This article was published in the Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. XIII, No 1, Autumn-Winter 1999, pp. 254-270.

From Policy to Regime:

Trends in Euro-Mediterranean Governance

DIMITRIS K. XENAKIS*

University of Exeter

Abstract

The post-Cold War (dis)order has lent great fluidity and instability to the Euro-Mediterranean international (sub)system, which was not well equipped in terms of policies, competencies and institutions to transcend complexity. There are also additional obligations for the rich and stable European North to apply the norms and rules of ‘good governance’ to the Mediterranean South. The discipline of International Relations puts great emphasis on international regimes as institutions for collective problem-solving characterised by the horizontal co-ordination of the actors involved. In this framework, the question whether the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) will be capacitated through mechanisms and institutions to successfully manage Euro-Mediterranean systemic complexity is central, especially since 1995, when the European Union (EU) has been more seriously investing in its Mediterranean policy. This article conceptualises the EMP as an international regime in statu nascendi, and explores the properties and dynamics of Euro-Mediterranean governance in relation to the prospective institutionalisation of the Barcelona Process (BP).

1. Prolegomena to System Change

Since the end of the Cold War, the transformation in world politics has led to a state of unpredictable change and, as often suggested, disorder. Increased perceptions of instability have resulted from the removal of the bipolar 'overlay' that provided balance in the international system. The passing to the new era was marked by the dramatic shift in Soviet strategic perceptions, the failure of the wider West to press the military and strategic advantage arising from the Soviet retrenchment, and the absence of a major international war as the catalyst for change. The above parameters are at the heart of the complexity that still exists in post-1989 world politics.[1] In an era when changes transform international politics, the prospects for global order and governance have become 'transcendent issues’.[2] But despite the lethal break-up with the past, new structures and ways of establishing a system of international governance are yet to replace today’s world order with one founded upon stronger and more efficient institutions.

The new international order is increasingly shaped by regional dynamics that had operated all along under the surface of superpower confrontation. Yet, defining and recognising conditions of stability at both international and regional levels during the era of the 'deterrence regime' was something comparatively easy. At a time when international monitors report more than thirty wars daily,[3] the uniquely observed turbulence the world has experienced over the last decade demonstrates the difficulties arising from the debris of its Cold War past. Now that the global threat of the Soviet monolith has been permanently dismantled, Europe no longer represents a theatre of potential large-scale military confrontation. Instead, it is frozen strategically, albeit other risks and crises are emerging in its periphery. Moreover, the East-West and North-South axes are far from providing a reliable conceptual platform from which to yield a greater understanding of European systemic change. Predictably, the US role in the Continent is declining, following the collapse of pre-existing threats. Less predictably though, the relative defence spending of 'radical powers' is likely to increase, adding to the potential for regional instability. At the same time, economics play a significant role in the general security ambiguity post-Cold War, to which is added a new dialectic linking political, military and socio-cultural arenas. In this context, ‘power’ is more evenly distributed as regional economic blocs expand their geopolitical and market spheres of influence. These trends, along with new forms of insecurity (proliferation of biological weapons, weapons of mass destruction, drugs trafficking, illegal immigrations, etc.), will determine future western responses to global instability through the formation of comprehensive security regimes and multilateral arrangements.

Embedded in a polydirectional and venturesome global order, the EU is presented with the opportunity to secure its territorial integrity, whilst marking its impact on the international scene by preserving peace and prosperity in its Southern and Eastern peripheries. The post-1989 explosion of political liberty in Central and Eastern Europe has paradoxically inflicted upon this transformative European order signs of regional anarchy of the most traditional type. More specifically, the end of the Cold War has given way to the disintegration of multinational states, a painful process of transition to liberal democracy (or polyarchy) and the market economy, and the resurgence of the suicidal effects of (ethnic) nationalism. Integration, disintegration, internationalisation, balance of power, and struggle for power have all contributed to the formation of a new Pan-European architecture. Realist prophecies of a new Macht-Politik telos have not yet been fulfilled. Rather, there are still signs of optimism that the world of the new century can be a purposive political cosmos where international antiparatheses (or antagonisms) are resolved through reason, and where prosperity can advance on the basis of unburdened comparative advantage. In the new Pan-European landscape, the EU has considerably better chances to project stability and prosperity in its near abroad through a system of mutual governance. Acknowledging the importance of regional and world trading-blocks development, the EU is in a position to consolidate itself as the strongest economic 'union of states’, not least because of the enduring predominance of economics in world affairs. As the EU has become the centre of gravity for both its eastern and southern peripheries, one may legitimately expect that its leadership potential will face up to its growing international responsibilities, including the application of 'good governance' in the management of the Euro-Mediterranean space.[4]

2. On Euro-Mediterranean Complexity

From the Second World War until 1989, the Europe served as the primary international theatre for the East-West confrontation, while developments in other regions were considered of secondary importance. This tradition has significantly affected European threat perceptions for more than half a century. However, now that the once fearsome Soviet threat has actually vanished, this attitude has changed, post-Cold War Europe is confronted by instability deriving from socio-political and economic disparities, together with the risk of small interstate and intrastate conflicts. During the Cold War, the Mediterranean region represented a crucial area in strategic terms, encompassing many possible seats of conflict and unresolved disputes with a strong historical background (the Greek-Turkish dispute over Cyprus and the Arab-Israeli conflict). The fact that the Mediterranean served as a security chessboard to the strategic policies of the two dominant military blocks - NATO and the Warsaw Pact - has introduced fragility in the regional security balance that persists even after the collapse of the Eastern pole.[5] Although no longer a feature of the East-West confrontation, the Mediterranean represents the most alarming source of insecurity for the new European order, as the recent proliferation of small-scale crises and the widening gap between North and South produce structural instability.

