrontation, the Mediterranean
represents the most alarming source of insecurity for the new European order,
as the recent proliferation of small-scale crises and the widening gap between
North and South produce structural instability.
No
other part of the globe exemplifies better the post-1989 trends towards
fragmentation and revival of 'ancient feuds' than the Mediterranean, with
security questions becoming increasingly indivisible, regardless of diverse
sub-regional features. From the perspective of international regionalism, the
Mediterranean encompasses at least two 'international regions': the
geographical space which borders its north-west sector (EU) and the
south-eastern one labelled as the Middle East. It also encompasses three
sub-regional groupings: Southern Europe (Portugal, Spain, France, Italy,
Greece, Turkey, Cyprus and Malta), the Mashreq (Jordan, Israel, Lebanon,
Jordan, Egypt and the Palestinian Authority) and the Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria,
Tunisia).[6]
Although, there are many variations in these geographical divisions, it is
still useful to think about the Mediterranean as a single system (totality).
Existing Mediterranean considerations need a complex re-conceptualisation of
both regional and sub-regional dynamics, as 'Mediterranean regions' do not
share the features traditionally found in international regionalism: a ‘common
co-operation space’.[7] True as the
latter may be, the Mediterranean can be also seen as a network of diversities
and dividing lines of co-operation between different socio-economic systems,
political cultures and regimes, languages, forms of expression, and religions.
In fact, it has always been a crossing point for conflict and co-operation,
antagonism and coexistence. Still though, Braudel observes, as the
Mediterranean regions are open to influences and exchanges they form a
large-scale unity, whose history could only be understood by looking at the
factors that tied them together and changed only over very long periods of
time.[8]
This means that co-operation and security across the Mediterranean are possible
but cannot be taken for granted, as they require an effort of will and specific
management.[9] Being a
heterogeneous synthesis of civilisations, along the lines of a 'heterarchy', as
well as of unequal economic development, a plurality of political regimes,
divergent perceptions of security, and uneven demographic growth, the
Mediterranean space occupies a prominent position between order and disorder
for which a comprehensive framework of analysis is yet to become discernible.
Thus one may legitimately refer to the Mediterranean as a region, where
geography, history and politics intermesh with culture and religion with
enormous complexity, resulting in a composite system of partial regimes, each
reflecting a particular sense of being and belonging.
But
the questions that are currently involved are new, in that they are products of
the new world (dis)order, especially since the 1990 Gulf crisis. The latter was
the first major international conflict to be recorded in the era of Pax Americana, fuelling stormy debates
about the emergence of 'new world orders', reducing the East-West confrontation
to a minimum, whilst re-emphasising, in however complex terms, the
Orient-Occident and North-South gaps. These events also appeared to have
offered useful ammunition to those contemplating the idea that the dominant
conflict post-Cold War is between Occidental and Oriental values. Huntington,
in undertaking this task,[10]
has predicted the future of world politics as a 'clash of civilizations'
characterised by conflict among culturally distinct groupings of humanity. Will
the future of Euro-Mediterranean reflect Huntington's cosmotheory? The answer
is no for two reasons. First, because his vision is rather flawed and, despite
the grandiose tone of his proposal, amounts to no more than a sophisticated
repackaging of traditional realist theory on a global scale, thus failing to
encourage intelligent intercultural dialogue. Sachedina makes the point well:
'such scholarship serves to corrupt the common moral and political language of
the two cultures and fosters violence and confrontation, and as a justification
for the prolongation of historical stereotypes'.[11]
Second, following Ayubi's assertion, because it was even before the 1990/1 Gulf
crisis that a new theory started to take shape, arguing that ‘Islamic
fundamentalism’ and not Communism constituted the major threat for the West.[12]
Although
the Gulf incident served as a reminder of the Mediterranean's potential to fall
victim of similar disputes over regional hegemony and associated trends of
over-armament, the present risks of North-South discord in Euro-Mediterranean
relations can only be partially ascribed to military factors. There also exists
a new conspicuous alertness of the social, demographic, economic and political
challenges. It is thus appropriate to emphasise the importance of the
North-South dichotomy and regional interdependencies of an unequal exchange
variable.[13] The North
is affluent, and becoming ever more so, in spite of the current recession
setback. Today, the Mediterranean offers a most dramatic illustration of
complex inequality, as for example the total GDP of EU Mediterranean states in
the North is eleven times greater than its southern littoral counterparts.[14]
Cyprus is also a good case in point, with a population of 700,000 and a per
capita income of nearly $10,000, while Egypt, with 58 million people, is below
$800 per capita. Unequal economic development, the plurality of political
regimes, the divergent perceptions of security threats, and rapid demographic
growth, are the major exacerbating factors of the Mediterranean North-South
divide. In the eyes of EU members, the southern Mediterranean rim is being
destabilised due to economic pressures and a resulting radicalisation of social
conflicts. As the regional population growth has been combined with some degree
of economic development - a process that, by increasing productivity in various
sectors of the economy, creates large pools of underemployed or unemployed
labour - new pressures emerge for individuals to move across the water-borders
of the Mediterranean.[15]
Worries
as they may be about losing control over energy supplies and illegal migration,
EU members do not actually perceive any distinct, direct (military) threat from
the South. A compelling reason for this is that the southern Mediterranean
countries attach more importance to threats coming from the Arab world, where
the term 'security' is usually associated with internal problems.[16]
It is also important to note the difficulty on the part of the EU to deal with
security issues in the region in contrast to dealing with other peripheral
systems. In the words of Mortimer, 'the EU has to anticipate possible hostility
in the Mediterranean without provoking it'.[17]
It may be another Mediterranean paradox, but most southern Mediterranean
countries view the strengthening of western security structures in the region
with suspicion. Chater notes: 'Europe ... wants to cut off access from the
south, building watchtowers to keep it under surveillance'.[18]
In addition, the majority of these countries are sceptical of the EU's alleged
willingness to undertake a decisive role in the Mediterranean, something they
also perceive as one of the causes of the regional arms races.[19]
But it is equally true that the EU faces significant difficulties in assuming a
substantive regional security role as a result of the presence of the American
‘factor’ and the continuing reluctance of the latter to share its hegemony in
the Middle East peace process.
