Saving the Sum of Things for Pay: Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone

by Michael van Maanen

Page 1 2 3 4 5

Michael van Maanen is a Founding Editor of Incite between March and May 1999, Michael worked as an intern at the Australian Mission to the United Nations in New York. He has currently suspended his Masters thesis on Private Military Organisations to take a position with the Australian Department of Defence.

Introduction

The end of the Cold War had a profound effect on the internal and external security dynamic of many African nations. The withdrawal of foreign patronage, the criminalisation and collapse of the state, the persistence of violent insurgencies and the failure of the United Nations to respond decisively to complex emergencies has placed tremendous strain on the often feeble security apparatus of the African state. In a time where the decline of bi-polarity has created an urgent need for a 'muscular' peace enforcement capability in Africa, we find the international community more reluctant than ever to intervene. Regional groupings such as the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) or the Southern African Development Community (SADC) have been exposed as poor substitutes, lacking both the political consensus and the institutional capacity to respond effectively to such crises.

In recent years, private military companies (PMC's) have attempted to fill this widening security vacuum. Up until the closure of the company in December last year, Executive Outcomes (EXO) was arguably the world's largest 'mercenary' firm. In their promotional literature, the company claims to "provide tailor made packages for government armed forces, [thereby] assisting in the creation of a secure environment conducive to peace, stability and foreign investment". EXO's record, argue its directors and management, speaks for itself. Over the past decade the company defeated discredited insurgencies in Angola and Sierra Leone and helped to reinforce ailing security structures in a handful of African states. Far from being the much reviled 'dogs of war', EXO's top brass argued that they were in fact defenders of peace and stability in Africa.

To an extent, this was a view shared by some academics and journalists in public and by a handful of government and United Nations officials in private. Condemnation and criticism of the company was more forthcoming, with many commentators arguing that EXO was a self-evidently de-stabilising force which threatened the sovereignty, integrity and economic viability of African states. Public distaste toward the company has been influenced by its origins in some of the apartheid regime's most controversial counter insurgency and military intelligence units. EXO's former management observes that their bid for international legitimacy also suffered from perceived associations between their company and the much reviled mercenary groups of the 1960's.

Particularly during the last four years of their operations, EXO pursued a high profile public relations campaign designed to eliminate suspicions stemming from historical anxieties regarding mercenarism and to subdue concerns generated as a result of the company's apartheid roots. EXO held up their 20 month operation in Sierra Leone as proof that private military force could be usefully and legitimately applied in the pursuit of peace. The company emphasised that it remained loyal to its client, it did not threaten the sovereignty of government, it never committed atrocities or transgressed human rights law, and at all times remained committed to facilitating Sierra Leone's transition from military rule to democratically elected government. On this basis, Nic van den Berg hailed the Sierra Leone operation as "a complete success". Not surprisingly, van den Berg's enthusiasm is not shared by all.

Reservations & Concerns

Executive Outcomes was contracted in April 1995 to provide military advisory and support services to Valentine Strasser's National Provisional Ruling Council. In addition to conducting evaluation and training programs for the Royal Sierra Leone Military Force under Strasser's overall command, EXO conducted offensive operations throughout the country until February 1997 when their contract was terminated. Ninety days after the company's departure, the RSLMF ousted the newly elected government of President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah and formed a coalition with the Revolutionary United Front of Foday Sankoh. Sierra Leone's first experiment with democracy in 27 years had lasted just over one year.

Critics seized upon this turn of events as proof that private military forces had only limited application and were unable to significantly alter the strategic trajectory of civil conflicts. Yet such assessments are simplistic, dismissing PMC's more on the basis of popular anti-mercenary myth than informed assessment. Closer examination of EXO's operations in Sierra Leone reveal that the company made a discernible impact on the course of the war and was instrumental in creating the stability which facilitated not only democratic elections but also the signing of the Abidjan peace agreement.

In fact, the operations of EXO illustrate that PMC's may in fact enjoy advantages over state based militaries or multinational peacekeeping forces. They are able to deploy rapidly and decisively, they carry no political baggage and they come armed with clear operational mandates immune to the internal machinations of deadlocked institutions such as the UN Security Council. They are also able to call upon a large pool of professionals with case-specific training and in many cases PMC's may also be more cost-effective than multinational or internationally mandated national forces.

