Date: Thu, 31 Dec 1998 06:02:54 -0500

From: John King <jking1@mediaone.net>

To: Ader <ader@compuserve.com>

Art and others have asked about this transcript.

Edited by John D. King <jkingmediaone.net> reformatted for e-mail. Original formats available.

-INTRODUCTION-

In the past I have made reference to a 1993 Senate Hearing where the FAA made testimony to 264 cases, from 1986 through 1992, that involved smoke, fumes, or fire in or near the cockpit. (See page reference 66 below). The issue centered on the FAA’s present regulatory requirements for "dense continuous smoke" in the cockpit and the pilots’ ability to see vital instruments and the outside world.

As usual, the FAA and the Air Transport Association didn’t ‘see’ the problem and cited their own analysis and record keeping that such a problem didn’t exist. The FAA claimed that there were few sources of such fires.

Absent from the FAA’s and the ATA’s testimonies too was this information known then of;

1. The TWA and United Airlines letters regarding certain hazardous wire insulation types and the need to stop using it. Same for those U.S. Navy letters.

2. The 1988 and 1989 FAA New Jersey Tech Center (Cahill) reports of wire arc-tracking and excessive smoke generation by PVC insulation.

3. Cautions to not reset tripped circuit breakers in that 1989 report.

4. The fire potential of PVC wire insulation seen in the 1991 Tech Center report ("Development And Growth Of Inaccessible Aircraft Fires Under In-flight Airflow Conditions, DOT/FAA/CT-91/2"). Quote; "Page 9, Test 32, with PVC wire and aluminized insulation batts, produced significantly more smoke and heat than tests 31 and 33… It can be seen from these graphs that the main source of smoke and heat in test 32 was from the PVC wire insulation,… A PVC/nylon wire insulation will not pass the

current flammability test for aircraft wiring which was imposed in 1972….Page 11 Conclusion(s) # 4. A PVC/Nylon insulated wire involved in a fire contributes significantly more smoke, heat, and hydrogen chloride to the cabin than Kapton or Tefzel insulated wire.)

5. Shortcomings of the 60 degree flammability flame test in that Cahill 1989 wire report. (wire runs straight up and down too).

6. Similarly, the flammability of certain insulation blankets. The industry had discarded the Bunsen burner test used by the FAA (reference, FAR 25.853) in favour of the "more reliable and consistent cotton swab test". (See the FAA’s latest acknowledgement of this in FAA’s Tech Center report DOT/FAA/AR-97/58).

Regarding those ever so elusive database records that FAA has continued to claim do not support any higher regulatory actions for wire insulations, cockpit smoke visibility or insulation blanket flammability standards ? It’s their records, figures lie and liars figure. Until they get their records straightened out, or this number is refuted, I’ll refer to the former Department Of Transportation’s Inspector General, Mary Schiavo when in Washington, on September 27, 1998, she said;

"Would it surprise you to learn that since 1994, just in the FAA publicly available internet data bases there are 783 reports of smoke in the cockpit, with about half of the reports concerning commercial carriers ? (Underlining added).

Any referenced (original) documents here are available. Contact jking1@mediaone.net.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Now the 1993 Senate hearing.

US Senate. HRG. 103-397

AVIATION COMPETITION AND SAFETY ISSUES

A HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION

OF THE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS FIRST SESSION

NOVEMBER 8, 1993

Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

73-926 CC WASHINGTON : 1994

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office

Superintendent of Documents. Congressional Sales Office, Washington. DC 20402

ISBN 0-16-043561-7

(ORDER & INQUIRY DESK 202-783-3238)

--------------------------------------------------

REF. (Page) 60

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR INOUYE

Mr. Chairman, I wish to thank you for holding these hearings today to consider issues of importance to competition-in the airline industry and aviation safety.

I am pleased to welcome Mr. Rex Johnson, Director of the State of Hawaii Department of Transportation, who will discuss legislation signed into law this year by the Governor of Hawaii which would allow the State of Hawaii to regulate inter-island air service for a ten year period. This provision of law requires an exemption from the pre-emption of the Federal Aviation Act similar to the exemption currently provided to the State of Alaska. As the members of this Committee are well aware, I

intend to pursue an amendment to S. 1491, the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1993, to provide the State of Hawaii with an exemption to regulate air passenger service.

Inter-island airline -operations and revenues have been adversely affected by a downturn in tourism. The most recent victim of this downturn is Hawaiian Airlines, one of the two major inter-island airlines, which recently declared bankruptcy under Chapter I 1. Hawaiian Airlines employs approximately 2100 workers state-wide.

The air service in Hawaii is unique in every sense of the word. I am unaware of any other state where the only means of passenger transportation from one county to the very next one is by air. Air service in Hawaii is our state highway system.

Preserving timely, safe, reliable and perhaps most importantly, cost effective air service is critical to communities throughout the State, and to the general commerce of our state, particularly our number one industry, tourism.

Earlier this year, I introduced S. 787 which would increase aviation safety for the travelling public by establishing an enforcement mechanism for minimum standards of cockpit visibility in cases of serious smoke emergencies.

The issue today is not whether air carriers should be forced to utilize a specific technology to address smoke in the cockpit. Rather, the inquiry is much more fundamental – do current Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations adequately address the threat of pilot vision loss due to smoke emergencies resulting from a continuous source of smoke; is the FAA effectively enforcing these regulations; and are the airlines currently capable of responding to smoke emergencies caused by dense continuous smoke?

Mr. Chairman, while I am aware that the FAA and the Air Transport Association continue to assert that no problem exists because no accidents have occurred which can be attributed to loss of pilot vision due to smoke in the cockpit, I believe it would be irresponsible to wait until hundreds die before taking action to ensure that pilots are able to safely land their aircraft in smoke emergencies. Accordingly, I thank you for your willingness to bring this critical safety issue to light through today's hearing.

Senator Ford. That is all I have, unless you gentlemen have something else? All right, the next panel will deal with the issue of smoke in the cockpit. This is a different kind of smoke. We have Mr. Thomas McSweeny, aircraft certification, FAA; Mr. Werjefelt, president, Vision Safe Corp.; and Jim, you are back up here again.

Mr. Landry? Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Ford. We have been doing a pretty good job of holding within 5 minutes, and I hope we can continue that. We still have a long day and a long night yet here.