Euro-Mediterranean
governance can be seen as a sui generis
ensemble of power politics and interdependence, in that bilateral relations are
concluded on realist principles, whereas at a multilateral/regional level it
has become clear that interdependence is increasing. Also, although EU
Mediterranean countries have reached a high level of political stability and
participate in common institutional(ised) structures - the existence of which
prevents the appearance and escalation of internal and external disputes - the rest
of the littoral countries are confronted with acute clashes. The tendency for
the littoral states to fall victims of the 'unitary trap' and, hence, act
unilaterally in an effort to solve their emerging security anxieties is
self-defeating and needs to be replaced by a more balanced and comprehensive
‘security regime’ founded upon the praxis of both conflict-management and
conflict-resolution. This recommendation is based on the idea of enhancing
national security through the prolepsis
of immediate violent crises,[20]
and through a long-term process of transparency and peace-building. For,
preventing conflicts before they arise is much more effective and cheaper than
responding militarily when they do.[21]
Lessons from recent experiences demonstrate that any such measures should also
include a range of options or preventive measures, and effective
decision-making procedures to make early action possible.[22]
Although the complexity of the new Euro-Mediterranean space requires integrated
multilateral institutions, it remains unclear whether these can effectively impact on the choices of the partners when it
comes to issues where national interests are, or appear to be, at stake.[23]
All said, the success of any viable form of Euro-Mediterranean governance
depends largely on the creation of flexible institutional arrangements to break
down regional complexity.
3.
Perspectives on Euro-Mediterranean Relations
Euro-Mediterranean
relations have been politicised as a result of the geographical proximity, the
nature and level of interdependence, as well as the role that previous European
policies towards the region have come to play. The Community had developed
conventional relations with the littoral countries as early as 1962 (and even
earlier in the case of the former North African French colonies), while it had
also participated in the major political issues of the region. Signs of an
enhanced European interest in the region were first recorded in 1975 at the
beginning of the Euro-Arab dialogue, then in the early and mid-1980s with the
accession of Greece and the Iberian nations, and again after the Gulf war in
the early 1990s. It could be argued that for historical, strategic and economic
reasons the Community was anxious from early on to open up its membership and
markets to Mediterranean countries.[24]
Europe’s external relations with the latter were realised in the form of
bilateral agreements, which paradoxically were of similar, if not often
identical content. Such a fragmented approach resulted in two general types of
association agreements: those concerning prospective members and closer
economic associates, namely Cyprus, Malta and Turkey, and those relating to the
rest of the littoral states that loom in the wider framework of the Union's
Mediterranean policy (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Jordan, Syria, Israel, Egypt,
Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority).
Post-1989,
developments in the region are observed with special attention by the EU's
southern members but are hardly followed in the North of the Union itself. The prospective enlargement of the EU has also led to the employment of
dynamic policies towards its eastern periphery, contrasting with its
rather vague Mediterranean orientation. The reform process in
Eastern Europe, currently under severe financial stress, should be kept alive
with the active support of the EU's budget. One might see current EU policies
towards the East affecting its Mediterranean policies, with the Union seeing
the latter as a counterpart to its ‘new’ Ostpolitik.
The dominant focus of the EU towards the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe could hinder the integrative potential of Southern EU members, and could
have a negative impact on foreign direct investment and the EU’s development
aid to the south. Yet, many southern Mediterranean countries worry that the
massive transfer of resources to Greece, Spain, Portugal and Cyprus would
further increase the regional economic gap.[25]
Turning the EU's focus is a difficult task given that the UK and Germany are
adamant in that economic assistance should aim at the reconstruction of East
European economies and polities to reinforce their accession process.
