ANSTO’s reactor Draft EIS (1998, p.3-14) refers to the 1992 Australian Science Technology and Engineering Council (ASTEC) report on major national research facilities in support of the new reactor proposal. DISR and Hughes MP Danna Vale have done likewise. However the 1992 ASTEC Review was a preliminary sifting of almost a hundred proposals for science funding; it was anything but a searching analysis of the cases for and against a new reactor. This can easily be confirmed by consulting the flimsy ASTEC report.

The ASTEC report itself says (p.xiii), in bold type: "It must be emphasised that, while the present study has identified a number of timely proposals for major national research facilities, ASTEC has not employed peer review, on-site visits or other steps necessary for a full evaluation of proposals. It will be essential for this to be carried out rigorously before final decisions are taken about which facilities should be given the highest priority for funding."

Prof. Anne Henderson-Sellers, an ASTEC member (and now an ANSTO division manager), expressed serious doubts about the medical, scientific and commercial reasons for a reactor in the 1993 Research Reactor Review (RRR) report. Henderson-Sellers was one of three members of the RRR panel,

During the 1993 RRR, ASTEC said a decision on a new reactor ".... must not be based solely on the needs of scientific research and industrial production. It must also take account of a number of social, political and cost factors. .... The detailed, rigorous evaluation advocated by ASTEC has yet to be made - ASTEC sees this as the responsibility of the Research Reactor Review."

If built the reactor will be the single biggest investment in a science facility in Australia's history, yet the Government did not consult its science advisory bodies - the Office of the Chief Scientist, ASTEC, or the CSIRO - before the 1997 decision to build a new reactor. The CSIRO said in its 1993 submission to the Research Reactor Review that "more productive research could be funded for the cost of a new reactor".

ANSTO/DIST (submission to Senate Economics References Committee, May 1998, pp.497-498) state that the 1993 Research Reactor Review (RRR) "identified the necessity for a replacement research reactor." That is a lie.

In a letter to me (12 August, 1996), then science minister Peter McGauran said: "Although the Research Reactor Review recommended that a decision on a new reactor be made 'in about five years time', it did not recommend that a new inquiry be undertaken." That is false. The 1993 Research Reactor Review (p.4) specifically said that "if, at some later stage, a new reactor is envisaged, it should be assessed by a new panel possibly operating within the Environmental Protection Act 1974". The RRR clearly had in mind a public inquiry, conducted by a panel such as that which conducted the RRR, not a sham Environmental Impact Assessment which was conducted not by "a new panel" but by ANSTO itself.

The RRR said (p.xv):

If, at the end of a further period of about five years,
- a high level waste repository site has been firmly identified and work started on proving its suitability
- there is no evidence that spallation technology can economically offer as much or more than a new reactor
- there has been no practical initiation of a cyclotron anywhere worldwide to produce technetium-99m
- there is good evidence of strong and diverse applications of neutron scattering capability in Australian science, including many young scientists, and a complex of industrial uses
- the national interest remains a high priority

it would be appropriate to make a positive decision on a new reactor. The most suitable site would need to be identified.

If any one of these onerous requirements is not met, either a negative decision, or a decision to delay further, would be indicated.

WASTE

Clearly this condition has not been met.

The RRR also said (p.xiv): "A crucial issue is final disposal of high-level wastes, which depends upon identification of a site and investigation of its characteristics. A solution to this problem is essential and necessary well prior to any future decision about a new reactor. ...... It would be utterly wrong to decide on a new reactor before progress is made on identification of a high level waste repository site."

The federal government’s plan for a shallow dump for low-level waste is by no means a fait accompli.

The plan for a "co-located" store for intermediate-level waste in SA is dead in the water given the extent of public and political opposition.

It is far from certain that overseas spent fuel reprocessing options will be available over the coming decades.

The Department of Primary Industry and Energy said in 1998 that long-lived intermediate-level waste is destined for disposal in a deep geological repository. No progress whatsoever has been made with respect to ultimate disposal.

Dr Peter Pockley, writing in the August 2000 edition of Australasian Science (pp.19-20) says: "The big question over waste is whether the government will pay any regard to the findings of the RRR, which stipulated that a new reactor should not proceed until firm arrangements are in place for storage of the waste from spent fuel of both existing and future reactors and their radioactive products. The government and ANSTO have moved from their commitment to this prerequisite. Last month Garnett said that while a plan for safe storage ‘needs to be done, the reactor should not be contingent on that.’"