At the same time, EXO's role in Sierra Leone reveals that the use of private military force in regional conflicts can potentially carry a heavy price. Legitimate questions and concerns arise when considering the consequences of private and unregulated military intervention in vulnerable African states. In the absence of international legislation and monitoring, many PMC's remain accountable only to their own bottom line. At present there are no guarantees that companies in the EXO mould will adhere to the virtuous corporate philosophies which they promote.

In addition, EXO's operations in Sierra Leone raised a number of questions regarding the independence of the company's military operations from larger transcontinental mining and exploration concerns. Critics have argued that behind EXO's claims of assistance to legitimate governments lay a callous desire to plunder the economic resources of African states through their corporate subsidiaries.

Finally, events surrounding the May coup in Sierra Leone raise the issue of whether private militaries have the capacity to secure a peace which lasts rather longer than one year. Many have argued that they do not, primarily because private intervention forces upset the balance between a state's political and military institutions while simultaneously eroding the sovereignty of government. These are all legitimate concerns which can only be answered through a closer analysis of EXO's corporate history and operational deployment in Sierra Leone.

What is Executive Outcomes?

Executive Outcomes belongs to a new breed of company known as 'Active Private Military Service Providers' or 'Active Private Military Companies'. These firms occupy a special niche in the 'security spectrum'. At one end, this spectrum includes basic security providers and ranges through to 'passive' military advisers and 'active' service providers such as EXO.

Active military companies may provide training or equipment to increase the force capability of a client government's armed forces. If this support fails to give the client the strategic or operational edge required to suppress the military advance of insurgent groups, APMC's are capable of deploying their own troops directly into combat zones. Contracts are governed by the strict understanding that employees of the private company remain at all times subject to the operational chain of command of government armed forces. The ability to deploy offensively is EXO's greatest commercial and tactical asset according to Nic van den Berg, since it allows the company "to elevate the scale of the conflict to a level which [insurgent or rebel groups] are unable to compete with".

Beyond hearsay and speculation very little is known about the history of EXO or the corporate and commercial links which the company fostered during its nine years of service. According to its own promotional literature, Executive Outcomes was established in 1989 as a wholly owned and registered South African company. The company's founder, Luther Eben (Eeben) Barlow, was a former Lieutenant Colonel with South African military intelligence and one-time member of the apartheid regime's Civil Cooperation Bureau. Under Barlow's stewardship, EXO began life as one of the many front companies established by the SADF to provide intelligence, counter intelligence and counter espionage training to South African defence personnel.

EXO absorbed a number of ex-SADF operatives following the exposure and demobilisation of many covert apartheid units from the early 1990's onwards. Although the company did not employ South African citizens exclusively (as claimed in their promotional literature), a majority of personnel were drawn from elite forces such as 32 Battallion, Koevoet, and various special forces regiments within the SADF. Potential employees were recruited chiefly by word-of-mouth and remained on company register awaiting operational deployment. At their peak, EXO boasted "between four and five thousand cv's on file".

The company's operational policy reflects the obvious sensitivity which management felt toward public perceptions of their activities. It states that EXO will not work for the highest bidder. Other considerations came into play when negotiating contracts. In a presentation delivered at a private conference in Johannesburg, EXO emphasised that they would work only for internationally recognised governments with palatable human rights records; they would not become involved with embargoed regimes, terrorist organisations, crime syndicates or drug cartels, nor would they fight in religious or ethnic conflicts or support governments which posed a security threat to the Republic of South Africa. Executive Outcomes was, they claimed, committed to providing an independent, apolitical and well-trained peace enforcement unit, perfectly adapted to operational environments in Africa.

However, EXO was not the independent force it claimed to be. Indeed, the company shared close ties with mining and exploration companies including Branch Energy, Diamond Works and Heritage Oil & Gas. While these links are routinely denied by all parties, Nic van den Berg has since acknowledged the existence of "a business relationship between these [security and mining] companies even though they were not necessarily registered or formalised in that sense". While often exaggerated in the press, it appears that EXO may have formed the security spearhead for mining companies seeking to acquire mineral concessions through the forcible creation of a stable climate for investment. As David Shearer observes, this is "high risk, high return strategy…[which] provides access to potentially valuable areas otherwise out of bounds to companies lacking a comparable security element". EXO's operations in Angola, Papua New Guinea and Sierra Leone do indeed suggest a link between low-intensity conflict, military companies and strategic minerals.