But
as EU foreign policy architects directed their foci in the East, the response to the growing scale of conflicts in
parts of the Mediterranean has been largely left to the EU's southern members.
While the northern EU members have accepted a degree of symmetry in the making
of the EU's foreign policy,[26]
different perceptions of interest among southern members persist about
Euro-Mediterranean relations. France, Spain and Italy bring Mediterranean
issues to the fore of the Union’s agenda, for they traditionally maintain a
plethora of economic and political ties with the region. In particular, France
has displayed a distinctive but ‘inchoate strategy’ towards the Mediterranean,[27]
making it hard for the EU to accept a French leadership in its Mediterranean
policy. Similarly, Spain, and to a limited extent Italy, have also expressed
distinct preferences.[28]
A further Mediterranean contradiction is that, while those three larger
southern EU members play an essential role in the setting of the EU’s
Mediterranean agenda, it is the smaller countries such as Greece confront in a
more direct manner the potential tidal waves of Mediterranean instability. But
Greece has been conspicuously reserved about assuming a more active
'Mediterranean role' in the Union's foreign policy, as it has failed to push
consistently for enhanced Mediterranean co-operation, perhaps with the
exception of EU-Cyprus relations.[29]
These differences illustrate that EU partners have not found a reliable modus operandi to promote their
Mediterranean interests. [30]
On top of that, south European ambitions for a stabilised and
prosperous Mediterranean in the early 1990s have been mainly promoted outside
the framework of the EU: France, Spain, and Italy have put forward a number of
multilateral schemes (Five plus Five, CSCM, Mediterranean Forum, etc.) that
were generally incapable of dealing with the ever complex array of security
challenges in the region. These initiatives, applied on parts of the
Mediterranean rather than to the regional system as a whole, have created more
tensions among southern EU members than any positive results they were expected
to bring. More importantly though, they all failed to establish an efficient
regime to accommodate and even transcend international change.[31]
4. Towards a Meaningful Partnership
The EU has
recently decided to adopt a new strategy aiming at correcting the imbalance
created by its monolithic bilateral trade relations. In June 1994 the Corfu
European Council gave the initial impetus, and in its communications of October
1994 and 8 March 1995 the Commission tabled its proposals for a
Euro-Mediterranean partnership that were endorsed by the European Council at
its Essen and Cannes meetings in December 1994 and June 1995 respectively. On
27-28 November 1995, EU Foreign Ministers sat down with their Mediterranean
homologues.[32] Epitomising
the 1995 Barcelona Declaration[33]
is the emphasis put on respect for democracy and human rights, political
dialogue, economic liberalisation, and financial and technical assistance for
the Mediterranean partners. The Declaration incorporates numerous international
norms on interstate relations and global disarmament. It also includes - albeit
in the circumlocutions of diplomacy - co-operation on combating terrorism and
drug-trafficking as well as on increasing arms control, particularly regional
renunciation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and issues of illegal
immigration. The 1995 Barcelona document infused a greater political and
security bias to Euro-Mediterranean relations, whilst encompassing an ambitious
economic plan for an industrially inspired Mediterranean free trade area
(MEFTA) by the year 2010. However, free access to industrial exports does not
mean a great deal if there is little to export, as in the case of most
Mediterranean partners.[34]
The MEFTA objective, which is to be achieved through a series of economic
reforms also entails security risks, since accelerated market liberalisation in
the southern Mediterranean rim could produce greater waves of instability. But
the EMP does not involve any ingenious mechanism to sustain regional political
co-operation, something that may prove vital in case of further economic
recession and resulting political instability.
The
EMP addressed the post-Cold War Mediterranean reality as an overlap of
different regions integrating different dimensions, including the
socio-cultural one that was apparently missing from previous Mediterranean
initiatives.[35] Its
rationale was to lock the EU with the 12 Mediterranean countries in a
co-operative regional process, encompassing a set of policy components whose
conceptual roots are drawn from both the 1992 Treaty on European Union and the
Conference/Organisation on Security and Co-operation in Europe (C/OSCE). In
particular, the inclusion of a follow-up mechanism constitutes the dynamic
element that offers assurance to the ‘continuity’ of the initiative, placing
the EMP in a position to be considered as a pragmatic mechanism: a major forum
for international co-operation at both Ministerial and Senior-Officials level.
The Euro-Mediterranean Committee of the BP consists of officials from both the
EU Troika and from all 12 southern Mediterranean countries. It should meet
regularly and report to the Foreign Ministers. It was also decided that the
Foreign Ministers of all partner-countries would meet periodically to review
progress in implementing the principles of the Barcelona Declaration and to
agree upon actions that would promote its objectives. This was a substantial
advance compared to earlier European policies and initiatives, 'with
ill-defined follow up provisions depending on constant ministerial action'.[36]
'It
is quite obvious', Jűnemann argues, 'that the Barcelona concept aims at a
careful westernisation of the Mediterranean, gradually converting it into an
area of economic and political influence'.[37]
Regarding the commitment to democracy and human rights, it seems that some
non-EU partners will sooner or later have to face the reality that the other
participants, European or not, might actually insist on the preservation of the
principles and norms agreed in Barcelona. But as Jűnemann reiterates, although
the political conditionality underlying the economic and financial partnership
'allows the EU to suspend its commitments in cases of failure concerning
democracy or respect of human rights, offering an apparently effective
instrument to influence the process of democratisation ... it exposes the MPCs
to the good will of the Europeans, thus offending their demand for equal
partnership'.[38] From this pespective, then, the charge of
'Westernising' looks like a shady political stratagem aimed at discrediting
forces that are pressing for change.