The government and ANSTO intend to ignore the RRR recommendations, and to side-step or completely ignore the relevant reactor EIS conditions which Senators Minchin and Hill agreed to in 1999.

SPALLATION TECHNOLOGY

Spallation technology continues to advance, as discussed for example by ANSTO’s John Boldeman 1995, "Accelerator Reactor Hybrid Systems", Proceedings of the 1995 Conference on "Nuclear Science and Engineering in Australia, 1995", Lucas Heights, 30-31 October.

See also the articles, written submissions and transcripts of public hearings from Professor Barry Allen, former ANSTO Chief Scientist. Allen says a mid-power spallation source would be a valuable research tool and would cost about the same as a new reactor. It is an option worthy of serious, independent investigation.

It is interesting to note that the US Department of Energy abandoned plans for a high-power research reactor several years ago and decided instead to invest in a high-power spallation source.

I have dealt with spallation technology in detail in previous reports, e.g. submission on ANSTO’s Draft EIS, submission to 1997-99 Senate Economics References Committee inquiry. This material is available on request.

NEUTRON SCIENCE

This has been addressed in detail previously, e.g. my submission on ANSTO’s EIS, submission to 1997-99 Senate Economics References Committee inquiry. This material is available on request.

In a nutshell, a reactor is not the only neutron option (spallation technology being an alternative, also suitcase science), and in any case the value of neutron science has been overstated by ANSTO, DISR etc. and the opportunity costs in other areas of science completely ignored.

In relation to the question posed by the Terms of Reference, whether the science at ANSTO is of sufficient distinction and importance to Australia to warrant a new reactor, the RRR said (ch.6): "The Review is not convinced that that is the case - at least not yet. ...... Nobody advanced the view that Australian scientists working at HIFAR are at the cutting edge of science. .... a picture of a vibrant field of science, energised by young people excited by the challenges and opportunities, did not emerge. ...... The Review was not even convinced that (reactor-based) science has been a major focus of ANSTO activity. The full flowering of recent vigour might not be evident yet in publications, but at present the case for a new reactor on science grounds cannot be sustained, however compelling the need for such science."

CYCLOTRON PRODUCTION OF TECHNETIUM-99m

The relevant RRR condition is that " there has been no practical initiation of a cyclotron anywhere worldwide to produce technetium-99m". This condition was inappropriately worded. The substantive issue is not whether non-reactor methods of Tc-99m production are immediately available, but whether a reliable supply can be obtained by whatever means.

For Tc-99m (half life 6 hours) and its parent molybdenum-99 (half life 66 hours), the immediate option is importation of bulk Mo-99 with Mo/Tc generator manufacture at Lucas Heights. This is a tried and proven strategy, e.g. during the reactor shutdown from February to May 2000.

In the longer term (with timing depending entirely on the availability of R&D funding), non-reactor options for Mo-99/Tc-99m production include:
- electron accelerator, Mo-100 target, separation of Tc-99m (Bennett et al., Idaho N.E.E.L.)
- cyclotron, Mo-100 target, separation of Tc-99m (Lagunas-Solar et al., University of California)
- hybrid cyclotron/spallation system, uranium target, Mo-99 production (Myrrha-Adonis, SCK-CEN, Belgium).

"NATIONAL INTEREST"

The most detailed case for a reactor on "national interest" grounds is the 7-page unreferenced paper by ASO/DFAT.

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and Australian Safeguards Office, 1998, Submission to Senate Economics References Committee, Inquiry into Lucas Heights Nuclear Reactor.

For a detailed, referenced critique of the "national interest" arguments, see the paper by Jean McSorley, submitted to the 1997-99 Senate Economics References Committee inquiry, available at <http://www.sea-us.org.au/no2reactor/nationalinterest.html>

ANSTO’s reactor Draft EIS (1998, p.3-16) attempts to justify the reactor proposal with reference to the 1994 Bain-Batelle report. The Draft EIS fails to note that this report was commissioned by ANSTO and thus its independence is open to debate. Moreover the report's treatment of substantive issues such as waste management is cursory; this can easily be proved by consulting the report.