No other part of the globe exemplifies better the post-1989 trends towards fragmentation and revival of 'ancient feuds' than the Mediterranean, with security questions becoming increasingly indivisible, regardless of diverse sub-regional features. From the perspective of international regionalism, the Mediterranean encompasses at least two 'international regions': the geographical space which borders its north-west sector (EU) and the south-eastern one labelled as the Middle East. It also encompasses three sub-regional groupings: Southern Europe (Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Cyprus and Malta), the Mashreq (Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt and the Palestinian Authority) and the Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia).[6] Although, there are many variations in these geographical divisions, it is still useful to think about the Mediterranean as a single system (totality). Existing Mediterranean considerations need a complex re-conceptualisation of both regional and sub-regional dynamics, as 'Mediterranean regions' do not share the features traditionally found in international regionalism: a ‘common co-operation space’.[7] True as the latter may be, the Mediterranean can be also seen as a network of diversities and dividing lines of co-operation between different socio-economic systems, political cultures and regimes, languages, forms of expression, and religions. In fact, it has always been a crossing point for conflict and co-operation, antagonism and coexistence. Still though, Braudel observes, as the Mediterranean regions are open to influences and exchanges they form a large-scale unity, whose history could only be understood by looking at the factors that tied them together and changed only over very long periods of time.[8] This means that co-operation and security across the Mediterranean are possible but cannot be taken for granted, as they require an effort of will and specific management.[9] Being a heterogeneous synthesis of civilisations, along the lines of a 'heterarchy', as well as of unequal economic development, a plurality of political regimes, divergent perceptions of security, and uneven demographic growth, the Mediterranean space occupies a prominent position between order and disorder for which a comprehensive framework of analysis is yet to become discernible. Thus one may legitimately refer to the Mediterranean as a region, where geography, history and politics intermesh with culture and religion with enormous complexity, resulting in a composite system of partial regimes, each reflecting a particular sense of being and belonging.

But the questions that are currently involved are new, in that they are products of the new world (dis)order, especially since the 1990 Gulf crisis. The latter was the first major international conflict to be recorded in the era of Pax Americana, fuelling stormy debates about the emergence of 'new world orders', reducing the East-West confrontation to a minimum, whilst re-emphasising, in however complex terms, the Orient-Occident and North-South gaps. These events also appeared to have offered useful ammunition to those contemplating the idea that the dominant conflict post-Cold War is between Occidental and Oriental values. Huntington, in undertaking this task,[10] has predicted the future of world politics as a 'clash of civilizations' characterised by conflict among culturally distinct groupings of humanity. Will the future of Euro-Mediterranean reflect Huntington's cosmotheory? The answer is no for two reasons. First, because his vision is rather flawed and, despite the grandiose tone of his proposal, amounts to no more than a sophisticated repackaging of traditional realist theory on a global scale, thus failing to encourage intelligent intercultural dialogue. Sachedina makes the point well: 'such scholarship serves to corrupt the common moral and political language of the two cultures and fosters violence and confrontation, and as a justification for the prolongation of historical stereotypes'.[11] Second, following Ayubi's assertion, because it was even before the 1990/1 Gulf crisis that a new theory started to take shape, arguing that ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ and not Communism constituted the major threat for the West.[12]

Although the Gulf incident served as a reminder of the Mediterranean's potential to fall victim of similar disputes over regional hegemony and associated trends of over-armament, the present risks of North-South discord in Euro-Mediterranean relations can only be partially ascribed to military factors. There also exists a new conspicuous alertness of the social, demographic, economic and political challenges. It is thus appropriate to emphasise the importance of the North-South dichotomy and regional interdependencies of an unequal exchange variable.[13] The North is affluent, and becoming ever more so, in spite of the current recession setback. Today, the Mediterranean offers a most dramatic illustration of complex inequality, as for example the total GDP of EU Mediterranean states in the North is eleven times greater than its southern littoral counterparts.[14] Cyprus is also a good case in point, with a population of 700,000 and a per capita income of nearly $10,000, while Egypt, with 58 million people, is below $800 per capita. Unequal economic development, the plurality of political regimes, the divergent perceptions of security threats, and rapid demographic growth, are the major exacerbating factors of the Mediterranean North-South divide. In the eyes of EU members, the southern Mediterranean rim is being destabilised due to economic pressures and a resulting radicalisation of social conflicts. As the regional population growth has been combined with some degree of economic development - a process that, by increasing productivity in various sectors of the economy, creates large pools of underemployed or unemployed labour - new pressures emerge for individuals to move across the water-borders of the Mediterranean.[15]

Worries as they may be about losing control over energy supplies and illegal migration, EU members do not actually perceive any distinct, direct (military) threat from the South. A compelling reason for this is that the southern Mediterranean countries attach more importance to threats coming from the Arab world, where the term 'security' is usually associated with internal problems.[16] It is also important to note the difficulty on the part of the EU to deal with security issues in the region in contrast to dealing with other peripheral systems. In the words of Mortimer, 'the EU has to anticipate possible hostility in the Mediterranean without provoking it'.[17] It may be another Mediterranean paradox, but most southern Mediterranean countries view the strengthening of western security structures in the region with suspicion. Chater notes: 'Europe ... wants to cut off access from the south, building watchtowers to keep it under surveillance'.[18] In addition, the majority of these countries are sceptical of the EU's alleged willingness to undertake a decisive role in the Mediterranean, something they also perceive as one of the causes of the regional arms races.[19] But it is equally true that the EU faces significant difficulties in assuming a substantive regional security role as a result of the presence of the American ‘factor’ and the continuing reluctance of the latter to share its hegemony in the Middle East peace process.