In
practice, however, after the Barcelona Conference, the BP moved forward to a
large extent by the new Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements that updated
and enhanced the previous individual agreements between the EU and the southern
Mediterranean countries. The new agreements focused mainly on trade
liberalisation, the encouragement of foreign direct investment and economic
co-operation, as well as on the need to further political, social and cultural
ties.[39]
Still though, co-operation on a South-South scale remains very limited. This is
also associated with the worsening of the Arab-Israeli relations. The
detachment of the EMP from the Middle East Peace Process was considered as a
successful manipulation by the Europeans to avoid the complex relations of the
Eastern Mediterranean. But the exclusion of US from the EMP - something that
gave the EU a predominant role in the process - increased the American
reluctance to share its political initiatives in the Middle East. This mutual
exclusion among the transatlantic partners should be regarded as a major
problem obstructing the EMP to bear fruits. In this framework, the overall
negative results of the follow-up meeting in Malta in 1997 underlined a causal
relationship between progress in the Middle East peace process and progress in
the BP.[40]
As Calleya points out, the results of the Malta Conference provided a 'reality
check' of the BP,[41] although it
was clear from the outset that these two processes were not to be linked together,
at least formally, but rather to act on a complementary manner.
5. Euro-Mediterranean (Regime) Formations
The fledging
Barcelona Process has been described as a political gesture aiming at
correcting the deficiencies of the previous narrow-minded European policies
towards the Mediterranean.[42]
It is also conceived of, in Gillespie's words, as 'emblematic of a process'
being constituted from a dynamic set of international exchanges, but still
falling short of a meaningful partnership.[43]
Yet, the invention of the entire project should be seen as a vital step towards
a partnership that may animate some confident expectations for the emergence of
a common 'Euro-Mediterranean consciousness', thus laying the groundwork for the
creation of an international regime. From a systemic point of view, the EMP is
a multi-dimensional international regime that established the linkages between
political (security/politics), economic (MEFTA) and socio-cultural (human
rights/civil society) arenas. For the moment though, the new Partnership
represents a balance of interests, rather than a genuinely common
Euro-Mediterranean interest per se.
Although it sets up a system of flexible arrangements to govern
Euro-Mediterranean relations, the substantial differentiation of the ratio with
the financial budged of the EU for the reconstruction of Eastern Europe was the
major reason for attracting the interest of the southern Mediterranean
countries.[44] Indeed, the
EMP is propelled by a certain economism whose financial implications are particularly
favourable to the non-EU partner states. In return to the above, the Union
linked issues of economic liberalisation to a set of political principles
ratified in Barcelona.
In
general, the EMP is a collective attempt to redefine European threat perceptions
from the Mediterranean, addressing the perils of social unrest and economic
underdevelopment. The European consensus on sensitive issues such as human
rights, democracy, self-determination and religious tolerance, together with
the initiation of multilateral economic and financial co-operation, constitutes
a space where the actors' expectations converge. It is on this premise that a
Euro-Mediterranean regime may in time come into being. The term ‘international
regime’ was introduced as early as 1975 by Ruggie as 'a set of mutual
expectations, rules and regulations, plans, organizational energies and
financial commitments, which have been accepted by a group of states'.[45]
Later in 1983, Krasner detected the appearance of international regimes 'when there
are clearly understood principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures
around which decision-maker's expectations converge in a given area of
international relations'.[46]
A somewhat different account is offered by Young who defines regimes as 'social
institutions governing the actions of those involved in specific activities or
set of activities'.[47]
The emphasis here is on rules that are translated into 'well-defined guides to
action' and on compliance mechanisms with the rules governing the regime. There
is a certain procedural bias in this view, in terms of the actors' expected
actions 'under appropriate circumstances'.[48]
In
general, there has been much discussion on the 'consensus definition' of
international regimes and even on the usefulness of the entire theory.[49]
Keohane, in an influential study that straddled the lines of realist and
neoliberalist thinking,[50]
suggested that 'Regimes are institutions with explicit rules, agreed upon
governments that pertain to particular sets of issues in international
relations’.[51] This 'lean'
definition - as opposed to the more 'complex' one offered by Krasner - has the
advantage of relieving scholars from the burden of justifying their decision to
call a given injunction a 'norm' rather than a 'rule' (or perhaps even a
'principle').[52] This definition is analytically helpful
for 'norms' are not explicit in the complex framework of Euro-Mediterranean
relations and, on top of that, no substantive level of institutional autonomy
exists. Indeed, although the EMP provides for a system of rules of the game, it
remains weak in relation to the development of an identifiable set of norms.