"If it is normal for the proponent to tell the truth, but not necessarily the whole truth, then ANSTO's presentation is normal. Sometimes the difference between the truth and the whole truth is quite remarkable." --Tony Wood, Former Head, Engineering and Reactors, ANSTO, 1998, EIS submission.

A substantive critique of the Final EIS was prepared by the Sutherland Shire Council. I can also supply a substantive critique of the Draft EIS and Final EIS on request. The following comments address process issues only.

The Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) was an expensive bureaucratic whitewash. The fact that ANSTO prepared the EIS is completely unacceptable given its vested interest in a new reactor and ANSTO's demonstrated track record of secrecy and dishonesty. That this was within the parameters of the EPIP legislation does not make it any less farcical.

The Sutherland Shire Council (submission to 1997-99 Senate Economics References Committee) called on the Federal Government to put in place an environmental auditor to oversee the reactor EIS process. That call went unanswered.

ANSTO had millions of dollars of tax-payers' money to prepare the EIS whereas local residents and other opponents of the reactor plan had no funding whatsoever.

ANSTO hired PPK Environment and Infrastructure to help prepare the EIS. PPK was heavily criticised by an independent auditor during the Holsworthy airport EIS. The PPK project team has no expertise in nuclear sciences. PPK's "information stalls" were high farce: PPK distributed information on the EIA/EIS process but hardly any information on the reactor proposal per se.

PPK refused to organise a public meeting at which both proponents and opponents would speak.

PPK refused to publicly release research documents being produced by ANSTO and NNC (the sub-contractor) during the preparation of the Draft EIS.

I asked ANSTO to send answers to a list of questions reasonably quickly so that I could incorporate the answers into my submission on the Draft EIS. ANSTO failed to provide the requested information.

From late 1997 to mid-1998, I sent dozens of questions to ANSTO. The only reply I received was from ANSTO’s Communications Manager, John Mulcair, who provided no answers to my questions but said that answers would be provided in the EIS. Most of the questions were not addressed at all in the Draft EIS or the Final EIS.

ANSTO manipulates its corporate image with the selective release of information and misinformation. Only the federal government has the power to immediately redress this situation yet the government itself has been secretive and dishonest, with government MPs repeatedly parroting ANSTO’s lies. (See my submission to the Senate Economics References Committee, "Misinformation on the Replacement  of the Lucas Heights Nuclear Reactor").

Dr. Furzer’s (Sydney University) submission on the Draft EIS notes that he twice asked ANSTO to supply four papers listed in the Draft EIS. The papers were not supplied and Dr. Furzer said his submission was "limited in scope" because of ANSTO’s failure to supply information.

Another submission to the Draft EIS noted that a request to ANSTO for a tape of a radio debate featuring Helen Garnett was not met in time for it to be of use in making a submission on the Draft EIS. ANSTO was in possession of the relevant tape.

Any number of other specific examples could be provided to illustrate problems experienced by the public during the EIS process.

The fact that there was no opportunity for public comments to be made on the Final EIS was unacceptable.

The government’s Public Relations strategy in relation to the proposed new reactor was explained by a senior government bureaucrat, based in Canberra, on Radio National's "Background Briefing" program (March 29, 1998, <www.abc.net.au/rn/talks/bbing/bb980329.htm>): "The government decided to starve the opponents of oxygen, so that they could dictate the manner of the debate that would follow the announcement. Because they couldn't win it on rational grounds ... they decided, right, we'll play the game and in the lead up to the announcement catch them totally unawares, catch them completely off-guard and starve them of oxygen until then."

A Department of Industry, Science and Tourism (DIST) briefing paper, dated April 1998, obtained by Sutherland Shire Council under Freedom of Information legislation, says: "There is "no point in consulting with potential/hypothetical recipients of a new reactor. It was discovered through the course of inquiry into the new airport that such a course of action serves only to inflame the communities for no good reason."

The government has ignored the recommendation of the Senate Economics References Committee (1999) for a public inquiry into the reactor proposal.

The Committee’s majority report said the decision to build a new reactor was "premature and open to ongoing controversy" because of the failure to carry out a public inquiry into the proposal, to properly investigate alternative sites, to take into account community views, and to resolve radioactive waste management issues.

