Goh
Chun Keong
NUS Economics Honours (2002/03) Thesis Paper
Submitted to Department in March 2003
---- Abstract ----
In this paper, we investigate the relationship
between Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) and the rate of
innovation. Given the current controversies that swirl around
Intellectual Property policies, we review the economic reasoning
that supports the IPRs and the underlying economic incentives to
induce further innovation. In addition, the optimal design of the
IPR system will also be discussed. For instance, on the issue of how
extensive the protection of awards is in both stand-alone and
sequential innovation environments.
The recent strengthening
of patent regime in the United States has ushered in the surge in
the patents granted since the 1980s. But have firms really gone more
innovative (induced by stronger patents) as conventional wisdom
dictates? To test this patents-innovation hypothesis, we examine the
patenting behaviour of 58 U.S. firms in semiconductor industry
characterised by rapid technological change and cumulative
innovation. Previous studies have shown that such firms are not
dependent on patents yet the propensity to patent has risen
dramatically since the mid 1980s.
Our quantitative results
suggest that the broadening of U.S. patent rights cause no
significant improvement in the rate of innovation. Instead firms
patent for offensive and defensive reasons, entirely unrelated to
improvements in technology. This is unlike what theoretical
economics literature had predicted earlier on.
This paper is available as PDF
4.0+ (1.8MB) or via email.
1:
I thank my supervisor Dr Albert
Hu for his invaluable advice and help.
home
|
?#060;/font>
copyright 2003 I @962C2 I All
Rights Reserved
|
|