Cox's definition of regimes illustrates this point: '[Regimes] are...recognized
patterns of practice that define the rules of the game'.[53] Ceteris paribus, by recognising the
linkages between political, security, economic and socio-cultural arenas, the
EMP is in a position to be considered as an international regime in the making,
albeit one which accords with a rather 'lean' definition of the term. Absent a
better or indeed less nebulous definition in the acquis académique, such claim remains valid.
It is
analytically profitable to establish that international regimes justify the
separateness of states as constitutionally distinct entities. As Taylor put it:
'states do not cease to be states because they are members of a regime...'.[54]
At the same time, regimes allow actors to 'socialise' with each other in a
complex web of norms of behaviour, rules and procedures of decision-making that
are commonly, if not ex ante, agreed
upon by the participating actors. The emphasis is on informal routes of
co-operative behaviour, patterned as much by specific political interests - although it has been argued that regimes
imply 'a form of co-operation that is more than the following of short-run
interests'[55] - as by a
common tendency to pursue (but not necessarily explicitly set as such)
reciprocal objectives. Moreover, international regimes project both 'inclusive'
and 'exclusive' frameworks of multiple and, more often than not, complex
interactions that reflect a given political reality.[56]
In the case of the EMP, it could be argued that regime creation is directed at
setting the limits of acceptable behaviour within a nascent and flexibly
arranged structure of governance. However, it does so within a flexible
institutional structure. The flexibility of the Partnership - the way in which
it is valued by the partners, and the means by which its norms can facilitate
agreement on the basis of mutualism and reciprocity - sets the limits of
'consciousness-raising' in issues of Euro-Mediterranean governance, and more
particularly, the possibility of acquiring operational capabilities.
Further,
international regimes deploy a system of interconnectedness among the areas of
co-operation which helps to a large extent to explain the complexity of the
interdependencies - both structural and functional - among the actors involved.
Aficionados of the literature on international regimes are conscious of the
significance of achieving mutually rewarding outcomes in systems of
institutionalised rule. Being a highly fragmented system of policy
interactions, any future attempts to navigate the dynamics of the
Euro-Mediterranean regime needs to be differentiated according to the specific
conditions of co-operation in its multifarious policy arenas embedded in all
its three-basket arrangements. However, it is useful to recall that what has
really changed in the new era for the regional security regimes is not so much
their relevance to security per se,
but rather ‘the nature of the functions that must be performed by the types of
regimes that have been implemented to secure stability’.[57]
That is, the quality of management exhibited by the common institutions. The
latter raises the question of what model of large-scale institution-building
should the EMP proceed with?
Gallarotti
offers many reasons for the failure of any organisational form, including
problems arising from the management of complex and tightly coupled systems,
adverse substitution, dispute intensification, and moral hazard.[58]
Thus, whether or not the EMP will play a dynamic role in the arenas of the
Mediterranean diplomacy, depends much on the process of adjusting its own
structures to accommodate and even break down regional complexity. In
particular, the endorsement of adequate system-transforming mechanisms -
similar to those used in the Helsinki Process - should be regarded as a
prototype for the regularisation of political behaviour in the
Euro-Mediterranean space and the utilisation of the Partnership itself. In this
context, and in order to achieve a relaxation of North-South tensions and to
emphasise the importance of human rights, the BP should aim at creating a
reason-based, institutionalised and symbiotic environment between the Union and
its Mediterranean partners.[59]
Yet, the C/OSCE experience points in the direction that a 'cognitive region’,
along the lines suggested by Adler,[60]
or more congruent organisational forms of collective/mutual governance, may
well develop on the basis of gradual institutionalisation and the sustenance of
certain norms (ethics of conduct).
The Institutional Promise of the Euro-Mediterranean
Regime
As students of
international relations put great emphasis on international regimes as institutional
devises for problem-solving, it is questionable how far the Euro-Mediterranean
system can realise its 'co-operative objectives' under its currently weak
institutional machinery. That is, without investing further in concrete
partnership-building measures on issues of substance such as the need to
develop a Charter for Peace and Stability in the region.[61]
The prospective Stability Pact will be an exercise in pre-emptive diplomacy
and, above all, will represent a form of institutionalised alliance. Such a
pact can provide the levels of transparency that an ongoing dialogue requires,
along with the necessary machinery to manage potentially unresolved crises.