So, Mr. Werjefelt, if I got close to that, I will let you go first.

STATEMENT OF BERTIL WERJEFELT, PRESIDENT, VISION SAFE CORP.

Mr. Werjefelt. Thank you. You have to excuse my voice. I have a little cold.

Senator Ford. Well, just pull the microphone up closer.

Mr. Werjefelt. Right.

Senator Ford. They do not understand me, and I am not hoarse.

(page) 61

Mr. Werjefelt. All right. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I welcome the opportunity to appear before the subcommittee today to discuss and explain the continuing unsafe conditions that are present when pilot vision is lost or seriously impaired during emergencies involving dense continuous smoke in the cockpit.

I thank the committee members and staff for devoting their time and efforts to this very serious safety problem, a problem which the FAA should have and could have corrected on its own long ago. I am also grateful that Senator Inouye has introduced legislation to eliminate the present unsafe conditions.

I have a prepared statement. I would like that it be included in the record as if read, and I would just like to summarize.

Senator Ford. Your statement will be included in the record as if given.

Mr. Werjefelt. Thank you. Time and again, reports concerning these types of accidents show that pilot vision was either completely lost or severely impaired to the point where pilots could not see to safely control and land the planes. Many lives have been lost. In some cases, pilots managed to land the planes with the guidance of controllers on the ground or by sticking their heads out the windows to try to see. Aside from skilful piloting, more than anything else it seems lots of luck was the serendipitous and deciding factor that made the difference between a catastrophe and an emergency landing.

I have provided a list of accidents for the committee. It is exhibit Y in my statement. A review of even a portion of the accident record confirms that loss of pilot vision in the cockpit is a serious safety problem. Moreover, Boeing has publicly stated to the Wall Street Journal that they alone have lost seven jets where smoke in the cockpit was a suspected cause.

It is important to consider that much money and effort is spent on ensuring pilot vision, from frequent pilot eye tests to very careful FAA certification of instruments and other costly equipment and design features, all for a single purpose, to ensure us and the pilots that they can see to safely control and land the plane. There must never be any question of whether there is too much smoke for the pilots to see to be able to land.

Now, in my testimony I have also included a letter from a former head of safety with Swissair. In addition to the dozen or so accidents listed, he points out that just 2 weeks ago there was another accident in Munich. That is the third time a DC-9 has been going down with virtually blind pilots on board, and strictly by luck they managed to land. The pilots could not see their instruments. They could not read their approach plates. The situation was extreme. Strictly with the guidance of the

controllers on the ground and some good luck did they manage to put that plane on the ground.

The same thing occurred a couple of years ago, and this one is listed in my list of accidents. It says pilot vision was severely impaired. Well, what does "severely impaired" mean to laymen? I will tell you what it means. I talked to the SAS staff involved in this, they told me that they feared that that plane would be lost, but as luck would have it, the captain on board happened to be from the area where the accident was occurring and managed to squeeze

(page) 62

his face to the side window to watch the scenery go by, which he was very familiar with. He could not see where the plane was going but could only estimate and was guided in on the runway people on the ground.

Now that is not the kind of safety we want. We have had a continuous long dispute with the FAA about these matters, and they seem to consistently deny that there is any problem whatsoever. And I would like to believe that summarizes our position and the safety problem that I am here to testify about.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Werjefelt follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BERT WERJFELT

I welcome the opportunity to appear before the Subcommittee today to discuss and explain the continuing unsafe conditions that are present because of loss of pilot vision during emergencies involving dense continuous smoke in the cockpit. I thank the Committee Members and Staff for devoting their time and efforts to this self evident, but nevertheless very serious safety problem, which the FAA should have connected on its own long ago. I am also grateful, as we should all be, that Senator Inouye, from my home state of Hawaii, has introduced Legislation (S. 787) to eliminate the present unsafe conditions.

Time and again, reports concerning these types of accidents show that pilot vision was either completely lost or severely impaired, to the point where pilots could not see to safely control and land the plane. Many lives have been lost. In some cases they did manage to land the plane with the guidance of controllers on the ground or, by sticking their heads out the window to try to see. Aside from skilful piloting, more than anything else, it seems "lots of luck" was the serendipitous

and deciding factor that made the difference between a catastrophe and an emergency landing, where all, or at least some, survived.

A review of a portion of the accident record confirms that loss of pilot vision in the cockpit is a serious safety problem. I call your attention to the attached list of "smoke related accidents". Moreover, Boeing has publicly stated to the Wall Street Journal (June 25, 91) that Boeing alone has lost seven (7) jets where smoke in the cockpit was a suspected cause.

When reflecting on Legislative action on this matter I believe it is noteworthy to observe that much time. money and effort is spent on pilot vision. From frequent pilot eye tests, to very careful FAA certification of instruments and other costly equipment and design features, all for a single purpose, to ensure us and the pilots that they can see to safely control and land the plane. In other words the least the public (and the pilots) expect when hundreds of passenger lives are involved, is that they can see to land the plane. The standard and the basic safety requirement is: there shall never be any question of

whether there is too much smoke for the pilot to see out the window to be able to land. To have to stick your head out the window (and hope you are not in clouds) to see to fly your plane because you can't see your instruments is unacceptable. Yet, as you note from the accident record (in the accidents with a more fortunate outcome), that is what is now going on. I believe everybody would be worried and alarmed if they found that was the safety standard on the plane they were flying. Even more alarmed, if you were actually facing a serious smoke emergency, only to find your pilots on your plane are unable to see to land! Well, this is the present safety standard. There are no provisions on any plane flying today to cope with dense continuous smoke. Yet, everybody knows that the ability to ensure pilots can see in such serious emergencies is what is absolutely essential and required.

