Subject:
B737 - Kaptonitis? Total Electric Power Loss on Approach |
Date: Sun, 27 Dec 1998 22:23:21 +0800
From: John Sampson <sampson@iinet.net.au>
To: JOHNDKING King <jking1@mediaone.net>, Patrick Price <PAPCECST@aol.com>,
"PEddyXX@aol.com" <PEddyXX@aol.com>, Ross Coulthart
<RCOULTHART@ninenet.com.au>,
Ader <ader@compuserve.com>, "naefw@dial.eunet.ch"
<naefw@dial.eunet.ch>,
"swissair_crm@e-mail.com" <swissair_crm@e-mail.com>,
"Babin, Jacques" <Jacques.Babin@bst-tsb.x400.gc.ca>
CC: Omega Systems Group Vernon Grose <omega@omegainc.com>, Edward Block
<EdwBlock@aol.com>,
David Evans <devans@phillips.com>, Bob Rowland <rwroland@aol.com>
FROM
http://pprune.org/ubb/NonCGI/Forum1/HTML/002015.html
|
Author:
Nightflyer Topic: 737 Power Loss posted 26 December 1998 20:54 UTC On December 15, 1998, about 1216 eastern standard time, a Boeing 737-232, N327DL, registered to Wilmington Trust Company Trustee, operated by Delta Air Lines Inc., flight 2461, as a 14 CFR Part 121 scheduled domestic passenger/cargo flight, experienced a reported total loss of electrical power on approach for landing at Orlando International Airport, Orlando, Florida. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and an IFR flight plan was filed. The airplane sustained minor damage. The airline transport-rated pilot-in-command (PIC), first officer (FO), 3 flight attendants, and 51 passengers reported no injuries. The flight originated from Boston, Massachusetts, about 3 hours 6 minutes before the incident. The PIC stated they were cleared for a visual approach to runway 35 at Orlando International Airport. The FO was flying the airplane. All descent and approach checklists were completed. The APU was started on base leg. The FO called for the gear and flaps 15. The airplane experienced a total loss of electrical power as the gear and flaps were extended. The APU did not start, and the battery indicated between 17 to 18 volts. The normal checklist procedures were accomplished followed by the quick reference procedures. Electrical power was unable to be restored. A go-around was initiated to continue the checklist. All communications and electrical equipment failed. The flap indicator indicated an asymmetrical setting. A flight controllability check was accomplished with no anomalies. The flight was continued and landing was made to runway 35. A left main landing gear tire blew out on rollout. The airplane cleared the runway, stopped, and was towed to the ramp. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
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Sampson Comment: A Kaptonitis smoking gun? At that voltage (17 to 18V) it sounds as though my theory on SR111 just came to life. They'd have been history if it had happened at night or IMC conditions (or both). The "normal checklist" (I assume) would be all about checking CB's and attempting to reset Generators. After that (logically) would come the (second?) APU start attempt. It sounds as though they probably had a dead short in the electrics (i.e. wiring) associated with the GEAR or FLAP extension (however it may have had something to do with the switchover priority between the APU gen and Gens 1 & 2 - wonder why they start APU on base leg?). With a dead short to the batteries I just don't think you are going to get a Gen reset (i.e. relevant to SR111 crew rotating Smoke/Elec switch - deselecting one generator and never getting the one associated with the next selection because of the dead short to the battery caused by the wiring fault). This was a very lucky planeful. To jog your memory about my SR111 theory, go to: switcher.html and solution.html then think about: virgin.html Appreciate any further definitive tech info on this one if someone comes across any. regards John Sampson |
Subject: Re: Your B737 Power
Loss Pprune Post Date: Wed, 30 Dec 1998 18:57:40 -0800 From: "Robin Rackham" <robin.rackham@virgin.net> To: "John Sampson" <sampson@iinet.net.au> Dear John: Thanks for your message. The information on the power loss came off the NTSB web page. http://www.ntsb.gov/Aviation/months.htm Thats basically all I know about the incident. When I was flying the 757 for Monarch, a crew had a similar problem, fortunately during the daytime, and landed at Lisbon on battery power. They had similar problems as the 737, particularly with the flap indications. It was due to a short on one of the busbars. Monarch had just introduced the 757, so it was all very new and not covered by the checklist. Boeing modified the QRH afterwards. Sorry but I don't know your friend Chris. Regards Robin Rackham |
Subject: Re: For INFO:- B737 -
Total Electric Power Loss on Approach Date: Sun, 27 Dec 1998 13:36:37 EST From: PAPCECST@aol.com To: sampson@iinet.net.au, jking1@mediaone.net, PEddyXX@aol.com, RCOULTHART@ninenet.com.au, avanderwal@compuserve.com, naefw@dial.eunet.ch, swissair_crm@e-mail.com, Jacques.Babin@bst-tsb.x400.gc.ca CC: omega@omegainc.com, EdwBlock@aol.com, devans@phillips.com, RWROLAND@aol.com The 737-200 model is an earlier model and was wired with BMS 13-51 wiring, which is KAPTON wire. UAL insisted that NO MORE KAPTON wire for their 737 & 757 models, and that was the reason Boeing developed TKT wiring (BMS 13-60 wire) so Boeing could sell a large production order to UAL for 737 & 757 model airplanes back in 1991. They had to have had a MAJOR electrical short (FLASHOVER). Someone has to find out the age of the airplane, total hours and cycles logged by the plane and when was the last major maintenance cycle performed on the airplane. At least ONE MAJOR circuit breaker had to have TRIPPED and possibly more. To find out: Did the F/O try to re-set any circuit breakers? A MAJOR SHORT had to have occurred in the major power buss. Inspection of the wiring would determined how much wiring was damaged. A complete check of associated wiring must be completed to prevent a FUTURE SR 111 from happening before the plane is returned to service. |