Captain Ronald J. Drez' Company H, on the 2nd Bns. southern flank, waited for the lift. Atfer 15 days of what had been, for them, a very unexciting operation, the Hotel Company Marines were anxious to return to the base. They sat eating C-rations and idling away the time until the helicopeters arrived. At 1400, Stemple radioed Drez, ordering him to prepare his company, not to return to base, but to conduct a helicopter-borne asault under the operational control of the 3rd Bn., 26th Marines. Even more startling, Drex learned that the assault lift was to begin in five minutes! Lt. Col Stemple later remembered that he selected Drez' company since it was closest to the 3rd Bn. He made the turnover just as the rest of his unit departed the area.
Drez and his company gunnery sergeant quickly put together a plan for what Drez later characterized as on of the "shortest tactical airlifts in history." The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing helicopters which lifted the still surprised Company H Marines from the eastern bank of the Suoi Co Ca set them down again less 1,000 meters away. At about the same time, helicopters also brought in Captain James F. Foster's Company A, 1st Bn., 7th Marines, which "landed in a 'hot' landing zone, dispatched the enemy" and took up positionns west of Company H.
Lt. Col. robertson's 3rd Bn., 26th Marines, now reinforced with two additional companies, lined up with five companies abreast to continue the move to Phase Line Charlie. In the meantime, Company E, BLT 2/26, which had been under the operational control of the 3rd Bn., 5th Marines reached Phase Line Charlie without incident, Company E encountered strong NVA forces in a bunker complex that the Marines called the "Northern Bunker Complex," about 1,000 meters to the north, just below the La Tho River and joined the 1st Bn., 1st Marines in blocking positions there.
On the 7th, the 3rd Bn., 26th Marines launched its assault into the northern Bunker Complex. companies I, K, and L, maintaininng their line, swung to the left like a huge door, pivoting on company H, 5th Marines and formed the battalion in a giant inverted "L." With the railroad berm on their left and a three-company blocking position on their right, Company A, 7th Marines and Drez' Company H launched a frontal attack. Soon, the Marines ran headlong into stiff enemy resistance. Company H made contact in a cemetery where North Vietnamese groops fighting from two pagodas laid down heavy fire. Much of the ground was under water, forming a quagmire through which the Marines were unable to maneuver. On the left flank, NVA uits in a fortified hamlet opened fire on Company A and casualties began to mount. Soon, 10 Mariens were dead and another 23 were wounded. Under the intense fire, the attacking companies recovered their wounded only with great difficulty. Both companies halted, dug in for the night, and called for preparation fires. After dark, volunteers moved forward to recover the dead. Captain Foster, the commander of Company A, recalled that he, six Marines, and a Navy Corpsman participated in the recovery of the dead and the wounded of his company. According to Foster, the Navy Corpsman continued treating casualties although wounded himself and was among the last to be evacuated.
Having had a taste of the enemy's tenacious defense, the Marines prepared themselves for the coming battle. Capt. Drez remembered that:
We dug in and prepared for what we knnew would be a real hard push the next day.
The enemy had shown themselves to be there in force, and they also showed that they
were not going to give up easy. The word came down from battalion that we could
expect...the 3rd Bn., 36th NVA Regt. to die fighting. They had shown no
inclination to surrender or to become Hoi Chans (ralliers). They were good,
hard North Vietnamese Army troops.
At 1120 on the 8th, the 3rd Bn., 26th Marines attacked to the north with five companies abreast. The 2nd Troop 4th ARVN Cavalry, which had arrived the previus evening, consisting of 12 armored personnel carriers (APC's) , reinforced the Marine assault. In their path, the Marines reported 79 dead North Vietnamese near the site of the previous day's battle. When Company H reached a rice paddy a few hundred meters from their starting point, Communist troops hidden in a treeline suddenly opened fire, trapping Marines in the paddy. For 30 minutes, the Marines returned fire individually, then began moving in small groups towerd a large bunker which appeared to be the linchpin of the Communist defenses. Just beyond the bunker and treeline, they could see the Song La Tho, on the other side of which the 1st Bn., 1st Marines remained in its blocking position.
The Marines requested air support. Because of the proximity of the 1st Bn., 1st Marines, the aircraft had difficulty attacking targets without endangering friendly troops. In one instance, a napalm bomb impacted directly on Company H, but miraculously bounced safely away before detonating. Capt. George B. Meegan, the commander of Company L, 26th Marines in another sector, recalled that a "napalm strike landed" by his 1st platoon and that several Marines sustained minor burns." Neither the airstrikes nor mortar and 3.5 inch rocket fire overcame the enemy resistance.
When supporting srms failed to silence the enemy in the bunker facing him, Capt. Drez requested Lt. Col. Robertson to provide him with some of the ARVN APC's. The APCs arrived, armed with recoilless rifles, and halted in the rice paddy. According to Drez, however, the ARVN refused to help. Instead, Drez had his attached combat engineer, PFC Michael A. Emmons, jerryrig a satchel charge consisting of C-4, hand grenades, two 3.5-inch rockest, and a five second fuse. With the assistance of another Marine, they carried the satchel charge to the top of the bunker where Drez lit the fuse and Emmons flipped the charge through an embrasure. When the others ran, Emmons momentarily remained atop the bunker. The explosion tossed him into the air, but he landed unhurt.