The majority report also said that the decision "relied largely on the vested interests of the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) and those involved in, and dependent on, the nuclear industry."

The majority report argued that no reactor should be constructed "until a permanent site for disposal of the Lucas Heights nuclear waste is determined."

The majority report recommended the establishment of a public inquiry "similar to the 1993 Research Reactor Review".

The federal Department of the Environment and Heritage (1999, p.42), in its assessment of ANSTO's EIS, said, "The Department accepts that a formal cost-benefit analysis for the proposal is not appropriate, in view of the comprehensive analysis by the Research Reactor Review (RRR)."

The Department (1999, p.34) also said that the "The RRR undertook a comprehensive examination of costs and benefits of a new reactor."

However, the RRR (1993) said that "a complete cost-benefit analysis of the case for a new reactor could not be done because of the inescapable arbitrariness of the financial values put on the national interest and benefits from science aspects."

Senator Minchin describes the Public Works Committee as an "independent public inquiry". In fact, the Public Works Committee process was a rubber stamp and a complete waste of time. This can easily be confirmed by consulting the Committee’s report, which merely parrots ANSTO information/misinformation ad nauseum.

A federal senate committee slammed the proposal in a report released on May 23, 2001. The majority report of thecommittee is a joint production of the Labor Party and the Democrats. The Democrats also wrote a minority report, taking a more critical line on the reactor project than the Labor Party, and a minority report from Liberal and National Party senators restates the government's support for a new reactor.

On the alleged need for a research reactor in Australia, the committee concluded that "... no conclusive or compelling case has been established to support the proposed new reactor and ... the proposed new reactor should not proceed."

The committee found that "the decision to build a new reactor was taken without a detailed investigation of Australia's present and future scientific and medical needs". It was not convinced that logistical difficulties constitute a serious obstacle to the importation of radioisotopes, and also noted the expanding medical and scientific applications of alternative technologies such as cyclotrons.

On the foreign policy agenda driving the Coalition government's plan for a new reactor, the committee found that "... the justification for the new research reactor solely on national interest grounds is not strong where national interest is defined on purely 'security' and non-proliferation grounds." The committee said the government's argument that a new reactor is required to facilitate nuclear disarmament and the implementation of nuclear safeguards is "tenuous".

The committee went on to say, "The argument for the new research reactor on national interest grounds is more convincing when all areas of nuclear technology are considered, including its role in the region as an educational, research and training centre. The Committee believes, however, that this reason alone is not sufficient to justify the new research reactor. If the reactor is to go ahead, then the main considerations in establishing the need for a reactor must be its place as a research tool providing a neutron source for Australian researchers and products for industry, the health care system and the potential impacts on the environment."

The committee recommended that before the government proceeds any further with the project it should establish an independent public inquiry into the alleged need for a new nuclear reactor and related issues such as funding for both medical and scientific research in Australia. The government rejected that recommendation on the same day the senate report was released.

The senate committee was particularly critical of the Coalition government and the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) for their secrecy. It said, "The Committee is highly critical of ANSTO's attitude which seeks to make a parliamentary committee subordinate to the whims of a government agency and prevents that committee from exercising its responsibility to scrutinise the executive. The Committee therefore appreciates the frustration experienced by the Sutherland Shire Council and members of the public who have experienced a similar attitude."

The report also states, "The Committee is highly critical of ANSTO's approach to providing documents. Its attitude seems to stem from a culture of secrecy so embedded that it has lost sight of its responsibility to be accountable to the Parliament."

Even Liberal and National Party senators conceded that point, accepting "... that ANSTO could have been more helpful in providing certain less commercially sensitive information to the Committee and could have been more willing to seek a compromise when sensitive material was involved."

The committee recommended that Senator Nick Minchin, the minister for industry, science and resources, should be censured for his refusal to comply with an order of the senate to table various documents relating to project including the reactor contract between ANSTO and the Argentinean company Invap, and the spent fuel reprocessing contract between ANSTO and the French company Cogema.

The committee recommended that the Australian National Audit Office "consider examining the tender and contract documents for the new reactor" with a view to determining whether documents sought by the committee and the senate should be made public; whether the cost estimate for the reactor is accurate; and whether, during the tendering process, ANSTO ensured that there was adequate and appropriate independent verification and validation of the tenderers' claims.