I believe the attached letter from Captain Otto Rentsch, former Head of Safety with Swissair, says it all (excerpt): "We were again just reminded of the need to correct this serious safety problem as soon as possible. Last week a Swissair MD-81 made an emergency landing at Munich Airport due to extreme smoke in the cockpit. The smoke was caused by an electric cable bundle on fire in the cockpit. The situation was so serious that the pilots were unable to read the approach charts and the instruments. For example, the speed indication was estimated according to an approximate position of the needle. The Approach Center personnel had to provide assistance to the pilots on frequencies and directions. This level of safety is unquestionably unacceptable. Pilots must be able to see so the can safely control and land their aircraft. Having talked to the Chief of Accident Investigation at the Swiss Department of Transportation, it is clear that skilful piloting and lots of luck was the only difference between the successful emergency landing, versus a catastrophe. A

(page) 63

very slight increase in smoke intensity would probably have totally blinded the pilots and might have changed the outcome. (There were 88 passengers and 7 crew on board). The need to ensure pilot vision in such emergencies is very clear. Hopefully the Authorities (and the Airlines) will now act quickly."

"Also, if my memory serves me right, the American NTSB issued a safety recommendation about 10 years ago in connection with a DC-9 (or MD 80/81?) smoke accident in Cincinnati where there was the same type of situation with severe smoke in the cockpit and the pilots had serious difficulties seeing their instruments. (There was also a similar one in Norway 4 or 5 years ago with a DC-9 or MD80) In spite of the NTSB recommendation it is obvious that the safety problem still persists."

"With further regard to your original question, I am also aware that there have been several other fatal smoke accidents world-wide, many of which the Authorities know and/or suspect were caused by loss of pilot vision."

It is also important for the Committee to note that European law would in all likelihood have brought criminal charges against the airline, manufacturer and others had the recent accident in Munich ended in tragedy. I have attached a news article from Aviation International News (July 93) - which shows that in similar cases, where known unsafe conditions have not been corrected, employees of the airline, manufacturer and even the Aviation Authorities were indicted on murder, manslaughter and homicide charges. Such actions have been taken several times.

NTSB has in the past issued recommendations on matters surrounding continuous smoke, past Chairman Jim Burnett noted in a Public Works and Transportation Hearing about ten years ago before the Committee on Investigation and Oversight, on the House side, concerning a DC-9 accident in Cincinnati, that the pilot had great difficulty seeing his instruments. Since that accident, what has happened?

NTSB issued a safety recommendation that the problem of continuous smoke be addressed by the FAA. The safety action has subsequently been labelled "closed acceptable action" by the NTSB. This by any reasonable measure would lead us to believe that the problem is solved. The reason I am here, is that it is not solved. The accident record is proof of the continuing unsafe conditions. The aircraft type involved in the Cincinnati accident has subsequently been involved in at least 2 more accidents where the same serious safety problem has been noted that the pilots had great difficulty seeing. The last accident, as noted by Captain Rentsch, occurred just a week or two ago in Munich, Germany, and as you can see from the list of accidents there have been many others.

Subsequent to the Cincinnati accident, the FAA spent four years at the request of Congress searching for a solution to the problem with continuous smoke, testing air scoops, relief valves, modifying aircraft, many hours of flight testing etc. The FAA was unable to find a viable solution that solves the problem of dense continuous smoke in the airplane.

As you will notice from the attached lengthy materials, in my response to comments by the ATA on Senator Inouye's Legislation, S. 787, the FAA in its instructions on how to comply with the regulations repeatedly mentions the need to address continuous smoke. You will also notice that the Airline Pilots Association has expressed their concern about the matter as recently as December of last year. McDonnell Douglas in its comments on Senator Inouye's legislation states that "the need to remove heavy smoke, whether continuous or not, from the flight station is most certainly a requirement." The whole crux of the matter is that the airplanes are not tested or certified to ensure pilot vision when there is continuous dense smoke.

While the FAA was unable to solve the problems relating to continuous smoke, our company, Vision Safe Corporation, was able to do so, to safeguard pilot vision. At considerable expense and over several years Vision Safe developed technology that allows pilots to see the flight path and vital instruments so that they can safely control and land the plane, regardless how much smoke there is in the cockpit. This is a major breakthrough in the area of aviation safety. The International Civil

Aviation Organization was quick to write about the matter when they learned. ICAO as you know is an arm of the United Nations. The headline of the article "Smoke-Related Accidents May Be Preventable - Newly developed smoke displacement device can provide a clear path of vision regardless of smoke density. ICAO very generously provided a full size picture of our Emergency Vision Assurance EVAS on their front cover. (I have provided some reprints for the Committee).

It was our decision to proceed to have the EVAS Technology FAA Certified. Again, this was a long and costly process.

Nevertheless we thought it was the appropriate thing to do to alleviate any concerns industry may have about the newly developed technology. EVAS is fully FAA approved as or November 1990,

(page) 64

subsequently we requested the FAA in Washington to enforce the safety regulations in accordance with the standards they prescribe in the FAA Advisory Circulars to address continuous smoke. Much to our surprise we are told by the FAA that it was no longer a safety problem (in spite of FAA’s 4 year failure in searching for a solution at taxpayer expense). We were also told that the FAA would not take any action to enforce the existing regulation for continuous smoke! The acrimony as been going on ever since. We now have file cabinets full of documentation arguing endlessly back and forth, whether pilots must be able to see in serious emergencies with dense continuous smoke!!!

FAA claims everything is fine the way it is. FAA tries to support its' totally unacceptable position by saying that accidents involving smoke in the cockpit and loss, or serious impairment, of pilot vision are not "unsafe conditions"(!), so long as the pilots managed to land, even if they had severe difficulty seeing and/or were forced to stick their heads out the window to try to see and/or had to be guided by controllers on the ground to find the airport! Such a safety policy is not only unacceptable, it is unbelievable. Moreover, at the same time, FAA also ignores fatal accidents where smoke in the

cockpit and blinded pilots were a suspected or known cause. In spite of the many fatal smoke accidents the FAA refuses to act.

FAA prescribes that means be available to deal with continuous smoke in their instructions of how to comply with the smoke regulation; McDonnell Douglas clearly states it is a safety requirement; "The need to remove heavy smoke, whether continuous or not, from the flight station is most certainly a requirement." There isn't a pilot anywhere who would accept or expect to have his or her vision impaired while trying to land. Nor for a moment would he or she question whether they would be able to see to safely land the plane. It is a fundamental safety requirement which is never questioned. Yet, today when the emergency involves dense and continuous smoke, the likelihood is very great that the pilots will be totally blinded by the smoke and unable to see to control the airplane. Hundreds of lives may be needlessly lost in the next avoidable accident.