Euro-Mediterranean governance can be seen as a sui generis ensemble of power politics and interdependence, in that bilateral relations are concluded on realist principles, whereas at a multilateral/regional level it has become clear that interdependence is increasing. Also, although EU Mediterranean countries have reached a high level of political stability and participate in common institutional(ised) structures - the existence of which prevents the appearance and escalation of internal and external disputes - the rest of the littoral countries are confronted with acute clashes. The tendency for the littoral states to fall victims of the 'unitary trap' and, hence, act unilaterally in an effort to solve their emerging security anxieties is self-defeating and needs to be replaced by a more balanced and comprehensive ‘security regime’ founded upon the praxis of both conflict-management and conflict-resolution. This recommendation is based on the idea of enhancing national security through the prolepsis of immediate violent crises,[20] and through a long-term process of transparency and peace-building. For, preventing conflicts before they arise is much more effective and cheaper than responding militarily when they do.[21] Lessons from recent experiences demonstrate that any such measures should also include a range of options or preventive measures, and effective decision-making procedures to make early action possible.[22] Although the complexity of the new Euro-Mediterranean space requires integrated multilateral institutions, it remains unclear whether these can effectively impact on the choices of the partners when it comes to issues where national interests are, or appear to be, at stake.[23] All said, the success of any viable form of Euro-Mediterranean governance depends largely on the creation of flexible institutional arrangements to break down regional complexity.

3. Perspectives on Euro-Mediterranean Relations

Euro-Mediterranean relations have been politicised as a result of the geographical proximity, the nature and level of interdependence, as well as the role that previous European policies towards the region have come to play. The Community had developed conventional relations with the littoral countries as early as 1962 (and even earlier in the case of the former North African French colonies), while it had also participated in the major political issues of the region. Signs of an enhanced European interest in the region were first recorded in 1975 at the beginning of the Euro-Arab dialogue, then in the early and mid-1980s with the accession of Greece and the Iberian nations, and again after the Gulf war in the early 1990s. It could be argued that for historical, strategic and economic reasons the Community was anxious from early on to open up its membership and markets to Mediterranean countries.[24] Europe’s external relations with the latter were realised in the form of bilateral agreements, which paradoxically were of similar, if not often identical content. Such a fragmented approach resulted in two general types of association agreements: those concerning prospective members and closer economic associates, namely Cyprus, Malta and Turkey, and those relating to the rest of the littoral states that loom in the wider framework of the Union's Mediterranean policy (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Jordan, Syria, Israel, Egypt, Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority).

Post-1989, developments in the region are observed with special attention by the EU's southern members but are hardly followed in the North of the Union itself. The prospective enlargement of the EU has also led to the employment of dynamic policies towards its eastern periphery, contrasting with its rather vague Mediterranean orientation. The reform process in Eastern Europe, currently under severe financial stress, should be kept alive with the active support of the EU's budget. One might see current EU policies towards the East affecting its Mediterranean policies, with the Union seeing the latter as a counterpart to its ‘new’ Ostpolitik. The dominant focus of the EU towards the countries of Central and Eastern Europe could hinder the integrative potential of Southern EU members, and could have a negative impact on foreign direct investment and the EU’s development aid to the south. Yet, many southern Mediterranean countries worry that the massive transfer of resources to Greece, Spain, Portugal and Cyprus would further increase the regional economic gap.[25] Turning the EU's focus is a difficult task given that the UK and Germany are adamant in that economic assistance should aim at the reconstruction of East European economies and polities to reinforce their accession process.

But as EU foreign policy architects directed their foci in the East, the response to the growing scale of conflicts in parts of the Mediterranean has been largely left to the EU's southern members. While the northern EU members have accepted a degree of symmetry in the making of the EU's foreign policy,[26] different perceptions of interest among southern members persist about Euro-Mediterranean relations. France, Spain and Italy bring Mediterranean issues to the fore of the Union’s agenda, for they traditionally maintain a plethora of economic and political ties with the region. In particular, France has displayed a distinctive but ‘inchoate strategy’ towards the Mediterranean,[27] making it hard for the EU to accept a French leadership in its Mediterranean policy. Similarly, Spain, and to a limited extent Italy, have also expressed distinct preferences.[28] A further Mediterranean contradiction is that, while those three larger southern EU members play an essential role in the setting of the EU’s Mediterranean agenda, it is the smaller countries such as Greece confront in a more direct manner the potential tidal waves of Mediterranean instability. But Greece has been conspicuously reserved about assuming a more active 'Mediterranean role' in the Union's foreign policy, as it has failed to push consistently for enhanced Mediterranean co-operation, perhaps with the exception of EU-Cyprus relations.[29] These differences illustrate that EU partners have not found a reliable modus operandi to promote their Mediterranean interests. [30]