Also, the emerging inter-parliamentary co-operation through the parliamentary
Forum will provide the EMP an additional legitimising platform from which to
promote peace and stability in this oft-troubled part of the globe. In this
Forum, a structured and regular dialogue will no doubt engender the awareness
of common Euro-Mediterranean interests, and contribute to the creation of
mutually reinforcing structures of governance. Both agenda-identification (the
inclusion of a legitimate claim of a participating member) and agenda-setting
functions could be achieved through the institutional interaction between the
new parliamentary Forum and the dominant decision-making body. There is a
normative implication underpinning this dynamic yet asymmetrical relationship
between the newly institutionalised Forum and the pre-existing
intergovernmental structures that have set up the institutional machinery of a
larger association. Be that as it may, there is evidence to suggest that the
proliferation of legitimate arenas will have an equally important domestic
impact on the policy strategy of the EMP partners, in that they would now have
to formulate multifarious strategies to pursue what they consider to be their
legitimate claims and relative gains. In any event, from an institutional
perspective, it would be interesting to evaluate the endorsement of an additional
parliamentary structure to the workings of a nascent Mediterranean
international regime like the EMP, and assess the extent to which its
mechanisms are capable of striking a balance between its declared objectives
and particular national interests, which may even take the form of
non-bargainable ones.
All
said, international regimes beg the theoretical question of whether
institutions and, by extension, systems of institutionalised governance really
matter in complex management arrangements as currently represented by the EMP.
Claiming too much for international institutions might prove a 'false promise'.[62]
However, ‘… in a world politics constrained by state power and divergent
interests, and unlikely to experience effective hierarchical governance,
international institutions operating on the basis of reciprocity will be
components of any lasting peace’.[63]
Thus the establishment of institutional structures and procedures may
significantly strengthen the international regime dynamics of the
Euro-Mediterranean system.
6. A Synthesis of Trends
The Gulf events
in the early 1990s unleashed a dialogue on what security arrangements should be
established in the Mediterranean to foster regional security and organise
regional politics. In recent years we have witnessed in the Mediterranean the
break out and prosecution of diverse armed conflicts (both within and between
nations), and the appearance of shaky political dynamics. These phenomena have
as their origin the particular characteristics of the region itself, an area
where the existence of diverse types of conflict signals the eventual
appearance of others. Co-operative security, this new task of the emerging
international Mediterranean community, is essentially about prolepsis, and has therefore to do with
improving transparency and the predictability of the multiple factors that
characterise current regional security equations. In this endeavour, the
co-operation of all 27 partners is indispensable, since the emerging
international Mediterranean community can propose but not impose, and even
less, be a substitute for them. The establishment of adequate institutional
machinery in the region is deemed necessary given the endemic nature of the
regional actual and potential tensions.
The
Union, which for the majority of states in the region has been a symbol of
economic success, political democracy and societal stability, has assumed a
controversial, yet pivotal, role during their post-Cold War transition
processes. As long as the Mediterranean continues to serve as a border between
a wealthy, developed, and stable Europe on the one hand, and a fragmented South
on the other, the EU could at best hope to 'keep the fire under control without
trying to extinguish it'. But the international role of the Union should aim even
higher. Namely, to resist the temptation of remaining an apathetic observer as
opposed to a constructive intermediary and an effective international
problem-solver in this unique 'body of water'.[64]
The
serious challenges arising from the southern Mediterranean rim demand a unitary
and coherent response. Currently, the complexity of the Mediterranean region is
such that it is becoming all the more difficult to be confronted, let alone
resolved, on an individual basis and, hence, by states acting in isolation from
others. Interestingly though, the active engagement of multiple actors in the
regional politics may well exacerbate the possibilities for reaching
substantive interstate agreement on a number of highly sensitive issues such as
immigration, economic aspects of security, external protection of citizens,
respect for human rights, and the resolution of protracted conflicts. The
engagement/isolation divide thus points in the direction of a ‘unitary trap’
where certain problems cannot be ignored, but cannot also be solved separately
by each partner acting alone. Both strategic orientation and co-ordinated
action will prove vital if the fragile stability of the region is to be
secured. But mutual trust and stability depends on a combination of other
factors, which, in addition to the promotion of North-South ‘co-development’,
must encompass greater mutual understanding in all relevant fields. In
conclusion, international regime theory provides a clearly defined set of
conditions for regional order-building and with it the successful
institutionalisation of Euro-Mediterranean relations. Its application
demonstrates that the characteristics of the Partnership, the fragmented
policies of the strategic actors, and the outcome of the process so far, point
to the need for a reliable strategy to transform Euro-Mediterranean governance
from policy to regime.
* Dimitris K. Xenakis is a doctoral candidate in Politics at the University of Exeter.
[1] See analysis provided in D. Johnson and E. Tachibana, 'The Complexity Threshold', unpublished master’s thesis, The George Washington University, May 1996.
[2] J. N. Rosenau, 'Governance, Order and Change in World Politics', in J. N. Rosenau and E. Czempiel (eds.), Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p.1.
[3] M. Booth, 'Global warring', End Lines, The Independent Magazine, 30 January 1999.
[4] European Commission, 'The Future of North-South Relations. Towards Sustainable Economic and Social Development', CASHIERS, Forward Studies Unit, Secretariat-General, Luxembourg, 1997.