The issue is so profoundly simple and straightforward and so essential to fundamental air safety that I question whether this Committee has ever had to face such a self evident issue before. Of course pilots must be able to see, whether or not, there is dense continuous smoke in the cockpit.

Clearly, the need to ensure pilot vision in emergencies with dense continuous smoke is acknowledged as a "requirement" by responsible industry leaders, as well as pilots (ALPA) and the public. FAA's own advisory material states that such protection must be provided to comply with the safety regulation. However, the fortitude of the FAA, and the industry as a whole, to accomplish this required level of safety, in a prompt and responsible manner, is blatantly lacking. Therefore, the dire need for Legislation.

After several years of acrimony with the FAA, which incidentally has been very costly, I am very pleased and grateful that Senator Inouye has persevered with the legislation and that this Committee has chosen to deal with this serious safety issue.

Frankly, not just I, but I believe many of the other parties involved would, in spite of all the rhetoric, be relieved if Congress just ordered the FAA to promptly comply with the existing safety regulation, to require protection against dense continuous smoke on existing and future aircraft. Let us not wait for more tragic accidents and more needless loss of life. There have been too many already.

That concludes my prepared statement, Mr. Chairman. I will be pleased to respond to any questions you or the other Members may have at this time.

(A miscellany of letters, articles, and information may be found in the committee's files.)

Senator Ford. Mr. McSweeny.

STATEMENT OF THOMAS McSWEENY, AIRCRAFT

CERTIFICATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

Mr. McSweeny. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am Tom McSweeny, director of Aircraft Certification for the FAA. I am pleased to have the opportunity to appear before you today to provide FAA’s findings, contained in a recent report to the Congress, concerning the effects of smoke in the cockpit of an aircraft.

I am enclosing as an attachment to my statement the full report, which I will discuss very briefly.

(page) 65

Senator Ford. It will be included in the record.

Mr. McSweeny. I will of course be pleased to respond to any aspects of the report which may be of interest to the committee.

In our preparation of the report, we evaluated existing technologies to evacuate smoke from the aircraft cockpit, determined whether action should be taken to change current regulations, and estimated the cost of installation of different technology for the commercial airline industry.

The evacuation of smoke from a cockpit is needed to enable the crew to operate the airplane. Our standards provide for the effective evacuation of smoke. An aircraft's equipment and procedures are considered to meet FAA requirements if smoke concentration is reduced within 3 minutes, so that any residual smoke neither distracts the flight crew nor interferes with operations under either instrument meteorological conditions, IMC, or visual meteorological conditions, VMC.

We believe these standards provide sufficient reserve for a flight crew to retain adequate visibility of the flight instruments and controls, and outside the aircraft, to continue safe flight and landing even when a reasonably probable continuous smoke source is present.

There are essentially two methods recognized as being effective in evacuating smoke from the cockpit. The method used in most transport category airplanes is to increase the flow of fresh air into the cockpit, forcing the smoke out. All FAA certificated, modern transport aircraft use this method, which has proven its effectiveness.

A second means of evacuating smoke is the installation of a device called the "smoke chute." Some aircraft use this method. In the early development of our certification standards, we considered the adoption of a specific requirement for smoke chutes, but did not do so, concluding that the smoke evacuation capabilities provided by our final rule adequately met the same safety concerns.

In the report to Congress, we examined another means of addressing smoke in the cockpit. This is the smoke displacement device, or EVAS, which provides a restricted viewing path from the pilot's smoke goggles to a small portion of the vertical flight instruments and a limited area of the windshield.

Our analysis led us to conclude that EVAS would be of only limited value, and should not be mandated for installation in airline aircraft. EVAS provides no smoke evacuation capabilities and, thus, these FAA certification requirements would have to continue to be met by other means. EVAS creates only a narrow vision path, so that if smoke were to accumulate in the cockpit, a number of important flight instruments and controls would still not be visible to the pilot.

Moreover, that limited capability would only be of use in daytime VMC conditions. I also have concerns that a flight crew's initial efforts to deploy EVAS would interfere with its primary responsibility to locate and address the source of the smoke, and its secondary responsibility to immediately land the aircraft.

In our report, we estimated the cost of mandating either smoke chutes or EVAS. We projected that the installation of smoke chutes would cost approximately $23.5 million over a 10-year period if all

(page ) 66

aircraft were retrofitted. The cost of EVAS, including maintenance and training, would be approximately $70 million.

In our view, the costs of either of these technologies clearly outweigh any benefits that might be derived from their installation.

Before closing, I would like to briefly touch on our examination of the aircraft safety record associated with cockpit smoke. This was an important element of our review.

In particular, we looked at 12 accidents and incidents furnished by the producer of the EVAS device. Of those 12 accidents and incidents, there is not a single one in which either we or the accident investigation authorities have determined that the use of a smoke displacement device such as EVAS would have contributed to a safe landing.

We also looked at 264 cases, from 1986 through 1992, that involved smoke, fumes, or fire in or near the cockpit. Our review disclosed that in none of those cases was the lack-of-pilot visibility of the instruments or outside of the aircraft a factor in preventing continued safe flight and landing. Thus, there would have been no apparent benefit from EVAS in these cases.

In summary, our analysis has led us to conclude that there is no existing technology that would improve smoke evacuation from the cockpit. Further, airplanes certificated in accordance with FAA’s 1986 smoke evacuation guidelines and associated agency certification advisory material have demonstrated a safety record that confirms existing procedures are satisfactory.

None of these airplanes have crashed nor have lives been lost due to the crew's inability to see the instruments or outside the cockpit.

That completes my prepared statement, Mr. Chairman, and I would be pleased to respond to any questions you may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. McSweeny follows:]

Prepared Statement Of Thomas McSweeney

I am Tom McSweeny, Director of Aircraft Certification for the FAA. I am pleased to have the opportunity to appear before you today to provide the FAA's findings contained in a recent report to the Congress concerning the effects of smoke in the cockpit of an aircraft. I am enclosing as an attachment to my statement the full report, which I will describe very briefly. I will, of course, be pleased to respond in more detail concerning any aspect of the report of interest to the committee.

In our preparation of the attached report, we evaluated existing technologies to evacuate smoke from an aircraft cockpit, determined whether action should be taken to change current regulations, and estimated the cost of installation of different technology for the commercial airline industry.

