Advocating Polemarchus
A philosophical essay
Presented to Prof. Lori Alward
On this, the 21st day of September, 1998
By Jared Earles

	Polemarchus inherits an argument that Cephalus originally advocated. He twists the argument from "justice is speaking the truth and paying whatever debts one has incurred" to "it [justice] gives benefits to friends and does harm to enemies." By this, Polemarchus insinuates that each individual has just friends, and they ought to be beneficiaries. On the other hand, those who are one's enemies deserve injustice. The system Polemarchus originally advocates is a system of retributive justice.
	Socrates attacks this system with a simple concept: one can have unjust friends. From this he argues that if a flaw in human judgment occurred, then this conception of justice would be reversed: one would be bettering one who is unjust, and perhaps harming one who is just. In exploiting this contradiction, Socrates convinced Polemarchus that justice is not giving "benefits to friends and harm to enemies."
	In order to answer Socrates' argument, I too, will undertake the dialectic form.	With a loud bang and sudden flash of light, a strange man, with odd-colored hair, appeared before our group.
	He said I have come from the future, Polemarchus, in order to relieve you of your argument with Socrates.
	Surely, perhaps you will have more success in persuading him than I.
	Socrates, Jared began, wouldn't you agree that a friend is someone who loves you and seeks to do good for you and on your behalf?
	Surely.
	And then an enemy would seek to do evil to you and on your behalf?
	Of course.
	So, a friend would be one equated with someone who is just?
	That would be logical.
	And an enemy would be unjust and evil?
	Yes.
	As you have argued, no one desires evil, correct?
	Yes I have.
	So, no one would ever choose to befriend someone who attempts to harm them?
	Well, perhaps two evil people would befriend one another in order to cause greater evil to someone else. Also, note that humans do not possess infallible judgment.
	First, let's examine what human's, if they had perfect judgment would choose, then we'll examine humans with shortcomings?
	It is agreed.
	So, hypothetically, no just person would befriend an unjust person?
	All right.
	So, benefiting your friends means doing just to the just, correct?
	Yes.
	And those who are just to others do deserve justice in return?
	It would only seem fair.
	In this sense, Polemarchus' argument holds true.
	I will agree to that, but you have much farther to go to prove it all.
	I know, but this is the first link in the chain, Socrates. Next, I would like to refine Polemarchus' argument. I would like to reclassify harm.
	How do you intend to do this?
	Let me give you an example. A dog must be trained to know when to bark. If a dog always barks at 2:14 am, then it must be taught not to bark at that time.
	That's for sure.
	And how would you teach a dog not to bark then?
	There are several options, you could buy a muzzle, you could give the dog treats, or you could spank the dog until it learned not to bark.
	If you bought a muzzle, would the dog be able to bark at any time during the night?
	No, but that would solve the problem.
	What if there were a burglar, then how would you know?
	You wouldn't.
	So a muzzle would not solve the problem, at least not without creating a greater one?
	It wouldn't.
	What happens when you run out of dog treats?
	You buy more.
	So this is an expensive undertaking?
	Yes.
	What if one were not wealthy?
	Then they could not do it.
	So, giving a dog treats would not solve the problem?
	Perhaps, after a time, the dog would associate treats with not barking. Then you wouldn't have to give the dog any more treats.
	But when you ran out of treats, perhaps the dog would bark for treats, instead of the old reason.
	Well, your solution sounds as plausible as mine.
	But, if you spank the dog, then reward it for not barking, it will learn not to bark. You see, it will associate spanking with barking at a certain time, and treats with quiet at a certain time. This way, you don't have to keep buying the dog treats, because it has learned not to bark for treats (because it knows barking at that time is bad), and you can still have the benefits of a good guard dog.
	That seems like a plausible answer, but why wouldn't the dog stop barking all together?
	Well, if one only spanked the dog when it barked at 2:14 am, then the dog wouldn't associate spanking with barking, simply spanking with barking at 2:14 am. Wouldn't you agree?
	Surely.
	The same is true of the unjust person. You don't want to silence them, because they can still contribute to society. You don't want to simply buy them off, because society will run out of resources, and the unjust will never truly learn a lesson. The best way to go about it is to do harm (the spanking), while still showing them what justice is (the treat). I support a system based on the rehabilitation of the unjust. The best method for this, as you agreed is a level of harm.
	That seems plausible in the best of all worlds, but what happens when you befriend an unjust person? Wouldn't you then spank a dog that doesn't bark, to use your analogy?
	Socrates, I think we should look at the idea of friends on a broader level. We should examine each person's motives. Those who are out to benefit you, as I stated before, are your friends. Given this, a person who aims to do you harm would not be one who you would benefit.
	But how do I know who to act justly towards? How do I know who my friends truly are?
	I think that a way to restate the same idea that Polemarchus had would be to say that justice is giving each their due.  By this, I mean that the just, your friends, are due good, and the unjust, your enemies, are due harm.
	But how do I know who my friends are? How do I know who deserves benefits?
	Perhaps the only way to know who is just is by an examination of motives.
	So this theory of justice means that you have to be omniscient?
	Not necessarily.
	Well, at least you have to be able to read minds.
	It seems that way.
	So, Jared, sometimes the just will be harmed and the unjust benefited?
If we were able to know the motives of others, then that would not be the case, but since human judgment is flawed, then justice may never be possible. But, Socrates, would you agree that, in the best of all worlds, this form of justice would be superior? I would offer an alternative, but that seems reasonable, I must admit.
	I would say that it is noteworthy that The Republic examines what Socrates would call the best of all possible worlds. Given this, his proof of justice does not lie in reality, but rather in theory, thus he affirms that a theoretical conception of justice is valid.
	A final note: I realize that this is longer than two pages, but because I used a dialectic form, I think that this length was necessary to fully answer the question.