Examining the Soul An analytical essay Presented to Prof. Lori Alward On this, the 28th of September, 1998 By Jared Earles In The Republic, Plato argues not only the basis of a just state, but also the basis of a just soul. His argument takes on the following structure: 1. Justice manifests itself in the same way, whether it be in the state or soul; 2. A just state would be ruled by "philosopher kings" representing reason; 3. A just state would place the next highest rank on "guardians" representing spirit; 4. A just state would place lowest precedent on "artisans and farmers" representing appetite; thus, a soul is composed of reason, spirit, and appetite, and a just soul is ruled primarily by reason, secondarily by spirit, and least by appetite. I offer one argument which independently attacks each of these premises. I argue that a just state arises from the consent of the governed (vis a vis Locke and Rousseau). I must first justify a state based on consent of the governed. I argue that individual free will is of the utmost importance. If an individual is forced into a decision, the decision itself loses meaning. Additionally, if an individual is continually coerced by the state, that individual may lose the capacity for innovation. Continued coercion breeds a paternalistic relationship between individual and state. The individual may become reliant on the state to provide the method for all functions. Farmers who have always been told to farm (and perhaps how to farm) will never be able to develop new concepts of how to farm more efficiently. Without innovation, a state will eventually crumble. Furthermore, a state which does not take into account the voice of the citizens can become tyrannical. This lays the way for a specific critique of Plato's republic. It is too idealistic. If philosopher kings were given all of the power in society, it is absurd to believe that they would never pursue their own interest in lieu of the social good. All philosopher kings would not be completely unconcerned with material gain. If they ever were to become materially concerned, then the society would no longer be governed by reason, but rather appetite, perpetuating injustice. The counter to this is that a state based on consent of the governed relies on the same idealism as Plato's republic. For a society to be continually just (under my conception) the individuals within it (at least the majority of them) must also have some conception of justice. If they do not, then the government perpetuates injustice. Examples such as slavery and the Japanese internment of World War II readily apparent prove that a consent-based government is not necessarily just. Thus, a government that continually schooled its future leaders in philosophy and reason would more likely be superior to a system which relied on the inherent justness (if that is even a word) of the majority. Furthermore, a consent-based system inspires the same conformity as Plato's republic. Alexis de Toqueville explains: I know of no country in which there is so little independence of mind and real freedom of discussion as in America. . .it is more especially the case, where the authority of the majority is so absolute and irresistible, that a man must give up his rights as a citizen, and almost abjure his quality as a human being, if he intends to stray from the track which it lays down. The majority, which a democracy or republic (in the modern conception) necessitates, coerces the individuals within a society to a greater extent than the government of Plato's republic. Not only would individuals be expected to rely on tradition (as in the previous farmer example), but they would also be expected to conform ideologically. Thus, a just state would not be based on the consent of the governed. If a just state were based on the consent of the governed, then a the state's conception of justice would be wholly different than an individual's. In the purest sense, a state would have no preconception of justice. It would arise singularly from its citizens. Those virtues which the citizens saw as just would form the state's conception of justice. On the other hand, an individual's interpretation of justice derives internally. Their own experiences and education, rather than the agreement of society at large, lead to their ideal of justice. It is then in the meeting of all of these interpretations of justice in a marketplace of ideas that a social notion of justice is formed. Thus, justice is not the same for both a state and individual. There are two distinct arguments against this logic. The first is that and individual conception of justice is not inherent. We are not all born with a concept of justice. We begin our understanding mainly through outside influences (ie education, experience, parental values, etc.). In this way, we are similar to a state. A state receives its ideal of justice through outside influences, just like an individual. Additionally, the aforementioned argument does not address Plato's argument. He argues that the values a state would uphold as just would be similar to an individual's. For example, we may all consent that discrimination is not just. So, a state's conception of justice would avoid discrimination. Similarly, a just individual would not discriminate. In light of this, the argument sidesteps Plato's assertion. The one argument I was unable to disprove was the supremacy of free will. I think that this is the true distinguishing factor. This is the argument which proves that Plato's republic perpetuates a level of injustice. Each society (Plato's and consent-based) grants a level of coercion and injustice, but a consent-based system still allows for free will. I believe that the lack of individual choice makes the republic an unjust state, and thus it can not be a model for a just soul.