The evacuation of smoke from a cockpit is needed to enable the crew to operate the airplane. Our standards provide for the effective evacuation of smoke. An aircraft's equipment and procedures are considered to meet FAA requirements if smoke concentration is reduced within 3 minutes so that any residual smoke neither distracts the flight crew nor interferes with operations under either instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) or Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC). We believe

these standards provide sufficient reserve for a flight crew to retain adequate visibility of the flight instruments and controls, and outside the aircraft, to continue safe flight and landing, even when a reasonably probable continuous smoke source is present.

There are essentially two methods recognized as being effective in evacuating smoke from the cockpit. The method used in most transport category airplanes is to increase the flow of fresh air into the cockpit, forcing the smoke out. All FAA certificated modern transport aircraft use this method, which has proven its effectiveness. A second means of evacuating smoke is the installation or a device called a "smoke chute." Some aircraft use this method. In the earlier development of our

(page) 67

certification standards, we considered the adoption of a specific requirement smoke chutes, but did not do so, concluding that the smoke evacuation capabilities provided by our final rule adequately met the same safety concerns.

In the report, we examined another means of addressing smoke in the cockpit. This is a smoke displacement device called EVAS (or the emergency Vision Assurance System) that provides a restricted viewing path from the pilot's smoke goggles to a small portion of the critical flight instruments and a limited area of the windshield. Our analysis led us to conclude that EVAS would be of only limited value, and should not be mandated for installation in airline aircraft. EVAS provides no smoke evacuation capabilities, and, thus, these FAA certification requirements would have to continue to be met by other means. It creates only a narrow vision path so that, if smoke were to accumulate in the cockpit, a number of important flight instruments and controls would still not be visible to the pilot. Moreover, that limited capability would only be of use in daytime Visual Meteorological Conditions. We also have concerns that a flight crew's initial efforts to deploy EVAS could interfere with its primary responsibility for locating and addressing the source of the smoke.

In our report, we estimated the costs of mandating either smoke chutes or EVAS. We project that the installation of smoke chutes would cost approximately $23.5 million over a 10-year period if all aircraft were retrofitted. The cost of EVAS, including maintenance and training, would be approximately $70 million. In our view, the costs of either of these technologies clearly outweighs any benefits that might be derived from their installation.

Before closing, I would like to briefly touch on our examination of the aircraft safe record associated with cockpit smoke. This was an important element of our review. In particular, we looked at 12 accidents and incidents furnished by the producer of the Emergency Vision Assurance System (EVAS) device. Of these 12 accidents and incidents, there is not a single one in which either we or the accident investigation authorities have determined that the use of a smoke displacement device, such as EVAS, would have contributed to a safe landing.

We also looked at the 264 cases from 1986 through 1992 that involved smoke, fumes, or fire in or near the cockpit. Our review disclosed that in none of those cases was the lack of pilot visibility of the instruments or outside the aircraft a factor in preventing continued safe flight and landing. Thus, there would have been no apparent benefit from EVAS in these cases.

In sum, our analysis has led us to conclude that there is no existing technology that would improve smoke evacuation from the cockpit. Further, airplanes certificated using the FAA’s 1986 smoke evacuation guidelines and associated agency certification advisory materials have demonstrated safety record that confirms existing procedures are satisfactory. None of these airplanes have crashed nor have lives been lost due to a crew's inability to see the instruments or outside the cockpit.

That completes my prepared statement, Mr. Chairman, I would be pleased to respond to any questions you may have at this time.

(The report to Congress "Smoke in the Cockpit of Transport Category Airplanes," by the Department of Transportation may be found in the committee’s files.)

Senator Ford. Thank you very much. Mr. Landry, the third time is a charm.

STATEMENT OF JAMES E. LANDRY, PRESIDENT, AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, ACCOMPANIED BY AL PREST, VICE PRESIDENT OF OPERATIONS

Mr. Landry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Well, I am particularly charmed because I have with me for this portion of this hearing Al Prest, ATA’s vice president of operations, who, in an earlier incarnation, was a captain for TWA for a number of years and, indeed, managed the training of TWA's flight crews for operations of Boeing 707's and 727's.

I appreciate this opportunity to discuss S. 787, which, if enacted into law, would direct the Secretary of Transportation to issue an advisory circular requiring that turbine engine powered aircraft have ventilation systems capable of providing a sufficiently smoke

(page) 68

free flight deck environment to permit continued control of the aircraft in situations where dense and continuous smoke enters

the cockpit, and that smoke displacement equipment be provided for the flight crew.

We believe that existing aircraft certification requirements adequately deal with situations where smoke enters the cockpit. We are particularly concerned about the second element of S. 787, that smoke displacement equipment be present in the cockpit. Our view is that the presence of such equipment could distract the crew from promptly performing the procedures needed to deal with a cockpit smoke situation.

Consequently, we oppose mandating that air carrier aircraft be equipped with such devices.

Existing FAA regulatory provisions establish smoke evacuation requirements for air carrier aircraft. Part 25 of the FAA regulations prescribes the airworthiness standards for the FAA’s issuance of type certificates for transport category aircraft, and includes a requirement concerning cockpit smoke evacuation.

Moreover, the FAA has issued an advisory circular that details the procedure by which cockpit smoke evacuation capability is to be demonstrated. In addition, the FAA has required that airplane flight manuals include a statement that whenever a fire is discovered aboard an aircraft, the crew is to land immediately or as soon as practicable at the nearest airport.

Hence, a comprehensive regulatory program exists to respond effectively to smoke in the cockpit of an air carrier aircraft.

Furthermore, the FAA has taken a series of regulatory actions that are intended to reduce the possible sources of smoke aboard air carrier aircraft and improve the ability of the crew to fight on board fires. Those initiatives are described in our statement for the record.

I wish to point out that those regulatory measures are designed to diminish the sources of aircraft fires and to strengthen on board fire fighting capability. This is an important consideration. If the source of a fire or smoke can be controlled, the likelihood of dense smoke continuously infiltrating the cockpit is greatly reduced.