The committee also expressed numerous concerns about the failure of ANSTO and the federal government to put in place plans to manage radioactive wastes arising from the existing HIFAR reactor or the planned new reactor.

Longer summary of the Senate report at <http://www.geocities.com/jimgreen3/senate3.html>

The senate report can be downloaded at <http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/lucasheights_ctte>.

The head of the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency (ARPANSA), John Loy, approved construction of a new 20-megawatt nuclear reactor in the Sydney suburb of Lucas Heights on April 5, 2002.

The approval came as no surprise - so much so that the Associated Press and The Australian reported it before it had even taken place. ARPANSA describes itself as the 'independent regulator' and the 'nuclear watchdog',  but it's a puppet regulator, more poodle than watchdog. The head of the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) sat on the panel which recommended Loy's appointment to the health minister. Moreover, ARPANSA and ANSTO are linked by a revolving door - six ex-ANSTO employees now work for ARPANSA.

The announcement was accompanied with the usual propaganda about the 'need' for a reactor to produce medical isotopes. "The government had a clear choice", said science minister Peter McGauran, "do we save lives or pander to extremists?" No mention of the fact that few if any doctors noticed the three-month closure of the existing reactor from February to May 2000.

ARPANSA has back-tracked from previous 'commitments' that a licence to construct a reactor would not be issued unless ANSTO demonstrated progress on radioactive waste management. For example, Loy said in June 2000 that before issuing a licence, "there would need to be progress on the strategy to establish a store for intermediate level waste, including for the waste arising from the reprocessing of spent fuel".

All the 'progress' on storage of intermediate level waste has been in the wrong direction. The federal government has given up on its previous plan to store the waste in South Australia because of overwhelming public opposition and state legislation prohibiting such a store. With no other options available, the federal government has gone back to the drawing board with the establishment of an 'advisory panel' to suggest siting options later this year.

In a statement which purports to justify the issuing of a reactor construction licence, Loy notes his previous 'commitment' not to issue a licence unless progress had been made on intermediate level waste storage, he notes the abandonment of plans to store the waste in SA, and then he moves on to the next topic as if there was no contradiction to be explained. (ANSTO discusses storage of intermediate level waste in such a way as to imply that a store actually exists, while McGauran asserted on April 5 that plans for a store are “well advanced”.)

Loy says in his latest statement that a licence to operate the reactor (in or about 2005) will not be issued unless 'significant progress' is made on waste management plans, but this may prove to be as hollow as his previous commitments.

Plans for a national low level waste dump in SA also face fierce opposition, with 86-93% of South Australians opposed to the planned dump and the incoming state Labor government also opposed. The federal government will release an environmental impact statement justifying the planned dump in the near future.

Perhaps the greatest uncertainty now facing the reactor project concerns the Argentinian company Invap, which won the contract to build the new reactor. Invap is in a perilous financial situation and recently had to apply for a $10.5 million loan from the Argentinian government. Invap is also facing legal action over the constitutionality of the reactor contract, which contains a provision for conditioning of spent fuel from the Lucas Heights reactor in Argentina as a fall-back option if reprocessing contracts with the French agency Cogema fall through. This provision appears to breach Argentina's constitution, which explicitly prohibits importation of radioactive waste. ANSTO and Invap make the unlikely claim that spent reactor fuel is not radioactive waste and thus the constitutional prohibition does not apply.

What is required is a fully fleshed-out, fully-costed set of alternative programs to meet the objectives associated with the reactor. This will include a fully fleshed-out, fully-costed set of alternative programs and technologies for Lucas Heights.

The study should encompass:
- future supply of medical radioisotopes, greater reliance on imported radioisotopes and/or accelerators and/or spallation sources and/or non-isotope-based medical procedures;
- further development of scientific research infrastructure, e.g. accelerators, spallation sources, various other possibilities) and greater funding for suitcase science; and
- national interest issues, e.g. greater funding for suitcase science to maintain reactor expertise; further development of non-reactor-dependent safeguards initiatives (ANTARES for isotopic fingerprinting, diplomatic initiatives, etc.).

The case for a Royal Commission, prepared by the Nuclear Reactor Taskforce of the Sutherland Shire Council, can be found at <http://www.geocities.com/jimgreen3/royal.html>