On top of that, south European ambitions for a stabilised and prosperous Mediterranean in the early 1990s have been mainly promoted outside the framework of the EU: France, Spain, and Italy have put forward a number of multilateral schemes (Five plus Five, CSCM, Mediterranean Forum, etc.) that were generally incapable of dealing with the ever complex array of security challenges in the region. These initiatives, applied on parts of the Mediterranean rather than to the regional system as a whole, have created more tensions among southern EU members than any positive results they were expected to bring. More importantly though, they all failed to establish an efficient regime to accommodate and even transcend international change.[31]

4. Towards a Meaningful Partnership

The EU has recently decided to adopt a new strategy aiming at correcting the imbalance created by its monolithic bilateral trade relations. In June 1994 the Corfu European Council gave the initial impetus, and in its communications of October 1994 and 8 March 1995 the Commission tabled its proposals for a Euro-Mediterranean partnership that were endorsed by the European Council at its Essen and Cannes meetings in December 1994 and June 1995 respectively. On 27-28 November 1995, EU Foreign Ministers sat down with their Mediterranean homologues.[32] Epitomising the 1995 Barcelona Declaration[33] is the emphasis put on respect for democracy and human rights, political dialogue, economic liberalisation, and financial and technical assistance for the Mediterranean partners. The Declaration incorporates numerous international norms on interstate relations and global disarmament. It also includes - albeit in the circumlocutions of diplomacy - co-operation on combating terrorism and drug-trafficking as well as on increasing arms control, particularly regional renunciation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and issues of illegal immigration. The 1995 Barcelona document infused a greater political and security bias to Euro-Mediterranean relations, whilst encompassing an ambitious economic plan for an industrially inspired Mediterranean free trade area (MEFTA) by the year 2010. However, free access to industrial exports does not mean a great deal if there is little to export, as in the case of most Mediterranean partners.[34] The MEFTA objective, which is to be achieved through a series of economic reforms also entails security risks, since accelerated market liberalisation in the southern Mediterranean rim could produce greater waves of instability. But the EMP does not involve any ingenious mechanism to sustain regional political co-operation, something that may prove vital in case of further economic recession and resulting political instability.

The EMP addressed the post-Cold War Mediterranean reality as an overlap of different regions integrating different dimensions, including the socio-cultural one that was apparently missing from previous Mediterranean initiatives.[35] Its rationale was to lock the EU with the 12 Mediterranean countries in a co-operative regional process, encompassing a set of policy components whose conceptual roots are drawn from both the 1992 Treaty on European Union and the Conference/Organisation on Security and Co-operation in Europe (C/OSCE). In particular, the inclusion of a follow-up mechanism constitutes the dynamic element that offers assurance to the ‘continuity’ of the initiative, placing the EMP in a position to be considered as a pragmatic mechanism: a major forum for international co-operation at both Ministerial and Senior-Officials level. The Euro-Mediterranean Committee of the BP consists of officials from both the EU Troika and from all 12 southern Mediterranean countries. It should meet regularly and report to the Foreign Ministers. It was also decided that the Foreign Ministers of all partner-countries would meet periodically to review progress in implementing the principles of the Barcelona Declaration and to agree upon actions that would promote its objectives. This was a substantial advance compared to earlier European policies and initiatives, 'with ill-defined follow up provisions depending on constant ministerial action'.[36]

'It is quite obvious', Jűnemann argues, 'that the Barcelona concept aims at a careful westernisation of the Mediterranean, gradually converting it into an area of economic and political influence'.[37] Regarding the commitment to democracy and human rights, it seems that some non-EU partners will sooner or later have to face the reality that the other participants, European or not, might actually insist on the preservation of the principles and norms agreed in Barcelona. But as Jűnemann reiterates, although the political conditionality underlying the economic and financial partnership 'allows the EU to suspend its commitments in cases of failure concerning democracy or respect of human rights, offering an apparently effective instrument to influence the process of democratisation ... it exposes the MPCs to the good will of the Europeans, thus offending their demand for equal partnership'.[38] From this pespective, then, the charge of 'Westernising' looks like a shady political stratagem aimed at discrediting forces that are pressing for change.

In practice, however, after the Barcelona Conference, the BP moved forward to a large extent by the new Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements that updated and enhanced the previous individual agreements between the EU and the southern Mediterranean countries. The new agreements focused mainly on trade liberalisation, the encouragement of foreign direct investment and economic co-operation, as well as on the need to further political, social and cultural ties.[39] Still though, co-operation on a South-South scale remains very limited. This is also associated with the worsening of the Arab-Israeli relations. The detachment of the EMP from the Middle East Peace Process was considered as a successful manipulation by the Europeans to avoid the complex relations of the Eastern Mediterranean. But the exclusion of US from the EMP - something that gave the EU a predominant role in the process - increased the American reluctance to share its political initiatives in the Middle East. This mutual exclusion among the transatlantic partners should be regarded as a major problem obstructing the EMP to bear fruits. In this framework, the overall negative results of the follow-up meeting in Malta in 1997 underlined a causal relationship between progress in the Middle East peace process and progress in the BP.[40] As Calleya points out, the results of the Malta Conference provided a 'reality check' of the BP,[41] although it was clear from the outset that these two processes were not to be linked together, at least formally, but rather to act on a complementary manner.