In response to a congressional directive, the FAA, on October 25, submitted to Congress a report entitled "Smoke in the Cockpit of Transport Category Aircraft." The report concluded that existing regulatory requirements are adequate, and that smoke displacement equipment would not be acceptable for showing compliance with the requirements of FAR section 25.831(d), which is the provision of part 25 that deals with cockpit smoke evacuation. Also significant is the fact that nothing cited in the report demonstrates that smoke displacement equipment would have averted any of the aircraft accidents that the FAA examined.

Airframe manufacturers and air carriers share those conclusions. No evidence has been brought to our attention which would warrant modification of the existing regulatory program for cockpit smoke evacuation or would justify the mandatory use of smoke displacement equipment.

Smoke displacement equipment is the wrong response to a cockpit smoke situation. The flight crew would have to retrieve the device, install and inflate it, during a critical period of time in which

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the crew should be directing its attention to controlling the aircraft, detecting and isolating the cause of the smoke, and initiating smoke removal procedures.

Such a distraction of flight crew attention could prove costly to those aboard the aircraft.

I am sure Mr. Prest can discuss the practical consequences of using this equipment in emergency situations if you wish.

Moreover, the smoke displacement equipment does not improve the evacuation of smoke from the cockpit. As its name indicates, it merely displaces smoke, and only from a small portion of the instrument panel and the windscreen. Much of the instrument panel and all of the communication and navigation, radios, throttles, overhead electrical, and other system controls will not be visible using it.

That is the crucial shortcoming, when you realize that the crew, during a smoke incident, must control the aircraft, which involves using instruments and controls beyond those which the smoke displacement equipment covers, and will likely be attempting to turn off Electrical or other aircraft systems to isolate the source of the smoke.

We are particularly concerned that the use of smoke displacement equipment will divert the flight crew from its primary responsibility of landing the aircraft as soon as practicable. Indeed, we are apprehensive that the use of the equipment could lead a crew to underestimate the seriousness of a smoke situation, or to conclude erroneously that it could master the situation without landing promptly.

For these reasons, we respectfully urge the subcommittee not to act favourably upon S. 787.

Senator Ford. Thank you very much, Mr. Landry.

Mr. Werjefelt, in testimony before the subcommittee on October 29, and that was just a couple of weeks ago, the Chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board, Carl Vogt, said that the National Transportation Safety Board had not found smoke in the cockpit to be the cause of any aviation accident. Consequently, NTSB has no outstanding safety recommendations for the FAA on this subject.

Do you believe this committee should legislate in an area which the premier aviation regulatory agency and the independent safety agency has rejected?

Mr. Werjefelt. Let me explain that, first of all, the NTSB does not cover all the accidents by a long shot. There are many accidents overseas that occur with U.S. made aircraft operated by foreign carriers. And we have communicated to the NTSB that one-half of the accidents we have listed, they have not even looked at. So, I can see where they would arrive-----

Senator FORD. And those would be overseas? Those accidents that you refer to would be overseas, out of the country?

Mr. Werjefelt. Correct, yes. Now, if they do not look at those, then how could they arrive at a conclusion that there was a problem? I can understand that. But there is a problem. There is a very serious problem. It is well known in the aviation safety community. But why they do not look

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at these other accidents, I do not know. They should, in my mind. They are equally important.

Does that answer your question, sir?

Senator Ford. Yes.

Mr. McSweeny, has the FAA ever tested the equipment which Vision Safe produces? If so, what were the results? Or, if not, why not?

Mr. McSweeny. The FAA has recently witnessed a test of a system that is intended to be installed in a Boeing 737. The system was tested in a fixed-space simulator---that is, not movable---and dense, theatrical white smoke was used. This particular test was a subjective, rather than a definitive, evaluation of the ability to land the aircraft.

As I remember the details, there was some difficulty with one or two pilots in properly landing the aircraft,

Senator Ford. Because of the equipment ?

Mr. McSweeny. One was caused by the failure of a second instrument that was covered by the bag. That forced the pilot to have to go somewhere else to find that information, and it was not obtainable. The second one was probably caused by some unfamiliarity with that particular simulator.

Mr. Werjefelt. Excuse me, Senator.

Senator Ford. Yes.

Mr. Werjefelt. Could I comment on that please, for a moment?

Senator Ford. Let me get to Mr. Landry, and then, if you have some comments, you may want to comment on both of them before we get through here.

Mr. Werjefelt. Thank you.

Senator Ford. Mr. Landry, your testimony mentions, "you are concerned that the use of smoke displacement equipment will divert the flight crew from its primary responsibility of landing the aircraft." Do you want Mr. Prest to answer that for you, or do you want to?

Mr. Landry. Well, I would like--I think the record would benefit from the perspective of an experienced flight captain and a man who managed the training of TWA’s flight crews for a number of years. Al.

Mr. Prest. Mr. Chairman, if I may, just before we get into that. It should be noted that the 12 incidents that have been referred to a couple of times in this hearing and elsewhere have been analysed by both personnel from within the industry, the Boeing Aircraft Corp., McDonnell-Douglas, Airbus Industries, as well as the FAA. And, with regard to at least one of the foreign accidents, let me read from the analysis done by the Boeing Co., which does not support smoke displacement equipment.

The accident was a TU-134-A, which is an Aeroflot airplane. And the accident occurred July 2, 1986. And the following is quoted from the Russian authorities. "According to the findings of the accident investigation, the TU-134 accident was caused by the fire in the rear cargo compartment. The smoke penetrated only the passenger cabin and had no effect on the piloting."

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The incidents referred to and the accidents referred to, for the most part--all of them, as a matter of fact-have no bearing or no relevance with regard to smoke displacement.

With regard to the specific issue at hand, smoke evacuation from the cockpit is the principal responsibility of the crew and they must manage that in a responsible manner. The aircraft is pressurized, which means the cabin altitude at cruising altitude is somewhere in the neighbourhood of 7,000 feet, while the outside altitude, pressure altitude would be 35,000 feet,

as an example.

That differential in the pressurization that is required--if there is an explosive decompression, we all know what happens, the air evacuates the airplane rather quickly. Flight crews are taught to evacuate smoke using a controlled means of evacuating the smoke, which increases the cabin pressure altitude to, let us say, 10,000 feet, in a period of about 20 seconds.