[5] Syria, Libya and the Balkan countries were supported by the former USSR, while US support was directed toward Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia, with both the US and the former USSR competing to support Egypt and Algeria. It is worth remembering that in the bipolar distribution of power in the region, the European Community was supporting Turkey, Malta and Cyprus.
[6] See St. C. Calleya, Navigating Regional Dynamics in the Post-Cold War World. Patterns of Relations in the Mediterranean Area, Aldershot, Dartmouth 1997, especially pp. 89-140.
[7] F. Attinà, 'Regional Cooperation in Global Perspective. The case of the "mediterranean" regions', Jean Monnet Working Papers in Comparative and International Politics, No. 4, Department of Political Studies, University of Catania, 1996.
[8] F. Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, Vols. I & II, 5th edition, Fontana Press, London, 1987.
[9] R. Aliboni, 'European Security Across the Mediterranean', Chaillot Papers, No 2, WEU Institute, Paris, 1991.
[10] S. Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations', Foreign Affairs, 72/3, 1993, pp. 22-49.
[11]A. Sachedina, 'Religion and Global Affairs: Islamic Religion and Political Order', SAIS Review, Vol. 18 No 2, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998, pp. 59-64.
[12] N. Ayubi, 'Farms, factories and.... walls: which way for European/Middle Eastern Relations', in N. Ayubi (ed.), Distant Neighbors: The Political Economy of Relations between Europe and the Middle East/North Africa. Reading, MA, Ithaka Press, 1995, p. 7.
[13] G. Joffe, et al. 'The Mediterranean: Risks and Challenges', International Spectator, Vol. 28 No 3, 1993, p.36.
[14] See further in R. Aliboni, et al. 'Co-operation and Stability in the Mediterranean: An Agenda for Partnership', International Spectator, 29/3, 1994, pp. 5-20.
[15] D. G. Massey, Economic Development and International Migration in Comparative Perspective, Commission for the Study of International Migration and Cooperative Economic Development, Washington DC, 1989.
[16] F. Faria, and A. D. Vasconcelos, 'Security in Northern Africa: Ambiguity and Reality', Chaillot Papers, No. 25, WEU Institute, Paris, 1996.
[17] E. Mortimer, 'Europe and the Mediterranean: The Security Dimension', P. Ludlow (ed.), Europe and the Mediterranean, CEPS, Brassey's, London, 1994, p. 106.
[18] K. Chater, 'Mediterranean Security: The Tunisian Viewpoint', in R. Aliboni, G. Joffe and T. Niblock, (eds Security Challenges in the Mediterranean Region, Frank Cass, London 1996, p. 65.
[19] G. Joffe, 'Southern Attitudes Towards an Integrated Mediterranean Region', Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 2 No 1, 1997, p. 18.
[20] By prolepsis is meant a type of conflict prevention that transcends the conventional understanding of non-constraining measures (those which are not coercive and depend on the goodwill of the parties involved), primarily diplomatic in nature. The term is roughly equivalent to preventive diplomacy regarding the instruments employed: fact-finding and observer missions, early warning and mediation, diplomatic and economic pressure, or even the preventive deployment of troops. For a similar definition see Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping, United Nations, New York, 1992.
[21] The Philip Morris Institute for Public Policy and Research, 'How can Europe Prevent Conflicts', PMI Discussion Papers, No 14, 1997.
[22] G. Munuera, 'Preventing Armed Conflict in Europe: Lessons from Recent Experience', Chaillot Papers, No. 15/16, WEU Institute, Paris, 1994.
[23] This point has been extensively argued in D. K. Xenakis, 'Mediterranean Complexity, Cyprus and the EU's Enlargement', Occasional Papers, Centre for Euro-Mediterranean Studies, The University of Reading, No 99/2, 1999.
[24] Eurostat Key Figures, 'European Union trade with the Mediterranean countries', Frontier-free Europe, No 4, 1996, p.2.
[25] These concerns became manifest at a joint statement produced by the Portuguese and Spanish Prime Ministers in Seville in 1990.
[26] R. Gillespie, 'Northern European Perceptions of the Barcelona Process', Revista CIDOB d'Afers Internacionals, 37, 1997.
[27] J. Howorth, 'France and the Mediterranean in 1995: From Tactical Ambiguity to Inchoate Strategy', Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 2 No 1, 1997, pp. 157-175.
[28] See respectively here, R. Gillespie, 'Spanish Protagonismo and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership', Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 2 No 1, pp. 33-48; and J. W. Holmes, 'Italy in the Mediterranean, but of it? ', Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 2 No 1, 1997, pp. 176-192.
[29] Ch. Tsardanides, 'The Southern EU Member States' Policy towards the Mediterranean: Regional or Global Co-operation', Journal of Area Studies, Vol. 9, No 3, September 1996, p. 65.
[30] See more analytically S. Stavridis, et al. (eds.), Foreign policies of the EU's Mediterranean States & Applicant Countries in the 1990s, London, MacMillan, 1999.