5. Euro-Mediterranean (Regime) Formations

The fledging Barcelona Process has been described as a political gesture aiming at correcting the deficiencies of the previous narrow-minded European policies towards the Mediterranean.[42] It is also conceived of, in Gillespie's words, as 'emblematic of a process' being constituted from a dynamic set of international exchanges, but still falling short of a meaningful partnership.[43] Yet, the invention of the entire project should be seen as a vital step towards a partnership that may animate some confident expectations for the emergence of a common 'Euro-Mediterranean consciousness', thus laying the groundwork for the creation of an international regime. From a systemic point of view, the EMP is a multi-dimensional international regime that established the linkages between political (security/politics), economic (MEFTA) and socio-cultural (human rights/civil society) arenas. For the moment though, the new Partnership represents a balance of interests, rather than a genuinely common Euro-Mediterranean interest per se. Although it sets up a system of flexible arrangements to govern Euro-Mediterranean relations, the substantial differentiation of the ratio with the financial budged of the EU for the reconstruction of Eastern Europe was the major reason for attracting the interest of the southern Mediterranean countries.[44] Indeed, the EMP is propelled by a certain economism whose financial implications are particularly favourable to the non-EU partner states. In return to the above, the Union linked issues of economic liberalisation to a set of political principles ratified in Barcelona.

In general, the EMP is a collective attempt to redefine European threat perceptions from the Mediterranean, addressing the perils of social unrest and economic underdevelopment. The European consensus on sensitive issues such as human rights, democracy, self-determination and religious tolerance, together with the initiation of multilateral economic and financial co-operation, constitutes a space where the actors' expectations converge. It is on this premise that a Euro-Mediterranean regime may in time come into being. The term ‘international regime’ was introduced as early as 1975 by Ruggie as 'a set of mutual expectations, rules and regulations, plans, organizational energies and financial commitments, which have been accepted by a group of states'.[45] Later in 1983, Krasner detected the appearance of international regimes 'when there are clearly understood principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which decision-maker's expectations converge in a given area of international relations'.[46] A somewhat different account is offered by Young who defines regimes as 'social institutions governing the actions of those involved in specific activities or set of activities'.[47] The emphasis here is on rules that are translated into 'well-defined guides to action' and on compliance mechanisms with the rules governing the regime. There is a certain procedural bias in this view, in terms of the actors' expected actions 'under appropriate circumstances'.[48]

In general, there has been much discussion on the 'consensus definition' of international regimes and even on the usefulness of the entire theory.[49] Keohane, in an influential study that straddled the lines of realist and neoliberalist thinking,[50] suggested that 'Regimes are institutions with explicit rules, agreed upon governments that pertain to particular sets of issues in international relations’.[51] This 'lean' definition - as opposed to the more 'complex' one offered by Krasner - has the advantage of relieving scholars from the burden of justifying their decision to call a given injunction a 'norm' rather than a 'rule' (or perhaps even a 'principle').[52] This definition is analytically helpful for 'norms' are not explicit in the complex framework of Euro-Mediterranean relations and, on top of that, no substantive level of institutional autonomy exists. Indeed, although the EMP provides for a system of rules of the game, it remains weak in relation to the development of an identifiable set of norms. Cox's definition of regimes illustrates this point: '[Regimes] are...recognized patterns of practice that define the rules of the game'.[53] Ceteris paribus, by recognising the linkages between political, security, economic and socio-cultural arenas, the EMP is in a position to be considered as an international regime in the making, albeit one which accords with a rather 'lean' definition of the term. Absent a better or indeed less nebulous definition in the acquis académique, such claim remains valid.

It is analytically profitable to establish that international regimes justify the separateness of states as constitutionally distinct entities. As Taylor put it: 'states do not cease to be states because they are members of a regime...'.[54] At the same time, regimes allow actors to 'socialise' with each other in a complex web of norms of behaviour, rules and procedures of decision-making that are commonly, if not ex ante, agreed upon by the participating actors. The emphasis is on informal routes of co-operative behaviour, patterned as much by specific political interests - although it has been argued that regimes imply 'a form of co-operation that is more than the following of short-run interests'[55] - as by a common tendency to pursue (but not necessarily explicitly set as such) reciprocal objectives. Moreover, international regimes project both 'inclusive' and 'exclusive' frameworks of multiple and, more often than not, complex interactions that reflect a given political reality.[56] In the case of the EMP, it could be argued that regime creation is directed at setting the limits of acceptable behaviour within a nascent and flexibly arranged structure of governance. However, it does so within a flexible institutional structure. The flexibility of the Partnership - the way in which it is valued by the partners, and the means by which its norms can facilitate agreement on the basis of mutualism and reciprocity - sets the limits of 'consciousness-raising' in issues of Euro-Mediterranean governance, and more particularly, the possibility of acquiring operational capabilities.

Further, international regimes deploy a system of interconnectedness among the areas of co-operation which helps to a large extent to explain the complexity of the interdependencies - both structural and functional - among the actors involved. Aficionados of the literature on international regimes are conscious of the significance of achieving mutually rewarding outcomes in systems of institutionalised rule. Being a highly fragmented system of policy interactions, any future attempts to navigate the dynamics of the Euro-Mediterranean regime needs to be differentiated according to the specific conditions of co-operation in its multifarious policy arenas embedded in all its three-basket arrangements. However, it is useful to recall that what has really changed in the new era for the regional security regimes is not so much their relevance to security per se, but rather ‘the nature of the functions that must be performed by the types of regimes that have been implemented to secure stability’.[57] That is, the quality of management exhibited by the common institutions. The latter raises the question of what model of large-scale institution-building should the EMP proceed with?