That 20 seconds is sufficient to rapidly draw the smoke out of the cockpit and give the crews the vision that is required to operate the aircraft. That vision includes, in the case of a three-pilot airplane, the captain looking over his shoulder at the flight engineer's panel, monitoring the pressurization and air conditioning controls, and the fresh air, RAM air, is available on the particular type of airplane. In the case of most two-crew airplanes, those pressurization controls are on the pilot's overhead panel, between the two pilots.

This smoke displacement device that we have been talking about today does not include vision protection in either of those two directions. Therefore, the smoke evacuation procedure is what we consider to be the safest procedure. That, with the oxygen mask and the smoke goggles that the crew are provided produces the best, most effective means to fly an airplane that has smoke in the cockpit.

Senator Ford. Now, Mr. Werjefelt, do you want to have some comment about the two statements?

Mr. Werjefelt. I sure would. Thank you. First of all, what Mr. McSweeny said about the flight test in the 737 or the test in the 737 simulator: 3 years ago the FAA certified the EVAS equipment and it went through all the necessary FAA rigmarole. And, believe me, it was a costly affair for a small company like ours. They subsequently wanted to go through some more tests with the 737 and Falcon 960, for which we have requests for equipment. The FAA could not furnish us two pilots out of their flight test personnel for the 737 test that were adequately rated or current on the equipment. There was no problem seeing anything I might add about American Airlines:

2 years ago their chief pilots requested we come over to Dallas to demonstrate the EVAS equipment for them. We did so with complete, full smoke in the cockpit. The pilots were immensely impressed by it and said they would love to have it on the airplanes. This was every chief pilot that American Airlines had for their different airplanes.

Senator Ford. Do you have a statement? Did they give you a statement to that effect?

Mr. Werjefelt. I will check our files on that, sir. I would be glad to submit it.

But, anyway, the pilots' comments were: "We just wonder whether or not the airline will go ahead and buy it." Scores of pilots

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around the globe, from Singapore Airlines to Swissair, to SAS, have tested this equipment, some of them for six others, others for -well, Swissair, in their case, 2 years. And they decided to put it into the planes for good reason, that it does what it says it will do. The current equipment that these gentlemen are talking about, the smoke evacuation equipment, does not work. There is not a plane flying today that has been tested or certified with continuous smoke. All they do is put in a little bit of smoke in the cockpit, and then you have to show that in 3 minutes, from this little space, you are able to evacuate it. Sir, the smoke evacuation equipment capability on any plane you fly on today is only equivalent to the capacity of a common kitchen exhaust fan. It is great if you have a burnt toast emergency, but if you have real heavy smoke coming into the cockpit, there it does not work, and the accident record proves it. Now, why would anyone -- I mean authorities that are investigating accidents, why would they conclude that one of the possible causes of an accident-now, this was a 747 going down with about 50 people. One of the possible causes was: disorientation consequent on reduced cockpit visibility and

smoke. This is just one many. If what FAA and ATA say worked, then the accident authorities would not come to conclusions like this.

So, I strongly object to what FAA and ATA are saying and I do not think they have been very objective in analysing the accidents. They are, in fact, refuting what the authorities are saying in their findings of these accidents.

Senator Ford. Senator Pressler.

Senator Pressler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me, first of all, congratulate you on your invention, because think that people such as you really contribute a lot in terms of ringing forth a new product and trying to present it. Now, the Airline Pilots Association wrote a letter in which they say that it is important to be able to evacuate continuous smoke if the source cannot be immediately identified. However, they do not endorse your invention.

Now, is there some other competing invention? For example, is there a way to have a fan that pumps the air – pumps fresh air in rapidly? Is there some other safety device that is proposed besides yours?

Mr. Werjefelt. Well, the gentlemen here mentioned a smoke chute which they tried 30, 40 years ago the first time around.

The FAA spent 4 years investigating it again at the request of Congress after an accident in 1983, and they were willing to propose that as a solution. Mind you, not for continuous smoke. They do not require it to work if the pilots cannot put the fire out and the smoke will not stop. Then you are out of luck. Just like that January 14 letter I received from the FAA, which says: "FAA does not protect you against continuous smoke."

Senator Pressler. Now, your invention does not evacuate smoke but rather allows the pilots to see through a smoky cockpit, I understand.

Mr. Werjefelt. Yes, sir.

Senator Pressler. And the FAA, in one of their earlier letters, said that the intense heat from the fire may force the pilots to

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move away from the place where they would have to be. What is your reaction to that?

Mr. Werjefelt. Well, I would say they are out of luck if they must leave the place where they are supposed to be to fly the plane. But please notice, the FAA thinks so highly of the EVAS equipment--maybe Mr. McSweeny does not-- but they have put it in their own advisory circular as the appropriate means to deal with an emergency of this sort. It is the first solution that has come down the path in the last 50 years for how to cope with continuous smoke in the cockpit. I just wish they would face up to the issue instead of trying to hide from it. Planes are going down full of smoke, pilots cannot see. I would certainly like to invite all three gentleman here to a test of the EVAS smoke equipment. This

will make them instant converts.

There are no restraints with it, there are no problems with it that a pilot will not cope with. And the FAA has tested it. The airlines have tested it. Yes, it gives you a somewhat restrained view, but that is strictly by the design of the system. We can offer other designs. As of now, we have done it strictly in accordance with what the FAA wants: the minimum basic visibility of instruments, and outside, to be able to land the plane. They did not request us to provide equipment that tells them how to turn on or off anything else.

So, I hope that answers the question, sir.

Senator Presser. Now, Mr. McSweeny, in the Newsweek focus they talk about the cost of equipment. According to this, they will spend roughly $20,000 per plane to install twin units for the pilot and copilot and to train personnel. Do you use a cost-benefit ratio at the FAA, in regard to safety? I mean, is that too expensive or is it that you doubt that it would work?

Mr.McSweeny. We have estimated the cost of the system at approximately $70 million. Most of that cost, roughly $60 million of it, comes in the first year as a result of installation costs. Yes, we do use cost-benefit analysis in our rulemaking. We see very limited additional benefit from the EVAS system. And with that limited additional benefit, we think the $70 million cost is not going to be appropriately balanced.

Senator Pressler. What is the FAA’s definition of an "unsafe condition"?