[31] D. K. Xenakis, 'Order and Change in the Euro-Mediterranean System', Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 4, 1999, forthcoming.
[32] Commission of the European Communities, 'Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on Strengthening the Mediterranean Policy of the European Union: Establishing a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership', 94/427, Brussels, 19 October 1994.
[33] Commission of the European Communities, Barcelona Declaration adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference, Final Version, Barcelona 28-11-1995.
[34] L. Tsoukalis, 'The EU in search of a Mediterranean policy' (in Greek), Evropaiki Ekfrassi, No 28, 1998, p. 37.
[35] A. Bin, 'Mediterranean Diplomacy: Evolution and Prospects', Jean Monnet Working Papers in Comparative and International Politics, No 5, Department of Political Studies, University of Catania, 1997, p.10.
[36] N. Waites and S. Stavridis, 'The European Union and the Mediterranean', in S. Stavridis, et al. (eds.), op. cit., p. 33.
[37] A. Jűnemann, 'Europe's interrelations with North Africa in the new framework of Euro-Mediterranean partnership - A provisional assessment of the Barcelona concept'', p. 383.
[38] Ibid., p. 373.
[39] The first agreement was signed with Tunisia (17 July 1995) and a similar one with Morocco (26 February 1996) in November the same year. On the same approach was also based the agreement with Israel (20 November 1995), establishing a permanent political dialogue, giving further reciprocal concessions on agricultural trade, and extending economic co-operation.
[40] F. Tanner, 'The Malta Meeting revisited: The Middle East is catching up with the Barcelona Process', Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies, Malta, Msida, 18 April 1997.
[41] St. Calleja, 'The Euro-Mediterranean Process After Malta: What Prospects?', Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 2 No 2, 1997, pp. 1-22.
[42] G. Edwards and E. Philippart, 'The EU Mediterranean Policy: Virtue Unrewarded or...?', Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11 No 1, pp. 185-207.
[43] R. Gillespie, 'The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership', Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 2 No 1, 1997, pp. 4-5.
[44] E. Barbé, 'The Barcelona Conference: Launching Pad of a Process', Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 1 No 1, 1996, p.32.
[45] J. Ruggie, 'International Responses to Technology: concepts and trends', International Organization, Vol. 29, No 3, 1975, pp. 557-584.
[46] St. D. Krasner (ed.), International Regimes, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1983, p.2. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action.
[47] O. Young, International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989, p. 12.
[48] Ibid., p. 16.
[49] See further here analysis provided by S. Strange, 'Cave! hic dragones: a critique of regime analysis', in St. D. Krasner (ed.), op. cit., pp. 337-354.
[50] This is of special importance considering that Euro-Mediterranean politics combine both power politics while on the other hand interdependence is increasing.
[51] R. O Keohane, 'Neoliberal Institutionalism: A Perspective on World Politics', in R. O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory, Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1989, p.4.
[52] A. Hasenclever, P. Mayer, and V. Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, p.7.
[53] R. W. Cox, 'Social forces, states and world orders: beyond international relations theory', Millennium, Vol. 10, No 2, Summer 1981, p. 128. Quoted in A. J. R. Groom and P. Taylor (eds.), Frameworks for International Co-operation, Pinter: London, 1990, p. 202.
[54] P. Taylor, International Organization in the Modern World: The European and the Global Process, Pinter, London, 1993, p. 3.
[55] R. Jervis, 'Security Regimes', in St. D. Krasner (ed.), op. cit., p. 173.
[56] D. N. Chryssochoou, et al., Theory and reform in the European Union, Manchester University Press, Manchester and New York, 1999, p. 25.
[57] J. S. Duffield, 'Explaining the Long Peace in Europe: The Contributions of Regional Security Regimes', Review of International Studies, Vol. 20 No 4, 1994, pp. 369-388.
[58] G. Gallarotti, 'The Limits of International Organization: Systemic Failure in the Management of International Relations', International Organization, Vol. 45, 1990.
[59] See here D. K. Xenakis, 'The Barcelona Process: Some Lessons from Helsinki', Jean Monnet Working Papers in Comparative and International Politics, No. 17, Department of Political Studies, University of Catania, 1998, p. 8.
[60] See E. Adler, 'Imagined (Security) Communities: Cognitive Regions in International Relations', Millennium, Vol. 26 No 2, 1997.
[61] Concluding Statement of the UK Presidency by the foreign Secretary Mr Robert Cook, Ad-Hoc Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting, Palermo, 3-4 June 1998.
[62] J. J. Mearsheimer, 'The False Promise of International Institutions", International Security, Vol. 19 No 3, 1994, p.7.
[63] R. O. Keohane and L. L. Martin, 'The Promise of Institutionalist Theory', International Security, Vol. 20 No 1, 1995, p. 50.
[64] T. Couloumbis and T. Veremis, 'Introduction: The Mediterranean in Perspective', in S. Stavridis, et al. (eds.), op. cit., p.18.