Gallarotti offers many reasons for the failure of any organisational form, including problems arising from the management of complex and tightly coupled systems, adverse substitution, dispute intensification, and moral hazard.[58] Thus, whether or not the EMP will play a dynamic role in the arenas of the Mediterranean diplomacy, depends much on the process of adjusting its own structures to accommodate and even break down regional complexity. In particular, the endorsement of adequate system-transforming mechanisms - similar to those used in the Helsinki Process - should be regarded as a prototype for the regularisation of political behaviour in the Euro-Mediterranean space and the utilisation of the Partnership itself. In this context, and in order to achieve a relaxation of North-South tensions and to emphasise the importance of human rights, the BP should aim at creating a reason-based, institutionalised and symbiotic environment between the Union and its Mediterranean partners.[59] Yet, the C/OSCE experience points in the direction that a 'cognitive region’, along the lines suggested by Adler,[60] or more congruent organisational forms of collective/mutual governance, may well develop on the basis of gradual institutionalisation and the sustenance of certain norms (ethics of conduct).

The Institutional Promise of the Euro-Mediterranean Regime

As students of international relations put great emphasis on international regimes as institutional devises for problem-solving, it is questionable how far the Euro-Mediterranean system can realise its 'co-operative objectives' under its currently weak institutional machinery. That is, without investing further in concrete partnership-building measures on issues of substance such as the need to develop a Charter for Peace and Stability in the region.[61] The prospective Stability Pact will be an exercise in pre-emptive diplomacy and, above all, will represent a form of institutionalised alliance. Such a pact can provide the levels of transparency that an ongoing dialogue requires, along with the necessary machinery to manage potentially unresolved crises. Also, the emerging inter-parliamentary co-operation through the parliamentary Forum will provide the EMP an additional legitimising platform from which to promote peace and stability in this oft-troubled part of the globe. In this Forum, a structured and regular dialogue will no doubt engender the awareness of common Euro-Mediterranean interests, and contribute to the creation of mutually reinforcing structures of governance. Both agenda-identification (the inclusion of a legitimate claim of a participating member) and agenda-setting functions could be achieved through the institutional interaction between the new parliamentary Forum and the dominant decision-making body. There is a normative implication underpinning this dynamic yet asymmetrical relationship between the newly institutionalised Forum and the pre-existing intergovernmental structures that have set up the institutional machinery of a larger association. Be that as it may, there is evidence to suggest that the proliferation of legitimate arenas will have an equally important domestic impact on the policy strategy of the EMP partners, in that they would now have to formulate multifarious strategies to pursue what they consider to be their legitimate claims and relative gains. In any event, from an institutional perspective, it would be interesting to evaluate the endorsement of an additional parliamentary structure to the workings of a nascent Mediterranean international regime like the EMP, and assess the extent to which its mechanisms are capable of striking a balance between its declared objectives and particular national interests, which may even take the form of non-bargainable ones.

All said, international regimes beg the theoretical question of whether institutions and, by extension, systems of institutionalised governance really matter in complex management arrangements as currently represented by the EMP. Claiming too much for international institutions might prove a 'false promise'.[62] However, ‘… in a world politics constrained by state power and divergent interests, and unlikely to experience effective hierarchical governance, international institutions operating on the basis of reciprocity will be components of any lasting peace’.[63] Thus the establishment of institutional structures and procedures may significantly strengthen the international regime dynamics of the Euro-Mediterranean system.

6. A Synthesis of Trends

The Gulf events in the early 1990s unleashed a dialogue on what security arrangements should be established in the Mediterranean to foster regional security and organise regional politics. In recent years we have witnessed in the Mediterranean the break out and prosecution of diverse armed conflicts (both within and between nations), and the appearance of shaky political dynamics. These phenomena have as their origin the particular characteristics of the region itself, an area where the existence of diverse types of conflict signals the eventual appearance of others. Co-operative security, this new task of the emerging international Mediterranean community, is essentially about prolepsis, and has therefore to do with improving transparency and the predictability of the multiple factors that characterise current regional security equations. In this endeavour, the co-operation of all 27 partners is indispensable, since the emerging international Mediterranean community can propose but not impose, and even less, be a substitute for them. The establishment of adequate institutional machinery in the region is deemed necessary given the endemic nature of the regional actual and potential tensions.

The Union, which for the majority of states in the region has been a symbol of economic success, political democracy and societal stability, has assumed a controversial, yet pivotal, role during their post-Cold War transition processes. As long as the Mediterranean continues to serve as a border between a wealthy, developed, and stable Europe on the one hand, and a fragmented South on the other, the EU could at best hope to 'keep the fire under control without trying to extinguish it'. But the international role of the Union should aim even higher. Namely, to resist the temptation of remaining an apathetic observer as opposed to a constructive intermediary and an effective international problem-solver in this unique 'body of water'.[64]

The serious challenges arising from the southern Mediterranean rim demand a unitary and coherent response. Currently, the complexity of the Mediterranean region is such that it is becoming all the more difficult to be confronted, let alone resolved, on an individual basis and, hence, by states acting in isolation from others. Interestingly though, the active engagement of multiple actors in the regional politics may well exacerbate the possibilities for reaching substantive interstate agreement on a number of highly sensitive issues such as immigration, economic aspects of security, external protection of citizens, respect for human rights, and the resolution of protracted conflicts. The engagement/isolation divide thus points in the direction of a ‘unitary trap’ where certain problems cannot be ignored, but cannot also be solved separately by each partner acting alone. Both strategic orientation and co-ordinated action will prove vital if the fragile stability of the region is to be secured. But mutual trust and stability depends on a combination of other factors, which, in addition to the promotion of North-South ‘co-development’, must encompass greater mutual understanding in all relevant fields. In conclusion, international regime theory provides a clearly defined set of conditions for regional order-building and with it the successful institutionalisation of Euro-Mediterranean relations. Its application demonstrates that the characteristics of the Partnership, the fragmented policies of the strategic actors, and the outcome of the process so far, point to the need for a reliable strategy to transform Euro-Mediterranean governance from policy to regime.