Mr. McSweeny. An "unsafe condition" is any condition that would jeopardize the continued safe flight and landing of the aircraft.

Senator Pressler. And is this an unsafe condition?

Mr. McSweeny. Is what, the smoke?

Senator Pressler. Yes.

Mr. McSweeny. Smoke in the cockpit would be unsafe if we did not have present safety systems to deal with it. We have rules that talk about the design of the aircraft. Many of those rules have changed recently to be much more stringent as far as circuit protection, fire safety, et cetera. We also have rules, as was mentioned earlier, requiring pilots to land immediately. All of those rules provide a regulatory base, which basically has led to a U.S. safety record that substantiates that the system works well.

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Senator Pressler. Now, Mr. Landry, your organization represents nearly the entire commercial aviation industry. You have stated that the current FAA guidelines are adequate for dealing with continuous smoke in the cockpit. I am concerned that the ATA simply taking an economical cost-benefit approach to an issue that could be potentially far more costly if not addressed. If a fully loaded 747 or DC-10 is lost because the FAA did not fully address potential problem, the repercussion would go beyond simple numbers.

How do you reconcile your organization's position with that of the Airline Pilots Association, a group that represents the men and women who fly your planes and are on the front lines of dealing with this issue?

Mr. Landry. Well, I can say whether the piece of equipment costs $10,000 or $20,000, or in the aggregate, $70 million, that would be a small price to pay to save one aircraft from a complete tragedy. But we are absolutely not convinced that that potential is in this particular equipment. Indeed, as Captain Prest would point it to you, we think it, if anything, increases the danger for handling a smoke situation in a cockpit, as opposed to smoke evacuation and other procedures that the FAA has already authorized and demanded in their regulations.

So, here is a situation in which the airlines, the regulators, and the manufacturers of the equipment all are in agreement. This is not a device that should be mandated aboard aircraft.

Al, would you like to say a few words?

Mr. Prest. I would just like to add, Senator Pressler, that, for the record, it should be noted that all of our carriers, including American Airlines, are opposed to this smoke displacement system. I certainly cannot address past history on this but on the ATA safety committee, the operations council-- and these are made up of the highest level of flight operations people within our member airlines--there is no support for this device whatsoever.

As indicated, we think that it is a potential danger. We think the time that would be required for a pilot to remove the device from its stowage to install it properly, and then the limited vision field that it offers once it is installed, is counter to the basic philosophy of smoke evacuation, flying the airplane, coordinating the crew, and getting the airplane on the ground as soon as possible. That is where we want to keep the emphasis.

Senator Pressler. I see my time is up. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to place in the record the relevant paragraphs of a letter from the Airline Pilots Association-although they do not necessarily address this system, but they do address the smoke in the cockpit. And I ask to have some additional questions for the record.

Senator Ford. Without objection, the statement will be put in the record and I hope the gentlemen will answer the questions expeditiously.

[The information referred to follows:]

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Letter From CAPT. Ricky R. Davidson, Chairman, ACCIDENT SURVIVAL

COMMITTEE, AIR LINE PILOT’s ASSOCIATION

December 11, 1992

Federal Aviation Administration

Transport Standards Staff, ANM-110

Renton, WA. 98055-4056

Re. Draft Advisory Circular (AC) 25-9A

LADIES AND GENTLEMAN: The Air Line Pilots Association, representing 42,000 pilots flying for 44 airlines, would like to comment on the proposed changes to the subject AC. We support the proposed changes and make further suggestions for change as outlined below.

Section 9.b, Airplane Test Conditions, should be revised to require that the lavatory smoke detectors be tested at a pressure altitude up to the pressure altitude approved for the cabin. Some smoke detector designs are negatively affected (less sensitive) at high pressure altitudes, and need to specially calibrated for those conditions. Unfortunately, these smoke detectors will then be too sensitive at low pressure altitudes. Therefore, we recommend that the units be tested to be effective at both altitudes, of sea level and maximum cabin pressure altitude.

We specifically submit comments on the change to the AC for the continuous production of smoke in evaluating the cockpit smoke evacuation capability. ALPA is very concerned that aircraft cockpits must be able to evacuate smoke effectively, so the crew can safely land the aircraft. We agree that this change will result in the test being more conservative and realistic. It is important to be able to evacuate continuous smoke if the source cannot be immediately identified. New aircraft use significantly more power in their systems, both the electrical and pneumatic/air conditioning systems. These systems have

correspondingly more smoke generation capability, and should thus be protected sufficiently. The continuous smoke test as proposed in the AC should accomplish this.

Accident experience supports the change to using continuous smoke in the cockpit smoke evacuation test. While the majority of the cockpit smoke incidents we have reviewed were controllable by disconnecting the damaged system, there appears to be several failure modes where it was not possible to disconnect the damaged system. Therefore, there is a need for the continuous smoke evacuation capability. Examples of this include the leaking of hydraulic lines onto hot components, some

electrical compartment failures, bombs, illegal cargo, and engine failures.

Our final comment upon review of the revisions to the AC addresses smoke evacuation, or venting, from the cabin. Specifically, the AC should provide more information on the need for evacuating smoke from post crash and inflight fires from the aircraft cabin. This is the next best way to prevent fire propagation second only to cooling the fire with water. Smoke evacuation in the cabin removes the combustible and hot gases before they can be completely burned in a flashover. The AC should present methodologies to test the cabin smoke evacuation using continuous smoke generation. Only be providing the capability to evacuate continuous smoke ran the cabin survivability be prolonged.

Thank you for the opportunity to comment. Please feel free to call us to discuss this further, please contact Pierre Huggins.

Sincerely, CAPT. RICKY R. DAVIDSON,

Chairman, Accident Survival Committee

Senator Ford. I have no further questions and we thank you gentlemen for attending today, and we will do our best to try to do the right thing.

The next panel will be on the General Aviation Statute of Repose. The witnesses will be Mr. Russell W. Meyer, chairman and chief executive officer of Cessna Aircraft; and John Howie, attorney -------------

END OF TRANSCRIPT RELEVANT TO SMOKE ISSUES ABOVE (pages 60-75)

John D. King 12/28/98

Jking1@mediaone.net

To Art and all:

How sad we can't ask the crews of ValuJet 592 and SR 111 to testify here.