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* Dimitris K. Xenakis is a doctoral candidate in Politics at the University of Exeter.

[1] See analysis provided in D. Johnson and E. Tachibana, 'The Complexity Threshold', unpublished master’s thesis, The George Washington University, May 1996.

[2] J. N. Rosenau, 'Governance, Order and Change in World Politics', in J. N. Rosenau and E. Czempiel (eds.), Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p.1.

[3] M. Booth, 'Global warring', End Lines, The Independent Magazine, 30 January 1999.

[4] European Commission, 'The Future of North-South Relations. Towards Sustainable Economic and Social Development', CASHIERS, Forward Studies Unit, Secretariat-General, Luxembourg, 1997.

[5] Syria, Libya and the Balkan countries were supported by the former USSR, while US support was directed toward Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia, with both the US and the former USSR competing to support Egypt and Algeria. It is worth remembering that in the bipolar distribution of power in the region, the European Community was supporting Turkey, Malta and Cyprus.

[6] See St. C. Calleya, Navigating Regional Dynamics in the Post-Cold War World. Patterns of Relations in the Mediterranean Area, Aldershot, Dartmouth 1997, especially pp. 89-140.

[7] F. Attinà, 'Regional Cooperation in Global Perspective. The case of the "mediterranean" regions', Jean Monnet Working Papers in Comparative and International Politics, No. 4, Department of Political Studies, University of Catania, 1996.

[8] F. Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, Vols. I & II, 5^th edition, Fontana Press, London, 1987.

[9] R. Aliboni, 'European Security Across the Mediterranean', Chaillot Papers, No 2, WEU Institute, Paris, 1991.

[10] S. Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations', Foreign Affairs, 72/3, 1993, pp. 22-49.

[11]A. Sachedina, 'Religion and Global Affairs: Islamic Religion and Political Order', SAIS Review, Vol. 18 No 2, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998, pp. 59-64.

[12] N. Ayubi, 'Farms, factories and.... walls: which way for European/Middle Eastern Relations', in N. Ayubi (ed.), Distant Neighbors: The Political Economy of Relations between Europe and the Middle East/North Africa. Reading, MA, Ithaka Press, 1995, p. 7.

[13] G. Joffe, et al. 'The Mediterranean: Risks and Challenges', International Spectator, Vol. 28 No 3, 1993, p.36.

[14] See further in R. Aliboni, et al. 'Co-operation and Stability in the Mediterranean: An Agenda for Partnership', International Spectator, 29/3, 1994, pp. 5-20.

[15] D. G. Massey, Economic Development and International Migration in Comparative Perspective, Commission for the Study of International Migration and Cooperative Economic Development, Washington DC, 1989.

[16] F. Faria, and A. D. Vasconcelos, 'Security in Northern Africa: Ambiguity and Reality', Chaillot Papers, No. 25, WEU Institute, Paris, 1996.

[17] E. Mortimer, 'Europe and the Mediterranean: The Security Dimension', P. Ludlow (ed.), Europe and the Mediterranean, CEPS, Brassey's, London, 1994, p. 106.

[18] K. Chater, 'Mediterranean Security: The Tunisian Viewpoint', in R. Aliboni, G. Joffe and T. Niblock, (eds Security Challenges in the Mediterranean Region, Frank Cass, London 1996, p. 65.

[19] G. Joffe, 'Southern Attitudes Towards an Integrated Mediterranean Region', Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 2 No 1, 1997, p. 18.

[20] By prolepsis is meant a type of conflict prevention that transcends the conventional understanding of non-constraining measures (those which are not coercive and depend on the goodwill of the parties involved), primarily diplomatic in nature. The term is roughly equivalent to preventive diplomacy regarding the instruments employed: fact-finding and observer missions, early warning and mediation, diplomatic and economic pressure, or even the preventive deployment of troops. For a similar definition see Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping, United Nations, New York, 1992.

[21] The Philip Morris Institute for Public Policy and Research, 'How can Europe Prevent Conflicts', PMI Discussion Papers, No 14, 1997.

[22] G. Munuera, 'Preventing Armed Conflict in Europe: Lessons from Recent Experience', Chaillot Papers, No. 15/16, WEU Institute, Paris, 1994.

[23] This point has been extensively argued in D. K. Xenakis, 'Mediterranean Complexity, Cyprus and the EU's Enlargement', Occasional Papers, Centre for Euro-Mediterranean Studies, The University of Reading, No 99/2, 1999.

[24] Eurostat Key Figures, 'European Union trade with the Mediterranean countries', Frontier-free Europe, No 4, 1996, p.2.

[25] These concerns became manifest at a joint statement produced by the Portuguese and Spanish Prime Ministers in Seville in 1990.

[26] R. Gillespie, 'Northern European Perceptions of the Barcelona Process', Revista CIDOB d'Afers Internacionals, 37, 1997.

[27] J. Howorth, 'France and the Mediterranean in 1995: From Tactical Ambiguity to Inchoate Strategy', Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 2 No 1, 1997, pp. 157-175.

[28] See respectively here, R. Gillespie, 'Spanish Protagonismo and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership', Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 2 No 1, pp. 33-48; and J. W. Holmes, 'Italy in the Mediterranean, but of it? ', Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 2 No 1, 1997, pp. 176-192.

[29] Ch. Tsardanides, 'The Southern EU Member States' Policy towards the Mediterranean: Regional or Global Co-operation', Journal of Area Studies, Vol. 9, No 3, September 1996, p. 65.

[30] See more analytically S. Stavridis, et al. (eds.), Foreign policies of the EU's Mediterranean States & Applicant Countries in the 1990s, London, MacMillan, 1999.

[31] D. K. Xenakis, 'Order and Change in the Euro-Mediterranean System', Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 4, 1999, forthcoming.

[32] Commission of the European Communities, 'Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on Strengthening the Mediterranean Policy of the European Union: Establishing a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership', 94/427, Brussels, 19 October 1994.

[33] Commission of the European Communities, Barcelona Declaration adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference, Final Version, Barcelona 28-11-1995.

[34] L. Tsoukalis, 'The EU in search of a Mediterranean policy' (in Greek), Evropaiki Ekfrassi, No 28, 1998, p. 37.

[35] A. Bin, 'Mediterranean Diplomacy: Evolution and Prospects', Jean Monnet Working Papers in Comparative and International Politics, No 5, Department of Political Studies, University of Catania, 1997, p.10.

[36] N. Waites and S. Stavridis, 'The European Union and the Mediterranean', in S. Stavridis, et al. (eds.), op. cit., p. 33.

[37] A. Jűnemann, 'Europe's interrelations with North Africa in the new framework of Euro-Mediterranean partnership - A provisional assessment of the Barcelona concept'', p. 383.

[38] Ibid., p. 373.

[39] The first agreement was signed with Tunisia (17 July 1995) and a similar one with Morocco (26 February 1996) in November the same year. On the same approach was also based the agreement with Israel (20 November 1995), establishing a permanent political dialogue, giving further reciprocal concessions on agricultural trade, and extending economic co-operation.

[40] F. Tanner, 'The Malta Meeting revisited: The Middle East is catching up with the Barcelona Process', Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies, Malta, Msida, 18 April 1997.

[41] St. Calleja, 'The Euro-Mediterranean Process After Malta: What Prospects?', Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 2 No 2, 1997, pp. 1-22.

[42] G. Edwards and E. Philippart, 'The EU Mediterranean Policy: Virtue Unrewarded or...?', Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11 No 1, pp. 185-207.

[43] R. Gillespie, 'The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership', Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 2 No 1, 1997, pp. 4-5.

[44] E. Barbé, 'The Barcelona Conference: Launching Pad of a Process', Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 1 No 1, 1996, p.32.

[45] J. Ruggie, 'International Responses to Technology: concepts and trends', International Organization, Vol. 29, No 3, 1975, pp. 557-584.

[46] St. D. Krasner (ed.), International Regimes, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1983, p.2. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action.

[47] O. Young, International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989, p. 12.

[48] Ibid., p. 16.

[49] See further here analysis provided by S. Strange, 'Cave! hic dragones: a critique of regime analysis', in St. D. Krasner (ed.), op. cit., pp. 337-354.

[50] This is of special importance considering that Euro-Mediterranean politics combine both power politics while on the other hand interdependence is increasing.

[51] R. O Keohane, 'Neoliberal Institutionalism: A Perspective on World Politics', in R. O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory, Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1989, p.4.

[52] A. Hasenclever, P. Mayer, and V. Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, p.7.

[53] R. W. Cox, 'Social forces, states and world orders: beyond international relations theory', Millennium, Vol. 10, No 2, Summer 1981, p. 128. Quoted in A. J. R. Groom and P. Taylor (eds.), Frameworks for International Co-operation, Pinter: London, 1990, p. 202.

[54] P. Taylor, International Organization in the Modern World: The European and the Global Process, Pinter, London, 1993, p. 3.

[55] R. Jervis, 'Security Regimes', in St. D. Krasner (ed.), op. cit., p. 173.

[56] D. N. Chryssochoou, et al., Theory and reform in the European Union, Manchester University Press, Manchester and New York, 1999, p. 25.

[57] J. S. Duffield, 'Explaining the Long Peace in Europe: The Contributions of Regional Security Regimes', Review of International Studies, Vol. 20 No 4, 1994, pp. 369-388.

[58] G. Gallarotti, 'The Limits of International Organization: Systemic Failure in the Management of International Relations', International Organization, Vol. 45, 1990.

[59] See here D. K. Xenakis, 'The Barcelona Process: Some Lessons from Helsinki', Jean Monnet Working Papers in Comparative and International Politics, No. 17, Department of Political Studies, University of Catania, 1998, p. 8.

[60] See E. Adler, 'Imagined (Security) Communities: Cognitive Regions in International Relations', Millennium, Vol. 26 No 2, 1997.

[61] Concluding Statement of the UK Presidency by the foreign Secretary Mr Robert Cook, Ad-Hoc Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting, Palermo, 3-4 June 1998.

[62] J. J. Mearsheimer, 'The False Promise of International Institutions", International Security, Vol. 19 No 3, 1994, p.7.

[63] R. O. Keohane and L. L. Martin, 'The Promise of Institutionalist Theory', International Security, Vol. 20 No 1, 1995, p. 50.

[64] T. Couloumbis and T. Veremis, 'Introduction: The Mediterranean in Perspective', in S. Stavridis, et al. (eds.), op. cit., p.18.